CONTEMPT OF COURT

Contempt of court in general means, “To offend the dignity of the court and
lower the prestige of the court”.
In Halsbury laws of England, it is defined as follow “Any act done or writing
published which is calculated to bring a court or judge into contempt or lower
his authority or to interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process
of the court is contempt of court”.
Why do Court need to have Contempt of Court powers?
 Possibility of wilful disobedience of courts’ orders.
 Tendency to lower image of judiciary.
 Need for maintaining independence of judiciary.
 Need to respect status and decisions of judiciary.
 Duty of all authorities in India to assist the courts in executing their
orders.
 Full faith and credit clause in the Constitution.
Constitutional Provisions
Art. 129: Supreme Court to be a court of record. The Supreme Court shall be a
court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power
to punish for contempt of itself. •
Art.215: High Courts to be courts of record. Every High Court shall be a court
of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to
punish for contempt of itself. •
Art.144: Civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court. All
authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the
Supreme Court. •
Art.141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts. The law
declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory
of Indi
Types
Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 – lays the types
Section 2(b) of the Act, defines “Civil Contempt”
Section 2(c) of the Act, defines “Criminal Contempt”
Criminal contempt
Section 2(c) of the Act, defines “Criminal Contempt”
“Criminal Contempt” as the publication (whether by words spoken or written or
by signs or by visible representations or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of
any act whatsoever which –
(i) Scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lower or tends to lower, the
authority of any court, or
(ii) Prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of
any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct,
the administration of justice in any other manner.
Case : Delhi Judicial Services Association v. State of Gujarat & others, (1991) 4
SCC 406
held that the definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act
of a person which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice or
which would lower the authority of the Court.
Essential Ingredients
1. Publication or other act;
2. Scandalizing or lowering the authority of the court or interfering with
judicial proceeding or administration of justice;
3. Prejudice to or Interference with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding (Media Trial)
4. Interference or obstruction with administration of justice in any other
manner
1. Publication or other act;
In the case of Re S.K. Sundarami, AIR 2001 SC 2374,
the telegraphic communication sent by the contemner contain the following: "I
call upon Shriman Dr. A.S. Anand Hon'ble Chief Justice of India to step down
from the constitutional office of the Chief Justice of India forthwith, failing
which I will be constrained to move the criminal court for offences under
sections 420, 406, 471, Indian Penal Code for falsification of your age, without
prejudice to the right to file a writ of quo-warranto against you and for a
direction to deposit a sum of Rs. 3 crores for usurping to the office of Chief
Justice of .India even after attaining the age of superannuation." The .Court held
it as gross criminal contempt of court.
2. Scandalizing or lowering the authority of the court or interfering with
judicial proceeding or administration of justice;
Rajendra Sail v. M.P. High Court Bar Association, 2005 AIR SCW 2443,
the prosecution witness made statement in public that in murder trial the judge
had disposition to acquit the accused. The judge about to retire was available for
sale and that the judgment was rubbish and deserves to be thrown in dustbin.
This comment made by the witness was published in newspaper. The Court held
that it amounts to gross contempt of Court
M.Y Shareef v. Judges of Nagpur High Court, AIR 1955 se 19,
held that Not only writings in petition or pleadings the scurrilous allegation or
scandalization against a Judge or Court amounts to contempt, but also the
allegations made in the application for the transfer of the case amounts to
contempt of Court and the counsel, who has signed it, may be punished for it.
3. Prejudice to or Interference with, the due course of any judicial proceeding
(Media Trial)
Actually, media trial or trial by newspaper is not considered proper because it
affects the fairness of trial and is likely to cause prejudice or likely to interfere
with, due administration of justice in the particular case.
4. Interference or obstruction with administration of justice in any other manner
J.R. Parashar v. Prashant Bhushani, AIR 2001 se 3395,
the Supreme Court has held that holding a Dharna by itself may not amount to
contempt of court, but if by holding a dharna access to the courts is hindered
and the officers of the court and members of the police are not allowed free
ingress and egress or the proceedings in court are otherwise disrupted, disturbed
or hampered, the Dharna may amount to contempt because the administration of
justice would be obstructed
Damayanti G. Chandiramani v. S. Vaney, AIR 1966 Born 19.
where a party threatens the advocate of other party to prosecute him in Court or
where a solicitor assaults the opposing solicitor outside the Court or where a
person demands the counsel not to undertake defence of the accused, it will
amount to contempt of Court
Punishment for Contempt of Court:
Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a contempt of court may be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months,
or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both
Limitation
Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 and the Limitation period for
actions of contempt is a period of one year from the date on which the contempt
is alleged to have been committed
Criticisms
‘scandalizing the authority of court’ was first used by Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke in 1742 in Roach v. Garvan (or Hall)25. The very origin of this
branch has been described as both “dubious and controversial.”26 The
celebrated dictum of Justice Wilmot in his undelivered judgement in Wilkes
Case27, way back in 1765 is considered as the locus classicus on the subject
and serves as the origination of the concept of “scandalizing the authority of the
court”. Wilmot observed that the entire objective of the law of contempt was to
keep a ‘blaze of Glory around judges’, to prevent people from making judges
‘contemptible in the eyes of the Public’.
Scandalizing the court’ has been defined by the Supreme Court of India, as
being any publication or action which has the effect of lowering the dignity or
majesty of the court in the eyes of the public and causing or likely to cause
obstruction in the administration of justice.28 It has the generalistic aim of
preventing the undermining of public confidence in the administration of
justice29 from baseless attacks on the integrity or impartiality of courts and
judges30. Thus, it can be applicable at any time
More recently, in the Prashant Bhushan case,35 the Supreme Court of India
amplified this notion by making a far-fetched observation that the impression
which the contentious tweet tended to give to an ordinary citizen is that when
historians look back, the impression they will get is that the Supreme Court of
India had a role in the destruction of democracy. Moreover, the Court noted that
the tweet reached millions of people, thus assuming that these millions of
people were gullible enough to believe the tweet and develop a sense of
disbelief towards the institution of judiciary.
Contrast differences between Hari Singh Nagra and Prashant Bhushan
cases
In Hari Singh Nagra,62 the Supreme Court of India was considering statements
made by senior advocate Kapil Sibal, regarding the “questionable integrity of
some of those who are in judiciary”; “the judges need disciplining”; that some
judges had received “monetary benefits for judicial pronouncements, rendering
blatantly dishonest judgement” and that some judges had been “kowtowing with
political personalities and obviously favouring the government….thereby losing
all sense of objectivity”.
The Supreme Court of India found that this did not amount to contempt for the
reason that his message was an articulation of the concerns of a senior advocate
with an experienced practice in the Supreme Court, who upon noticing that the
public image of the legal community was dipping, made such statements for
precautionary effect. Thus, the court was much impressed by the prowess of
Sibal, that he being in the fraternity knew more and thus could fairly exercise
his right to criticize. In saying so, the Supreme Court of India pacified the rather
uncanny and unusual test of fair criticism laid down by it in the case of re:
Arundhati Roy, 63:
“…fair criticism of the conduct of a judge, the institution of the judiciary and its
functioning may not amount to contempt if it is made in good faith and in public
interest. To ascertain the good faith and the public interest, the courts have to
see all the surrounding circumstances including the person responsible for
comments, his knowledge in the field regarding which the comments are made
and the intended purpose sought to be achieved. All citizens cannot be permitted
to comment upon the conduct of the courts in the name of fair criticism which,
if not checked, would destroy the institution itself.”64
The propriety of this test seems logically unpalatable. By holding so, the courts
have held that only those who have considerable knowledge of the legal field
are entitled to criticize the courts, and not others. As has been seen, this
reasoning found favour with the Supreme Court of India in Sibal’s case. It is
interesting to note that the respondent in re: Arundhati Roy,65 was a Booker
Prize winning author. So, if she was not viewed by the court to be enough well
versed to be able to comment on the courts, then it is not clear who, except the
persons from the legal community themselves, will be so able.
Quite interestingly, in the infamous case of Prashant Bhushan, 66 the Supreme
Court of India did not seem to follow this reasoning while convicting the
advocate for saying in his tweet that “CJI rides a 50 lakh motorcycle belonging
to a BJP leader without a mask or helmet at a time when he keeps SC in
Lockdown mode denying citizens their fundamental right to access justice” and
that “when historians in future look back at the 6 years to see how democracy
has been destroyed in India even without a formal emergency, they will
particularly mark the role of the Supreme Court in this destruction, & more
particularly the role of the last 4 CJIs”. The Court observed that the contemnor
had “indulged in an act tending to bring disrepute to the administration of
justice”. He was expected to act as a responsible officer of the court. Hence,
despite the contemnor having a practice of 30 years in the Supreme Court of
India and the Delhi High Court, the test as laid down in Arundhati Roy,67 was
clearly not followed by the Supreme Court of India. The legal standing of the
contemnor, instead of acting as an exonerating circumstance, weighed as a
factor for the court to find him guilty; quite contrary to the ruling in Hari Singh
Nagra, 68.
It is clear from these decisions and the other irregularities highlighted in the
preceding section that there is no uniformity and consistency in the practice and
application of law by the courts in the matter of punishing for criminal contempt
and that it is surrounded by numerous contradictions. It is in these
circumstances that the authors argue in the subsequent section in the favour of
an inquiry into the mental element of the alleged contemnor making the
contemptuous comment as one of the possible solutions to the vagueness
surrounding this element of criminal contempt. The next section analyses the
possibility of narrowing it down by making mens rea a relevant consideration
for determining guilt in ‘scandalizing’ cases.
Lack of consideration for mens rea