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Performance Analysis
in Game Sports:
Concepts and Methods

Martin Lames

123
Performance Analysis in Game Sports:
Concepts and Methods
Martin Lames

Performance Analysis in
Game Sports: Concepts
and Methods
Martin Lames
Faculty of Sports and Health Sciences
Technical University Munich
Munich, Germany

ISBN 978-3-031-07249-9    ISBN 978-3-031-07250-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07250-5

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
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claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface

This book is based on many years of teaching the subject of performance analysis
as a master’s course at TU München, Germany. Even more influential, it is based on
three decades of research in this area covering theoretical as well as practical
aspects. Theoretical activities include the search for conceptual and methodological
achievements in the analysis of game sports (a term for net games plus invasion
games), including mathematical and stochastic modelling. Practical activities com-
prise the introduction of technological innovations, giving support in match analysis
to top-level, mostly national teams, and deriving a conceptual framework for work-
ing in the practice of performance analysis based on these experiences.
The scientific roots of this work lie in the discipline of sports science one could
call “training and exercise science” as closest translation of German
“Trainingswissenschaft”. The aim of this discipline of sports science is to provide
scientific foundation for practical action in training and competition. Although it
seems to be a quite narrow and merely applied perspective, a closer look reveals that
this is by no means the case. To give a scientific foundation for practice it is, for
example, necessary to understand the structure of the respective sports discipline.
This, in turn, requires investigations of the type of basic research trying to establish
general findings that for example explain success in competition. Also, it is neces-
sary to identify properties of athletes as determinants of performance and to estab-
lish the relationships between them, what will altogether be called “theoretical
performance analysis”. Nevertheless, scientifically founded support for practice
remains the ultimate task that may only be solved by applying special and different
methods and concepts: “practical performance analysis”.
The book has six major chapters, starting with basic concepts, continuing with
the two most important methods of data collection in performance analysis, action
detection and position detection. Finally, concepts and methods of theoretical and
practical performance analysis are presented.
Chapter 1: Basics explains the underlying concepts and functions of performance
analysis in the broader framework of training and exercise science. Special attention
is given to—compared to other sports—the unique structure of game sports. The
concept introduced to explain the nature of game sports is a dynamic interaction
process with emerging behaviour. This concept will be substantiated in detail
because it is the reference point of the whole book. Another basic concept is the
distinction between theoretical and practical performance analysis that is introduced

v
vi Preface

and will be referenced to throughout the book as well. It is interesting to compare

this concept of performance analysis with different approaches like notational anal-
ysis (UK) and sports analytics (USA).
Chapter 2: Action Detection refers to the standard method of action recording
with observational systems. It will derive the most common types of observational
systems from concepts of behavioural assessment in psychology. Control of
observer agreement is an important topic in this context to quantify reliability of
observations either for examining data provided by external sources or to check/
improve one’s own observational systems. Finally, practical examples demonstrate
power and flexibility of well-designed observational systems.
In the recent two decades technological progress has made it possible to track the
positions of athletes. Chapter 3: Position Detection starts with a brief introduction
to the different technologies in use, GPS-, radio- and video-based systems. It then
discusses methods to control the accuracy of tracking systems which used to be a
surprisingly under-reported area. Only recently one has become aware of the com-
plexity of validation studies and potential error sources in position detection.
In Chapter 4: Theoretical Performance Analysis the different approaches to anal-
yse the structure of sports are described in detail. It contains the classical statistical
approaches and modelling approaches with the direct modelling of sports phenom-
ena from action and position data and the valuable approach of importing models
from other scientific areas and applying them to performance analysis. A special
section is devoted to Dynamical Systems Theory with special focus on synergetics
and ecological dynamics. All approaches are questioned critically whether or in
how far they are capable of solving the problems of performance analysis.
Chapter 5: Practical Performance Analysis is dedicated to explaining the con-
cepts and methods of scientifically founded performance analysis conducted in
practice. As the central method, qualitative game analysis makes use of qualitative
methods; this research methodology not so common in performance analysis is
briefly introduced. A more comprehensive view on performance analysis is advo-
cated, including the collection of all information necessary for generating practical
recommendations for training. Concepts and methods are described in depth and
specific attention is given to main tasks in practical performance analyses such as
identifying strengths and weaknesses of one’s own team and the opponent, develop-
ing a match strategy, and support tactical instruction and learning by video-based
tactics training.
At the end, Chapter 6: Outlook mentions the most interesting future perspectives
for performance analysis and analysts. It is not speculative at all to expect a further
progress in technological options for match analysis. Also, the role of performance
analysts will change when working increasingly in “training systems”, a term
expressing the tendency towards many experts from different areas being integrated
in a professional support system of a team or an athlete.
This book emphasizes a certain perspective on performance analysis. Always
keeping in mind that the ultimate aim is to provide scientific foundation for practical
action in sport it focuses on conceptual bases of performance analysis. Accordingly,
the basic scenario for application is always sports practice. The most important
Preface vii

methods and concepts for giving scientific support to practice are addressed in a
systematic, comprehensive manner, whereas giving a review on existing studies in
PA is not the priority. Readers of this textbook are scientists and students interested
in a comprehensive, concept-driven overview of the scientific discipline of perfor-
mance analysis, but also practitioners working in sports practice with an interest in
conceptual backgrounds and a critical reflection of their daily work.

Munich, Germany Martin Lames

Contents

1 Basics����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   1
1.1 Definitions and Concepts������������������������������������������������������������������   1
1.1.1 Performance Analysis ������������������������������������������������������������   2
1.1.2 Competition, Training, and Athletes’ Abilities ����������������������   2
1.1.3 Theoretical and Practical Performance Analysis��������������������   4
1.1.4 General Model of Sports Performance Structure��������������������   7
1.2 Performance Analysis in Game Sports ��������������������������������������������   9
1.2.1 The Nature of Game Sports����������������������������������������������������   9
1.2.2 Basic Problems of Performance Analysis
in Game Sports������������������������������������������������������������������������ 12
1.3 Approaches in Performance Analysis ���������������������������������������������� 14
1.3.1 Classical Performance Analysis���������������������������������������������� 15
1.3.2 Notational Analysis���������������������������������������������������������������� 19
1.3.3 Sports Analytics���������������������������������������������������������������������� 21
2 Action Detection ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23
2.1 Assessment of Behaviour������������������������������������������������������������������ 23
2.2 Design of Observational Systems ���������������������������������������������������� 25
2.2.1 Type of Observational Systems���������������������������������������������� 27
2.2.2 Elements of Observational Systems���������������������������������������� 31
2.2.3 Complex Observational Systems�������������������������������������������� 37
2.3 Validation of Observational Systems������������������������������������������������ 37
2.3.1 General Framework of Validation ������������������������������������������ 38
2.3.2 Role of Observer �������������������������������������������������������������������� 40
2.3.3 Methods and Statistics for Testing Observer
Agreement������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 43
2.4 Examples for Studies Using Action Detection���������������������������������� 53
2.4.1 Event Profiling������������������������������������������������������������������������ 53
2.4.2 Detailed Event Observation���������������������������������������������������� 54
2.4.3 Hierarchical Categorial System���������������������������������������������� 56

ix
x Contents

3 Position Detection�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59
3.1 Functioning of Position Tracking����������������������������������������������������� 60
3.1.1 Position Detection Methods���������������������������������������������������� 60
3.1.2 Signal Processing�������������������������������������������������������������������� 66
3.2 Validation of Tracking Systems�������������������������������������������������������� 70
3.2.1 Gold Standards for Position Tracking in Sports �������������������� 72
3.2.2 Design of Validation Studies�������������������������������������������������� 74
3.2.3 Accuracy of Position Tracking in Sports�������������������������������� 79
4 Theoretical Performance Analysis������������������������������������������������������������ 83
4.1 Statistical Approaches of TPA���������������������������������������������������������� 84
4.1.1 Performance Profiles�������������������������������������������������������������� 85
4.1.2 Impact of Influencing Factors ������������������������������������������������ 88
4.1.3 Criticism of Statistical Approaches���������������������������������������� 92
4.2 Modelling Approaches���������������������������������������������������������������������� 93
4.2.1 Methodological Aspects of Modelling Approaches���������������� 94
4.2.2 Direct Modelling of Game Behaviour������������������������������������ 97
4.2.3 Importing Models to PA���������������������������������������������������������� 115
4.3 Dynamical Systems Theory Approaches������������������������������������������ 133
4.3.1 Dynamical Systems Theories�������������������������������������������������� 133
4.3.2 Complex Systems, Synergetics, and Relative Phase�������������� 136
4.3.3 Ecological Psychology������������������������������������������������������������ 144
4.3.4 Applications of DST in PA ���������������������������������������������������� 148
4.3.5 Outlook DST in PA ���������������������������������������������������������������� 167
5 Practical Performance Analysis���������������������������������������������������������������� 177
5.1 Introduction�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 177
5.2 Concepts of PPA ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 178
5.2.1 Definition, Aims, and Research Strategies������������������������������ 178
5.2.2 Informational Coupling of Competition and Training������������ 181
5.2.3 Comprehensive Performance Analysis ���������������������������������� 188
5.3 Methods of PPA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 190
5.3.1 Qualitative Game Analysis������������������������������������������������������ 190
5.3.2 Development of Match Strategies������������������������������������������ 201
5.3.3 Video-Based Tactics Training (VTT)�������������������������������������� 204
5.4 Game Analysts in Professional Training Systems���������������������������� 214
5.4.1 Applications of Game Analysis���������������������������������������������� 215
5.4.2 The Role of Game Analysts���������������������������������������������������� 218
5.4.3 Game Analysis Software�������������������������������������������������������� 220
5.4.4 Club Information Systems������������������������������������������������������ 223
6 Outlook������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 227
6.1 Outlook on the Core Topics of PA���������������������������������������������������� 227
6.1.1 Basic Concepts������������������������������������������������������������������������ 227
6.1.2 Action Detection �������������������������������������������������������������������� 228
Contents xi

6.1.3 Position Detection������������������������������������������������������������������ 229

6.1.4 Theoretical Performance Analysis������������������������������������������ 230
6.1.5 Practical Performance Analysis���������������������������������������������� 232
6.2 The Future of PA������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 233
6.2.1 Artificial Intelligence and PA�������������������������������������������������� 233
6.2.2 Sports Practice and PA������������������������������������������������������������ 234

References ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 237

Index�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 255
Abbreviations

AI Artificial intelligence
DMA Double moving average
DST Dynamical systems theory
EPTS Electronic performance tracking system
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GDR German Democratic Republic
GNSS Global navigation satellite system
GPS Global positioning system
IFAB International Football Association Board (rule commission of FIFA)
LPS Local positioning system
MLS Minimum least squares
NBA National basketball association (highest US basketball league)
NTSC National Television Standards Committee (video norm)
PA Performance analysis
PAL Phase alternation line (video norm)
PPA Practical performance analysis
QGA Qualitative game analysis
RFID Radio-frequency identification
SNA Social network analysis
TPA Theoretical performance analysis
TU Technical University
VBT Video-based tracking
VR Virtual reality
VTT Video-based tactics training

xiii
List of Figures

Figure 1.1 Scientific subject of training and exercise science

Figure 1.2 General structural model of sports performance
Figure 1.3 General structural model of performance in game sports
Figure 1.4 Hits in Google Scholar for “Performance Analysis Football”
Figure 1.5 The general structural model for sports performances
Figure 1.6 Empirical structure of performance in cross-country skiing
Figure 2.1 Model projection
Figure 2.2 General structure of invasion games and net games
Figure 2.3 Criteria for selecting an observational variable
Figure 2.4 Role of the observer
Figure 2.5 Absolute and case-by-case agreement
Figure 2.6 Compensation of objectivity
Figure 2.7 Agreement matrix for observer training
Figure 2.8 Matrix of agreement, matrix of weights, and weighted agreement matrix
Figure 2.9 Type I agreement matrix for recording duels in match
Figure 2.10 Start and end location of episodes (ball control periods) of the dominant
and the inferior team in a Bundesliga match
Figure 3.1 Two-dimensional Illustration of triangulation of a position given the
distances from three satellites
Figure 3.2 Calculation of area with sufficient elevation angle dependent on camera
position
Figure 3.3 Approximation of a trajectory by measurements of different frequency
Figure 3.4 Simulated smoothing with moving averages
Figure 4.1 Levels of modelling
Figure 4.2 Percent of match duration of ball control categories in 11 matches of
Bayern Munich
Figure 4.3 Distance covered in m/min per 5 min-interval
Figure 4.4 Distance covered (m/min) of teams visiting the teams with the lowest
and highest season average in home games
Figure 4.5 Match standings of 306 matches of Bundesliga season 2012/13 per min
Figure 4.6 Spectral Fatigue Index over 5 bouts of 2 vs. 2 small sided game under
fatigued and not fatigued conditions
Figure 4.7 The course of distance covered in 5-min intervals in three selected
matches and of the average of 36 matches

xv
xvi List of Figures

Figure 4.8 ACF of distance covered for the mean of each 5-min interval and mean
ACF the lags of all matches
Figure 4.9 Z-values for playing time, total distance covered, and distance covered
standardized with playing time for the 5-min interval with maximum
intensity (max) and for max+1
Figure 4.10 Interaction graphs and minimum spanning trees for basketball, football,
and handball
Figure 4.11 Two plays, their network, and their adjacency matrix
Figure 4.12 State-transition model for tennis
Figure 4.13 State-transition model for table tennis
Figure 4.14 Transition matrix of a tennis match
Figure 4.15 Transition matrix of a table tennis match
Figure 4.16 Relevance of tactical behaviours in tennis
Figure 4.17 System dynamics of a damped and a driven pendulum
Figure 4.18 A tennis rally of Justine Henin and Serena Williams with phase space
trajectories of each player
Figure 4.19 Illustration of Relative Phase for in-phase, anti-phase, and the general
phase relation between two objects
Figure 4.20 Coordination patterns in finger-waggling; positions of the two finger
tips over time in Kelso’s finger waggling experiment; potential land-
scapes for coupled oscillators
Figure 4.21 Conceptual model of a phase space in football
Figure 4.22 Left: Basic nonlinearities in team and net sports Right: Nonlinearities
in football matches
Figure 4.23 Left: Goals shot in Bundesliga season 2019/20 plotted against shots at
goal; Right: Plotted against goal attempts
Figure 4.24 Proportion of “chance variables” and chance goals of all goals
Figure 4.25 The rate of chance goals in scored and conceded goals by the first and
last team and the four first and last teams of Bundesliga 2011–12
Figure 4.26 Distribution of results in a football match assuming two independent
negative binomial distributions
Figure 4.27 Team centroids of Italy and France in the World Championship final
2006 with Relative Phase
Figure 4.28 Illustration of a rally in a net game as dynamical system
Figure 4.29 Perturbation profile for two matches of Nadal and Federer, French
Open 2007
Figure 4.30 Age-dependent course of critical goal situations (CGS) and perturba-
tions per match and CGS per goal and perturbations per CGS
Figure 4.31 Perturbation profiles of football teams of different age groups
Figure 4.32 Colour-coded recurrence plot for a football match
Figure 4.33 Recurrence plots of nine randomly selected football matches
Figure 5.1 The informational coupling between competition and training
Figure 5.2 Illustration of the concept of comprehensive performance analysis
Figure 5.3 Illustration of the concept of considering interactions between match
analyst and coach, staff, and athletes as being embedded in a
social context
List of Figures xvii

Figure 5.4 Illustration of the analogy between Qualitative Content Analysis and
Qualitative Game Analysis
Figure 5.5 Steps of QGA
Figure 5.6 Conceptual model of strategy development including feedback through
strategy check
Figure 5.7 The trimodal communication model of Merten
Figure 5.8 Organizational sequence and results of video-based tactic test and
match behaviour of service
Figure 5.9 Different roles of match analysts in a sports club
Figure 5.10 Design and user interfaces of a table tennis match analysis software
Figure 5.11 Different roles in the staff of a professional football club
Figure 5.12 Architecture of a club information system
List of Tables

Table 1.1 Comparison of TPA and PPA

Table 2.1 Starting events of ball possessions leading to a critical goal situation in
youth football
Table 2.2 Examples for observational variables
Table 2.3 Specification of an observational system for discrete, continuous, and
enumerative variables
Table 2.4 Frequency and duration of game stoppages in football per match
Table 2.5 Expert ratings of OSPAF variables with mean and Aiken’s V and intra/
inter-rater kappa
Table 2.6 Hierarchical observational system with game phases (categorial sys-
tem) on first level and game phase specific variables on second and
third level
Table 3.1 Comparison between different tracking technologies
Table 3.2 Assessment of the accuracy of LPS position tracking
Table 3.3 RMSE for position, speed, and acceleration
Table 4.1 Correlations between match intensity and teams’ average performances
and product (interaction) of average performances for typical kinematic
PIs; all correlations significant: min p = 0.007
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for the percentage of chance goals per team in
Bundesliga and Premier League 2011–12
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics of the recurrence parameters of 21 football matches
Table 4.4 Inter-correlations between recurrence parameters and traditional PIs for
n = 21 matches
Table 5.1 Comparison of qualitative and quantitative research based on different
criteria
Table 5.2 The analogy between Qualitative Content Analysis and Qualitative
Game Analysis

xix
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
categories (or, rather, it is the thinking of the one category of
opposition), not at all to representative and abstract fictions, which
are based either upon mere representation or upon nothing. As the
result of that arbitrary form, we have seen vegetable opposed to
mineral, society opposed to the family, or even Rome opposed to
Greece, and Napoleon to Rome; or the superficies actually opposed
to the line, time to space, and the number two to the number one.
But this error belongs to another more general error, which we shall
deal with in its place, when discussing philosophism.
Here it is important to indicate only that false
application of the dialectic which tends to resolve in Errors of the
dialectic applied
itself and so to destroy distinct concepts, by to the relation of
treating them as opposites. The distinct concepts the distincts.
are distinct and not opposite; and they cannot be
opposite, precisely because they already have opposition in
themselves. Fancy has its opposite in itself, fanciful passivity, or
æsthetic ugliness, and therefore it is not the opposite of thought,
which in its turn has its opposite in itself, logical passivity,
antithought, or the false. Certainly (as has been said), he who does
not make the beautiful (in so far as he does anything, and he cannot
but do something) effectively produces another value, for example
the useful, and he who does not think, if he does anything, produces
another value, the fanciful for instance, and creates a work of art.
But in this way we issue from those determinations considered in
themselves, from the opposition which is in them and which
constitutes them; and from the consideration of effectual opposition
we pass to the consideration of distinction. Considered as real, the
opposite cannot be anything but the distinct; but the opposite is
precisely the unreal in the real, and not a form or grade of reality. It
will be said that unless one distinct concept is opposed to another, it
is not clear how there can be a transition from one to the other. But
this is a confusion between concept and fact, between ideal and
therefore eternal moments of the real and their existential
manifestations. Existentially, a poet does not become a philosopher,
save when in his spirit there arises a contradiction to his poetry, that
is to say, when he is no longer satisfied with the individual and with
the individual intuition: in that moment, he does not pass into but is
a philosopher, because to pass, to be effectual, and to become are
synonyms. In the same way, a poet does not pass from one intuition
to another, or from one work of art to another, save through the
formation of an internal contradiction, owing to which his previous
work no longer satisfies him; and he passes into, that is to say he
becomes and truly is, another poet. Transition is the law of the
whole of life; and therefore it is in all the existential and contingent
determinations of each of these forms. We pass from one verse of a
poem to another because the first verse satisfies, and also does not
satisfy. The ideal moments, on the contrary, do not pass into one
another, because they are eternally in each other, distinct, and one
with each other.
Moreover, the violent application of the dialectic to
the distincts, and their illegitimate distortion into Its reductio ad
absurdum.
opposites, due to an elevated but ill-directed
tendency to unity, is punished where it sins; that is to say, in not
attaining to that unity to which it aspired. The connection of distinct
is circular, and therefore true unity; the application of opposites to
the forms of the spirit and of reality would produce, on the contrary,
not the circle, which is true infinity, but the progressif ad infinitum,
which is false or bad infinity. Indeed, if opposition determine the
transition from one ideal grade to the other, from one form to the
other, and is the sole character and supreme law of the real, by what
right can a final form be established, in which that transition should
no longer take place? By what right, for instance, should the spirit,
which moves from the impression or emotion and passes dialectically
to the intuition, and by a new dialectic transition to logical thought,
remain calm and satisfied there? Why (as is the contention of such
philosophies) should the thought of the Absolute or of the Idea be
the end of Life? In obedience to the law of opposition, it would be
necessary that thought, which denies intuition, should be in its turn
denied; and the denial again denied; and so on, to infinity. This
negation to infinity exists, certainly, and it is life itself, seen in
representation; but precisely for this reason we do not escape from
this evil infinite of representation save through the true infinite,
which places the infinite in every moment, the first in the last and
the last in the first, that is to say, places in every moment unity,
which is distinction.
We must, however, recognize that the false application of the
dialectic has had, per accidens, the excellent result of demonstrating
the instability of a crowd of ill-distinguished concepts; as we must
take advantage of the devastation and overturning of secular
prejudices which it has brought about. But that erroneous dialectic
has also promoted the habit of lack of precision in the concepts, and
sometimes encouraged the charlatanism of superficial thinkers;
though this too, per accidens, so far as concerns the initial motive of
dialectical polemic is rich with profound truth.
The form of law given to the concept of the
concept has led to this confusion; for it is an The Improper
form of logical
improper form, all saturated with empirical usage. principles or laws.
Given the law of identity and contradiction, and The principle of
given side by side with it that of opposition or sufficient reason.
dialectic, there inevitably arises a seeming duality;
whereas the two laws are nothing but two inopportune forms of
expressing the unique nature of the concept, or, rather, of reality
itself. The peculiar nature of the concept may rather be said to be
expressed in another law or principle, namely that of sufficient
reason. This principle is ordinarily used as referring to the concept of
cause, or to the pseudoconcepts, but (both in its peculiar tendency
and in its historical origin) it truly belonged to the concept of end or
reason. That is to say, it was desired to establish that things cannot
be said to be known, when any sort of cause for them is adduced,
but on the contrary, that cause must be adduced, which is also the
end, and which is, therefore, the sufficient reason. But what else
does seeking the sufficient reason of things mean but thinking them
in their truth, conceiving them in their universality, and stating their
concept? This is logical thought, as distinct from representation or
intuition, which offers things but not reasons, individuality but not
universality.
It is not worth while talking about the other so-called logical
principles; because, either they have been already implicitly dealt
with, or they are ineptitudes without any sort of interest.

SECOND SECTION

THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT

I.

THE CONCEPT AND VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT

With the ascent from the intuition-expression to

the concept, and with the concentration upon it of Relation of the
logical with the
our attention, we have risen from the purely Æsthetic form.
imaginative to the purely logical form of the spirit.
We must now, so to speak, begin the descent; or rather consider in
greater detail the position that has been reached, in order to
understand it in all its conditions and circumstances. Were we not to
do this, we should have given a concept of the concept, which would
err by abstraction.
The concept, to which we have risen from intuition,
does not live in empty space. It does not exist as a The concept as
expression.
mere concept, or as something abstract. The air it
breathes is the intuition itself, from which it detaches itself, but in
whose ambient it continues. If these images seem unsuitable, or
somewhat drawn from the sphere of representations, we may
choose others, such as that, which we used on another occasion, of
the second grade, which, to be second, must rest upon the first,
and, in a certain sense, be the first. The concept does not exist, and
cannot exist, save in the intuitive and expressive forms, or in what is
called language. To think is also to speak; he who does not express,
or does not know how to express his concept, does not possess it:
at the most, he presumes or hopes to possess it. Not only is there
never in reality an unexpressed representation, a pictorial vision
unpainted, or a song unsung; but there is never even a concept
which is simply thought and not also translated into words.
We have previously defended this thesis against the objections
which are wont to be made to it.[1] But in order to recapitulate and
thus to avoid the misunderstandings which might arise from the
abbreviating formulæ which we use, it will be well to repeat that the
concept is not expressed only in the so-called vocal or verbal forms;
and if we mention these more than others, it will be by synecdoche,
that is to say, when we refer to them, we desire to take them as
representative of all the others. Undoubtedly, the affirmation that
the concept can also be expressed in non-verbal form may cause
surprise. It will be said that geometry itself, in so far as it describes
geometrical figures, at the same time employs or implies speech;
and we shall be ironically challenged to attempt to set the Critique of
Pure Reason to music or to make a building of Newton's Natural
Philosophy. But we must carefully beware of breaking up the unity of
the intuitive spirit, because errors arise and become incorrigible,
precisely through such breaking up. Words, tones, colours, and lines
are physical abstractions, and only by abstraction can they be
successfully separated. In reality, he who looks at a picture with his
eyes also speaks it in words to himself; he who sings an air also has
its words in his spirit; he who builds a palace or a church speaks,
sings, and makes music; he who reads a poem sings, paints,
sculptures, constructs. The Critique of Pure Reason cannot be set to
music, because it already has its music; the Natural Philosophy
cannot be built in stone, because it is already architectonic; in
exactly the same way that the Transfiguration cannot be turned into
a symphony in four movements, or the Promessi Sposi into a series
of pictures. Thus the challenge, if made, would testify to the lack of
reflection on the part of the challengers, for they would confuse
physical distinctions with the real and concrete act of the intuitive
spirit.
Owing to the incarnation of the concept or logic in
expression and language, language is quite full of Æsthetic and
Æsthetic-logical
logical elements; hence people are often led astray expressions or
into affirming (we have already made clear the expressions of the
concept;
erroneousness[2] of this) that language is a logical propositions and
function. Water might as well be called wine, judgments.
because wine has been poured into the water. But
language as language or as simple æsthetic fact is one thing, and
language as expression of logical thought is another, for in this case,
certainly, language remains always language and subject to the law
of language, but is also more than language. If the first be termed
simple expression, logos seimantikos, as Aristotle said, or judicium
æstheticum sive sensitivum, according to the school of Baumgarten,
the second must on the contrary be called affirmation, logos
apophantikos, judicium logicum or æsthetico-logicum. To this same
issue we can reduce, if we understand it properly, the distinction
between proposition and judgment, for they are only distinguishable
in so far as it is assumed that the second form is dominated by the
concept, whereas the first is given as free of such domination.
But we should seek in vain for facts in proof of expressions
belonging to either form, because we cannot furnish them without
making the proviso that we understand them in the meaning of one
or other of the two forms. Taken by themselves, any verbal
expressions which we adduce or can adduce as proofs are
indeterminate and therefore of many meanings. "Love is life" can be
the saying of a poet who notes an impression with which his soul is
agitated and marks it with fervour and solemnity; or it can be,
equally, the logical affirmation of some one philosophizing on the
essence of life. "Clear, fresh, and sweet waters," when uttered by
Petrarch, is an æsthetic proposition; but the same words become a
logical judgment when, for example, they answer the question as to
which is the most celebrated love song of Petrarch, or pseudological
when applied by a naturalist to the substance water. A word no
longer has meaning, or—what amounts to the same thing—has no
definite meaning, when it is abstracted from the circumstances, the
implications, the emphasis, and the gesture with which it has been
thought, animated, and pronounced. Nevertheless, forgetfulness of
this elementary hermeneutic canon, by which a word is a word only
on the soil that has produced it and to which it must be restored,
has been in Logic the cause of interminable disputes as to the logical
nature of this or that verbal phrase, separated from the whole to
which it belonged and rendered abstract. It would be much less
equivocal to adduce such poems as I Sepolcri, or the song A Silvia,
as documents of æsthetic propositions, and philosophical treatises
(for examples, the Metaphysics or the Analytics) as documents of
æsthetic-logical judgments or propositions. But here, too, we should
need to add: "poetry considered as poetry," and "philosophy
considered as philosophy," since it is clear that a poem is prose in
the soul of him who reflects upon it, and prose is poetry in the soul
of a writer vibrating with enthusiasm and emotion in the act of
composition. Facts do not constitute proofs in philosophy, save when
they are interpreted through the medium of philosophy; and then,
too, they become mere examples, which aid in fixing the attention
upon what is being demonstrated.
The relation between language and thought,
conceived as we have conceived it, does not admit Surpassing of the
dualism of
the criticism that it creates an insuperable dualism, thought and
though that criticism was justly aimed at those who language.
set the two concepts side by side and parallel with
one another. In that case the sole means that remained of obtaining
unity was to present language as an acoustic fact and declare
thought to be the unique psychic reality, and language the physical
side of the psychophysical nexus. But no one will henceforth wish to
repeat the blasphemy that language (the synonym of fancy and
poetry) is nothing but a physical-acoustic fact and merely adherent
to thought. We have in the two forms, notwithstanding their clear
distinction, not parallelism and dualism, but an organic relation of
connection in distinction,—the first form being implied in the second,
the second crystallized into the first,—precisely in conformity with
that rhythmical movement of the concepts which we have already
discussed. And thus, too, when asked if the prius of Logic be the
concept or the judgment, we must reply that the judgment,
understood as an æsthetic proposition, is certainly a prius; but
understood as a logical judgment, it is neither a prius nor a posterius
in relation to the concept, since it is the concept itself in its
effectuality.
This pure expression of the concept, which is the
logical judgment, constitutes what is called The logical
judgment as
definitive judgment or definition. This, considered definition.
on its verbal side, or as the synthesis of thought
and word, does not give rise to any special logical theory in addition
to that which we have already stated, when definition showed itself
to be one with distinction or conceptual thought; nor does it give
rise to any special æsthetic doctrine, since the general doctrine
expounded elsewhere includes this also. The dispute, as to whether
the definition be verbal or real, finds its solution in the relation we
have just established between thought and words; hence definition
is verbal because it is real, and vice versa. And as to the other
meaning of the question, whether, that is to say, definition be
nominal or real, conventional or corresponding with the truth, that
finds its solution in the distinction between pseudoconcepts and
concepts, the first of which, it is clear, are defined only in a
nominalist or conventional way, because they are, in fact, nominalist
and conventional.
Greater importance attaches to the other dispute,
as to whether the definitive judgment be The
indistinguishability
analysable into subject, predicate, and copula, of subject and
whether, for example, the definition: "the will is the predicate in the
practical form of the spirit," can be resolved in the definition. Unity of
essence and
terms: "will" (subject), "practical form of the spirit" existence.
(predicate), and "is" (copula). Now, the difference
between subject and predicate is here illusory, since predicate
means the universal which is predicated of an individual, and here
both the so-called subject and the so-called predicate are two
universals, and the second, far from being more ample than the first,
is the first itself. As to the "is," since the two distinct terms which
should be copulated are wanting, it is not a copula; nor has it even
the value of a predicate, as in the case in which it is asserted of an
individual fact that it is, that is to say, that it has really happened
and is existing. The "is," in the case of the definition, expresses
nothing except simply the act of thought which thinks; and what is
thought is, in so far as it is thought; if it were not, it would not be
thought; and if it were not thought, it would not be. The concept
gives the essence of things, and in the concept essence involves
existence. That this proposition has sometimes been contested is
due solely to the confusion between the essence, which is existence
and therefore concept, and the existence which is not essence and
therefore is representation. It is due therefore to the problem to
which representations gave rise in this respect, and with which we
shall deal further on. Freed from this confusion, the proposition is
not contestable, and is the very basis of all logical thought, of which
we have to examine the conceivability, or essence, that is, its
internal necessity and coherence; and when this has been
established, existence has also been established. If the concept of
virtue be conceivable, virtue is; if the concept of God be conceivable,
God is. To the most perfect concept the perfection of existence
cannot be wanting without being itself non-existent.
Yet it would seem that though the definition affirms
both essence and existence, and therefore the Alleged emptiness
of the definition.
reality of the concept, it is, nevertheless, an empty
form; for we have recognized that in every definition subject and
predicate are the same, and it is therefore a tautological judgment.
Certainly, the definition is tautological, but it is a sublime tautology,
altogether different from the emptiness which is usually condemned
in that expression. The tautology of the definition means that the
concept is equal only to itself and cannot be resolved into another or
explained by another. In the definition truth praesentia patet, and if
the Goddess does not reveal herself by her simple presence, it is in
vain that the priest will strive to discover her to the multitude by
comparing her with what is inferior to her: with sensible things,
which are particular manifestations of her.
As in relation to the concept the definition is not to
be held distinguishable, so in its expressive or Critique of the
definition as fixed
verbal aspect it must not be understood as a verbal form.
formula separate from the basis of the discourse,
as though it were the official garb of truth, the only worthy setting
for that gem. Such a conception of its nature has caused pedantry of
definition, hatred of and consequent rebellion against definitions.
That pedantry, however, like all pedantries, had some good in it; that
is to say, it energetically affirmed the need for exactitude; and too
frequently the rebellion, denying, like all rebellions, not only the evil
but also whatever good there might be in the thing opposed, has,
through its hatred of formulæ, made exactitude of thought a
negligible matter. But definition, taken verbally, is not a formula, a
period or part of a book or discourse; it is the whole book or the
whole discourse, from the first word to the last, including all that in
it may seem accidental or superficial, including even the accent, the
warmth, the emphasis, and the gesture of the living word, the notes,
the parentheses, the full stops, and commas of the writing. Nor can
we indicate a special literary form of definition, such as the treatise
or system or manual, because the definition or concept is given alike
in opuscules and in dialogues, in prose and in verse, in satire and in
lyric, in comedy and in tragedy. To define, from the verbal point of
view, means to express the concept; and all the expressions of the
concept are definitions. This might trouble rhetoricians desirous of
devoting a special chapter to the form of scientific treatment; but it
does not trouble good sense, which quickly recognizes that the thing
is just so, and that an epigram may give that precise and efficacious
definition in which the ample scholastic volume of a professor
sometimes fails, although full of pretence in this respect.
[1] See Æsthetic, part i. chap. iii.
 [2] See Sect. I. Chap. III.

II

THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM, THE SYLLOGISM

The definition not only is not a formula separable

or distinguishable from the thread of the discourse, Identity of
definition and
but it cannot even be separated or distinguished syllogism.
from the ratiocinative forms or forms of
demonstration, as is implied in the custom of logicians, who make
the doctrine of the definition or of the systematic forms, as they
usually call them, follow that of the forms of demonstration. They
ingenuously imagine that thought, after having had a rough-and-
tumble with its adversaries, and after having proclaimed, shouted,
and finally vindicated its own right, mounts the rostrum and
henceforth calm and sure of itself begins to define. But, in reality, to
think is to combat continuously without any repose; and at every
moment of that battle there is always peace and security; and
definition is indistinguishable from demonstration, because it is
found at every instant of the demonstration and coincides with it.
Definition and Syllogism are the same thing.
The syllogism, indeed, is nothing but a connection
of concepts; and although it has been disputed as Connection of
concepts and
to whether it must be considered so, or rather as a thought of the
connection of logical propositions or judgments, concept.
the dispute is at once solved, so far as we are
concerned, by observing :hat precisely because the syllogism is a
connection of concepts, and concepts only exist in verbal forms, that
is to say, in propositions or judgments, the syllogism is also a
connection of judgments. This serves to reinforce the truth that if
the effective presence of the verbal form must always be recognized
in the logical fact, it must, on the other hand, be forgotten when
Logic is being constructed and the nature of Logic and of the
concept is being sought. Now, the connection of the concepts
represents nothing new in relation to the thinking of the concept. As
has already been seen, to think the concept signifies to think it in its
distinctions, to place it in relation with the other concepts and to
unify it with them in the unique concept. A concept thought outside
its relations is indistinct, that is to say, not thought at all.
Therefore, the connection of the concepts, or syllogizing, cannot be
conceived as a new and more complex logical act. To syllogize and
to think are synonymous; although, in the ordinary use of language,
the term "to syllogize" throws into special relief the verbal aspect of
thinking, and, more exactly, the dynamic character of verbal
exposition, which is indeed the very character of this exposition, for
it is with difficulty, or only empirically, that it can be distinguished
into static and dynamic, definition and demonstration.
But if the syllogism be thus identified with the
concept itself, it may nevertheless seem that it Identity of
judgment and of
must be distinguished from the judgment of syllogism.
definition seeing that the syllogism is a form of
logical thought, and consequently of verbal expression, quite distinct
from and incapable of being confounded with any other: a
connection of three judgments, two of which are called premisses
and the third conclusion, closely cemented by the syllogistic force,
which is placed in the middle term. This character of triplicity seems
ineradicable and peculiar to the syllogism in contrast with the
judgment.
Some question, however, must be raised concerning this
characteristic because of another characteristic universally
recognized in the syllogism; namely, that the premisses are
conclusions of other syllogisms, just as the conclusion becomes, in
its turn, a premiss. This being so, it might be said with greater truth
that the syllogism is to syllogize or to think; and since this is infinite,
so the propositions of which it consists are also infinite. On the other
hand, there is no judgment which is not a syllogism, since it is clear
that he who affirms a judgment affirms it by some reasoning or
syllogism, present and active in his spirit, though more or less
understood in the words. And are not other propositions understood
in the syllogisms which are properly so-called, not only in the forms,
which are called abbreviated (immediate inferences, enthymemes,
etc.), but also in all the other forms; since it is admitted that every
syllogism, as has just been observed, presupposes other preceding
syllogisms, indeed an infinity of others? It will be replied that at the
end of the chain there must yet be found the difference between
judgment and syllogism, or two first judgments, which are not
produced by syllogism, and form the columns, upon which the
structure of the first conclusion rests. But such an answer (if it do
not imply simply the strange fancy that thought has a beginning and
therefore also an end in time) will mean that judgment and syllogism
are distinct in intrinsic character, which makes the one the necessary
condition of the other. Now, this intrinsic distinctive character is
precisely what cannot be found, because it does not exist; and if it
be not in every link, it is vain to seek it at the beginning of the chain.
Certainly, that venatio medii, that ergo, that
unification of triplicity, are things of much The middle term
and the nature of
importance. But whence comes their importance if the concept.
not from being the expression of the synthetic
force of thought, of thought which unifies and distinguishes, and
distinguishes because it unifies and unifies because it distinguishes?
And is triplicity truly triplicity, one, two, three, arithmetically
enumerable? But if this be so, how is it that we never succeed in
counting those three, resolving each one of them into a series of
similar terms, or of other propositions and concepts? Upon attentive
consideration we perceive that here, too, the number three is
symbolical, and that it does no more than designate the distinction,
which unifies or thinks the singular concept in the universal through
the particular, or determines the universal through the particular, by
making it a singular concept, whence it remains perfectly certain
that the relation of these three determinations is not numerical.
Such a logical operation, not being anything special, but simply
logical reasoning itself, is of necessity found also in the judgment.
A possible objection at this point is that even if the
unity of judgment and syllogism can be held to be Pretended non-
definitive logical
demonstrated as regards definitions and syllogisms judgments.
which are the basis of definitions, yet it has not
been demonstrated for the other forms of syllogisms and logical
judgments, which are not definitive. But if these judgments and
syllogisms be logical, they cannot fail to be definitive, or to have for
their content affirmations of concepts. "All men are mortal" is a
definition of the concept of man, whose mortality is verbally
emphasized or his immortality denied. It is without doubt an
incomplete definition, because it is torn from the web of thoughts
and of speech of which it formed part; and this web will also always
be incomplete or capable of infinite completion by means of new
affirmations and new negations. But in its incompleteness it is at the
same time also complete, because it affirms a concept of reality, of
life and death, of finite and infinite, of spirituality and of its forms,
and so on; these are all presupposed determinations, and therefore
existing and operating in the concepts of man and mortality. "Caius
is a man" (which is the second premiss of the syllogism traditionally
adduced as an example) is certainly not a definition (though it
presupposes and contains many definitions) precisely for the reason
that it is not a pure logical judgment. Hence it happens that the
conclusion itself: "therefore Caius is mortal," is more than a pure
logical conclusion, since it also contains a historical element, the
person of Caius. But we shall speak further on of these individual or
historical judgments; and then we shall also see in what relation
they stand to the universal or pure logical judgments, and if it be
truly possible to distinguish between them, otherwise than for the
sake of convenience. The distinction is in any case convenient and
does no harm at this point; and therefore for didactic reasons we
allow it to stand; indeed we make use of it.
Just as in the case of definitions, so also in the case of the syllogism,
it is to be noted that the verbal expression does not consist of an
obligatory formula, but assumes the most varied
forms, apparently very remote from syllogizing as The syllogism as
fixed verbal form.
commonly understood. The abuse of the syllogism Its use and
as a formula continued for centuries, notably in abuse.
mediæval Scholasticism, and notwithstanding the
rebellion of the Renaissance, it has persisted among many
philosophical schools, its last conspicuous manifestation being the
didactic elaboration of the Leibnitzian philosophy, or Wolffianism.
Certain of Wolff's demonstrations have remained famous, such as
that concerning the construction of windows, contained in his
Manual of Architecture. "A window must be large enough for two
persons to lean against it, side by side," he developed it in this way:
"Demonstration. It is customary to lean against a window with
another person in order to look out. But the architect must serve the
interests of his employer in everything. Therefore he must make the
window large enough for two persons to be able to be there side by
side.[1] Q.E.D."
No more such syllogistic pedantries have been seen in our times, but
(as has been already remarked in reference to pedantry of
definition) contempt for the formula has too often resulted in
contempt even for the correctness of the reasoning. So that it has
sometimes been necessary to advise a bracing bath of scholasticism,
and it has been observed and lamented of certain new civilizations
(for example, of Russian culture, or of the Japanese people, who are
so little addicted to mathematics), that they have not had a
scholastic period, like that of the West, so general with them is the
habit of incorrect, loose, and passionately impulsive and fantastic
reasoning. Certainly the formula, the exercise of disputation in
forma, the logica scholastica utens has its merits; and we must know
how to have recourse to it when it is advantageous to do so, and to
express thought in the brief and perspicuous formulæ of the
syllogism, of the sorites, or of the dilemma. From this point of view
the new methods of mathematical Logic or Logistic, upon which
some are now working, and even the logical machines which have
been constructed, would help; they would help—if they helped. For
the point is just this: when formulæ, methods of demonstration,
machines and the like, are recommended, expedients and
instruments of practical or economic use are thereby proposed; and
these cannot make good their existence otherwise than by getting
themselves accepted for the utility—the saving of time and space,
and so of fatigue, which they effect. Like all technical inventions,
those products must be brought to the market; and the market
alone decides upon their value and assigns to them their price. At
the present time, it seems that logistic methods have no value and
price, save for certain narrow circles of people, who amuse
themselves with them in their own way and so pass the time.
Certain erroneous doctrines take their origin from
the undue separation of demonstration and Erroneous
separation of
definition, conspicuously that particular error which truth and reason
places a difference of degree between truth and of truth in the
reason of truth, and consequently admits that a pure concepts.
truth can be known without its reason being
known. But a truth, of which the reason is not known, is not even
truth; or it is truth only in preparation and in hypothesis. We hear
much about the intuition with which men of genius are equipped,
and which enables them to go straight to the truth, even when they
are not capable of demonstrating it. But this intuition, when it is not
that truth in preparation, or that orientation towards a truth still
quite hypothetical, must of necessity be thought and thus also be
demonstration of truth; it must be truth and also reason of truth;
thought and reasoning performed no doubt with lightning rapidity,
which is expressed in brief propositions and needs going over again
and rethinking, in order that it may afford a more ample and, from
the didactic point of view, a more persuasive, exposition; but it is
always thought and reasoning.
Things are still worse, when not only is a diversity of degree
admitted, but the complete indifference of demonstration to truth is
proclaimed, so that many or infinite possible demonstrations of one
identical truth would be possible. If by this it were meant merely
that one identical truth, or one identical concept, can assume infinite
verbal or expressive forms, and if demonstration were understood as
"exposition" or "expression," there would be nothing to object. But if
by demonstration be meant something truly logical, that which is
properly called by that name in Logic, this thesis leads directly to the
negation of truth, making the demonstration of truth, or truth itself,
an illusion, a sophistical appearance created simply to persuade.
Those acquainted with courts of law know that very often when a
magistrate has made his decision and pronounced sentence he
deputes to a younger colleague the task of "reasoning" it, or of
providing an appearance of reasoning to what is indeed not a logical
product, but simply the voluntas of a certain provision. But though
this procedure be intelligible and useful when it occurs in the field of
practice and of law, it cannot be admitted in the theoretical field,
where it would be the ruin of thought and indirectly of the will itself.
Naturally, all that has been said as to the definition
and the syllogism has reference to the true and Difference
between truth
proper concept, or the pure concept. In the case of and reason of
pseudoconcepts, where practical motives enter, truth in the
definition is a simple command (a nominalist pseudoconcepts.
definition), and demonstration has no place, save
for those of its elements that are derived from the pure concept:
given the definitions, the reasoning must logically proceed in a
determinate manner. In pseudoconcepts, then, definitions are
separate from demonstrations: the first do not spring from the
second and are not all one with them; the second presuppose the
first and do not produce them. Of these definitions infinite
demonstrations are possible, precisely because in reality none is
possible, for the definitions themselves are infinite; and when a
demonstration is given, this is done only pro forma; it is a deception,
to conceal a practical convenience, or rather a logical reasoning
employed to make it clear. It is for this reason also that the
definitions employed in those demonstrations seem to be obtained
by means of an act of faith in the irrational; and here faith signifies,
not the confidence of thought in itself, but the making a virtue of
necessity, accepting as true what is not known as such.—For the
rest, pseudoconcepts and concepts have the same relation with the
verbal form; that is to say, all are expressed in the most various
ways, and there is no obligatory form of language, which can be
called the literary form of logical character. The style of the Civil
Code, which aroused the admiration of Stendhal, is not the eternal
style of laws, for laws were once even put into verse; as in like
barbaric times the sciences used to be put into verse. In the life of
the word, concepts and pseudoconcepts rush forward in such a way
that it is vain to seek there for distinction among them.

[1] Mentioned in Hegel, Wiss. d. Logik 2, iii. 370 n.

III

CRITIQUE OF FORMALIST LOGIC

From the fact that in the verbal form all distinctions

(pure concepts, and empirical and abstract Intrinsic
impossibility of
concepts, distinct concepts and opposite concepts) formal Logic.
are indistinguishable, and on the other hand all
identities, such as that of concept, definition and demonstration,
appear differentiated or capable of differentiation, we can deduce
the impossibility of constructing logical Science by means of an
analysis of the verbal form. The condemnation of all formal Logic is
thus pronounced.
This Logic has been variously called Aristotelian,
peripatetic, scholastic, after its authors and Its nature.
historical representatives; syllogistic, from the
doctrine that forms its principal content; formal, from its pretensions
to philosophic purity; empirical, by those who tried to drive it back to
its place; and although this last name is correct, it would be better
to call it formal, and still better, verbal, to indicate of what the
empiricism to which it is desired to allude, chiefly consists. Indeed, if
empiricism be marked by its limiting itself to single representations,
regrouping them in types and arranging them in classes, there is no
doubt that that method of treatment is empirical, which takes the
logical function, not in the eternal peculiarity of its character as
thought of the universal, but only in its various particular translations
or manifestations, in which it acquires contingent characteristics.
Since these contingent characteristics come to it, in the first place,
from the verbal form, it can well be called verbalism. Owing to its
verbalism, too, it has happened, that over and above the grammars
of individual languages, there has been conceived as existing a
general, rational and logical Grammar; and this hybrid science, which
is no longer grammar and arose from logical assumptions, has
developed in such a way as to be indistinguishable from empirical or
verbal Logic.
Certainly, as mere empiricism, this so-called Logic
could not be condemned. And Hegel was not Its partial
justification.
wrong in remarking that if people are interested in
establishing that there are sixty species of parrots and one hundred
and thirty-seven of veronica, it is not clear why it should be of less
interest to establish the various forms of the judgment and of the
syllogism. That discipline has its utility as mere empiricism, and it
may be useful to any one to employ in certain cases the terminology
in which an affirmation is characterized as positive or as merely
negative, as particular or as universal, as a judgment that awaits
reasoning and demonstration, as an immediate inference,
enthymeme or sorites, as a conclusive or an inconclusive, or as a
correct or an incorrect syllogism, and so on. It is also
comprehensible how, as mere empiricism, it assumed a normative
character, and was translated into rules; rules, which are valid within
their own sphere, neither more nor less than are all empirical rules.
But it does not limit itself to acting simply as an
empirical description, nor even as a simple Its error.
technique; it usurps a much more lofty office. Just
as Rhetoric and Grammar, innocent and useful so long as they limit
themselves to the functions of convenient grouping and convenient
terminology, become false and harmful when they assume the
attitude of sciences of absolute values, and must then be resolved
into, and replaced by Æsthetic; so empirical or verbal Logic becomes
transformed into error when it claims to give the laws of thought, or
the thought of thought, which cannot be other than the concept of
the concept. It is not, then, formal, as it boasts itself to be, because
the only logical form is the universal, and this alone is the object of
logical investigation; but it is falsely formal, since it relies upon
contingencies, and must, therefore, be called formalist. We reject it
here exclusively in its formalist aspect; that is to say, in so far as it is
a complex of empirical distinctions that wish to pass as rational and
usurp the place of true rationality.
Several of such empirical distinctions, such as the
distinction between thought and principle of Its traditional
constitution.
thought, truth and reason of truth, judgments and
syllogisms, and such-like, have been recorded and criticized; we
shall proceed to mention others, when suitable opportunities occur.
Here it will be well to refer to the general physiognomy and structure
of that Logic, as it was embodied for centuries in the schools and
still persists in treatises.
Its point of departure is the external distinction
between words and connections of words, which The three logical
forms.
belongs properly to Grammar. But words are then
treated by it as concepts, and connections of words, as judgments.
Thus it obtains the identification of the concept with the abstract
and mutilated grammatical word and arrives at the monstrous
determination of the concepts as things which are not in themselves
either true or false. Thus, again, by constantly calling upon the
connections of the concepts for succour, it succeeds in distinguishing
the judgment from the mere proposition. A double criterion is
constantly adopted in establishing these and other fundamental
forms: the verbal and the logical; and formalist Logic oscillates
equivocally between the two different determinations; whence the
alternating appearance of truth and of falsehood, with which its
distinctions present themselves. The syllogism, which should be the
third fundamental form, is conceived as the connection of three
distinct judgments; but if it yet retains its importance and
preponderance over two-membered forms or over serial forms of
more than three propositions and judgments, this is really because
to the distinction and enumeration of the three propositions there is
added the criterion of the concept as a nexus, or as a triunity of
universal, particular and singular.
The three fundamental forms have been reduced
by some logicians to two, by others; amplified to The theories of
the concept and
four or to five, by adding to them the perceptive of the judgment.
form or the definitive and systematic form. These
restrictions and amplifications have always encountered resistance,
because it was justly felt that in this way one form of empiricism was
being mingled with another: the verbal form with empirical
distinctions drawn from other presuppositions. But in determining in
particular the three fundamental forms, formalist Logic has not been
able to restrict itself to the mere distinction of words and
propositions, artificially placed in relation with the pure concept; but
has been obliged to draw from other sources. The concepts are
variously classified, sometimes from the verbal point of view, as
identical, equivalent, equivocal, anonymous and synonymous;
sometimes from the logical point of view, as distinct, disparate,
contrary or contradictory; sometimes from the psychological point of
view, as incomplete and complete, obscure and clear, the concepts
further always being understood as names, so that, for example,
distinct concepts are indifferently philosophically distinct concepts,
and empirically distinct concepts; and the contraries are both the
philosophical contraries and those empirically so-called. The same
has occurred in the classification of judgments where sometimes the
determinations of the concept are taken as foundation and the
judgments distinguished as universal particular and individual;
sometimes the intrinsic dialectic nature of the concept, and they are
distinguished as affirmative, negative and indeterminate or infinite;
sometimes the stages passed through in the search for truth, and
they are distinguished into categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive,
or apodeictic, assertory and problematic. And these forms have
further always been understood verbally. "Universality" is the
"totality" empirically designated by the word, and not true
universality; and "individuality," on the contrary, is not only the
individuality of the representation, but also the single particularity of
the distinct concept; "affirmative" is differentiated from "negative" by
accidental grammatical form, and not because that unique act which
is thought, at once affirmation and negation (as the will is both love
and hatred) can be truly divided.
The classification of syllogisms, founded exactly
upon the empirical conception of the judgment as The theory of the
syllogism.
the copulation of a subject and a predicate affords
a suitable parallel to this method of treatment of the judgment;
subject and predicate being understood in an empirical and
grammatical manner, whence they are also discovered in those
verbal affirmations, in which they are not distinct, because they are
identical, as in the case of the judgment of definition. For empirical
Logic, in the judgment: "The will is the practical form of the spirit,"
"will" is subject and "practical form" predicate in the same way as in
"Peter is a man," "Peter" is subject, and "man" predicate. From the
distinction between subject and predicate, arise the four figures of
the syllogism; the criterion being the position of the middle term in
the two premisses of the three propositions of which the syllogism is
formed. If the middle term be subject in the first premiss and
predicate in the second, we have the first figure; if it be predicate in
both, the second; if it be subject in both, the third; if it be predicate
in the first and subject in the second, the fourth figure ("sub-prae,
turn prae-prae, turn sub-sub, turn prae-sub"). But in order to deduce
the moods of each figure recourse is then had to another criterion,
indeed to two other criteria; that is, to the empirical distinctions of
judgments into universal and particular, and into affirmative and
negative, with the four consequent determinations into universal-
affirmative judgments (A), universal-negative (E), particular-
affirmative (I), and particular-negative (O). Thus, in the first figure,
two universal affirmative premisses constitute the first mood, and
the conclusion is universal affirmative (Barbara); two premisses,
both universal, but one affirmative and the other negative, constitute
the second, and the conclusion is universal negative (celarent); two
premisses, one universal affirmative and the other particular
affirmative, constitute the third mood, and the conclusion is
particular affirmative (darii); two premisses, one universal negative
and one particular affirmative, constitute the fourth mood, and the
conclusion is particular negative (ferio). And so on.
This is not the occasion to go on expounding in its
other particulars this construction, of which we Spontaneous
reductions to the
have given an example, for it is very well known: absurd of formal
nor to attach importance to criticizing it, since' its Logic.
foundations themselves have already been shown
to be false and its hybrid genesis explained. Verbal Logic, which
vaunts itself as rational, carries its own caricature in itself, namely
the creation of Sophisms; because, since it seeks the force of
thought in words, it cannot prevent sophistical ability from making
use, in its turn, of words, in order capriciously to create thoughts
and forms of thought. Thus verbal Logic, in order to combat
sophisms, is constrained hastily and eagerly to abandon simple
verbal connections, and to take refuge in concepts and connections
of concepts thought in words; that is to say, neither more nor less
than to negate the formalist point of view. And with analogous self-
irony it renounces that point of view and dissolves itself, when it
tries to refute the fourth figure of the syllogism, or to reduce the
second, third and fourth to the first, as the only real figure, and then
the first to a connection of three concepts; not to mention the
permanent self-irony and patent demonstration of falsity involved in
the logical deduction of the figures of the syllogism which it makes
from a series of moods, recognized as not conclusive.
Formalist Logic has been the object of many violent
attacks from the Renaissance onwards; but it Mathematical
Logic or Logistic.
cannot be said that it has been struck in its
essential part, because up to the present, the principle itself, or the
incoherence from which it springs, has not been attacked. Several
attempts at reform have followed and still follow; they have all of
them the same defect, which is the wish to reform formal Logic
without issuing from its circle, and without refuting its tacit
presumption— the pretension of obtaining thought in words,
concepts in propositions. The most considerable attempt of the kind
that has been made, which has many zealous followers in our day, is
mathematical Logic, also called calculatory, algebraical,
algorhythmic, symbolic, a new analytic, or a Logical calculus or
Logistic.
It is admitted by those who profess it and is for the
rest evident from the definitions of Logistic that Its non-
mathematical
have been given, that it has nothing in common character.
with mathematics, for although the majority of its
cultivators are mathematicians and use is made of the phraseology
usual in Mathematics, and it is directed toward Mathematics, in
certain of its practical intentions, there is nothing intrinsically
mathematical in it. Logistic is a science which deals, not with
quantity alone, but with quantity and quality together; it is a science
of things in general; it is universal mathematics, containing also,
subordinated to itself, the mathematical sciences properly so-called,
but not coinciding with these. It means to be, not mathematics, but
a general science of thought.
But the "thought" of Logistic is nothing but the
"verbal proposition," which, in fact, supplies its Example of its
mode of
starting-point. What the proposition is; whether it treatment.
be possible truly to distinguish the proposition we
call "verbal" from all the others, poetical, musical, pictorial; whether
the verbal proposition does not bear indistinctly in itself, a series of
very diverse spiritual formations, from poetry to mathematics, from
history and philosophy to the natural sciences; what language is and
what the concept is—these and all other questions concerning the
forms of the spirit and the nature of thought, remain altogether
extraneous to Logistic and do not disturb it in its work. The
propositions (the concept of the proposition remaining an
unexplained presupposition) can be indicated by p, q, etc.; the
relation of implication of one proposition in another can be indicated
by the sign ⊃, hence an isolated proposition is "that which implies
itself" (p.⊃.q.). By following a method such as this, many distinctions
of the traditional formalist Logic are eliminated, and in compensation
for this, new ones are added and old and new are dressed in a new
phraseology. The logical sum a + b is the smallest concept, which
contains the other two a and b and is what was previously called the
"sphere of the concept"; the logical product a x b indicates the
greater concept contained in a and in b, and answers to that which
was previously called "comprehension." There are also new or
renovated laws, like the law of identity, by force of which, in Logic
(differently from Algebra), a + a + a ... = a; by which it is desired to
signify this profound truth, that the repetition of one and the same
concept as many times as one wishes, always gives the same
concept;—the law of commutation, by which ab = ba;—or that of
absorption, by which a(a + b) = a; or—(the convention being that
the negation of a concept is indicated by placing against it a vertical
line) the other beautiful laws and formulæ: a + a | = a| (a | )a = a;
aa | = o. This is a charming amusement for those who have a taste
for it.
Thus it is seen that if the words and the formulæ
be somewhat different, the nature of mathematical Identity of nature
of Logistic with
Logic in no respect differs from that of formalist formalist Logic.
Logic. Where the new Logic contradicts the old, it
is not possible to say which of the two is right; as of two people
walking side by side over insecure ground, it is impossible to say
which of the two walks securely. The very doctrine of the
quantification of the predicate (which has been the leaven of the
reform) in no wise alters the traditional manner of conceiving the
judgment, with the corresponding arbitrary manner of distinguishing
subject and predicate. It simply establishes a convention with the
object of being able to symbolize, with the sign of equality, the
subject and the predicate:—the subject being included in the
predicate, is part of it: "men are mortal" equals: "men are some
mortals"; and so, "men" being indicated with a and "some mortals"
with b, the judgment can be symbolized: a = b. For us, it is
indifferent whether the modes of the syllogism be the 64 and the 19
recognized as valid by traditional Logic, or the 12 affirmative and the
24 negative of Hamilton's Logic, which distinguishes four classes of
affirmative and four of negative propositions. It is indifferent
whether the methods of conversion be three or two or one. It is
indifferent whether logical laws or principles be enumerated as two,
three, five or ten. Since we do not accept the point of departure, it is
impossible for us, far from admitting the development, even to
discuss it; save to demonstrate that from capricious choice comes
capricious choice, as we have made sufficiently clear in our
treatment of formalist Logic. Mathematical Logic is a new
manifestation of this formalist Logic, involving a great change in
traditional formulæ, but none in the intimate substance of that
pretended science of thought.
As the science of thought, Logistic is a laughable
thing; worthy, for that matter, of the brains that Practical aspect of
Logistic.
conceive and advocate it, which are the same that
are promulgating a new Philosophy of language, indeed a new
Æsthetic, with their insipid theories of the universal Language. As a
formula of practical utility it is not incumbent upon us to examine it
here; all the more since we have already had occasion to give our
opinion upon this subject. In the time of Leibnitz, fifty years later in
the last days of Wolffianism; a century ago in Hamilton's time; forty
years ago in the time of Jevons and of others; and finally now, when
Peano, Boole, and Couturat are flourishing, these new arrangements
are offered on the market. But every one has always found them too
costly and complicated, so that they have not hitherto been
generally used. Will they be so in the future? The practical work of
persuasion, proper to the commercial traveller seeking purchasers of
a new product, and the foresight of the merchant or manufacturer
as to the fortune that may await that product, are not pertinent to
Philosophy; which, being disinterested, could here, at the most,
reply with words of benevolent patience: "If they be roses, they will
bloom."

IV

THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION

Problems of a widely different nature from these

formalist playthings await exploration in the depths Reaction of the
concept upon the
of the Science of Logic. And resuming what we representation.
have called the descent of the universal into the
individual, it is of importance, after having established the relation
between concept and form of expression, to examine in what way
the concept reacts upon the representation, from which it appears to
be at a stroke and altogether separated.
In more precise terms: Beyond doubt the concept is thought only in
so far as it becomes concrete in an expressive form and itself also
becomes, from this point of view, representative. Thus, a logical
affirmation, or one that presents itself as logical, can be viewed
under a twofold aspect, as logical and as æsthetic. It can be
regarded as well thought-out, and so also very well expressed,
perfectly æsthetic because perfectly logical; or as very well
expressed but ill thought, or not truly thought, and so not logical,
and yet sentimental, passionate and imaginative. But this
expression-representation, in which the concept lives (and which is,
for example, the tone, the accent, the personal form, the style,
which I am employing in this book to expound Logic), is a new
representation, conditioned by the concept. We now ask, not indeed
the character of this representation (which is sufficiently clear), but
of what kind are those representations, about and upon which, the
thought of the concept has been kindled. Do they remain apart,
excluded from the light of the concept, obscure as before, that is,
logically obscure? Does the concept illuminate only itself in a sort of
egoistic satisfaction, without irradiating with its light the
representations upon which it has arisen?
That would be inconceivable and contrary to the
unity of the spirit; and indeed, such separation and Logicization of the
representations.
indifference do not exist. The appearance of the
concept transfigures the representations upon which it arises,
making them other than they formerly were; from being
indiscriminate it makes them discriminate; from fantastic, logical;
from clear but indistinct (as used to be said), clear and distinct. I
am, for example, in such a condition of soul as prompts me to sing
or to versify, and thus to make myself objective and known to
myself; but I am objective and known only to fancy, so much so,
that at the moment of poetical or musical expression I should not be
able to say what was really happening in me: whether I wake or
dream, whether I see clearly, or catch glimpses, or see wrongly.
When from the variety of the multitude of representations, which
have preceded and which follow it, I pass on to enquire as to the
truth of them all (that is to say, the reality, which does not pass),
and rise to the concept, those representations themselves must be
revised in the light of the concept that has been attained, but no
longer with the same eyes as formerly,—they must not be looked at,
but henceforth, thought. My state of soul then becomes
determinate; and I shall say, for example: "What I have experienced
(and sung and made poetry of), was an absurd desire; it was a clash
of different tendencies that needed to be overcome and arranged; it
was a remorse, a pious desire," and so on. Thus by means of the
concept is formed a judgment of that representation.
We have already studied the judgment, which is
proper to the concept, and called it definitive The individual
judgment and its
judgment or judgment of definition. We have difference from
shown how in it there is no distinction of subject the definitive
and predicate, so much so that it may be said, with judgment.
regard to it, that there is neither subject nor
predicate, but the complete identity of the two: a predicate or