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Forgetting Current Issues in Memory 1st Edition Sergio
Della Sala Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Sergio Della Sala
ISBN(s): 9781848720121, 1848720122
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 2.93 MB
Year: 2010
Language: english
Forgetting
Current Issues in Memory
Series Editor: Robert Logie
Professor of Human Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Edinburgh, UK

Current Issues in Memory is a series of edited books that reflect the state-of-
the-art in areas of current and emerging interest in the psychological study of
memory. Each volume is tightly focused on a particular topic and consists
of seven to ten chapters contributed by international experts. The editors of
individual volumes are leading figures in their areas and provide an introduc-
tory overview. Example topics include: binding in working memory, prospect-
ive memory, memory and ageing, autobiographical memory, visual memory,
implicit memory, amnesia, retrieval, memory development.

Other titles in this series:

The Visual World in Memory
Edited by James R. Brockmole

Current Issues in Applied Memory Research

Edited by Graham M. Davies & Daniel B. Wright
Forgetting

Edited by Sergio Della Sala

Published in 2010
by Psychology Press
27 Church Road, Hove, East Sussex BN3 2FA
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Psychology Press
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010.
To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

Psychology Press is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,

an Informa business
© 2010 Psychology Press

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or

reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
This publication has been produced with paper manufactured to
strict environmental standards and with pulp derived from sustainable
forests.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Forgetting / edited by Sergio Della Sala.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Memory. 2. Autobiographical memory. I. Della Sala, Sergio.
BF378.F7.F67 2010
153.1′25—dc22 2009044489

ISBN 0-203-85164-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN: 978–1–84872–012–1(hbk)
To Miriam
I forgot several things about the war, yet I will never forget that particular
moment.
(Emilio Lussu, Sardinian Brigade [Un anno sull’altipiano] 1945)
Contents

List of contributors ix
Preface xiii

1 Forgetting: Preliminary considerations 1

HENRY L. ROEDIGER III, YANA WEINSTEIN, AND
POOJA K. AGARWAL

2 Forgetting: A historical perspective 23

HANS J. MARKOWITSCH AND MATTHIAS BRAND

3 A new taxonomy of memory and forgetting 35

ROBERTO CUBELLI

4 Forgetting in memory models:

Arguments against trace decay and consolidation failure 49
GORDON D. A. BROWN AND STEPHAN LEWANDOWSKY

5 Connectionist models of forgetting 77

JAAP M.J. MURRE

6 Synaptic plasticity and the neurobiology of memory

and forgetting 101
FLAVIA VALTORTA AND FABIO BENFENATI

7 The functional neuroimaging of forgetting 135

BENJAMIN J. LEVY, BRICE A. KUHL, AND
ANTHONY D. WAGNER

8 Sleep and forgetting 165

PHILIPPE PEIGNEUX, REMY SCHMITZ, AND
CHARLINE URBAIN
viii Contents
9 Forgetting due to retroactive interference in amnesia:
Findings and implications 185
MICHAELA DEWAR, NELSON COWAN, AND
SERGIO DELLA SALA

10 Accelerated long-term forgetting 211

CHRISTOPHER BUTLER, NILS MUHLERT, AND
ADAM ZEMAN

11 Aspects of forgetting in psychogenic amnesia 239

MATTHIAS BRAND AND HANS J. MARKOWITSCH

12 Autobiographical forgetting, social forgetting, and

situated forgetting: Forgetting in context 253
CELIA B. HARRIS, JOHN SUTTON, AND
AMANDA J. BARNIER

13 The role of retroactive interference and consolidation

in everyday forgetting 285
JOHN T. WIXTED

Author index 313

Subject index 329
Contributors

Pooja K. Agarwal, Department of Psychology, Washington University, One

Brookings Drive, Campus Box 1125, St. Louis, MO 63130–4899, USA.
Amanda J. Barnier, Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Macquarie
University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia.
Fabio Benfenati, Department of Neuroscience and Brain Technologies, The
Italian Institute of Technology, Via Morego 30, 16163 Genova and
Department of Experimental Medicine, University of Genova, Viale
Benedetto XV, 3, 16132 Genova, Italy.
Matthias Brand, University of Duisburg-Essen, General Psychology: Cogni-
tion, Department of Computer Science and Applied Cognitive Science,
Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Forsthausweg 2, 47057 Duisburg,
Germany and Physiological Psychology, University of Bielefeld, PO Box
100131, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany.
Gordon D. A. Brown, Department of Psychology, University of Warwick,
Coventry CV4 7AL, UK and School of Psychology, University of Western
Australia, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia.
Christopher Butler, Department of Clinical Neurology, University of Oxford,
Oxford, UK.
Nelson Cowan, Department of Psychological Sciences, 210 McAlester
Hall, University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, Missouri 65211–2500,
USA.
Roberto Cubelli, Department of Cognitive Science and Education, Center for
Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Corso Bettini, 31, I-38068
Rovereto, Trento, Italy.
Sergio Della Sala, Human Cognitive Neuroscience and Centre for Cogni-
tive Ageing and Cognitive Epidemiology, Psychology, University of
Edinburgh, UK.
Michaela Dewar, Human Cognitive Neuroscience and Centre for Cognitive
x List of contributors
Ageing and Cognitive Epidemiology, Psychology, University of
Edinburgh, UK.
Celia B. Harris, Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Macquarie
University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia.
Brice A. Kuhl, Department of Psychology, University of Stanford, Jordan
Hall, Building 420, MC 2130, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
Benjamin J. Levy, Department of Psychology, University of Stanford, Jordan
Hall, Building 420, MC 2130, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
Stephan Lewandowsky, School of Psychology, University of Western
Australia, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia.
Hans J. Markowitsch, Physiological Psychology, University of Bielefeld,
PO Box 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany.
Nils Muhlert, Peninsula Medical School, Barrack Road, Exeter EX2 5DW,
UK.
Jaap M. J. Murre, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam,
Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Philippe Peigneux, Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research
Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium and Cyclotron
Research Centre, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium.
Henry L. Roediger III, Department of Psychology, Washington University,
One Brookings Drive, Campus Box 1125, St. Louis, MO 63130–4899,
USA.
Remy Schmitz, Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research
Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium.
John Sutton, Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Macquarie University,
Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia.
Charline Urbain, Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research
Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium.
Flavia Valtorta, Division of Neuroscience, S. Raffaele Scientific Institute, Via
Olgettina 60, 20132 and International School of Psychotherapy with
Imaginative Procedures (SISPI), Corso Concordia 14, 20129 Milan,
Italy.
Anthony D. Wagner, Department of Psychology and Neurosciences Program,
University of Stanford, Jordan Hall, Building 420, MC 2130, Stanford,
CA 94305, USA.
Yana Weinstein, Department of Psychology, Washington University, One
Brookings Drive, Campus Box 1125, St. Louis, MO 63130–4899, USA.
 List of contributors xi
John T. Wixted, Department of Psychology, University of California at San
Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093–0109, USA.
Adam Zeman, Peninsula Medical School, Barrack Road, Exeter EX2
5DW, UK.
Preface

Because the mountain grass

Cannot but keep the form
Where the mountain hare has lain.
(W. B. Yeats, Memory, 1919)

Several books are published each year on various aspects of memory and
amnesia. However, little attention has been devoted to the counter aspect of
memory, that is, forgetting. Considerable knowledge has been accrued on
how healthy people (young and elderly) forget, why forgetting is instrumental
to our ability to think and, indeed, to remember. Scientists and clinicians have
also gathered knowledge on what happens to brain-damaged people showing
pathological forgetting. However, this information is scattered across differ-
ent disciplines and in highly specialized journals. Hence, the niche for this
book, which aims at being a source collating the available interdisciplinary
knowledge on forgetting.
Memory and forgetting are inextricably intertwined. In order to under-
stand how memory works we need to understand how and why we forget.
Forgetting is usually a term used to refer to a loss, the loss of a memory, due
to the decay or overwriting of information. It is a term with a negative conno-
tation, as illustrated by Rowan Atkinson’s witty remark: “As I was leaving
this morning, I said to myself, ‘The last thing you must do is to forget your
speech.’ And sure enough, as I left the house this morning, the last thing I
did was to forget my speech.”
However, as Jorge Luis Borges (1942) reminded us in his short story
“Funes, the Memorious”: “To think is to forget a difference, to generalize,
to abstract.” That is, forgetting is the other coin of memory: without forget-
ting, remembering would be impossible, and humans would be like dull
computers incapable of creativity. Indeed, Nietzsche maintained that it would
be “altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting.” Therefore, the
importance of the topic should be clear, which, strangely enough, has been
neglected in comparison with other features of memory.
This volume addresses various aspects of forgetting, drawing from several
xiv Preface
disciplines, including experimental and cognitive psychology, cognitive and
clinical neuropsychology, behavioural neuroscience, neuroimaging, clinical
neurology, and computing modeling. It is by no means an exhaustive review
of all the knowledge accrued on forgetting and on how to account for it, but
it covers enough material to offer an overview of the topic.
This book could not have seen the light without the work and the insight of
several people whom I would like to thank: the series editor, Robert Logie,
who invited us to propose this collection of essays; the commisioning editor,
Becci Edmondson, and the editorial assistant, Sharla Plant, at Psychology
Press; and of course all the authors who kindly contributed to this volume.
Sergio Della Sala
Edinburgh, December 2009
1 Forgetting
Preliminary considerations
Henry L. Roediger III,
Yana Weinstein, and Pooja K. Agarwal
Washington University in St. Louis, USA

The existence of forgetting has never been proved: we only know that some
things do not come to our mind when we want them to.
(Friedrich Nietzsche, 1844–1900)

Of all the common afflictions from which humankind suffers, forgetting is

probably the most common. Each of us, every day, forgets something we wish
we could remember. It might be something we have done, something we
intended to do, a fact, a name of a person or restaurant, and so on ad
infinitum. As we age, our incidents of forgetting increase and we worry more
about them. A whole industry of books, tapes, and even new mental gym-
nasia has grown up to deal with the cognitive frailties of old age, the primary
one being rampant forgetting. Compared to other nuisances of life, forgetting
probably tops the list. The “common cold” is actually quite rare compared to
forgetting in all its manifestations. As Underwood (1966) wrote: “Forgetting
is a most exasperating and sometimes even painful phenomenon” (p. 542).
More recently, Nairne and Pandeirada (2008) maintained that for most
people “forgetting is a scourge, a nuisance, a breakdown in an otherwise
efficient mental capacity” (p. 179), although they quickly noted that there is
often an adaptive value in forgetting too.
Despite the fact that psychologists have been studying learning and mem-
ory for 125 years, the current volume is the only one we can find devoted
solely to the topic of forgetting. “Forgetting” is a term used in the titles of
many works of fiction and even cultural critique (see Markowitsch & Brand,
Chapter 2), but this volume is the first scientific one devoted to it. Strange,
you might think.
Given the ubiquity of forgetting in our daily lives, the quote by Nietzsche
that heads our chapter must seem stranger still. Given its ubiquity, how can
the existence of forgetting be doubted? Difficulties of these sorts usually
revolve around matters of definition, and that is the case here. We turn to this
issue first.
2 Roediger, Weinstein, and Agarwal
Defining forgetting
According to the authors of the International encyclopedia of the social
sciences: “It seems quite unnecessary to be concerned with a definition of
‘forgetting’ ” (Sills & Merton, 1968, p. 536). Nonetheless, psychologists have
attempted to define forgetting in several different ways. Cubelli (Chapter 3)
provides a thorough exploration of the various extant definitions of forget-
ting, and below we give a general overview. Before undertaking the task of
examining these issues, however, we review some preliminary considerations.
At least since Köhler (1947, p. 279), psychologists have found it useful to
distinguish among three stages in the learning/memory process: acquisition
(encoding), storage (maintenance or persistence), and retrieval (utilization of
stored information, see too Melton, 1963; Weiner, 1966). Encoding or acqui-
sition is the initial process in learning, although this process may be extended
in time as a memory trace (a persisting representation) formed through
consolidation. Only events that have been securely encoded or learned in the
first place can be said to be forgotten; it makes no sense to say that one has
forgotten the 15th name in the Auckland, NZ, telephone book or the capital
of Mars, because one never knew these bits of information in the first place.
We take Tulving’s definition of forgetting – “the inability to recall something
now that could be recalled on an earlier occasion” (1974, p. 74) – as our
starting point in considering more complex definitions. We consider first
the strongest form of the concept of forgetting, the one implicit in the quote
from Nietzsche.

Forgetting as complete loss from storage

Davis (2008) defines the strong form of forgetting as “the theoretical possibil-
ity that refers to a total erasure of the original memory that cannot be
recalled, no matter what techniques are used to aid recall” (p. 317). Given the
context of his chapter, we feel sure he would be willing to include not just
measures of recall, but any measure (explicit or implicit, direct or indirect)
of the prior experience having been encoded in the nervous system. Davis
argued that it would only be possible to look for “strong” forgetting in simple
organisms (e.g., simple gastropods like slugs) where the entire neural circuitry
has been mapped out. “Only when all the cellular and molecular events that
occur when a memory is formed return to their original state would I say
this would be evidence for true forgetting” (Davis, 2008, p. 317).
To our knowledge, no evidence for this strong form of forgetting has been
produced even in simpler organisms; and since all the research in the present
volume is about forgetting in organisms more complex than mollusks, it
would be practically impossible to obtain evidence for this strong form of
forgetting. Even if every test known to psychologists failed to show evidence
for any sort of trace of past experience, the possibility remains that a change
owing to that prior experience (some latent memory trace) still remains.
 1. Forgetting: Preliminary considerations 3
Davis (2008) concluded that the strong form of forgetting is not scientific-
ally useful, and we agree with him. We can ask the further question: If the
strong form of forgetting can never be proved (as Nietzche’s dictum states),
does this mean that forgetting in this sense never occurs? We think the answer
to this question must be no (although we cannot prove it). Think of all the
events and happenings that occurred to you when you were 7 years old, ones
you could have easily reported the next day (so they were encoded). Do you
still really have traces of all these events lying dormant in your brain, waiting
for the right cue to become active again? We strongly doubt it. Probably the
many of the millions of events, conversations, facts, people, and so on that
are encountered in everyday life and at one point committed to memory do
suffer the strong form of forgetting by being obliterated from our nervous
systems. However, that is a matter of faith, given that we cannot find proof.
As we discuss below, it is possible to entertain a contrary possibility, because
powerful cues can bring “forgotten” information back into consciousness.
Still, given the huge number of events in one’s life, the idea that all would be
stored forever (in some form) seems unlikely.

Forgetting as retrieval failure

Another possibility, essentially the obverse of the strong form of forgetting,
might be considered a weak form of the concept. In its starkest form, this
idea would maintain that all events that have been encoded and stored do
somehow persist in the nervous system (including all those from age 7), and
the inability to access them now is due to retrieval failure. Although this
proposal might seem farfetched, when Loftus and Loftus (1980) surveyed
psychologists many years ago, a large percentage (84%) favored something
like this view. The percentage today might be lower, but the 1970s were the
heyday of studies of retrieval in general and the power of retrieval cues in
particular (Tulving & Thomson, 1973; for reviews see Roediger & Guynn,
1996; Tulving, 1983).
The idea of forgetting as retrieval failure is a scientifically useful concept,
because (unlike the case with forgetting as storage failure) evidence can be
found in its favor. Let us consider one experiment to demonstrate the point.
Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) presented high-school students with lists of
words to remember. Although there were many conditions, for our purposes
consider the condition in which students studied 48 words that were members
of 24 common categories, so they heard two words per category. Thus, stu-
dents heard lists such as “articles of clothing: blouse, sweater; types of birds:
blue jay, parakeet.” The words were presented at a slow rate (2.5 sec/word) so
the encoding of the words was ensured, in the sense that if the experimenter
had stopped at any point, the subjects could have successfully recalled the
last word presented. Thus, in this sense, all 48 words were learned.
One group of subjects was tested by free recall; they were given a blank
sheet of paper and asked to recall the words in any order. They recalled 19.3
4 Roediger, Weinstein, and Agarwal
words, which means they forgot (failed to retrieve) about 29 others (28.7 to be
exact). We can thus ask what happened to the forgotten words. It is logically
possible that their representations had completely evaporated and had van-
ished from storage, but, as already discussed, we can never assume that. On
the other hand, it could be that traces of the words were stored, but could not
be retrieved with the minimal cues of free recall (people must use whatever cues
they can internally generate). Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) found evidence
for this latter possibility by giving the students (both the same group that had
received a free recall test and a different group that had not had such a test)
category names as cues. When the 24 category names (e.g., articles of cloth-
ing) were given, students were able to recall 35.9 words (and it did not matter
much as to whether or not they had taken the prior free recall test). Thus,
with stronger cues, students were able to recall nearly twice as many words as
in free recall, showing that some of the forgetting in free recall was due to
retrieval failures. Such powerful reversals of forgetting demonstrated in many
experiments were probably why the psychologists surveyed in the late 1970s
by the Loftuses claimed that forgetting was mostly due to retrieval failures.
Of course, even with the powerful category name cues, students still forgot
about 25% of the words (12 of 48). Were these lost from storage? There is no
way to know, but probably if the students had been further probed with
recognition tests (with strong “copy cues”) or with implicit tests (Schacter,
1987), evidence for storage of even more words would have been found. The
asymmetry in the logic here – evidence of forgetting as retrieval failure can be
obtained, but evidence of forgetting as storage failure cannot – leads back to
Nietzsche’s dictum. Still, as noted above, we cannot conclude that forgetting
never involves elimination of stored traces, just that such a claim cannot be
verified scientifically.

Forgetting as loss of information over time

A third way of defining forgetting, the one first used since Ebbinghaus
(1885/1964) and many others since his time, is to plot retention of some
experiences over time. This definition is complementary to the forgetting-as-
retrieval-failure definition, not opposed to it. The typical way to conduct such
forgetting experiments is to have (say) seven groups of subjects exposed to the
same information (e.g., a list of words). One group would be tested immedi-
ately after learning, with other groups tested at varying delays after that point
(e.g., 1 hour, 6 hours, 12, hours, 24 hours, 48 hours, and 1 week). Retention
would be plotted across the various retention intervals and a forgetting curve
would be derived, almost always showing less information recalled or recog-
nized as a function of the time since learning. As Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) put
it: “Left to itself every mental content gradually loses its capacity for being
revived, or at least suffers loss in this regard under the influence of time”
(p. 4). One critical methodological stricture in such experiments is that the
type of test be held constant across delays, so that retrieval cues do not differ.
 1. Forgetting: Preliminary considerations 5
As noted, Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) was the first to plot forgetting over time.
He presented his results in a series of tables in his book (see pp. 67–76), but
later writers have chosen to show them in a figure and his findings appear in
Figure 1.1. Ebbinghaus memorized lists of nonsense syllables so that he could
recall them perfectly, and then he tried to relearn the list at varying delays
from 19 minutes to 26 days. He measured the number of trials (or the amount
of time) needed to learn the list perfectly in the first instance and then, later,
he measured the trials or time to relearn the list after varying intervals. The
measure shown in Figure 1.1 is percentage of savings in relearning the list,
defined as the number of trials needed to learn the list originally (OL, for
original learning) minus the number of trials needed for relearning (RL)
divided by OL and then multiplied by 100 (to get a percentage). Thus,
savings = (OL − RL)/OL × 100. Ebbinghaus noted that the shape of the
forgetting curve appeared logarithmic.
This savings method of forgetting is not used much today, but nothing
about the forgetting curve much hangs on the exact details of experimental
design or the measure used, because nearly all forgetting functions look
pretty much alike. Rubin and Wenzel (1996) examined “100 years of forget-
ting,” seeking the best quantitative fit to the hundreds of forgetting curves
that had been collected up until that point. They tried 105 different functions
and concluded that 4 functions fit the forgetting curves quite well (and pretty
much indistinguishably): the logarithmic function, the power function, the
exponential in the square root of time, and the hyperbola in the square root
of time. More recently, Wixted and Carpenter (2007) have argued that the
power function is the correct one to describe the shape of the forgetting curve.

Figure 1.1 Forgetting curve adapted from Ebbinghaus (1885/1964, pp. 67–76).
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