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Exploring the Variety of Random
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both, or by all the governments interested, in which event he,
Chatfield, was authorized to use his good offices. But he was at the
same time directed to add that Great Britain was not disposed to
enter into any engagement binding her to employ armed forces in
Central America. This course was not pleasing to Pavon, but fully
satisfied the executive of Nicaragua. Chatfield's mediation was never
called for.

Buitrago, director of the state of Nicaragua, was drawn by the

force of public opinion to give his assent to the state taking part in a
convention intended to reorganize the republic of Central America.[X-
2] The Nicaraguan delegates used their best endeavors for the
accomplishment of their mission; but from the beginning they found
their efforts hindered by the machiavelism of the aristocrats of
Guatemala, and in disgust left the convention after filing a protest.[X-
3] They returned to it afterward, however, and on the 11th of April,
1842, the convention made a declaration in seven articles
establishing a 'gobierno nacional provisorio,' having at its head a
'supremo delegado,' with a council composed of one representative
chosen by each of the respective state assemblies.[X-4] Antonio José
Cañas was appointed supremo delegado. But this great effort on the
part of the men imbued with a truly patriotic spirit came to naught,
because the assembly of Guatemala indignantly rejected the
compact of Chinandega, and Ferrera of Honduras acted in bad faith.
Costa Rica accepted it with certain restrictions.[X-5]

A second effort was made on the 27th of July at Chinandega by

the delegates of Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, who passed an
act to form a league under the name of Confederacion Centro
Americana.[X-6] Sixteen of the articles in the constitution conformed
with the instructions given by the aristocrats of Guatemala through
the state assembly to the commissioners despatched to the villa de
Santa Rosa on the 28th of September, 1839; and yet, after their
adoption by the convention of Chinandega, these same persons
made opposition to them. The fact was, that they had been all along
using deception, appointing commissioners to several diets, but
never intending that a reorganization of Central American nationality
should be arrived at.[X-7]

Guatemala accredited a legation at Leon,

PACTO DE
CHINANDEGA.
Gerónimo Carcache being the envoy. He tried to
exculpate his government for its opposition to the
compact of Chinandega, asserting at the same time its firm resolve
to uphold the treaty concluded in October 1842, by Pavon, Arriaga,
and Duran, and accepted by Costa Rica in May 1843.[X-8] This
opposition, notwithstanding the organization of the executive and
council, under the compact of Chinandega, was effected at San
Vicente, in Salvador, on the 29th of March, 1844; Fruto Chamorro,
delegate from Nicaragua, being chosen supremo delegado, Juan
Lindo, delegate from Honduras, president of the council, and Justo
Herrera, ex-jefe of the same state, secretary of that body. The
installation of the confederate government was at once
communicated to the several states.

Honduras, on the 27th of April, recognized and accepted what

had been done at San Vicente. Salvador and Nicaragua expressed
much satisfaction. The reactionary government of Guatemala kept
silent, and on being pressed for an answer, returned a cold and
laconic one, to the effect that the matter would be laid before the
legislative body; that is to say, the assembly which, on the 17th of
April, 1839, had declared the Central American confederation
dissolved.[X-9] It could not be expected that such an assembly would
give its assent. The committee to which the subject was referred
made an unfavorable report, which the assembly accepted. Costa
Rica suggested amendments to the 'pacto de Chinandega.'[X-10] This
document never had any practical value, for the governments which
were parties thereto took no account of the duties it imposed on
them. It will be seen that the executive of Honduras was its covert
enemy, and that the government of Salvador openly infringed a
number of its clauses.

Malespin, president of Salvador, was arranging

MALESPIN AND
ARCE.
affairs for a change in favor of a theocratic régime
to please Viteri, bishop of San Salvador, when
news came that the state had been invaded at Atiquizaya by Manuel
José Arce. The ex-president had with him troops of Guatemala, and
a supply of arms and ammunition to put in the hands of Malespin's
enemies. The question will be asked, Why did the aristocrats of
Guatemala cause the invasion of Salvador, her executive being their
agent Malespin, who was, moreover, under the control of Bishop
Viteri? This is easily explained. Malespin was, in the eyes of the
aristocrats, another Carrera, disposed at times to slip out of their
hands. It was, therefore, important to have him superseded by Arce,
when affairs in the state would go on smoothly and to their
satisfaction. In Arce ruling over Salvador, they would have, besides,
a support against Carrera.[X-11] But the people of Salvador, albeit
much dissatisfied with Malespin and Viteri, were decidedly opposed
to Arce with aristocratic surroundings. His invasion of the state only
served to strengthen Malespin's power for a time. The president set
the whole state in motion to meet the emergency. He did even
more: he asked for the assistance of the supremo delegado of the
confederacy, which was promised him. Each state was to furnish
1,000 men; but meanwhile Salvador was to place 2,000 men at the
disposal of the confederate executive.[X-12] The general government
agreed to use its utmost endeavors to avert the subjugation of
Salvador by Guatemala. Malespin was enjoined, on his part, to
confine his military operations within the territory of his own state.
He easily got together in a few days at San Salvador 4,000 men,
with which force he marched to the front. One portion of the
vanguard, under Lieutenant-colonel Pedro Escalon, on the 5th of
May, reached the Chingo Valley in pursuit of Arce, Aquilino San
Martin, and Guillermo Quintanilla, who fled to their headquarters at
Coatepeque. They were attacked there, and took to flight a second
time, leaving a large quantity of arms and ammunition. Another
portion of the vanguard occupied Chalchuapa, placing a force and
the artillery at Santa Ana.[X-13]

Guatemala and Salvador.

Malespin, in disregard of the command he had received from the

supremo delegado, marched triumphantly to Jutiapa, in Guatemala;
in consequence of which, the government of Rivera Paz assumed
that Guatemala was in a state of war, her territory having been
invaded; and Carrera was called upon to use her forces against the
invaders. A forced loan was decreed, and a change took place in the
cabinet, Manuel F. Pavon assuming the portfolios of relations,
government, and war.[X-14] Pavon was certainly the man for the
occasion.[X-15] He returned an answer to a note from the minister of
the supremo delegado, which Milla, his biographer, has pronounced
an able and conclusive one. But it was in reality a mass of abuse
against Salvador and Malespin. He did not attempt to show that
Arce's invasion was not the act of the Guatemalan government, as
he should have done; but claimed that the war against Malespin was
not a consequence of Arce's act, but of the malice of the
Salvadoreños.[X-16]

The bad climate of Jutiapa soon began to

TREATY BETWEEN
HONDURAS AND
decimate the Salvador army, reducing it to about
SALVADOR. 3,000 men. Moreover, the government of Salvador,
then in charge of Vice-president Guzman, could
not easily procure means for the support of such a force. It was
quite evident that the time for upsetting Carrera had not yet come;
and Malespin's defeat would only bring greater outrages upon the
people. Patience was necessary under the circumstances. It was
consequently decided to abandon Jutiapa and recross the rio de la
Paz, which was effected on the 17th of June.[X-17] The assembly
empowered the government to negotiate for peace, and a
convention was entered into at the hacienda de Quezada on the 5th
of August, 1844,[X-18] under which friendly relations were restored,
and Guatemala promised to accredit a commissioner near the
confederate government.[X-19] This convention was, however,
annulled by the Guatemalan commissioners, because the supremo
delegado had refused to ratify it.[X-20] But the government of
Guatemala determined that it should be held valid by Malespin's
accepting it as law for the Salvadoreños. Bishop Viteri undertook to
accomplish this, and succeeded.[X-21] Malespin gave his assent to
the convention being ratified by the supremo delegado, and made a
declaration of peaceful intentions toward Guatemala.[X-22] He refers
to the liberals residing at Leon, who had been driven from Honduras
by Ferrera, and from Salvador by himself; and he accuses them of
being the cause of much trouble, for which they should be
discountenanced by honorable men. The pacto de Chinandega, as
we have seen, had become a dead letter. Honduras and Salvador
entered, on the 10th of July, 1844, at San Salvador, into a treaty,
which was ratified by both governments.[X-23]

Chamorro's government was notified by Ferrera that auxiliary

forces from Nicaragua would no longer be allowed to traverse
Honduran territory.[X-24] Chamorro's minister, M. Aguilar,
remonstrated against a measure which would prevent the arrival of
friendly troops to defend the confederacy, whereof Honduras was a
component part.[X-25] Chamorro, using his lawful authority, ordered
J. Trinidad Muñoz, who commanded the Honduras force of
operations, not to obstruct the passage of the Nicaraguan troops.
Muñoz disobeyed the order; and upon the Nicaraguans arriving at
Choluteca, on the 17th of August, he required them to leave the
territory of Honduras forthwith; which not being done, he assailed
and conquered them on the 19th, after a three hours' fight.[X-26]
This action had a great influence on the fate of Central America; for
it satisfied the aristocrats of Guatemala that the supremo delegado
had no means for enforcing his authority or for carrying out his
plans. It was virtually a declaration of war between Honduras and
Nicaragua. Malespin was likewise emboldened by it to assail
Nicaragua. The latter must then move with the utmost activity
against Ferrera, before Malespin, now at peace with Guatemala,
could come to his aid. But difficulties that could not be overcome
were in the way; and it was only on the 23d of October that
upwards of 1,000 Nicaraguans appeared before Nacaome, which
they assaulted the next day, and after two hours of hard fighting,
were repulsed.[X-27]

Trinidad Cabañas and Gerardo Barrios, two of

WAR ON
NICARAGUA.
Morazan's officers, made, on the 5th of
September, 1844, an attempt at San Miguel to
overthrow Malespin without bloodshed; but having failed, they went
off to Nicaragua by way of La Union. Malespin's minister, José
Antonio Jimenez, then demanded of the Nicaraguan government
that Cabañas and Barrios should be either expelled or surrendered
to Salvador for punishment. The demand was rejected. The two
officers were by no means discouraged. They persevered in their
efforts, which, more than anything else, finally brought about the
tyrant's overthrow. By virtue of a special decree, Malespin took, on
the 25th of October, personal command of the state forces, placing
the executive office in charge of the vice-president, Joaquin Eufracio
Guzman, who on the same day entered upon the discharge of his
duties, giving Malespin unlimited powers for the defence of the
state. Such authorization did not justify Malespin's carrying the war
into Nicaragua.[X-28] This state, after the defeat of its troops at
Nacaome, had removed them from Honduran territory, and sued for
peace. And yet Malespin, in violation of the laws of Salvador, made
preparations for an offensive war against Nicaragua.

It will be well, before relating the events of this campaign, to

cast an eye upon the present lamentable condition of the four states
thus bent upon each other's destruction. Guatemala was ruled by
the aristocrats with a rod of iron. Her financial affairs were
completely disorganized. In Salvador Malespin had no other rule of
conduct than his own will and Bishop Viteri's evil counsels. He
believed himself surrounded by enemies, and indeed he was.[X-29]
Honduras was in a disturbed state, and the victim of Ferrera's
despotism. Nicaragua was in anything but a satisfactory situation.
The men who with their superior talents, statesmanship, and
influence might have carried the ship of state safely through the
coming storm, Francisco Castellon and Máximo Jerez, were in
Europe working to undo the evils wrought against Central America
by Pavon and Chatfield. The director of the state, Manuel Perez,[X-
30] lacked the prestige that the occasion required. Casto Fonseca,
the commander of the forces, had been given the rank of 'gran
mariscal.'[X-31]

The pacto de Chinandega had ceased to exist. Owing to hostile

acts of Malespin, Chamorro had to seek safety in flight. Ferrera
treated Chamorro with contumely, and shamefully abused him in a
report to the chambers of Honduras, in January 1846.[X-32] Malespin
and his army against Nicaragua entered Honduras, and at Nacaome
made an address to the president and army of Honduras.[X-33] The
two allied presidents had a conference at Sauce on the 7th of
November, and agreed that Malespin should be recognized as the
general-in-chief of their forces. At Choluteca proposals for peace
came from Leon; and on the 21st of the same month the treaty of
Zatoca[X-34] was concluded, which was disgraceful to the Nicaraguan
negotiators.[X-35] A secret clause was also agreed to, binding
Nicaragua, among other things, to retire her troops from Chinandega
to Chichigalpa. But the authorities and people of Leon preferred
death with honor to submission to such degrading demands. The
treaty and secret clause were indignantly rejected. Perez, the
director, surrendered the executive office to Senator Emiliano
Madrid.
 In the night of November 21st the allied forces
ATTACK ON LEON.
encamped in the barranca de San Antonio.[X-36]
On the 26th, at 8 in the evening, they were in front of Leon, and
threw bombs into the city. The next morning at 3 o'clock Malespin,
being drunk, ordered an assault, which resulted disastrously for the
invaders; for at sunrise he found his camp strewn with corpses.[X-37]
The attack was, however, continued that day till 4 o'clock in the
afternoon, when the allies found themselves short of ammunition,
and with many of their chief officers killed or wounded. Discord now
broke out among them, and the Hondurans wanted to abandon the
campaign; but J. Trinidad Muñoz, acting for Malespin, quieted them,
and the struggle went on. That night Muñoz erected intrenchments,
and at break of day on the 28th the allies were in condition to act
vigorously.[X-38]

Commissioners came out to the allied headquarters, and on the

1st of December a treaty was negotiated,[X-39] to which no
ratification was given in the city, and the war continued. Meanwhile
there was much agitation in Salvador, with occasional revolutionary
attempts, which becoming known at Leon, emboldened the
authorities and citizens to keep up the fight, notwithstanding the
other departments had turned against them.[X-40]
 South-western Nicaragua.

José Francisco Montenegro and Juan Ruiz were the

commissioners of Rivas and Granada, near Malespin. Their mission
brought about the creation of a new government, which had no
recognition in Leon. Senator Silvestre Selva lent himself to be made
by Malespin and his allies director supremo of Nicaragua, under the
stipulation of ratifying the convention of December 1st, adding the
name of Pio Castellon to the list of the proscribed.[X-41]

Several partial actions took place in other

SIEGE OF LEON.
parts of the department of Leon, which turned out
favorably for the invaders.[X-42] But Malespin was furious at his
failure thus far to capture Leon. The firing of his guns was incessant.
He made a final effort, throwing himself at the head of a force upon
the works of Sutiaba, which were in charge of Gerardo Barrios; and
after some hours' hard fighting was repulsed, leaving the field
covered with his killed and wounded. But there was no unity of
action in the city at this time. Some officers believed that Casto
Fonseca, though brave, was not competent to make a proper
defence; and one of them, named José M. Valle, alias El Chelon,
suggested that he should turn over the command to Cabañas.
Fonseca looked upon the suggestion as an insult, and in
consequence Valle retired, and Cabañas became an object of
suspicion to Fonseca. The siege with its horrors continued. The fatal
spirit of localism that maintained discord between the several towns,
specially between Granada and Leon, was now as ever, and till the
transfer of the capital from Leon to Managua, a great misfortune for
the whole country. The besiegers made the most of it.[X-43]

A vessel arrived at this time at Realejo with arms for the

besieged, of which Malespin got information from the Englishman
Manning, and through Selva's agent he obtained possession of 1,000
muskets, 200 rifles, 200 barrels of powder, 200 quintals of lead, and
12,000 flints. With this supply the operations against Leon were
pushed with still greater vigor, and the city succumbed to an assault
by Guardiola on the 24th of January, 1845. Malespin now gave full
sway to his bloody instincts, by shooting a number of prominent
citizens and surrendering the town to the soldiery for plunder.[X-44]
The outrages committed defy description.[X-45]

INDEPENDENCE OF
SALVADOR.
While Malespin was engaged in the Nicaragua
campaign, the state of Salvador was preparing to
throw off the yoke, and his brother Calixto was issuing arbitrary
orders without the knowledge or assent of Vice-president Guzman.
At last, at midnight between the 30th and 31st of December, 1844,
the garrison at San Salvador was surprised by a party of armed men
from the Calvario, and captured, together with the arms in the
barracks.[X-46] After that the revolt went on gaining large
proportions; but the rebels were defeated in the plain of Jucuapa,
Cojutepeque, on the 4th of January, 1845.

The liberal chiefs Cabañas and Barrios, who escaped from

Nicaragua, reached La Union. Barrios,[X-47] with the view of rousing
the Salvadorans, spread the report that Malespin had succumbed at
Leon. Cabañas, a truthful man, disliked the scheme, but finally
allowed his companion to pursue his plan without contradiction.
They both entered San Miguel on the 28th of January, 1845, and
loudly congratulated his friends and acquaintances on Malespin's
defeat. The whole department was soon in commotion, and letters
poured upon Guzman to sound the cry for liberty. Calixto Malespin
continued his arbitrary acts, and Guzman concluded to oust him
from his command, without bloodshed if possible. In this he was
successful on the 2d of February;[X-48] the barracks were soon
surrendered to him, the troops following his lead. The capital
seconded the movement, and was soon followed by the other
departments.[X-49] The government sent a circular to the other
states announcing the change effected, and it was recognized by all
but Honduras.[X-50]

The chambers of Salvador assembled on the 15th, before which

Guzman made an energetic speech, and Malespin was not only
dethroned, but his election to the presidency was declared null.[X-51]
However, there was much to do yet to uproot him from Central
American politics, as he had the support of Honduras. In an
encounter at Quelepa Cabañas was defeated, which gave the
reactionists courage to approach San Vicente; but public opinion was
now so clearly pronounced against Malespin that Bishop Viteri turned
against him, and began his efforts to win over to the clerico-
oligarchic party the new president, Joaquin Eufracio Guzman.[X-52]
He at once issued a decree of excommunication against Ex-president
Malespin.[X-53] But the government of Honduras being bent on
supporting Malespin at all hazards, Guardiola landed at La Union
with an armed force, and occupied San Miguel; notwithstanding
which act Guzman did not declare war against Honduras. Attributing
it to ignorance of the true state of affairs in Salvador, he sent a
second note, which, like the first, remained unanswered. Malespin
continued—with the assent of Honduras, and without that of
Nicaragua, which had assumed neutrality in the contest—calling
himself general-in-chief of the armies of Salvador, Honduras, and
Nicaragua, and declared Guzman, the Salvadoran chambers, and the
inhabitants of upwards of 100 towns which had set him aside, guilty
of treason.

Guzman was now menaced from several quarters; namely, from

Malespin's partisans in San Salvador, the military at Comayagua, J.
Trinidad Muñoz, who wanted to destroy the liberals that had escaped
from Leon, and lastly, Rafael Carrera, who, though at times inclined
to wheedle the liberals, generally had his claws ready to tear them
to pieces. Guzman found the panther more untractable than the
other wild beasts. It was therefore necessary to place in Guatemala
experienced tamers; but he was unsuccessful in this. His
commissioners, though they managed by fawning to approach
Carrera, met with poor success in their mission.[X-54]

Guzman marched against Belloso at San

TREATY OF PEACE.
Vicente and defeated him. He next went to San
Miguel, which he entered amidst the plaudits of the people.[X-55]
Malespin entered with him into a convention at Jocoro, binding
himself to surrender all national property of Salvador and to leave
the country. But the authorities of Honduras disapproved the
arrangement, and it fell to the ground;[X-56] the war continued, till
on the 18th of April a treaty of peace and friendship was concluded
at Chinameca, to which the minister of Salvador, Dueñas, added
another clause, requiring that both Salvador and Honduras should
disband their troops immediately after the ratification of the treaty.
[X-57] Honduras failed to ratify it, and proposed that new
conferences should be held at Gualcinse, and at the same time
despatched 900 men upon that place under Malespin. Armed parties
from Honduras invaded Salvador; and, indeed, Ferrera was using all
possible means to exasperate the latter state into committing acts of
hostility against the former, so that Carrera might have an
opportunity to take a hand in the game.

The chambers of Salvador assembled at this time, and Minister

Dueñas reported a treaty of peace, amity, and alliance with
Guatemala.[X-58] He seemed to expect aid from that side of the river
Paz.[X-59] Nicaragua had extended a friendly reception to two
Salvador commissioners.[X-60] The chambers gave Guzman ample
powers for the defence of the state. This did not include authority to
invade any other state, unless as a retaliatory measure. A resort to
this was finally resolved upon, and a Salvadoran army under
Cabañas marched the 24th of May upon Comayagua, meeting with
defeat there on the 2d of June, and again at Sensenti on the 10th of
the same month.[X-61] The Hondureños inhumanly put to death all
the wounded Salvadoreños left at Comayagua and Santa Rosa.
Ferrera, now flushed with victory, thought that he could dictate
terms to Salvador.[X-62] It was a mistake on his part, for the people
of Salvador rose en masse to repair the disasters of Comayagua and
Sensenti.
 Salvador and Honduras.

Guardiola committed many acts of vandalism

GUARDIOLA'S
VANDALISM.
in La Union, in consequence of which Minister
Dueñas, on the 25th of July, addressed a circular
to the agents of foreign nations protesting against the seizure of
foreign goods in the government's warehouse at that port. Cabañas,
after the disasters before related, arrived at San Miguel with scarcely
fifty men, and endeavored to collect his scattered forces; but his
efforts were unavailing, and Guardiola marched into the city—which
had been abandoned by nearly all the inhabitants—and gave it up to
be plundered by his soldiers.[X-63]

All that part of Salvador on the Lempa and the district of

Chalatenango were in the hands of the enemy, who acted as the
master of a conquered country. One of the commanders was the
notorious Manuel Quijano. The Salvadoreños attacked him and were
defeated. The Hondurans now felt certain that they could capture
San Salvador. But on the 15th of August Guardiola with 900 men
attacked the Salvadoreños at the hacienda del Obrajuelo and was
routed, losing two thirds of his force and most of his war material.[X-
64]He evacuated San Miguel at midnight. The authorities of
Honduras soon after published a suspension of hostilities in order to
negotiate a peace.[X-65] An armistice was afterward signed at
Sumpul.[X-66] Muñoz of Nicaragua, for motives of his own, exerted
himself to bring about peace between Honduras and Salvador, to
which end he despatched Sebastian Escobar as commissioner to the
two belligerents. Sensenti was finally fixed upon as the place for
holding the conferences, and a treaty of peace, amity, and alliance
was concluded on the 27th of November, 1845, under which
Malespin and Espinosa were forbidden to set foot in Salvador
without leave of her government.[X-67]

The government of Guatemala, with a view of

GUATEMALAN
INDEPENDENCE.
not too openly going counter to public opinion in
the states desiring to see a national government
established, inserted in the treaty concluded with Salvador on the
4th of April, 1845, a clause apparently intended to promote that end.
[X-68]And yet it was at the same time considering the expediency of
declaring the entire independence of Guatemala, and gathering
material which was made public in a manifesto in March 1847.
Indeed, she had no desire to carry out the stipulations, though she
named Joaquin Duran and Doctor Mariano Padilla her
commissioners.[X-69] Pretexts were not wanting, and new
commissioners appointed, namely, Marure and Rodriguez, both of
whom favored Guatemala's absolute independence. The result was
the abandonment of the plan of reorganization as entirely
impracticable.[X-70] The declaration of independence was made in
the decree of March 21, 1847.[X-71] Carrera, the president, in a
manifesto, set forth the causes that had prompted such a measure,
which he called one of regeneration, and asked the people to greet it
with the same enthusiasm that was shown in 1821, when the cry for
separation from Spain was raised.[X-72]

The secessionists pronounced it an able effort; but it caused a

disagreeable impression in the states, and in none more so than in
Salvador. It wounded public sentiment. Carrera had no legal right to
take such a step. The constituent assembly had placed him in charge
of the executive, but had not made him a legislator. For all that, the
separation from the rest of Central America became an accomplished
fact, and Carrera was declared a hero, the founder of the republic,
and coin was struck with his bust on it.[X-73] This act was ratified on
the 14th of September, 1848, by the constituent assembly of
Guatemala, when Carrera was no longer in power.

Lindo was ruling in Honduras and Guerrero in Nicaragua, but

these two states were in accord with Salvador, from fear of British
pretensions, on the necessity of a Central American union. They
constituted, early in 1848, the diet of Nacaome, which urgently
invited Guatemala and Costa Rica to join it; but the former
peremptorily declined, alleging that the decree of March 21st
precluded her taking any step backward. Costa Rica sent deputies to
Nacaome.[X-74] The celebrated Ecuatorian general, Juan José Flores,
arrived in Costa Rica in July 1848, and was received with much
consideration, which flattered his vanity. He wanted the aid of Costa
Rica for his own plans, and got himself into the good graces of
President Castro. The dissolution of the Colombian republic had
enabled him to become the ruler of Ecuador; and being of the same
way of thinking as Pavon and his fellow-secessionists of Guatemala,
he counselled a complete separation of the states of Central
America. Several influential men of Costa Rica favored the policy of a
wholly independent government for their state.[X-75]

Congress, on the 30th of August, 1848,

REPUBLIC OF
COSTA RICA.
consummated the work of final separation, with a
decree declaring that the title 'Estado de Costa
Rica' was not in consonance with the 22d article of the constitution,
which established the principle of Costa Rica's sovereignty, freedom,
and independence; that with this understanding, and as a free,
sovereign, and independent nation, other powers had treated with
her on a footing of equality. It was therefore resolved, carrying out
the wishes of the municipal districts, that the term 'república' be
substituted for that of 'estado.'[X-76] President Castro sanctioned its
promulgation on the 31st.

Notwithstanding so many difficulties, the friends of union never

resigned the hope of accomplishing their purpose. In November
1849 commissioners of Honduras, Salvador, and Nicaragua
assembled at Leon, and on the 8th agreed upon a basis of union of
the three states, the terms of which were subsequently
promulgated;[X-77] and it was left optional with Guatemala and
Costa Rica to join it or not. The remnants of the aristocratic element,
with the support of British officials,[X-78] opposed the union, and in
order to defeat it, promoted revolutions in Nicaragua and Honduras.
The compact went into effect, however, on the 9th of January, 1851,
when the national representatives assembled in Chinandega, José F.
Barrundia, representative from Salvador, being chosen their
president.[X-79]

The national constituent congress was installed at Tegucigalpa

on the 9th of October, 1852, and began its labors on the following
day.[X-80]

Trinidad Cabañas was on the 13th elected jefe

A SHORT-LIVED
FEDERATION.
supremo of the federation, but he declined the
honor, being desirous of disarming opposition to
the new organization on the part of his political opponents. His
resignation was accepted on the 26th, and Francisco Castellon
chosen on the 28th.[X-81] An organic law was enacted on the 13th of
October, and communicated to the government of the federation.[X-
82] The supreme executive authority, on the 20th of November,
1852, was held by Pedro Molina, vice-jefe, four senators, and two
acting ministers of state. The federation thus organized was not
destined to be long lived. Upon the allegation that the congress had
created a dictatorship, and referred the organic statute to the people
instead of the legislatures of the states, the assemblies of Salvador
and Nicaragua set aside the federation, and declared themselves
independent states.[X-83] Nicaragua may have receded from that act;
but whether it was so or not, the union between Honduras and
Nicaragua was dissolved by the war which broke out in February
1863 between Salvador and Guatemala, Honduras joining one of
those states, and Nicaragua the other. Further efforts have been
made from time to time—1871-76, and even as late as 1885—to
accomplish the union of the states under one government; but
obstacles have been in the way, the chief doubtlessly being the
personal ambition or jealousy of rulers, and the project still remains
as a possible event to come about in a few years, as it is believed to
be much desired by the majority of Central Americans.[X-84]
 CHAPTER XI.
REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA.

1841-1856.

Rule of Carrillo Continued—Plots for its Overthrow—Invasion of Morazan—Change of

Government—Morazan's Policy—Opposition—Revolts—Morazan's Defeat and Death—
Satisfaction of the Oligarchs—Measures of the Victors—New Constitution—
Subsequent Amendments—Sedition—Castro's Administration—Costa Rica Declared a
Republic—Recognition by Spain—Relations with Other Powers—Boundary Questions
with Nicaragua and Colombia—President Juan Rafael Mora—His Repressive Measures.

Carrillo, believing himself clothed with unlimited authority, on the

8th of March, 1841, issued what he called a 'ley de garantias,' giving
himself a life tenure of office and inviolability.[XI-1] The supreme
government was made to consist of the executive, and two
chambers, named respectively 'consultiva' and 'judicial,' whose
members were to be chosen by electoral colleges.[XI-2] Intending to
celebrate with éclat the inauguration of the cámara consultiva,
Carrillo recalled from exile Juan Mora and four others.[XI-3] The
consultiva, following Carrillo's wishes, elected Manual Antonio Bonilla
segundo jefe.[XI-4] The enemies of the present ruler were numerous,
and increasing. They called Morazan to their aid, through General
Bermudez of Peru.
 Morazan sailed from Chiriquí in Panamá, and
MORAZAN AND
SARAVIA.
after visiting several places in Central America
landed with about 500 men at Caldera[XI-5] on the
7th of April, 1842. With him were generals Saget, Cabañas, Saravia,
and Rascon.[XI-6] Carrillo heard of the invasion in the evening of the
8th, and at once assumed personal command of the troops to
operate against the enemy, turning over the executive office to
Bonilla, the vice-jefe,[XI-7] and providing other measures for an
active campaign. Nearly 1,000 men under Colonel Vicente Villaseñor
composed the expedition, among whose captains and lieutenants
were some of the wealthiest persons in the country.[XI-8] Morazan
had issued a manifesto assuring the Costa Ricans that his policy
would be one of order, union, and progress, to accomplish which
Braulio Carrillo must be ousted from power. As the government
forces approached the invaders, Villaseñor made known its contents
to his command, and asked whether they were for fighting or for a
peaceable arrangement. Both officers and men almost
unanimously[XI-9] favored the latter, and a convention was concluded
at Jocote on the 11th of April, by virtue of which the two forces
fraternized, becoming one army. It was further agreed that a
constituent assembly should be called to reorganize the state, the
government meanwhile remaining in charge of Morazan, or in his
absence in that of Vicente Villaseñor.[XI-10] This convention was
accepted on the next day at San José by Carrillo, with a few
additions which did in no wise vitiate it, and Morazan afterward
ratified the whole at Heredia.[XI-11] He was enthusiastically
welcomed at Alajuela and Heredia, and with an augmented force
marched on San José, which he entered without hindrance. As jefe
supremo provisorio he made José Miguel Saravia his sole minister of
state, and issued a proclamation embodying complete forgetfulness
of all past political offences, and tendering an asylum in Costa Rica
to all persons, of whatever party, suffering persecution in the other
states.[XI-12] He next appointed a committee to revise the laws
enacted by Carrillo, with the view of repealing such as were deemed
unwise or arbitrary, and a number of them were accordingly
annulled, the preposterous one of March 8, 1841, not being, of
course, excepted. The state constitution of January 21, 1825, was
revived, and the people were called upon to elect a constituent
assembly, which was to meet at San José on the 10th of July.[XI-13]
This body, composed of thirteen members, one of whom was the
distinguished ex-jefe Juan Mora, was installed on the appointed day
under the presidency of José F. Peralta, deputy for Cartago, and on
the 15th of July unanimously elected Morazan provisional jefe of the
state.[XI-14]

The great political change thus effected in Costa Rica greatly

alarmed the reactionists; and specially those of Guatemala, who lost
no time in adopting measures to destroy Morazan. This chief, on the
other hand, took steps toward the reorganization of Central America,
equipping troops therefor. Some of his measures were deemed too
severe, giving rise to rebellion in some localities. There were
intimate relations between Carrera of Guatemala and General
Antonio Pinto of Costa Rica, as well as between the serviles of both
states, who, together with the clergy, worked to promote a revolt.
An attempt in Guanacaste by Colonel Manuel A. Molina failed, and
caused his arrest, trial, and execution at Puntarenas.[XI-15] Colonel
Molina was a son of Pedro Molina, the noted champion of free
principles, and however legal his execution may have been, it was
certainly impolitic. His sentence might have been commuted, thus
averting the disruption which at once broke out in the liberal ranks.
[XI-16]
 Saget was at Puntarenas attending to the
WAR AND
REBELLION.
embarkation of 45 officers, 200 men, 2,000 or
3,000 muskets, and about 1,300 pounds of
powder and lead. At Alajuela were 300 recruits of that department
and 100 of Cartago, all commanded by Florentin Alfaro. This officer
was won over by Morazan's enemies, and revolting on the 11th of
September marched upon San José, where the people followed his
example. The revolutionists then called General Pinto to the
command.[XI-17] Morazan's body-guard of forty Salvadorans thrice
repulsed the assailants, but finally had to retreat to the chief
barracks.[XI-18] The jefe, together with Cordero, Cabañas, and
Saravia, and 80 men sustained another terrible onslaught on the
12th. The besiegers were constantly on the increase till they
numbered 5,000, and the besieged on the decrease by death and
desertion.[XI-19] Chaplain José Antonio Castro came to propose a
capitulation based on Morazan's abandonment of the country, and a
pledge of security to his supporters. Believing that his loyalty and
military honor were at stake, Morazan declined the propositions.[XI-
20] Pinto's secretary, Vicente Herrera, was very virulent, demanding
Morazan's blood; and the chaplain reported that the jefe wanted war,
refusing to recognize any authority on the part of his adversaries to
give pledges, which enraged their commander and his secretary all
the more.[XI-21] The fight continued, and blood flowed freely.[XI-22]
Mayorga, comandante at Cartago, rebelled, and Morazan's situation
had become a desperate one on the 13th. No reënforcements could
reach him, and provisions were exhausted. Juan Mora and Chaplain
Castro endeavored to bring about an arrangement, but the terms
offered, being oppressive, were rejected. The firing was resumed
between one and two o'clock in the morning of the 14th. Morazan
and his handful of supporters, worn out by fatigue, hunger, and
wounds, made their way through the besiegers and reached
Cartago,[XI-23] Cabañas covering the retreat with 30 men. Mayorga's
wife, who disapproved her husband's disloyalty, sent them word of
their danger. But it came too late. Morazan and the rest were
surrounded and captured. Young Francisco Morazan and Saravia,
arriving a little later, were also secured. Deception toward Cabañas
was used,[XI-24] and treachery toward Morazan, who was promised
his life.

Early the next morning, an officer named

BLOODY WORK.
Darío Orozco came to inform Morazan and his
companions that they were to be put in irons, by demand of the
troops. Saravia rose and seized a pistol to blow his brains out; but
Morazan prevented the suicide, though only for a few moments. He
then walked a while smoking, and finally submitted to have the
shackles put on his feet, and just as it was being done he had a
horrible convulsion which ended in death. It is said that he had
swallowed poison. The shackles were riveted on a corpse![XI-25]
Villaseñor stabbed himself with a dagger, and fell to the ground
covered with blood, unfortunately for him, not dead. Morazan was
shackled. The prisoners were at once taken to San José. Morazan,
though wounded, rode on horseback, and Villaseñor was carried in a
hammock; but on arriving at the Cuesta de las Moras, Captain
Benavides, a Peruvian who commanded their guard, made them
walk to the court-house. Morazan on the way conversed with Pardo
and Vijil, and remembering that it was the 15th of September,
remarked to Vijil, "How solemnly we are keeping the anniversary of
independence!" The other prisoners were confined in the building
called Los Almacenes, and Morazan was left with Villaseñor as his
sole companion.

Moderate men strongly urged a strict observance of law, aside

from prejudice or passion;[XI-26] but their voice was drowned in the
uproar of the enemies of Morazan,[XI-27] clamoring for his death
without form of trial, regardless of the requirements of the
constitution of 1825, and of the fact that he was the legitimate chief
of the state.[XI-28] But nothing availed to save his life. Pinto, like his
prototype Pontius Pilate, after a slight hesitation, signed the order of
execution of both Morazan and Villaseñor, to be carried out within
three hours. Morazan then summoned his son Francisco, and
dictated to him his last will and testament; some of its clauses are
epitomized below.[XI-29] After placing in charge of Montealegre a
handkerchief and a few other objects for his wife, so soon to
become a widow, he walked with dignity and a firm step to the place
of execution. Villaseñor, who was nearly dead from his wound, was
carried in a chair. On arriving at the fatal spot Morazan embraced
Villaseñor, saying, "My dear friend, posterity will do us justice."
Barrundia thus describes the last moments of the ex-president: He
gave the order to prepare arms, saw that a good aim was taken,
then gave the command to fire, and fell to the ground. Still raising
his bleeding head, he cried out: "I am yet alive;" when a second
volley despatched him. Thus on the 15th of September, the
anniversary of Central American independence, just as the sun was
sinking in the west, the soul of the noble patriot returned to the
region whence it came.[XI-30]

Morazan's death caused much satisfaction to

MORAZAN'S
GREATNESS the ruling powers of Guatemala and Honduras.[XI-
RECOGNIZED. 31] In Guatemala it was an occasion for rejoicing,
with high mass and other religious ceremonies.[XI-32] The time
came, however, when Morazan's greatness was recognized in
Guatemala and Honduras, when the servile element no longer had a
voice in public affairs.[XI-33] Relations had been suspended by the
Guatemalan government with that of Costa Rica, while the latter
recognized Morazan as its chief.[XI-34] Treaties of union and mutual
defence had been made by the states of Guatemala, Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Honduras against Costa Rica on the 7th and 16th of
October.[XI-35] After Morazan's downfall an attempt was made to
prevail on the new government to subscribe to these treaties, but it
failed.[XI-36]

On the 23d of September the civil and other

CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY.
authorities at San José passed acts setting aside
the supreme powers that had ruled the state since
its occupation by Morazan, and proclaiming J. M. Alfaro as jefe
provisorio, with Antonio Pinto as comandante general.[XI-37] These
acts were subsequently confirmed by the people of the state.[XI-38]
Among Alfaro's first measures were to forbid the return of political
exiles, including Carrillo; to check attempts at rebellion; to invite
Morazan's soldiers to return to their homes;[XI-39] to restore
confiscated property; to establish an official journal; and to raise a
forced loan.[XI-40] Disregarding the remonstrances of Guatemala, the
government, of which José María Castro was now minister-general,
by its decree of the 5th of April, 1843, called upon the people to
send deputies to a constituent assembly. This body was installed on
the 1st of June, and soon after adopted the groundwork upon which
was to be erected the fundamental law of the state.[XI-41] The
assembly likewise enacted a law declaratory of the rights of man;
and another on freedom of the press under certain limitations.
Among the other acts worthy of mention passed by this body were
the following: The jefe, Alfaro, was to hold his office till the
promulgation of the constitution and the election of his successor
under it. All his acts were approved, and a vote of thanks was
awarded him. A similar vote was given to General Pinto. Francisco M.
Oreamuno was chosen segundo jefe, and a short time afterward he
was called to fill the executive chair, upon leave of absence being
given to Alfaro.[XI-42] The assembly adjourned on the 22d of
September, to meet again on the 13th of November. The
constitutional bases, nicknamed by the conservatives "de los
tribunos," did not meet the approval of the government. The
assembly then adopted a constitution, which made provision for two
chambers, the executive authority being exercised by a jefe, as
formerly, and all the functionaries constituting the supreme powers
being chosen by the whole people. The promulgation of the new
fundamental law was made on the 11th of April, 1844,[XI-43] and all
officers were required to take an oath to support it. Pinto, the
comandante general, refused to do so without first consulting Alfaro
and others. He tried to make an armed opposition, but did not
succeed, and was dismissed, Colonel José María Quiroz superseding
him.[XI-44]

The publication of the new fundamental law was celebrated with

feasts for three days. But the fact of Pinto's dismissal from the
command of the forces caused serious divisions in families,[XI-45]
which has been felt ever since in the political events of the country.
The two chambers decreed by the constituent assembly complicated
the political machinery, and the enemies of the new constitution
exaggerated its defects. The necessity of a senate in Costa Rica was
not clear, for the composition of the house of deputies was such that
it required impulsion rather than checks. Therefore, what would be
the mission of the senate?[XI-46]

Alfaro reassumed the duties of the executive

MOYA, GALLEGOS,
AND ALFARO.
office on the 28th of June, on which date Castro
resigned his position of secretary-general,[XI-47] to
take a seat in the chamber of deputies, which was installed on the
3d of July. The first duty of this body was to count the votes for