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This document is the third part of a detailed exploration of the Soviet ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system, focusing on its interior components and operational systems. It describes the turret's layout, including the gunner's and range-finder's positions, optical sighting systems, and radar modules, along with the challenges faced during target engagement. The document also highlights the evolution of the system's technology and its effectiveness against aerial threats, particularly during historical conflicts.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
6 views3 pages

zsu3

This document is the third part of a detailed exploration of the Soviet ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system, focusing on its interior components and operational systems. It describes the turret's layout, including the gunner's and range-finder's positions, optical sighting systems, and radar modules, along with the challenges faced during target engagement. The document also highlights the evolution of the system's technology and its effectiveness against aerial threats, particularly during historical conflicts.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Soviet ZSU-23-4, "Shilka", Part 3

Picture 1:
This is the third part of a three-part exploration of the interior of the Soviet/Russian ZSU-23-4 self-propelled AAA gun system.
Incidentally, ZSU stands for "Zenitnaya Samokhodnaya Ustanovka", or Anti-aircraft Self-Propelled Gun.

Up to this point we have looked into the driver's compartment and then lowered ourselves down into the turret to examine the
commander's station and some of the equipment at the back of the turret. This is the view looking down into the gunner's and range-
finder's hatch, looking toward the rear of the turret where we left off in Part 2. This hatch is considerably larger than the
commander's, but it also contains similar latches and rubber sealing gasket. The stenciling on the hatch reads, "When leaving crew
compartment turn off lighting systems prior to closing hatch." Mounted on the roof on this side of the hatch is the second sight head
for the back-up periscope optical sighting system. It is visible at the lower edge of the photograph. You can also see the open cover
off to the lower-right for the other periscope that is mounted on the commander's side of the roof. Down inside the turret are the
radar electronics modules that we saw last in Part 2, and the gunner's seat back is also visible at the lower edge of the hatch
opening. Recall that both the gunner and range-finder sit much lower in the turret than the commander.

Picture 2:
An excellent view of the right optical sight shows the cover opened and the complex design of the sight head itself. Through use of the
optical sight B-7 unit the gunner can lay and fire the guns either with our without radar assistance. The optical sight uses a conventional set
of gun aspect rings to determine lead angle and can be used also when one of the computer systems suffers a failure.

The optical B-7 unit makes it possible to track a target by angular position when the target can be visually observed through the sights. The
B-7 consists of a left periscope that we have seen near the commander's cupola that is mechanically linked to the radar antenna, and a right
element, seen here, that is coincident in direction with the gun barrels. Both of these periscope views are displayed in the single optic on
the B-7 unit inside the turret. As you will soon see, there is only one eyepiece for this system, which is mounted directly to the B-7 unit,
located in front of the gunner, so only one person at a time can use the system. Although some official literature describing the ZSU-23-4
seems to indicate that both the gunner and commander may use the optical B-7 system, it would be a real stretch for the commander to
even get his head over to the optics to operate it correctly. I suspect that is the reason why the commander's cupola has his own
independent, although crude sighting system that can be mounted on the cupola base outside his hatch.

Picture 3:
The equipment at the back of the turret behind the range-finder's seat includes a control module and electronics cabinet for the air filtration
system. The black panel on the box reads, "Caution. Before crossing fallout contaminated zone close three air inlet shutters side of SA10M,
three air outlet shutters on roof of SA10M, shutters on computer and cabinets T-37M1 and T-40M1, drivers, commanders and operators
hatches, close the "NPS" toggle switch on control console." With these precautions, the NBC air filtration system had a prayer of
maintaining the interior crew compartments free of contaminates, provided the equipment and filters were serviced properly.

Picture 4:
The right side of the turret interior is crammed with two tall component racks. The one on the right we saw partially in the last picture is the T-43M module, and
the one directly in front of us is the T-40M1. One of the many cooling system ducts is seen behind the left-upper side of the tall T-40M1 module, removing heated
air from the cabinet through the turret wall via a fan and duct. Off to the left is the T-37M1 range-finder complex. An unfortunate tactical result of the electronics
overheating problem was that Shilka crews had to restrict the amount of time using the radar in the surveillance mode, or the system would overheat and go down.
Over time, the turret and cooling systems were gradually redesigned to reduce the most critical problems, and then with the introduction of solid-state electronics
most of the overheating problems were solved. Overheating of electronics modules has not been restricted to this vehicle; it is a constant design consideration for
any highly computerized equipment, particularly complicated AAA systems in the close confines of an AFV.

According to military sources, a typical engagement sequence in the Shilka could occur like this: the two radar operators (gunner and range-finder) would already
have the vehicle radar switched to surveillance or sector scan mode to acquire possible incoming targets. When a target was detected, a warning light and buzzer
would sound and the radar would be manually switched to automatic tracking mode. At this time, the target would be interrogated with an IFF (identification-
friend-foe) profile signal. If the aircraft was friendly, the sequence would shut down, but if there was no response to interrogation, the lock-on sequence would
continue. The range and height data from the range-finder complex was then fed into the computer and a gun lead provided for firing. As soon as the computer had
the lead adjusted, the AZP-23 was automatically brought to bear on the target by the flip of a switch and the gun tracking system would be fed a continuous stream
of computer generated corrections. When these corrections had been completed, the radar operator or commander then signaled the rest of the crew that firing was
eminent by indicating that the vehicle had correct data for firing. The guns could then be fired, usually in a one-second, 60-round burst, which could result in as
much as 11.4kg (25lb) of projectiles being hurled toward the target.

Picture 5:
This is the T-37M1 range-finder complex (also known as the "operator's electronic module"), the interface between the radar signal pulse initiation and its reception, the difference in time providing range to target. The T-
37M1 also provides speed of target and therefore lead angles for the gunner. The handwheel is the manual gun elevation control. At the top of the panel is part of
the B-7 periscopic sighting system control panel.

The firing cycle takes about six seconds from initial target acquisition to radar tracking lock-on. US tests of captured Shilkas (the vehicles acquired through Israel)
reported that the time from initial target acquisition to firing of the guns took approximately 20-30 seconds for an average crew. If you consider that a typical jet
fighter-bomber travels at around 725kmph (450mph), it could then traverse the 5km lethal zone of the Shilka in around 25 seconds. That means that even a good
Shilka crew would have great difficulty knocking down a fast mover. On the other hand, a slower target like a helicopter, traveling at perhaps 290kmph (180mph)
would traverse the lethal zone of the Shilka in about 60 seconds. To hit a helicopter which had realized by radar warning systems that it was in peril and was
therefore taking evasive action, the Shilka had to have a good crew and be able to acquire and identify targets very quickly. There was not much tome to track and
fire their weapons to kill even the slower targets. And still, the Shilka was a real nemesis to Israeli aircraft during the '67 war, accounting for a remarkable
percentage of aircraft kills.

Picture 6:
Looking down to the floor around the range-finder's seat we can see that he also has turret traverse pedals at his feet, just as the
commander has. The T-40M1 electronics rack is to the right of his seat and the T-43M component module is visible at the upper
right corner of the picture.

The effectiveness of the Shilka was reduced in the 1970s because countermeasures were developed to the threat. Aircraft that were
especially vulnerable to these gun systems, like attack helicopters, were configured with radar warning receivers that could detect
initial search emissions from the Gun Dish radar. If they were alerted in time, a helicopter crew could then simply avoid the limited
lethal envelope of the Shilka, notifying other aircraft of the coordinates of the vehicle. Additional tactical countermeasures could
then be used as well. For instance, Shilkas could themselves be engaged by attack helicopters by firing long-range anti-tank
missiles (like TOW) from ranges outside the effective kill range of the Shilka's AZP-23 guns. This proved most effective in Desert
Storm were many Iraqi Shilkas were killed in the early months of the conflict until there were no active units existing or their crews
refused to turn on their search/surveillance radars for fear of being destroyed.

Picture 7:
This is the gunner's view of his T-36M radar module and screen. The manual gun elevation handwheel is off to the right, and the gunner's powered turret controls
are below the screen in the form of two handgrips. The powered turret is electrically driven, both powered elevation and traverse depend on large electrical motors
located under the turret floor and under the guns. Down on the floor in front of the gunner's seat are two pedal similar to those found at the commander's and
range-finder's positions. But while their pedals activate the powered turret traverse, the gunner's pedals fire the guns. The electronic panel above the T-36M in front
of the gunner is the B-7 optical sight system that uses the two periscopes we saw on the roof. The single eyepiece for the system is seen to the left, but is missing
its forehead pad, although the mounting bracket for the pad is visible. The writing over the right knob on the B-7 panel reads, "Caution! Do not open device." The
two positions for the knob are labeled "Tracker" on the left, and "Standby" on the right.

The Gun Dish acquisition and tracking radar is a J-band type (14.6-15.6 GHz) that is linked to the analog linear prediction computer. The radar has a maximum
surveillance range of around 20km, a maximum tracking range of around 18km, and is backed up by conventional optical speed-ring periscopic sights on the turret
roof that we saw earlier in this page. The large parabolic reflector radar antenna is covered with a radio wave-passing screen and fitted with a horn-type exciter.
The radar searches for and identifies a target, and then automatically tracks it and provides both target range and angular position. Should the target move from the
scanning area, servo drives automatically adjusted the antenna to attempt to reacquire the target, or so the publicity brochure I am holding in my hand claims.

According to another Soviet report, an optical sight engagement would go something like this: First, the target must be visually acquired, then the command given:
"Target on the left, helicopter. Range 2000 meters, Destroy!" The operator [gunner] must lay the tubes in the direction of the target by turning the handle of the
control panel, shift the sight lever to the "double position", align the open sight with the axis of the bore, set the distance grid with the indicated range, bring it up
under the target, and finally, press the button on the control lever to fire a short burst.

Picture 8:
This is another view of the gunner's systems, including the gunner's powered turret controls, his T-36M radar display and
electronics panel, and the periscopic sighting system B-7 at the top edge of the picture. A traditional Soviet A-1 radio connection
box for the R-124 intercom system is at the top left in the photo. All four crewmen are provided helmets with headphones and a
microphone, connected to the vehicle intercom system.

Although they are hidden in this view, the turret's B-4 gun stabilization and T-55M1 turret steering electronic complexes are located
under the radar display, but further forward in the turret. The stabilization system is linked to an azimuth gyro that keeps the radar
antenna and gun sights on target in spite of the pitch and roll of the vehicle over rough terrain. Automatically, through servo
systems, the unit alters the antenna and gun sight angles accordingly. A kinematic roll circuit is built into the whole stabilizing
network to alter the antenna direction in the horizontal plane as the turret is traversed. The word kinematic refers to prediction of
the motion of objects, basically a set of four equations, which can be utilized to determine or predict an object's motion if certain
prior motion information is determined.

Ammunition for the four cannons is normally loaded with a ratio of three HE rounds to one AP round. In October of 1997, there
were reports of ZSU-23-4 updates/modernization programs being offered by the Ukrainians that include a new radar system
replacing the GUN DISH radar system, a sensor pod believed to include day/night camera, and a laser rangefinder. Mounted above
the radar/sensor pod are six fire-and-forget SAMs, believed to be Russian SA-18/GROUSE. This is a similar system to the new
Russian 2S6 Tunguska vehicle which is provided with radar, cannons, and up to eight 9M311 (SA-19) missiles.

Picture 9:
How does the Shilka's RPK-2 radar work? Simply stated, the radar set turns on its transmitter and shoots out a short but high-intensity burst of high-frequency radio waves. The burst is very short, perhaps as short as a
microsecond. The radar set then turns off its transmitter so it won't confuse itself, turns on its receiver, and listens for an echo. The radar set then measures the time
it takes for the echo to return from the airplane, as well as any Doppler shift of the echo. Doppler shift is the change forced on a wave that has rebounded off a
moving object, in comparison to a wave that bounces off a stationary one.

Since radio waves travel at the speed of light, depending on atmospheric conditions, they travel at roughly 1,000 feet per microsecond. If the radar set has a very
good and fast clock, then it can measure the distance of the airplane very accurately by measuring the time it took between sending the radio waves and receiving
the echo. Using sophisticated signal processing equipment, the radar set can also measure the Doppler shift very accurately and therefore determine the speed of
the airplane. But in ground-based radar units like the Shilka, there is also a lot of potential interference from ground clutter, for the radar wave may bounce off
other objects and these echoes also return to the antenna, confusing the system as to which echo is the true echo of the aircraft. The easiest way to remove all the
clutter is to filter it out by recognizing that it is not Doppler-shifted. All this emitting, recording, filtering, etc., takes a lot of equipment to do the job precisely, and
so we see all these complexes and electronic boxes in the Shilka turret. Recall that not only does the radar have to find and track a target, but it also has to interface
with the turret motors to make the turret/guns automatically track the target as well, including any required lead angles, elevation changes for range, etc.

Picture 10:
This US Marine Corps photo shows an Iraqi ZSU-23-4M knocked out during Desert Storm. Notice that the forward right
ammo access door on the turret roof is open and a belt of 23mm ammunition is hanging down the turret side. The radar dish
has been destroyed and the large access door to the air filtration system (located to the right of the gunner's/range-finder's
hatch) has been opened. The two crew hatches on the turret roof are also open, as well as two of the three side hull hatches.
The second side hatch (behind the gentleman) is the location of the DG-4M1 80hp auxiliary gas turbine engine, used to
power the electrical systems when the main engine is turned off. There are both DC (direct current) and AC (alternating
current) generators onboard. The other open hatch further forward marks the location of the large transformer for the vehicle
electrical power supply, as well as the stowage location for the OU-3GA2 IR spotlight for the commander's cupola.

Picture 11:
There are many Shilkas still in use today, and the system will probably be continuously updated as long as economical use of the
vehicles is possible. One of the newest versions is offered by Russia's Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant and the Minotor-Service
Company of the Republic of Belarus. The new models are named the ZSU-23-4M4, and the ZSU-23-4M5, depending on the
amount of new equipment in the upgrade.

Some of the upgrade packages include digital signal processing and computerization, an improved optronic radar system, as well as
detection, tracking, and ranging of targets by laser rangefinder. Coded telecommunications equipment can hook the Shilka into
automated fire control from a mobile command/control post. Some of the upgrades available include missile systems mounted to
the turret, as you see in this photo taken at the 1999 Moscow Air Show with SA-16 Igla. The driver's compartment has also been
modernized with a new hydraulic steering system with a Y-shaped steering wheel, and a television camera system for both forward
and rear viewing. The suspension and powerplant have been improved to increase the average running speed, allowing the
improved Shilka to accompany modern battle tanks and lightly armored vehicles in combat. Air conditioning has also been added to
the turret.

Whether this type of upgrade program will significantly extend the service life of Shilkas with current users will be determined
purely by economics and need. This photo is credited to FoxbatAVIa.

Picture 12:
Once again I would like to thank David S. Speaks for his photography, as well as the Threat Training Facility (TTF) operated by
members of the 547th Intelligence Squadron of the USAF at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. You can take a short visit to their
facility through a TTF Virtual Tour at their web page.

The bulk of the technical information for these pages comes from a Russian publication that was translated by the Foreign Science
and Technology Center in Charlottesville, Virginia, and first published in English in the US Army Aviation Digest. Any errors in
the web page text are mine. We are continually searching for additional information about the Shilka's interior and crew operation.
Should you have something to add, we would be interested to hear from you.

TO ZSU-23-4 PART 1

TO ZSU-23-4 PART 2

BACK TO AFV INTERIORS HOME PAGE

(c) 2002, 2003 AFV INTERIORS Web Magazine

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