Neutral Citation No.

- 2024:AHC:160343
Court No. - 5 Reserved

Case :- WRIT - A No. - 3561 of 2023 A.F.R.

Petitioner :- Siddharth Singh

Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 5 Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Raghavendra Sharan Tiwari
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.

Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, Police
Commissionerate, Varanasi dated 03.02.2023, rejecting the
petitioner's case for appointment as a Constable in the Uttar
Pradesh Police, on account of a criminal case lodged against him,
of which he has been later on acquitted.

2. The facts giving rise to this petition would show that the
petitioner staked his claim for the post of a Police Constable in the
Uttar Pradesh Police. This was in the recruitment year 2013. The
petitioner was selected for the post and the date for his training
was scheduled as 02.12.2015. After the petitioner was selected, in
the Police Verification Report Form (PVR), he disclosed that a
criminal case had been lodged against him, in which this Court had
stayed proceedings. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi
by his order dated 02.02.2016 rejected the petitioner's candidature
on ground of pendency of that case. That order of the Senior S.P.,
Varanasi was challenged by the petitioner before this Court by
means of Writ-A No.18399 of 2016, wherein an interim order dated
26.04.2016 was granted to the following effect:

“In the meantime, the respondents are directed to send the petitioner for
training and if he successfully completes his training, then in his appointment
letter it would be mentioned that the appointment of the petitioner shall abide
by the result of the writ petition.”

3. This order was challenged by the State by means of Special

Appeal Defective No.130 of 2017. The Division Bench allowed the
 2

appeal vide judgment and order dated 27.02.2017 and set

aside the interim order dated 26.04.2016. The learned Single
Judge was required to decide the writ petition on merits. The
writ petition came up before the learned Single Judge for
hearing on 19.09.2022 and this Court vide judgment and order
of that date set aside the order dated 02.02.2016 passed by the
Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi, rejecting the
petitioner's candidature, with a remit of the matter to the said
Officer carrying a direction to take into account the subsequent
acquittal that the petitioner had earned vide judgment and order
dated 05.03.2019 passed by the learned Magistrate. The
learned Judge directed the Senior S.P. that in taking his
decision, he shall exercise his power independently, in
accordance with law, but would consider the effect of the
judgment of acquittal dated 05.03.2019 passed by the learned
Magistrate in the criminal case.

4. When the matter again came up before the respondents,

this time, represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Police,
Police Headquarters, Police Commissionerate, Varanasi, he
proceeded to reject the petitioner's candidature vide order
dated 03.02.2023, holding the judgment of the Trial Court not to
have cleansed or purged the petitioner of the lingering shadows
of the crime, which in the view of the Deputy Commissioner of
Police, he had committed but got away because of some kind
of a compromise reached outside Court.

5. Aggrieved, this writ petition has been instituted.

6. A notice of motion was issued on 03.03.2023. Parties

have exchanged a short counter and a short rejoinder, besides
a counter affidavit on behalf of respondent Nos.2, 3, 5 and 6, to
which a rejoinder too has been filed. The parties having
 3

exchanged pleadings, this petition was admitted to hearing on

20.09.2024, which proceeded forthwith and judgment was
reserved.

7. Heard Mr. Raghavendra Sharan Tiwari, learned Counsel

for the petitioner and Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the
respondents.

8. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the Deputy

Commissioner of Police has gone more by the fact that a crime
was registered against the petitioner, wherein after
investigation, the Police filed a charge-sheet. He has then
opined that a perusal of the judgment passed by the learned
Magistrate, acquitting the petitioner, does not surely lend itself
to a construction that the petitioner had not committed the
crime. The reason for this conclusion is that the prosecution
witnesses had turned hostile, the advantage of which went to
the petitioner. There is a remark by the Deputy Commissioner
of Police that in the social milieu of rural life, it is often seen that
domestic disputes, leading to FIRs / NCRs, invite intervention of
some respectable persons of the society, who mediate the
dispute, resulting in a compromise between parties. This in turn
causes the witness to go hostile. The impact of the hostility of
witnesses in a Criminal Court is that the prosecution is not able
to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, leading to the
accused being acquitted. It is then remarked that in the present
case something of this kind has happened. It is then added that
a person to be appointed to the Police must be a man of clean
antecedents. A man with criminal antecedents, if appointed to
the Police Force, would put a question mark on their image. It is
more or less on the said reasoning that the Deputy
Commissioner of Police has proceeded to pass the order
 4

impugned.

9. The short counter affidavit and the rejoinder are not of

much relevance because the first respondent has disassociated
itself from any issue in the matter, leaving it to the Police
Authorities who passed the impugned order to answer the
petitioner. In the counter affidavit, that has been filed on behalf
of respondent Nos.2, 3, 5 and 6, the stand taken is that the
Commissioner of Police, Varanasi directed verification of the
petitioner and it was found that Crime No.359 of 2013, under
Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC read with Section 3/4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act was registered against him. In this
regard, the opinion of the District Magistrate, Varanasi was
obtained and he gave opinion that the petitioner is not a fit
person for appointment on a Constable's post in the Civil
Police. As such, the then Senior Superintendent of Police,
Varanasi passed the order dated 02.02.2016, rejecting the
petitioner's candidature, since set aside by this Court. There is
then a copious reference to Government Order No. 4694-II-B-
321-1947 dated 28.04.1958, which has bearing upon matters of
character verification of candidates, seeking employment under
the State Government. It is again mentioned there that the
Senior Superintendent of Police referred the matter to the
District Magistrate in accordance with the said Government
Order, who opined the petitioner not fit for appointment vide his
letter dated 20.01.2023. The stand is that the District Magistrate
had given legal opinion to the effect that the judgment of the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, acquitting the
petitioner, was due to the witnesses hostility, leaving the
Appointing Authority free to take his decision. It is then averred
that the Appointing Authority, taking into consideration the fact
that the petitioner had been acquitted due to witnesses turning
 5

hostile, held that he was not a person of good character, free

from criminal antecedents and, therefore, unfit to be recruited to
the Police Force. If appointed, he would bring the Police a bad
name. It is more or less on these grounds, most of which figure
in the impugned order, that the respondents have sought to
support their action.

10. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, we are of

opinion that the purpose of all rules relating to recruitment and
the way the law about it has evolved, is to keep persons with
criminal antecedents out of government service; not just the
Police. It is for this reason that the Government Order of 1958
makes very elaborate provision in keeping with the time when it
was issued to check on the criminal antecedents of a
prospective appointee to government service. It would be
apposite to extract the relevant part of the Government Order
dated 28.04.1958:

3. (a) Every direct recruit to any service under the

Uttar Pradesh Government will be required to produce:

(i) A certificate of conduct and character from the

head of the educational institution where he last
studied (if he went to such an institution).

(ii) Certificates of character from two persons. The

appointing authority will lay down requirements as to
kind of persons from whom it desires these
certificates.

b) In cases of doubt, the appointing authority may

either ask for further references, or may refer the
case to the District Magistrate concerned. The
District Magistrate may then make further enquiries
as he considers necessary.

Note(a) A conviction need not of itself involve the

refusal of a certificate of good character. The
circumstances of the conviction should be taken into
account and if they involve on moral turpitude or
association with crimes of violence or with a
movement which has its object to overthrow by violent
means of Government as by law now established in free
India the mere conviction need not be regarded as
disqualification. (Conviction of a person during his
childhood should not necessarily operate as a bar to
 6

his entering Government service. The entire

circumstances in which his conviction was recorded as
well as the circumstances in which he is now placed
should be taken into consideration. If he has
completely reformed himself on attaining the age of
understanding and discretion, mere conviction in
childhood should not operate as a bar to his entering
Government service).

(b) While no person should be considered unfit for

appointment solely because of his political opinions,
care should be taken not to employ persons who are
likely to be disloyal and to abuse the confidence
placed in them by virtue of their appointment.
Ordinarily, persons who are actively engaged in
subversive activities including members of any
organization the avowed object of which is to change
the existing order of society by violent means should
be considered unfit for appointment under Government.
Participation in such activities at any time after
attaining the age of 21 years and within three years
of the date of enquiry should be considered as
evidence that the person is still actively engaged in
such activities unless in the interval there is
positive evidence of change of attitude.

(c) Persons dismissed by the Central Government or by

a State Government will also be deemed to be unfit
for appointment to any service under this Government.

2(d) In the case of direct recruits to the State

Services under the Uttar Pradesh Government includes
requiring the candidates to submit the certificates
mentioned in paragraph 3 (a) above. The appointing
authority shall refer all cases simultaneously to
Deputy Inspector General of Police, intelligence and
the District Magistrate (of the home district and of
the district(s) where the candidate has resided for
more than a year within five years of the date of the
inquiry) giving full particulars about the candidate.
The District Magistrate shall get the reports in
respect of the candidates from the Superintendent of
Police who will consult District Police Records and
records of the Local Intelligence Unit. The District
Police or the District Intelligence Unit shall not
make any enquiries on the spot, but shall report from
their records whether there is anything against the
candidate, but if in any specific case the District
Magistrate at the instance of the appointing
authority ask for an enquiry on the spot the Local
Police or the Local Intelligence Units will do so and
report the result to him. The District Magistrate
shall then reports his own views to the appointing
authority. Where the District Police or the Local
Intelligence Units report adversely about a candidate
the District Magistrate may give the candidate a
hearing before sending his report.

(e) In the case of direct recruits (who are lower in

rank than that of a State Service Officer) of:
 7

(i) the police (including ministerial staff of Police

Officers).

(ii) the Secretariat.

(iii) the staff employed in the government factories,

(iv) power houses and dams.

besides requiring the candidates to submit the

certificates mentioned in paragraph 3 (a) above, the
appointing authorities shall refer all cases
simultaneously to the Deputy Inspector General,
C.I.D. and the District Superintendent of Police (of
the home district and of the district(s) where the
candidate has resided for more than a year within
five year of the date of the inquiry) giving full
particulars about the candidate. The Superintendents
of Police will send his report direct to the
appointing authority if there is nothing adverse
against the candidate. In cases where the report is
unfavourable the Superintendent of Police will
forward it to the District Magistrate who will send
for the candidate concerned, give him a hearing and
then, form his own opinion. All the necessary papers
(the Superintendent of Police's report the
candidate's statement and the District Magistrate's
finding) will there after be sent to the appointing
authority.

4. It will be seen that in cases of direct recruit to

services other than those mentioned in paragraphs 3
(c) and 3 (d) above, verification shall not be
necessary as a matter of routine except in cases of
doubt when the procedure mentioned in paragraph 3 (b)
shall be followed.

5. In the case of a candidate for services mentioned

in paragraphs 3 (c) and 3 (d) above-

(i) if at the time of enquiry the candidate is

residing in a locality situated outside Uttar Pradesh
or if he has resided in such a locality at any time
within five years of the date of enquiry for a period
of one year or more it shall be the duty of the
deputy Inspector General, C. I. D. to consult also
the C. I. D. D. of the State concerned in which the
locality is situated before making his verification
report.

(ii) if the candidate was residing before partition

in area now comprising Pakistan the Deputy Inspector
General, C. I. D. shall also make a reference to the
Director of Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home
Affairs, Government of India, in addition to the
usual enquires as indicated above.

6. It has also been observed that where the District

Magistrates are required to send the attestation
forms they sometimes do not sign the forms
themselves, Government consider it very desirable
that the attestation forms should invariably be
 8

signed by the District Magistrates them selves in all

such cases.”

11. A careful perusal of the aforesaid Government Order

shows that it was never considered trite principle that every
conviction would lead to refusal of a certificate of good
character. It would, if moral turpitude was involved or there was
participation in a crime of violence or association with a
movement which had for its object overthrow of the lawful
Government established in free India by violent means. It would
show the concern of those who issued the Government Order
not to alienate from government service young men of the time,
who had participated in movements to free India, and may be,
resorted to violent means against the British Government.
There are also provisions about safeguarding the interest of
candidates for government service against childhood
indiscretions that were committed by young men at a juvenile
age, who later on reformed themselves. The reason why the
District Magistrate was associated with the process of character
verification was to secure, what was thought at the time, a non-
partisan view about the antecedents of the person and not just
a stereotyped opinion, stencil cut on the basis of registered
criminal cases alone. The later Government Orders have not
changed this position and the District Magistrate's opinion is still
sought by the Police before verifying a candidate's character.

12. It is quite another matter, as it seems that the District

Magistrates do not seem to have lived up to the trust reposed in
them in that, that they too seem to refuse certification of good
character, if they find a case registered against a candidate, or
even a judgment of acquittal that makes them think that it was
not honourable. Not every crime, irrespective of its triviality, or
the fall out of a social malady, ought be regarded as a definitive,
 9

pre-determined disablement from government employment. A

young man or a woman could for once be accused, rightly or
wrongly, of indulging in some kind of a skirmish leading to the
registration of a case, say for an offence punishable under
Section 323, 504, 506 IPC. It may lead to a final report or a
charge-sheet. If charge-sheeted, the trial may end in acquittal,
or may be a conviction too for the young man or woman, who
once committed the indiscretion. But, never again. Should such
a person for all times to come be banished from the privilege of
public employment, when otherwise the person possesses by
all other standards sterling character. This, of course, would not
hold true of a heinous offence committed by a man or woman,
not a juvenile. Yet every indiscretion, as already remarked,
must not become a lifetime disability for a person of good
character and sound talent to be deprived of public
employment. In this connection, reference may be made to
Commissioner of Police and others v. Sandeep Kumar,
(2011) 4 SCC 644. The facts in Sandeep Kumar (supra) can
best be recapitulated in the words of their Lordships that say:

“2. The respondent herein, Sandeep Kumar applied

for the post of Head Constable (Ministerial) in
1999. In the application form it was printed:

“12(a) Have you ever been arrested, prosecuted,

kept under detention or bound down/fined,
convicted by a court of law for any offence,
debarred/disqualified by any Public Service
Commission from appearing at its
examination/selection or debarred from any
examination, rusticated by any university or
any other education authority/institution.”

Against that column the respondent wrote: “No”.

3. It is alleged that this is a false statement

made by the respondent because he and some of his
family members were involved in a criminal case
being FIR No. 362 under Sections 325/34 IPC. This
case was admittedly compromised on 18-1-1998 and
the respondent and his family members were
acquitted on 18-1-1998.
 10

4. In response to the advertisement issued in

January 1999 for filling up of certain posts of
Head Constables (Ministerial), the respondent
applied on 24-2-1999 but did not mention in his
application form that he was involved in the
aforesaid criminal case. The respondent qualified
in all the tests for selection to the post of
temporary Head Constable (Ministerial). On 3-4-
2001 he filled the attestation form wherein for
the first time he disclosed that he had been
involved in a criminal case with his tenant
which, later on, had been compromised in 1998 and
he had been acquitted.

5. On 2-8-2001 a show-cause notice was issued to

him asking the respondent to show cause why his
candidature for the post should not be cancelled
because he had concealed the fact of his
involvement in the aforesaid criminal case and
had made a wrong statement in his application
form. The respondent submitted his reply on 17-8-
2001 and an additional reply but the authorities
were not satisfied with the same and on 29-5-2003
cancelled his candidature.”

13. In upholding the relief granted by the High Court to the

candidate seeking employment in the police in Sandeep
Kumar, it was held by the Supreme Court:

“8. We respectfully agree with the Delhi High

Court that the cancellation of his candidature
was illegal, but we wish to give our own opinion
in the matter. When the incident happened the
respondent must have been about 20 years of age.
At that age young people often commit
indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often
be condoned. After all, youth will be youth. They
are not expected to behave in as mature a manner
as older people. Hence, our approach should be to
condone minor indiscretions made by young people
rather than to brand them as criminals for the
rest of their lives.

11. As already observed above, youth often

commits indiscretions, which are often condoned.

12. It is true that in the application form the

respondent did not mention that he was involved
in a criminal case under Sections 325/34 IPC.
Probably he did not mention this out of fear that
if he did so he would automatically be
disqualified. At any event, it was not such a
serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, and
hence a more lenient view should be taken in the
 11

matter.”

14. Of particular relevance in connection with the present case

is the authority of the Supreme Court in Ram Kumar v. State of
U.P. and others, (2011) 14 SCC 709. This case too related to
police service, where the candidate seeking recruitment, had a
criminal case in the background, of which he was acquitted. The
facts in Ram Kumar (supra) again can best be gathered from the
report of their Lordships' decision, which read:

“2. The facts very briefly are that pursuant to

an advertisement issued by the State Government
of U.P. on 19-11-2006, the appellant applied for
the post of Constable and he submitted an
affidavit dated 12-6-2006 to the recruiting
authority in the pro forma of verification roll.
In the affidavit dated 12-6-2006, he made various
statements required for the purpose of
recruitment and in Para 4 of the affidavit he
stated that no criminal case was registered
against him. He was selected and appointed as a
male constable and deputed for training.

3. Thereafter, Jaswant Nagar Police Station,

District Etawah, submitted a report dated 15-1-
2007 stating that Criminal Case No. 275 of 2001
under Sections 324/323/504 IPC was registered
against the appellant and thereafter the criminal
case was disposed of by the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Etawah on 18-7-2002 and the
appellant was acquitted by the court. Along with
this report, a copy of the order dated 18-7-2002
of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was
also enclosed.

4. The report dated 15-1-2007 of Jaswant Nagar

Police Station, District Etawah, was sent to the
Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad. By
order dated 8-8-2007, the Senior Superintendent
of Police, Ghaziabad, cancelled the order of
selection of the appellant on the ground that he
had submitted an affidavit stating wrong facts
and concealing correct facts and his selection
was irregular and illegal.

5. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Writ Petition

No. 40674 of 2007 under Article 226 of the
Constitution before the Allahabad High Court but
the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ
petition by his order dated 30-8-2007 [ WP (C)
No. 40674 of 2007, order dated 30-8-2007 (All)] .
 12

The learned Single Judge held that since the

appellant had furnished false information in his
affidavit in the pro forma verification roll, his
case is squarely covered by the judgment rendered
by this Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v.
Ram Ratan Yadav [(2003) 3 SCC 437 : 2003 SCC
(L&S) 306] and that he was rightly terminated
from service without any inquiry. The appellant
challenged the order of the learned Single Judge
in Special Appeal No. 924 of 2009 but the
Division Bench of the High Court did not find any
merit in the appeal and dismissed the same by the
impugned order dated 31-8-2009 [ Special Appeal
(Defective) No. 924 of 2009, order dated 31-8-
2009 (All)].”

15. In Ram Kumar, it was held by the Supreme Court:

“9. We have carefully read the Government Order

dated 28-4-1958 on the subject “Verification of
the character and antecedents of government
servants before their first appointment” and it
is stated in the government order that the
Governor has been pleased to lay down the
following instructions in supersession of all the
previous orders:

“The rule regarding character of candidate for

appointment under the State Government shall
continue to be as follows:

The character of a candidate for direct

appointment must be such as to render him
suitable in all respects for employment in
the service or post to which he is to be
appointed. It would be the duty of the
appointing authority to satisfy itself on
this point.”

10. It will be clear from the aforesaid

instructions issued by the Governor that the
object of the verification of the character and
antecedents of government servants before their
first appointment is to ensure that the character
of a government servant for a direct recruitment
is such as to render him suitable in all respects
for employment in the service or post to which he
is to be appointed and it would be a duty of the
appointing authority to satisfy itself on this
point.

11. In the facts of the present case, we find

that though Criminal Case No. 275 of 2001 under
Sections 324/323/504 IPC had been registered
against the appellant at Jaswant Nagar Police
Station, District Etawah, admittedly the
 13

appellant had been acquitted by order dated 18-7-

2002 by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Etawah.

12. On a reading of the order dated 18-7-2002 of

the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate it would
show that the sole witness examined before the
court, PW 1, Mr Akhilesh Kumar, had deposed
before the court that on 2-12-2000 at 4.00 p.m.
children were quarrelling and at that time the
appellant, Shailendra and Ajay Kumar amongst
other neighbours had reached there and someone
from the crowd hurled abuses and in the scuffle
Akhilesh Kumar got injured when he fell and his
head hit a brick platform and that he was not
beaten by the accused persons by any sharp
weapon. In the absence of any other witness
against the appellant, the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate acquitted the appellant of
the charges under Sections 323/34/504 IPC. On
these facts, it was not at all possible for the
appointing authority to take a view that the
appellant was not suitable for appointment to the
post of a police constable.

13. The order dated 18-7-2002 of the Additional

Chief Judicial Magistrate had been sent along
with the report dated 15-1-2007 of Jaswant Nagar
Police Station to the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Ghaziabad, but it appears from the order
dated 8-8-2007 of the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Ghaziabad, that he has not gone into the
question as to whether the appellant was suitable
for appointment to service or to the post of
constable in which he was appointed and he has
only held that the selection of the appellant was
illegal and irregular because he did not furnish
in his affidavit in the pro forma of verification
roll that a criminal case has been registered
against him.

14. As has been stated in the instructions in the

Government Order dated 28-4-1958, it was the duty
of the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Ghaziabad, as the appointing authority, to
satisfy himself on the point as to whether the
appellant was suitable for appointment to the
post of a constable, with reference to the nature
of suppression and nature of the criminal case.
Instead of considering whether the appellant was
suitable for appointment to the post of male
constable, the appointing authority has
mechanically held that his selection was
irregular and illegal because the appellant had
furnished an affidavit stating the facts
incorrectly at the time of recruitment.”
 14

16. A mechanical approach, which reads like a mathematical

equation, always leading to disqualification from public
employment for a person, against whom a criminal case is
registered - whatever be the charge - even if he is acquitted -
has to be eschewed. The nature of the case against the person
has to be taken into consideration and the background in which
the accusation came to be made. The degree of moral turpitude
attaching to the crime given the prevailing circumstances in
society, must also be borne in mind. Also, it cannot be
discounted if the offence is one that has become commonplace
in society by easy false implications. Of course, this Court does
not wish to say that any generalization be made out of these
propositions. At the same time, the Appointing Authority and the
Advising District Magistrate must carefully glean through the
evidence and circumstances that may point towards a patently
false accusation, given the prevalent social conditions about
certain offences. The background of the person and his general
reputation must also be taken into account, particularly, when
considering the effect of a judgment of acquittal entered in his
favour by the Court that tried him.

17. This is particularly true, this Court must make it bold to

say, when an offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC and
the accompanying charges under Section 3/4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act are in issue. While the evil may be rife in society,
it is equally true that there is abundant false implication. This is
particularly so about the relatives of the husband, not so directly
connected, with the sovoured matrimonial bond between the
spouses. This includes the husbands, brothers, married sisters
and the sister's husband, all of whom may unnecessarily suffer
the stigma of being under the malevolent shadow of a criminal
case, when there is not the slightest of criminality about any
 15

facet of there being.

18. The petitioner in this case is the brother of the

prosecutrix's husband. The District Magistrate and the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, as the Certifying and the Appointing
Authority, have applied a thumb rule to the judgment of acquittal
to conclude against the petitioner on the ground alone that the
witnesses had turned hostile. This is not a case involving a
heinous offence, where the accused - a possible desperado or
a hardened criminal - might have suborned witnesses or won
them over. The crime itself is a fall out of matrimonial
maladjustment between the spouses. The corpus delicti in this
case would not show any case or evidence of violence. A
perusal of the judgment, even if the witnesses have been
motivated by compromise not to support the prosecution, does
in no way show the petitioner to be a person of any kind of
criminal antecedents. Rather, this Court has no hesitation in
saying that he appears to be the victim of an accident, because
his brother and sister-in-law could not get along in matrimony.
Going a step further, if one were to think that indeed the
husband or the in-laws demanded dowry or mistreated the
prosecutrix, there is nothing in the judgment, particularly,
appearing against the petitioner. It would be too much, in our
opinion, to deprive a man otherwise of clean antecedents, of
hard won public employment in the fashion the respondents
have done. It is clearly arbitrary.

19. The remarks about the disciplined character of the Police

Force are no doubt very valid in themselves, but the idea of this
disciplined force cannot be exalted to a position, where all
candidates, seeking recruitment to the Force, must be expected
to be men, unscathed by the wear and tear of life or the
accidents of contemporary society. We think that the Deputy
 16

Commissioner of Police as well as the Collector, who advised in

the matter, applied an entirely unrealistic standard to the case
in judging the petitioner unsuitable for recruitment to the Police.
Both sides have time and again placed reliance upon the
celebrated decision of the Supreme Court on the issue in Avtar
Singh v. Union of India and others, (2016) 8 SCC 471. The
principles propounded there by their Lordships have been
summarized thus:

38. We have noticed various decisions and tried

to explain and reconcile them as far as possible.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise
our conclusion thus:

38.1. Information given to the employer by a

candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest,
or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or
after entering into service must be true and
there should be no suppression or false mention
of required information.

38.2. While passing order of termination of

services or cancellation of candidature for
giving false information, the employer may take
notice of special circumstances of the case, if
any, while giving such information.

38.3. The employer shall take into consideration

the government orders/instructions/rules,
applicable to the employee, at the time of taking
the decision.

38.4. In case there is suppression or false

information of involvement in a criminal case
where conviction or acquittal had already been
recorded before filling of the
application/verification form and such fact later
comes to knowledge of employer, any of the
following recourses appropriate to the case may
be adopted:

38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which

conviction had been recorded, such as shouting
slogans at young age or for a petty offence which
if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent
unfit for post in question, the employer may, in
its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact
or false information by condoning the lapse.

38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in

case which is not trivial in nature, employer may
 17

cancel candidature or terminate services of the

employee.

38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in

a case involving moral turpitude or offence of
heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and
it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit
of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer
may consider all relevant facts available as to
antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as
to the continuance of the employee.

38.5. In a case where the employee has made

declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal
case, the employer still has the right to
consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to
appoint the candidate.

38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully

declared in character verification form regarding
pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature,
employer, in facts and circumstances of the case,
in its discretion, may appoint the candidate
subject to decision of such case.

38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact

with respect to multiple pending cases such false
information by itself will assume significance
and an employer may pass appropriate order
cancelling candidature or terminating services as
appointment of a person against whom multiple
criminal cases were pending may not be proper.

38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known

to the candidate at the time of filling the form,
still it may have adverse impact and the
appointing authority would take decision after
considering the seriousness of the crime.

38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in

service, holding departmental enquiry would be
necessary before passing order of
termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of
suppression or submitting false information in
verification form.

38.10. For determining suppression or false

information attestation/verification form has to
be specific, not vague. Only such information
which was required to be specifically mentioned
has to be disclosed. If information not asked for
but is relevant comes to knowledge of the
employer the same can be considered in an
objective manner while addressing the question of
fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be
taken on basis of suppression or submitting false
 18

information as to a fact which was not even asked

for.

38.11. Before a person is held guilty of

suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of
the fact must be attributable to him.”

20. Going by the principles enumerated in Avtar Singh

(supra), this Court must remark that here is not a case of any
kind of suppression on the petitioner's part. He has truthfully
disclosed his involvement in the case at the time he filled up the
Police Verification Report Form, supported by an affidavit. The
fact of disclosure is not disputed by the respondents too. The
principles in Avtar Singh, also in the opinion of this Court,
would not work to mechanically disqualify the petitioner in the
manner the respondents have chosen to do.

21. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed.

The impugned order dated 03.02.2023 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, Police
Commissionerate, Varanasi is hereby quashed. A mandamus is
issued to the Deputy Commissioner of Police aforesaid to pass
fresh orders within three weeks next of the receipt of a copy of
this judgment, bearing in mind the guidance here.

22. There shall be no order as to costs.

23. Let a copy of this judgment be communicated to the

Deputy Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, Police
Commissionerate, Varanasi through the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Varanasi by the Registrar (Compliance).

Order Date :- 01.10.2024

Anoop
(J.J. Munir, J.)

Digitally signed by :-
ANOOP KUMAR SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad