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Architecting Cloud SaaS Software –
Solutions or Products

Engineering Multi-tenanted Distributed

Architecture Software
Being an “aspiring author and perspiring Professor myself”, I can well
appreciate the effort that Shri Prithviraj has put into this book. IIT Madras
alumni do everything well, and this book is another case in point. While
I’m not a subject matter expert in “Cloud SaaS software”, I can still glean
that is an extraordinarily well-organized book that lays out the material
clearly and crisply. Shri Prithviraj’s varied experience in the IT industry, as
well as his academic training at IISc and at IITM, are evident in the way
he has effortlessly communicated the nuances. Writing well may only be
a journey to an end, but the journey here is to be savored.... I wish the
book a great reception in the target industry and by all its practitioners.

R. Nagarajan  May 12, 2015

Architecting Cloud SaaS Software –
Solutions or Products
Engineering Multi-tenanted Distributed
Architecture Software

Sankaran Prithviraj

Chennai • Delhi
Copyright © 2016 Pearson India Education Services Pvt. Ltd

Published by Pearson India Education Services Pvt. Ltd, CIN: U72200TN2005PTC057128, formerly
known as TutorVista Global Pvt. Ltd, licensee of Pearson Education in South Asia.

No part of this eBook may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the
publisher’s prior written consent.

This eBook may or may not include all assets that were part of the print version. The publisher
reserves the right to remove any material in this eBook at any time.

ISBN 978-93-325-3760-6
eISBN 978-93-325-4165-8

Head Office: A-8 (A), 7th Floor, Knowledge Boulevard, Sector 62, Noida 201 309, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Registered Office: Module G4, Ground Floor, Elnet Software City, TS-140, Blocks 2 & 9,
Rajiv Gandhi Salai, Taramani, Chennai 600 113, Tamil Nadu, India.
Fax: 080-30461003, Phone: 080-30461060
www.pearson.co.in, Email: [email protected]
Contents

Prefacexi
Why this Book xv
About the Author xvii

1 Introduction 1
1.1 SaaS Deployed and Provided from Cloud Environment 2
1.2 Software Solution 3
1.3 ‘Software Architecting’ is Different from ‘Software Designing’ 4
1.4 Togaf, Abbs, Sbbs and Building Blocks 5
1.5 Cloud Saas – An Evolution and SaaS Business Models 7
1.5.1 Mainframe Leasing Model 7
1.5.2 Conventional, On-Premise Installed Model 8
1.5.3 Hosted Model of 1990s 8
1.5.4 Cloud Model: (SaaS Provided from Cloud Environment) 9
1.6 SaaS Provided from Cloud Environment vs Hosted Model 10
1.7 Enterprise Models for SaaS Consumption 12
1.7.1 Modelling Enterprises (for the Sake of Providing Solutions) 12
1.7.2 Bigger Enterprises and Verticals 13
1.7.3 Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises 13
1.7.4 Long Tail 13
1.8 Summary 15

2 Architecting Methods for Cloud SaaS Software – Solutions or Products 17

2.1 Introduction 18
2.2 Cloud SaaS Solution Addressing Business Capabilities of Smes 20
2.3 Adopting TOGAF’s ADM Phases for Cloud SaaS Solution 21
2.3.1 Phases – Preliminary Phase to Phase A–D 21
2.3.2 Phase E: Opportunities and Solutions 24
2.3.3 Remaining Phases in ADM 27
2.4 Agile Architecting Method 27
2.4.1 Requirements Collection and Identification of ABBs 28
2.4.2 Architecting by Employing Techniques from TOGAF 29
2.5 Summary 34
vi Contents

3 How Do Hypervisors Work? How Does IaaS Function? 35

3.1 Introduction 36
3.2 Hardware Virtualization 36
3.3 Auto-Provisioning 37
3.4 Data Centre Rack Systems 38
3.5 Scaling through Software Architecture or Hardware 39
3.6 Motivation or Need for Scalable Architecture 39
3.7 Scalable Architecture (of Software) 40
3.8 Concept of Load Balancer 44
3.9 Auto-Scaling 45
3.10 Summary of Capabilities of Hypervisors 46
3.11 A Simple Model of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 47
3.12 Example Case Situations 47
3.13 Summary 49

4 Architecting Software Solutions for Public IaaS Cloud (without SaaS) 51

4.1 Introduction 52
4.2 The Method in Brief 52
4.2.1 Identifying Minimum Deployment Hardware
Configuration for each SBB 53
4.2.2 Calculating IaaS Infrastructure Configuration 54
4.3 Digital Communication Platform 54
4.4 Approach to Realization 56
4.5 Realization of the Envisaged Solution Architecture 59
4.6 Architectural Considerations 61
4.7 Mapping Deployment Architecture into Public IaaS Cloud 62
4.8 Summary 65

5 Characteristics of Cloud SaaS Sof tware 67

5.1 Introduction 68
5.2 Multi-Tenancy 68
5.3 Customization 69
5.3.1 Web Tier: User Interface 70
5.3.2 Business Tier 71
5.3.3 Data Tier 72
5.3.4 Reports 77
5.3.5 Abilities to Choose Functions at Fine Granular Level 77
5.4 Scaling (Auto-Scaling and Auto-Provisioning) 78
5.5 Operational and Billing Support Services 79
5.6 Software Upgrades and Maintenance 80
 Contents vii

5.7 Maintenance of Database 81

5.8 Efficient Multi-Tenancy 81
5.9 SaaS Architecture is Unique 81
5.10 Summary 81

6 Cloud Compatibility Measure 83

6.1 Introduction 84
6.2 Motivation to Come Up with Cloud Compatibility Measure 84
6.3 Definition of ‘Cloud Compatibility’ 85
6.4 SaaS (Solutions) Maturity Model 85
6.5 SaaS Maturity Continuum Scale 88
6.6 Cloud Compatibility Measure 89
6.6.1 Procedure to Set Up the ‘Cloud Compatibility Measuring Scale’ 89
6.6.2 Ideal Values for Characteristics 101
6.6.3 Case Study – Measures for Two Products of Similar Functionalities 103
6.7 Combined Discussion about All the Three ‘Cloud Compatibility Measures’ 105
6.8 Summary 106

7 Architecting SaaS Solutions for Cloud Using Semi-Cloud Compatible SBBs 107
7.1 Introduction 108
7.2 Case Study 108
7.2.1 Introduction to Case Study 108
7.2.2 Description of Customer 109
7.2.3 Customers’ Requirements 110
7.2.4 Solutions Implications and Constraints 110
7.2.5 Case Model 111
7.3 Architecting Solution 112
7.3.1 Building Business Capabilities for a Group of Enterprises 112
7.3.2 Calibrating COTS against Cloud Compatibility Criteria 113
7.3.3 Key Challenges and Solutions in Finalizing SBBs 114
7.3.4 Security Requirements and Solutions to the Final Solution 115
7.4 Summary of Cloud-Based SaaS Solution 115
7.4.1 Deployment Architecture for Minimum Usage 115
7.4.2 Evolving Deployment Architecture 116
7.4.3 Size Software for Scalability 117
7.4.4 Determining Scaling Algorithms 117
7.5 Other Routine Steps for Implementing the Solution 118
7.6 Less Cloud-Ready Software Costs More for Per-User/Time 119
7.7 Summary 119
viii Contents

8 Architecting Cloud SaaS Solutions with Cloud Non-Compatible Products 121

8.1 Introduction 122
8.2 Classification of Solutions Using Not-at-All Cloud Compatible Products 122
8.3 Some General Strategies 124
8.4 Case Study 127
8.4.1 Use Case 1 127
8.4.2 Use Case 2 128
8.4.3 Some Common Observations 128
8.4.4 Solution Description 129
8.5 Summary 132

9 Architecting Cloud Compatible SaaS Software Products 133

9.1 Introduction 134
9.2 Cloud SaaS Product Architecture Development Methodology 136
9.3 Drivers Influencing Architecture of Cloud SaaS Products 136
9.4 Characteristics Required for Cloud-SaaS-Products’ Architecture 137
9.5 Selection of Basic Architecture for Cloud Compatible SaaS Product 139
9.6 Starting Points for Architecting Projects 140
9.6.1 Starting from CCRA for SaaS 140
9.6.2 Starting from Functional Requirements of Cloud SaaS Product 142
9.7 Distributed Applications Architecture 143
9.7.1 Tier-Wise Specific Points Relevant to Architecture of Cloud SaaS 143
9.7.2 Architecting to Scale the Application 149
9.7.3 Service Orientation of Entire Product Architecture 151
9.8 Identity and Access Management 151
9.9 Transaction-less vs Transaction-intensive Products 153
9.10 Efficient Multi-tenancy 153
9.11 Infrastructure Softwares’ Architectures for SaaS Solutions 153
9.12 Deployment Architecture Basics for Cloud SaaS Products 154
9.13 Future Direction 154
9.14 Summary 155

10 Cloud Computing Reference Architecture 157

10.1 Introduction 158
10.1.1 Review Bias 158
10.1.2 What Does CCRA Bring to Table for Solution Architects? 160
10.2 Cloud Computing Architectures Are Service-Oriented Architectures 161
10.2.1 Important Aspects of Cloud (SaaS) Services 161
10.2.2 Cloud Reference Architecture Derives Experience from
SOA in Addressing these Aspects 163
 Contents ix

10.3 A Quick Summary of the SOA RA 163

10.4 Using the SOA RA with the CCRA 165
10.5 CCRA – Architecture Overview Diagram 167
10.5.1 Roles of CCRA 167
10.5.2 Architectural Elements for Each of These Three Major Roles 168
10.6 Architectural Principles and Related Guidance 175
10.7 Comparison of CCRAs of IBMTM, MicrosoftTM and HPTM[25]176
10.8 Summary 180

11 Architecting for Security in Cloud SaaS Software 181

11.1 Introduction 182
11.2 Segments of Security 182
11.3 Security Architecture for Cloud SaaS 182
11.4 Security as an Aspect 183
11.5 Building Security within SaaS Software: Some Implementation Tips 185
11.6 Summary 186

Abbreviations  187

References189

Keyword Taxonomy Through Semantic Tree 192

Key Words Taxonomy 195

Index197
Preface

In Architecting Cloud SaaS Software: Solutions or Products, I have presented specific engineering
insights that are required to architect and engineer cloud SaaS. By this, I imply that I have
included new and emerging engineering knowledge relating to cloud SaaS architecture apart
from the ones used for architecting hitherto conventional software. The book focuses on this
additional information, which is only the beginning of a foray to the exciting field of cloud
computing. It compiles the approaches used to create software solutions (and products) that
can run as multi-tenanted single instance software in cloud platforms. Thus, it shall be a useful
text to anyone who wants to become a specialist in this niche area of architecting cloud SaaS.
It is common knowledge that the need to execute software on public, private or hybrid
clouds created a necessity to architect software differently. However, the important question
is whether the additional knowledge required to architect this class of software is essential
for all software professionals or only for those who specialize in developing cloud SaaS
software. The answer to this question lies in the answer to another intriguing poser: how long
will cloud technology last? In other words, if the cloud is going to stay here forever, there is
little option for any IT professional to skip acquiring this knowledge. Cloud pervades the
industry in one form or another; hence, this knowledge becomes indispensible. Infrastructure
as a Service (IaaS) is one of the first cloud based value providing solutions that most
companies acquire; IaaS may be implemented within the boundary of an enterprise, though
many companies may be less than willing to use public or hybrid clouds for their regular
business-processing needs. Hence, even regular business solutions need to be provided on
IaaS platform (within the enterprise boundary) and need to be multi-tenanted because of the
various advantages it provides. Thus, the concepts covered in this book will only get further
refined and enhanced, and continue to be relevant for the future. Forthcoming software will
not be written ignoring specific characteristics such as multi-tenancy for hosting them in
cloud platforms. The theory and ideas discussed in the book will go a long way to help those
who wish to have a sustained career in the IT field.
This book has been written from a practical perspective with case studies being used
to explain most of the concepts for the benefit of IT professionals who engineer, architect or
design cloud SaaS. Technical leads, architects, designers, software engineers and software
developers also stand to benefit from this book. Those who are into Marketing can read
Chapters 1, 3 and 4 as these will be of immediate use to them and help them to understand
and use accurately the taxonomy associated with cloud computing. Project managers and
practice heads can recommend this book for their engineering team. They too shall benefit
by reading Chapter 1 to use the taxonomies of this field very accurately. Chapter 3 introduces
more taxonomies; this chapter is recommended to all. The architecting project methodology
discussed in chapter 2, will prove to be useful since it helps to adopt and monitor architecting
projects, although that is not the focus of the contents of this book.
xii Preface

Chapter 4 describes, step by step, the procedure for conventional software to be

architected for IaaS cloud platform – be it public or private. Thus the chapter is useful to
all those who are currently providing software solutions on the IaaS platform irrespective
of whether or not they are keen to develop a skill in multi-tenanted cloud compatible SaaS
software.
Professionals in marketing, project managers and non-hands on CxOs, who want to
know more beyond introductory material on cloud computing found in Chapter 1, can read
Chapter 5 on Characteristics of Cloud SaaS Software and Chapter 6 on Cloud Compatibility
Measure. These chapters reveal the difference between conventional software and the cloud
compatible one. They also provide measures to monitor the extent to which the software
being developed in your projects is cloud compatible. These parameters by which one can
define, measure and monitor ‘cloud compatibility’ are unique and not found in any other
book of my knowledge. Thus, the chapters of this book will be useful to:
a. the sales and marketing team to identify pre-sale solutions
b. project managers and tech leads to monitor the compatibility of their end product
architecture to the Cloud.
There are many knowledge barriers for aspiring professionals who want to enter into
this field of architecting cloud SaaS. The subject requires advanced knowledge from at least
three different fields: architecting software, architecting methodology such as The Open
Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) and a strong design and engineering knowledge
of distributed computing. A typical engineer who designs object-oriented software can
comfortably read this book. The book has useful references that will help the reader to get
over difficulties, if any, in understanding some of the concepts. Those who seriously practice
architecting cloud SaaS can consider employing TOGAF as architecting methodology.
Chapter 2 gives a method of tailoring TOGAF, the general purpose architecting methodology,
to suit to the specific purpose of architecting cloud compatible SaaS. I recommend reading
Chapter 2 in the second pass rather than the first one. Knowing TOGAF will be an advantage
in getting the best out of this chapter.
Along with Chapter 4, Chapters 7, 8 and 9 forms a set and it is the core of this book.
As suggested by the title of these chapters, they cover the principles that govern the
architecture of cloud-compatible SaaS solutions or products, using currently available non-
or semi- cloud-compatible products. While customers look for highly cloud-compatible
solutions, it is disappointing when component software that needs to be used for solution
is not cloud compatible. That is the reality faced by today’s practising engineers in real-life
architecting projects. Keeping this reality in mind, Chapters 7, 8 and 9 have been written to
provide direct help to the practising engineers. The topics covered in these chapters should
come in handy in their projects.
Chapter 10 reviews one of the standards for architecture of the cloud platform.
Although this chapter can be read in the second pass, the theory covered here is used in
explaining concepts in other chapters. Tailoring generic standards to the specific purpose of
architecting cloud SaaS is from the practice point of view and another original contribution
in this book.
 Preface xiii

Users are concerned not so much about the challenges in cloud compatible SaaS
development and the solutions the technology offers, as they are about the security aspects
of cloud computing. I do not think that a chapter on security can provide all the answers.
As security in cloud is a vast and specialized field, it needs elaborate treatment in a separate
book. Chapter 11 is just a preliminary and does not intend to cover any aspect in depth.
The illustration given below suggests an effective method to read this book quickly
and profit from it in each pass. Each horizontal listing of chapters gives one logical group
of chapters. In each pass, readers can read the set of chapters in that level. Traverse from
top to bottom in that order, one level at a time.

Recommended reading sequence for

software professionals

Start Chapter 1 Chapter 3 Chapter 4

Reading Pass 2 Chapter 5 Chapter 6

Reading Pass 3 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9

Reading Pass 4 Chapter 10 Chapter 11

Reading Pass 5 Chapter 2

In the following table, I have given my recommendation on who can read what chapters
to gain maximum benefit.

Chapter Software professionals, Tech leads Sales and marketing Non-hands on

number architects, designers and project and customer-facing CxOs
and engineers managers people
1    
2 
3    
4   (optional)
5    
6    
7 
8 
9 
10  (optional)
11   
xiv Preface

In a rapidly growing field such as cloud computing, it is a great challenge for any
author including me to keep the contents of the book in sync with current developments.
I am sure that the contents of this book will serve as a sound basis to understand later-day
developments in the field. I wish all readers the best to succeed in this exciting field of cloud
computing.

Acknowledgements
I thank Prof. R. Nagarajan, retired, formerly professor of Computer Science, IIT Madras,
Chennai, without whose help this book could not have been conceived. A mere ‘Thank you’
appears to be far too less a term than what I would like to convey. He not only encouraged me
to write this book but also reviewed the manuscripts and drafts several times and provided
valuable inputs. The ‘semantic tree’ found at the end of the book is wholly his novel idea.
After his full tenure at IITM, he has also spent 14 years in the industry at various techno-
solution spaces. Thus, a combination of his academic and industrial experience helped in
his powerful review comments and paved the way to tone up this book to its present shape.
While I have made every effort to present error-free content, it is quite possible that a few
mistakes may have crept in inadvertently. If the reader finds any such inaccuracies, the fault
is entirely mine as an effect of having ignored some of Prof. Nagarajan’s valuable comments.
I am obliged to Mr S. Murali, Vice President, Scope International Ltd, Standard
Chartered Bank, for his suggestions which helped to make the book’s contents reach junior
professionals in the industry and also helped the book to reach .Net professionals apart from
its intent for Java professionals.
I am indebted to my family members, especially my wife, but for whose good, strong,
unfailing and ubiquitous support, this book would not have been possible.
Thanks are also to the new generation gadgets and apps, which lessened the writing
burden. Text-to-voice for proof-reading, voice-to-text for dictating the manuscript are definitely
worth mentioning. These gadgets helped, in no small measure, to mitigate this arduous task of
writing two hundred pages of technical content and reviewing them several times.
Last but not the least, I am grateful to all those who have helped me in several ways to
make this book possible.

Sankaran Prithviraj
Discovering Diverse Content Through
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end here proposed requires. But having, in the foregoing
observation, sufficiently explained the nature of ancient criticism, he
enters on the subject treated of from ver. 91 to 118, with a sublime
description of its end; which was to illustrate the beauties of the
best writers, in order to excite others to an emulation of their
excellence. From the raptures which these ideas inspire, the poet is
brought back, by the follies of modern criticism, now before his eyes,
to reflect on its base degeneracy. And as the restoring the art to its
original purity and splendour is the great purpose of this poem, he
first takes notice of those, who seem not to understand that nature
is exhaustless; that new models of good writing may be produced in
every age; and consequently, that new rules may be formed from
these models, in the same manner as the old critics formed theirs,
which was, from the writings of the ancient poets: but men wanting
art and ability to form these new rules, were content to receive and
file up for use, the old ones of Aristotle, Quintilian, Longinus,
Horace, &c. with the same vanity and boldness that apothecaries
practise, with their doctors' bills: and then rashly applying them to
new originals (cases which they did not hit) it was no more in their
power, than in their inclination, to imitate the candid practice of the
ancients when

The gen'rous critic fanned the poet's fire,

And taught the world with reason to admire.

For, as ignorance, when joined with humility, produces stupid

admiration, on which account it is commonly observed to be the
mother of devotion and blind homage, so when joined with vanity
(as it always is in bad critics) it gives birth to every iniquity of
impudent abuse and slander. See an example (for want of a better)
in a late ridiculous and now forgotten thing, called the Life of
Socrates;[298] where the head of the author (as a man of wit
observed) has just made a shift to do the office of a camera
obscura, and represent things in an inverted order, himself above,
and Sprat, Rollin, Voltaire, and every other writer of reputation,
below.
Ver. 118. You then whose judgment, &c.] He comes next to the
ancient poets, the other and more intimate commentators of nature,
and shows, from ver. 117 to 141, that the study of these must
indispensably follow that of the ancient critics, as they furnish us
with what the critics, who only give us general rules, cannot supply,
while the study of a great original poet, in

His fable, subject, scope in ev'ry page:

Religion, country, genius of his age;

will help us to those particular rules which only can conduct us safely
through every considerable work we undertake to examine; and
without which, we may cavil indeed, as the poet truly observes, but
can never criticise. We might as well suppose that Vitruvius's book
alone would make a perfect judge of architecture, without the
knowledge of some great master-piece of science, such as the
rotunda at Rome, or the temple of Minerva at Athens, as that
Aristotle's should make a perfect judge of wit, without the study of
Homer and Virgil. These therefore he principally recommends to
complete the critic in his art. But as the latter of these poets has, by
superficial judges, been considered rather as a copier of Homer, than
an original from nature, our author obviates that common error, and
shows it to have arisen (as often error does) from a truth, viz., that
Homer and nature were the same; that the ambitious young poet,
though he scorned to stoop at anything short of nature, when he
came to understand this great truth, had the prudence to
contemplate nature in the place where she was seen to most
advantage, collected in all her charms in the clear mirror of Homer.
Hence it would follow, that though Virgil studied nature, yet the
vulgar reader would believe him to be a copier of Homer; and
though he copied Homer, yet the judicious reader would see him to
be an imitator of nature, the finest praise which any one, who came
after Homer, could receive.
Ver. 141. Some beauties yet no precepts can declare, &c.] Our
author, in these two general directions for studying nature and her
commentators, having considered poetry as it is, or may be reduced
to rule, lest this should be mistaken as sufficient to attain perfection
either in writing or judging, he proceeds from ver. 140 to 201, to
point up to those sublimer beauties which rules will never reach, nor
enable us either to execute or taste,—beauties, which rise so high
above all precept as not even to be described by it; but being
entirely the gift of heaven, art and reason have no further share in
them than just to regulate their operations. These sublimities of
poetry (like the mysteries of religion, some of which are above
reason, and some contrary to it) may be divided into two sorts, such
as are above rules, and such as are contrary to them.
Ver. 146. If, where the rules, &c.] The first sort our author describes
from ver. 145 to 152, and shows that where a great beauty is in the
poet's view, which no stated rules will authorise him how to reach,
there, as the purpose of rules is only to attain an end like this, a
lucky licence will supply the place of them: nor can the critic fairly
object, since this licence, for the reason given above, has the proper
force and authority of a rule.
Ver. 152. Great wits sometimes may gloriously offend, &c.] He
describes next the second sort, the beauties against rule. And even
here, as he observes, from ver. 151 to 161, the offence is so
glorious, and the fault so sublime, that the true critic will not dare
either to censure or reform them. Yet still the poet is never to
abandon himself to his imagination. The rules laid down for his
conduct in this respect are these: 1. That though he transgress the
letter of some one particular precept, yet that he be still careful to
adhere to the end or spirit of them all, which end is the creation of
one uniform perfect whole. And 2. That he have, in each instance,
the authority of the dispensing power of the ancients to plead for
him. These rules observed, this licence will be seldom used, and only
when he is compelled by need, which will disarm the critic, and
screen the offender from his laws.
Ver. 169. I know there are, &c.] But as some modern critics have
pretended to say, that this last reason is only justifying one fault by
another, our author goes on, from ver. 168 to 181, to vindicate the
ancients; and to show that this presumptuous thought, as he calls it,
proceeds from mere ignorance,—as where their partiality will not let
them see that this licence is sometimes necessary for the symmetry
and proportion of a perfect whole, in the light, and from the point,
wherein it must be viewed; or where their haste will not give them
time to observe, that a deviation from rule is for the sake of
attaining some great and admirable purpose. These observations are
further useful, as they tend to give modern critics an humbler
opinion of their own abilities, and a higher of the authors they
undertake to criticise. On which account he concludes with a fine
reproof of their use of that common proverb perpetually in the
mouths of the critics, "quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus;"
misunderstanding the sense of Horace, and taking quandoque for
aliquando:

Those oft are stratagems which errors seem,

Nor is it Homer nods, but we that dream.

Ver. 181. Still green with bays, &c.] But now fired with the name of
Homer, and transported with the contemplation of those beauties
which a cold critic can neither see nor conceive, the poet, from ver.
180 to 201, breaks out into a rapturous salutation of the rare felicity
of those few ancients who have risen superior over time and
accidents; and disdaining, as it were, any longer to reason with his
critics, offers this as the surest confutation of their censures. Then
with the humility of a suppliant at the shrine of immortals, and the
sublimity of a poet participating of their fire, he turns again to these
ancient worthies, and apostrophises their Manes:
 Hail, bards triumphant! &c.

Ver. 200. T' admire superior sense, and doubt their own!] This line
concludes the first division of the poem; in which we see the subject
of the first and second part, and likewise the connexion they have
with one another. It serves likewise to introduce the second. The
effect of studying the ancients, as here recommended, would be the
admiration of their superior sense, which, if it will not of itself
dispose moderns to a diffidence of their own (one of the great uses,
as well as natural fruits of that study), our author, to help forward
their modesty, in his second part shows them (in a regular deduction
of the causes and effects of wrong judgment) their own bright
image and amiable turn of mind.
Ver. 201. Of all the causes, &c.] Having, in the first part, delivered
rules for perfecting the art of criticism, the second is employed in
explaining the impediments to it. The order of the two parts was
well adjusted. For the causes of wrong judgment being pride,
superficial learning, a bounded capacity, and partiality, they to whom
this part is principally addressed, would not readily be brought either
to see the malignity of the causes, or to own themselves concerned
in the effects, had not the author previously both enlightened and
convinced them, by the foregoing observations, on the vastness of
art, and narrowness of wit; the extensive study of human nature and
antiquity; and the characters of ancient poetry and criticism; the
natural remedies to the four epidemic disorders he is now
endeavouring to redress.
Ver. 201. Of all the causes, &c.] The first cause of wrong judgment is
pride. He judiciously begins with this, from ver. 200 to 215, as on
other accounts, so on this, that it is the very thing which gives
modern criticism its character, whose complexion is abuse and
censure. He calls it the vice of fools, by which term is not meant
those to whom nature has given no judgment (for he is here
speaking of what misleads the judgment), but those to whom
learning and study have given more erudition than taste, as appears
from the happy similitude of an ill-nourished body, where the same
words which express the cause, express likewise the nature of pride:

For as in bodies, thus in souls, we find,

What wants in blood and spirits, swelled with wind.

It is the business of reason, he tells us, to dispel the cloud in which

pride involves the mind: but the mischief is, that the rays of reason,
diverted by self-love, sometime gild this cloud, instead of dispelling
it. So that the judgment, by false lights reflected back upon itself, is
still apt to be a little dazzled, and to mistake its object. He therefore
advises to call in still more helps:

Trust not yourself; but your defects to know,

Make use of ev'ry friend and ev'ry foe.

Both the beginning and conclusion of this precept are remarkable.

The question is of the means to subdue pride. He directs the critic to
begin with a distrust of himself; and this is modesty, the first
mortification of pride: and then to seek the assistance of others, and
make use even of an enemy; and this is humility, the last
mortification of pride: for when a man can once bring himself to
submit to profit by an enemy, he has either already subdued his
vanity, or is in a fair way of so doing.
Ver. 215. A little learning, &c.] We must here remark the poet's skill
in his disposition of the causes obstructing true judgment. Each
general cause which is laid down first, has its own particular cause in
that which follows. Thus, the second cause of wrong judgment,
superficial learning, is what occasions that critical pride, which he
places first.
Ver. 216. Drink deep, &c.] Nature and learning are the pole-stars of
all true criticism: but pride obstructs the view of nature; and a
smattering of letters makes us insensible of our ignorance. To avoid
this ridiculous situation, the poet, from ver. 214 to 233, advises,
either to drink deep, or not to drink at all; for the least sip at this
fountain is enough to make a bad critic, while even a moderate
draught can never make a good one. And yet the labours and
difficulties of drinking deep are so great, that a young author, "fired
with ideas of fair Italy," and ambitious to snatch a palm from Rome,
here engages in an undertaking like that of Hannibal: finely
illustrated by the similitude of an inexperienced traveller penetrating
through the Alps.
Ver. 233. A perfect judge, &c.] The third cause of wrong judgment is
a narrow capacity; the natural cause of the foregoing defect,
acquiescence in superficial learning. This bounded capacity our
author shows, from ver. 232 to 384, betrays itself two ways: in its
judgment both of the matter, and the manner of the work criticised.
Of the matter, in judging by parts, or in having one favourite part to
a neglect of all the rest. Of the manner, in confining men's regard
only to conceit, or language, or numbers. This is our poet's order,
and we shall follow him as it leads us, only just observing one
general beauty which runs through this part of the poem; it is,—that
under each of these heads of wrong judgment, he has intermixed
excellent precepts for the right. We shall take notice of them as they
occur.
He exposes the folly of judging by parts very artfully, not by a direct
description of that sort of critic, but of his opposite, a perfect judge,
&c. Nor is the elegance of this conversion less than the art; for as, in
poetical style, one word or figure is still put for another, in order to
catch new lights from distant images, and reflect them back upon
the subject in hand, so in poetical matter one person or description
may be commodiously employed for another, with the same
advantage of representation. It is observable that our author makes
it almost the necessary consequence of judging by parts, to find
fault: and this not without much discernment: for the several parts
of a complete whole, when seen only singly, and known only
independently, must always have the appearance of irregularity,—
often of deformity; because the poet's design being to create a
resultive beauty from the artful assemblage of several various parts
into one natural whole, those parts must be fashioned with regard to
their mutual relations in the stations they occupy in that whole, from
whence the beauty required is to arise; but that regard will occasion
so unreducible a form in each part, when considered singly, as to
present a very mis-shapen form.
Ver. 253. Whoever thinks a faultless piece to see,] He shows next,
from ver. 252 to 263, that to fix our censure on single parts, though
they happen to want an exactness consistent enough with their
relation to the rest, is even then very unjust: and for these reasons:
—1. Because it implies an expectation of a faultless piece, which is a
vain fancy. 2. Because no more is to be expected of any work than
that it fairly attains its end. But the end may be attained, and yet
these trivial faults committed: therefore, in spite of such faults, the
work will merit that praise that is due to everything which attains its
end. 3. Because sometimes a great beauty is not to be procured, nor
a notorious blemish to be avoided, but by suffering one of these
minute and trivial errors. 4. And lastly, because the general neglect
of them is a praise, as it is the indication of a genius, attentive to
greater matters.
Ver 263. Most critics, fond of some subservient art, &c.] II. The
second way in which a narrow capacity, as it relates to the matter,
shows itself, is judging by a favourite part. The author has placed
this, from ver. 262 to 285, after the other of judging by parts, with
great propriety, it being indeed a natural consequence of it. For
when men have once left the whole to turn their attention to the
separate parts, that regard and reverence due only to a whole is
fondly transferred to one or other of its parts. And thus we see, that
heroes themselves, as well as hero-makers, even kings, as well as
poets and critics, when they chance never to have had, or long to
have lost the idea of that which is the only legitimate object of their
office, the care and conservation of the whole, are wont to devote
themselves to the service of some favourite part, whether it be love
of money, military glory, despotic power, &c. And all, as our author
says on this occasion,

to one loved folly sacrifice.

This general misconduct much recommends that maxim in good

poetry and politics, to give a principal attention to the whole,—a
maxim which our author has elsewhere shown to be equally true
likewise in morals and religion, as being founded in the order of
things; for if we examine we shall find the misconduct here
complained of to arise from this imbecility of our nature, that the
mind must always have something to rest upon, to which the
passions and affections may be interestingly directed. Nature
prompts us to seek it in the most worthy objects; and reason points
us to a whole, or system: but the false lights which the passions
hold out confound and dazzle us: we stop short; and, before we get
to a whole, take up with some part, which thenceforth becomes our
favourite.
Ver. 285. Thus critics of less judgment than caprice,
Curious not knowing, not exact but nice,
Form short ideas, &c.]
2. He concludes his observations on those two sorts of judges by
parts, with this general reflection:—The curious not knowing are the
first sort, who judge by parts, and with a microscopic sight (as he
says elsewhere) examine bit by bit. The not exact but nice, are the
second, who judge by a favourite part, and talk of a whole to cover
their fondness for a part, as philosophers do of principles, in order to
obtrude notions and opinions in their stead. But the fate common to
both is, to be governed by caprice and not by judgment, and
consequently to form short ideas, or to have ideas short of truth;
though the latter sort, through a fondness to their favourite part,
imagine that it comprehends the whole in epitome, as the famous
hero of La Mancha, mentioned just before, used to maintain, that
knight errantry comprised within itself the quintessence of all
science, civil, military, and religious.
Ver. 289. Some to conceit alone, &c.] We come now to that second
sort of bounded capacity, which betrays itself in its judgment on the
manner of the work criticised. And this our author prosecutes from
ver. 288 to 384. These are again subdivided into divers classes.
Ver. 289. Some to conceit alone, &c.] The first, from ver. 288 to 305,
are those who confine their attention solely to conceit or wit. And
here again the critic by parts, offends doubly in the manner, just as
he did in the matter; for he not only confines his attention to a part,
when it should be extended to the whole, but he likewise judges
falsely of that part. And this, as the other, is unavoidable, the parts
in the manner bearing the same close relation to the whole, that the
parts in the matter do; to which whole, the ideas of this critic have
never yet extended. Hence it is, that our author, speaking here of
those who confine their attention solely to conceit or wit, describes
the distinct species of true and false wit, because they not only
mistake a wrong disposition of true wit for a right, but likewise false
wit for true. He describes false wit first, from ver. 288 to 297,

Some to conceit alone, &c.,

where the reader may observe our author's address in representing,

in a description of false wit, the false disposition of the true; as the
critic by parts is apt to fall into both these errors.
He next describes true wit, from ver. 296 to 305,

True wit is nature to advantage dressed, &c.

And here again the reader may observe the same beauty; not only
an explanation of true wit, but likewise of the right disposition of it,
which the poet illustrates, as he did the wrong, by ideas taken from
the art of painting, in the theory of which he was exquisitely skilled.
Ver. 305. Others for language, &c.] He proceeds secondly to those
contracted critics, whose whole concern turns upon language, and
shows, from ver. 304 to 337, that this quality, where it holds the
principal place in a work, deserves no commendation:—1. Because it
excludes qualities more essential. And when the abounding verbiage
has choked and suffocated the sense, the writer will be obliged to
varnish over the mischief with all the false colouring of eloquence. 2.
Secondly, because the critic who busies himself with this quality
alone, is unable to make a right judgment of it; because true
expression is only the dress of thought, and so must be perpetually
varied according to the subject, and manner of treating it. But those
who never concern themselves with the sense, can form no
judgment of the correspondence between that and the language.

Expression is the dress of thought, and still

Appears more decent, as more suitable, &c.

Now as these critics are ignorant of this correspondence, their whole

judgment in language is reduced to verbal criticism, or the
examination of single words; and generally those which are most to
his taste, are (for an obvious reason) such as smack most of
antiquity, on which account our author has bestowed a little raillery
upon it; concluding with a short and proper direction concerning the
use of words, so far as regards their novelty and ancientry.
Ver. 337. But most by numbers judge, &c.] The last sort are those,
from ver. 336 to 384, whose ears are attached only to the harmony
of a poem. Of which they judge as ignorantly and as perversely as
the other sort did of the eloquence, and for the same reason. Our
author first describes that false harmony with which they are so
much captivated; and shows that it is wretchedly flat and unvaried:
for

Smooth or rough, with them, is right or wrong.

He then describes the true: 1. As it is in itself, constant; with a

happy mixture of strength and sweetness, in contradiction to the
roughness and flatness of false harmony: and 2. As it is varied in
compliance to the subject, where the sound becomes an echo to the
sense, so far as is consistent with the preservation of numbers, in
contradiction to the monotony of false harmony. Of this he gives us,
in the delivery of his precepts, four beautiful examples of
smoothness, roughness, slowness, and rapidity. The first use of this
correspondence of the sound to the sense, is to aid the fancy in
acquiring a perfecter and more lively image of the thing represented.
A second and nobler, is to calm and subdue the turbulent and selfish
passions, and to raise and warm the beneficent, which he illustrates
in the famous adventure of Timotheus and Alexander, where, in
referring to Mr. Dryden's Ode on that subject, he turns it to a high
compliment on his favourite poet.
Ver. 384. Avoid extremes, &c.] Our author is now come to the last
cause of wrong judgment, partiality,—the parent of the immediately
preceding cause, a bounded capacity, nothing so much narrowing
and contracting the mind as prejudices entertained for or against
things or persons. This, therefore, as the main root of all the
foregoing, he prosecutes at large, from ver. 383 to 474. First, to ver.
394, he previously exposes that capricious turn of mind, which, by
running into extremes, either of praise or dispraise, lays the
foundation of an habitual partiality. He cautions, therefore, both
against one and the other; and with reason; for excess of praise is
the mark of a bad taste; and excess of censure, of a bad digestion.
Ver. 394. Some foreign writers, &c.] Having explained the disposition
of mind which produces an habitual partiality, he proceeds to expose
this partiality in all the shapes in which it appears both amongst the
unlearned and the learned.
I. In the unlearned it is seen, first, in an unreasonable fondness for,
or aversion to, our own or foreign, to ancient or modern writers. And
as it is the mob of unlearned readers he is here speaking of, he
exposes their folly in a very apposite similitude:

Thus wit, like faith, by each man is applied

To one small sect, and all are damned beside.

But he shows, from ver. 396 to 408, that these critics have as wrong
notions of reason as those bigots have of God; for that genius is not
confined to times or climates; but, as the common gift of nature, is
extended throughout all ages and countries; that indeed this
intellectual light, like the material light of the sun, may not shine at
all times, and in every place with equal splendour, but be sometimes
clouded with popular ignorance, and sometimes again eclipsed by
the discountenance of the great; yet it shall still recover itself, and,
by breaking through the strongest of these impediments, manifest
the eternity of its nature.
Ver. 408. Some ne'er advance a judgment of their own,] A second
instance of unlearned partiality is (as he shows from ver. 407 to 424)
men's going always along with the cry, as having no fixed nor well-
grounded principles whereon to raise any judgment of their own. A
third is reverence for names, of which sort, as he well observes, the
worst and vilest are the idolizers of names of quality; whom
therefore he stigmatises as they deserve. Our author's temper as
well as his judgment is here seen, in throwing this species of
partiality amongst the unlearned critics. His affection for letters
would not suffer him to conceive, that any learned critic could ever
fall into so low a prostitution.
Ver. 424. The vulgar thus—As oft the learned—] II. He comes in the
second place, from ver. 423 to 452, to consider the instances of
partiality in the learned. 1. The first is singularity. For, as want of
principles, in the unlearned, necessitates them to rest on the
common judgment as always right, so adherence to false principles
(that is, to notions of their own) mislead the learned into the other
extreme of supposing the common judgment always wrong. And as,
before, our author compared those to bigots, who made true faith to
consist in believing after others, so he compares these to
schismatics, who make it to consist in believing as no one ever
believed before, which folly he marks with a lively stroke of humour
in the turn of the thought:

So schismatics the plain believers quit,

And are but damned for having too much wit.

2. The second is novelty. And as this proceeds sometimes from

fondness, sometimes from vanity, he compares the one to the
passion for a mistress, and the other to the pride of being in fashion;
but the excuse common to both is, the daily improvement of their
judgment:

Ask them the cause; they're wiser still they say;

And still to-morrow's wiser than to-day.

Now as this is a plausible pretence for their inconstancy, and our

author has himself afterwards approved of it, as a remedy against
obstinacy and pride, where he says, ver. 570,

But you with pleasure own your errors past,

And make each day a critique on the last,

he has been careful, by the turn of the expression in this place, to

show the difference between the pretence and the remedy. For time,
considered only as duration, vitiates as frequently as it improves.
Therefore to expect wisdom as the necessary attendant of length of
days, unrelated to long experience, is vain and delusive. This he
illustrates by a remarkable example, where we see time, instead of
becoming wiser, destroying good letters, to substitute school divinity
in their place; the genius of which kind of learning, the character of
its professors, and the fate, which, sooner or later, always attends
whatsoever is wrong or false, the poet sums up in those four lines:

Faith, gospel, all, seemed made to be disputed, &c.

And in conclusion he observes, that perhaps this mischief, from love

of novelty, might not be so great, did it not, along with the critic,
infect the writer likewise, who, when he finds his readers disposed to
take ready wit on the standard of current folly, never troubles
himself to think of better payment.
Ver. 452. Some valuing those of their own side or mind, &c.] 3. The
third and last instance of partiality in the learned, is party and
faction, which is considered from ver. 451 to 474, where he shows
how men of this turn deceive themselves, when they load a writer of
their own side with commendation. They fancy they are paying
tribute to merit, when they are only sacrificing to self-love. But this
is not the worst. He further shows, that this party spirit has often
very ill effects on science itself, while, in support of faction, it labours
to depress some rising genius, that was, perhaps, raised by nature
to enlighten his age and country. By which he would insinuate, that
all the baser and viler passions seek refuge, and find support in
party madness.
Ver. 474. Be thou the first, &c.] The poet having now gone through
the last cause of wrong judgment, and the root of all the rest,
partiality, and ended his remarks upon it with a detection of the two
rankest kinds, those which arise out of party rage and envy, takes
the occasion, which this affords him, of closing his second division in
the most graceful manner, from ver. 473 to 560, by concluding from
the premises, and calling upon the true critic to be careful of his
charge, which is the protection and support of wit; for, the defence
of it from malevolent censure is its true protection, and the
illustration of its beauties, is its true support.
He first shows, the critic ought to do this service without loss of
time, and on these motives:—1. Out of regard to himself, for there is
some merit in giving the world notice of an excellence, but little or
none, in pointing, like an index, to the beaten road of admiration. 2.
Out of regard to the poem, for the short duration of modern works
requires that they should begin to live betimes. He compares the life
of modern wit (which in a changeable dialect, must soon pass
away), and that of the ancient (which survives in an universal
language), to the difference between the patriarchal age and our
own, and observes, that while the ancient writings live for ever, as it
were, in brass and marble, the modern are but like paintings, which,
of how masterly a hand soever, have no sooner gained their
requisite perfection by the softening and ripening of their tints,
which they do in a very few years, but they begin to fade and die
away. 3. Lastly, our author shows that the critic ought in justice to
do this service out of regard to the poet, when he considers the
slender dowry the muse brings along with her. In youth it is only a
vain and short-lived pleasure; and in maturer years, an accession of
care and labour, in proportion to the weight of reputation to be
sustained, and of the increase of envy to be opposed: and therefore,
concludes his reasoning on this head with that pathetic and
insinuating address to the critic, from ver. 508 to 526.

Ah! let not learning, &c.

Ver. 526. But if in noble minds some dregs remain, &c.] So far as to
what ought to be the true critic's principal study and employment.
But if the sour critical humour abounds, and must therefore needs
have vent, he directs to its proper object, and shows, from ver. 525
to 556, how it may be innocently and usefully pointed. This is very
observable; our author had made spleen and disdain the
characteristic of the false critic, and yet here supposes them
inherent in the true. But it is done with judgment, and a knowledge
of nature. For as bitterness and astringency in unripe fruits of the
best kind are the foundation and capacity of that high spirit, race,
and flavour which we find in them, when perfectly concocted by the
warmth and influence of the sun, and which, without those qualities,
would gain no more by that influence than only a mellow insipidity,
so spleen and disdain in the true critic, when improved by long study
and experience, ripen into an exactness of judgment and an
elegance of taste, although, in the false critic, lying remote from the
influence of good letters, they remain in all their first offensive
harshness and acerbity. The poet therefore shows how, after the
exaltation of these qualities into their state of perfection, the very
dregs (which, though precipitated, may possibly, on some occasions,
rise and ferment even in a noble mind) may be usefully employed,
that is to say, in branding obscenity and impiety. Of these, he
explains the rise and progress, in a beautiful picture of the different
geniuses of the two reigns of Charles II. and William III. The former
of which gave course to the most profligate luxury; the latter to a
licentious impiety. These are the crimes our author assigns over to
the caustic hand of the critic; but concludes however, from ver. 555
to 560, with this necessary admonition, to take care not to be misled
into unjust censure, either on the one hand, by a pharisaical
niceness, or on the other by a self-consciousness of guilt. And thus
the second division of his Essay ends: the judicious conduct of which
is worthy our observation. The subjects of it are the causes of wrong
judgment. These he derives upwards from cause to cause, till he
brings them to their source, an immoral partiality: for as he had, in
the first part,

traced the Muses upward to their spring,

and shown them to be derived from heaven, and the offspring of

virtue, so hath he here pursued this enemy of the muses, the bad
critic, to his low original, in the arms of his nursing mother
immorality. This order naturally introduces, and at the same time
shows the necessity of, the subject of the third and last division,
which is, on the morals of the critic.
Ver. 560. Learn then, &c.] We enter now on the third part, the
morals of the critic. There seemed a peculiar necessity of inculcating
precepts of this sort to the critic, by reason of that native acerbity so
often found in the profession; of which, a short memorial will soon
convince the reader, and at the same time inform him why our
author has here included all critical morals in candour, modesty, and
good breeding. When, in these latter ages, human learning reared
its head in the West, and its tail, verbal criticism, was of course to
rise with it, the madness of critics presently became so offensive,
that the sober stupidity of the monks might appear the more
tolerable evil. J. Argyropylus, a mercenary Greek, who came to teach
school in Italy after the sacking of Constantinople by the Turk, used
to maintain that Cicero understood neither philosophy nor Greek;
while another of his countrymen, J. Lascaris by name, threatened to
demonstrate that Virgil was no poet. However, these men raised in
the west of Europe an appetite for the Greek language. So that
Hermolaus Barbarus, a noted critic and most passionate admirer of
it, used to boast that he had invoked and raised the devil, about the
meaning of the Aristotelian εντελεχεια. As this man was famous for
his enchantments, so one, whom Balzac speaks of, was as useful to
letters by his revelations, and was wont to say, that the meaning of
such a verse in Persius, no one knew but God and himself. But they
were not all so modest. The celebrated Pomponius Lætus, in excess
of veneration for antiquity, became a real pagan, raised altars to
Romulus, and sacrificed to the gods of Greece. But if the Greeks
cried down Cicero, the Italian critics knew how to support his credit.
Every one has heard of the childish excesses into which the fondness
for being thought Ciceronians carried the most celebrated Italians of
this time. They generally abstained from reading the scripture for
fear of spoiling their style, and Cardinal Bembo used to call the
epistles of St. Paul by the contemptuous name of epistolaccias,—
great overgrown epistles. But Erasmus cured this frenzy in that
masterpiece of good sense, entitled Ciceronianus, for which, as
lunatics treat their physicians, the elder Scaliger insulted him with all
the brutal fury peculiar to his family and profession. His son Joseph
and Salmasius had such endowments of art and nature as might
have made them public blessings; yet how did these savages tear
and worry one another. The choicest of Joseph's flowers of speech
were stercus diaboli, and lutum stercore maceratum. It is true these
were strewn upon his enemies. He treated his friends better; for in a
letter to Thuanus, speaking of two of them, Clavius and Lipsius, he
calls the first "a monster of ignorance," and the other "a slave to the
Jesuits" and an "idiot." But so great was his love of sacred amity,
that he says, at the same time, "I still keep up a correspondence
with him, notwithstanding his idiotry, for it is my principle to be
constant in my friendships.—Je ne reste de lui écrire nonobstant son
idioterie, d'autant que je suis constant en amitié." The character he
gives of his own work, in the same letter, is no less extraordinary:
"Vous vous pouvez assurer que nostre Eusebe sera un tresor des
merveilles de la doctrine chronologique." But this modest account of
his chronology is a trifle in comparison of the just esteem Salmasius
conceived of himself, as Mr. Colomies tells the story: This critic one
day meeting two of his brethren, Messrs. Gaulmin and Maussac, in
the royal library at Paris, Gaulmin, in a virtuous consciousness of
their importance, told the other two that he believed they three
could make head against all the learned in Europe. To which the
great Salmasius fiercely replied, "Do you and Mr. Maussac join
yourselves to all that is learned in the world, and you shall find that I
alone am a match for you all." Vossius tells us that, when Laur. Valla
had snarled at every name of the first order in antiquity, such as
Aristotle, Cicero, and one whom I should have thought this critic was
likeliest to pass by, the redoubtable Priscian, he impiously boasted
that he had arms even against Christ himself. But Codrus Urcæus
went further, and actually used those arms the other only threatened
with. This man while he was preparing some trifling piece of
criticism for the press, had the misfortune to hear his papers were
burned, on which he is reported to have broke out, "Quodnam ego
tantum scelus concepi, O Christe; quem ego tuorum unquam læsi,
ut ita inexpiabili in me odio debaccheris? Audi ea, quæ tibi mentis
compos et ex animo dicam. Si forte, cum ad ultimam vitæ finem
pervenero, supplex accedam ad te oratum, neve audias, neve inter
tuos accipias oro; cum infernis Diis in æternum vitam agere decrevi."
Whereupon, says my author, he quitted the converse of men, threw
himself into the thickest of a forest, and there wore out the
wretched remains of life in all the agonies of despair.
But to return to the poem. This third and last part is in two divisions.
In the first of which, from ver. 559 to 631, our author inculcates the
morals by precept. In the second, from ver. 630 to the end, by
example. His first precept, from ver. 561 to 566, recommends
candour, for its use to the critic, and to the writer criticised.
2. The second, from ver. 565 to 572, recommends modesty, which
manifests itself in these four signs: 1. Silence where it doubts,

Be silent always when you doubt your sense;

2. A seeming diffidence where it knows,

And speak, though sure, with seeming diffidence;

3. A free confession of error where wrong,

But you with pleasure own your errors past;

4. And a constant review and scrutiny even of those opinions which

it still thinks right.

And make each day a critique on the last.

3. The third, from ver. 571 to 584, recommends good-breeding,
which will not force truth dogmatically upon men, as ignorant of it,
but gently insinuates it to them, as not sufficiently attentive to it. But
as men of breeding are apt to fall into two extremes, he prudently
cautions against them. The one is a backwardness in communicating
their knowledge, out of a false delicacy, and for fear of being
thought pedants: the other, and much more common extreme, is a
mean complaisance, which those who are worthy of your advice do
not need, to make it acceptable; for such can best bear reproof in
particular points, who best deserve commendation in general.
Ver. 584. 'Twere well might critics, &c.] The poet having thus
recommended in his general rules of conduct for the judgment,
these three critical virtues to the heart, shows next, from ver. 583 to
631, upon what three sorts of writers these virtues, together with
the advice conveyed under them, would be thrown away; and which
is worse, be repaid with obloquy and scorn. These are the false
critic, the dull man of quality, and the bad poet, each of which
species of incorrigible writers he hath very exactly painted. But
having drawn the last of them at full length, and being always
attentive to the two main branches of his subject, which are, of
writing and judging well, he re-assumes the character of the bad
critic (whom he had touched upon before), to contrast him with the
other; and makes the characteristic common to both, to be a never-
ceasing repetition of their own impertinence.
The poet—still runs on in a raging vein, &c. ver. 606, &c.
The critic—with his own tongue still edifies his ears, 614, &c.
Than which there cannot be an observation more just, or more
grounded on experience.
Ver. 631. But where's the man, &c.] II. The second division of this
last part, which we now come to, is of the morals of critics, by
example. For, having in the first, drawn a picture of the false critic,
at large, he breaks out into an apostrophe, containing an exact and
finished character of the true, which, at the same time, serves for an
easy and proper introduction to this second division. For having
asked, from ver. 630 to 643, Where's the man, &c., he answers,
from ver. 642 to 681, that he was to be found in the happier ages of
Greece and Rome; in the characters of Aristotle and Horace,
Dionysius and Petronius, Quintilian and Longinus, whose several
excellencies he has not only well distinguished, but has contrasted
them with a peculiar elegance. The profound science and logical
method of Aristotle is opposed to the plain common sense of
Horace, conveyed in a natural and familiar negligence; the study and
refinement of Dionysius, to the gay and courtly ease of Petronius;
and the gravity and minuteness of Quintilian, to the vivacity and
general topics of Longinus. Nor has the poet been less careful in
these examples, to point out their eminence in the several critical
virtues he so carefully inculcated in his precepts. Thus in Horace he
particularizes his candour; in Petronius, his good-breeding; in
Quintilian, his free and copious instruction; and in Longinus, his
great and noble spirit.
Ver. 681. Thus long succeeding critics, &c.] The next period in which
the true critic, he tells us, appeared, was at the revival and
restoration of letters in the West. This occasions his giving a short
history, from ver. 682 to 709, of the decline and re-establishment of
arts and sciences in Italy. He shows that they both fell under the
same enemy, despotic power; and that when both had made some
little efforts to recover themselves, they were soon again
overwhelmed by a second deluge of another kind, namely,
superstition; and a calm of dulness finished upon Rome and letters
what the rage of barbarism had begun:

A second deluge learning thus o'er-run,

And the monk finished what the Goth begun.

When things had long remained in this condition, and all hopes of
recovery now seemed desperate, it was a critic, our author shows
us, for the honour of the art he here teaches, who at length broke
the charm of dulness, who dissipated the enchantment, and, like
another Hercules, drove those cowled and hooded serpents from the
Hesperian tree of knowledge, which they had so long guarded from
human approach.
Ver. 697. But see! each Muse, in Leo's golden days,] This presents us
with the second period in which the true critic appeared, of whom
he has given us a complete idea in the single example of Marcus
Hieronymus Vida; for his subject being poetical criticism, for the use
principally of a critical poet, his example is an eminent poetical critic,
who had written of the Art of Poetry in verse.
Ver. 709. But soon by impious arms, &c.] This brings us to the third
period, after learning had travelled still further West, when the arms
of the Emperor, in the sack of Rome by the Duke of Bourbon, had
driven it out of Italy, and forced it to pass the mountains. The
examples he gives in this period, are of Boileau in France, and of the
Lord Roscommon and the Duke of Buckingham in England: and
these were all poets, as well as critics in verse. It is true, the last
instance is of one who was no eminent poet, the late Mr. Walsh. This
small deviation might be well overlooked, were it only for its being a
pious office to the memory of his friend. But it may be further
justified, as it was an homage paid in particular to the morals of the
critic, nothing being more amiable than the character here drawn of
this excellent person. He being our author's judge and censor, as
well as friend, it gives him a graceful opportunity to add himself to
the number of the later critics; and with a character of his own
genius and temper sustained by that modesty and dignity which it is
so difficult to make consistent, this performance concludes.
I have here given a short and plain account of the Essay on
Criticism, concerning which, I have but one thing more to say, that
when the reader considers the regularity of the plan, the masterly
conduct of each part, the penetration into nature, and the compass
of learning so conspicuous throughout, he should at the same time
know, it was the work of an author who had not attained the
twentieth year of his age.

NOTES.
Ver. 28. In search of wit, these lose their common sense,] This
observation is extremely just. Search of wit is not only the occasion,
but the efficient cause of the loss of common sense; for wit
consisting in choosing out, and setting together such ideas from
whose assemblage pleasant pictures may be drawn on the fancy, the
judgment, through an habitual search of wit, loses, by degrees, its
faculty of seeing the true relation of things; in which consists the
exercise of common sense.
Ver. 32. All fools have still an itching to deride,
And fain would lie upon the laughing side.]
The sentiment is just, and if Hobbes's account of laughter be true,
that it arises from a silly pride, we see the reason of it. The
expression too is fine; it alludes to the condition of idiots and natural
fools, who are observed to be ever on the grin.
Ver. 43. Their generation's so equivocal.] It is sufficient that a
principle of philosophy has been generally received, whether it be
true or false, to justify a poet's use of it to set off his wit. But to
recommend his argument, he should be cautious how he uses any
but the true; for falsehood, when it is set too near the truth, will
tarnish what it should brighten up. Besides, the analogy between
natural and moral truth makes the principles of true philosophy the
fittest for this use. Our poet has been pretty careful in observing this
rule.
Ver. 51. And mark that point where sense and dulness meet.]
Besides the peculiar sense explained in the comment, the words
have still a more general meaning, and caution us against going on,
when our ideas begin to grow obscure, as we are then most apt to
do, though that obscurity be an admonition that we should leave off,
for it arises, either from our small acquaintance with the subject, or
the incomprehensibility of its nature, in which circumstances a
genius will always write as badly as a dunce. An observation well
worth the attention of all profound writers.
Ver. 56. Thus in the soul while memory prevails,
The solid pow'r of understanding fails;
Where beams of warm imagination play,
The memory's soft figures melt away.]
These observations are collected from an intimate knowledge of
human nature. The cause of that languor and heaviness in the
understanding, which is almost inseparable from a very strong and
tenacious memory, seems to be a want of the proper exercise of that
faculty, the understanding being in a great measure unactive, while
the memory is cultivating. As to the other appearance, the decay of
memory by the vigorous exercise of fancy, the poet himself seems to
have intimated the cause of it in the epithet he has given to the
imagination. For if, according to the atomic philosophy, the memory
of things be preserved in a chain of ideas, produced by the animal
spirits moving in continued trains, the force and rapidity of the
imagination, breaking and dissipating the links of this chain by
forming new associations, must necessarily weaken, and disorder
the recollective faculties.
Ver. 67. Would all but stoop to what they understand.] The
expression is delicate, and implies what is very true, that most men
think it a degradation of their genius to employ it in what lies level to
their comprehension, but had rather exercise their talents in the
ambition of subduing what is placed above it.
Ver. 80. Some, to whom heaven, &c.] Here the poet (in a sense he
was not, at first, aware of) has given an example of the truth of his
observation, in the observation itself. The two lines stood originally
thus:
 There are whom heav'n has blest with store of wit,
Yet want as much again to manage it.

In the first line, wit is used, in the modern sense, for the effort of
fancy; in the second line it is used in the ancient sense, for the result
of judgment. This trick, played the reader, he endeavoured to keep
out of sight, by altering the lines as they now stand,

Some, to whom heav'n in wit has been profuse,

Want as much more, to turn it to its use.

For the words, "to manage it," as the lines were at first, too plainly
discovered the change put upon the reader, in the use of the word
"wit." This is now a little covered by the latter expression of "turn it
to its use." But then the alteration, in the preceding line, from "store
of wit," to "profuse," was an unlucky change. For though he who has
"store of wit" may want more, yet he to whom it was given in
"profusion" could hardly be said to want more. The truth is, the poet
had said a lively thing, and would, at all hazards, preserve the
reputation of it, though the very topic he is upon obliged him to
detect the imposition, in the very next lines, which show he meant
two very different things, by the very same term, in the two
preceding:

For wit and judgment often are at strife,

Though meant each other's aid, like man and wife.

Ver. 88. Those rules of old, &c.] Cicero has, best of any one I know,
explained what that thing is which reduces the wild and scattered
parts of human knowledge into arts. "Nihil est quod ad artem redigi
possit, nisi ille prius, qui illa tenet, quorum artem instituere vult,
habeat illam scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quarum ars nondum sit,
artem efficere possit.—Omnia fere, quæ sunt conclusa nunc artibus,
dispersa et dissipata quondam fuerunt, ut in musicis, &c. Adhibita
est igitur ars quædam extrinsecus ex alio genere quodam, quod sibi
totum Philosophi assumunt, quæ rem dissolutam divulsamque
conglutinaret, et ratione quadam constringeret." De Orat. l. i. c. 41,
42.
Ver. 112, 114. Some on the leaves—Some dryly plain.] The first are
the apes of those learned Italian critics who at the restoration of
letters, having found the classic writers miserably deformed by the
hands of monkish librarians, very commendably employed their
pains and talents in restoring them to their native purity. The
second, the plagiarists from the French critics, who had made some
admirable commentaries on the ancient critics. But that acumen and
taste, which separately constitute the distinct value of those two
species of Italian and French criticism, make no part of the character
of these paltry mimics at home described by our poet in the
following lines,

These leave the sense, their learning to display,

And those explain the meaning quite away.

Which species is the least hurtful, the poet has enabled us to

determine in the lines with which he opens his poem,

But, of the two, less dang'rous is th' offence

To tire our patience, than mislead our sense.

From whence we conclude that the Reverend Mr. Upton was much
more innocently employed, when he quibbled upon Epictetus, than
when he commented upon Shakespeare.[299]
Ver. 150. Thus Pegasus, &c.] We have observed how the precepts
for writing and judging are interwoven throughout the whole poem.
The sublime flight of a poet is first described, soaring above all
vulgar bounds, to snatch a grace directly which lies beyond the
reach of a common adventurer; and afterwards, the effect of that
grace upon the true critic; whom it penetrates with an equal rapidity,
going the nearest way to his heart, without passing through his
judgment. By which is not meant that it could not stand the test of
judgment; but that, as it was a beauty uncommon, and above rule,
and the judgment habituated to determine only by rule, it makes its
direct appeal to the heart, which, when once gained, soon brings
over the judgment, whose concurrence (it being now enlarged and
set above forms) is easily procured. That this is the poet's sublime
conception appears from the concluding words:

And all its end at once attains.

For poetry doth not attain all its end, till it hath gained the judgment
as well as heart.
Ver. 209. Pride, where wit fails, steps in to our defence,
And fills up all the mighty void of sense.]
A very sensible French writer makes the following remark on this
species of pride: "Un homme qui sçait plusieurs langues, qui entend
les auteurs grecs et latins, qui s'élève même jusqu'à la dignité de
scholiaste; si cet homme venoit à peser son véritable mérite, il
trouveroit souvent qu'il se réduit avoir eu des yeux et de la mémoire;
il se garderoit bien de donner le nom respectable de science à une
érudition sans lumière. Il y a une grande différence entre s'enrichir
des mots ou des choses, entre alléguer des autorités ou des raisons.
Si un homme pouvoit se surprendre à n'avoir que cette sorte de
mérite, il en rougiroit plutôt que d'en être vain."
Ver. 235. Survey the whole, nor seek slight faults to find
Where Nature moves, and rapture warms the mind;]
The second line, in apologizing for those faults which the first says
should be overlooked, gives the reason of the precept. For when a
great writer's attention is fixed on a general view of nature, and his
imagination becomes warmed with the contemplation of great ideas,
it can hardly be, but that there must be small irregularities in the
disposition both of matter and style, because the avoiding these
requires a coolness of recollection, which a writer so qualified and so
busied is not master of.
Ver. 248. The world's just wonder, and ev'n thine, O Rome!] The
Pantheon I would suppose; perhaps St. Peter's; no matter which;
the observation is true of both. There is something very Gothic in
the taste and judgment of a learned man, who despises the
masterpiece of art, the Pantheon, for those very qualities which
deserve our admiration. "Nous esmerveillons comme l'on fait si
grand cas de ce Pantheon, veu que son edifice n'est de si grande
industrie comme l'on crie: car chaque petit masson peut bien
concevoir la maniere de sa façon tout en un instant: car estant la
base si massive, et les murailles si espaisses, ne nous a semblé
difficile d'y adjouster la vonte à claire voye."—Pierre Belon's
Observations, &c. The nature of the Gothic structures apparently led
him into this mistake of the architectonic art in general; that the
excellency of it consists in raising the greatest weight on the least
assignable support, so that the edifice should have strength without
the appearance of it, in order to excite admiration. But to a judicious
eye such a building would have a contrary effect, the appearance (as
our poet expresses it) of a monstrous height, or breadth, or length.
Indeed, did the just proportions in regular architecture take off from
the grandeur of a building, by all the single parts coming united to
the eye, as this learned traveller seems to insinuate, it would be a
reasonable objection to those rules on which this masterpiece of art
was constructed. But it is not so. The poet tells us truly,

The whole at once is bold, and regular.

Ver. 267. Once on a time, &c.] This tale is so very apposite, that one
would naturally take it to be of the poet's own invention; and so
much in the spirit of Cervantes, that we might easily mistake it for
one of the chief beauties of that incomparable satire. Yet, in truth it
is neither; but a story taken by our author from the spurious Don
Quixote, which shows how proper an use may be made of general
reading, when if there be but one good thing in a book (as in that
wretched performance there scarce was more) it may be picked out,
and employed to an excellent purpose.
Ver. 285. Thus critics, &c.] In these two lines the poet finely
describes the way in which bad writers are wont to imitate the
qualities of good ones. As true judgment generally draws men out of
popular opinions, so he who cannot get from the crowd by the
assistance of this guide, willingly follows caprice, which will be sure
to lead him into singularities. Again, true knowledge is the art of
treasuring up only that which, from its use in life, is worthy of being
lodged in the memory, and this makes the philosopher; but curiosity
consists in a vain attention to every thing out of the way, and which
for its inutility the world least regards, and this makes the
antiquarian. Lastly, exactness is the just proportion of parts to one
another, and their harmony in a whole; but he who has not extent of
capacity for the exercise of this quality, contents himself with nicety,
which is a busying oneself about points and syllables, and this
makes the grammarian.
Ver. 297. True wit is nature to advantage dressed, &c.] This
definition is very exact. Mr. Locke had defined wit to consist "in the
assemblage of ideas, and putting those together, with quickness and
variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity,
whereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the
fancy." But that great philosopher, in separating wit from judgment,
as he does in this place, has given us (and he could therefore give
us no other) only an account of wit in general, in which false wit,
though not every species of it, is included. A striking image,
therefore, of nature is, as Mr. Locke observes, certainly wit; but this
image may strike on several other accounts, as well as for its truth
and beauty, and the philosopher has explained the manner how. But
it never becomes that wit which is the ornament of true poesy,
whose end is to represent nature, but when it dresses that nature to
advantage, and presents her to us in the brightest and most amiable
light. And to know when the fancy has done its office truly, the poet
subjoins this admirable test, viz. When we perceive that it gives us
back the image of our mind. When it does that, we may be sure it
plays no tricks with us; for this image is the creature of the
judgment, and whenever wit corresponds with judgment, we may
safely pronounce it to be true.
Ver. 311. False eloquence, &c.] This simile is beautiful. For the false
colouring given to objects by the prismatic glass is owing to its
untwisting, by its obliquities, those threads of light which nature had
put together, in order to spread over its work an ingenious and
simple candour, that should not hide but only heighten the native
complexion of the objects. And false expression is nothing else but
the straining and divaricating the parts of true expression; and then
daubing them over with what the rhetoricians very properly term
colours, in lieu of that candid light, now lost, which was reflected
from them in their natural state, while sincere and entire.
'Tis not enough no harshness
Ver. 364.
gives offence,
The sound must seem an echo to
the sense.
The judicious introduction of this precept is remarkable. The poets,
and even some of the best of them, have been so fond of the beauty
arising from this trivial observance, that their practice has violated
the very end of the precept, which is the increase of harmony; and
so they could but raise an echo, did not care whose ears they
offended by its dissonance. To remedy this abuse therefore, our
poet, by the introductory line, would insinuate, that harmony is
always to be presupposed as observed, though it may and ought to
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