HSE Return on Experience

Title: Main Engine Failure – Loss of propulsion

Reference: REX-TS-Shipping- 2025-011 Date: October 2024
Business: Shipping
Country: European coasts Site: at sea
Domains : Workplace safety Technological risk Transport Health Environment Security Societal
Causes key words: Lubrication, FO Pump failure, oil film destruction
Consequences key words: Delay, cost

Incident description:
October 2024
✓ at 09:34, the main engine “Common Rail” type on VLCC Tanker had a shut down alarm due to low lubrication oil (LO)
pressure from No.1 main LO pump. No.2 main LO pump engaged automatically (almost instantly).
✓ Inspection revealed No.1 main LO pump was severely damaged.
✓ At 10:39, an OIL MIST ALARM caused a main engine slowdown, which reset itself.
✓ at 13:28, another OIL MIST ALARM prompted another slowdown but reset automatically. The crew conducted
superficial checks with an infrared thermometer. No issues raised during checks and voyage continued.

One day later:

✓ at 16:55, a FUEL LIMIT alarm indicated fully open fuel pump racks as the engine attempted to maintain sufficient fuel
supply to the fuel rail. The crew reduced engine speed for assessing the situation.
✓ at 17:21, a M/E FUEL RAIL LOW PRESS alarm caused another automatic slowdown.
✓ By 17:54, the main engine was stopped for inspection.

→Inspection revealed severe damage to all four fuel pump units and the fuel pump camshaft.
Debris were found in the fuel oil pump unit.

Consequences:
• Damage of main engine fuel unit (common rail fuel pumps plunger rollers broken, driving camshaft of fuel pumps
with traces of overheat and mechanical, damage, scratches in way of the cam surfaces).

• The VLCC remained adrift and required to be towed until received spare parts and the support of service engineers.

Analysis:
The operational parameters are not considered a contributing factor to this incident.
The maintenance of the fuel oil pumps is not considered a contributing factor to this incident.
The Fuel oil quality is not considered a contributing factor to this incident.
→The M/E lubricating oil supply system is the key factor of this incident.

• The first indication of impending damage occurred at 09:33:54, with the alarm: “M/E Bearing oil inlet pressure low” and
subsequent M/E Shutdown alarm.

• This was due to damage of No.1 Main LO pump coupling, which disrupted the oil supply to the lubrication system of
M/E and of fuel pumps specifically.

• Changeover to No.2 Main LO pump took place quickly, within 6 seconds, LO pressure dropped from 5.18 bars down to
0.62 bars then 4 seconds after, LO normal pressure was recovered. However, it is suspected that this short lubricating
oil starvation was the root cause of the fuel pump/ camshaft damage.

• This is supported also by the fact that, approximately 1 hour after M/E shutdown alarm was activated, the first oil mist
alarm in M/E fuel supply unit was triggered.

This document is circulated in the TotalEnergies organization within the framework of its safety policy. It should only serve as guidance, and may be provided as confidential information
to authorized contractors and suppliers working for TotalEnergies or any of its affiliate. TotalEnergies and its affiliate shall in no event accept any liability for either the facts described
nor for any reliance on the content by any third party. V
 HSE Return on Experience
The issue escalated within 24 hours, eventually preventing the supply unit from delivering adequate fuel oil to the fuel rail until
the point that M/E could not be started anymore.

Immediate cause:
• No.1 Main LO pump shut down due to abrupt coupling damage which resulted in disruption of M/E lubricating oil supply
at a sufficient pressure which may have led to the shearing of the lubricant film. However, lubrication pressure was
quickly restored after auto change over to No.2 Main LO pump.

→The momentarily pressure drop is the main cause of the fuel oil pumps and camshaft damage.

Rail unit with electronic control unit

Duplicated supply line for fuel and

servo oil

Supply unit

Fuel pumps

Camshaft casing

Fuel pump roller Driving camshaft

Source Instruction manual Win GD X82-2.0

This document is circulated in the TotalEnergies organization within the framework of its safety policy. It should only serve as guidance, and may be provided as confidential information
to authorized contractors and suppliers working for TotalEnergies or any of its affiliate. TotalEnergies and its affiliate shall in no event accept any liability for either the facts described
nor for any reliance on the content by any third party. V
 HSE Return on Experience
Root causes:

• Inadequate response to alarm

The initial OMD alarm which was activated shortly after the damage of No 1 Main LO pump, and was automatically reset,
allowing the M/E to continue operation could have served as an early sign of the damage to the Fuel Oil pump system.

The crew conducted, after the second OMD (Oil Mist Detector) alarm, a preliminary external inspection of the affected unit (MP
running), including temperature measurements with an infrared thermometer, but found no abnormal indications. No M/E
stoppage for internal check.

→The inadequate response to the OMD alarms is considered a contributing factor to this incident.

Procedures changed or amended after incident and investigation:

✓ Include in the PMS a condition inspection of the Main LO pump coupling, with replacement scheduled as needed, every
30 months.

✓ Update the list of minimum spare parts required for the Main LO pump, to include a set of bolts, nuts, and rubber
compensators for the coupling

✓ Update the list of critical spares to include a spare camshaft for the fuel oil pumps. FO pumps already considered in
sufficient Spare.

✓ Revise the Company’s policy for operating FO pumps to mandate the continuous engagement of three fuel oil pumps,
with the fourth pump isolated and disengaged from the camshaft.

✓ Train the crew emphasizing the critical importance of stopping the M/E and conducting an in-depth investigation of any
oil mist alarm, even when it resets automatically.

Recommendations:

The incident provides several key learnings that emphasize the interconnection between equipment operation, vessel
performance, and safety systems. The failure of the No.1 Main LO Pump coupling is suspected to be the pivotal event that
initiated a cascade of complications. The brief period of lower lubrication oil pressure following the pump failure had severe
consequences for the main engine, particularly the fuel pump camshaft and fuel pump rollers.

Even though the standby main LO pump activated immediately and restored system pressure, the damage to the camshaft
serves as a stark reminder of how even short interruptions in lubrication can result in significant mechanical damage
➔ Confirm that the setting of the threshold of the automatic starts the stand-by LO pump.
➔ importance of immediate and decisive action when lubrication systems exhibit any signs of malfunction, as delays can
exacerbate damage and escalate operational risks.

The incident underscores the critical role of the Oil Mist Detection system and reinforces the need for vigilance. In-depth
investigation of any OMD alarm, is paramount, even if the alarm resets automatically.
➔ An effective response to OMD alarms can prevent undetected issues from developing into severe engine damage,
ensuring the safety and reliability of operations

This document is circulated in the TotalEnergies organization within the framework of its safety policy. It should only serve as guidance, and may be provided as confidential information
to authorized contractors and suppliers working for TotalEnergies or any of its affiliate. TotalEnergies and its affiliate shall in no event accept any liability for either the facts described
nor for any reliance on the content by any third party. V