Political Science and International Relations Political Science and International Relations

Theses

Spring 2024

A Break from the Past or A Link in the Chain?: The Republican

Party from Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump
Mitchell Evans
Loyola Marymount University

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 A Break from the Past or A Link in the Chain?:
The Republican Party from Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump

by

Mitchell Evans

A thesis presented to the

Faculty of the Department of

Political Science and International Relations
Loyola Marymount University

In partial fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science

May 2024
This thesis has been examined and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Degree Bachelor of Arts in Political Science by:

Thesis Advisor:

Michael Genovese, Ph.D.

Program Advisor:

Richard Fox, Ph.D.

“A Break from the Past or A Link in the Chain?: The Republican
Party from Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump”

ABSTRACT

The election of Donald Trump appeared to be a rejection of Republican ortho-

doxy. That someone who targeted the previous idols of Republican beliefs about
free trade, protectionism, immigration, and welfare could have so completely won
over the Republican voter base was notable. However, that Republican base had
changed substantially since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Where white
college graduates have traditionally voted more Republican, and those without a
college degree were more Democratic in this era, this dynamic had switched by
2016. In this thesis, I ask two questions: First, how has the Republican Party
changed its ideological and policy stances from Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump?
Second, to what extent have changes in the electorate driven this change? This
paper will be a longitudinal study of the changing trends of the Republican Party
through its platforms and help expand on the scholarship of how changes in the
electorate impact policy stances. Is there a future for the cult of personality of
the Republican Party post-Donald Trump?

ii
Dedication

To Mom and Dad, for whose endless support I will always be eternally grate-

ful. You helped me edit late at night, gave advice, and always pushed me to

do my best. This project could not have been possible without your assistance

and support.

For Boomer, whose boundless reservoirs of happiness have brought me so

much joy and whose endless stomach hopefully does not devour this thesis.

iii
Contents

1 Where We Are 1

1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1.2.1 Party Politics in America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Party Strength over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Relationship between President and Party . . . . . . . 6

Decline of Party Elites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Party Elites and Opinion Formation . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Political Polarization in the United States . . . . . . . 12

1.2.2 Realignment and Changes in the Electorate . . . . . . 14

Brief Overview of Realignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Realignment and Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Critique of Realignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1.2.3 Populism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Brief Overview of Populism Theory . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Impact of Populism on Political Parties . . . . . . . . . 20

iv
 Populism, Partisanship, and Ideology . . . . . . . . . . 21

1.2.4 Presidency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Presidential Authority and Unilateralism . . . . . . . . 23

1.2.5 Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

1.3 Research Question and Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

1.4 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

1.5 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

2 How We Got Here 29

2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2.2 Ronald Reagan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The 1980 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The 1984 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

2.3 George H.W. Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

The 1988 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

The 1992 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2.4 Robert Dole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

The 1996 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

2.5 George W. Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

The 2000 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

The 2004 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

2.6 John McCain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

v
 The 2008 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

2.7 Mitt Romney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

The 2012 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

2.8 Donald Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

The 2016 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

The 2020 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

2.9 Changes In The Electorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

2.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

3 There and Back Again 61

3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

3.2 Ronald Reagan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

3.3 George H.W. Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

3.4 George W. Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

3.5 Donald Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

4 Final Thoughts 83

vi
Acknowledgements
“I don’t know half of you half as well as I should like; and I like less than
half of you half as well as you deserve.” J.R.R. Tolkien, The Fellowship of
the Ring
I am writing to express my sincere gratitude to all those who have con-
tributed to completing this thesis. This work would not have been possible
without many people’s support, encouragement, and assistance.
First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my advisor, Dr. Michael Gen-
ovese, whose guidance, expertise, and unwavering support have been invalu-
able throughout this journey. His insightful feedback, constructive criticism,
and encouragement have significantly shaped the development of this thesis.
I extend my heartfelt appreciation to the members of our thesis program
and especially our program advisor, Dr. Richard Fox, for their valuable
input, suggestions, and scholarly insights. Their expertise and dedication
have enriched the quality of this work and broadened my perspective on the
subject matter.
I am grateful to the Department of Political Science and International
Relations at Loyola Marymount University for not only providing access to
resources, facilities, and research opportunities but also for their crucial role
in facilitating the research process and supporting my academic endeavors.
Further thanks to The American Presidency Project by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, whose online database of presidential platforms, executive
orders, and related material made my research possible.
I also want to thank my colleagues and peers for their camaraderie, en-
couragement, and intellectual exchange throughout this academic endeavor.
Their friendship, support, and collaborative spirit have made this journey
rewarding and memorable. Without their joy, care, and aid, my life and my
work would not shine as bright as they do.

vii
 Chapter 1

Where We Are

1.1 Introduction

The United States has had many politically polarizing, corrupt, or controver-

sial presidents, yet few have been as self-interested and autocratic as the 45th

President. The election of Donald Trump appeared to be a total rejection of

Republican orthodoxy on many issues. That someone who seemed to target

the previous idols of Republican beliefs about free trade, protectionism, immi-

gration, and welfare could have so completely won over the Republican voter

base was notable. His conduct before and during his presidency was spiteful,

bullying, and occasionally racist. His embrace of executive unilateralism and

his rhetoric around limits on his power demonstrated his full-throated wish

to be a dictator. He was impeached twice and constantly embroiled in scan-

dal, with all of these factors culminating in the events of January 6th, 2021.

The Republican Party’s fervent embrace of Donald Trump requires a serious

1
INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

examination of how we reached this point.

Since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the Republican Party has

shifted to the conservative right, shorning nearly all of what remained of its

liberal and moderate flanks.1 Reagan believed in low taxes, reduced welfare

spending, free trade, and a militant interventionist foreign policy.2 These re-

mained the pillars of Republican ideology, though not without its detractors,

until Donald Trump’s victory in 2016. Trump relied upon white, largely non-

college-educated voters in the traditionally Democratic states of Wisconsin,

Michigan, and Pennsylvania3 to overcome staggeringly high disapproval rat-

ings4 and win the Electoral College by a combined 80,000 votes. Trump’s

voter base was discontent with elites of both parties, globalization, minori-

ties of all stripes, and the political system in general.5 The degree to which

the changing electorate “gradually, then suddenly” reshaped the Republican

Party is still being debated today. To understand how Trump was able to

win both the presidential primary and general election in 2016, we must look

at the changes in the Republican Party since 1980 to track its evolution and

to contextualize Donald Trump among the Republican presidents and party

leaders in the Reagan era onwards. This process will help determine which is-

1. Gerald F Seib, We Should Have Seen it Coming: From Reagan to Trump–a Front-Row Seat to a Political
Revolution (Random House, 2020).
2. George R Goethals, Realignment, Region, and Race: Presidential Leadership and Social Identity (Emer-
ald Publishing Limited, 2018).
3. Goethals.
4. Alan Abramowitz and Jennifer McCoy, “United States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and
Polarization in Trump’s America,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
681, no. 1 (2019): 137–156, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716218811309.
5. Abramowitz and McCoy.

2
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

sues and governing styles Trump followed that of his Republican predecessors

and where he was a radical break.

My thesis seeks to address how the Republican Party has changed its ideo-

logical and policy stances from Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump, and to what

extent has the change, if any, been driven by changes in the electorate? This

paper will be a longitudinal study of the changing trends of the Republican

Party and its platforms and help expand on the scholarship of how changes

in the electorate impact policy stances. I will be using the Republican Party

presidential platforms and tracking several common issues across Republican

presidential administrations; I will also be engaging with secondary sources

and relevant academic literature to further my arguments. Is there a future

for the cult of personality of the Republican Party post-Donald Trump?

1.2 Literature Review

My literature review will cover four factors of American politics, beginning

with a section on the literature regarding party politics in the United States.

Party functionality is key to understanding how Donald Trump was able to

win and take over the Republican Party. First, by looking at party strength in

terms of the relationship between the President and his political party and the

decline of the political influence of party elites over the base, then discussing

the relationship between party elites and opinion formation. Next, I will

move to the literature review on realignment and changes in the electorate.

3
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

This section will first detail some historical background on realignment and

define the term and its relationship to American politics. Then, I will delve

into the subsections related to realignment and race and some critiques of

realignment literature. My third section will deal with populism with a brief

overview of its impact on parties and voters. The fourth section will focus

on the presidency, highlighting presidential authority and unilateralism.

1.2.1 Party Politics in America

Party Strength over Time

Party politics is a long-held American tradition, with the first American

political parties arising almost immediately after the end of George Wash-

ington’s presidency with the Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties.

Political parties “afforded a way of organizing elections, legitimizing oppo-

sition, and guaranteeing peaceful transitions of power. Once in office, they

helped elected officials work together and bridged some of the differences

between and among government institutions.”6 Ideally, they aim to “bring

fractures and diverse groups together as a unified force, provide a necessary

link between the distinct branches and levels of government, and provide

continuity beyond terms of office. Parties also play an important role in en-

couraging active participation in politics.”7 One conceptual model of party

6. John White and Matthew Kerbel, Party On!: Political Parties from Hamilton and Jefferson to Trump
(Routledge, 2017).
7. White and Kerbel.

4
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

politics first developed during the 1950s by Ralph M. Goldman is to view

them as divided into three sections: Party In Electorate, Party Organiza-

tion, and Party In Government.8 Party In Electorate broadly refers to people

who have a particular connection to a party, Party Organization refers to

the formal machinery of a political party, and Party In Government refers

to the candidates elected and have taken political office.9 This model has

been critiqued based on being outdated and less relevant but can still serve

a useful purpose theoretically.10 The goals of political parties vary depending

on time and place (among other factors), but the two common conceptions

are election-driven, policy-oriented, or both. Election-driven definitions focus

primarily on the election-seeking itself; Joseph Schlesinger’s definition is that

“[a] political party is a group organized to gain control of government in the

name of the group by winning election to public office.”11 More policy-driven

definitions highlight the ideological goals of a party as “an organization that

seeks to achieve political power by electing members to public office so that

their political philosophies can be reflected in public policies.”12

Essential political functions aside, the American people today find politi-

cal parties unlikeable. In fact, political parties have become less popular with

8. Andrew Goldman, The National Party Chairmen and Committees: Factionalism at the Top (Routledge,
2019).
9. White and Kerbel, Party On!: Political Parties from Hamilton and Jefferson to Trump.
10. White and Kerbel.
11. Joseph A Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office (University of Michigan Press, 1991).
12. Jay M Shafritz and Karin L Sandell, “The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government & Politics,”
Newspaper Research Journal 11, no. 1 (1990): 113.

5
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

“Voter dissatisfaction with both parties is high.”13 Famously, George Wash-

ington warned against political parties and partisanship during his farewell

address at the end of his presidency, declaring them, “A fire not to be

quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame,

lest, instead of warming, it should consume.”14 Many Americans over the suc-

ceeding centuries agreed. These negative attitudes have waxed and waned

over the decades, with “Americans often [dreaming] of freeing themselves

from the two-party system. . . Such dreams are utopian. America has always

had two major political coalitions, each winning about half the vote. It will al-

ways have two major political coalitions, each winning about half the vote.”15

This aspect of two-party dominance results from how political coalitions are

optimized to be about half of the electorate to balance the ability to win

elections while ensuring that each faction can advance its policy priorities.16

The design of our political system ensures that two parties will form, and the

coalitional math supports the forming of two roughly co-equal blocs.

Relationship between President and Party

The presidency is the highest office in the land, as we all learn and know, yet

with the support of the legislative branch, a substantial domestic footprint

is possible to achieve. Therefore, having deep relationships with Congress

13. White and Kerbel, Party On!: Political Parties from Hamilton and Jefferson to Trump.
14. Burton Ira Kaufman and George Washington, “Washington’s Farewell Address: The View From the
20th Century,” (No Title), 1969,
15. Frank J DiStefano, The Next Realignment: Why America’s Parties Are Crumbling and What Happens
Next (Prometheus Books, 2019).
16. Daniel J Galvin, “Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush,” 2009,

6
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

is necessary, A goal furthered by ties to the President’s fellow party mem-

bers in the legislature as an intermediary bond. Presidents strengthen their

parties via party-building, which are “efforts undertaken by the president to

endow the party organization with enhanced capacities.”17 Party-building is

a way of building support for the President by creating or expanding ma-

jorities and deepening relationships between the President and their party.

Party-building can vary substantially depending on which party holds the

presidency and whether they have control of both houses of Congress. Re-

publican presidents, from Eisenhower to Bush, wanted “to build a new po-

litical majority, not to redeem the Republican Party per se. Yet in each

case, they concluded that their formal party apparatus was the most efficient

and broadly useful vehicle for their purposes.”18 The formal party organiza-

tion was to be an arm of the President expanding his influence across the

country, expanding majorities, and creating or taking advantage of oppor-

tunities for agenda-setting. In contrast, due to more legislative control by

the Democratic Party, Democratic presidents were more focused on coalition

management, as “stable Democratic majorities prompted inconsistent and

decidedly noninnovative actions on the part of Democratic presidents.”19

This influence can conceptualized in several different ways. A classic exam-

ple is personal influence. As Richard Neustadt writes in Presidential Power,

17. DiStefano, The Next Realignment: Why America’s Parties Are Crumbling and What Happens Next.
18. Galvin, “Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush.”
19. Galvin.

7
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

where he defines this influence as “ his personal capacity to influence the men

who make up government.”20 Neustadt posits that personal relationships are

necessary due to the President’s lack of formal powers regarding the legisla-

tive process. Further work on this theory has emphasized “that presidents

are highly limited in creating opportunities to influence Congress. Instead,

the context in which presidents govern is generally fixed, and presidents can

do little to fundamentally alter that context.”21 According to George Ed-

wards, presidential authority is constrained and limited, dependent on tak-

ing advantage of legislative ‘windows’ and other opportunities. While these

constraints are “congressional perceptions about whether the president has a

mandate, whether the president’s party controls Congress, and the degree of

polarization between the congressional parties”22 Presidential influence and

accomplishments are more outside of his control than the public expects, as

most, if not all, of these factors, are beyond a president’s control, determined

by election results and perceptions of popularity versus hostility by the public

and within Congress. Therefore, presidents do not have unilateral freedom

to act but much smaller ’windows,’ and “to understand presidential leader-

ship. . . we should focus on how presidents exploit those opportunities that

are presented, and at the same time we must be cognizant of how the con-

20. Richard E Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from
Roosevelt to Reagan (Simon / Schuster, 1991).
21. Jeffrey E Cohen, The President on Capitol Hill: A Theory of Institutional Influence (Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2019).
22. George C Edwards, Predicting the Presidency: The Potential of Persuasive Leadership (Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2016).

8
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

text constrains the president.”23 Another conceptual model is based on game

theory, where “presidents [act] as strategic actors, with the context (politi-

cal and otherwise) structuring their strategic decisions.”24 Both of the latter

theories emphasize other political figures and the constraints the President

operates under

Decline of Party Elites

Since the democratization of the presidential nomination process, party elites

have somewhat lost influence and control over their parties. Primary elec-

tions, where the party’s voters decide which candidate to support, reduce

the influence of the formal party as “Party organizations struggle in primary

elections because the very concept is antithetical to what parties do.”25 Differ-

ences within “party in government can engage in internecine campaign war-

fare during primaries” and further, “no matter the intentions of the party or-

ganization, a well-motivated and mobilized electorate can overcome them.”26

The primary system as we understand it today grew out of the 1970s reform

movements as “Before the advent of primaries, when parties controlled their

entire nomination process, there was no public scrutiny of candidate choice

by parties. The parties would make their delegate allocation rules, delegates

would show up to party conventions, and those delegates were free to make
23. Cohen, The President on Capitol Hill: A Theory of Institutional Influence.
24. Cohen.
25. Chapman Rackaway and Laurie L Rice, American Political Parties Under Pressure: Strategic Adapta-
tions for a Changing Electorate (Springer, 2017).
26. Rackaway and Rice.

9
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

whatever decisions on candidates they desired. The voting public had little

to no say in party nominations.”27

This state of affairs could not last forever with the increasing democratic

trends of the 1960s and after the highly chaotic and controversial “1968 Demo-

cratic convention. . . the public has strongly retrenched against the idea of

parties having exclusive authority over nominations, especially for the pres-

idency.”28 Since then, the parties have changed their rules back and forth

in a contest between more elite control versus voter power, with the trend

favoring the latter.29 Political elites still can and do send cues and signals to

the electorate in various ways (endorsements being a prominent example).

With the decline of traditional media and the rise of celebrity and political

fundraising, the party insiders have fewer ways to control the nomination

process.30 However, compared to their early to mid-20th-century dominance,

voters now drive the process much more substantially.

Party Elites and Opinion Formation

Political opinions are formed by various factors, including parents, schools,

geography, religion, and more; the factor of most interest here is that of party

elites. Party elites on both sides have become more ideologically aligned:

a standard definition of elite polarization is the “high levels of ideological

27. Rackaway and Rice, American Political Parties Under Pressure: Strategic Adaptations for a Changing
Electorate.
28. Rackaway and Rice.
29. Rackaway and Rice.
30. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die; What History Tells Us About Our Future,
Crown (Random House, New York, 2018).

10
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

distance between parties and high levels of homogeneity within parties.”31

Party elites are more ideologically aligned with their fellow partisans and

against their opposites, which has impacted the electorate as a whole (see

Bruckman et al. 2013 below)

A polarized environment causes this order of priority to apparently

shift, such that a strengthened partisan identity causes party en-
dorsements to carry the day. . . partisans in a polarized environment
follow their party regardless of the type or strength of the argument
the party makes (also see Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). Moreover,
when individuals engage in strong partisan-motivated reasoning,
they develop increased confidence in their opinions.32

Elite polarization provides signals to the mass public on what their stances

should be, especially issues that are highly salient at the moment, and “most

voters have responded to these cues: party identification and voting choices

are now closely connected to worldviews and policy positions.”33 Voters have

paid attention to these elite cues: “Perceptions of the parties depend on

what party leaders do, and individuals are better able determine the par-

ties’ ideological positions as the cues sent by party elites have become more

distinct.”34 The electorate responds to these cues by sorting themselves by

party. A key result of “political elites become more polarized and perceptions
31. James N Druckman, Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus, “How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public
Opinion Formation,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 57–79.
32. Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus.
33. Joshua N Zingher, “Response to Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis’s Review of Political Choice
in a Polarized America: How Elite Polarization Shapes Mass Behavior,” Perspectives on Politics 21, no. 1
(2023): 321–321.
34. Joshua N Zingher and Michael E Flynn, “From On High: The Effect of Elite Polarization On Mass
Attitudes and Behaviors, 1972–2012,” British Journal of Political Science 48, no. 1 (2018): 23–45.

11
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

of partisan gridlock become more prevalent, [is that] the degree to which one

can expect meaningful political debate that transcends party lines may be

decreasing.”35 It is important to note, “Like other political elites, presidents

since the 1980s have become much clearer in the signals they send to the

electorate.”36 Crucially, as “party elites have become more polarized, indi-

viduals have become better able to identify the party that best matches their

own ideological positions, thereby contributing to polarization at the mass

level.”37

Political Polarization in the United States

Political polarization is no longer just an elite phenomenon but a broad-based

mass one as well. Political polarization has filtered from elites to the general

public in recent decades. As parties diverge and ideological conflict strength-

ens the vitriol present in our political sphere, “Political hostility is not simply

a function of the amount of disagreement that exists over basic policy issues;

it is a function of fewer overlapping group memberships and clearer distinc-

tions between partisan in-groups and out-groups.”38 This phenomenon of in-

creased positivity towards the in-group and hostility towards the out-group is

35. Brian F Harrison, “Bully Partisan or Partisan Bully?: Partisanship, Elite Polarization, and US Presi-
dential Communication,” Social Science Quarterly 97, no. 2 (2016): 418–438.
36. Zingher, “Response to Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis’s Review of Political Choice in a
Polarized America: How Elite Polarization Shapes Mass Behavior.”
37. Zingher and Flynn, “From On High: The Effect of Elite Polarization On Mass Attitudes and Behaviors,
1972–2012.”
38. Zingher and Flynn.

12
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

known as affective polarization.39 One study found, “Compared with the most

salient social divide in American society—race—partisanship elicits more ex-

treme evaluations and behavioral responses to ingroups and outgroups.”40

This startling result shows the depth of polarization and the degree to which

“party identification in the United States is more of an affective than instru-

mental or ideological bond.”41 However, other researchers have found more

complex results on the ideological front.

An individual’s position on the social dimension was once a much

weaker predictor of political behaviors and attitudes than it is to-
day. In addition, an individual’s position on the economic dimen-
sion, which has always been an important predictor of behavior,
has become even stronger. Americans have sorted on not one but
both ideological dimensions. The parties are not only more clearly
divided on both the elite and mass level, but they are divided on a
wider set of issues. The increasing importance of the social dimen-
sion has not supplanted the importance of the economic dimension;
rather, the predictive power of both dimensions is increasing.42

Political polarization has been increasing for decades among both Republi-

cans and Democrats; however, the Republican Party began the shift towards

affective polarization first. With the rise of Newt Gingrich in the 1980s, who

envisioned politics as a Hobbesian total war and riding affective polarization

into power, the Republican Party shifted to a no-holds-barred “politics as

39. Shanto Iyengar and Sean J Westwood, “Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group
Polarization,” American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 3 (2015): 690–707.
40. Iyengar and Westwood.
41. Iyengar and Westwood.
42. Zingher and Flynn, “From On High: The Effect of Elite Polarization On Mass Attitudes and Behaviors,
1972–2012.”

13
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

warfare” strategy.43

1.2.2 Realignment and Changes in the Electorate

Brief Overview of Realignment

Political parties are not eternal coalitions. Demographic support for each

party varies across each election to some degree. Moreover, some elections

have dramatic shifts, demographically, regionally, and ideologically, regarding

what our political party system looks like. Realignments are a natural part

of the political cycle, with a unique definition by Frank DiStefano, “Political

realignments are part of a cycle built deep into the political structure of the

American republic. They’re much like earthquakes that occur on known fault

lines in the earth.”44 Realignment literature was based upon the work of V.O.

Key, who posited the presidential elections of 1896 and 1932 as realignment

elections that led to substantial changes in the political realm.45 Frank DiSte-

fano further describes the party system as being stable for suddenly breaking

down.

For long periods of time, political parties stay fundamentally the

same, attracting similar coalitions and standing for a consistent set
of ideas. Then they suddenly break, whether through one sharp
“critical election” or a longer period of disruption, unleashing an
unstable era of turbulence and change. New parties arise in the
turmoil, attracting different coalitions and standing for different
43. Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die; What History Tells Us About Our Future, Crown.
44. DiStefano, The Next Realignment: Why America’s Parties Are Crumbling and What Happens Next.
45. Valdimer O Key Jr, “A Theory of Critical Elections,” The Journal of Politics 17, no. 1 (1955): 3–18.

14
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

ideas. Most important, what defines these parties and the breaks
between them is the rise of new issues and ideas.46

Realignment is a pivotal process because it helps define the different eras and

party systems and when parties change. While ‘critical realignment’ focuses

on specific elections, ‘secular realignment’ is a more gradual process, defined

as “Political elites make gradual changes in response to shifts in opinions on

issues and preferences of the electorate. (Key 1959)”47 This is similar to the

concept of changes in the electorate.

[it] refers to alterations in the way individuals or groups of individ-

uals engage or interact with parties. Work in this area describes
why people change their party affiliations or what factors motivate
their decisions to participate in political processes. On the other
hand, work about changes in elite-level politics refers to the ways
that parties and/or candidates construct or reshape their strategies
or policy positions as they interact with the electorate and seek to
build coalitions.48

Changes in the electorate are slightly different, but both concepts contribute

to the general understanding of how American politics shifts.

Realignment and Race

Race is one of the most fundamental parts of political politics, and many

argue that it also plays a role in realignment and electorate change. George
46. DiStefano, The Next Realignment: Why America’s Parties Are Crumbling and What Happens Next.
47. Keneshia Nicole Grant, “Relocation and Realignment: How the Great Migration Changed the Face of
the Democratic Party” (PhD diss., Syracuse University, 2014).
48. Grant.

15
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

Goethals argues that a primary factor driving realignment is “racial dynam-

ics. Furthermore, these racial dynamics are perpetuated largely by social

identity concerns; that is, people’s need to have their political leaders vali-

date themselves and the groups by which they define themselves.”49 Under

this framework, concern over racial dynamics that challenged social hierar-

chies or seemed to conflict with the in-group social identity led to realign-

ment. Goethals notes explicitly that “Challenges or alternatives to a South-

ern social identity based on white superiority were fiercely resisted”50 as an

impetus behind several realignment elections. Keneshia Grant looks at how

African-American migrants during the Great Migration affected the political

landscape with

political actors—parties and politicians—responded to the changes

in the electorate in a number of ways: (1) they took positions to at-
tract support from Black voters; (2) they worked to mobilize Black
voters during election campaigns; and (3) in some instances, when
they were unwilling to meet Black demands, they worked to limit
the power of Black voters by demobilizing the population.51

Ideology and common issues do still play a role in this process as ”on the

basis of Black voters’ reaction to the New Deal, Democrats understood that

Black voters might be a group that was amenable to the new positions of the

party—positions that increasingly advocated for the expansion of the federal

49. Goethals, Realignment, Region, and Race: Presidential Leadership and Social Identity.
50. Goethals.
51. Grant, “Relocation and Realignment: How the Great Migration Changed the Face of the Democratic
Party.”

16
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

government’s role in social welfare and civil rights issues.”52

Critique of Realignment

The realignment literature is only sometimes accepted, with several critiques

of the genre. Notably, David Mayhew describes the literature as “the rules are

unclear and the past is uncharted.”53 Specifically, that statistical analysis of

the classic 19th and 20th-century presidential contests fails to distinguish the

‘realigning’ elections outside of 1932, with Mayhew remarking “that short-

term, deviating electoral change is one thing; long-term, realigning change

is another.”54 Mayhew’s further use of previous quantitative research leads

him to find that “To recapitulate, neither statistics nor stories bear out the

canonical realignments calendar of 1860, 1896, and 1932. Something like faith

seems to be needed to keep it in place.”55 Mayhew finds the concept dismissive

and reductive of voters’ agency, noting, “It is a Rip Van Winkle view of

democracy that voters come awake only once a generation.”56 Ultimately, he

dismisses the theoretical framework(s) by declaring, “The ambitious version

of the realignments perspective had its fruitful days, but it is too slippery,

too binary, too apocalyptic, and it has come to be too much of a dead end.”57

52. Grant.
53. David R Mayhew, Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre (Yale University Press,
2008).
54. Mayhew.
55. Mayhew.
56. Mayhew.
57. Mayhew.

17
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

1.2.3 Populism

Brief Overview of Populism Theory

When discussing populism, its variety across several contexts makes it chal-

lenging to define narrowly. A useful definition by Sheri Berman is below:

political movement or party emphasizing a Manichean, us-versus-

them worldview in which the “us” refers to the “people,” defined of-
ten in ethnic or communal terms and seen as engaged in a zero-sum
battle with “them,” defined most often as liberal elites, the estab-
lishment, and minorities and/or immigrants. Populists, moreover,
claim to be democratic—indeed, much of their rhetoric is based on
the idea that the existing political system has ignored, neglected, or
outright worked against the interests of the people—but democracy
is understood in majoritarian and illiberal terms58

Causes of populism fall into two categories: demand-side and supply-side

explanations. Demand-side focuses “on society or individuals in their anal-

yses of Populism.”59 These explanations would focus on economic concerns

(‘economic anxiety’) or sociocultural worries such as “rising immigration, the

decline of traditional values, and the mobilization of women and minority

groups” or the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States.60

While supply-side explanations are centered on “changes in the nature of

democracy itself, in particular the growing inability or unwillingness of elites

and institutions to supply responses to citizens’ demands. . . on the failures

58. Sheri Berman, “The Causes of Populism in the West,” Annual Review of Political Science 24 (2021):
71–88.
59. Berman.
60. Berman.

18
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

of governments, politicians, policy makers, parties, and other actors in their

analyses of populism.”61 Supply-side theories would posit that the success of

populism depends on the “decline of responsiveness and effectiveness of polit-

ical institutions, which has made many citizens willing to vote for politicians

and parties with antiestablishment, anti–status quo messages.”62 Populism

has a long history in the United States, with notable examples from the

20th Century including “Huey Long’s Share the Wealth movement, Joe Mc-

Carthy’s witch-hunting communists, and George Wallace’s white backlash”63 ,

along with (arguably) Pat Buchanan.

Right-wing populism is often exclusionary and authoritarian, as these

movements value “(1) the importance of security against risks of instabil-

ity and disorder. . . (2) the value of group conformity to preserve conventional

traditions and guard our way of life. . . and (3) the need for loyal obedience

toward strong leaders who protect the group and its customs (‘I alone can

fix it,’”64 This total deference to “Authoritarian values blended with populist

rhetoric can be regarded as a dangerous combination fueling a cult of fear”65 ,

as fear of the other is required for such illiberal movements to thrive.

61. Berman.
62. Berman.
63. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism
(Cambridge University Press, 2019).
64. Norris and Inglehart.
65. Norris and Inglehart.

19
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

Impact of Populism on Political Parties

The impact of populism on the American political realm cannot be under-

stated. Trump’s ascendancy to the highest office in the land marked the

victory of the populist right faction of the Republican Party. John Heile-

mann, the managing editor of Bloomberg Politics, said in 2016, “This was

the year of bipartisan, ecumenical, populist rage, and it was enough that

the figure of Donald Trump was able to marshal that populist outrage and

engineer a hostile takeover of the Republican Party.”66 Trump’s embrace of

the culture war helped “turned [politics] angry, zero-sum, moralistic, and

destructive—while also discouraging the sorts of pragmatic and innovative

reforms that renewing our parties would entail.”67 This new front of political

competition scrambled voters and pols alike with “some of those who con-

sider themselves part of each party’s most committed “base” don’t actually

believe fully in their party’s official ideology—and then seek to enforce their

alternative version as the true one.”68 Donald Trump’s remaking of the Re-

publican Party in his image has left it confused about its policy stances, a

fracturing coalition as Republicans try and square the circle of their current

and former belief systems.

Due to this inability to square the circle, incoherence substitutes policy,

leading to further outrage and solidifying Trump as the populist icon. As

66. Rackaway and Rice, American Political Parties Under Pressure: Strategic Adaptations for a Changing
Electorate.
67. DiStefano, The Next Realignment: Why America’s Parties Are Crumbling and What Happens Next.
68. DiStefano.

20
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

William Howell and Terry Moe discuss, “The GOP under Trump has fur-

thered a populist doom loop in which he disrupts government, alienating his

supporters from the state even more and, in turn, causing them to double

down in their support of populists.”69 Incoherence, ineffectiveness, and out-

rage provide fertile ground for the success of populism, creating incentives

for Trump and other populist figures to further these attitudes rather than

solve them.

Populism, Partisanship, and Ideology

As mentioned previously, populism is more than a left-right issue or a party

preference. It is a conceptual model of politics. Populism in its more con-

spiratorial and fringe versions can be dangerous as with “enough scale to

disrupt politics and culture, it has the power to breed distrust in institu-

tions, divorce people from the political order, and enhance susceptibilities

to dangerous narratives and those who traffic in them.”70 In fact, it may be

that “normatively disconcerting attitudes we oftentimes attribute to parti-

san tribalism may be the work of another dimension of opinion,”71 that of

populism and anti-establishment views. Uscinsiki et al.’s study found that

Candidates who employ anti-establishment rhetoric, be it through

conspiracy theories or populist appeals, may be able to activate peo-
69. William G Howell and Terry M Moe, “Response to Daniel W. Drezner’s Review of Presidents, Populism,
and the Crisis of Democracy,” Perspectives on Politics 19, no. 2 (2021): 591–591.
70. Joseph E Uscinski et al., “American Politics in Two Dimensions: Partisan and Ideological Identities
Versus Anti-Establishment Orientations,” American Journal of Political Science 65, no. 4 (2021): 877–895.
71. Uscinski et al.

21
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

ple’s anti-establishment orientations and connect them to salient

political choices (e.g., voting), effectively pulling the once orthog-
onal anti-establishment dimension in the direction of their end of
the left-right dimension. Anti-establishment orientations may not
be strong enough to override left-right orientations when it comes
to salient, partisan presidential candidates for most people. How-
ever, they may reduce the impact of left-right considerations by
presenting a new framework.72

Another of their findings was that “even when it comes to misinformation

and conspiracy theories with a salient partisan or ideological component,

some combination of left-right and anti-establishment motivations underwrite

belief; these are not merely the product of partisan-motivated reasoning.”73

Populism is not entirely separate from or a part of the left-right axis, with its

influence on voters’ beliefs and partisanship being a highly relevant topic. The

interaction between the more traditional left-right dichotomy and populist

attitudes is a crucial dynamic in the modern Republican Party and Donald

Trump.

This may explain some of the drastic shifts among white voters in the

2016 presidential election. In 2016, white voters with college degrees bolted

away from Donald Trump, while white voters without college degrees flocked

toward him.

Among white college graduates, according to the national exit poll,

Trump’s three-point margin was the smallest in decades, and far
72. Uscinski et al., “American Politics in Two Dimensions: Partisan and Ideological Identities Versus
Anti-Establishment Orientations.”
73. Uscinski et al.

22
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE LITERATURE REVIEW

smaller than Mitt Romney’s 14-point margin in 2012. Among white

voters without college degrees, however, Trump’s 37-point margin
was much greater than Romney’s already impressive 25-point mar-
gin. Related to the education divide, the exit polls showed that,
among white voters, the class divide was also much larger than the
gender divide74

White working-class voters had long been drifting away from the Democratic

Party, and this cements that change for the foreseeable future. Yet the flight

of white college graduates can be explained by their dislike of Trump’s pop-

ulist, derogatory appeal, which so endeared him to his diehard supporters.

1.2.4 Presidency

Presidential Authority and Unilateralism

Presidential authority refers to the powers and capabilities of the President,

such as their ability to issue executive orders and their control of the ad-

ministrative state. Presidential use of executive power is a tool to bypass

Congress. However, their use depends “on both the ideological alignment of

the president and Congress as well as changes in legislative capacity to limit

executive action through statutory discretion and oversight.”75 This frame-

work is not static across Presidential administrations or even during them

as factors change, like “When congressional capacity is low, the President

can more effectively circumvent a hostile Congress through unilateral action.

74. Abramowitz and McCoy, “United States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and Polarization
in Trump’s America.”
75. Alexander Bolton and Sharece Thrower, “Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism,” American
Journal of Political Science 60, no. 3 (2016): 649–663.

23
LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

In these times, he issues more executive orders when his preferences diverge

from Congress.”76 Over the past decade or so, though, there has been an “ex-

pansion of executive power and the decline in legislative authority have been

fueled by complementary forces of increased congressional polarization and

decreased legislative capacity.77 Legislative capacity is simply the extent to

which Congress can pass legislation and actively engage in the balance of pow-

ers, and crucially with “recent conditions of divided government and highly

competitive, approximate parity in the strength of parties at the national

level, have led to the expansion of executive authority at the expense of a

diminished legislature.”78 When presidents want to accomplish their agenda,

unilateral action is an attractive route, especially when faced with a hostile,

incapable Congress. Understanding the concepts of presidential power and

executive style helps better ground the reader regarding how presidents ap-

proach their power and in what ways this understanding has broadened in

recent Republican administrations.”

1.2.5 Gaps

When looking at the election of Donald Trump, gaining a brief understanding

of how political parties, party elites, realignment and changes in the elec-

torate, populism, and expanding presidential authority work is crucial. How-

76. Bolton and Thrower, “Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism.”
77. Edward G Carmines and Matthew Fowler, “The Temptation of Executive Authority: How Increased
Polarization and the Decline in Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the Expansion of Presidential
Power,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 24, no. 2 (2017): 369–398.
78. Carmines and Fowler.

24
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS

ever, some gaps remain, including how party ideologies change. As “Gerring

wasn’t sure himself what accounted for the development of a party’s ideol-

ogy or what made ideologies suddenly change after long eras of stability.”79

Party ideologies, as we have seen, are undergoing a period of intense change.

Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to say that Trump discarded all of pre-

vious Republican thought. Analyzing these dynamics as a whole is necessary

to fit Donald Trump into a larger context of Republican presidents, their

platforms, policy administration, and presidential conduct. This would give

better context into the changes of party ideology and what they even mean

in the current American political system.

1.3 Research Question and Hypothesis

My research question is: how has the Republican Party, on an ideological and

policy basis, changed from Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump, and to what

degree, if any, have changes in the electorate played in this process?

I hypothesize that Donald Trump did mark a significant break from the

Republican Party on social and economic issues, which he attempted to ex-

ecute through his expansion of executive power; these developments were

furthered by the changes in the electorate over the preceding decades since

the victory of Ronald Reagan, which supported the Republican Party’s pop-

ulist and authoritarian elements, resulting in Donald Trump’s victory in 2016

79. John Gerring, Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996 (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

25
METHODS CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

and subsequent dominance over the Republican Party.

1.4 Methods

My primary data source will be the Republican Party presidential platforms

from 1980 onwards. Party platforms are the official statements of what parties

and presidential candidates want to communicate to the public, what they

view as important, and how to resolve the salient issues of the day. They

serve as a statement of the candidate’s ideals and goals while also attempting

to unify the party around said beliefs. Tracking the party platforms will allow

me to chart the Republican Party’s evolution and more accurately fit Donald

Trump’s platform and policy into that of his predecessors.

Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980 demonstrated the success of the conserva-

tive wing of the Republican Party on the federal level over its more moderate

counterparts. By selecting this timeframe from 1980 onwards, I can focus

on the era when conservatism firmly took the reins of the modern Republi-

can party and see the differences within the conservative movement that has

dominated the party.

I will also be using secondary sources and other relevant academic litera-

ture to provide more context and information about the policy administration

of key issues across Republican presidential administrations within the rele-

vant timeframe, with a focus on executive unilateralism and authority. This

is a necessary component to provide a fuller view of where the Republican

26
CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE CONTRIBUTIONS

Party is going in terms of its views and practices about policy and execu-

tive power. Further, by integrating other primary and secondary sources,

this study can help contextualize the ways that Donald Trump is a uniquely

damaging, anti-democratic, and populist figure and also where he fits into

more of a historical pattern of executive unilateralism and right-wing author-

itarianism.

1.5 Contributions

This study aims to provide more detail regarding the specific issues that

Donald Trump differed from his recent Republican predecessors, answering

whether it was just in style, scope, or policy grounds. By tracking salient

social and economic issues throughout this period’s presidential platforms

and administrations, I aim to show where Donald Trump fits in. This is

important as it can serve as an indication of whether a Donald Trump-esque

figure was inevitable or not. Did the Republican Party already build the

road for right-wing authoritarian populism to take over the party in the 21st

Century? The party platforms may be able to demonstrate certain warning

signs that the party was about to fall to demagoguery.

Secondly, trying to gain a greater understanding of how the electorate

played a role in the process of the party platforms and the nature of the

party itself, changing. Donald Trump’s populist appeal did not spring out

of the ground from nowhere; previous attempts by Ron Paul in 2012, Sarah

27
CONTRIBUTIONS CHAPTER 1. WHERE WE ARE

Palin in 2008, and Pat Buchanan during the 1990s commanded significant

sway, yet none were able to accomplish the final goal of victory in the party’s

presidential primary. How had the party changed in the intervening years,

and how had such right-wing populism become more attractive?

Right-wing authoritarianist populism is not going away from the current

iteration of the Republican Party anytime soon. Gaining a greater under-

standing of how party ideologies change and how such populism interacts

with the party and the electorate can help give insight into where the Repub-

lican Party is today and where it might be in a post-Donald Trump future.

28
 Chapter 2

How We Got Here: Change in Party

Platforms and Electorates Over Time

2.1 Overview

The United States has had many politically polarizing, corrupt, or controver-

sial presidents, yet few have been as self-interested and autocratic as the 45th

President. The election of Donald Trump appeared to be a total rejection of

Republican orthodoxy on many issues. That someone who seemed to target

the previous idols of Republican beliefs about free trade, protectionism, immi-

gration, and welfare could have so completely won over the Republican voter

base was notable. His conduct before and during his presidency was spiteful,

bullying, and occasionally racist. His embrace of executive unilateralism and

his rhetoric around limits on his power demonstrated his full-throated wish

to be a dictator. He was impeached twice and constantly embroiled in scan-

dal, with all of these factors culminating in the events of January 6th, 2021.

29
OVERVIEW CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

The Republican Party’s fervent embrace of Donald Trump requires a serious

examination of how we reached this point.

Since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the Republican Party has

shifted to the conservative right, shorning nearly all of what remained of its

liberal and moderate flanks.80 Reagan believed in low taxes, reduced welfare

spending, free trade, and a militant interventionist foreign policy.81 These

remained the pillars of Republican ideology, though not without its detrac-

tors, until Donald Trump’s victory in 2016. Trump relied upon white, largely

non-college-educated voters in the traditionally Democratic states of Wiscon-

sin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania82 to overcome staggeringly high disapproval

ratings83 and win the Electoral College by a combined 80,000 votes. Trump’s

voter base was discontent with elites of both parties, globalization, minori-

ties of all stripes, and the political system in general.84 The degree to which

the changing electorate “gradually, then suddenly” reshaped the Republican

Party is still being debated today. To understand how Trump was able to

win both the presidential primary and general election in 2016, we must look

at the changes in the Republican Party since 1980 to track its evolution and

to contextualize Donald Trump among the Republican presidents and party

leaders in the Reagan era onwards. This process will help determine which is-
80. Seib, We Should Have Seen it Coming: From Reagan to Trump–a Front-Row Seat to a Political Revo-
lution.
81. Goethals, Realignment, Region, and Race: Presidential Leadership and Social Identity.
82. Goethals.
83. Abramowitz and McCoy, “United States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and Polarization
in Trump’s America.”
84. Abramowitz and McCoy.

30
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE RONALD REAGAN

sues and governing styles Trump followed that of his Republican predecessors

and where he was a radical break.

2.2 Ronald Reagan

The 1980 Platform

Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential platform was hopeful and uplifting. It fo-

cused on highlighting the perceived weaknesses and inadequacies of the Carter

administration, proclaiming that “America is adrift. Our country moves ag-

onizingly, aimlessly, almost helplessly into one of the most dangerous and

disorderly periods in history.”85 The country was “continuing downward spi-

ral in economic vitality and international influence.”86 The language evokes

despair and bleakness, yet quickly, the tone shifts to a much more posi-

tive, unifying rhetorical vision. Now, the Republican Party seeks to “affirm

our deep commitment to the fulfillment of the hopes and aspirations of all

Americans—blacks and whites, women and men, the young and old, rural

and urban,”87 that while the Democratic Party could not fulfill these latent

dreams, the Republicans would, on a broad national level.

Economic policy prescriptions are presented as providing more choices,

liberty, and freedom. Taxes were to be cut, and raises were to be slowed as
85. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of
1980,” The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted), https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273420.
86. Peters and Woolley.
87. Peters and Woolley.

31
RONALD REAGAN CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

they “generate increases in economic growth, output, and income, which will

ultimately generate increased revenues. The greater justification for these

cuts, however, lies in the right of individuals to keep and use the money they

earn.”88 According to the theory, people are better qualified to spend their

own money than the government. These policies were libertarian-esque in

nature, marking a shift away from Ford and Nixon’s more moderate Keyne-

sian policies in favor of the monetarist policies supported by Milton Friedman

and other Austrian economists from the Chicago School of Economics.

Welfare was another significant focus of the economic section of the plat-

form with specific fixes. The platform promised to clean up the “degrad-

ing, dehumanizing, wasteful, overlapping, and inefficient programs that invite

waste and fraud but inadequately assist the needy poor.”89 This was to be

accomplished by fixing the ‘poverty trap’ of welfare assistance being greater

than earned income, reducing government spending, and reforming welfare

programs to a smaller, localized program with less federal oversight was the

goal, firmly in line with the idea of state control and weakening the federal

bureaucracy. The federal government should stay out of the way of the states,

which should be free to design their programs.

The platform sections on jobs and international trade firmly promote eco-

nomic growth as the key economic policy goal of the Republican Party, par-

ticularly export-led growth that would help revitalize the domestic economy.
88. Peters and Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of 1980.”
89. Peters and Woolley.

32
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE RONALD REAGAN

The platform acknowledges some of the economic displacement of foreign

trade: “Much of this problem is a result of the present Administration’s in-

ability to negotiate foreign trade agreements which do not jeopardize Amer-

ican jobs.”90 Foreign trade may have some adverse effects, but that was due

to the Carter administration’s inability or unwillingness to prioritize Amer-

ican workers’ interests to eliminate foreign trade barriers. Protectionism is

a threat “as protectionist tariffs and quotas are detrimental to our economic

well-being. . . The Republican Party will consider appropriate measures neces-

sary to restore equal and fair competition between ourselves and our trading

partners.”91 Free trade was a nearly unparalleled good, yet the Democrats

could not remove protectionist barriers, a significant barrier to economic revi-

talization. Therefore, a Republican president would hold them accountable,

ensuring that foreign countries would have to truly open their markets or

face unspecified retaliatory actions. Protectionism was the obstacle to be

overcome and not something that the United States should be engaging in,

save only as a last resort.

America’s position had never been so precarious since the interwar period,

evoking memories of Pearl Harbor, World War II, and the constant Soviet

presence as an encroaching hegemonic threat that required substantial mili-

tary investment to counter. The platform called for “sustained defense expen-

diture sufficient to close the gap with the Soviets, and ultimately reach the

90. Peters and Woolley.

91. Peters and Woolley.

33
RONALD REAGAN CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

position of military superiority.”92 Military spending had to rise drastically in

order to fund the new programs and armaments outlined in the section. The

United States would center our foreign policy goals around “pursue positive

non-military means to roll back the growth of communism. . . help our allies

and other non-Communist countries defend themselves against Communist

aggression.”93 Foreign policy was to be militarist and realist, skeptical of the

international realm and arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union

and the United States. To do otherwise, our varied enemies, but especially

the Soviets, would continue to take advantage of us, leaving us feeble and

unable to maintain a credible deterrence, either conventional or nuclear.

The platform is hopeful but realistic. It seeks to promote people’s eco-

nomic freedom from government, reduce taxation and spending, and stake a

more militant role in the global arena.

The 1984 Platform

In 1984, Ronald Reagan was the incumbent President, whereas in 1980, he

could run as an oppositional candidate; now, he had to run on his record in

office. The preamble consciously echos the 1980 platform: “The Republican

Party looks at our people and sees a new dawn of the American spirit.”94

As before, the optimistic view of the nation pervades the entire party plat-
92. Peters and Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of 1980.”
93. Peters and Woolley.
94. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of
1984,” The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted), https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273427.

34
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE RONALD REAGAN

form. Its thesis was, “From freedom comes opportunity; from opportunity

comes growth; from growth comes progress.”95 Economically, there are a few

changes: “Not every problem cries out for a federal solution. We must help

the poor escape poverty by building an economy which creates more jobs,

the greatest poverty fighter of them all.”96 The remaining economic sections

touched on where the Reagan administration had succeeded on inflation, tax

cuts, and indexing the tax code as noted policy victories. While pointing

out that the Democratic Congress had not cut spending to the level Reagan

and other Republicans wanted, insisting that balanced budgets must come

from spending cuts, not taxation. The platform decries the relatively weak

hand of the presidency in budget negotiations, supporting a line-item veto

to empower the executive.97 The “welfare industry” had been fought and in-

flation defeated, allowing economic growth to lift people out of poverty and

lessening government dependence98 . The platform calls for revisions to the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to expand market access for goods

and reduce government interventions in markets: the platform also calls for

“reviewing trade with totalitarian regimes.”99 Trade could be used against

American interests either economically or in terms of geopolitics.

Foreign policy and international relations gained more details around ef-

forts to resist the Soviet Union, while defense spending was not as central
95. Peters and Woolley.
96. Peters and Woolley.
97. Peters and Woolley.
98. Peters and Woolley.
99. Peters and Woolley.

35
RONALD REAGAN CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

to the platform. The central goal of Reagan’s foreign policy was to “main-

tain our freedom in a peaceful international environment in which the United

States and our allies and friends are secure against military threats.”100 Com-

munist states or movements in countries like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, El

Salvador, Angola, and Grenada, among others. Again, the stance around di-

rect talks with the Soviets signaled a hardline position, stating that “any

future agreement with the Soviets must require full compliance, be fully

verifiable, and contain suitable sanctions for non-compliance.”101 This was

not to negate future diplomacy but to eke out where Reagan stood rhetor-

ically. Indeed, precursors to Reagan’s proposals on nuclear weapons are in

the platform with the administration “seek[ing] substantial reductions in nu-

clear weapons, rather than merely freezing nuclear weapons at their present

dangerous level.”102 The section is brief but noteworthy in that diplomacy,

even around nuclear weapons, was not foreclosed.

The platform is similar to its predecessor, with some mild changes, espe-

cially around detailing administration victories and a more concrete global

foreign policy aimed at countering perceived Soviet influence.

100. Peters and Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of 1984.”
101. Peters and Woolley.
102. Peters and Woolley.

36
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE GEORGE H.W. BUSH

2.3 George H.W. Bush

The 1988 Platform

As George H.W. Bush wished to ascend from Vice President to President,

the 1988 platform is often celebratory in tone. It seeks to remind Americans

that the economic recovery since the early 1980s was thanks to the Reagan

administration getting the federal government out of the way. The platform

promised, “people direct government and government empowers people to

solve their own problems and to have more choices in their lives. . . military

strength, diplomatic resoluteness, and firm leadership are necessary to keep

our country and our allies free.”103 Economically, the rhetoric strictly ad-

hered to the platforms of the Reagan administration: no new taxes, wealth

creation, entrepreneurship, and reduced welfare spending. Support for free

trade is even greater if possible, “We will not accept the loss of American jobs

to nationalized, subsidized, protected foreign industries and will continue to

negotiate assertively the destruction of trade barriers.”104 The new Bush ad-

ministration would continue to remove trade barriers aggressively, improve

market access for American goods, and reduce unfair trade practices in the

global system. Bush also ardently argues against American protectionism,

proclaiming that “protectionism, an economic narcotic that saps the life out
103. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of
1988,” The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted), https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273433.
104. Peters and Woolley.

37
GEORGE H.W. BUSH CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

of commerce, closes foreign markets to U.S. producers and growers, and costs

American consumers billions of dollars.”105

The platform staunchly supports internationalism from a more realistic

perspective. Military might and strength are referenced throughout to defend

and promote freedom and democracy. Bush would center his foreign policy

around “defending the United States of America and its people; protecting

America’s vital national interests abroad; and fostering peace, stability and

security throughout the world through democratic self-determination and

economic prosperity.”106 Our foreign policy must defend ourselves and our

interests and promote economic and democratic freedom. Diplomacy with

the Soviet Union is necessary and encouraged, but “dialogue and engagement

can be successful only if undertaken from a position of strength.”107 The

Republican party knows how the world works, unlike the naive fantasies of

liberals, is the subtext of this passage. It aligns with the prior platforms

during the Reagan era of 1980 and 1984.

The 1992 Platform

President George H.W. Bush sought his own re-election; the world was chang-

ing drastically with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Iraqi invasion of

Kuwait, and subsequent liberation, to name two key events. The platform

portrays the collapse of the Soviet Union as the grand defeat of not just
105. Peters and Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of 1988.”
106. Peters and Woolley.
107. Peters and Woolley.

38
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE GEORGE H.W. BUSH

communism but also the Democratic ideals of a stronger federal government

as they “revise history to rationalize a return to bigger government, higher

taxes, and moral relativism.”108 In contrast, “Presidents Reagan and Bush

turned our Nation away from the path of over-taxation, hyper-regulation,

and mega-government. . . We cut taxes, reduced red tape.”109 The Republi-

can party continued to stand against the Democratic standards of higher

taxation, regulation, or supporting the mess of welfare.110 The familiar bro-

mides on economic issues continued to emphasize entrepreneurship, small

business, and freedom of and from government, attacking the Democratic

party’s tax-and-spend regulatory big government nature.

Regarding free trade, the Bush administration talks about its successes in

promoting economic liberalization worldwide, as export-led growth supported

significant numbers of jobs and industries. The platform declares, “We are

tough free traders, battling to sweep away barriers to our exports,”111 The re-

duction of global trade barriers was akin to an evangelical mission: to reduce

market barriers for American goods wherever they might be and eliminate

subsidies to the greatest extent possible. The North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA) was a critical success. In conjunction with the goal of

economic freedom, “U.S. aid, whether bilateral or through international or-

108. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of
1992,” The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted), https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273439.
109. Peters and Woolley.
110. Peters and Woolley.
111. Peters and Woolley.

39
GEORGE H.W. BUSH CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

ganizations, should promote market reforms, limit regulation, and encourage

free trade.”112 These were the economic ideals of the administration domes-

tically and internationally.

On defense and foreign policy, the platform is nigh laudatory towards

President Bush for the end of the Soviet Union finishing the “crusade of a

half-century, to champion freedom and civilization against the dark night of

totalitarianism, is now victorious.”113 The defeat of the evil empire, as Reagan

called it, was one of the greatest foreign policy successes of the post-World

War II order. Bush also warned of the dangers of isolationism, saying, “His-

tory teaches that when the United States shrinks from the world, we hasten

the emergence of new dangers.”114 In this vein of cautious optimism on the

international scene, the platform called for the “difficult task of reducing both

the size and cost of defense without letting down America’s guard.”115 For

the first time since the covered time frame, the Republican platform formally

called for reductions to the defense budget. The world was a different place,

and the party changed its stance on defense spending to some extent. Still,

the era of Ronald Reagan to George H.W. Bush showed far more continuity

on the selected issues than change; the details may have depended on the

year, but the larger ideological project remained intact and seemingly poised

to dominate the Republican party for years to come.

112. 1992.
113. Peters and Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of 1992.”
114. Peters and Woolley.
115. Peters and Woolley.

40
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE ROBERT DOLE

2.4 Robert Dole

The 1996 Platform

In 1992, former Arkansas governor Bill Clinton defeated George H.W. Bush,

and the Republican presidential primary was open for the second time since

Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980. In 1996, Senator Robert Dole of Kansas,

a vice presidential candidate in 1976 with President Gerold Ford and then-

serving as leader of the Republican Senate Caucus, was the victor. According

to this platform, the Clinton administration was a disaster, socially, morally,

and economically, and a new Republican administration put the United States

back on the right path.

Economically, the emphasis is on “American enterprise and creativity will

carry it, free from unnecessary taxes, regulation, and litigation”116 , which is

very much in line with Reagan’s ideals. With free trade, alongside the calls

for improved market access and expansion of export-led growth, there is a

more explicit call for “vigorous enforcement of the trade agreements we al-

ready have on the books. . . , promote market reforms, limit regulation, and

encourage free trade. . . Republicans will not allow the World Trade Organiza-

tion to undermine United States sovereignty.”117 Now, this enforcement was

still in the context of promoting free trade, and the section is clear on that,
116. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of
1996,” The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted), https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273441.
117. Peters and Woolley.

41
ROBERT DOLE CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

but it is a slight shift in expanding on the levers to stop unfair trade practices

and dismissing the role of the World Trade Organization.

Regarding foreign policy, it contrasts the hopeful, optimistic tone of prior

sections and platforms with a more pessimistic outlook. The platform de-

clared that the “international situation - and our country’s security against

the purveyors of evil - has worsened over the last three and a half years.”118

The Clinton administration had a “rudderless foreign policy”119 , and was in-

capable of promoting strength, freedom, and democracy on the international

scene120 . This section recalls the negativity of the Carter administration’s for-

eign policy, continuing a line of attack that Democrats are ineffective, weak,

and not able to promote America’s international goals. Indeed, the compari-

son between Carter and Clinton is even more apparent regarding defense, as

Clinton’s “amateur approach to military matters and dramatic reductions in

defense spending. . . Not since the “Hollow Army” days of Jimmy Carter.”121

This marks a change from the 1992 platform and a return to the calls for

increased defense spending and new weapon programs, which is hard to ac-

complish while promoting the Balanced Budget Amendment. The sections

on foreign policy and defense did change from 1992. However, they were still

broadly in line with Reagan’s policies. They were primarily a function of

being out of power, like in 1980, and portraying the party as the fix to the

118. Peters and Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of 1996.”
119. Peters and Woolley.
120. Peters and Woolley.
121. Peters and Woolley.

42
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE GEORGE W. BUSH

Democratic-inflicted woes.

2.5 George W. Bush

The 2000 Platform

George W. Bush, son of George H.W. Bush and Governor of Texas, won the

2000 Republican presidential nomination to take on Vice President Al Gore.

The party had not won a presidential election since his father in 1988, twelve

years prior. This platform emphasizes the choice, opportunity, optimism, and

new vision the Republican party offers the American people after eight years

of the Clinton presidency. Economically, America was prosperous thanks to

the Republican government of Presidents Reagan and H.W. Bush, yet the old

target of “over-taxation of the American people. The weak link in the chain of

prosperity is the tax system.”122 Taxati sapped the country’s economic health,

preventing economic growth, opportunity, and progress as the phrase went,

so it needed to be cut down to reduce government size. Reforms to Social

Security were highlighted to the greatest extent since 1980123 , promoting

individual saving accounts and economic choice and ruling out tax increases

to continue funding the program. The welfare reform section praises previous

efforts to reduce welfare dependence and directs future efforts to support

faith-based providers.
122. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, 2000 Republican Party Platform,”
The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted), https://www.presiden
cy.ucsb.edu/node/273446.
123. Peters and Woolley.

43
GEORGE W. BUSH CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

Free trade remained central to the American economy and the Republican

vision of export-led growth. The platform calls for expanding WTO negoti-

ations, presidential negotiation authority, and market access for goods and

services. Protectionism abroad would not be tolerated, as George W. Bush

would pursue “vigorous enforcement of U.S. trade laws against unfair com-

petition.”124 Protectionism at home would be opposed as well, noting how

Republicans had to push for free trade initiatives and how Clinton “turned

to Republican leadership in the Congress to enact permanent normal trade

relations with China.”125

Foreign policy and defense spending are in line with previous claims, cri-

tiquing Clinton and Democrats for being leaderless, ineffective, and too weak

on the international stage. The platform proclaims that “the [Clinton] ad-

ministration has squandered the opportunity granted to the United States

by the courage and sacrifice of previous generations.”126 Democrats had only

doubled down on their mistakes since the Carter years, weakening our stand-

ing and military strength; this neglect requires “spending more and investing

wisely to transform our military into a true twenty-first century force.”127

The platform thematically focuses more attention on democratic ideals

of liberty and freedom as goals to aspire to both at home and abroad. We

see changes regarding health care, and new attention is being paid to Social

124. Peters and Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, 2000 Republican Party Platform.”
125. Peters and Woolley.
126. Peters and Woolley.
127. Peters and Woolley.

44
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE GEORGE W. BUSH

Security reforms via individual saving accounts. Foreign policy is centered

around the spread of democracy and freedom, encouragement of market lib-

eralization and trade across the globe, and increases in defense spending and

investment. There are changes on some domestic issues and more significant

promotion of democratic principles, yet substantively, the platform remains

in line with Reaganism.

The 2004 Platform

In the closest election in modern American presidential history, George W.

Bush was the victor over Al Gore with 537 votes in Florida, which remains

mildly controversial for various reasons. Then, of course, the terrorist attacks

on September 11th, 2001, reshaped the political landscape, domestically and

internationally, on so many issues. The Second Gulf War (Operation Iraqi

Freedom) began in March of 2003, becoming another extremely relevant for-

eign policy topic. The platform is also dedicated to Ronald Reagan after his

passing. Defense and foreign policy are critical to this platform, especially

regarding the above issues.

Economically, the platform details the Bush tax cuts, Medicare reform,

and the great benefits of free trade. The Bush tax cuts were presented as

returning Americans’ wealth to them, promoting investment, and arguing

why they should be made permanent128 , very standard. Welfare reform is

128. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, 2004 Republican Party Platform,”
The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted), https://www.presiden
cy.ucsb.edu/node/273450.

45
GEORGE W. BUSH CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

briefly mentioned, but more attention is given to Medicare reform, primarily

the drug benefit coverage, as “While others spent many years talking. . . this

President and this Congress got it done.”129 While not welfare and including

several conservative policies, it was a notable expansion of a social program

and a departure from limiting spending for such programs. Free trade is

elevated to being explicitly a social good. It is given the evangelical mission

of spreading “the benefits of freedom across the globe – by actively working

to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to

every corner of the world.”130 Trade is more than economic development; it

is social as well. While such ideas were present in prior platforms, they are

far more fleshed out and central to this edition.

Foreign policy is front and center in this platform; the War on Terror and

its various facets are prioritized. The Bush administration had “rallied Amer-

ica to its calling – to make the world safer and better.”131 The constant focus

is on terrorism, terrorists, Afghanistan, and Iraq as countries being liberated

and stabilized. The platform firmly emphasizes the righteousness and neces-

sity of invading Iraq, saying, “we have confirmed that Saddam Hussein had

the capability to reconstitute his weapons programs and the desire to do so.

Our nation did the right thing. . . [Bush] chose defending America.”132 While

also promoting new authorities like the Department of Homeland Security

129. Peters and Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, 2004 Republican Party Platform.”
130. Peters and Woolley.
131. Peters and Woolley.
132. Peters and Woolley.

46
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE JOHN MCCAIN

and the PATRIOT Act, calling for increased defense spending to meet the

responsibilities of the war and expanding investment into new programs.

This platform was deeply affected by the War on Terror, heralding a new

era of American interventionism in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are staunchly

supported. These were seen as liberating, democratizing missions and are

defended as such. The emphasis on freedom and liberty takes on new heights

in the platform, even in economic areas. Tax cuts are justified as such,

but Medicare reform also expands social spending. Free trade evangelism is

elevated to the next degree, increasingly taking on not just an economic good

role but a social emphasis beyond previous platforms.

2.6 John McCain

The 2008 Platform

In 2008, the Great Financial Crisis was underway and would soon spark the

Great Recession right in the middle of a presidential contest. The economic

crash shook the foundations of the electorate and upended the presidential

election. This issue would upend the campaign of Senator John McCain of

Arizona, a conservative fighter pilot shot down in Vietnam, who won the

Republican presidential primary. His platform is similar to the Bush era’s

but somewhat more conservative on balance and still in line with Reagan’s

vision.

Economically, the platforms seek to permanently enact the Bush-era tax

47
JOHN MCCAIN CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

cuts, reform health care without expanding social programs, and support re-

gional economic trade initiatives. The most significant economic policy would

be “making the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent so American families will

not face a large tax hike.”133 This would lock in the tax cuts passed during

the Bush administration and, in so doing, spur economic growth, families,

and small businesses while keeping the government in check. Health care re-

form was a vital issue, with the platform promoting widespread reform while

simultaneously ruling out new government taxes, benefits, or entitlements.134

Regarding free trade, the platform emphasizes the economics: “Greater in-

ternational trade, aggressively advanced on a truly level playing field, will

mean more American jobs, higher wages, and a better standard of living.”135

However, it drops the emphasis on free trade as a social good.

Much like the 2004 platform, this platform is highly interested in foreign

policy and defense issues. America’s foreign policy would remain “Peace

through strength,” but the platform shies away from the Bush administra-

tion’s explicit interventionism. The platform continues the calls for invest-

ment in missile defense, intelligence, and anti-terrorism capabilities yet does

not propose the broad-based defense spending increases called for by earlier

Republican platforms.

Overall, the platform is mildly more conservative than its immediate pre-
133. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, 2008 Republican Party Platform,”
The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted), https://www.presiden
cy.ucsb.edu/node/278999.
134. Peters and Woolley.
135. Peters and Woolley.

48
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE MITT ROMNEY

decessor but engages in the same ideological framework. It calls for per-

manently enacting the Bush tax cuts, shies away from significant spending

increases across the board, and is a less forceful proponent of free trade.

2.7 Mitt Romney

The 2012 Platform

The unpopularity of President George W. Bush and the generational talent

of Senator Barack Obama of Illinois, in conjunction with the economic crisis,

were too much for McCain’s campaign, which was defeated. In 2012, the

second straight open Republican presidential primary, former Massachusetts

Governor Mitt Romney prevailed. With the Great Recession still a signifi-

cant factor, this platform is more direct with the economic reality than its

predecessor.

The economic policy takes the lead, with the platform calling for extend-

ing the Bush-era tax cuts, smaller government spending and regulations,

expanding work requirements for welfare, and moderation around free trade.

Extending the Bush tax cuts is seen as spurring economic growth, as “Exces-

sive taxation and regulation impede economic development. Lowering taxes

promotes substantial economic growth and reducing regulation encourages

business formation and job creation.”136 Work requirements for welfare pro-
136. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, 2012 Republican Party Platform,”
The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted), https://www.presiden
cy.ucsb.edu/node/302338.

49
MITT ROMNEY CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

grams would be expanded to new areas. Furthermore, the “fiscal nightmare

of Obamacare, with over $1 trillion in new taxes, multiple mandates, and

a crushing price tag”137 would be vociferously resisted and immediately re-

pealed under a Republican president and Congress. The free trade section

is conflicted as “International trade is crucial for our economy. . . a downside,

however, as some governments have used a variety of unfair means to limit

American access.”138 For the first time, free trade is not the net positive it

once was; now, it can cause economic losses if mishandled. The platform

focuses its ire on China, and “a Republican President will. . . stand ready to

impose countervailing duties.”139 A Republican presidential candidate had

never so forcefully threatened a trade war, a sign of the economic tensions

already present in 2012. A Pew Research Center survey found that 53% of

Americans saw China’s growing economic might as a bad thing in 2011, which

may help contextualize the shift here.140

On defense and foreign policy, the platform backs the classic Republican

realist formula of peace through strength, reversing Obama’s defense cuts.

The platform proclaims, “We are the party of peace through strength”141 , a

standard foreign policy framework for the party. On defense spending, the

platform denounces Obama for “reduced the defense budget by over $487
137. Peters and Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, 2012 Republican Party Platform.”
138. Peters and Woolley.
139. Peters and Woolley.
140. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, “China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower:
23-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey” (Washington, D.C.) July 13, 2011, https://www.pewresearch.org/
global/2011/07/13/china-seen-overtaking-us-as-global-superpower/?src=prc-headline.
141. Peters and Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, 2012 Republican Party Platform.”

50
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE DONALD TRUMP

billion over the next decade and fought Republican efforts to avoid another

$500 billion in automatic budget cuts.”142 The Republican party would ensure

that defense investment in technology, military hardware, and other defense

articles would continue to be cost-effective and bring security to America.

This platform is concretely in line with the Republican orthodoxy of the re-

cent era, except for free trade. The platform calls for permanent tax cuts and

deregulation, opposes welfare spending, and supports defense increases. How-

ever, it is less supportive of free trade, especially with China. The increased

forceful attitude towards US-China trade results from increased pressure from

voters who saw Chinese economic growth as threatening and American cor-

porations’ continued calls to enforce their rights. The tension between free

trade ideals and complex realities emerged.

2.8 Donald Trump

The 2016 Platform

For the third straight presidential election, there was an open Republican

presidential primary. Its victor would be the noted businessman and me-

dia personality Donald Trump, whose campaign was and would continue

to be highly controversial for his behavior, remarks, and various scandals.

Economic recovery from the aftereffects of the Great Recession is prevalent

throughout the platform.

142. Peters and Woolley.

51
DONALD TRUMP CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

Economic recovery is the key goal, which is to be accomplished through

pro-growth policies. This includes “the establishment of a pro-growth tax

code a moral imperative”143 to rejuvenate the economy by eliminating anti-

growth provisions. Welfare reform via the “dynamic compassion of work

requirements in a growing economy”144 would encourage job creation and op-

portunities and reduce dependence that Obama administration reforms had

created. The platform also calls for the repeal of Obamacare and the ter-

rible economic impacts it had. The platform is much more protectionist on

free trade, saying that if “agreements do not adequately protect U.S. inter-

ests, U.S. sovereignty, or when they are violated with impunity, they must

be rejected.”145 Regarding China, the platform describes the Obama admin-

istration’s handling of unfair trade practices as “ a virtual surrender”146 , and

opposes the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

On foreign policy, the platform highlights the myriad dangers of the world

and how America and our military can respond. After the Obama adminis-

tration’s weakness and budget cuts, “our enemies have been emboldened and

our national security is at great risk.”147 The platform calls for “the Republi-

can Party is committed to rebuilding the U.S. military into the strongest on

143. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, 2016 Republican Party Platform,”
The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted), https://www.presiden
cy.ucsb.edu/node/318311.
144. Peters and Woolley.
145. Peters and Woolley.
146. Peters and Woolley.
147. Peters and Woolley.

52
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE DONALD TRUMP

earth”148 via strengthening our conventional forces and investing in strategic

programs. The negativity around foreign policy aligns with prior platforms

when Republicans are out of the White House and evokes the ghost of the

Carter administration.

The 2016 platform does not mark a dramatic break with Republican or-

thodoxy across the board. On many issues, it resembles prior Republican

platforms and administrations; it calls for tax cuts, welfare cuts, and work

requirements, reforms to Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, and in-

creases in defense spending and investment. One area where it did mark a

more concrete break is hesitance and skepticism around free trade. While the

2012 platform questioned free trade, this platform wanted to take a harder

line on the issue and skeptically review any new agreements.

The 2020 Platform

In 2020, there was no official party platform, but rather, a resolution of sup-

port. The most substantive section was regarding the “unanimously agreed to

reassert the Party’s strong support for President Donald Trump and his Ad-

ministration.”149 The resolution is devoid of policy and ideology, just loyalty

to Donald Trump and opposition to whatever the policies of the Biden cam-

paign and the Democratic Party are. The platform symbolizes the hollowness

148. Peters and Woolley.

149. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Republican Party Platforms, Resolution Regarding the Repub-
lican Party Platform,” The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara (hosted),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/342191.

53
CHANGES IN THE ELECTORATE CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

of the Republican party under Trump’s leadership and his transformation of

the party into a personalist vehicle for his own gain. By 2020, Donald Trump

had taken over the party entirely and could suborn or exile any figures that

could threaten his control. The resolution is a symbol of what Trump and

the Party value: loyalty and deference towards himself and opposing the

Democrats and their allies in the media.

The lack of a platform similarly exposes the limits around analyzing party

platforms, whether they can be restarted or ignored or not done when the

party chooses to. Party platforms are not perfect predictors of behavior, and

at the moment, it can be challenging to see which parts will be acted on

and which will not. The 2016 platform was not indicative of the descent

into personalism that is the 2020 platform, exposing the limits of this line

of analysis. Nevertheless, the absence of a platform is in and of itself an

incredibly revealing development. That the Republican party did not or

could not do anything more substantive than a statement of support reveals

how intellectually bankrupt it has become.

2.9 Changes In The Electorate

The electorate seemed to have played a role in affecting the issue salience of

individual party platforms, but prior to the 2012 Romney and 2016 Trump

party platforms, the overall Reaganist framework does appear to be firmly

locked in. However, the electorate of the 1980s and the 2016 and 2020 Presi-

54
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE CHANGES IN THE ELECTORATE

dential elections experienced drastic changes over this time frame. We must

review the changes in the electorate holistically over the whole time frame to

understand better the conditions that allowed Donald Trump to win in 2016

and take control of the Republican party.

First, looking at the presidential elections of the Reagan era itself. Dur-

ing the presidential elections of the 1980s, the primary factor of Republican

victories was that “voting patterns show little ideological voting, but rather

voting based on the judgment of the performance of an incumbent adminis-

tration.”150 So, rather than a mass conservative uprising being the reason for

Reagan and George H. W. Bush’s victories, more traditional concerns around

economic health and well-being were the drivers of vote choice.

Several new phenomena developed in the American electorate, such as

the rise of ideological voting, political polarization on various fronts, and

increasing numbers and political influence of minority voters. Political po-

larization developed as “voter shifts and the Southern Democratic political

party realignment in the 1970s and 1980s led to increased party polarization

in the 1990s and 2000s as Americans sorted into more ideologically homo-

geneous political parties.”151 These ideologically differing and increasingly

hostile parties led to increased polarization among voters as well. One of the

most important developments is educational polarization among white voters

150. Larry M Schwab, The Illusion of a Conservative Reagan Revolution (Routledge, 2017).
151. Abramowitz and McCoy, “United States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and Polarization
in Trump’s America.”

55
CHANGES IN THE ELECTORATE CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

as

In the elections between 1984 and 2000, white college-educated vot-

ers supported the Republican candidate at a higher rate than white
non-college voters — though this group never supported Reagan’s
successor candidates at as high a rate. The 2000 election marked
the beginning of a process of educational polarization among white
voters that continued at least through 2020152

This divide and what drives Trump’s support among his voters is what is

most relevant to this section. Dr. William Marble, the Director of Data Sci-

ence for the University of Pennsylvania, found that “white college-educated

voters have become increasingly liberal on economic issues, pushing them to-

ward the Democratic party. Simultaneously, non-college voters have come to

base their voting decisions more heavily on their conservative cultural atti-

tudes.”153 Increased salience of cultural issues and debates, ‘the culture war,’

helped attract white non-college-educated voters toward Republicans and

away from Democrats. At the same time, Democrats persuaded more upper-

middle-class college graduates over the past twenty years. These findings have

been echoed in other research with “gradual erosion of the socially conser-

vative hegemony. . . has triggered a negative authoritarian counter-reaction

among. . . a backlash that has been especially powerful in mobilizing older

generations of white men in rural communities.”154

152. William Marble, “What Explains Educational Polarization Among White Voters?” (), https://william
marble.co/docs/EducPolarization.pdf.
153. Marble.
154. Norris and Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism.

56
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE CONCLUSION

The power of racial issues is also apparent as white working-class voters

shifted parties along racial resentment lines during the 21st Century, a shift

that was highlighted but predated by Barack Obama.155 While only 62% of

the most racially resentful white working-class voters supported George W.

Bush, by 2016, that figure had climbed to 87%, while the least racially re-

sentful white working-class voters fled for the Democratic Party.156 In the

2016 election specifically among all white voters, those “with high levels of

racial/ethnic resentment voted overwhelmingly for Trump regardless of edu-

cation.”157 Issue salience is what appears to have been vital for Trump, by

priming his audience with his meld of xenophobia and economic grievances,

he was able to accelerate the shift that had been taking place over the past

several decades. These voters also tend to be more skeptical of institutions

and accepting of strongman rhetoric and actions, providing the right-wing

authoritarian populist base for Trump that he needs to gain and hold power.

2.10 Conclusion

There are changes in the party platforms, but not necessarily the ones I ex-

pected. My initial hypothesis regarding a significant break on domestic and

foreign policy issues for Donald Trump is largely absent in the 2016 party

platform. My hypothesis of changes in party platforms primarily being a

155. Abramowitz and McCoy, “United States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and Polarization
in Trump’s America.”
156. Abramowitz and McCoy.
157. Abramowitz and McCoy.

57
CONCLUSION CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

’top-down’ process appears confirmed as while Republican candidates em-

phasized different issue priorities or specific solutions to deal with the issues

of their day, they do seem to have continued to work under the framework of

Ronald Reagan, modifying it as needed. The platforms of Ronald Reagan,

George H.W. Bush, and Bob Dole are all ideologically similar, with little if

any changes on the issue basis that I analyzed. The platforms of George

W. Bush emphasized freedom, democracy, and liberty to new extents, using

them as conceptual markers to build support for their policies while reacting

to the aftermath of September 11th. Only on the issues of welfare limited

to Medicaid Part D and free trade was there some ideological change, but it

was in line with previous platforms and would be dropped subsequently. The

2008 platform and 2012 platforms seem like a return to previous platforms.

However, the 2012 platform started to forcefully raise the economic losses of

free trade, especially around China, which may have been driven by increased

concern among Chinese relative economic dominance among voters and Re-

publican party elites. In 2016, Trump’s platform did not mark a clear break

as I had expected, except around the issue of free trade. The tension between

free trade as a concept and in practice that undergirded the 2012 platform

section resolved itself in 2016 in favor, if not protectionism, at least halting

market liberalization right where it was. It would have been hard to predict

in 2016 that in 2020, the party platform boiled down to nothing more than

devotion to their chosen candidate, Donald Trump. The 2020 party platform

58
CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE CONCLUSION

of passing a resolution supporting Trump and adopting the previous party

platform is unprecedented for a major political party in modern history. It is

symbolic of the party’s enthrallment with Donald Trump and his lack of com-

mitment to policy or ideology beyond his embrace of right-wing authoritarian

populism.

Party platforms can be valuable indicators of behavior in the office of

presidential candidates. Now, accounting for presidential influence, mainly

to what extent their fellow party members control Congress, the party plat-

forms served as guideposts for what an administration wanted to do and

tried to accomplish. Republican presidents did have to compromise with

Democratic Congresses or vice versa, which entailed some policy wins and

losses as the balance of power shifted. Nevertheless, party platforms served

as valuable indicators of desired direction, in some cases not just of what a

particular presidential candidate or the party would support at that moment

but as presaging future change on issue prioritization and ideological or pol-

icy shifts. This is most identifiable from the free trade section of the 2012

platform, retrospectively demonstrating that the party might move in a less

supportive direction on the issue of international trade and market liberal-

ization. Still, the example of the 2016 party platform and the 2020 resolution

demonstrates that any predictive power is limited and qualified in nature.

The platforms would not serve as significantly effective indicators of creeping

authoritarianism; the rigidity of Reaganist doctrine hides the shifts taking

59
CONCLUSION CHAPTER 2. HOW WE GOT HERE

place among white voters.

From the 1990s to the 2020s, white college and non-college-educated voters

increasingly clustered in the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively.

This shift was driven both by cultural changes and economic inequality. Yet,

the former played a much more significant role, as cultural conservatism and

racial resentment served as critical variables in whether white voters sup-

ported Republican presidential candidates or Democratic ones. This does

support my hypothesis that the changes in the Republican party electorate

from the 1980s to the 2020s became more accepting of conservative author-

itarian populism as voters supportive of those issue frameworks sorted into

the Republican party, and candidates were more able to use that to their

advantage.

60
 Chapter 3

There and Back Again: Republican

Presidents, Their Views of Executive
Unilateralism and the Imperial
Presidency

3.1 Overview

When Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, the shadow of Richard Nixon’s

broad view of presidential authority still loomed over the country, as it was

only six years after Nixon’s resignation. Throughout Reagan and his suc-

cessors, the Republican Party embraced an increasingly broad view of pres-

idential power and authority, if not to the same extent as Nixon. Ronald

Reagan and George H.W. Bush were connected to the Iran-Contra scandal,

where George W. Bush This trend finally resulted in Donald Trump’s efforts

61
RONALD REAGAN CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

to subvert the 2020 election after he lost, culminating in the January 6th,

2021 insurrection.

Yet to point the finger at Donald Trump as the President who expanded

executive power ignores how the concept of executive power and authority

has changed between the Reagan and Trump eras and the degree to which

Donald Trump’s conservative authoritarian populism nature influenced his

more modern conception of expansive presidential power. Over the past

twenty years, Congress has ceded portions of its policymaking power to the

executive branch, becoming more polarized and less influential over gover-

nance.158 Simultaneously, the number and (to a lesser extent) the rate of new

executive orders, a hallmark of executive power, have trended downwards.159

This diminishment of Congress’s centralization of the checks and balances of

the federal government has encouraged or necessitated, depending on your

view, that the executive branch assumes more significant control over the

policymaking process via executive action.

3.2 Ronald Reagan

Before Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, Democrats had controlled both

houses of Congress since the Eisenhower midterm elections of 1954. With

158. Carmines and Fowler, “The Temptation of Executive Authority: How Increased Polarization and the
Decline in Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the Expansion of Presidential Power.”
159. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Executive Orders,” ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters,
The American Presidency Project (Santa Barbara, CA) 1999-2024, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
323876.

62
CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN RONALD REAGAN

Reagan’s landslide victory of 50.1% of the vote to 41.9%, Republicans flipped

twelve Senate seats, including that of prominent Democrats such as George

McGovern, Frank Church, or Warren Magnuson among the defeated.160 Now

it seemed the more conservative Republicans in the Senate and White House

would be given the chance to implement their goals while the more liberal

Democrats who controlled the House of Representatives.

Once Ronald Reagan took office in 1980, the party’s conservative wing

had the President they had been pushing for since 1976.161 The conserva-

tive movement, with Reagan at their head, had plenty of priorities they

wanted to enact, such as low taxes, reduced welfare spending, free trade,

increased military spending, and a militant interventionist foreign policy.162

Campaigning on the platform is one thing, but implementation and getting

the House Democrats to agree was another. One measure of his success in

accomplishing these goals is to examine the “Congressional Quarterly’s pres-

idential support scores. This is a measure of the votes in which congressional

majorities voted the same as the stated position of the President.”163 This in-

dicator demonstrates a level of support in Congress for presidential priorities

to what degree a president can succeed in their legislative agenda. Compared

to other post-World War II presidents, relatively speaking, “Reagan did post

160. Daniel S Lucks, Reconsidering Reagan: Racism, Republicans, and the Road to Trump (Beacon Press,
2020).
161. Lucks.
162. Goethals, Realignment, Region, and Race: Presidential Leadership and Social Identity.
163. Seib, We Should Have Seen it Coming: From Reagan to Trump–a Front-Row Seat to a Political Revo-
lution.

63
RONALD REAGAN CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

high presidential support scores the first two years, but compiled moderate

and low scores during the final six years. An analysis of the entire eight years

shows that Reagan had a moderate-to-poor record of success rather than the

great success.”164 Legislatively, Reagan was less successful after his first two

years, with his later congressional support waxing and waning over time.

On the issues analyzed above in Chapter 2 (low taxes, reduced welfare

spending, free trade, increased military spending, and a militant interven-

tionist foreign policy), Ronald Reagan had a mixed record of success across

his eight years in office. While defense spending did increase “from $133

billion in 1980 to $290 billion in 1988, or from 4.9 percent to 5.9 percent

of GDP,”165 this was substantially less than Reagan had requested in his

presidential budgets.166 Free trade was promoted yet was not significantly

expanded. Foreign policy was primarily up to the President’s discretion;

however, the Iran-Contra scandal was perhaps the greatest blunder of the

Reagan administration, which will be discussed in more detail below. On

domestic grounds of the ever-present issues of taxes and welfare programs,

Reagan was less successful in accomplishing his goals compared to the more

defense and foreign policy-oriented areas, notching some key early wins and

mixed records later on.167

164. Schwab, The Illusion of a Conservative Reagan Revolution.

165. Michael A Genovese, Todd L Belt, and William W Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy:
Comparing Leadership Styles, FDR to Biden (Taylor & Francis, 2024).
166. Schwab, The Illusion of a Conservative Reagan Revolution.
167. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles,
FDR to Biden.

64
CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN RONALD REAGAN

This lack of legislative success could have led to an executive branch be-

ing more interested in unilateral action and control of the executive branch;

however, there were mixed results on that front. In terms of administrative

style, Reagan “had less involvement in the operation of his administration

than any president during the past fifty years. In the Reagan administration,

the President would set broad policy and then delegate.”168 Reagan did not

believe in the centralized, personally directed style of leadership and was not

intensely policy-focused.169 However, it would be a mistake to say that Rea-

gan was uninterested in achieving his goals or gaining control of the executive

branch to implement them more effectively.

In one of the most recognizable and harsh examples of this, President Rea-

gan cemented his willingness to stand tough with the air traffic controller’s

strike of 1981. Despite being a “past president of the Screen Actors Guild,

the only former union official ever to occupy the Oval Office, a man whose

election PATCO had endorsed only nine months earlier.”170 Reagan sent dis-

missal notices out to some 11,345 strikers,” and ultimately, the PATCO strike

was one the costliest strikes in American history.171 Nevertheless, his firm res-

olution of the crisis, banning strikers from returning to the FAA, signaled his

resolve. Symbolically, he would not allow a part of the federal government to

168. Schwab, The Illusion of a Conservative Reagan Revolution.

169. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles,
FDR to Biden.
170. Joseph A McCartin, Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike That
Changed America (Oxford University Press, 2011).
171. McCartin.

65
RONALD REAGAN CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

disobey the law and reject his authority.

Yet the most significant application of executive overreach, and also the

most considerable misconduct of the Reagan administration, was the Iran-

Contra scandal. The Iran-Contra scandal is a long, complex saga that I will

only briefly discuss, focusing on the aspects of executive unilateralism. Ba-

sically, the idea was to “initial sale of arms to the Iranians and for the idea

that the funds gained from such sales could be used for “off the books” pol-

icy initiatives such as backing the Contras.”172 After the Iranian Revolution,

U.S.-Iran relations had considerably deteriorated, with American citizens be-

ing held hostage for 444 days; nearly simultaneously in Nicaragua, communist

and anti-communist revolutionaries were fighting a civil war, and the Rea-

gan administration wanted to support the anti-communist Contras. Thanks

to the Boland Amendment173 , Congress “barred the CIA and Department

of Defense (DOD) from supporting military activities” in Nicaragua beyond

halting the flow of weapons.174 Federal appropriations could not be used to

support the Contras after allegations of the Reagan administration exceed-

ing American policy interests and being actively involved in regime change

operations.

172. Richard P. Barberio, “The Reagan Administration and Iran-Contra,” in Presidents and Political Scan-
dal: Managing Scandal in the Modern Era (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 59–77, isbn:
978-3-030-45504-0, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45504-0 4.
173. Matt Barker, Seth MacFarlane, and Mike Weitzman, “Stanny Slickers II: The Legend of Ollie’s Gold,”
Directed by Pam Cooke, Ron Hughart and Anthony Lioli, featuring Seth MacFarlane, Wendy Schaal, and
Scott Grimes, American Dad Season 3, Episode 15 (Aired May 11th, 2008, in broadcast syndication), https:
//www.hulu.com/series/977c8e25-cde0-41b7-80ce-e746f2d2093f.
174. Malcolm Byrne, Iran-Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power (Uni-
versity Press of Kansas, 2017).

66
CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN RONALD REAGAN

This ban on funding for the Contras and or American efforts to resupply

them is half the equation; the other half was the sale of weaponry to the newly

formed Islamic Republic of Iran to release hostages being held by Hezbollah

in Lebanon.175 Given Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism af-

ter 1980, “selling arms to the Iranians was likely illegal, no matter how it

was passed through other nations or papered over with retroactive finding,”

according to Reagan’s own Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.176 The

other half of the equation of using those funds for supplies for the Contras,

if not illegal, was undoubtedly against congressional intent in the Boland

Amendment. Iran-Contra was ultimately the tale of the executive refusing

to heed the legality of Congressional mandates. It was the broadest example

of executive unilateralism since the Nixon administration.

When the scandal inevitably came to light, the response from the Reagan

administration would be mirrored decades later, of fingerpointing, blame, and

covering up evidence. There were “attempts to shift blame away from Presi-

dent Reagan. . . battle lines over just who would take the blame for the arms

sales to Iran were drawn”177 as the administration tried to figure out a plan.

Despite a televised presidential address to try and deflect the issue, “Pub-

lic opinion polls taken in the wake of Reagan’s speech showed that nearly

80% of the American public did not believe him.”178 When President Reagan

175. Barberio, “The Reagan Administration and Iran-Contra.”

176. Barberio.
177. Barberio.
178. Barberio.

67
RONALD REAGAN CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

testified in front of Congress to finally defuse the scandal, his performance

and evasiveness “was a major reason why President Reagan ended up with

such a poor reputation as an administrator. The hearings and reports on the

affair painted a picture of an administration headed by a president who was

incredibly uninformed and detached from the basic activities under his con-

trol.”179 Ultimately, President Reagan was never charged with a crime, and

it is difficult to establish a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt given

the complexity involved on all sides. Though, as a side note, the independent

counsel appointed to investigate the scandal, “[Lawrence] Walsh indicated in

his report that he was open to charging President Reagan with a crime if the

evidence warranted it, a very different interpretation of the legal status of a

sitting president from the one held by Robert Mueller in his investigation of

Donald Trump.”180

Ronald Reagan did not embrace executive unilateralism to the sheer extent

of Richard Nixon and generally had mixed results in his fights with Congress

or the other branches of government. Yet his involvement in attempting to

free American citizens in Lebanon via missile sales to Iran and then trying to

launder the proceeds to Nicaraguan anti-communists likely violated several

laws and was in direct defiance of Congress.

179. Schwab, The Illusion of a Conservative Reagan Revolution.

180. Barberio, “The Reagan Administration and Iran-Contra.”

68
CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN GEORGE H.W. BUSH

3.3 George H.W. Bush

George H.W. Bush is an oft-forgotten figure in American politics, beyond his

leadership with the First Gulf War, being overshadowed by Ronald Reagan

before him and then Bill Clinton afterward. Still, his presidency is worth an-

alyzing; in the context of executive power, he was involved in the Iran-Contra

scandal as Vice President and then helped bury the matter as President.

George H.W. Bush promised a different view of administering the execu-

tive branch than his old boss and predecessor, Ronald Reagan. He wanted

voters to know that “[Bush] went out of his way to stress that he would

not follow Reagan’s managerial style. . . He delegates less responsibility and

is involved at a much lower level of detail than his predecessor. Bush knows

much more about what is happening in his administration.”181 He wanted his

administration to be more centralized around himself, though he still worked

with a tight circle of top staff and cabinet members as advisors.182

Like many other officials from the Reagan Administration, George H.W.

Bush proclaimed that he was not involved in the Iran-Contra scandal and

was unaware of what was occurring, like President Reagan. Bush said that

“he was absent during some of the meetings. . . over the arms sales and that

he did know about the policy, but—much as Reagan maintained—he did not

181. Schwab, The Illusion of a Conservative Reagan Revolution.

182. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles,
FDR to Biden.

69
GEORGE H.W. BUSH CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

believe that the arms sales were predicated on the return of hostages.”183

Bush was not as directly impacted by the scandal as Reagan was in the

public view. The effectiveness of the coverup and the template provided by

Reagan of admitting partial knowledge while denying the rest “provided the

framework for George H. W. Bush’s successful deflection of the matter during

his run for the presidency in 1988.”184 Once elected, he quietly “brought the

investigation into the prosecutions of those involved with the scandal to an

end by pardoning key players in the events that made up Iran-Contra and

the coverup that ensued”185 , thus ending the scandal and letting it fade out

of the public consciousness where it had been so prominent since 1986.

A key figure underpinning the legal rationale for these actions was William

Barr. Barr served various leadership roles under Bush, the Elder’s Depart-

ment of Justice, quickly rising through the ranks to become his Attorney Gen-

eral.186 As Attorney General, Barr was instrumental in supporting “Bush’s

pardons of six Reagan administration officials charged in the Iran-contra

investigation, a move the independent counsel described at the time as ‘a

coverup.’”187 Barr advanced “the ’unitary executive’ theory, rooted in Article

II of the Constitution, which holds that the President controls the entire exec-

183. Barberio, “The Reagan Administration and Iran-Contra.”

184. Barberio.
185. Barberio.
186. Tom Hamburger, “How William Barr, Now Serving as a Powerful Ally for Trump, Has Championed
Presidential Powers,” Washington Post May 16, 2019, https://www .washingtonpost.com/politics/how -
william-barr-now-serving-as-a-powerful-ally-for-trump-has-championed-presidential-powers/2019/05/14/
418fe6d4-727f-11e9-9eb4-0828f5389013 story.html.
187. Hamburger.

70
CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN GEORGE W. BUSH

utive branch.”188 Barr’s views on the presidency “grants presidents sweeping

authority, Barr is part of a group of conservative intellectuals who have been

leading the charge to expand the powers of the executive branch over the past

four decades”189 and arguing against limits placed on the presidency by the

separation of powers. The ability of Congress to check against the President’s

authority is a necessary part of accountability in our democratic system, even

if that means allowing investigations by Congress that are more politically

motivated than out of democratic concern. The Presidency was and should

not be an island unto itself but one co-equal branch of government.

George H.W. Bush was not a strong proponent of executive unilateralism

during his term in office. He did not seek to take control of independent

federal agencies or dismiss Congressional directives to the extent that had

occurred in Iran-Contra. Yet he did pardon those involved in the scandal,

which helped end the subsequent investigation. Further, under his admin-

istration, the legal framework for executive unilateralism was significantly

bolstered by Bill Barr’s tenure at the Department of Justice.

3.4 George W. Bush

When George W. Bush was elected in November of 2000, foreign policy was

not the issue that received top billing in the election, and few could have

predicted just to what extent he and his administration would change our
188. Hamburger.
189. Hamburger.

71
GEORGE W. BUSH CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

national security state. Bush was a supporter of the ‘unitary executive’ the-

ory, outlined in the prior section, that held the president “controls all of the

executive branch and has the authority to make all decisions he deems neces-

sary to run it.”190 Beyond his vast expansion of the national security state in

the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, he also real-

ized the power of the administrative state in making policy and side-stepping

Congress.

George Bush’s advancement of presidential power was far from limited

to foreign policy or national security but directly involved many domestic or

administrative areas. As President, he was the strongest supporter of the uni-

tary executive since Nixon, as he was “vigorous in his defense of the unitary

executive. In fact he publicly referred to the —unitary executive theory. . . a

total of 148 times over the course of his eight years in office. President Bush

advanced unitarian principles from the moment he took office in 2001.”191

Bush and his administration felt that they were “not just protecting presi-

dential power, but also in restoring it to its pristine state pre-Watergate.”192

Administratively, “Bush, like his predecessors, viewed the appointment strat-

egy as a necessary mechanism for asserting control over the wider executive

branch. The President made it clear early on that he would not tolerate

190. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles,
FDR to Biden.
191. Meenekshi Bose, President Or King?: Evaluating the Expansion of Executive Power from Abraham
Lincoln to George W. Bush (Nova Science Publishers, 2011).
192. Bose.

72
CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN GEORGE W. BUSH

disobedient agency heads.”193 Their goal was to implement, expand, and pre-

serve the institutional authority of the presidency from what they saw as

interference from Congress, which institutionally was more akin to a rival

than an equal.

Bush favored not just the unitary executive theory but rather “cloak[ed]

itself in the unitary executive theory while pushing naked unilateralism all

in the name of politics.”194 His use of signing statements demonstrated this

expansive view, that signal “more important use of signing statements, how-

ever, has been to register questions about the constitutionality of the law in

question.”195 Bush went beyond signaling favored provisions or questioning

the constitutional legality of the laws in question; he “asserted discretion in

which provisions of the law to enforce.”196 This was a significant step to-

ward executive unilateralism197 , selectively enforcing or even interpreting the

provisions of the law in ways that Congress did not intend or support.

the executive power was the indivisible purview of the President

was appended the assertion that the scope of that executive power
was also defined by the President. This gave new resonance to the
older claim that Congress could not infringe legislatively on the
President‘s constitutional authority . In this view, not only could
the President act when Congress had not acted in a given area, but
193. Bose.
194. Bose.
195. James P Pfiffner, “The Contemporary Presidency Constraining Executive Power: George W. Bush and
the Constitution,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 38, no. 1 (2008): 123–143.
196. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles,
FDR to Biden.
197. Bose, President Or King?: Evaluating the Expansion of Executive Power from Abraham Lincoln to
George W. Bush.

73
GEORGE W. BUSH CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

even in the face of congressional opposition.198

The NSA surveillance scandal demonstrated an example of this broad con-

ception of executive power. In the aftermath of 9/11, there was a broad

expansion of American intelligence collection and operations, including elec-

tronic surveillance. Previous court reforms (in the aftermath of the Watergate

scandal) required the use of warrants for domestic electronic surveillance by

the United States government.199 Yet Bush embarked on a massive expansion

of electronic surveillance by “instead, he secretly ordered the NSA to conduct

the surveillance and, when his actions were disclosed, [Bush] asserted that

he had the constitutional authority to ignore the law.”200 Bush’s view was

that it was authorized indirectly in the congressional authorization of mili-

tary force to respond to 9/11, despite not being present; fundamentally, “to

the extent that FISA infringed upon the Commander in Chief power, it was

itself unconstitutional.”201 A sweeping rejection of the checks and balances

system and the concept of limits in general.

These are just a few examples of President Bush’s whole-hearted embrace

of executive unilateralism surpassing Reagan’s Iran-Contra efforts and Bush

the Elder’s grounding of the ‘unitary executive’ theory into law. George

W. Bush conceived of and attempted to implement a sweeping expansion

198. Bose, President Or King?: Evaluating the Expansion of Executive Power from Abraham Lincoln to
George W. Bush.
199. Pfiffner, “The Contemporary Presidency Constraining Executive Power: George W. Bush and the
Constitution.”
200. Pfiffner.
201. Bose, President Or King?: Evaluating the Expansion of Executive Power from Abraham Lincoln to
George W. Bush.

74
CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN DONALD TRUMP

of presidential authority around electronic surveillance, administrative pol-

icy and appointments, regulatory bodies, and foreign policy.202 Now, while

foreign policy is often the remit of the President, there are limits on these

powers, limits Bush did not acknowledge until forced to do so by Congress

and the Supreme Court. Bush’s actions on surveillance, ‘enhanced interro-

gation,’ and ‘enemy combatants’ were indicative of a president who believed

that he had nigh-total control over certain areas of policy.203 George W. Bush

implemented executive unilateralism to a new degree.

3.5 Donald Trump

When discussing the views and practices of Donald Trump on executive

power, it is necessary to remember that while Trump has less defined po-

litical or policy beliefs, he has a strong belief and adherence to the ‘unitary

executive’ theory, which he takes to the point of unilateralism to a differing

but similarly expansive view as George W. Bush. The number of scandals

and struggles he faced was often self-inflicted due to his autocratic leadership.

As President, Donald Trump demanded total loyalty from his subordi-

nates, wanting to control the bureaucracy to fight the ‘deep state’ that was

preventing conservative goals from being implemented. He “demanded loy-

202. Pfiffner, “The Contemporary Presidency Constraining Executive Power: George W. Bush and the
Constitution.”
203. Jon Herbert, “Revisiting Arthur Schlesinger’s The Imperial Presidency: Richard Nixon, George W.
Bush, and Executive Power,” in Watergate Remembered: The Legacy for American Politics, ed. Michael A.
Genovese and Iwan W. Morgan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012), 29–51, isbn: 978-1-137-01198-5,
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137011985 2.

75
DONALD TRUMP CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

alty from his advisors and appointees and was notoriously thin-skinned when

criticized, to the extent of attempting to use the power of his office to silence

critics.”204 His penchant for unquestioned loyalty led him to conflict with

some of his appointees, most notably including James Comey, then-Director

of the FBI, and later Mark Milley, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.205 To the degree that Trump acknowledged the federal bureaucracy, it

was solely a target, the now infamous ‘deep state.’ He transformed the federal

government by “targeting many government departments and agencies and

then changing their leadership, replacing them with his acolytes, getting rid

of senior civil service staff, and ignoring experienced and expert advice.”206

He felt that federal bureaucracy was subverting his desires and hindering his

policy goals. He found it easier to use political appointees who were directly

loyal to him to accomplish his goals. His intense downsizing of certain sub-

departments or leaving vacant positions meant that “Trump was creating

generational vacuums of expertise that seriously undermined the long-term

efficacy of state institutions”207 and increased his own power as President.

Rather than collaborating legislatively with Congress, he focused on using

the administrative or regulatory powers of the executive branch. He “often

resorted to executive authority to expand his power and achieve his policy
204. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles,
FDR to Biden.
205. Jeffrey. Goldberg, “The Patriot: How Mark Milley Held the Line,” The Atlantic October 2, 2023 (2023),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/11/general-mark-milley-trump-coup/675375/.
206. John L Campbell, Institutions under Siege: Donald Trump’s Attack on the Deep State (Cambridge
University Press, 2022).
207. Campbell.

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CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN DONALD TRUMP

goals. . . a strategy recognized his weaknesses as a legislative president.”208 He

was not interested or successful in the legislative arena and so preferred to use

his executive authority to accomplish his outcomes via the regulatory process,

which allowed him to circumvent Congress.209 Trump brought back Bill Barr

as Attorney General, appreciating his questioning of the Muller investigation

and sweeping view of executive power.210 Now, with a President who was

more inclined to his way of thinking around executive unilateralism than

George H.W. Bush, Barr would be one of Trump’s most prominent defenders

for most of his term in office.

The two impeachments he faced during and after his presidency best

demonstrate Donald Trump’s view of executive, political, and personal power

as a sweeping combination. There are plenty of other scandals worth further

research. Still, for the purposes of this thesis, these two scandals symbolize

the lengths to which he melded his expansive executive unilateralism with

personal interests and authoritarian results.

The first impeachment stemmed from Donald Trump placing a halt on

Congressionally appropriated weapons and other military aid to Ukraine in

exchange for domestic political goals. Trump asked newly-elected Ukranian

president Volodymyr Zelensky “ ‘to do us a favor’...asked Ukrainians to in-

vestigate unfounded allegations about former Vice President Joseph R. Biden

208. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles,
FDR to Biden.
209. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers.
210. Hamburger, “How William Barr, Now Serving as a Powerful Ally for Trump, Has Championed Presi-
dential Powers.”

77
DONALD TRUMP CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

Jr. . . as well as to chase a conspiracy theory that Ukraine, not Russia, had

intervened in 2016.”211 Such efforts were extortionate given that the admin-

istration had placed a hold on $391 million worth of U.S. support for the

Ukrainian military, which constituted roughly equivalent to a tenth of its

budget, against congressional appropriations and without notifying Congress

of any reason for such hold. Gordon Sondland, former U.S. Ambassador to

the European Union, said bluntly, “The Ukrainians should not expect the

money if Mr. Zelensky did not publicly announce the investigations.”212 This

scandal involved using military aid to coerce a foreign country, fighting an

active conflict, to interfere with the 2020 U.S. presidential election, defying

congressional mandates, and ultimately, to the personal political benefit of

Donald Trump. The House impeached, and the Senate acquitted Trump on

mainly party-line votes, save for a handful of outliers.213 Trump faced little

accountability for his actions, but they signaled the lengths he would go to

accomplish personalistic political goals.

The second impeachment and scandal, regarding ‘The Big Lie,’ Don-

ald Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 U.S. presidential election, directly

threatened the foundations of our democracy. Trump had a history of refus-

ing to acknowledge unsuccessful electoral outcomes, including the 2016 Iowa

211. Sharon LaFraniere, Andrew E. Kramer, and Danny Hakim, “Trump, Ukraine and Impeachment: The
Inside Story of How We Got Here.,” The New York Times November 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/11/us/ukraine-trump.html.
212. LaFraniere, Kramer, and Hakim.
213. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles,
FDR to Biden.

78
CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN DONALD TRUMP

Republican Caucus and the 2016 U.S. presidential election.214 Already, these

claims had “compromised many people’s faith in America’s electoral institu-

tions. A Gallup poll found that while about half of Americans surveyed in

2006 expressed confidence that their elections were honest, that percentage

dropped to less than a third in 2016.”215 So, public confidence in elections had

been declining prior to the 2020 election, with prior Trump claims serving

as a primer for his supporters to question the validity of election outcomes,

especially those unfavorable to Trump. Thanks to his “intellectual arrogance

and narcissism. No matter what the issue, Trump had a very difficult time

accepting facts that contradicted his views”216 and could not accept that he

lost to Joe Biden.

Therefore, Trump led an all-out campaign to ensure his ex post facto

victory and to overturn the election results. His legal campaign amounted

to little, with the final effort of Texas v. Pennsylvania being summarily

dismissed from the Supreme Court (as a side note, future House Speaker Rep.

Mike Johnson organized the Congressional Republican amicus brief in this).

What happened next is more relevant. Once the legal channels were closed,

Trump looked toward the political and often illegal ones. One idea would

be to “ordering the Defense Department, the Department of Justice, and the

Department of Homeland Security to seize voting machines in states that

214. Campbell, Institutions under Siege: Donald Trump’s Attack on the Deep State.
215. Campbell.
216. Campbell.

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DONALD TRUMP CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

he suspected of voter fraud.”217 This would amount to an unconstitutional

usurpation of state governments by the federal government and immensely

authoritarian. What Trump did in reality could hardly be called better.

His attempts to convince George Secretary of State Brad Raffensburger to

overturn the election would later be a critical factor in a criminal prosecution

by Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis.218

Finally, on January 6th, 2021, Donald Trump’s pressure campaign to get

everyone to overturn the election violently crashed into reality. He “encour-

aged his supporters to march on the Capitol and ‘fight like hell’..Seven people

died during or after the melee.”219 For this, he would be impeached, though

the trial would not reach the Senate until after the inauguration, with seven

Republicans220 joining the Senate Democrats to convict Trump, failing short

by just nine votes of conviction. While his actions on January 6th are not

directly a part of what is traditionally considered executive unilateralism,

they show the logic taken to its final stage of autocracy: that the President

is beyond law or democracy or the peaceful transition of power and is an

authoritarian monarch.

Donald Trump embraced executive unilateralism as a matter of course.

His personality and inclinations did not fit with checks and balances or the
217. Campbell, Institutions under Siege: Donald Trump’s Attack on the Deep State.
218. Aaron Blake, “Analysis — 4 Things Revealed by Trump’s Georgia Indictment,” Washington Post
August 17, 2023, https : / / www . washingtonpost . com / politics / 2023 / 08 / 15 / takeaways - trump - georgia -
indictment/.
219. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles,
FDR to Biden.
220. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers.

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CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN DONALD TRUMP

separation of powers. His experience as the CEO of a private company left

him unfamiliar with such a system and more used to the top-down leader-

ship that demanded fealty. His use of executive actions in the regulatory

or administrative areas on issues like immigration or climate change was a

reflection of his disinclination to participate in the legislative process or com-

promise with Congressional democrats.221 His actions regarding military aid

to Ukraine demonstrated the complete and utter contempt for the idea that

Congress had a role to play in foreign policy or even that foreign policy was

anything beyond what Donald Trump personally thought would benefit him.

His conservative populism was the justification for his belief in increasing his

own political power to that of an autocrat, that “he alone could fix it.”222

Donald Trump’s presidency was a reminder that politics is what people

make of it: our institutions, laws, and democratic attitudes. These are all

based on a level of common acceptance. If a populist, anti-establishment

figure gets elected, one might expect less respect for institutions or political

norms. But Donald Trump delights in ignoring norms and conventions alto-

gether and was able to build a similarly skeptical base, some of whom were

willing to follow him to the point of violence to ensure his victory. Politi-

cal violence is not new in America, nor are presidents who overreach their

authority. Still, the melding of these two forces in a polarized society is a

221. Genovese, Belt, and Lammers.

222. Yoni Appelbaum, “Trump Claims, ‘I Alone Can Fix It’ during the Republican National Convention,”
The Atlantic, July 22, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/trump- rnc- speech-
alone-fix-it/492557/.

81
DONALD TRUMP CHAPTER 3. THERE AND BACK AGAIN

deep cause for concern. The 2024 U.S. presidential election will be a rematch

between Presidents Biden and Trump, the first rematch since 1956 and the

first between two presidents since 1892.223

223. Jon Grinspan, “Opinion — 2024, Meet 1892, Your Doppelgänger,” sec. Opinion, The New York Times
April 11, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/11/opinion/2024-1892-cleveland-harrison.html.

82
 Chapter 4

Final Thoughts

I hypothesized that Donald Trump marked a significant break from the Re-

publican Party on social and economic issues, which he attempted to execute

through his expansion of executive power. These developments were fur-

thered by the changes in the electorate over the preceding decades since the

victory of Ronald Reagan, which supported the Republican Party’s populist

and authoritarian elements, leading to Donald Trump’s victory in 2016 and

subsequent dominance over the Republican Party.

Based on the 2016 party platform, Donald Trump only marked a clear

break on the issue of free trade, whereas the other issue areas remained in

line with Republican orthodoxy. The lack of a party platform in the 2020

presidential election, with only a simple resolution to replace it, demonstrates

a clear and significant break. The resolution signaled the lack of interest in

policy, serving only as a loyalty pledge, a marker that the Republican party

had been subsumed into a personalist vehicle for Donald Trump.

83
 CHAPTER 4. FINAL THOUGHTS

Party platforms can serve as valuable and important analytical tools, but

for research purposes, they are generally more retrospective than forward-

looking. Secondly, they are not suited for predicting authoritarian impulses.

The electorate did play a role in allowing for the rise of authoritarian populism

in the Republican party, as culturally more conservative white non-college-

educated voters joined the Republican party. In contrast, college-educated

white voters, who tended to be more socially and later economically liberal,

shifted towards the Democratic Party. While the direction of this process

is not wholly clear, it was probably a more bottom-up phenomenon that

politicians like Newt Gingrich, George W. Bush, and the Tea Party movement

took advantage of and reached an apex with Donald Trump.

Donald Trump’s embrace of executive unilateralism must be carefully

framed in context. While Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were

involved in the Iran-Contra affair, such brazen disregard for the law and

Congress was not the general mode of conduct during either of their admin-

istrations. George W. Bush’s administration is more complex. Ultimately,

he viewed it as necessary to widely expand the powers of the presidency in

order to accomplish his national security and foreign policy goals. This was

taken far beyond the law or Congressional mandates, and he held the view

that the presidency was the ‘first among equals’ if not the leading branch of

government. His embrace of signing statements was another example of the

vast amounts of presidential power he viewed available such that he could

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CHAPTER 4. FINAL THOUGHTS

pick and choose which provisions of the law he wished to enforce. Still, he

would back down after losing fights with Congress and the Supreme Court

over the illegality of the NSA’s warrantless surveillance program, the use of

torture by the CIA, the designation of ‘enemy combatant’ and their rights to

trial, or due process among several noted controversies.

What distinguishes Donald Trump is his willingness to use this pattern of

executive unilateralism for his own personal benefit, not in service to policy,

political, or institutional goals. Trump saw himself as an elected autocrat

and did not see anything wrong with asking a foreign country to meddle in

American domestic politics for his gain or any of the countless other scandals.

With regards to ‘The Big Lie,’ that is where Trump took his authoritarian

populist, all-powerful presidency to the edge; as the authentic voice of Real

America, he couldn’t possibly be fairly defeated by the Democratic Party and

Joe Biden. It had to be the biggest fraud ever perpetrated, and therefore, he

was entitled to take his fight beyond the law to the brutal cold world of mob

violence and of might makes right.

The point of this project is to remind people of the fragility of social

consensus in a democratic society. If we cannot agree on what is democ-

racy, or who won the last presidential election, then we are in for a long

and dark road ahead. The Republican party will have to move beyond Don-

ald Trump eventually one way or another; when that occurs, will the next

Republican president, after Trump, advocate for executive unilateralism to

85
 CHAPTER 4. FINAL THOUGHTS

where it crosses the line from conservative populism to authoritarianism or

not? Given the party’s current state, it is hard to predict, and the diffi-

culties demonstrated in Chapter 2 suggest that predictive power regarding

authoritarianism is negligible primarily because it is so personalistic. Still,

the Republican party will have to adapt and change to some extent to meet

the new electorates of the future, which will necessitate the ability to win

popular support to a much greater extent than they have in recent elections.

Already, we are seeing the Republican party try to use cultural conser-

vatism to attract voters of color who are more moderate or conservative on

social issues. The educational polarization of white voters also seems likely

to increase or at least stay steady for the foreseeable future, helping fuel our

polarized partisan politics. These and other recent electoral trends suggest

that the close election results of the past few cycles likely continue.

What is needed is a societal and institutional response to the challenges

posed by Donald Trump and the symbol of right-wing authoritarian populism

he represents. Popular reforms include reforming the Electoral College, the

filibuster, and the Senate, among others, to increase government efficiency

and effectiveness, making it easier for policy to be passed legislatively and be

implemented. Without strong incentives to do so, it is difficult to imagine the

Republican party moving on from Donald Trump anytime soon. A significant

loss in the 2024 elections would be enough to jolt the party and allow openings

for new figures to take over, but if the party denies that it lost those incentives

86
CHAPTER 4. FINAL THOUGHTS

lose some of their power. A more significant problem is that our democratic

foundations have been shaken nearly to their core. Will the next Republican

president peacefully transfer power to a democratic candidate who might

have beaten him electorally? It will be a long, hard road to recover from

the damage that Trump has inflicted on the Republican party and society at

large, but it can, will, and must be done.

87
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