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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Tacitus, Cornelius.
[Historiae. English]
The histories/Tacitus; translated by W. H. Fyfe; revised and
edited by D. S. Levene.
(Oxford world’s classics)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Rome—History—Flavians, 69–96. 2. Rome—History—Civil War,
68–69. I. Levene, D. S. II. Title. III. Series.
DG286.T313 1997 937′.07—dc20 96–32812
ISBN 0–19–283958–6 (pbk.)
3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
Printed in Great Britain by
Cox & Wyman Ltd.
Reading, Berkshire
introduction v
CONTENTS
Introduction vii
Translator’s Note xxiii
Note on the Imperial Roman State xxv
Note on Roman Names xxix
Note on the Text xxxi
Select Bibliography xxxiv
Chronology of the Life of Tacitus and the
Period of the Histories xxxvii
Maps xliii
THE HISTORIES 1
book one 3
book two 59
book three 117
book four 171
book five 233
Explanatory Notes 250
Glossary of Place-Names 293
Index 295
vi introduction
introduction vii
INTRODUCTION
Tacitus the Historian
The historian Cornelius Tacitus is the writer who, more than
any other, has defined for later generations our picture of the
Roman Empire. He was born around ad 56, shortly after the
Emperor Nero came to the throne. Under Nero’s successors he
engaged in a political career, at which he achieved consider-
able success, gaining the quaestorship in 81 or 82, the
praetorship in 88, and the consulship in 97, and later becom-
ing governor of Asia (a province of the empire consisting of
part of modern Turkey). In addition, a fragmentary funerary
inscription from Rome has recently been conjectured to be
that of Tacitus.1 If correct, this allows us to fill in further
gaps in his career, including the information that he was
tribune (presumably around 85), and that his quaestorship
had been the most prestigious of all: he was ‘quaestor
Augusti’, who attended the Emperor himself. This post was
normally reserved for those of the highest background: even
as a young man Tacitus was marked out for outstanding
political success.
But Tacitus’ significance lies less in his own political ex-
periences than in his application of them to his historical
works. Other Roman historians had been politically in-
volved—many ancient theorists, indeed, saw such experience
as an essential prerequisite for the writing of political history.
Yet none ever focused such subtlety and complexity of analy-
sis onto the inner workings of Roman political and military
power.
His earlier works were short: the Agricola, a biography of
his father-in-law Julius Agricola, a notable governor of Brit-
ain, and the Germania, an ethnographic study of the tribes of
Germany. Both appeared at the end of the century, shortly
1
The inscription is Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum vi. 1574: the identification
with Tacitus is made by Geza Alföldy, Mitteilungen des Deutschen
Archaeologischen Instituts: Römischen Abteilung, 102 (1995), 251–68.
viii introduction
after his consulship. The date of a third work, the Dialogue on
Orators, a debate on the place of rhetoric in contemporary
Rome, is disputed; some have thought it his first work, but it
may well postdate both the Agricola and the Germania. But
Tacitus’ reputation rests above all upon his two final writings:
the large-scale historical masterpieces of his maturity, the
Histories and the Annals.
Between them, the Histories and the Annals covered the
whole history of Rome from ad 14 to 96. The Annals, though
written second, dealt with the earlier part of that period,
taking the story down to the death of Nero in 68. The
Histories, the earlier of the two works, described the civil wars
succeeding Nero’s death, the eventual emergence of Vespasian
as emperor, and the reigns of the three emperors of the Flavian
dynasty: Vespasian and his sons Titus and Domitian.
When complete, the Histories contained (probably) twelve
books, the Annals eighteen. However, substantial portions of
both works are now lost. The collapse of the Roman Empire
in Western Europe was followed by a period when few pagan
authors were prized enough to have copies made of their
writings; much of Latin literature perished as a result. The
earliest surviving manuscript of the Histories dates from the
eleventh century, and all subsequent copies are usually
thought to derive from it. It contains barely a third of the total
work: Books 1–4 are intact, but the manuscript breaks off in
mid-sentence something like a quarter of the way through
Book 5. The same manuscript gives us most of Books 11–16
of the Annals; another provides the bulk of Books 1–6. The
remainder of that work, too, has vanished.
The third of the Histories that is left to us treats just two
years: ad 69–70; the missing portion of the work will have
dealt with the following twenty-six years up to the death of
Domitian. The reason for this unbalanced coverage is the
uniquely eventful ad 69. It is known as the ‘Year of the Four
Emperors’: in the vacuum left by the deposition and death of
Nero, four men successively claimed the throne, each with his
own armies behind him. The four were Galba, Otho, Vitellius,
and Vespasian; and a year of virtually continuous civil war
and struggles for power concluded with Vespasian, his rivals
introduction ix
dead, established as the sole authority. That murderous com-
petition Tacitus recounts in detail in his first three books.
Books 4–6 probably described the rest of Vespasian’s reign,
to his death in 79; Books 7–12 then dealt with the brief reign
of Titus, and the longer one of Domitian—Tacitus seems to
have had a penchant for structuring his works in groups of six
books. Book 4 and the surviving portion of Book 5 cover only
the first months of that period, as two provincial revolts
simultaneously were to be recounted, one by the Germans, the
other by the Jews; and it is with those revolts that these books
are largely concerned.
The Background
Until the middle of the first century bc, Rome was a republic,
ruled not by one man, but a succession of annually elected
officials (though in practice the election process was strongly
dominated by the wealthy classes). The supreme officials were
the two consuls; they were, however, advised by a Senate
consisting of all ex-office holders; and from the ranks of these
came the military commanders and provincial governors who
controlled the empire.
However, in the last half-century of the Republic the system
broke down. A series of civil wars was fought out between
leading political and military figures, not least Julius Caesar,
who temporarily vanquished his rivals and established himself
as sole ruler. But on his assassination in 44 bc civil war began
anew; only in 31 bc did it come to an end, when Octavian,
Caesar’s great-nephew and heir, defeated Mark Antony,
leaving himself alone in control. He ostensibly restored the
institutions of the Republic, but reserved for himself a new
role in the state: ‘princeps’ or ‘leading man’. He adopted
the name ‘Augustus’, and in effect took supreme power in
his own hands—the first emperor of Rome. On his death in
ad 14, the throne passed to his stepson Tiberius; thence to
Tiberius’ great-nephew Gaius (often known as Caligula), to
Gaius’ uncle Claudius, and finally to Claudius’ stepson
Nero. These first five emperors all came from two of the
ancient aristocratic families of Rome, the Julii and the Claudii,
x introduction
and hence are often referred to as the ‘Julio-Claudian’
dynasty.
Nero’s rule became increasingly capricious and tyrannical;
and in 68 he was faced with two rebellions by provincial
governors, one in Gaul under Vindex, another in Spain under
Galba. His army successfully defeated the first, but then itself
threatened to turn against him. Nero fled Rome, as the city
troops, followed by the Senate, declared for Galba. He com-
mitted suicide, leaving no heir within his family; the Senate
voted to make Galba emperor. His rule, however, was hardly
secure. At this point Tacitus’ Histories begin.
Sources and Methods
Tacitus was an adolescent in 69–70, and possibly witnessed
one or two of the events that he describes in the Histories.
From time to time he also made use of personal informants; he
is known in later life to have associated with several of the
participants in the civil war; he seems also to have consulted
some documentary material. But for the bulk of his informa-
tion he, in common with most surviving ancient historians,
was not doing original research, but relied upon earlier pub-
lished histories and memoirs of the period, now lost to us.
Since Tacitus (again like other ancient historians) cites sources
by name extremely rarely, it is a matter of controversy which
he used at any given point.
Sometimes he followed these sources closely, but often he
adapted them, slanting his narrative in order to highlight his
favoured themes. In some areas ancient historical practice
granted the historian considerable leeway to alter what was
handed down to him. It was an accepted convention, for
example, that the speeches in a historical work might bear
little or no resemblance to anything that the characters had
really said. Such speeches largely consisted of free composi-
tions by which the historian might indicate the type of argu-
ments that a character might plausibly have used; but they
also became vehicles for the historian, without necessarily
endorsing the viewpoint expressed, to explore key issues rel-
evant to the period. Thus, for example, the question of the
introduction xi
succession—whether an emperor should select his heir from
within his own family, or should adopt an outsider—is exam-
ined in the Histories from different standpoints by both Galba
(1. 15–16) and Mucianus (2. 76–7).
Not only the words, however, but also the deeds of the
characters were subject to manipulation. Tacitus shows him-
self perfectly capable, when it suits him, of adapting chrono-
logy, conflating repeated events into a single episode, or
elaborating a description with details derived more from liter-
ary convention than the available evidence. In this he once
again simply follows the practices of his predecessors; such an
approach to his material, unacceptable though it would be to
a modern historian, is nevertheless typical of ancient historical
writing. Both of his most famous historical forerunners at
Rome, Sallust and Livy, were capable of being similarly cava-
lier, and Tacitus’ debt to both is clear: the Histories contain
not simply numerous verbal reminiscences of Sallustian or
Livian phrasing but sometimes entire episodes modelled upon
his great predecessors (e.g. 4. 68 ff.).
Despite this, Tacitus’ account shows on the whole a fair
degree of accuracy, certainly in the outlines of his narrative,
but even in particular episodes. Relatively little documentary
material (such as inscriptions) survives; but where such docu-
ments intersect with Tacitus’ account, they tend to confirm it.
His battle scenes can be compared to the actual topography of
the battlegrounds; unlike Livy’s battles, they usually fit the
known features of the landscape closely. Few modern histori-
ans doubt that he provides for us not merely the most compre-
hensive but also the most reliable sustained account of the
period; but if he is the only source for an event, one must keep
a wary eye for those areas where adaptation or reworking of
his source material may have occurred.
A good general sense of the direction of Tacitus’ manipula-
tions may be obtained by comparing his account with those of
the other historians of the period: the biographies of all the
emperors down to Domitian written by his younger Roman
contemporary Suetonius; the biographies of Galba and Otho
by his older Greek contemporary Plutarch; the history of the
Jewish War written in Greek by Josephus, a Jewish com-
xii introduction
mander turned pro-Flavian historian; and finally the later
history of Rome written by the third-century senator Cassius
Dio. None of these is Tacitus’ equal either as historian or as
writer; but the comparison can indicate to the reader those
areas where Tacitus may actively be distorting, or at any rate
selecting one of several alternative versions of events that were
available to him. The notes to this translation, accordingly,
frequently refer to those other historians, so as to demonstrate
what is distinctive about Tacitus’ own account.
Understanding Tacitus
Tacitus’ biting wit is famous. Again and again individuals,
groups, events are summed up with a pungent, cynical, and
often paradoxical epigram. Virtually every page furnishes ex-
amples: ‘The troops could be punished though not controlled’
(4. 27); ‘At last, for lack of the truth, Galba yielded to the
consensus of error’ (1. 35); ‘[He] excused them from the
services which they refused to render’ (3. 58); ‘Good men owe
their power to their virtues; he was one of that worst sort who
derive it from their vices’ (3. 77); ‘More careful of their safety
than of their authority’ (4. 48); ‘He played the slave to gain a
throne’ (1. 36); ‘Petitioning for peace, though war there was
none’ (1. 63); and, perhaps most famous of all, his obituary on
the Emperor Galba (1. 49): ‘He had the qualifications to be a
ruler—if only he had not ruled.’
By such comments Tacitus, so it seems, makes his interpre-
tations and views clear: one has the consistent sense of a
powerful mind seeing beneath specious appearances and fair
words, and setting out instead the realities of power and the
moral depravity of civil war. So also is he a master of innu-
endo, his narrative coloured by hints of vicious undercurrents
and sinister motives underlying even the most straightforward
of events. Once again examples abound. The hints at 1. 39
and 1. 42, for instance, that Galba’s colleague Vinius was
complicit in his murder (‘His whole life and reputation give
reason to suppose that he was an accomplice in the crime of
which he was the cause’); the ‘mercy’ of Otho when he par-
dons Celsus at 1. 71, where the calculating nature of his
introduction xiii
ostensibly virtuous action is made explicit (‘Otho now wanted
to earn a name for clemency by pardoning a well-known man
who had fought against his party’); the senators who admired
Otho ‘and in their hearts unanimously favoured Vitellius’
(2. 53); and much of the narrative of Vitellius’ own behaviour,
such as his hypocritical attitude towards Junius Blaesus (2. 58,
3. 38–9).
Today it is usually thought undesirable for a historian con-
sistently and overtly to instil his biases and his interpretations
into his narrative, especially when he does so by imputing to
characters thoughts and motives for which he presents no
evidence. Yet it is an approach to historiography that was
widespread among the ancients; and it does at any rate seem
to provide the reader with an overwhelming sense of a clear,
distinctive, and powerful analysis of the Roman Empire. If
that analysis is thought one-sided, its very conspicuousness
appears to provide the modern historian with straightforward
evidence for the direction of Tacitus’ partiality, which can
then be compensated for when one assembles one’s own
account of the period.
However, it would be misleading to think that these overt
comments make Tacitus’ opinions easy to determine. For the
form and nature of his observations encourage the reader to
attempt to combine them into an overall picture; but reconcil-
ing them in practice proves a far from simple task. Vinius’ role
in the murder of Galba provides an excellent example. For
while, as quoted above, at Galba’s death Tacitus suggests
clearly that he believed in Vinius’ complicity, earlier (1. 32–4)
he had shown Vinius strongly advocating that Galba protect
himself by remaining in the palace. Tacitus himself is em-
phatic that this was the policy that Galba should have fol-
lowed: he describes Icelus’ alternative as leading to ‘the ruin of
his country’. The implication in Tacitus is that Vinius is giving
Galba the best possible chance of success; in the parallel
passage of Plutarch, Vinius is far less forceful in advocating
his proposal, and the author does not explicitly endorse its
good sense. It seems that Tacitus, far from uncomplicatedly
propagating the view that Vinius was a conspirator, is actually
muddying the waters by undermining that view in advance.
xiv introduction
The sententious nature of his comments seems to compel one
to give them the widest application; yet actually reconciling
them with each other leads only to doubt and conflict.
A similar problem is caused by rumour. Tacitus portrays a
world governed by rumour, a world where whispered infor-
mation, whether true or false, is one of the prime agents that
can transform history. Vitellius’ rebellion originates in and is
promoted by rumours of atrocities committed by Galba (1.
51, 1. 54); rumour turns Rome to panic under Otho (1. 85);
it leads Otho’s army to insubordination (2. 23), and Civilis’
Germans to break openly with Rome (4. 54). Rumours first
designate Vespasian for the throne (2. 73), and are actively
employed by Mucianus and the other Flavians in support of
their cause (2. 83, 3. 54). The false rumours of Lucius Piso’s
rebellion in Africa not only lead to Piso’s murder but are
strongly indicated by Tacitus to come close to being self-
fulfilling: it is precisely those rumours that lead Piso to con-
template the very action of which he is falsely accused (4. 38,
4. 48–50).
Yet rumour is more than a simple actor in the historical
events: it is one of Tacitus’ chief vehicles for commenting
upon those events, as he places sinister interpretations and
innuendoes into the mouths of unspecified observers. One
example is the rumour he reports at 2. 60 of Caecilius
Simplex’s attempt to purchase the consulship from Vitellius.
No other version is given, and the imputation against Simplex
is thus allowed by Tacitus to stand, if not directly endorsed by
the author, at least implicitly so, because unchallenged. Or
3. 65, with the reports of a jealous rivalry between Vespasian
and his brother Flavius Sabinus, leading to the latter’s refusal
to lead the City Garrison against Vitellius. Here Tacitus does
offer a ‘more charitable explanation’—that Sabinus was of
gentle character—but the more damaging innuendoes still
retain their force, not least because they offer the evidence of
specific past actions, which the ‘more charitable explanation’
fails to refute.
But assessing the precise status of such rumours—how far
Tacitus himself is endorsing their contents—is continually
problematic; and this is only accentuated when one has to
introduction xv
weight them against Tacitus’ more direct statements. His
treatment of Vinius once again provides an example of these
problems. At 1. 13 Tacitus reports a rumour that Otho was
due to marry Vinius’ daughter: this provides what he other-
wise never gives—a motive for Vinius to have joined Otho in
his rebellion. But how seriously should one take this rumour?
Only a few lines before (1. 12) he has shown that other, false
rumours about Galba’s plans to adopt an heir are clearly
prompted by malice against Vinius himself (‘Many were influ-
enced by foolish hopes and spread self-interested rumours
pointing to some friend or patron, thereby also gratifying their
hatred for Titus Vinius, whose unpopularity waxed daily with
his power’). Rumour in the latter case is a means for deceiving
oneself and others, and a vehicle for venting hatred against
Vinius. In such a context, can a further rumour about
Vinius—the rumour of Otho’s relationship with him—be pre-
senting the authorial standpoint? The question is left entirely
open.
It is little surprise, in the face of this, that readers have often
despaired of pinning down Tacitus’ interpretations of Roman
history: all we have to rely on, it seems, is multiple and
contradictory viewpoints of doubtful validity. One seems at
times to be looking into a bottomless pit where nothing at all
makes sense. One can see why many commentators have
preferred to deny that a consistent interpretation is to be
found at all. Tacitus’ ambiguous treatment of the Flavian
commander Antonius Primus, for example, has often been
ascribed to his use of multiple sources: some pro-Antonius,
which present him with the highest motives and the virtues of
the best of generals; others seeking, after his quarrel with
Mucianus and fall from Vespasian’s favour, to load onto his
shoulders all the guilt of Flavian atrocities. On this view,
Tacitus has drawn on both of these at different times, and
failed to observe—or care—that they have led him into
contradiction.
At times the case for such a reading is strong. For example,
the contradiction between the violence against the city of
Rome shown by the Flavian troops (and blamed on their
generals) at 4. 1 and the specific statement at 4. 39 that
xvi introduction
Antonius and Arrius Varus ‘were popular in Rome, because
they had used no violence off the field of battle’. It is possible
that Tacitus is seeking to demonstrate the fickleness and
brutality of the Roman mob, by hinting at their shifting sup-
port; but the clear factual inconsistency is hard to explain in
this way alone, and it may well be preferable to conclude that
he has simply reproduced contradictory material from his
sources.
But at other times, especially when the passages in question
are more closely juxtaposed, such an account is much less
satisfactory. For example, Antonius’ vigorous suppression of
the mutinies in his army at 3. 10–11 is undercut by the belief,
which Tacitus reports, that he was himself the instigator of
them (‘It was even supposed by some that [Antonius] had
cunningly promoted both outbreaks, to secure for himself the
full profit of the war’). But the combination of these two (very
typical, as discussed above, of Tacitus) fits perfectly his por-
trayal of Antonius from his first appearance (2. 86)—a man
on the one hand ‘by no means contemptible in war’, on the
other ‘invaluable in riots and sedition’. Tacitus consistently
shows Antonius as someone of the finest military qualities,
and the ability to quell insubordination among one’s troops
was, for a Roman, a central military virtue. But at the same
time, Antonius’ more dubious morality in wider matters is
never far from the story’s surface: and the possibility is raised,
as here, that this can lead him to actions that are not only
wrong in themselves but specifically undermine the very
virtues for which he is being praised.
Antonius’ actions at the sack of Cremona conform to a
similar pattern. Like any good commander, he makes a speech
restraining his troops and advising instead practical measures
that they must take to ensure victory (3. 20). His speech
superficially conforms to the canons of military virtue; but he
noticeably does not seek to dissuade the soldiers from sacking
the town on principle; and Tacitus leaves it open whether it
was his idea to point to the town to encourage his men during
the battle (3. 27–8). This in turn matches exactly his reported
behaviour directly prior to the town’s destruction (3. 32–4):
he is not perhaps directly responsible for the atrocities (the
introduction xvii
town is already burning when he cracks his joke ‘It will not be
long before it is hot’), but shows no interest in keeping his
soldiers from them. To attribute the double-sidedness of this
portrait of Antonius to Tacitus’ incompetent combination of
contradictory sources is to overlook the way in which he does
precisely juxtapose contradictory views of Antonius and unite
them into a single complex portrait. The very fascination of
Tacitus’ Antonius lies in his combination of the practical
virtues of the military commander with a moral unscrupulous-
ness that leads to the potential annulment even of many of the
positive results of his attractive qualities.
Thus it is possible to make sense of Tacitus’ contradictions
and complications, although they lead us to an overall picture
that is far from simple, a picture that eschews clear morals and
explanations. Indeed, Tacitus’ reader is faced with a not dis-
similar dilemma to Tacitus’ characters: the necessity of finding
one’s way beneath the surface meaning of the story, and
attempting to piece together the author’s account from con-
trasting fragments of information. If assessing the truth in
rumours is difficult for us, Tacitus shows it as equally difficult
for his characters. But it provides the only way for them—and
us—to make sense of the hidden undercurrents governing
events in imperial Rome.
Germans and Jews
No section of Tacitus’ work is more famous than his account
of the Jews at the opening of Book 5. It is the most substantial
surviving treatment of Jewish history and religion by a pagan
writer of the ancient world; as a result it has often been read
by those interested in Jewish history as in effect a self-
contained piece, in isolation from the rest of the work.
Its fame, however, has hardly benefited Tacitus’ reputation
as a historian; for no part of his writing shows him to a worse
advantage. His account of Jewish origins is appallingly gar-
bled, and the garbling appears all the more blatant as a result
of the remarkable and, for Tacitus, unpredictable sequence of
events that turned the Jewish sacred writings into the central
text of later European culture. This is the one part of Tacitus’
xviii introduction
work where numerous non-specialist readers can instantly
spot the errors, and indeed can do so more confidently than
would have been possible for most of his Roman contempo-
raries. Moreover, Tacitus’ manifest hostility to Jews and
Judaism leaves him vulnerable on another score. The modern
revulsion against racism in general and anti-Semitism in
particular means that this hostility leaps to the reader’s atten-
tion and draws a strongly adverse response. For while one
may view indulgently Tacitus’ biases when they concern indi-
viduals and institutions long dead, in the case of the Jews
his writings are seen in the light of subsequent history. It is
only a slight exaggeration to say that, for many readers, a
clear line runs from Tacitus via the Inquisition through to
Auschwitz.
Yet to read Tacitus instinctively in such a manner can be
counterproductive, leading to serious misinterpretation of the
work. For the most interesting question is why Tacitus should
have presented such an account of the Jews. One must appre-
ciate that, for him, Jews are not the central focus of his
interest, even though they may be for many modern readers.
What is fundamentally informing his picture is a literary back-
ground and a wider historical context in which Jews play only
a small role; and his distortions and hostility, real though they
are, stem above all from those more general considerations.
First, it should be made clear that Tacitus’ garblings are not
invented by him: virtually everything that he writes he has
drawn from earlier, generally Greek, sources. He can be con-
victed of carelessness, in that, had he cared to, he could
certainly have found more authoritative accounts by Jews
themselves; but there is no reason to think that he was aware
just how unreliable his information was. From what he pre-
sumably saw as broadly accurate sources, he selected the
information that would enable him to create his desired
picture.
The most striking feature of Tacitus’ account of Jews is the
notion of inversion: Jews, for him, are people who turn the
familiar Roman world upside down. This is quite explicit at 5.
4: ‘Moses introduced a new cult, which was the opposite of all
other religions. All that we hold sacred they held profane, and
introduction xix
they allowed practices which we abominate.’ He finds the
origin of Jewish sacrificial rites and circumcision precisely in
the desire to reverse current practices; he sees Jews as rejecting
the fundamental Roman ties of family, patriotism, and na-
tional religion. Unlike Romans, they bury rather than cremate
the dead; and, of course, the non-anthropomorphic monothe-
ism of Judaism is entirely alien to the cults familiar to the
Romans, a point that Tacitus reinforces by specifically con-
trasting it with the superficially similar cult of Bacchus.
Tacitus moreover contradicts himself here, since he has previ-
ously relayed the (false) information that Jews had an image
of an ass in the Temple. But this likewise is governed by the
inversion of known practices; the ass was seen as a lowly
creature, hardly appropriate for a central cult image. The
same consideration drives his eccentric account of the Exodus:
a need to explain the paradoxes of Judaism. From it he derives
aetiologies for, among other things, the ass, the sacrifices, the
taboo on pork, the Sabbath, and the general Jewish rejection
of the rest of mankind.
Such an approach to foreign cultures did not originate with
Tacitus. There was a long literary tradition of ethnography
which treated other races as the reverse of one’s own, a
tradition going back at least to Herodotus’ famous (and inac-
curate) account of the Egyptians in very similar terms. Tacitus
provides for his work a digression with exotic overtones along
lines recognizable and attractive to his readers. But ethno-
graphic writing can serve wider ideological purposes. By treat-
ing another culture as the reverse of one’s own, one helps
construct and reinforce a particular notion of what one’s own
culture is. That this is true of Tacitus can be seen if one
examines his Jewish digression against its wider context.
If no part of Tacitus’ historical writing is better known than
his description of the Jews, perhaps no part is less known than
his account in Books 4 and 5 of the revolt of Civilis in
Germany, in the middle of which the surviving part of his
discussion of Judaism appears. An apparently inconsequential
episode, almost unknown (apart from the odd passing refer-
ence) from other sources, yet an episode to which Tacitus has
devoted virtually an entire book of his work. But the sheer fact
xx introduction
of its prominence in his narrative shows its importance to him;
and a dominant theme within it is the question that it raises of
what it is to be a Roman.
This issue had earlier been flagged several times in Books
1–3, where the armies of Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian each
were shown at times behaving towards Italy as foreign con-
querors, and appearing in various other ways un-Roman.
Thus of Otho’s troops: ‘As though on foreign soil and among
an enemy’s towns, they burnt, ravaged, plundered’ (2. 12).
The Vitellian Caecina at first contrasts with this: he ‘seemed to
have left his cruelty and profligacy on the other side of the
Alps’ (2. 20); but he paradoxically does so while wearing
Gallic costume, and soon the Vitellians too are acting in the
manner of alien victors: ‘the fields were ravaged like an
enemy country’ (2. 87); the wild soldiers are unable to cope
with city life (2. 88), and Vitellius tries to ride triumphantly
into Rome as its captor, before being dissuaded by his friends
(2. 89). Then the Flavians follow suit: Antonius’ armies ‘taste
the joys of plundering their compatriots’ (3. 15), and he is seen
‘harrying Italy like a conquered country’ (3. 49). In the moral
chaos of the times, the Romans themselves abandon Roman
values. But with Civilis the theme plays an ever more central
role.
Tacitus refers to the war against Civilis as ‘a civil and a
foreign war at once’ (4. 22; also 2. 69), and this phrase sets the
issue starkly. Are the Romans fighting other Romans, or is this
a war against foreigners, one that is in consequence less mor-
ally problematic for a Roman reader? Civilis and his followers
are ambiguous. On the one hand, they exhibit features that
are typically Roman. They have served with the Roman army
and sometimes display the disciplined and courageous behav-
iour that is, for a Roman, paradigmatic of Roman military
virtue; it is their Roman opponents who act with the
indiscipline and cowardice associated with barbarians (4. 20,
33, 37). Their leaders, not least Civilis himself, whose very
name is emphatically Roman (presumably the result of his
having been granted Roman citizenship), use the language of
Roman imperialism; their avowed aim is to set up a German
and Gallic empire in parallel to the Roman one (e.g. 4. 59:
introduction xxi
‘The Empire of All Gaul’; also 4. 63, 69). Civilis, like a good
Roman commander, keeps his men under control, while his
Roman counterpart hands over authority to his mutinous
troops (4. 24–5, 34–5). Sabinus claims descent from Julius
Caesar, and actually takes the name ‘Caesar’ for himself
(4. 55, 67); Classicus dresses in a Roman uniform (4. 59).
Yet at the same time as showing the Romanness of the
rebels, Tacitus has them appearing in other respects as alien
and foreign. Even when employing Roman tactics, they often
combine them with barbarian wildness (4. 22–3, 28–9); in
battle they engage in wild cries (4. 18). They use traditional
German rites and customs (e.g. 4. 15); Civilis ruddles his hair
and grows it long, and associates with a god-priestess (4. 61,
65). In short, a consistent feature of this narrative is that the
clear boundaries between Roman and non-Roman are broken
down. Tacitus thereby exposes a fundamental problem of
Roman imperialism: how far are the Romanized subjects truly
part of the empire; how far are they truly Roman? And can
Romans accept a definition of ‘being a Roman’ that would
permit a Civilis or a Classicus, with all their barbarian
elements, to be defined as members of their own culture?
With the advent of Petillius Cerialis, however, the barriers
begin to be reasserted. At 4. 73–4 Cerialis appeals to the Gauls
precisely by stressing their own closeness to Rome and by
treating Civilis and the Germans as hostile foreigners. Tacitus
at least in part endorses this, now calling the war ‘foreign
service’ with his own voice (4. 72); and after Cerialis’ speech
he begins to portray the rebels less as Roman, more as
unequivocally alien and barbaric (e.g. 4. 78, 5. 15, 5. 17).
It is at this point that the digression on Judaism appears. It
can now be seen that his Jews both parallel and fail to parallel
the Germans. Like the Germans, the Jews are in revolt; like the
Germans, the Jews’ revolt is a consequence of oppression by
Roman officials (4. 14, 5. 9); like the Germans, the Jews have
imperial ambitions of their own (5. 13). Yet with the Jews,
there is no problem. Unlike the Germans, they are a people
entirely alien to Rome, and in fighting them one is dealing
with an unequivocally foreign enemy. In short, the Jewish
War for Tacitus is there as a foil to the German War: a war
xxii introduction
that is everything that the German War might have been but
for a long time was not. His account of Judaism is hostile and
simplistic, but that is precisely what heightens the contrast
with the problematic complexities of his picture of the
Germans, where the very notions of ‘Roman’ and ‘foreign’
had for a time appeared to be collapsing. Tacitus’ fundamen-
tal concern, as in the rest of his work, is in exploring the
significance and workings of the Roman Empire itself.
Germans and Jews alike are simply an instrument to that end.
introduction xxiii
TRANSLATOR’S NOTE
Tacitus’ Latin style is notoriously idiosyncratic. His writing is
extremely compressed and obscure, laconic epigrams abound-
ing; his vocabulary is often poetic and archaic; his sentences
irregularly constructed, with standard Latin grammar and
syntax contorted to supply an appropriate phrase. An English
translation that sought to capture much of this would be
virtually unreadable; the best a translator can do in practice is
to give some sense of the biting and lapidary quality of the
original, without sacrificing intelligibility.
The basis for this translation is the 1912 translation by
W. H. Fyfe; however, it has been very substantially altered.
Fyfe for the most part managed to avoid the vices of the worst
classical translators of his day; there is little of the biblical
pastiche or the excessive literalness that mars the work of
many of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, he occasionally
employed terms that sound inappropriate in modern English;
these I have tried to remove. More often his determination to
avoid excessive literalness led him into excessive verbosity,
turning the epigrammatic wit of Tacitus into something rather
ponderous; I have rewritten many such passages so as to
introduce a more Tacitean brevity. Finally, Fyfe on numerous
occasions seems to have misinterpreted Tacitus’ Latin; in these
cases I have corrected the translation to bring it into line with
the best modern understanding of the text. The introductory
material and notes are entirely my own.
In translating geographical names I have adopted the fol-
lowing principles. With towns, mountains, islands, and rivers
I have kept ancient names, except in cases where the modern
English name is so familiar that to retain the ancient name
would appear pedantic and alienating: thus I speak of ‘Jerusa-
lem’ (not ‘Hierosolyma’), the ‘Rhine’ (not the ‘Rhenus’), and
‘Cologne’ (not ‘Colonia Agrippinensis’). Inevitably this has
involved one or two borderline decisions that may appear
arbitrary to some readers. In all cases where the ancient name
is used, the modern name appears in the glossary, and is
xxiv translator’s note
introduction
footnoted on the occasion of the site’s first appearance in the
text.
With Roman provinces and other wide geographical areas,
I have used the ancient name except when there is both a clear
etymological link between the ancient name and the modern,
and when the area denoted by the name has remained con-
stant between then and now. For example, I speak of ‘Britain’,
‘Spain’, and ‘Italy’ (not ‘Britannia’, ‘Hispania’, and ‘Italia’);
but ‘Helvetia’ (not ‘Switzerland’), ‘Belgica’ (not ‘Belgium’),
and ‘Judaea’ (not ‘Israel’). Unfamiliar provinces may be found
on the map of the Roman Empire. It should be noted that the
names ‘Africa’ and ‘Asia’ in Roman times denoted not the
continents, but relatively small provinces in North Africa and
Asia Minor respectively.
All calendar dates have been translated into their modern
equivalents. For distances I have retained the Latin calcula-
tions in the text: thus ‘five miles’ refers to ‘Roman miles’, not
English ones. A Roman mile was around 1,618 yards, about
92 per cent of an English mile. In the introduction and notes,
all year dates are ad unless otherwise stated.
The paragraph numbers are those standardly employed to
refer to Tacitus. As usual with such paragraphing in classical
prose authors, they derive not from the ancient world, but
from early printed editions. In Tacitus’ case it is disputed
whether they originate with Gruterus’ edition or with Piche-
na’s (both published in Frankfurt in 1607).
Finally, I should like to thank those who have helped me
during the preparation of this translation: in particular Helen
DeWitt, David Hunt, Eric Levene, Norma Levene, Barbara
Levick, John Moles, Jocelyne Nelis-Clément, Leighton
Reynolds, Clemence Schultze, and especially Judith Luna of
OUP and Tony Woodman.
introduction xxv
NOTE ON THE IMPERIAL
ROMAN STATE
At the top of the tree was the emperor: he held supreme
power in the state. However, a number of functions were
devolved upon others, and there was a standard career struc-
ture followed by those members of the upper classes with
political ambitions. One would hold in succession various
political offices known as magistracies: first one became
quaestor (normal minimum age 25) then (though this step
could be omitted) either tribune (not to be confused with the
military officer with the same title: see below) or aedile. All
these had minor administrative or judicial duties. Under the
Republic tribunes had been elected to serve the interests of the
citizen body, and had then had considerable powers, including
the right of veto over senatorial enactments; hence the Em-
peror held tribunician power. Ordinary tribunes still in theory
possessed some of these powers, but it was now exception-
ally rare for them to be used. After this one might become
praetor (normal minimum age 30), with more senior func-
tions; this office also entitled one to hold various important
posts in the imperial service.
Finally one might reach the post of consul. Consuls had
been the supreme officials of the Republic, and retained con-
siderable prestige under the Empire. Two served at a time;
originally they held office for a full year, but the need to
provide ex-consuls to serve in various senior administrative
capacities led to several pairs holding the office in succession
during a year. To be first holder of the office in a calendar
year, however, was still highly prestigious, not least because
one’s name was then enshrined in the official date of that year;
the Emperor himself often took one of these slots. The consul-
ship, unlike the other magistracies, might be held more than
once by a suitably distinguished candidate.
Those who had held any one of these offices formed to-
gether the senate (along with a few others who had been
xxvi note on the imperial roman state
introduction
specifically honoured with senatorial rank). The Senate’s func-
tion was essentially advisory, though it still wielded consider-
able authority, especially at times of crisis. All magistracies
except the consulship were elected by the Senate (though the
Emperor’s support for a particular candidate guaranteed his
election). Consuls were appointed by the Emperor himself.
Occasionally two censors were appointed to review the
membership of the Senate. These would be senior ex-consuls;
one would typically be the Emperor himself. They had the
power to expel those considered unfit (see below). More com-
monly, however, the Emperor, who had censorial power,
reviewed the lists alone.
Roman Society
Rome was a strongly hierarchical society, though movement
between the classes was often possible. The laws of citizen-
ship were complex, but it by now essentially included all
descended from the early Romans and Italians, as well as
significant numbers of foreigners who had been granted it,
and could then transmit it to their descendants; it carried with
it various rights and privileges. If a citizen freed a slave, that
freedman also could claim citizenship, though with various
disabilities (which did not apply to his descendants).
The upper class was the senators, involved with the poli-
tics and administration of the state (see above). Wealthy citi-
zens who would not or (because of their lower family
background) could not be politically involved might be en-
rolled as knights (or equestrians), who likewise had con-
siderable privileges and prestige (freedmen, however, were not
normally eligible for this category). There was a property
qualification for both of these classes; periodically the cen-
sors (see above) would check the lists, and remove those
thought either morally or financially unfit.
Below them was the mass of ordinary citizens. Many of
these would have close attachments to particular members of
the upper classes, for example through having been slaves in
their households. This relationship was formalized; the in-
ferior group were known as clients, and they owed various
introduction xxix
NOTE ON ROMAN NAMES
In the late Republic a male Roman citizen generally had three
names: a personal name, a clan name, and a surname—for
example Marcus Tullius Cicero. The clan name (‘Tullius’)
would be borne not only by his extended family, but also by
various people, such as freed slaves, who gained citizenship
through him: thus Cicero’s secretary Tiro on being freed took
the name Marcus Tullius Tiro. Hence sharing a clan name
often did not involve a blood relationship.
The surname (‘Cicero’) was usually inherited within fami-
lies, though might be a nickname personal to an individual;
thus brothers, for example, might sometimes have different
surnames.
Few personal names were available to choose from: the
main ones were Appius, Aulus, Decimus, Gaius, Gnaeus,
Lucius, Marcus, Publius, Quintus, Servius, Sextus, Tiberius,
and Titus. These might be used alone by close family and
intimate friends, but outside those circles a Roman would
typically be addressed by surname alone, or by a combination
of personal name and either clan name or surname—‘Marcus
Tullius’ or ‘Marcus Cicero’.
Under the Empire, however, the situation became vastly
more complex. People often took extra surnames reflecting,
for example, adoptions or maternal family background.
People sometimes even took multiple clan names for similar
reasons. Sometimes surnames were placed first and treated as
personal names. And, while the Republican forms of address
still sometimes continued, it was far more common to refer to
someone formally by a clan name and surname together (e.g.
‘Petillius Cerialis’, not ‘Quintus Petillius’): this is the usual
practice in Tacitus. And with the single name by which people
were commonly identified, no particular rule was followed: it
might be a clan name (as with the Emperors Claudius and
Vitellius), a surname (as with the Emperors Nero, Otho, and
Vespasian), or even a personal name (as with the Emperors
Tiberius, Gaius, and Titus).
xxx noteintroduction
on roman names
Female names under the Republic had normally been
simply a feminine version of the father’s clan name—thus
Cicero’s daughter was called ‘Tullia’. Once again under the
Empire this often became more complex, and women would
sometimes have names derived from, for example, their ma-
ternal family background, or from surnames; now too women
would sometimes have more than one name.
This translation employs the names that Tacitus himself
uses; in the index, however, the full names (where these are
known) are given, to assist cross-referencing with other works
where different versions of the person’s name might be used.
Except in the cases of the Emperors Tiberius, Gaius, and
Titus, however, the alphabetization ignores the personal
names listed above: so ‘Titus Vinius’ should be looked up
under ‘Vinius’, not ‘Titus’.
introduction xxxi
NOTE ON THE TEXT
Our knowledge of Tacitus’ Histories (and of Annals Books
11–16) comes from a single eleventh-century manuscript in
Beneventan script: the so-called ‘Second Medicean’. A number
of fifteenth-century manuscripts also survive; but almost cer-
tainly these all derive from copies made from the Second
Medicean itself,1 and so give us no independent knowledge of
the text. Only at 1. 69–75 and 1. 86–2. 2, where pages are
missing from the Second Medicean, does the evidence of these
later manuscripts become vital, for they were copied before
the pages were lost.
The most widely used modern texts of Tacitus are the
Oxford Classical Text of C. D. Fisher, and the Teubner text of
H. Heubner. In cases of significant dispute, I have adopted the
following readings in this translation:
World’s Classics Fisher Heubner
1. 2 opimum †opimum opimum
1. 3 necessitates fortiter necessitates fortiter necessitates, ipsa
toleratae toleratae necessitas
fortiter tolerata
1. 11 legio [Lipsius] legiones legiones
1. 35 resistens resistens sistens
1. 41 Vercilionem Vergilionem Vercilionem
1. 43 Staius Statius Staius
1. 52 aviditate imperandi aviditate imperandi [aviditate
imperandi]
1. 58 sedatis stratis sedatis
1. 70 acciti exciti acciti
1. 76 set set et
1. 77 Saevino Propinquo †Saevino P . . . Scaevino Paquio
[Andresen]
2. 4 ardor †labor ardor
2. 9 corpus corpus caput
1
The most recent critical text of the Histories, by K. Wellesley (Stuttgart, 1989),
argues for the independence of a group of the later manuscripts, but his claims have
so far failed to receive scholarly support.
xxxii note on the text
introduction
2. 18 quin quin [qui]
2. 20 [barbarum tecgmen] [barbarum tecgmen] barbarum tegumen
2. 49 obnoxii [Wellesley] noxa noxa
2. 55 vita cessisse [Halm] cessisse cessisse
2. 100 patuit Patavii patuit
3. 5 quam iussorum †commissior† quam iussorum
3. 6–7 principia belli principia belli volgata victoria,
secundum secundum post principia
Flavianos data. Flavianos data. belli secundum
vulgata victoria vulgata victoria Flavianos data
3. 13 militibus principem militem auferre militibus principem
auferre auferre
3. 15 cursabant curabant cursabant
3. 18 forte ducti [Halm] [forte victi] forte iuncti
3. 44 inclinatus inditus inclinatus
3. 69 cecidisset cecidisset cessisset
3. 72 pretio? stetit, pretio stetit? pro pretio? stetit,
<dum> pro patria patria <dum> pro
bellavimus. bellavimus? patria
bellavimus.
3. 80 pulsantur pulsantur palantur
3. 84 aggeres aggeres aggerem
4. 4 novum bonum novum
4. 5 [regione Italiae [regione Italiae [regione Italiae]
Carecina] e Carecina] e <e> Carecinae
municipio municipio municipio
4. 6 inanior [Wellesley] maior maior
4. 12 <quo> arma arma equosque <quo> arma
equosque retinens retinens integris equosque
integris turmis turmis Rhenum retinens integris
Rhenum perrumpere . . . turmis Rhenum
perrumperet. perrumperet.
4. 13 Iulius Paulus et Iulius Paulus et Iulius Civilis et
Iulius Civilis Iulius Civilis Claudius Paulus
4. 15 proxima [occupata] proximo proxima [occupata]
†occupata†
4. 22 Romanorum Romanorum [Romanorum]
4. 28 [Romanorum [Romanorum Romanorum <in>
nomen] nomen] nomen
4. 29 concursus casus concursus
4. 35 desertos se desertos se desertos <se
derelictos>que
4. 37 incruentati, quia incruenti: in via incruentati, quia
dispersos dispersos dispersos
4. 40 iustum iudicium iustum iudicium iustam vindictam
4. 65 formido [Wellesley] condicio condicio
5. 14 sextae tertiae decimae sextae
note on the text
introduction xxxiii
In accordance with standard classical editorial conventions, [ ] indicates
an editorial deletion of words found in the manuscript; < > indicates an
editorial supplement to the manuscript; . . . signals a lacuna in the text.
† indicates that the editor regards the text as intractably corrupt.
introduction xxxvii
CHRONOLOGY OF THE LIFE OF
TACITUS AND THE PERIOD
OF THE HISTORIES
Note: a number of the dates given here are probable rather than
certainly attested. With the revolt of Civilis, accurate dates are espe-
cially hard to come by, as Tacitus himself is our only source, and he
is often vague on chronology in this section.
ad 54 Death of the Emperor Claudius; accession of Nero.
c.56 Birth of Tacitus.
68 (9 June) Suicide of Nero (1. 4). (16 June) Galba, in Spain,
learns of Nero’s death and his own elevation to the
throne.
Execution of Nymphidius Sabinus, Prefect of the Guard
(1. 5); murder of Fonteius Capito, governor of Lower
Germany, and Clodius Macer, governor of Africa (1. 7).
(Sept./Oct.) Galba enters Rome. Massacre at the Mulvian
Bridge (1. 6).
(end Nov.) Vitellius arrives in Lower Germany as gover-
nor (1. 9, 1. 52).
69 (1 Jan.) Mutiny of troops of Upper Germany (1. 12, 1.
55–6). (2–3 Jan.) The armies of Upper Germany and of
Lower Germany salute Vitellius as emperor (1. 57). (10
Jan.) Galba adopts Piso Licinianus as his successor (1. 18).
(15 Jan.) Otho declared emperor in Rome and recognized
by Praetorian Guard (1. 27–38). Murder of Galba, Vinius,
and Piso (1. 41–3). Otho recognized by the Senate (1. 47).
(Jan.–Feb.) Vitellian armies under Caecina and Valens
march on Italy (1. 62–70).
(late Feb.–early Mar.) Otho dispatches an advance guard
under Annius Gallus and Vestricius Spurinna; he sends his
fleet to Narbonese Gaul (1. 87, 2. 11).
Caecina crosses the Alps (1. 70).
(15 Mar.) Otho leaves Rome (1. 90). (second half Mar.)
Spurinna repulses Caecina from Placentia (2. 21–2).
Valens crosses into Italy.
xxxviii chronology
introduction
(5 Apr.) Battle at Castores. Caecina defeated (2. 24–6).
(c.8 Apr.) Valens joins Caecina at Cremona (2. 30). (c.10
Apr.) Othonian council of war at Bedriacum (2. 32–3).
(14 Apr.) First Battle of Bedriacum. Othonian defeat
(2. 41–5). (16 Apr.) Otho commits suicide at Brixellum
(2. 49). (19 Apr.) Vitellius recognized as emperor by
the Senate (2. 55).
(late Apr./early May) Vitellius greeted by generals at
Lyons (2. 59).
(c.24 May) Vitellius visits the battlefield at Bedriacum
(2. 70).
(June–July) Vitellius advances to Rome (2. 71, 2. 87–8).
(1 July) Vespasian proclaimed emperor at Alexandria (2.
79). (3 July) Vespasian proclaimed at Caesarea (2. 79).
(16/17 July) Vitellius enters Rome (2. 89).
(late July–Aug.) Mucianus moves west; Vespasian holds
Egypt; Titus takes command in Judaea (2. 82–3).
(late Aug./early Sept.) Antonius Primus and Arrius Varus
invade Italy (3. 6). Civilis receives a letter from Antonius
and begins to plan his rebellion (4. 13). He allies himself
with the Canninefates (4. 15–16).
(c.17 Sept.) Caecina marches to meet the invasion (2. 99–
100). (c.19 Sept.) Antonius surprises a Vitellian detach-
ment at Forum Alieni (3. 6). (c.23 Sept.) The Pannonian
legions arrive at Padua (3. 7). (c.25 Sept.) Valens marches
north from Rome (3. 36).
(late Sept./early Oct.) Civilis defeats the Roman armies
near Vetera (4. 18); he persuades the Batavian auxiliaries
to join his revolt (4. 19).
(c.4 Oct.) Antonius reaches Verona (3. 8). (c.12 Oct.) The
fleet at Ravenna declares for Vespasian (2. 101, 3. 12).
(mid-Oct.) Civilis attacks the camp at Vetera (4. 21–3);
Hordeonius Flaccus sends troops from Mogontiacum to
its relief (4. 24). (c.17 Oct.) The Moesian legions arrive at
Verona (3. 10). (18 Oct.) Caecina attempts treachery, and
is imprisoned by his army; they march towards Cremona
(3. 13–14). (22–3 Oct.) Antonius marches to intercept
them (3. 15). (24–5 Oct.) Second Battle of Bedriacum.
Vitellian forces defeated (3. 16–31). (26–9 Oct.) Sack of
Cremona (3. 32–4). (end Oct.) Civilis besieges Vetera (4.
28–30).
chronology
introduction xxxix
(early Nov.) German troops swear allegiance to Vespasian
(4. 31). (c.19 Nov.) The Vitellians hold the Apennines at
Mevania (3. 55). Vitellius himself leaves Rome a few days
later to join them. (c.20 Nov.) Antonius advances to
Fanum Fortunae (3. 50). (c.28 Nov.) Mutiny of the fleet at
Misenum (3. 57). (end Nov.) Capture of Valens (3. 43).
(c.1 Dec.) Vitellius returns to Rome (3. 56). His remaining
troops are moved to Narnia (3. 58). (c.7 Dec.) Tarracina
seized by Misenum rebels (3. 57). Antonius reaches
Carsulae (3. 60). (c.10 Dec.) Valens executed at Urbinum
(3. 62). (c.15 Dec.) Surrender of Vitellians at Narnia (3.
63). (16 Dec.) Antonius marches to Ocriculum; he sends
Cerialis ahead to Rome (3. 78). (c.17 Dec.) Lucius
Vitellius captures Tarracina (3. 77). (18 Dec.) Vitellius
tries unsuccessfully to abdicate (3. 67–8). Flavius Sabinus
besieged in the Capitol (3. 69). (19 Dec.) Capitol stormed;
Temple of Jupiter burned. Sabinus captured and killed (3.
70–4). Cerialis defeated outside Rome (3. 79). (19–20
Dec.) Antonius marches to Rome (3. 79). (20 Dec.) Cap-
ture of Rome. Vitellius killed (3. 82–5). (c.21 Dec.)
Vespasian recognized as emperor by the Senate (4. 3).
(end Dec.) Mucianus reaches Rome (4. 11). Mutiny in
Novaesium; murder of Hordeonius Flaccus. Vocula re-
lieves Mogontiacum (4. 36–7).
70 (1 Jan.) Meeting of the Senate (4. 39). (9 Jan.) Meeting of
the Senate; attack on prosecutors under Nero (4. 40–3).
(15 Jan.) Meeting of the Senate: attack on prosecutors
dropped (4. 45–5). (first half Jan.) Murder of Piso in
Africa (4. 48–50). Classicus, Tutor, and Sabinus join
Civilis’ rebellion (4. 55–6).
(Spring) Vocula advances to save Vetera, but is driven
back to Novaesium and there is murdered (4. 56–9).
Rhine army swears allegiance to Gallic Empire (4. 59–60).
(Apr./early May) Titus encamps before Jerusalem (5. 1);
John of Gischala captures the Temple from Eleazar (5.
12).
(21 June) Ceremony to begin the restoration of the Capi-
tol (4. 53).
(Summer) Mucianus and Domitian start from Rome
with reinforcements (4. 68). Petillius Cerialis reaches
Mogontiacum (4. 71); he captures Trier (4. 72–5) and the
xl chronology
introduction
rebel camp (4. 76–8). Germans massacred in Cologne (4.
79). Civilis defeats Cerialis near Vetera, but is then forced
to retreat (5. 14–19).
(Aug.) Fall of Jerusalem.
(Aug./Sept.) Vespasian leaves Alexandria for Rome.
(end Sept.) Surrender of Civilis (5. 24–6).
c.76 Tacitus embarks on his career, appointed by Vespasian to
one of the junior posts (the ‘Vigintivirate’) designed for
aspiring young politicians. His position (if Alföldy’s iden-
tification is accepted—see Introduction p. vii) was that of
decemvir stlitibus iudicandis, serving as president of
certain civil law-courts.
77 Tacitus betrothed to the daughter of the consul Julius
Agricola, future governor of Britain; he marries her
shortly after. Her name is unknown.
79 Death of Vespasian; accession of Titus.
81 Death of Titus; accession of Domitian.
81 or 82 Tacitus becomes quaestor; he may have been (following
Alföldy) quaestor Augusti, in attendance on the Emperor.
c.85 Tacitus (probably) becomes tribune.
88 Tacitus becomes praetor. By now he was also a member of
the senior college of priests called the ‘Board of Fifteen’
(the quindecimviri sacris faciundis).
89/90–3 Tacitus absent from Rome on military and/or civilian
provincial service; the precise posts are unknown, but may
well have included a term as a legionary commander.
93 Death of Agricola, Tacitus’ father-in-law.
96 Assassination of Domitian; accession of Nerva.
97 (second half) Tacitus becomes consul.
98 Death of Nerva; accession of Trajan. Tacitus publishes the
Agricola and the Germania.
100 Tacitus and his friend Pliny the Younger successfully pros-
ecute Marius Priscus for corruption while governor of
Africa.
105–6 Tacitus is by now researching and writing the Histories; it
is not known when he began.
c.109 Tacitus publishes the Histories.
112–13 Tacitus is governor of Asia.
chronology
introduction xli
c.114 Tacitus begins work on the Annals.
117 Death of Trajan; accession of Hadrian.
The date of publication of the Dialogue on Orators is unknown;
reasonable suggestions have included 102 and 107. It is fairly certain
that Tacitus outlived Trajan and was still writing the Annals in the
first part of Hadrian’s reign. Beyond this, the publication date of the
Annals and the date of Tacitus’ death are both unknown.
SALAR
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g Optimus Maximus
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5 Imperial Palace; Temple of Apollo
0 50 m 6 Tiber Island
7 Tiberius’ House
8 Hall of Liberty
a Senate House e Temple of Saturn 9 Vipsanian Arcade
b Temple of Vesta f Golden Milestone 10 Flavians’ House
c Temple of Julius g Lacus Curtius 11 Fundane Pool
d Rostra h Temple of Concord 12 Camp of the Praetorian Guard
map 1 Plan of Rome in ad 69–70
BRITAIN
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map 2 The Roman Empire in ad 69–70
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Novaria Brixia Verona
Graian Vercellae Altinum
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Turin
Placentia Hostilia Atria
? Bedriacum Po
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Regium Mutina Bononia
s Lepidum
Alp Ravenna
Cottian
Ariminum
Albingaunum
Albintimilium Fanum Fortunae
Hercules Monoecus Pisa Urbinum
Antipolis
Forum Julii
Sena
Stoechades Perusia
Islands
Mevania
Interamna
Ferentium Narnia
Ocriculum
Rome
Bovillae Anagnia
Ostia Aquinas
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Minturnae
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map 3 Northern and Central Italy in ad 69–70
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book one 1
THE HISTORIES
2 the histories
4 the histories [1, 3]
tribes. Dacia had the privilege of inflicting and receiving defeat
at our hands, and a pretender claiming to be Nero almost
deluded the Parthians also into declaring war. Now too Italy
was smitten with new disasters, or disasters it had not wit-
nessed for a long period of years. Towns along the rich coast
of Campania were swallowed by the earth or buried from
above. The city was devastated by fires, her most ancient
temples were destroyed, and the Capitol itself was fired by
Roman hands. Sacred rites were grossly profaned, and there
was adultery among the great. The sea swarmed with exiles,
and cliffs were red with blood. Worse horrors reigned in the
city. To be rich or well born, to hold office or refuse it, was a
crime: merit of any kind meant certain ruin. Nor were the
informers more hated for their crimes than for their prizes:
some carried off a priesthood or the consulship as their spoil,
others won administrative office and a place at the heart of
power: the hatred and fear they inspired worked universal
havoc. Slaves were bribed against their masters, freedmen
against their patrons, and, if a man had no enemies, he was
ruined by his friends.
3 However, the period was not so utterly barren as to yield no
examples of heroism. Mothers accompanied sons in flight,
wives followed husbands into exile: one saw here a kinsman’s
courage and there a son-in-law’s devotion: slaves obstinately
faithful even on the rack: distinguished men bravely facing the
utmost straits and matching in their end the famous deaths of
older times. Besides these manifold disasters to mankind,
there were portents in the sky and on the earth, thunderbolts
and other premonitions of good and of evil, some doubtful,
some obvious. Indeed, never has it been proved by such ter-
rible disasters to Rome or by such clear evidence that the gods
are concerned not with our peace of mind, but rather with
vengeance.
4 Before I begin my task, it seems best to go back and con-
sider the state of affairs in the city, the temper of the armies,
the condition of the provinces, and to determine the elements
of strength and weakness in the different quarters of the
world. By this means we may see not only the actual course of
[1, 5] book one 5
events, whose outcome is largely governed by chance, but also
why and how they occurred.
The death of Nero, after the first outburst of joy with which
it had been greeted, soon had aroused conflicting feelings not
only among the senators, the people, and the soldiers in the
city, but also among all the generals and their troops abroad.
It had divulged a secret of state: an emperor could be made
elsewhere than at Rome.* Still, the Senate was overjoyed.
They had immediately taken advantage of their liberty to act
under less constraint before an absent emperor, new to the
throne. The delight of the leading knights fell little short of the
Senate’s. Respectable citizens who were attached to the great
families, clients or freedmen who had seen their patrons con-
demned or exiled, now revived their hopes. The base mob,
who had grown familiar with the pleasures of the theatre and
the circus, the most degraded of the slaves, and men who had
squandered their property and lived on Nero’s discreditable
bounty, all were miserable and greedy for news.*
The troops in the city had long soaked themselves in alle- 5
giance to the Caesars, and it was more by the pressure of
intrigue than of their own inclination that they came to desert
Nero. They soon realized that the donation promised in
Galba’s name was not to be paid to them,* and that peace
would not, like war, offer opportunity for great services and
rich rewards. Since they also saw that in their bid for the new
Emperor’s favour they had been forestalled by the army which
proclaimed him, they were ripe for revolution; and they
were further incited by their villainous Prefect Nymphidius
Sabinus,* who was plotting to be emperor himself. As a
matter of fact, he was detected in the course of his plan and
was dealt with. But, though the ringleader was removed,
many of the troops still felt conscious of their treason, and
some could be heard berating Galba’s senility and avarice. His
severity—a quality once admired and set high in soldiers’
estimation—only annoyed troops whose contempt for the old
methods of discipline had been fostered by fourteen years of
service under Nero. They had come to love the emperors’ vices
as much as they had formerly feared their virtues. Moreover,
6 the histories [1, 6]
Galba had let fall a remark which augured well for Rome, but
spelt danger to himself. ‘I do not buy my soldiers,’ he said, ‘I
select them’—yet these words were inconsistent with every-
thing else that was going on.
6 Galba was old and ill. Of his two lieutenants, Titus Vinius
was the vilest of men and Cornelius Laco the laziest. Between
them, they burdened Galba with the odium of Vinius’ crimes,
and ruined him by the disdain for Laco’s inefficiency.
His march from Spain was slow and stained with blood-
shed. He executed Cingonius Varro, the consul-elect, and
Petronius Turpilianus,* an ex-consul, the former as an accom-
plice of Nymphidius, the latter as one of Nero’s generals. They
were both denied any opportunity of a hearing or defence, and
died apparently innocent. On his arrival at Rome the butchery
of thousands of unarmed soldiers* gave an ill omen to his
entry, and alarmed even the men who did the slaughter.
The city was filled with strange troops. A legion had been
brought from Spain,* and the regiment of marines enrolled by
Nero still remained. Moreover, there were several detach-
ments from Germany, Britain, and Illyricum, which had them-
selves been selected by Nero, dispatched to the Caspian Pass
for the projected war against the Albani, and subsequently
recalled to crush the revolt of Vindex.* These were all fine fuel
for a revolution; although their favour centred on nobody in
particular, they were at the disposal of anyone who had
enterprise.
7 It happened by chance that the news of the deaths of
Clodius Macer and of Fonteius Capito* arrived in Rome
simultaneously. Macer, who was undoubtedly raising a dis-
turbance in Africa, was put to death by the procurator
Trebonius Garrutianus, acting under Galba’s orders: Capito
had made a similar attempt in Germany and was killed by
two legionary commanders, Cornelius Aquinus and Fabius
Valens,* without waiting for instructions. While Capito had a
foul reputation for avarice and loose living, some people yet
believed that he had withheld his hand from treason. His
officers, they supposed, had urged him to declare war, and,
when they could not persuade him, had themselves arranged
to accuse and entrap him; Galba, from weakness of character,
[1, 9] book one 7
or perhaps because he was afraid to inquire too far, approved
what had happened for good or for ill, since it was past
alteration. At any rate both executions were unpopular.
Now that Galba was detested, everything he did, whether
right or wrong, brought upon him equal detestation. His
freedmen were all-powerful: money could do anything: his
slaves were eager to capitalize on their unexpected fortune,
and with so elderly an emperor were losing no time. The evils
of the new court were those of the old, and while equally
oppressive were not so easily excused. Even Galba’s age
seemed comic and despicable to a populace that was used to
the young Nero and compared emperors, as such people will,
in point of looks and personal attraction.*
Such, then, was the variety of feeling at Rome, as was 8
natural in so vast a population. To turn to the provinces:
Spain was under the command of Cluvius Rufus,* a man of
great eloquence, and more skilled in the arts of peace than of
war. The Gallic provinces had not forgotten Vindex: more-
over, they were bound to Galba by his recent grant of Roman
citizenship and his rebate of their tribute for the future. The
tribes, however, which lay nearest to the armies stationed in
Germany had not received these honours: some had even lost
part of their territory and were equally aggrieved when they
sized up their own injuries and their neighbours’ benefits.
The troops in Germany, proud of their recent victory, but
fearful that they had supported the wrong side, were uneasy
and indignant: a very dangerous state for so strong a force to
be in. They had been slow to desert Nero, and Verginius* had
not immediately declared for Galba. Whether he really did not
want the throne is doubtful: without question his soldiers
made him the offer. The death of Fonteius Capito aroused the
indignation even of those who had no business complaining.
However, they still lacked a leader: Galba had sent for
Verginius under a pretence of friendship, and, when he was
not allowed to return and was even subject to prosecution,
the soldiers interpreted the accusation as being against
themselves.
The army of Upper Germany felt no respect for their gover- 9
nor, Hordeonius Flaccus.* Weakened by age and an affliction
8 the histories [1, 10]
of the feet, he was without resolution or authority, and could
not have controlled even the mildest troops. These fiery spirits
were only further inflamed when they felt such a weak hand
on the reins. The legions of Lower Germany had been for
some time without a governor, until Galba’s appointee, Aulus
Vitellius, appeared. He was the son of the Lucius Vitellius
who had been censor and thrice consul;* this, it seemed, was
sufficient reason.
The army in Britain showed no bad feeling. All through the
disturbance of the civil wars no troops kept cleaner hands.
This may have been because they were so far away and
severed by the sea, or perhaps frequent engagements had
taught them to keep their rancour for the enemy. Quiet ruled
in Illyricum also, although the legions, which had been sum-
moned by Nero, while lingering in Italy had made overtures to
Verginius. But the armies lay far apart (always a sound assist-
ance to the preservation of military loyalty), and the men
could neither share vices nor join forces.
10 The East was still untroubled. Licinius Mucianus held Syria
with four legions.* He was a man who was equally talked
about in good fortune as in bad. As a youth he was ambitious
and cultivated the friendship of the great. Later he found
himself in straitened circumstances and a slippery position;
moreover, Claudius’ displeasure was suspected. He was rel-
egated to the remoteness of Asia, where he came as near to
being an exile as afterwards to being an emperor. He was a
strange mixture of luxury and industry, courtesy and arro-
gance, of good and bad. In leisure he was self-indulgent, but
he revealed considerable flair when on service. His outward
behaviour was praiseworthy, though ill was spoken of his
private life. However, with those who were under him or near
him, and with his colleagues, he gained great influence by
various devices: the sort of man who would more readily
make an emperor than be one.
The Jewish War* was being conducted by Flavius
Vespasian—appointed by Nero—with three legions. He had
no ill-will against Galba, and nothing to hope from his fall.
Indeed he had sent his son Titus to carry his compliments and
offer allegiance, an incident we must reserve for its proper
[1, 12] book one 9
place. It was only after Vespasian’s rise that we came to
believe in the mysterious movings of Providence, and sup-
posed that portents and oracles had predestined the throne for
him and his family.
Ever since the days of the deified Augustus, knights of Rome 11
have been the uncrowned kings of Egypt and of the garrison
that controls it. The province being difficult to reach, a rich
source of corn, torn and tossed by fanaticism and licentious-
ness, ignorant of law, unused to civil government, it seemed
wiser to keep it in the control of the Household.* The gover-
nor at that date was Tiberius Alexander,* himself a native of
Egypt.
Africa and its legion, now that Clodius Macer had been
executed, were ready to put up with any ruler after their
experience of a petty master. The two Mauretanias, Raetia,
Noricum, Thrace, and the other provinces governed by procu-
rators* had their sympathies determined by the neighbour-
hood of troops, and always caught their likes or dislikes from
the strongest army. The ungarrisoned provinces, and chief
amongst these Italy, were destined to be the prize of war, and
lay at the mercy of any master.
Such was the state of the Roman world when Servius Galba,
consul for the second time, and Titus Vinius his colleague,*
inaugurated the year which was their last, and almost the last
for the commonwealth of Rome.
A few days after 1 January a dispatch arrived from Belgica, 12
in which the procurator Pompeius Propinquus announced
that the legions of Upper Germany had broken their oath of
allegiance* and were clamouring for a new emperor, but that
by way of tempering their treason they referred the final
choice to the Senate and People of Rome. Galba had already
been deliberating and seeking advice from associates as to the
adoption of a successor, and this occurrence hastened his
plans. During all the preceding months this question had
undeniably formed the chief subject of gossip throughout the
country. Such discussion was eagerly craved, and went un-
checked; Galba’s age and exhaustion reinforced it. Few people
showed sound judgement or any spirit of patriotism. Many
were influenced by foolish hopes and spread self-interested
10 the histories [1, 13]
rumours pointing to some friend or patron, thereby also grati-
fying their hatred for Titus Vinius, whose unpopularity waxed
daily with his power.
Galba’s affability only served to strengthen the greedy am-
bitions of his newly powerful friends; for his weakness and
13 credulity halved the risk of crime and doubled the reward. The
power of the Emperor was divided between the consul, Titus
Vinius, and Cornelius Laco, the Prefect of the Guards; and an
influence as great was enjoyed by Icelus, one of Galba’s freed-
men, who had been given the rings of a knight* and was
accordingly called by the name of Marcianus. These three
ordinarily disagreed, and each followed his own interest in
smaller matters: but on the question of the succession they fell
into two camps. Vinius was for Marcus Otho; Laco and Icelus
were agreed not so much on any one candidate as on any
other.
Galba was aware of the friendship between Otho and
Vinius. Otho was a bachelor and Vinius had an unmarried
daughter: the gossip among the rumour-mongers was desig-
nating them the future father- and son-in-law. Galba, one may
suppose, felt some concern for his country, too. Why take the
throne from Nero, if it was to be left to Otho? Otho had led
an irresponsible boyhood and a dissolute youth, and endeared
himself to Nero by aping his sybaritism. Thus it was to Otho,
the person privy to his lusts, that Nero had entrusted the
imperial whore Poppaea Sabina, until he could get rid of
Octavia.* But then he suspected Otho of an attachment to this
same Poppaea, and removed him to the province of Lusitania
under cover of a governorship.
Otho had been popular in his administration of the prov-
ince, and was the first to join Galba’s party. Being a man of
action and the most distinguished of Galba’s officers in the
war, he had instantly conceived the hope of succeeding him,
and with each passing day grasped at it more eagerly. Most of
the soldiers were on his side, and the court supported him as
a second Nero.
14 After receiving the news of the German revolt, although
Galba still knew nothing for certain of Vitellius’ plans, he was
fearful as to the extent to which the violence of the troops
[1, 15] book one 11
might spread. He was unable to trust even the troops in the
city, so he had recourse to what seemed his sole remedy and
held an imperial election.* Besides Vinius and Laco he sum-
moned Marius Celsus,* consul-elect, and the City Prefect*
Ducenius Geminus. After prefacing a few words about his
own advanced age he ordered Piso Licinianus to be sent for;
this was either on his own initiative, or, as some believed, at
the insistence of Laco.* Laco had met Piso at Rubellius
Plautus’* house and they had formed a friendship, but he
cunningly pretended that he was supporting a stranger, and
Piso’s good repute gave colour to this policy.
Piso was a noble on both sides, being the son of Marcus
Crassus and Scribonia. There was an old-world austerity
in his face and bearing, and just critics spoke of his strict
morality: people who took a less favourable view thought him
sour. But this side of his character that the uneasy distrusted
was what commended him to the Emperor who was adopting
him.
Galba, then, is said to have taken Piso’s hand and addressed 15
him as follows:*
‘Were I a private citizen, and were I to adopt you in the
presence of the pontiffs by the usual formality of a curial
statute,* it would be an honour for me to introduce into my
family a descendant of Gnaeus Pompey and of Marcus
Crassus,* and for you it would be a distinction to add to your
noble ancestry the glories of the Sulpician and Lutatian
houses.* As it is, I have been called by the consent of gods and
men to be an emperor. Your distinguished qualities and your
patriotism have persuaded me to offer to you peacefully the
throne for which our ancestors fought on the field of battle,
and which I too won by war. In so doing I am following the
precedent set by the deified Augustus, who raised to a rank
second only to his own, first his nephew Marcellus, then his
son-in-law Agrippa, then his grandsons, and finally his step-
son Tiberius Nero.* However, while Augustus looked for a
successor in his own family, I have searched throughout the
state. Not that I lack either kinsmen or supporters in war, but
it was not through self-interest that I myself came to the
throne, and, to prove my policy in this matter, consider how
12 the histories [1, 16]
I have passed over not only my own relatives but yours. You
have an elder brother,* as noble as yourself. He would have
been worthy of this position, but you are worthier.
‘You are old enough to have outlived youthful passions.
Your life has been such that you have nothing in your past to
excuse. So far you have only experienced misfortune.* Pros-
perity probes the heart with a keener touch; misery only calls
for patience, but there is corruption in success. Loyalty, inde-
pendence, and affection are the prime virtues of the human
heart, and certainly you yourself will have the strength of
mind to retain them. But the sycophancy of others will
weaken them. Flattery and adulation will break down their
defences, and self-interest too, the bane of all sincerity. You
and I can talk plainly with each other today; yet others will
address themselves not to us but to our fortunes. To persuade
an emperor what he ought to do is a laborious task: but on
any emperor flattery is successful, even in the absence of
devotion.
16 ‘If the vast bulk of this empire could stand and keep its
balance without a guiding hand, I was a suitable person to set
in motion a republic. As it is, things have long ago come to
such a pass that neither I in my old age can give the Roman
people any better gift than a good successor, nor you in your
prime anything better than a good emperor. Under Tiberius,
Gaius, and Claudius, Rome was the heirloom of a single
family. There is a kind of liberty in the free choice we are
beginning to exercise. Now that the Julian and Claudian
house is extinct, the best man will always be discovered by
adoption. Royal birth and ancestry are the gift of fortune, and
are only valued as such. In adoption we can use a free judge-
ment, and if we wish to choose well, the voice of the country
points the way. Think of Nero, swollen with the pride of his
long line of royal ancestry. It was not Vindex with a powerless
province at his back, nor I with a single legion, that freed
Rome’s shoulders of that burden: it was his own barbarity and
profligacy. And that was before there was any precedent for
the conviction of an emperor.
‘We have been called to the throne by the sword, and by
those who thought us worthy. Our high state will not escape
[1, 18] book one 13
the eye of envy; but there is no reason for you to feel alarm
because in this world-wide upheaval a couple of legions have
not yet settled down. I myself did not succeed to a safe and
peaceful throne, and, when once the news of your adoption is
spread, I shall cease to be charged with my advanced age,
which is now the only fault they find in me. Evil men will
always miss Nero: you and I must ensure that good citizens do
not miss him too.
‘A longer sermon would ill befit the time, and I have fulfilled
my purpose if I have done right in choosing you. The soundest
and easiest criterion of right and wrong policy is to consider
what you would have approved or condemned in another
emperor. For Rome is not like the nations which are ruled by
kings, where one house is supreme and the rest are slaves.
Your future subjects are men who cannot endure the extremes
either of bondage or of freedom.’
Galba spoke these words and more to the same effect in the
tone of one creating an emperor: the others addressed Piso as
though he were emperor already. Piso is said to have betrayed 17
no sign of agitation or elation either before those who were
then present, or later when everybody’s eyes centred upon
him. His language to his Emperor and adoptive father was
deeply respectful and he spoke modestly of himself. He made
no change in his expression or bearing, showing himself more
able than anxious to rule.
A discussion then took place whether the adoption should
be announced formally before the people, or in the Senate,
or in the Guards’ camp. They decided in favour of the
camp, on the ground that it would be a compliment to the
troops, whose goodwill it was immoral to win by bounty and
bribery, but was by no means to be despised, if it could be
won by good means. Meanwhile the curiosity of the populace,
impatient of any important secret, had brought together
crowds all round the palace, and when once the rumour
began to leak out an attempt at suppression only resulted in
spreading it.
The tenth of January was a dreary wet day, and was dis- 18
rupted by an extraordinary storm of thunder and lightning
showing the displeasure of Providence. Such phenomena were
14 the histories [1, 19]
regarded in old days as a sign for the suspension of elections,
but they did not deter Galba from proceeding to the camp.
He disregarded such things as the result of pure chance—or
perhaps the blows of fate are foretold but not forestalled.
He addressed a crowded assembly of the soldiers with true
imperial brevity, stating simply that in adopting Piso he was
following the example of the deified Augustus, and the old
military custom whereby each man chose another.* He was
afraid that by suppressing the news of the German rebellion
he might only seem to exaggerate the danger, so he voluntarily
declared that the Fourth and Twenty-Second Legions* had
been led by a few traitors into seditious murmurings but no
further, and would soon return to their allegiance. He made
no attempt to enhance his words either by pandering to his
audience or by largess. However, the tribunes and centurions
and those of the soldiers who stood nearest to him gave well-
sounding answers. The rest were sorry and silent, for the war
seemed to have lost them the bounty that it had always been
essential to grant even in peace. Everybody agrees that they
could have been won over had the parsimonious old Emperor
made the least display of generosity. He was ruined by his old-
fashioned inflexibility and excessive strictness, too rigorous
for these degenerate days.
19 From the camp they proceeded to the Senate, and Galba’s
speech to its members was no fuller or finer than to the
soldiers. Piso spoke graciously, and there was no lack of
support in the Senate. Many wished him well; those who did
not were the more effusive. The majority were indifferent, but
displayed a ready servility, intent on their private speculations
without thought of the country’s good. There was no other
public speech or action from Piso during the four days which
intervened between his adoption and assassination.
Reports of the German rebellion grew daily more insistent
and the public was always ready to hear and believe any news,
provided it was bad. Accordingly the Senate had decided that
a commission must be sent to the army in Germany. It was
discussed in private whether Piso should go himself to add
dignity to the commission, since he would carry with him the
status of a Caesar, the others the authority of the Senate. It
[1, 21] book one 15
was also voted to send Laco, the Prefect of the Guards, but he
vetoed the plan. The Senate had allowed Galba to nominate
the commissioners and he showed the most atrocious indeci-
sion, now nominating members, now excusing them, now
making exchanges, yielding always to pressure from people
who wanted to go or to stay at home according as they were
determined by their hopes or their fears.
The next question was one of finance.* After investigating 20
all possible sources it seemed most reasonable to recover the
revenue from those quarters where the cause of the deficit
lay. Nero had squandered in lavish presents 2,200 million
sesterces. Galba gave instructions that these moneys should be
recovered from the individual recipients, leaving each a tithe
of their original gift. However, in each case there was scarcely
a tenth part left, for they had run through Nero’s money as
freely as they had squandered their own: the most worthless
spendthrifts had no lands or investments left, nothing but the
apparatus of their vices.
Thirty of the knights were entrusted with the duty of recov-
ering the money. This commission, for which there was no
precedent, proved burdensome owing to the numbers to re-
ceive bribes. Every quarter was beset with sales and brokers,
and unsettled by lawsuits. And yet lively satisfaction was
caused by the discovery that the beneficiaries of Nero’s bounty
were as poor as the victims of his greed.
At this time several military tribunes were cashiered,
Antonius Taurus and Antonius Naso of the Guards, Aemilius
Pacensis of the City Garrison, and Julius Fronto* of the
Watch. However, this proved no remedy. The others only
began to feel alarmed, thinking that Galba’s craft and timidity
had sacrificed individuals, while his suspicions rested on them
all.
Meanwhile Otho had nothing to hope from a peaceful 21
settlement: all his plans demanded a disturbance. Many
motives spurred him on: his extravagance would have ruined
an emperor, and his poverty was all but unendurable for a
private person: he was angry with Galba and jealous of Piso.
He also invented fears for his safety, by way of whetting his
ambition: ‘I proved a major nuisance to Nero,’ he would say,
16 the histories [1, 22]
‘and can scarcely expect the compliment of a second exile to
Lusitania. Besides, monarchs always hate and suspect the man
who is mentioned as “next to the throne”. This was what did
me harm with the elderly emperor, and it will weigh still more
with the youthful Piso, who is naturally savage and has been
exasperated by a long period of exile: Otho could well be
murdered. I must do and dare while Galba’s authority is on
the wane and Piso’s not yet established. These times of change
suit big enterprises. Inaction is more deadly than daring: there
is no call for delay. Death is the natural end for all alike, and
the only difference is between fame and oblivion afterwards.
Seeing that the same end awaits the innocent and the guilty, a
man of spirit should at least die with good cause.’
22 Otho’s character was by no means so effeminate as his
physique. His intimate freedmen and slaves, who were al-
lowed a licence unusual in private households, dangled before
him the baits for which he was greedy: the luxuries of Nero’s
court, the marriages he could make, the adulteries he could
commit, and all the other imperial pleasures. They were his,
they pointed out, if he had the courage—it was shameful to lie
quiet and leave them to others.
He was also incited by the astrologers, who declared that
their study of the stars pointed to great changes and a year of
glory for Otho. People of this class always betray the powerful
and deceive the ambitious; we shall go on for ever proscribing
them and keeping them by us.* Poppaea had always had
her boudoir full of these astrologers, the worst kind of outfit
for a royal marriage. One of them, called Ptolemy, had gone
with Otho to Spain and foretold that he would outlive Nero.
This came true and Otho believed in him. Now, basing him-
self on his own calculations, and the gossip of those who
reckoned up Galba’s age and Otho’s youth, he had persuaded
him that he would ascend the throne. But Otho accepted the
prophecy as if it was the signal of fate revealed by a skilled
practitioner: human nature always likes to believe what it
cannot understand. Nor was Ptolemy himself slow to incite
his master to crime, which lies only a short step from such
ambitions.
[1, 25] book one 17
But it is unclear whether Otho’s criminal designs were in 23
fact suddenly conceived. He had long been courting the good-
will of the soldiers, either in the hope of being adopted by
Galba or to prepare the way for treason. On the road from
Spain, while the men were marching or on outpost duty, he
would address the longest-serving soldiers by name, remind-
ing them how he and they had served together under Nero,
and calling them his comrades. He renewed acquaintance with
some, asked after others and helped them with money or
influence, frequently letting fall complaints and ambiguous
remarks about Galba, and using all the other arts which work
upon uneducated minds. The soldiers grumbled bitterly at
the exertions of the march, the shortage of provisions, and the
strict discipline. What they were used to was a journey to the
Campanian Lakes or Greek seaports on board ship—they
found it hard to struggle over the Pyrenees and Alps, and
march immense distances under arms.
While the soldiers were thus already fired with discontent, 24
Maevius Pudens, one of Tigellinus’* intimates, had added fuel
to their feelings by luring on all who were naturally unstable
or in need of money, and who were consequently rashly eager
for a change. Eventually, whenever Galba dined with Otho,
Maevius went to the length of presenting 100 sesterces to each
of the soldiers on guard, on the pretext of feasting them. This
system of public largess Otho extended by making presents in
confidence to individuals, and such spirit did he show in
bribery that when a member of the Body Guard, Cocceius
Proculus, brought an action to claim part of his neighbour’s
farm, Otho bought the whole property out of his own pocket
and gave it to him. He was enabled to do this by the ineffi-
ciency of the Prefect Laco, who was no less blind to notorious
than to secret scandals.
Otho now put Onomastus, one of his freedmen, in charge 25
of the projected crime, and Onomastus took into his confi-
dence Barbius Proculus, an aide-de-camp, and a subaltern
named Veturius, both in the Body Guard. Having assured
himself in a wide-ranging conversation that they were both
bold and cunning, Otho proceeded to load them with bribes
[1, 29] book one 19
view a good one, favourable to his plans.* In a few moments
his freedman Onomastus announced that the architect and
contractors were waiting to see him. This had been agreed
upon as the signal that the troops were assembling and the
conspiracy was ripe. On being asked where he was going,
Otho pretended that he was buying an old property, but
suspected its condition and so had to inspect it first. Thus,
leaning on his freedman’s shoulder, he passed through
Tiberius’ House into the Velabrum and thence to the Golden
Milestone* at the foot of the Temple of Saturn. There twenty-
three soldiers of the Body Guard saluted him as emperor.
When he showed alarm at the smallness of their number they
put him hastily into a litter, and, drawing their swords, hur-
ried him away. About the same number of soldiers joined
them on the way, some accomplices, most merely curious.
Some marched along shouting and flourishing swords; others
kept silent, intending to take their cue from subsequent events.
Julius Martialis was the tribune on duty in the camp. He led 28
most people to suppose he was in the plot, either because of
the magnitude of this unexpected crime, or else because he
was afraid that the treason was widespread in the camp, and
that he might be killed if he offered any opposition. So too the
other tribunes and centurions all preferred present safety to a
risky loyalty. In fact the general attitude was this: few dared
to undertake so foul a crime, many wished it done, and
everybody would condone it.
Meanwhile Galba, in total ignorance and intent upon his 29
sacrifices, continued to importune the gods of an empire that
had already ceased to be his. First there came a rumour that
some one or other of the senators was being hurried to the
camp, then that it was Otho. Immediately people who had
met Otho came flocking in from all quarters of Rome; some in
their terror exaggerated the truth, some minimized it, remem-
bering even then to flatter. After discussion it was decided that
the temper of the cohort on guard in the palace should be
tested, but not by Galba himself. His authority was held in
reserve for the time when stronger medicine was required.
The troops were summoned. Piso, standing out on the steps
of the palace, addressed them as follows:
20 the histories [1, 30]
‘Fellow-soldiers, it is now five days since I was made a
Caesar. I knew nothing of the future nor whether the name
was more to be desired or feared. It now lies with you to
decide whether or not my adoption is to prove a calamity for
my house and for my country. In saying this, I do not dread
disaster on my own account. I have known misfortune, and I
am at this very moment discovering that prosperity is just as
dangerous. But for the sake of my adoptive father, of the
Senate, and of the whole empire, I deplore the thought that we
may have today either to die or—what for good men is as
wretched—to kill. In the recent revolution our comfort was
that Rome was spared the sight of blood,* and the transfer
was effected without disturbance; and we thought that my
adoption would be a safeguard against an outbreak of civil
war even after Galba’s death.
30 ‘I will make no claims for myself as to rank or respectabil-
ity. To compare myself with Otho, I need not recite my
virtues. His vices are all he has to be proud of. They ruined the
empire, even when he was playing the part of an emperor’s
friend. Why should he deserve to be emperor? For his swag-
gering demeanour? For his effeminate costume? Extravagance
deceives some people: they take it for liberality. They are
wrong. He will know how to squander money, but not how to
give it away. His mind is full of seductions and debauchery
and intrigues with women. These are in his eyes the rewards of
the throne. And the lusts and pleasures of these vices would be
all his, the blushes of shame would be everybody’s. No man
has ever ruled well who won the throne in infamy.
‘The whole of mankind agreed to give Galba the title of
Caesar. Galba with your approval gave that title to me. Even
if the “country”, the “Senate”, the “people”, are empty terms,
it is in your interest, my fellow-soldiers, to see that it is not the
rascals who create an emperor. From time to time one hears of
the legionaries being in mutiny against their generals. But your
good faith and your good name have stood to this day unim-
paired. It was not you who deserted Nero: he deserted you.
Are you going to allow less than thirty deserters and renegades
to bestow the crown? Why, no one would tolerate their choos-
ing so much as a centurion or a tribune for themselves! Are
[1, 32] book one 21
you going to allow this precedent, and by your acquiescence
make their crime your own? You will soon see this lawless
spirit spreading to the troops abroad: we will suffer from the
treason, you from the war. Besides, innocence wins you as
much as the murder of your Emperor: you will get from us as
large a bounty for your loyalty* as you would from others for
your crime.’
The members of the Body Guard dispersed. The rest of the 31
cohort paid some heed to his speech. Aimlessly, as happens in
moments of confusion, they seized their standards, without as
yet any fixed plan, and not, as was afterwards believed, to
cloak their treachery. Marius Celsus had been dispatched
to the select detachments of the Illyrian army, which were
quartered in the Vipsanian Arcade,* while instructions had
been given to two senior centurions, Amullius Serenus and
Domitius Sabinus, to summon the German troops from the
Hall of Liberty. They distrusted the legion of marines, who
had been alienated by Galba’s butchery of their comrades on
his entry into Rome. Three officers of the Guards, Cetrius
Severus, Subrius Dexter, and Pompeius Longinus, also hurried
to the camp in the hope that the mutiny was still in its early
stages and might be averted by good advice before it came to
a head. The soldiers attacked Subrius and Cetrius with threats
and forcibly seizing Longinus disarmed him, because his loy-
alty to his Emperor was in virtue not of his military rank, but
of his personal friendship for Galba, and consequently the
rebels suspected him all the more. The marines without any
hesitation joined the Guards. The select Illyrian detachments
drove Celsus away at the point of their javelins. The German
detachments wavered for some time. They were still in poor
condition physically, and inclined to be passive.* Nero had
dispatched them as an advance guard to Alexandria; the long
voyage back again had damaged their health, and Galba was
restoring their strength with lavish care.
The whole populace of Rome was now crowding into the 32
palace together with a good sprinkling of slaves. With dis-
cordant shouts they demanded the death of Otho and the
destruction of the conspirators. They might have been in the
circus or the theatre, clamouring for entertainment. There was
22 the histories [1, 33]
neither sense nor sincerity in their behaviour: on that same
day they were going to clamour for the opposite with equal
zeal. But it is an established custom to flatter any emperor
with unbridled cheering and meaningless enthusiasm.
Meanwhile, Galba was torn between two opinions. Titus
Vinius maintained that they ought to remain within the pal-
ace, employ the slaves to offer resistance, and block up all the
doors, instead of going out to face the angry troops. ‘This will
give time’, he urged, ‘for the disloyal to repent and the loyal to
unite their forces. Crimes profit by haste, good counsels by
delay. Besides, if need be, we shall have the same chance of
leaving the palace later: if we leave and repent of it, our return
will depend upon other people.’
33 All the others voted for immediate action before the con-
spiracy, still weak in strength and numbers, could expand.
‘Otho’, they argued, ‘will soon panic. He crept away by
stealth and was carried to a parcel of strangers, and now
because we dally and waste time he has leisure to rehearse his
part of emperor. What is the good of waiting until he sets his
camp in order, invades the Forum, and approaches the Capi-
tol, while Galba looks on? Our Emperor is distinguished and
his friends gallant—as long as they do not step over the
threshold. Are they to close up the house, as if they were
anxious to endure a siege? Much help may we hope from
slaves, when once the vast crowd loses its unity, and its first
indignation, which counts for so much, begins to cool. No,
cowardice is too risky. Or if we must fall, let us meet the
danger halfway, and cover Otho with disgrace, ourselves with
honour.’
When Vinius resisted this proposal, Laco assailed him with
threats, prompted by Icelus, who persisted in his private quar-
34 rel to the ruin of his country. Galba without further delay
supported those whose plan would look best. However, Piso
was first dispatched to the camp. The young man had a great
name, his popularity was still fresh, and moreover he disliked
Titus Vinius, or, if he did not, rancour made men hope he did:
it is so easy to believe in hatred.
Scarcely had Piso departed, when there arrived a rumour
that Otho had been killed in the camp.* At first it was vague
[1, 36] book one 23
and uncertain, but eventually, as so often happens with daring
lies, people began to assert that they had been present and
seen the deed. Some were glad and some indifferent, so the
news gained easy credence. Many, however, thought that the
report had been concocted and disseminated by friends of
Otho, who now mingled in the crowd and tried to lure Galba
out by spreading this agreeable falsehood.
At this point not only the populace and the ignorant mob, 35
but many of the knights and senators as well, broke out into
applause and unbridled enthusiasm. With their fear they had
lost their caution. Breaking open the palace gates they rushed
in and presented themselves before Galba, complaining that
they had been forestalled in the task of revenge. All the cow-
ards who, as events proved, could show no courage in action,
indulged in bombastic words and defiant language. Nobody
knew, everybody pontificated. At last, for lack of the truth,
Galba yielded to the consensus of error. When he had put on
his breastplate he was lifted in a chair, for he was too old and
infirm to stand against the crowds that kept flocking in. In the
palace he was met by Julius Atticus, of the Body Guard, who
displayed a bloody sword and shouted out that he had killed
Otho. ‘Comrade,’ said Galba, ‘who ordered you?’ Galba had
a remarkable power of curbing soldiers’ presumption, for he
was not afraid of threats nor corrupted by flattery.
Meanwhile, in Otho’s camp there was no longer any doubt 36
of the soldiers’ unanimity. Such was their enthusiasm that
they were not content with carrying Otho shoulder-high in
procession; they placed him among the standards on the
platform, where shortly before a gilt statue of Galba had
stood, and made a ring round him with their colours. Trib-
unes and centurions were allowed no approach: the com-
mon soldiers even called out, ‘Beware of the officers.’ The
whole camp resounded with confused shouts of mutual
encouragement.
It was quite unlike the motley shouts and spiritless flattery
of a civilian mob. As new adherents streamed in, directly the
soldiers caught sight of one of them, they grasped him by the
hand, flung their arms round him, kept him at their side, and
dictated the oath of allegiance. Some commended their gen-
24 the histories [1, 37]
eral to his soldiers, and some the soldiers to their general.
Otho, for his part, was not slow to salute the crowd with
outstretched hand and throw kisses to them. In every way he
played the slave to gain a throne.
When the whole legion of the marines had sworn allegiance,
he gained confidence in his strength, and, considering that
those whom he had earlier incited individually needed a few
words of general encouragement, he stood out on the rampart
of the camp and began as follows:
37 ‘In what guise I come forward to address you, fellow-
soldiers, I cannot tell. Dubbed emperor by you, I dare not call
myself a private citizen: yet “emperor” I cannot say with
another on the throne. And what am I to call you? That too
will remain in doubt until it is decided whether you have here
in your camp an enemy or an emperor of Rome. You hear
how they clamour at once for my death and your punishment?
So clear is it that we must fall or stand together.
‘Doubtless Galba—such is his clemency—has already
promised our destruction. Is he not the man who entirely
unbidden butchered thousands of utterly innocent soldiers? I
shudder whenever I recall his ghastly entry into the city, when
before the face of Rome he ordered the decimation of the
troops who had surrendered, had pleaded for mercy, and
had been taken under his protection. That is Galba’s only
“victory”. These were the auspices under which he made his
entry; and what glory has he brought to the throne he occu-
pies, save the murder of Obultronius Sabinus and Cornelius
Marcellus in Spain, of Betuus Cilo in Gaul, of Fonteius Capito
in Germany, of Clodius Macer in Africa, of Cingonius on his
march to Rome, of Turpilianus in the city, and of Nymphidius
in the camp? What province is there in the empire, what
military camp, that has not been polluted with massacre? He
calls it “salutary correction”. For his “remedies” are what
other people call crimes: his cruelty is disguised as “strict-
ness”, his avarice as “economy”, while by “discipline” he
means punishing and insulting you.
‘It is but seven months since Nero’s death, and already
Icelus alone has embezzled more than all the depredations of
the Polyclituses and Vatiniuses and Aegialuses* put together.
[1, 39] book one 25
Vinius would have been less greedy and lawless in his rapacity
had he been emperor himself. As it is, he has kept us in
subjection as if we belonged to him, yet has despised us as the
property of another. His own fortune alone could provide the
largess which they daily cast in your teeth but never pay into
your pocket.
‘Nor in Galba’s successor either is there any hope for you. 38
Galba has seen to that. He has recalled from exile the man
whose avarice and sour temper he judged most like his own.
You witnessed for yourselves, my comrades, the extraordi-
nary storm which signified even Heaven’s abhorrence at that
ill-starred adoption. The Senate and People of Rome feel the
same. They are counting on your courage. You alone can
give strength to the right policy: it is powerless without you,
however good it be.
‘It is not to war and danger that I call you. All the troops are
with us. That single plain-clothes cohort* is no longer a de-
fence to Galba, but his gaoler. When once they have caught
sight of you, when once they come to take their orders from
me, the only quarrel between you will be who can do most to
put me in their debt. There is no room for delay in plans which
cannot be commended until they are put into action.’
Otho then gave orders to open the arsenal.* The soldiers
immediately seized their arms in such haste that all the ordi-
nary distinctions of the service were neglected: neither Guards
nor legionaries carried their own arms: in the confusion they
took the helmets and shields of the auxiliaries. There were
no tribunes or centurions to encourage them: each man was
his own leader and motivator, and villains found their chief
incentive in the consternation of the good.
As the riot increased, Piso, alarmed by the din of their 39
shouts, which echoed even in the city, had overtaken Galba,
who had meanwhile left the palace and was approaching the
Forum. Marius Celsus had also brought back no good news.
Some were for returning to the palace, others for seeking the
shelter of the Capitol, many for seizing the Rostra.* The
majority merely disagreed with other people’s proposals, and,
as so often happens in disasters, the best course always seemed
the one for which it was now too late.
26 the histories [1, 40]
It is said that Laco, without Galba’s knowledge, proposed
the assassination of Titus Vinius, either with the idea that his
execution would be a sop to the soldiers, or because he be-
lieved him Otho’s accomplice, or, as a last alternative, hatred
may have been his motive. However, the time and the place
both bred misgivings. When killing once begins it is difficult to
set a limit: besides, their plans were upset by the arrival of
terrified messengers, by the desertion of their supporters, and
by a general waning of enthusiasm among those who at first
had been the keenest to display their loyalty and courage.
40 Galba was driven hither and thither by the tide of the
surging mob. Everywhere the temples and public buildings
were crowded with spectators, who viewed a sorry scene. No
shouts came from the common people: astonishment was on
their faces, and their ears open to every sound. There was
neither uproar nor quiet, but the silence of strong anger and
alarm.
However, a report reached Otho that the populace was
arming. He bade his men fly headlong to forestall the danger.
Off went the Roman soldiers as if they were going to drag
Vologaeses or Pacorus from the ancestral throne of the
Arsacids*—and not to butcher their own Emperor, a helpless
old man. Savage and armed, they broke at a full gallop into
the Forum, scattering the populace and trampling senators
under foot. Neither the sight of the Capitol nor the sanctity of
the temples towering above them, nor the thought of Roman
emperors past and to come, deterred them from committing
that crime which the next successor always avenges.
41 Seeing the armed ranks now close at hand, the standard-
bearer of the cohort on guard over Galba—tradition says his
name was Atilius Vercilio—tore off the effigy of Galba* and
flung it to the ground. This signal clearly showed that all the
troops were for Otho: the people fled, deserting the Forum,
and swords were drawn against any who lingered. Near the
Lacus Curtius* Galba was precipitated from his chair by the
panic of the bearers and flung to the ground. The accounts of
his last words vary according as they are prompted by hatred
or admiration. Some say that he begged and asked what harm
he had deserved, imploring for a few days’ respite to pay the
[1, 44] book one 27
troops their largess. The majority say that he deliberately
offered his neck to the blow and bade them, ‘Come, strike, if
it serves the country’s need.’ Whatever he said mattered little
to his assassins.
As to the actual murderer there is a difference of opinion.
Some say it was Terentius, a reservist, others that his name
was Laecanius. The most common account is that a soldier of
the Fifteenth Legion, by name Camurius, pierced his throat
with a sword-thrust. The others foully mutilated his arms
and legs (his breast was protected) and with bestial savagery
continued to stab the headless corpse.
Then they made for Titus Vinius. Here, too, there is a doubt 42
whether the immediate fear strangled his voice, or whether he
called out that they had no mandate from Otho to kill him. He
may have invented this in his terror, or it may have been a
confession of his complicity in the plot. His whole life and
reputation give reason to suppose that he was an accomplice
in the crime of which he was the cause. He was brought to the
ground in front of the temple of the deified Julius by a blow on
the back of the knee, and afterwards a common soldier named
Julius Carus ran him right through with a sword.
However, Romans now can look to one hero that day. This 43
was Sempronius Densus, a centurion of the Praetorian
Guards, who had been assigned by Galba to protect Piso.*
Drawing his dagger he faced the armed assassins, flinging their
treason in their teeth, and by his shouts and gestures turned
their attention upon himself, thus enabling Piso to escape
despite his wounds.
Piso, reaching the Temple of Vesta, was mercifully sheltered
by the public slave, who hid him in his lodging. There his
immediate death was postponed, but thanks to his conceal-
ment rather than any reverence shown towards religious ob-
servances. Eventually Otho, who was burning to have him
killed, dispatched expressly for that purpose Sulpicius Florus
of the British auxiliaries, whom Galba had recently enfran-
chised, and Staius Murcus of the Body Guard. They dragged
Piso forth and butchered him on the threshold of the temple.
None of his murders pleased Otho so much as this. On 44
Piso’s head, as on no other, they say, he gazed with insatiable
28 the histories [1, 45]
eyes. This was possibly the first moment at which he felt
relieved of all anxiety, and free to indulge his glee. Or perhaps,
in the case of Galba and of Vinius, the recollection of his
treason to the one and his friendship with the other had
troubled even his unfeeling heart with gloomy thoughts;
whereas Piso being an enemy and a rival, he considered it a
pious duty to gloat over his murder.
Their heads were fixed on poles and carried along with the
standards of the cohorts side by side with the eagle of the
legion. Those who had done the deed and those who had
witnessed it vied with each other in displaying their bloody
hands, all boasting of their share, some falsely, some truly, as
if it were a fine and memorable exploit. Vitellius subsequently
discovered more than 120 petitions demanding rewards for
distinguished services rendered on that day. He gave orders to
search out all the petitioners and put them to death. This was
not out of respect for Galba: he merely followed the tradi-
tional custom by which emperors secure their present safety
and posthumous vengeance.
45 You would have thought the Senate and people different
men. There was a general rush for the camp, every one push-
ing ahead of his neighbour and trying to overtake those in
front. They heaped insults on Galba, praised the prudence
of the troops, and covered Otho’s hand with kisses, their
extravagance in inverse proportion to their sincerity. Otho
rebuffed no one, and succeeded by his words and looks in
moderating the soldiers’ greed and menaces. They loudly de-
manded the execution of Marius Celsus, the consul-elect, who
had remained Galba’s faithful friend to the last. They were as
much offended at his efficiency and honesty as if these had
been criminal qualities. What they obviously wanted was to
find a first excuse for plunder and murder and the destruction
of all decent citizens. But Otho had as yet no influence to
prevent crimes: he could only order them. So he simulated
anger, giving instructions for Celsus’ arrest, and, by promising
that he should meet with a worse penalty, rescued him from
immediate death.
46 The will of the soldiers was henceforward supreme.* The
Praetorian Guards chose their own Prefects, Plotius Firmus, a
[1, 47] book one 29
man who had risen from the ranks to the post of Chief of the
Watch, and joined Otho’s side before Galba’s fall, and
Licinius Proculus, an intimate friend of Otho, and therefore
suspected of furthering his plans. They made Flavius Sabinus
City Prefect, therein following Nero’s choice, under whom
Sabinus had held that post;* besides, most of them had an eye
to the fact that he was Vespasian’s brother.
An urgent demand arose that the customary fees to
centurions for granting exemptions from duties should be
abolished, for they constituted a sort of annual tax upon the
common soldier. The result had been that a quarter of each
company could be scattered on leave, or else lounge idly about
the barracks, so long as they paid the centurion his fee. Nor
was there anyone to care about either the amount of this
impost or the means by which the soldiers raised the money:
they purchased leisure by highway robbery or menial service.
Then, again, a soldier who had money was savagely burdened
with work until he should buy exemption. Thus he became
impoverished, and moreover enervated by idleness, and re-
turned to his company no longer a man of means and energy
but penniless and lazy. So the process went on. One after
another they became debased by the same poverty and lax
discipline, rushing blindly into quarrels and mutiny, and, as a
last resource, into civil war.* Otho was afraid that bribing the
rank and file would alienate the centurions, and promised to
pay the annual exemption-fees out of his imperial exchequer.
This was indubitably a sound reform, which good emperors
have since established as a regular institution in the army.
The Prefect Laco, Otho pretended to banish to an island;
but he was stabbed by a reservist who had been sent ahead
to murder him.* Marcianus Icelus, as a freedman, Otho
sentenced to public execution.
Thus the day was spent in crimes; but the ultimate evil was 47
the joy they caused. The Senate was summoned by the Urban
Praetor. The other magistrates all vied in flattery. The senators
arrived post-haste. They decreed to Otho the powers of the
tribunate, the title of Augustus, and all the imperial preroga-
tives. They all strove to blot out their former insults and abuse
of him; but, as these had been hurled equally from all sides,
30 the histories [1, 48]
they did not, as far as anyone could see, stick in his memory.
Whether he had laid aside his resentment or only postponed
punishment, his reign was too short to show.
He was then carried through the still blood-drenched
Forum among the piles of dead bodies to the Capitol, and
thence to the palace. He granted permission to burn and bury
the bodies of his victims. Piso’s wife Verania and his brother
Scribonianus laid out his body, and this was done for Vinius
by his daughter Crispina. They had to search for the heads
and buy them back from the murderers, who had preserved
them for sale.
48 Piso was nearly 31. His reputation was better than his
fortune. His brothers had been executed,* Magnus by
Claudius, Crassus by Nero. He himself after being long in
exile was a Caesar for four days. Hastily adopted in prefer-
ence to his elder brother, the only advantage he reaped was to
be killed first.
Titus Vinius in his fifty-seven years* had displayed strange
contrasts of character. His paternal ancestors included
praetors; his mother’s father was one of the proscribed.* A
scandal* marked his first military service under the command
of Calvisius Sabinus. The commander’s wife suffered from an
untoward desire to inspect the site of the camp, which she
entered by night disguised in soldier’s uniform. There she
brazenly tried her hand at the guard and other military duties,
and then had the effrontery to commit adultery in the com-
mander’s own quarters. In this scandal Titus Vinius was con-
victed as the guilty man. He was therefore put in irons by
order of Gaius Caesar. However, times soon changed, and he
was set at liberty.
After mounting the ladder of office without check, he was
as an ex-praetor given the command of a legion, and proved
successful. But soon again he soiled his reputation with the
ignoble charge that he had stolen a gold cup from Claudius’
dinner-table. Claudius on the next day gave orders that Vinius
alone of all his guests should be served on earthenware. How-
ever, Vinius’ governorship of Narbonese Gaul was strict and
honest. Subsequently his friendship with Galba drew him over
the precipice. He was bold, cunning, and efficient, with equal
[1, 50] book one 31
power for industry or for corruption, according to his mood.
Vinius’ will was annulled because of his great wealth. Piso was
poor, so his last wishes were respected.
Galba’s body lay long neglected, and under cover of dark- 49
ness was subjected to numerous insults. Eventually his stew-
ard Argius, one of his former slaves, gave it a humble funeral
in Galba’s private garden. His head, which the camp-
followers and servants had mangled and carried on a pole,
was found next day in front of the tomb of Patrobius (one of
Nero’s freedmen whom Galba had executed) and buried with
the body which had already been cremated.
Such was the end of Servius Galba, who for seventy-three
years had enjoyed prosperity under five different emperors,
happier in their reign than his own. He came of an old and
noble family and possessed great wealth. His own character
was mediocre, rather free from vices than rich in virtues.
Though not indifferent to fame, he did not flaunt it. Not
greedy of other people’s money, he was careful of his own,
and a miser with public funds. Towards friends and freedmen,
if they happened to be honest, he was irreproachably tolerant;
when they were not, he was culpably blind. But his distin-
guished origin and the perils of the time disguised his apathy,
which passed as prudence. In the flower of his youth he served
with distinction in Germany. As pro-consul he governed
Africa wisely, and in later years showed the same fairness
in Nearer Spain.* When he was a commoner he seemed too
big for his station: the universal view was that he had the
qualifications to be a ruler—if only he had not ruled.
The city was in a panic. The alarm aroused by the recent 50
atrocious crime and by Otho’s well-known proclivities was
further increased by the fresh news about Vitellius. This news
had been suppressed before Galba’s murder, and it was be-
lieved that only the army of Upper Germany had revolted.
Now when they saw that the two men in the world who were
most notorious for immorality, indolence, and extravagance
had been, as it were, appointed by Providence to ruin the
empire, not only the senators and knights who had some stake
and interest in the country, but the masses as well, openly
deplored their fate. Their talk was no longer of the recent
32 the histories [1, 51]
specimens of bloody peace: they reverted to the records of the
civil wars, the taking and retaking of Rome by her own
troops, the devastation of Italy, the pillage of the provinces,
the battles of Pharsalia, Philippi, Perusia, and Mutina,* those
bywords of national disaster. ‘The world was turned upside
down’, they mused, ‘even when good men fought for the
throne: yet the Roman Empire survived the victories of Julius
Caesar and of Augustus, as the Republic would have survived
had Pompey and Brutus been victorious. But now—are we to
go into temples and pray for Otho or for Vitellius? To pray for
either would be impious. It would be wicked to offer vows for
the success of either in a war of which we can only be sure that
the winner will prove the worse.’
Some predicted the intervention of Vespasian* and the
armies of the East. He was preferable to either of the others;
still they shuddered at the thought of a fresh war and fresh
bloodshed. Besides, Vespasian’s reputation was doubtful. He
was the first emperor who ever changed for the better.
51 I must now explain the origin and causes of the rising of
Vitellius. After the slaughter of Julius Vindex and his whole
force, the troops were in high spirits at the fame and booty
they had acquired. Without toil or danger they had won a
most profitable victory. So they were all for marching against
the enemy: plunder seemed better than pay. They had endured
a long and unprofitable service, rendered the more irksome by
the country and climate and by the strict discipline observed.
But discipline, however relentless in time of peace, is always
relaxed in civil wars, when temptation stands on either hand
and treachery goes unpunished.
Men, armour, and horses they had in abundance for use
and for show. But, whereas before the war the soldiers only
knew the men of their own company or troop, and the provin-
cial frontier* separated the armies, now, having once joined
forces against Vindex, they had gained a knowledge of their
own strength and of the Gallic provinces, and were looking
for more fighting and fresh quarrels, calling the Gauls no
longer allies, as before, but ‘our enemies’ or ‘the vanquished’.
They had also the support of the Gallic tribes on the banks of
the Rhine, who had espoused their cause and were now the
[1, 52] book one 33
most eager to rouse them against ‘the Galbians’, as they now
called them, despising the name of Vindex. So, cherishing
hostility against the Sequani and Aedui,* and against all the
other communities in proportion to their wealth, they drank
in dreams of sacking towns and pillaging fields and looting
houses, inspired partly by the peculiar failings of the strong—
greed and vanity—and partly also by a feeling of irritation at
the insolence of the Gauls, who boasted, to the chagrin of the
army, that Galba had remitted a quarter of their tribute and
had made grants to their community.*
Further fuel was added by a rumour, cunningly circulated
and rashly credited, that the legions were being decimated and
all the most enterprising centurions discharged. From every
side came alarming news and sinister reports from the city.
The colony of Lyons was up in arms, and its stubborn attach-
ment to Nero* made it a hotbed of rumour. But in the camp
itself the soldiers’ hatreds and fears, and (when once they had
realized their strength) their feeling of security, furnished the
richest material for lies and won them easy credence.
In the preceding year, shortly before the beginning of 52
December, Aulus Vitellius had entered Lower Germany and
held a careful inspection of the winter quarters of the legions.
He had restored many to their rank, remitted degrading pen-
alties, and relieved those who had suffered disgrace, acting
mainly from ambitious motives, but partly also upon sound
judgement. Amongst other things he had showed impartiality
in remedying the injustices due to the mean and rapacious way
in which Fonteius Capito had issued promotions and reduc-
tions. The soldiers did not judge Vitellius’ actions as those of
a consular governor: they took him for something more, and,
while the strict found him undignified, his supporters spoke of
his affability and beneficence, because he showed neither
moderation nor judgement in making presents out of his own
money and squandering other people’s. Besides, they were so
greedy for power that they took even his vices for virtues.
In both armies there were plenty of quiet, law-abiding men,
as well as many who were unprincipled and energetic. But for
sheer reckless cupidity none could match two of the legionary
commanders, Alienus Caecina and Fabius Valens. Valens was
34 the histories [1, 53]
hostile to Galba, because, after unmasking Verginius’ hesita-
tion and thwarting Capito’s designs, he considered that he had
been treated with ingratitude: so he incited Vitellius by point-
ing out to him the enthusiasm of the troops. ‘You’, he would
say to him, ‘are famous everywhere, and you need find no
obstacle in Hordeonius Flaccus. Britain will join and the
German auxiliaries will flock to your standard. Galba cannot
trust the provinces; the old man holds the empire on suffer-
ance; the transfer can be soon effected, if only you will spread
open your cloak and go to welcome your good fortune.
Verginius was quite right to hesitate. He came of a family of
knights, and his father was a nobody. He would have failed,
had he accepted the empire: his refusal saved him. Your father
was thrice consul, and he was censor with an emperor for his
colleague. That long ago gave you imperial dignity, and makes
it unsafe for you to remain a private citizen.’
These promptings spurred on Vitellius’ sluggish nature to
form desires, but hardly hopes.
53 Caecina, on the other hand, in Upper Germany, was a
handsome youth, whose big build, imperious spirit, clever
tongue, and upright carriage had enticed the soldiers to his
side. While quaestor in Baetica he had promptly joined
Galba’s party, and in spite of his youth had been given com-
mand of a legion. Later he was found to have misappropriated
public funds, and, on Galba’s orders, was prosecuted for
peculation. Highly indignant, Caecina determined to embroil
the world, and veil the injuries he had sustained with the ruin
of his country.
Nor were seeds of dissension lacking in the army. The entire
force had taken part in the war against Vindex, nor was it
until after Nero’s death that they joined Galba’s side, and even
then they had been anticipated in swearing allegiance by the
detachments of Lower Germany. Then again the Treviri
and Lingones,* and the other communities which Galba had
punished by issuing harsh edicts and confiscating part of
their territory, were in close communication with the winter
quarters of the legions. They began to talk treason: the sol-
diers degenerated in civilian society. All that was wanted was
[1, 55] book one 35
someone to avail himself of the support they had offered to
Verginius.
Following an ancient custom, the tribe of the Lingones had 54
made a present of a pair of silver hands to the legions as a
symbol of hospitality. Assuming the squalid appearance of
one in mourning, their envoys made the round of the officers’
quarters and the soldiers’ tents complaining of their own
wrongs and of the rewards lavished on neighbouring tribes.
Finding the soldiers ready to listen, they made inflammatory
allusions to the army itself, bewailing its dangers and
humiliation.
Mutiny was almost ripe, when Hordeonius Flaccus ordered
the envoys to withdraw, and, in order to secure the secrecy of
their departure, gave instructions to them to leave the camp by
night.* This gave rise to an alarming rumour. Many declared
that the envoys had been killed, and that, if they did not look
out for themselves, the leading spirits among the soldiers, who
had complained of the present state of things, would be mur-
dered in the dark, while their comrades knew nothing about
it. So the legions formed a secret compact. The auxiliaries
were also taken into the plot, although at first they had been
distrusted, because their infantry and cavalry had been posted
all round as though an attack on the legion were meditated.
However, they soon showed themselves the keener conspira-
tors. Evil men achieve unanimity more easily for war than for
harmony in peacetime.
In Lower Germany, however, the legions on 1 January 55
swore the usual oath of allegiance* to Galba, though with
much hesitation. Few voices were heard even in the front
ranks; the rest were silent, each waiting for his neighbour to
take some bold step. Human nature is always ready to follow
where it hates to lead. However, the feelings of the legions
varied. The First and Fifth were already so mutinous that
some soldiers threw stones at Galba’s statues. The Fifteenth*
and Sixteenth dared not venture beyond muttered threats, but
they were watching to see the outbreak begin.
In Upper Germany, on the other hand, on the very same
day, the Fourth and the Twenty-Second Legions, who were
36 the histories [1, 56]
quartered together, smashed their statues of Galba. The
Fourth took the lead, the Twenty-Second at first holding back,
but eventually making common cause with them. They did
not want it to be thought that they were shaking off their
allegiance to the empire, so in taking the oath they invoked the
obsolete names of the Senate and People of Rome. None of the
senior officers made any movement for Galba, and indeed
some of them, as happens in such outbreaks, were prominent
in the rebellion. However, nobody mounted the platform to
make a general address, for there was no one as yet with
whom to curry favour.
56 The consular governor Hordeonius Flaccus stood by and
watched their treachery. He had not the courage to check the
storm or even to rally the waverers and encourage the faithful.
Sluggish and cowardly, it was mere indolence that kept
him loyal. Four centurions of the Twenty-Second Legion,
Nonius Receptus, Donatius Valens, Romilius Marcellus, and
Calpurnius Repentinus, who tried to protect Galba’s statues,
were swept away by the rush of the soldiers and put under
arrest. No one retained any loyalty, or remembered their
former oath of allegiance; and, as happens in mutinies, they
were all on the side of the majority.
On the night of 1 January the standard-bearer of the Fourth
Legion came to Cologne, and brought the news to Vitellius at
his dinner that the Fourth and Twenty-Second Legions had
flung down Galba’s statues and sworn allegiance to the Senate
and People of Rome. As this oath appeared meaningless, it
seemed best to seize the critical moment and offer them an
emperor. Vitellius dispatched messengers to inform his own
troops and generals that the army of Upper Germany had
revolted from Galba; so they must either make war on the
rebels immediately, or, if they preferred peace and unity, make
an emperor for themselves; and there was less danger, he
reminded them, in choosing an emperor than in looking for
one.
57 The quarters of the First Legion* were nearest at hand, and
Fabius Valens was the most enterprising of the generals. On
the following day he entered Cologne with the cavalry of his
legion and auxiliaries, and saluted Vitellius as emperor. The
[1, 59] book one 37
other legions of the province followed suit, vying with each
other in enthusiasm; and the army of Upper Germany, drop-
ping the fine-sounding titles of the Senate and People of Rome,
joined Vitellius on 3 January, which clearly showed that on
the two previous days they were not really at the disposal of
a republican government. The inhabitants of Cologne and the
Treviri and Lingones, rivalling the zeal of the troops, made
offers of assistance, horses, arms, or money, each according to
the measure of their strength, wealth, or enterprise. And these
offers came not only from the civil and military leaders, men
who had plenty of money to spare and much to hope for from
victory, but also whole companies or individual soldiers
handed over their savings, or, instead of money, their belts
and medals, and the handsome silver ornaments on their
uniforms, acting from enthusiasm, impulse, or greed.
Vitellius accordingly commended the zeal of the troops. He 58
distributed among Roman knights the court offices which had
been usually held by freedmen,* paid the centurions their
furlough fees* out of the imperial purse, and for the most part
conceded the soldiers’ savage demands for one execution after
another, though he occasionally cheated them by pretending
to imprison their victims. Thus Pompeius Propinquus,* the
procurator in Belgica, was promptly executed, while Julius
Burdo, who commanded the fleet on the Rhine, was adroitly
rescued. The indignation of the army had broken out against
him, because he was supposed to have concocted a false
accusation against Fonteius Capito, and then to have laid a
trap for him. Capito’s memory was dear to the army, and
where violence reigned murder might show its face, but par-
don had to be stealthy. So Burdo was kept in confinement and
only released after victory had allayed the soldiers’ rancour.
Meanwhile a centurion named Crispinus was offered as a
scapegoat. He had actually stained his hands with Capito’s
blood, so his guilt seemed more obvious to those who clam-
oured for his punishment, and Vitellius felt he was a cheaper
sacrifice.*
Julius Civilis was the next to be rescued from danger. He 59
was all-powerful among the Batavi,* and Vitellius did not
want to alienate so spirited a people by punishing him.
38 the histories [1, 60]
Besides, eight cohorts of Batavian troops were stationed in the
country of the Lingones. They had been an auxiliary force
attached to the Fourteenth, and in the general disturbance had
deserted the legion. Their decision for one side or the other
would be of the first importance. Nonius, Donatius, Romilius,
and Calpurnius, the centurions mentioned above, were
executed by order of Vitellius. They had been convicted of
loyalty, a heinous offence among deserters.
His party soon gained the support of Valerius Asiaticus,
governor of Belgica, who subsequently married Vitellius’
daughter, and of Junius Blaesus, governor of the Lyons divi-
sion of Gaul, who brought with him the Italian Legion* and
the ‘Taurian’ regiment of cavalry, which had been quartered
at Lyons. The forces in Raetia lost no time in joining his
standard, and even the troops in Britain showed no hesitation.
60 Trebellius Maximus,* the governor of Britain, had earned by
his meanness and cupidity the contempt and hatred of the
army. This was further inflamed by Roscius Coelius, who
commanded the Twentieth Legion;* they were old enemies,
but had seized the opportunity of the civil war to break out
into a more violent quarrel. Trebellius blamed Coelius for
the mutinous temper and insubordination of the army:
Coelius complained that Trebellius had robbed his men and
impaired their efficiency. Meanwhile the commanders’ un-
seemly quarrel ruined the discipline of the forces, whose in-
subordination soon came to a head. The auxiliaries joined in
the attacks on the governor and ostracized him, and infantry
and cavalry companies rallied round Coelius: Trebellius, thus
abandoned, took refuge with Vitellius. The province remained
quiet, despite the removal of the ex-consul. The government
was carried on by the legionary commanders, who were
equal in authority, though Coelius’ audacity increased his
power.
61 Thus reinforced by the army from Britain, Vitellius, who
now had an immense force and vast resources at his disposal,
decided on an invasion by two routes under two separate
generals. Fabius Valens was ordered to lure the Gauls to his
standard, or, if they refused, to devastate their country, and
then to invade Italy by way of the Cottian Alps. Caecina was
to follow the shorter route and descend into Italy over the
[1, 63] book one 39
Pennine Pass.* Valens’ column comprised some picked de-
tachments from the army of Lower Germany, along with the
‘eagle’ of the Fifth Legion, and auxiliary horse and foot,
amounting in all to about 40,000 men. Caecina’s troops from
Upper Germany numbered 30,000, their main strength con-
sisting in the Twenty-First Legion.* Both columns were rein-
forced by German auxiliaries, whom Vitellius also recruited to
fill up his own army, intending to follow with his full military
strength.
Strange was the contrast between Vitellius and his army. 62
The soldiers were all eagerness, clamouring for battle while
Gaul was still frightened and Spain still undecided. Winter,
they said, was no obstacle; peace and delay were for cowards:
they must invade Italy and seize Rome. Haste was the safest
course in civil war, where action was needed rather than
deliberation. Vitellius was dully apathetic, anticipating his
imperial status by indulging in idle luxury and lavish ban-
quets. At midday he would be drunk and drowsy with
overeating. However, such was the zeal and energy of the
soldiers that they even did the general’s duties themselves, and
behaved exactly as if the Emperor had been present to encour-
age the alert and threaten the laggards. They promptly fell in
and began to clamour for the signal to start. The title of
Germanicus* was then and there conferred on Vitellius:
Caesar he refused to be called, even after his victory.
On the very day of departure a happy omen greeted Fabius
Valens and the army he led to war. As the column advanced,
an eagle flew serenely ahead and seemed to lead the way. Mile
after mile the soldiers cheered loudly, mile after mile the bird
flew calm and undismayed: this was taken for a sure omen of
success.
They entered confidently the country of the Treviri, who 63
were allies. At Divodurum,* the chief town of the
Mediomatrici, although they were welcomed with all cour-
tesy, the troops fell into a sudden panic. Hastily seizing their
arms, they began to massacre the innocent citizens. Their
object was not plunder; they were seized by a mad frenzy,
which was the harder to allay as its cause was a mystery.
Eventually the general’s entreaties prevailed, and they re-
frained from destroying the town. However, nearly 4,000
40 the histories [1, 64]
people had already been killed.* This spread such alarm
throughout Gaul that, as the army approached, whole towns
flocked to meet them, with their magistrates at their head
and prayers in their mouths. Women and boys prostrated
themselves along the roads, and they resorted to every poss-
ible means by which an enemy’s anger may be appeased,
petitioning for peace, though war there was none.
64 It was in the country of the Leuci* that Fabius Valens heard
the news of Galba’s murder and Otho’s elevation. The soldiers
showed no emotion, neither joy nor fear; their thoughts were
all for war. The Gauls’ doubts were now removed. They hated
Otho and Vitellius equally, but Vitellius they also feared.
They next reached the Lingones, faithful adherents of their
party. There the courtesy of the citizens was equalled by the
good behaviour of the troops. But their joy was short-lived,
thanks to the disorderly conduct of the Batavian auxiliaries
who, as narrated above, had detached themselves from the
Fourteenth Legion and been drafted into Valens’ column. A
quarrel between some Batavians and legionaries led to blows:
the other soldiers quickly took sides, and a fierce battle would
have flared up, had not Valens punished a few of them to
remind the Batavians of the discipline they had forgotten.
Coming to the Aedui, they in vain sought an excuse for
fighting. For when the natives were ordered to contribute
money and arms, they in addition presented them with provi-
sions free of charge. Lyons did gladly what the Aedui had
done from fear. But the town was deprived of the Italian
Legion and the ‘Taurian’ cavalry regiment; Valens decided to
leave the Eighteenth Cohort there in its old winter quarters.
Manlius Valens, who was in command of the Italian Legion,
never received any distinction from Vitellius, although he
deserved well of the party, the reason being that Fabius had
slandered him, making accusations against him behind his
back, while to avert his suspicions he praised him in public.
65 The recent war had served to inflame the long-standing
quarrel between Lyons and Vienne. Much damage was done
on both sides, and the frequency and animosity of their con-
flicts proved that they were not merely fighting for Nero and
Galba. Galba had made his displeasure an excuse for confis-
[1, 66] book one 41
cating to the Treasury the revenues of Lyons, while on Vienne
he had conferred various distinctions. The result was a bitter
rivalry between the towns, and the Rhone between them only
formed a bond of hatred.
Consequently the inhabitants of Lyons began to work on
the feelings of individual Roman soldiers, and to urge them to
crush Vienne. They reminded them how the Viennese had laid
siege to Lyons, a Roman colony, had assisted the efforts of
Vindex, and had lately raised troops to defend Galba. Having
supplied a pretext for bad feeling, they went on to point out
the rich opportunity for plunder. Not content with private
persuasion, they presented a formal petition that the army
would march to avenge them, and destroy the headquarters of
the Gallic war. Vienne, they urged, was thoroughly un-Roman
and hostile, while Lyons was a Roman colony, part of the
army* and sharing in its victories and reverses. They besought
them in the event of adverse fortune not to leave their city to
the fury of its enemies.
By these arguments and others of the same nature they 66
brought matters to such a pass that even the generals and
party leaders despaired of cooling the army’s indignation.
However, the Viennese realized their danger. Arrayed with
olive-branches and ritual headbands, they met the approach-
ing column and, seizing the troops’ weapons, knees, and feet
in supplication,* succeeded in appeasing them. Valens more-
over made each of the soldiers a present of 300 sesterces. They
were thus persuaded to respect the antiquity and high stand-
ing of the colony, and to listen with patience to their general’s
speech, in which he commended to them the lives and prop-
erty of the Viennese. Nevertheless, the town was disarmed,
and private individuals had to assist the army with various
kinds of provisions. There was, however, a persistent rumour
that Valens himself had been bought with a heavy bribe. He
had long been in mean circumstances and ill concealed his
sudden accession of wealth. Prolonged poverty had inflamed
his inordinate desires, and the needy youth grew into an
extravagant old man.
He next led the army by slow stages through the country of
the Allobroges and Vocontii,* bribes to the general determin-
42 the histories [1, 67]
ing the length of each day’s march and the choice of a camp.
For Valens struck disgraceful bargains with the landowners
and municipal authorities, often applying violent threats, as,
for instance, at Lucus,* a township of the Vocontii, which he
threatened to burn, until he was appeased with money. Where
it was impossible to get money, he was won over with women
for fornication and adultery. And so it went on until the Alps
were reached.
67 There was even more looting and bloodshed on Caecina’s
march. The Helvetii* were a Gallic tribe distinguished for-
merly as fighting men, but later only in the memory of their
past; having heard nothing of Galba’s murder, they refused
to acknowledge the authority of Vitellius. This exasperated
Caecina’s headstrong nature. Hostilities broke out owing to
the greed and impatience of the Twenty-First Legion, who had
seized a sum of money which was being sent to pay the
garrison of a fort in which the Helvetii used to keep native
troops at their own expense. The Helvetii, highly indignant at
this, intercepted a dispatch* from the German army to the
Pannonian legions, and kept a centurion and some men in
custody. Greedy for battle, Caecina hastened to take venge-
ance on the nearest culprit without giving them time for
second thoughts. Promptly breaking up his camp, he pro-
ceeded to harry the country, and sacked a charming and
much-frequented watering-place, which had grown during the
long peace into the size and importance of a town.
Instructions were sent to the Raetian auxiliaries to attack
the Helvetii in the rear, while their attention was occupied
68 with the legion. Full of spirit before the crisis, the Helvetii
were terrified in the face of danger. At the first alarm they had
chosen Claudius Severus general, but they knew nothing of
fighting or discipline and were incapable of combined action.
An engagement with the Roman veterans would be disastrous;
and the walls, dilapidated by time, could not stand a siege.
They found themselves between Caecina and his powerful
army on the one side, and on the other the Raetian auxiliaries,
both horse and foot, and the whole fighting force of Raetia as
well, trained soldiers well used to fighting. Their country was
given over to plunder and massacre. Flinging away their arms,
[1, 70] book one 43
they wandered miserably between the enemy armies.
Wounded and scattered, most of them took refuge on Mount
Vocetius.* But some Thracian auxiliaries were promptly sent
to dislodge them. The German army, aided by the Raetians,
pursued them through the woods, and cut them to pieces in
their hiding-places. Many thousands were killed and many
sold as slaves.
Having completed the work of destruction, the army ad-
vanced in hostile array against Aventicum,* their capital
town, and were met by envoys offering surrender. The offer
was accepted. Caecina executed Julius Alpinus, one of their
chief men, as the prime instigator of the revolt. The rest he left
to the clemency or cruelty of Vitellius.
It is hard to say whether the Helvetian envoys found 69
Vitellius or the army the more implacable. The soldiers clam-
oured for the destruction of the town, and shook their fists
and weapons in the envoys’ faces: even Vitellius indulged in
threatening language. Ultimately, however, Claudius Cossus,
one of the envoys, a noted speaker who greatly enhanced the
effect of his eloquence by concealing his skill under a well-
timed affectation of nervousness, succeeded in softening the
hearts of the soldiers. A mob is always liable to sudden
changes of feeling, and the men were as sensible to pity as they
had been extravagant in their brutality. Thus with streams of
tears and importunate prayers for a better answer the envoys
procured a free pardon for Aventicum.
Caecina halted for a few days in Helvetian territory until he 70
could get news of Vitellius’ decision. Meantime, while carry-
ing on his preparations for crossing the Alps, he received from
Italy the joyful news that ‘Silius’ Cavalry’, stationed near the
Po, had taken the oath of allegiance to Vitellius. The members
of this troop had served under Vitellius when governor in
Africa.* They had subsequently been detached under orders
from Nero to be sent ahead to Egypt, and had then been
recalled, owing to the outbreak of the war with Vindex. They
were now in Italy. Their officers, who knew nothing of Otho
and were attached to Vitellius, extolled the strength of the
approaching column and the fame of the German army. At
their prompting the troop went over to Vitellius, bringing
44 the histories [1, 71]
their new Emperor a gift of the four strongest towns of
the Transpadane district, Milan, Novaria, Eporedia, and
Vercellae.* Of this they informed Caecina themselves.
But one troop of horse could not garrison the whole of the
widest part of Italy. Caecina accordingly hurried forward the
Gallic, Lusitanian, and British auxiliaries, and some German
detachments, together with ‘Petra’s Cavalry’, while he himself
hesitated for a little whether he should not change course,
cross the Raetian Alps into Noricum, and attack the governor,
Petronius Urbicus, who, having raised a force of irregulars
and broken down the bridges, was supposed to be a faithful
adherent of Otho. However, he was afraid of losing the infan-
try and cavalry forces whom he had already sent on ahead,
and at the same time he considered that there was more glory
in holding Italy, and that, wherever the theatre of the war
might be, Noricum was sure to be among the spoils of victory.
So he chose the Pennine route and led his reserves and the
heavy marching column of regular troops across the Alps,
although they were still deep in snow.
71 Meanwhile, contrary to all expectation, Otho was not
stagnating in idle luxury. He postponed his pleasures and
disguised his extravagance, suiting all his behaviour to his
imperial dignity. But people knew they had not seen the last of
his vices, and his virtuous hypocrisy only increased their
alarm.
He gave orders to summon Marius Celsus to the Capitol.
This was the consul-elect whom he had rescued from the
savage clutches of the soldiers by pretending to put him in
prison. Otho now wanted to earn a name for clemency by
pardoning a well-known man who had fought against his
party.* Celsus was firm. Pleading guilty to the charge of
fidelity to Galba, he voluntarily claimed credit for setting an
example. Otho treated him as if there was nothing to pardon.
Calling on heaven to witness their reconciliation, he then and
there admitted him to the circle of his intimate friends, and
subsequently gave him an appointment as one of his generals.
Celsus remained faithful to Otho too, doomed apparently to
the losing side. His acquittal delighted the upper classes and
was the subject of much popular comment, and even earned
[1, 73] book one 45
the approval of the soldiers, who admired the very qualities
which aroused their indignation.
Equal rejoicing, though for different reasons, followed the 72
fulfilment of the request for Ofonius Tigellinus’ destruction.
Born of obscure parentage, he had grown from an immoral
youth into a vicious old man. He rose to the command of the
Watch and the Praetorian Guard, finding that vice was a
short-cut to these and other rewards of virtue. Here he prac-
tised the vices of manhood—first cruelty, then greed. He cor-
rupted Nero and introduced him to every kind of depravity;
then ventured on some villainies behind his back, and finally
deserted and betrayed him. Thus in his case, as in no other,
those who hated Nero and those who wished him back
agreed, though from different motives, in calling persistently
for his execution. During Galba’s reign he had been protected
by the influence of Titus Vinius, on the plea that he had saved
his daughter. Saved her he had, not out of clemency (he had
killed too many for that), but to secure a refuge for the future.
For all such villains, distrusting the present and fearing a
change of fortune, prepare for themselves a shelter against
public indignation by obtaining the favour of private persons.
So they rely to escape punishment not on their innocence but
on a system of mutual insurance. People were all the more
incensed against Tigellinus, since the recent feeling against
Vinius was added to their old hatred for him. From all quar-
ters of Rome they flocked, flooding into the palace and the
squares, into the circus and the theatre (where the mob enjoys
complete licence), and broke out into riotous uproar. Eventu-
ally Tigellinus at Sinuessa Spa received the news* that his last
hour was inevitably come. There, after a cowardly delay for
couplings and embraces with his prostitutes, he cut his throat
with a razor, and blackened the infamy of his life by a belated
and shameful death.
About the same time there arose a demand for the punish- 73
ment of Calvia Crispinilla. But she was saved by various
prevarications, and Otho’s connivance brought him some
discredit. This woman had tutored Nero in vice, and after-
wards crossed to Africa to incite Clodius Macer to civil war.*
While there she openly schemed to start a famine in Rome.
46 the histories [1, 74]
However, she secured herself by marrying an ex-consul, and
lived to enjoy a wide popularity in the country. She escaped
harm under Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, and eventually
wielded a great influence due to her being both rich and
childless, considerations of the first importance in good times
as much as in bad.
74 During this time Otho wrote to Vitellius constant letters
deformed with various effeminate inducements: he offered
him money or an influential position, or any retreat he liked to
select for a life of luxury. Vitellius made similar offers. At first
both wrote in the mildest tone, though the insincerity on
either side was stupid and unseemly. But they soon struck a
quarrelsome note, and accused each other of lechery and
crime—here neither lied.
Otho recalled the commission which Galba had sent out to
Germany, and, using the pretext of senatorial authority, sent
fresh commissioners to both the armies in Germany, and also
to the Italian Legion and the troops quartered at Lyons.
However, the commissioners remained with Vitellius with a
readiness which showed they were under no compulsion; and
the Guards whom Otho had attached to them, ostensibly as a
mark of honour, were sent back before they had time to mix
with the legionaries.
Further to this, Fabius Valens sent letters in the name of the
German army to the Guards and the City Garrison, extolling
the strength of his own side and offering to join forces. He
even went so far as to reproach them with having transferred
to Otho the title which had long before been conferred on
75 Vitellius.* Thus they were assailed with threats as well as
promises, and told that they were not strong enough to fight,
and had nothing to lose by making peace. But, in spite of all,
the fidelity of the Guards remained unchanged.
However, Otho dispatched assassins to Germany, Vitellius
to Rome. Neither met with success. Vitellius’ assassins were
lost in the crowds of Rome, where nobody knows anybody,
and thus escaped detection and punishment: Otho’s were
betrayed by their strange faces, since the troops all knew each
other by sight. Vitellius then composed a letter to Otho’s
brother Titianus, threatening his life and his son’s in the event
[1, 77] book one 47
that Vitellius’ mother and children were in any way harmed.
As it happened, neither household suffered. Fear was perhaps
the reason in Otho’s time, but Vitellius, after his victory, could
certainly claim credit for clemency.
The first news which gave Otho confidence was the an- 76
nouncement from Illyricum that the legions of Dalmatia and
Pannonia and Moesia had sworn allegiance to him. Similar
news arrived from Spain, and Cluvius Rufus was commended
in a special decree, but it was found out immediately after-
wards that Spain had gone over to Vitellius. Even Aquitania
soon fell away, although Julius Cordus had sworn in the
province for Otho. Loyalty and affection were dead: men
changed from one side to the other through fear or com-
pulsion. It was fear which gave Vitellius the province
of Narbonese Gaul, for it is easy to go over when the big
battalions are so near.
The distant provinces and the troops across the sea all
remained at Otho’s disposal, but not from any enthusiasm for
his cause; what weighed with them was the name of Rome and
the aura surrounding the Senate. Besides, Otho had got the
first hearing. Vespasian swore in the Jewish army for Otho,
and Mucianus the legions in Syria; Egypt too and all the
provinces towards the East were held for him. He also re-
ceived the submission of Africa, where Carthage had taken the
lead, without waiting for the sanction of the governor,
Vipstanus Apronianus. Crescens, one of Nero’s freedmen—in
evil days even these creatures make themselves into part of the
state—had given the common people of the town a gala
dinner in honour of the new Emperor, with the result that the
inhabitants hurried into various excesses. The other African
communities followed the example of Carthage.
The provinces and their armies being thus divided, Vitellius 77
could only win the throne by fighting. Otho meanwhile was
carrying on the government as if the time were one of pro-
found peace. Sometimes he took into account the country’s
dignity, though more often the exigencies of the moment
forced him into unseemly haste. He held the consulship him-
self with his brother Titianus as colleague until 1 March. For
the next two months* he appointed Verginius, as a sort of sop
48 the histories [1, 78]
to the army in Germany. As colleague he gave him Pompeius
Vopiscus, ostensibly because he was an old friend of his own,
but it was generally understood as a compliment to Vienne.
For the rest of the year the nominations which Nero or Galba
had made were allowed to stand. Caelius Sabinus and Flavius
Sabinus were consuls until 1 July, Arrius Antoninus* and
Marius Celsus until 1 September; even Vitellius after his
victory did not cancel their appointment.
To the pontifical and augural colleges* Otho either nomi-
nated old men who had already held high office, as the final
crown of their career; or else by way of recompense installed
young aristocrats, newly returned from exile, in the
priesthoods which their fathers or grandfathers had held.
He restored Cadius Rufus, Pedius Blaesus, and Saevinus
Propinquus* to their seats in the Senate. They had been con-
victed during Claudius’ and Nero’s reigns of extortion in the
provinces. In pardoning them the name of their offence was
changed, and their greed appeared as ‘treason’. For so un-
popular was the law of treason that it sapped the force of
better statutes.
78 Otho moreover tried to win over the municipalities and
provinces by similar bribes. At Hispalis and Emerita* he en-
rolled new families of settlers, he granted Roman citizenship*
to the whole community of the Lingones, and made over
certain Moorish towns as a gift to the province of Baetica. For
Cappadocia and Africa he devised new legislation, as showy
as it was short-lived. All these grants are excused by the
exigences of the moment and the impending crisis, but he even
found time to remember his old amours, and passed a measure
through the Senate restoring Poppaea’s statues. He is believed
also to have thought of celebrating Nero’s memory as a means
of attracting public support. Some persons actually erected
statues of Nero, and there were even times when the populace
and the soldiers saluted Otho as Nero Otho, as though
thereby enhancing his fame and dignity. However, he refused
to commit himself. He was afraid to ban the title—or else
ashamed to accept it.*
79 While people were intent upon the civil war, foreign affairs
were neglected. Consequently a Sarmatian tribe called the
Rhoxolani, who had slaughtered two cohorts of auxiliaries in
[1, 80] book one 49
the previous winter, now formed the still more daring scheme
of invading Moesia. They assembled nearly 9,000 mounted
men, all, thanks to their impetuosity and earlier success, more
intent on plunder than on fighting. While they were riding
about aimlessly and off their guard, they were suddenly at-
tacked by the Third Legion and its native auxiliaries. On the
Roman side everything was ready for a battle: the Sarmatians
were scattered over the country; some in their greed for plun-
der were heavily laden, and the slippery roads deprived them
of their horses’ speed. They were cut to pieces as surely as if
they had been in fetters.
It is quite extraordinary how all a Sarmatian’s courage is, so
to speak, outside himself. Fighting on foot, no one is more
cowardly; but their cavalry charge would break almost any
troops. But on this occasion it was raining and the ice had
thawed; their pikes and their swords, which were extremely
long and needed both hands to wield, were useless; their
horses slipped and they were encumbered by the heavy coat of
mail which all their chiefs and nobles wear. Being made of
iron plates and very hard leather, it is impenetrable to blows,
but most inconvenient for any one who is knocked down by a
charge of the enemy and tries to get up. Besides, they sank into
the deep, soft snow. The Roman soldiers, whose cuirasses
gave them easy movement, armed with javelin and lance, and
using when necessary their light swords, sprang on the unde-
fended Sarmatians (they never carry shields) and stabbed them
at close quarters. A few, surviving the battle, hid themselves in
the marshes, and there perished from the severity of the winter
and their wounds.
When the news of this reached Rome, Marcus Aponius, the
governor of Moesia, was granted a triumphal statue,* while
the commanding officers of the legions, Aurelius Fulvus,
Tettius Julianus,* and Numisius Lupus, received the insignia
of consular rank. Otho was delighted and took all the credit
to himself, as if he had been the successful general, and
had himself employed his officers and armies to enlarge the
empire.
In the mean time a riot broke out in an unexpected quarter, 80
and, though trivial at first, nearly ended in the destruction of
Rome. Otho had given orders that the Seventeenth Cohort
50 the histories [1, 81]
should be summoned from the colony of Ostia to the city, and
Varius Crispinus, a tribune of the Guards, was instructed to
provide them with arms. Anxious to carry out his instructions
undisturbed while the camp was quiet, he arranged that the
arsenal was to be opened and the cohort’s wagons loaded at
nightfall. The hour aroused suspicion; the motive was ques-
tioned; his quest for a quiet moment developed into an up-
roar. The mere sight of swords made the drunken soldiers
long to use them. They began to murmur and accuse their
tribunes and centurions of treachery, suggesting that the sena-
tors’ slaves were going to be armed against Otho. Some of
them were ignorant and fuddled by wine; the worst element
saw a chance of plunder; the mass of them, as usual, were
eager for any change; and those who were better the night had
kept from their duty. When Crispinus tried to check them,
the mutineers killed him together with the strictest of the
centurions, seized the weapons, bared their swords, and
mounting the horses, made for Rome and the palace.
81 It so happened that a large party of upper-class women and
men was dining with Otho. In their alarm they wondered
whether the soldiers’ outbreak was coincidental or a ruse of
the Emperor’s: would it be safer to fly in all directions or to
stay and be arrested? At one moment they would make a show
of firmness, at the next their terror betrayed them. All the time
they were watching Otho’s face; and, as happens with minds
prone to suspicion, Otho’s fears inspired fear in others. But
feeling no less alarm for the senators than for himself, he had
promptly dispatched the Prefects of the Guards to appease the
anger of the troops, and told all his guests to leave immedi-
ately. Then on all sides officials threw away their insignia and
avoided their massed entourages of attendants and slaves. Old
gentlemen and their wives roamed the dark streets of the city
in all directions. Few went home, most of them fled to friends,
or sought an obscure refuge with the humblest of their
clients.*
82 The soldiers’ onrush could not be stopped even by the gates
of the palace. They invaded the banquet hall, demanding to
see Otho. Julius Martialis, a tribune, and Vitellius Saturninus,
a prefect of the legion,* were wounded while endeavouring to
[1, 83] book one 51
stem the flood. On every side were swords and threats, now
against their centurions and tribunes, now against the whole
Senate; and since they could not select any one victim for their
wrath, in a blind frenzy of panic they clamoured for a free
hand against all. At last Otho, abandoning imperial dignity,
stood up on a couch and with great difficulty restrained them
by means of prayers and tears. They returned to their camp
unwillingly, and with a guilty conscience.
The next day Rome was like a captured city. The houses
were shut, the streets almost deserted, the people sombre.
The soldiers, too, hung their heads, more through sulkiness
than contrition. Their Prefects, Licinius Proculus and Plotius
Firmus, harangued them by companies, the one mildly, the
other harshly, according to their different characters. They
concluded by announcing that the men were to receive 5,000
sesterces apiece. After that Otho ventured to enter the camp.
The tribunes and centurions, each flinging away the insignia
of his rank, crowded round him begging for a safe discharge.
Stung by the disgrace of this, the troops settled down to
obedience, and themselves demanded that the ringleaders
should be punished.
In the general disturbance Otho’s position was difficult. The 83
soldiers were by no means unanimous. The better sort wanted
him to put a stop to the prevalent insubordination, but the
great bulk of them liked insurrection and emperors who had
to court their favour, and the prospect of rioting and plunder
made it easier still to press them into civil war. He realized,
also, that one who wins a throne by violence cannot keep it
by suddenly trying to enforce the rigid discipline of earlier
days.* However, the danger of the crisis for both the city and
the Senate seriously alarmed him, so he finally delivered the
following speech:
‘Fellow-soldiers, I have not come to fan the fire of your
affection for me, or to instil courage into your hearts: in both
those qualities you are more than rich. No, I have come to ask
you to moderate your valour and to set some bounds to your
devotion towards me. These recent disturbances did not origi-
nate in greed or hatred, which so often cause dissension in an
army; nor was it even that you feared danger and tried to shirk
52 the histories [1, 84]
it. The motivation was your excessive loyalty, which you
displayed with more ardour than judgement. For honourable
motives, when combined with a lack of discretion, often land
men in disaster.
‘We are preparing for war. Do you imagine that we could
publish all our dispatches, and discuss all our plans in the
presence of the whole army, when we have to devise a system-
atic campaign and keep up with the rapid changes of the
situation? There are things a soldier ought to know, but there
is much of which he must be ignorant. It is necessary for the
maintenance of strict discipline and of the general’s authority
that even his tribunes and centurions should often obey
blindly. If individuals are permitted to question why orders
are given, obedience is done for, and authority falls to the
ground.
‘In actual warfare, are men to take up arms at dead of
night? Shall a few drunken blackguards—for I cannot believe
that many lost their heads in the recent panic—go and stain
their hands with the blood of centurion and tribune, and then
84 break into their general’s tent? Now, I know you did it to
protect me, but the riot and the darkness and the general
confusion might also have provided an opportunity to kill me.
Suppose Vitellius and his henchmen had their choice of the
state of mind they would pray to find us in: what more could
they desire than mutiny and dissension, the men insubordinate
to the centurions, the centurions to the tribunes, and the
whole force, cavalry and infantry alike, rushing in headlong
confusion to their ruin? Good soldiering, my comrades, con-
sists in obedience, not in scrutinizing the general’s orders; and
the army which is most orderly before the emergency is most
courageous when actually in it. Let yours be the swords and
the courage: leave it to me to plan the campaign and to direct
your valour.
‘The culprits were but few, and only two are to be punished;
the rest of you must blot out all memory of that discreditable
night. No army anywhere must hear those words you spoke
against the Senate, the fount of the empire and the glory of all
the provinces. Why, in Heaven’s name, the very Germans
themselves, whom Vitellius is stirring up with all his might
[1, 85] book one 53
against us, would not dare to advocate the condemnation of
its members! Shall it be said that Italy’s own sons, the real
soldiery of Rome, are clamouring to murder and massacre the
very senators through whose lustre and glory we throw into
the shade the obscure and squalid adherents of Vitellius?
Vitellius has captured a few tribes and raised a sort of shadow
of an army: but the Senate is with us. Therefore on our side
stands Rome: they are her foes.
‘Do you imagine that the stability of this beautiful city
consists in houses and edifices built of stone upon stone? They
are dumb inanimate things; it is of no consequence whether
they fall to pieces or are rebuilt. The eternity of our empire,
the peace of the world, your welfare and mine, all depend
upon the safety of the Senate.* Instituted with solemn
ceremony by the father and founder of Rome, the Senate has
come down in undying continuity from the kings to the
emperors: and as we have received it from our ancestors, so let
us hand it on to our posterity. From your ranks come the
senators, and from the Senate come the emperors of Rome.’
This speech was well calculated to reprimand and soothe 85
the soldiers’ minds; both it and Otho’s moderation—for he
had only ordered the punishment of two men—were well
received. He had calmed for the moment troops who could
not be controlled. Yet peace and quiet were not restored in
Rome. Amid the clash of arms the city displayed the face of
war. Refraining from organized riot, the soldiers now dis-
persed to private houses and lived in disguise, paying malevo-
lent attention to all whom nobility of birth or wealth or any
other distinction made a mark for scandal. Many, besides,
believed that some of Vitellius’ soldiers had come to Rome to
study the state of party feeling.
Everywhere suspicion was rife, and terror invaded even the
privacy of the home. But far greater was the alarm displayed
in public places. With every fresh piece of news that rumour
brought, men’s feelings and the expression on their faces
changed. They were afraid to be found short of confidence
when things looked doubtful for Otho, or lacking in joy when
they went well. Above all, when the Senate was summoned to
the House, they found it extraordinarily hard always to strike
54 the histories [1, 86]
the right note. Silence would argue arrogance; plain speaking
would arouse suspicion; yet flattery would be detected by
Otho, who had so lately been a private citizen practising the
art himself. So they had to turn and twist their sentences.
Vitellius they called enemy and traitor, the more far-sighted
confining their insults to such vague generalities. A few en-
gaged in more accurate abuse, but always chose a moment of
uproar when a great many people were shouting, or else
drowned their own words in a torrent of language.
86 Another cause of alarm was the portents reported by vari-
ous separate sources. In the entrance to the Capitol, it was
said, the figure of Victory had let the reins of her chariot slip
from her hands: an apparition of superhuman size had sud-
denly burst out of the chapel of Juno: a statue of the deified
Julius on the island in the Tiber had, on a fine, still day, turned
round from the west and faced the east:* an ox had spoken in
Etruria: animals had given birth to strange monsters. Still
other phenomena were seen, of the sort which in primitive
ages were observed even in time of peace, though now we only
hear of them in time of panic.*
But the greatest damage at the moment, and the greatest
alarm for the future, was caused by a sudden rising of the
Tiber. Immensely swollen, it wrecked the Pile Bridge,* and, its
current being stemmed by the heavy ruins, it flooded not only
the flat, low-lying portions of the city, but also districts that
seemed safe from inundation. Many people were swept away
in the streets, still more were overtaken by the flood in shops
or in their beds. The result was a famine among the poor,
since food was scarce and they were deprived of their means
of livelihood. Blocks of flats, the foundations of which had
rotted in the standing water, collapsed when the river sank.
No sooner had the panic caused by the flood subsided than it
was found that, although Otho planned an expedition, his
army’s route over the Campus Martius and up the Flaminian
Way* was blocked. Though its causes were accidental or
natural, this mishap was turned into a miraculous omen of
impending disaster.
87 Otho had held a purification of the city* and meditated his
plans for the war. Recognizing that the Pennine and Cottian
[1, 88] book one 55
Alps and all the other passes into Gaul were held by Vitellius’
troops, he decided to invade Narbonese Gaul by sea. His fleet
was strong, and devoted to his cause; for he had enrolled the
survivors of the Mulvian Bridge massacre, whom Galba’s
cruelty had kept in prison, into a legion, and to the remaining
marines likewise he had held out hopes of promotion into a
more prestigious regiment. To the fleet he attached the cohorts
of the City Garrison and a large force of Guards. These were
the flower of the army and its chief strength, well able to
advise and protect the generals.
The command of the expedition was entrusted to Antonius
Novellus and Suedius Clemens, both senior centurions, and to
Aemilius Pacensis, to whom Otho had restored the rank of
tribune, of which Galba had deprived him. In charge of the
fleet he still retained the freedman Moschus* to keep an eye on
his betters. In command of the cavalry and infantry he placed
Suetonius Paulinus,* Marius Celsus, and Annius Gallus, but
the man in whom he put most faith was the Prefect of the
Guards, Licinius Proculus. This officer had shown himself
efficient in garrison service, but was without any experience
of warfare. He maligned the individual virtues of his col-
leagues—Paulinus’ power of influence, Celsus’ energy, Gallus’
ripe judgement—and being a knave and no fool, he easily
got the better of men who were both honest and
restrained.
It was about this time that Cornelius Dolabella was ban- 88
ished to the colonial town of Aquinas,* though not kept in
close or dishonourable confinement. There was no charge
against him: the stigma upon him was his ancient name and
kinship to Galba.*
Otho issued orders that several of the magistrates and most
of the ex-consuls were to join the expedition, not to take part
in the campaign or to assist in any way, but apparently as a
friendly escort. Among these was even Lucius Vitellius, whom
he treated neither as an emperor’s brother nor as the brother
of an enemy, but just like anybody else.
As a result, much anxiety was aroused for the safety of the
city, where all classes were afraid and at risk. The leading
members of the Senate were old and infirm, and enervated by
56 the histories [1, 89]
a long period of peace: the aristocracy were inefficient and had
forgotten how to fight: the knights knew nothing of military
service. The more they tried to conceal or suppress their
alarm, the more obvious it became. Some of them, on the
other hand, were led by crass ostentation to purchase beauti-
ful armour and fine horses; others procured as provisions of
war elaborate dinner services or some other stimulants for
their appetites. Prudent men were concerned for the country’s
peace; the frivolous, without a thought for the future, were
inflated by empty hopes; a good many, whose loss of credit
made peace unwelcome, were delighted at the general unrest,
feeling safest among uncertainties.
89 Though cares of state are too vast to arouse any interest in
the masses, yet as the whole revenue was devoted to military
purposes, and the price of food rose, the common people
gradually began to realize the evils of war. During the revolt
of Vindex they had not suffered so much. Being carried on in
the provinces between the legionaries and the natives of Gaul,
it was in effect a foreign war, and the city had not been
affected. For from the time when the deified Augustus organ-
ized the rule of the Caesars, the wars of the Roman people had
been fought in distant countries: all the anxiety and all the
glory fell to the emperor alone. Under Tiberius and Gaius the
country only suffered from the evils of peace. Scribonianus’
rising* against Claudius was no sooner heard of than crushed.
Nero had been dethroned more by rumours and dispatches
than by force of arms. But now not only the legions and the
fleet but, as had seldom happened before, the Guards and the
City Garrison were called out for the campaign. Behind them
were the East and the West and all the forces of the empire,
material for a long war—under any other generals.
An attempt was made to delay Otho’s departure by point-
ing out the impiety of his not yet having replaced the sacred
shields.* But delay had ruined Nero: Otho would have none
of it. And the knowledge that Caecina had already crossed the
90 Alps acted as a further stimulus. Accordingly, on 14 March he
commended the government of the country to the Senate, and
granted to the restored exiles all the rest of the property
confiscated by Nero which had not yet been sold for the
[1, 90] book one 57
imperial Treasury. The gift was a just one, and made a fine
impression, but in practice it was futile: such was the haste
with which for a long time the money had been confiscated.
Otho then summoned a public meeting, and, after extolling
the majesty of Rome and praising the whole-hearted adher-
ence of the Senate and people to his cause, he used very
moderate language against the Vitellian party, criticizing the
legions more for folly than treason, and making no mention of
Vitellius himself. This may have been due to his own modera-
tion, or it may be that the writer of the speech felt some
qualms for this own safety, and therefore refrained from
insulting Vitellius. For it was generally believed that as in
strategy he took the advice of Suetonius Paulinus and Marius
Celsus, so too in political matters he employed the talents of
Galerius Trachalus.* Some people even thought they could
recognize Trachalus’ style of oratory, expansive and sonor-
ous, well adapted to the ears of the crowd: and his style was
well known through his frequent speeches in court.
The crowd’s loud shouts of applause were typical of the
flatterer, excessive and insincere. Men vied with each other in
their enthusiasm and prayers for his success, much as though
they were sending off the dictator Caesar or the Emperor
Augustus. Their motive was neither fear nor affection, but a
sheer passion for servility. One can see the same in households
of slaves, where each obeys his own interest: public dignity
counts for nothing. On his departure Otho entrusted the peace
of the city and the interests of the empire to his brother Salvius
Titianus.
58 the histories
book two 59
BOOK TWO
Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, Fortune was 1
already sowing the seeds of a dynasty, the varying fortunes of
which were destined to bring happiness and misery to the
country, and success and destruction to the rulers themselves.
Before Galba’s fall Titus Vespasianus had been dispatched
by his father from Judaea to Rome. The ostensible reason of
his journey was to show respect to the new Emperor, and to
solicit some post for which his years now fitted him.* How-
ever, the popular passion for invention had suggested that he
had been summoned to be adopted. This rumour was based
on the fact that Galba was old and childless: the public never
wearies of appointing successors until the choice is made. The
character of Titus gave still more colour to it. He was capable
of filling any position. His appearance lacked neither charm
nor dignity. Vespasian’s successes also, and the utterances of
oracles, further endorsed the rumour, to say nothing of the
chance occurrences which pass for omens when people are
predisposed to believe in them.
It was at Corinth in Achaia that Titus received reliable
reports of Galba’s murder, and was assured by people in the
town that Vitellius had declared war. In great perplexity he
summoned a few of his friends and considered all the pos-
sibilities on either side. If he continued his journey to Rome he
would earn no gratitude for homage intended for another
sovereign, and would be held as a hostage either for Vitellius
or for Otho: on the other hand, if he returned to Judaea he
would inevitably offend the victor. However, the struggle was
still undecided, and his father’s support for the successful
party would excuse the conduct of the son. Or if Vespasian
himself assumed sovereignty,* they would have to plan war
and forget all about giving offence.
Such considerations kept him wavering between hope and 2
fear; but ultimately hope prevailed. Some people believed that
his longing to get back to Queen Berenice* fired him to return.
True, the young man’s fancy was attracted by Berenice, but he
60 the histories [2, 3]
did not allow this to interfere with business. Still, his youth
was a time of happy self-indulgence, and he showed more
restraint in his own reign than in his father’s.
Accordingly, he sailed along the coasts of Achaia and Asia
Minor, and, skirting the shore which lay upon his left, reached
the islands of Rhodes and Cyprus, whence he made a bolder
crossing to Syria. On his way he conceived a desire to go and
see the Temple of Venus at Paphos, which is famous among all
the inhabitants and visitors.
It may be of some interest to give here a short account of the
origin of this worship,* the ritual of the cult, and the shape—
unparalleled elsewhere—in which the goddess is depicted.
3 According to an old tradition, the temple was founded by
King Aerias, and some people maintain that the goddess bears
the same name. A more modern version states that the temple
was consecrated by Cinyras, on the spot where the goddess
landed when the sea gave her birth.* The knowledge and
method of divination, however, according to this account,
was imported from elsewhere by the Cilician Tamiras,* and
an arrangement was made that the descendants of both fami-
lies should preside over the rites. Later, however, it seemed
wrong that the royal line should not outrank a foreign clan, so
the newcomers resigned the practice of the art which they had
themselves introduced, and now the priest whom you consult
is always of the line of Cinyras.
They accept whatever victim has been vowed, providing
males are selected. They put most faith in kids’ entrails. Blood
must not be poured on the altar, at which they offer only
prayers and pure fire. Although the altar stands in the open air
it is never wetted by rain. The goddess is not represented in
human form; the idol is cone-shaped, rising from a broad
circular base to a narrow circumference at the top. The reason
for this is unknown.
4 Titus inspected the temple treasures and the offerings made
by various kings, and other objects which the Greeks, in their
national passion for antiquarianism, attribute to a dim and
distant past. He then consulted the oracle first about his
voyage. Learning that the sea was calm, and that no obstacles
stood in his way, he sacrificed a large number of victims, and
[2, 5] book two 61
put covert questions about his own fortunes. The priest,
whose name was Sostratus, seeing that the entrails were uni-
formly favourable, and that the goddess assented to Titus’
ambitious schemes, returned for the moment a brief and ordi-
nary reply, but afterwards sought a private interview and
revealed the future to him. So Titus returned to his father with
heightened hopes, and amid the general anxiety of the prov-
inces and their armies his arrival spread boundless confidence
of success.
Vespasian had already broken the back of the Jewish War.
Only the siege of Jerusalem remained.* That this proved a
difficult and laborious task was due rather to the nature of the
town’s mountain site and the stubborn superstition of its
inhabitants than to any adequate provision enabling them to
endure the hardships of the siege. Vespasian had, as stated
above, three legions well tried in war. Four others were under
Mucianus’ command. Although these had never seen war, yet
their envy of the neighbouring army’s fame had banished
sloth. Indeed, the former were hardened by work and danger,
but just as powerful was the latter’s drive, a result of their
unbroken inaction, and their passion for the warfare that they
had never experienced.
Both generals had auxiliary infantry and cavalry, fleets and
allied princes, and a fame that rested on widely differing
claims. Vespasian was an indefatigable campaigner. He 5
headed the column, chose the camping-ground, never ceasing
by night or day to use strategy and, if need be, the sword to
thwart the enemy. He ate what he could get, and dressed
almost like a common soldier. Indeed, save for his avarice, he
matched the generals of old days. Mucianus, on the other
hand, was distinguished by his grandeur and wealth, and his
general superiority to the standards of a private person. He
was the better speaker, a skilful administrator and prescient
statesman. Their combined qualities would have made a fine
emperor, if one could have blended their virtues and omitted
their vices.
Governing as they did the neighbouring provinces of Judaea
and Syria, jealousy had at first led to quarrels. However, on
the death of Nero, they forgot their dislike and joined hands.
62 the histories [2, 6]
It was their friends who first brought them together, and
subsequently Titus became the chief bond of union and for the
common good suppressed their misguided rivalry. His natural
and studied qualities combined to fascinate even such a man
as Mucianus. They recruited tribunes, centurions, and com-
mon soldiers, each according to his character, by his industry
or indulgence, playing on his probity or his pleasures.
6 Before the arrival of Titus both armies had sworn allegiance
to Otho. News travels fast in such cases, but civil war is a slow
and serious undertaking, and the East, after its long and
harmonious repose, was now for the first time beginning to
arm for it. In earlier times all the fiercest civil wars had broken
out in Italy or Gaul, among the forces of the West. Pompey,
Cassius, Brutus, and Antony all courted disaster by carrying
the war overseas. Syria and Judaea often heard of Caesars, but
seldom saw one.* There were no mutinies among the soldiers;
they merely made threats against Parthia with varying success.
Even in the last civil war the peace of these provinces had been
untroubled by the general confusion. Later they were loyal to
Galba. But when it became common knowledge that Otho
and Vitellius were engaged in a wicked contest to seize the
Roman world, the troops began to chafe at the thought that
the prizes of empire should fall to others, while their own lot
was merely the constraints of slavery. They began to take
stock of their strength. Syria and Judaea had seven legions
on the spot with a vast force of auxiliaries. Next to them on
one side came Egypt with two legions: on the other lay
Cappadocia and Pontus, and all the forts along the Armenian
frontier. Asia and the remaining provinces were rich and
thickly populated. The islands were girdled by sea, and the sea
itself was safe from the enemy and aided the intervening
preparations for war.
7 The generals were well aware of the soldiers’ feelings, but
decided to await the issue between the other warring parties.
‘In civil war’, they reckoned, ‘there are no sure ties to unite
victor and vanquished. It matters little whether Vitellius or
Otho chances to survive. Even good generals grow arrogant
through success: this pair’s troops are quarrelsome, lazy,
and hedonistic, and they are both the victims of their own
[2, 9] book two 63
vices. One will fall on the field and the other succumb to his
success.’
So Vespasian and Mucianus postponed their attack until
the time was right. They were themselves recent converts to
the project of war, which the others had long fostered from
various motives. The better sort were animated by patriotism,
many by the delights of plunder, some by the uncertainty of
their own fortunes. Thus, though their motives differed, all,
good and bad alike, agreed in their eager desire for war.
About this time Achaia and Asia were thrown into a 8
groundless panic by a rumour that ‘Nero was at hand’.* The
accounts of his death being many and various, people were all
the more inclined to allege and to believe that he was still
alive. I shall mention in the course of this work the attempts
and the fate of the other pretenders. This time it was a slave
from Pontus, or, according to other traditions, a freedman
from Italy. His skill as a singer and harpist, combined with his
facial resemblance to Nero, gave him some credentials for
imposture. He bribed some penniless and vagabond deserters
by dazzling promises to join him, and they all set out to sea.
A storm drove them on to the island of Cythnus, where he
found some troops homeward bound on leave from the East.
Some of these he enrolled, ordering all who resisted to be
killed, and then he proceeded to plunder merchants and arm
all the sturdiest of their slaves. Finding a centurion named
Sisenna carrying home a pair of silver hands as a token of
alliance from the army in Syria to the Guards, he tried by
various devices to work upon him, until Sisenna took fright
and escaped secretly from the island in fear of violence. Thus
the panic spread. The great name of Nero attracted many who
pined for revolution and hated the existing state of things.
The rumours waxed daily, until a chance dispelled them.
Galba had entrusted the government of the provinces Galatia 9
and Pamphylia to Calpurnius Asprenas, who had been
granted an escort of two triremes from the fleet at Misenum.*
It so happened that with these he touched at Cythnus, where
men were at hand to issue invitations to the ships’ captains in
the name of Nero. The pretender, assuming an air of melan-
choly, appealed to ‘the loyalty of his former soldiers’, and
64 the histories [2, 10]
begged them to convey him to Syria or Egypt. The captains,
either from indecision or guile, asserted that they must talk to
their men, and would come back when they had got their
minds prepared. However, they faithfully made a full report
to Asprenas, on whose instructions they boarded the ship and
killed the impostor, whoever he was. The man’s eyes and hair
and ferocious look were so remarkable that the body was
carried into Asia and thence to Rome.
10 In a country so divided, whose frequent changes of rulers
left it wavering between liberty and anarchy, even small events
caused serious disturbance. Vibius Crispus,* a man whose
wealth, influence, and ability had won him a reputation that
was great rather than good, impeached before the Senate a
man of equestrian rank called Annius Faustus, who had been
a professional informer under Nero. The Senate had recently
in Galba’s principate passed a resolution authorizing the pros-
ecution of informers. This resolution had been applied incon-
sistently, and its strength or weakness varied according to
whether the defendant was helpless or influential. But it still
retained some terrors. Crispus, moreover, had exerted all his
powers to secure the ruin of the man who had informed
against his brother. He had, in fact, induced a large propor-
tion of the Senate to demand that Faustus should be sent to
execution undefended and unheard. However, in the eyes of
others the defendant’s greatest advantage was his prosecutor’s
undue influence. ‘We must give him time,’ they argued, ‘the
charges must be published: however hateful the criminal, his
case must be properly heard.’
At first this advice prevailed: the trial was postponed for a
few days. But then came Faustus’ conviction, which aroused
in the country less satisfaction than his vile character war-
ranted. People recalled the fact that Crispus himself had
similarly turned informer for pecuniary profit. It was not
the penalty but the prosecutor that was unpopular.
11 Meanwhile the war opened successfully for Otho. At his
order the armies of Dalmatia and Pannonia started from their
base. They comprised four legions, each of which had sent
forward detachments 2,000 strong. The rest followed at a
short interval: the Seventh Legion raised by Galba; and those
[2, 12] book two 65
composed of veteran troops—the Eleventh and Thirteenth,
and the Fourteenth, which had won great distinction by crush-
ing the rebellion in Britain.* Nero had further increased their
glory by choosing them as his crack troops, which accounts
for their lasting loyalty to him and their keen support of
Otho. But the mightier their strength, the greater their self-
confidence and the slower their march. The auxiliary cavalry
and infantry preceded the main body of the legions. From
Rome itself came no mean force, five cohorts of Guards with
some detachments of cavalry and the First Legion.* To these
were added an irregular force of 2,000 gladiators: during the
civil wars even strict generals availed themselves of this
shameful support.* Annius Gallus was placed in command of
these forces with Vestricius Spurinna,* and they were sent
forward to hold the banks of the Po. Their first plans had
failed: Caecina, whom Otho had hoped to contain within the
Gallic provinces, had already crossed the Alps.
Under Otho’s personal command marched picked detach-
ments of his Body Guard and the rest of the Praetorian Guard,
together with veterans of the latter and a large force of
marines. He let no luxury either delay or disgrace his march.
In an iron breastplate* he marched on foot at the head of
his troops, looking rough and dishevelled, quite unlike his
reputation.
Fortune smiled on his first efforts. Through his fleet and 12
control of the sea he held most of Italy right up to the border
with the Maritime Alps. To assault this province and attack
Narbonese Gaul he had placed in command Suedius Clemens,
Antonius Novellus, and Aemilius Pacensis. Pacensis, however,
was made a prisoner by his mutinous troops: Antonius
Novellus had no authority: Suedius Clemens was in charge,
but used his command to curry favour, and was as greedy for
battle as he was criminally blind to insubordination.
No one could have imagined they were in Italy, on the soil
of their native land. As though on foreign shores and among
an enemy’s towns, they burnt, ravaged, plundered, with re-
sults all the more horrible since no precautions had been taken
against danger. The fields were full, the houses open. The
inhabitants ran to meet them with their wives and children,
66 the histories [2, 13]
and were lured by the security of peace into all the horrors of
war.
The governor of the Maritime Alps at that time was Marius
Maturus. He summoned the inhabitants, whose fighting
strength was ample, and proposed to resist at the frontier the
Othonians’ invasion of the province. But at the first onslaught
the mountain people were cut down and scattered. They had
assembled in random haste; they knew nothing of military
camps or commanders, nothing of the glory of victory or the
disgrace of flight.
13 Enraged by this engagement, Otho’s troops visited their
indignation on the town of Albantimilium.* The battle had
brought them no booty, for the peasants were poor and their
armour worthless, and being swift of foot, with a good know-
ledge of the country, they had escaped capture. However, the
soldiers sated their greed at the expense of the innocent town.
A Ligurian woman afforded a fine example of courage which
made their conduct the more odious. She had concealed her
son, and when the soldiers, who believed that she had hidden
money with him, demanded from her under torture where she
was keeping him concealed, she pointed to her womb and
replied, ‘He hides here.’ No subsequent terrors nor even death
itself could bring her to change that resolute and noble
answer.
14 Panic-stricken couriers brought to Fabius Valens the news
that Otho’s fleet was threatening the province of Narbonese
Gaul, which had sworn allegiance to Vitellius. Representatives
from the Roman colonies also arrived beseeching his aid. He
dispatched two cohorts of the Tungri* and four troops of
horse, together with the entire cavalry regiment of the Treviri.
This force was put under the command of Julius Classicus,
and part of it was kept back in the colony of Forum Julii,*
since, if the whole force marched inland and the seaboard
were left unprotected, Otho’s fleet would swoop down at
once. Twelve troops of cavalry and a picked body of aux-
iliaries marched against the enemy: these were reinforced by
a Ligurian cohort which had long garrisoned this district,
and 500 Pannonian recruits who had not yet joined their
legion.
[2, 16] book two 67
The engagement began promptly. Otho’s line was so ar-
ranged that some of the marines, reinforced by local civilians,
held the rising ground by the sea, while the Guards filled the
level space between the hills and the shore. On the sea itself
the fleet, acting in conjunction with the land force, was ready
for the battle, and extended a threatening front facing the
coast. The Vitellians were weaker in infantry; their strength
lay in cavalry. The mountain people were posted on the neigh-
bouring heights, and the auxiliary foot-soldiers massed in
close order behind the cavalry.
The Treviran cavalry rashly charged the enemy, and meet-
ing Otho’s veterans in front were simultaneously assailed in
the flank by the civilians, flinging stones. This they could do
well enough; and, interspersed among the regulars, they all,
bold and timid alike, showed the same courage in the hour of
victory. Additional panic struck the defeated Vitellians when
the fleet began to harass their rear. They were now sur-
rounded, and would have been entirely destroyed had not the
darkness of night hampered the victorious army and sheltered
the losers’ flight.
But though beaten the Vitellians were not cowed. Calling 15
up reinforcements, they suddenly attacked while the unsus-
pecting enemy were taking their ease after the victory. They
killed the sentries, broke into the camp, and terrified the sailors.
In time the panic gradually subsided. The Othonians seized a
nearby hill, defended their position, and eventually assumed
the offensive. The slaughter was frightful. The officers com-
manding the cohorts of Tungri, after long maintaining their
battle-formation, fell beneath a shower of weapons. Nor was
victory bloodless even for the Othonians, for the enemy’s
cavalry rallied and cut off all who rashly ventured too far in
pursuit. So they agreed to a sort of armistice. As a safeguard
against sudden alarms caused either by the fleet on the one
side or the cavalry on the other, the Vitellians retired to
Antipolis,* a town in Narbonese Gaul, and the Othonians to
Albingaunum,* away from the front in Liguria.
The news of this naval victory kept Corsica and Sardinia 16
and the other adjacent islands faithful to Otho’s cause. How-
ever, Decumus Picarius, the governor, nearly ruined Corsica
68 the histories [2, 17]
by an act of indiscretion, which in a war of such dimensions
could not possibly have affected the issue, and only ended in
his own destruction. He hated Otho and determined to aid
Vitellius with all the forces of Corsica; a useless assistance,
even if it had been forthcoming. He summoned the chief men
of the island and disclosed his project. Claudius Pyrrhicus,
who commanded the Liburnian cruisers* stationed there, and
a Roman knight named Quintius Certus ventured to oppose
him. He ordered their execution. Their deaths frightened
those present into swearing allegiance to Vitellius; the general
mass of ignorant people did the same, blindly sharing the
others’ fear. However, when Picarius began to enlist them and
to harass his undisciplined men with military duties, their
loathing for the unwonted labour set them thinking of their
weakness. They lived on an island; Vitellius’ legions were in
Germany, a long way off; Otho’s fleet had already sacked
and plundered even districts that had auxiliary infantry and
cavalry to protect them.
The revulsion was sudden, but did not issue in overt resist-
ance. They chose a moment suitable for treachery. Waiting till
Picarius’ retinue had gone, they murdered him in his bath,
stripped and helpless, and slaughtered his comrades too. The
killers themselves brought to Otho the heads, like those of
public enemies. They received neither reward from Otho nor
punishment from Vitellius: in the vast cesspool of the age their
deed was overshadowed by more heinous crimes.
17 I have already described how ‘Silius’ Cavalry’ had opened
up Italy and taken the war into its heart. No one there either
supported Otho or preferred Vitellius. But prolonged peace
had crushed their spirits into utter servility.* They were an
easy prey to the first comer and cared little who was the better
man. As the auxiliaries sent forward by Caecina had also
arrived, all the fields and cities between the Alps and the Po,
the most prosperous district in Italy, were held by the Vitellian
forces. One of the Pannonian cohorts had been captured at
Cremona: 100 cavalry and 1,000 marines had been cut off
between Placentia and Ticinum.* After this success the river
and its banks were no longer a barrier to the Vitellian troops:
indeed the Batavians and the Germans from across the Rhine
[2, 20] book two 69
found the Po a positive temptation. Crossing suddenly oppo-
site Placentia, they captured a handful of scouts and created
such a panic that the others in terror spread the false report
that Caecina’s whole army was upon them.
Spurinna, who was holding Placentia, had made up his 18
mind that Caecina had not yet arrived, and that his own men
must be kept within the city’s defences if Caecina should
approach. He could not send three cohorts of Guards, 1,000
troops on special detachment, and a few cavalry to face
Caecina’s veteran army. But his men were unruly and ignorant
of war. Seizing the standards and colours they broke out,
threatening with their weapons the general who tried to check
them, and paying no heed to their centurions and tribunes.
They even clamoured that Otho was being betrayed, and that
Caecina was there by invitation. Their recklessness was for-
eign to Spurinna; yet he accompanied them, at first under
compulsion, later with a pretence of willingness. He was
anxious that his advice should carry greater influence in the
event that the mutiny cooled.
At nightfall, with the Po in sight,* Spurinna decided to 19
entrench his camp. The unaccustomed hard work crushed the
enthusiasm of his town-bred troops. The older men began to
curse their credulity, and to point out the fearful danger to
their small force of being surrounded by Caecina’s army in the
open country. More sober language by now had pervaded the
camp. The tribunes and centurions mingled with the men, and
everyone talked with admiration of Spurinna’s foresight in
selecting a powerful and wealthy colony as a strong base for
their operations. Finally Spurinna himself explained to his
troops his plans instead of reproaching their faults, and, leav-
ing patrols behind, led the rest of the men back to Placentia in
a quieter and more submissive frame of mind. There the walls
were strengthened, outworks built, and the turrets increased
in height and number, while Spurinna provided for and
prepared not only arms but also obedience and willing disci-
pline. This was all his party lacked, for their courage was
unimpeachable.
Caecina, meanwhile, seemed to have left his cruelty and 20
profligacy on the other side of the Alps. He marched through
70 the histories [2, 21]
Italy with a well-disciplined force. The people in the country
towns and colonies took offence at his costume as showing
arrogance: while they wore the plain toga, Caecina addressed
them attired in a parti-coloured plaid and trousers.* More-
over, his wife Salonina rode on a fine horse with purple
trappings, and though this did no one any harm, they grum-
bled and seemed hurt. It is an ineradicable human trait to turn
critical eyes on new-found fortune, and to insist upon modera-
tion most of all in those who used to be our equals.
Crossing the Po, Caecina tried to undermine the loyalty of
the Othonians by negotiations and promises. They retaliated
with the same weapons, and when they had finished bandying
empty and fine-sounding phrases about Peace and Concord,
Caecina devoted all his attention and plans to an assault on
Placentia in terrifying force. He knew that his future reputa-
tion rested on the result of the initial fighting.
21 But the first day’s work savoured more of impatience than
of the skills of a veteran army. The men ventured under the
walls without cover or precaution, drunk and overfed. Mean-
while the amphitheatre, a fine building outside the walls, was
burnt down: it was set on fire either by the attacking force
hurling torches and heated shot and firebrands against the
besieged, or by the besieged in returning their fire. The com-
mon people of the town, typically suspicious, believed that
fuel for the fire had been surreptitiously introduced by inhab-
itants of the neighbouring colonies out of envy and jealousy,
since no building in Italy could hold so many people. However
the disaster happened, they thought little of it while worse
threatened: once safety was restored, they bewailed it as the
worst calamity they could have suffered.
To return, however, to Caecina: he was repulsed with heavy
losses, and the night was spent in preparing siege-equipment.
The Vitellians produced screens, fascines, and mantlets, to
protect the assailants while undermining the walls: the
Othonians procured stakes and huge masses of stone, lead,
and brass, to destroy the enemy and crush them to pieces.
Both parties were actuated by feelings of pride and ambition.
However, the encouragements used were different, one side
[2, 23] book two 71
praising the strength of the legions and the German army, the
other the reputation of the Guards and the City Garrison. The
Vitellians decried their enemy as lazy idlers who had been
corrupted by the circus and the theatre: in response they
vilified the Vitellians as a pack of foreigners and barbarians.
Meanwhile, Otho and Vitellius were lauded or blamed,
mutual insults providing the more fruitful stimulus.
Hardly had day dawned before the walls of Placentia bris- 22
tled with defenders, and the fields glittered with the soldiers’
armour. The Vitellian legions advancing in close order with
their auxiliaries in scattered bands assailed the higher portions
of the walls with arrows and stones: where the walls were in
disrepair or crumbling from age they attacked from close
quarters. The Othonians above, poising and aiming their
weapons with surer effect, rained them down on the Germans,
who came rashly charging under the walls, naked, as is their
national custom, chanting fiercely and brandishing their
shields over their heads. Meanwhile, the legionaries under
cover of their screens and fascines undermined the walls, built
up a mound, and assailed the gates, while Otho’s Guards
rolled onto them with terrific crashes huge millstones, which
they had arranged for this purpose along the walls. Of those
beneath, some were crushed by the stones; others were pierced
through and left mangled and bleeding to death. Panic
redoubled the slaughter, and the missiles from the walls came
all the fiercer and more disabling. They retreated, their party’s
reputation ruined.
Caecina, ashamed of his rash attempt at assault, was afraid
of looking ridiculous and useless if he sat still in the same
camp. So he recrossed the Po and made for Cremona. As he
was retiring, Turullius Cerialis with a large force of marines,
and Julius Briganticus with a few cavalry, surrendered to him.
The latter, a Batavian by birth, had held a cavalry command:
the former was a senior centurion, who was known to
Caecina, as he had commanded a company in Germany.
Spurinna, learning the enemy’s route, informed Annius 23
Gallus by letter of all that had happened, the defence of
Placentia and Caecina’s plans. Gallus was leading the First
72 the histories [2, 24]
Legion to the relief of Placentia, for he doubted the ability of
so few cohorts to resist a long siege and the full strength of the
German army. Hearing that Caecina was defeated and mak-
ing for Cremona, he halted at Bedriacum, though he found it
hard to restrain his troops, whose zeal for battle nearly broke
into mutiny. The village of Bedriacum lies between Verona
and Cremona, and two Roman disasters have now given it a
sinister notoriety.
Around the same time Martius Macer gained a victory in
the neighbourhood of Cremona. With great enterprise he had
transported his gladiators over the Po in boats, and suddenly
unleashed them onto the opposite bank. There they routed the
Vitellian auxiliaries and killed all who offered resistance, the
rest taking flight to Cremona. But Macer checked their vic-
torious ardour, in case the enemy acquired reinforcements
and reversed the fortune of the battle.
This aroused suspicion among the Othonians, who put a
bad construction on all that their generals did. All the least
courageous and most impudent of the troops vied with each
other in assailing with various accusations Annius Gallus,
Suetonius Paulinus, and Marius Celsus (for the two latter had
also been placed in command by Otho). The most energetic in
promoting mutiny and dissension were Galba’s murderers,
who, maddened by fear and guilt, created endless disorder,
sometimes talking open sedition, sometimes sending secret
letters to Otho. As he always believed the lowest sort of man,
and feared the virtuous, he now wavered nervously, being
always irresolute in success and firmer in the face of danger.
He therefore sent for his brother Titianus and gave him the
chief command.
24 Meanwhile, success attended the generalship of Paulinus
and Celsus. Caecina was tortured by his constant failure and
the waning reputation of his army. Repulsed from Placentia,
he had lately seen his auxiliaries slaughtered, and even his
patrols constantly worsted in skirmishes more frequent than
memorable. Now that Fabius Valens was close at hand, he
determined not to let all the glory of the war fall to him, and
hastened with more greed than prudence to retrieve his repu-
tation. About twelve miles distant from Cremona, at a place
[2, 26] book two 73
called Castores,* he carefully concealed his most aggressive
auxiliaries in a wood overlooking the road. The cavalry were
ordered to ride further forward and provoke an engagement.
They were then to feign flight and lure the enemy into an
impetuous pursuit, until they fell into the ambush.
This plan was betrayed to Otho’s generals. Paulinus took
charge of the infantry, Celsus of the horse. A detachment of
the Thirteenth Legion, four auxiliary cohorts, and 500 cavalry
were stationed on the left flank. Three cohorts of the Guards
in column occupied the raised high road. On the right flank
marched the First Legion, two auxiliary cohorts, and 500
cavalry. Besides these they moved out 1,000 cavalry drawn
from Guards and auxiliaries, as a reserve to crown their
success, or assist them in difficulties.
Before they came to close quarters, the Vitellians began to 25
retire. Celsus, forewarned of the ruse, halted his men. Where-
upon the Vitellians impatiently rose from their ambush and,
while Celsus slowly retired, followed him further and further
until they plunged headlong into an ambush themselves. The
auxiliaries were on their flanks; the legions faced them in
front; and the cavalry had suddenly divided and closed in on
their rear. However, Suetonius Paulinus did not immediately
give the signal for his infantry to join battle. He was by nature
dilatory, the sort who prefers cautiously reasoned measures to
accidental success. He kept on issuing orders about filling up
the ditches, clearing the fields, and extending the line, con-
vinced that it was soon enough to begin his victory when he
had taken every precaution against defeat. This delay gave the
Vitellians time to take refuge in the vineyards, where the
interlaced vine-stems made it hard to follow. Adjoining these
was a little wood, under cover of which they took heart anew
and killed the foremost of the Guards’ cavalry. There Prince
Epiphanes* was wounded, while vigorously rallying Otho’s
forces.
At this point Otho’s infantry charged, crushed the opposing 26
line, and even routed the troops who were hurrying up in
support. For Caecina had brought up his auxiliaries not all at
once but in separate detachments. These, arriving in scattered
units, and never in sufficient force, only added to the confu-
74 the histories [2, 27]
sion, since they were caught up in the panic of the rout. In the
camp, moreover, the troops mutinied over the failure to lead
the entire army into battle. Julius Gratus, the camp prefect,
was put in irons on the charge of planning to betray the army
to his brother,* who was fighting on Otho’s side: the
Othonians had arrested the brother, the tribune Julius Fronto,
on the same charge.
But such was the universal panic among the pursued and
their assailants, on the field and before the camp, that it was
commonly said on both sides that, if Suetonius Paulinus had
not sounded the retreat, Caecina’s whole army might have
been destroyed. Paulinus maintained that he avoided any ex-
cessive strain of work or marching, for fear of exposing his
exhausted troops to a counterattack from the Vitellians in the
camp, who were still fresh for battle: besides, he had no
reserves to fall back on in case of defeat. A few approved of
the general’s strategy, but the common opinion was against
him.
27 This reverse reduced the Vitellians not to despair but to
discipline. Not only was this the case in the camp of Caecina,
who blamed his men as being readier for mutiny than for
battle, but the troops under Fabius Valens, who had now
reached Ticinum, lost their contempt for the enemy, conceived
a desire to retrieve their glory, and offered their general a
more respectful and steady obedience.
There had, all the same, been a serious outbreak of mutiny.
It had begun at an earlier point in the story, to which I shall
now revert—it seemed wrong to break the narrative of
Caecina’s operations. The Batavian cohorts, who had left the
Fourteenth Legion during the war against Vindex, heard of
Vitellius’ rising while on their way to Britain, and, as I have
already described, joined Fabius Valens in the country of the
Lingones. There they grew insolent. Whenever they passed the
tents of the Roman soldiers, they boasted that they had kept
the Fourteenth under control, had deprived Nero of Italy, and
held the whole issue of the war in the palm of their hand. This
insulted the soldiers and galled the general; brawls and quar-
rels ruined good discipline. Ultimately Valens began to suspect
that their insubordination meant treachery.
[2, 29] book two 75
Accordingly, on receiving the news that Otho’s fleet had 28
defeated the Treviran cavalry and the Tungri, and was now
blockading Narbonese Gaul, he determined to assist his allies,
and at the same time by a stroke of generalship to separate
contingents that were so undisciplined and, if united, so
strong. He therefore ordered a section of the Batavians to
march to the rescue. Immediately this order became generally
known, the auxiliaries began to complain and the legionaries
to chafe. They were, they said, being deprived of their strong-
est support. Here were these veterans, so often victorious in
war—but directly the enemy came in sight they were being
withdrawn virtually from the battle-line. If the province was
more important than the safety of Rome and the empire, why
was everybody not following them there? But if Italy was
the corner-stone of victory, the Batavians ought not to be
severed from the army—it would be like amputating a body’s
strongest limbs.
In answer to this fierce criticism, Valens loosed his lictors 29
upon them and set to work to check the mutiny: but they
attacked him, stoned him, and chased him out of the camp,
shouting that he was concealing the spoils of Gaul and the
gold from Vienne, the due reward of their labours. They
looted the baggage, ransacked the general’s quarters, and even
rummaged in the ground with javelins and lances; Valens, in
slave’s dress, took refuge with a cavalry officer. Gradually the
disorder began to die down, aided by the policy of Alfenus
Varus, the camp prefect: the centurions were forbidden to
inspect the sentries, and no bugle sounded to summon the men
to their martial duties. As a consequence all were paralysed:
they eyed each other in astonishment, dismayed above all at
having no one to command them. By silence, by submission,
but at last with tearful prayers, they sought pardon. Valens
appeared, squalid and in tears, but unexpectedly safe and
sound—such delight, sympathy, and cheers. Mobs oscillate
between extremes of emotion; theirs had now changed to joy.
They made a ring round him with the eagles and standards,
and carried him to the Tribunal platform with praises and
congratulations. With prudent moderation he demanded no
punishment for anyone, but, to disarm suspicion of his good
76 the histories [2, 30]
faith, he criticized one or two of them severely. He was well
aware that in civil war the men are allowed more licence than
their generals.
30 While they were entrenching themselves at Ticinum they
heard the news of Caecina’s defeat, and the mutiny nearly
broke out afresh:* Valens, they thought, had treacherously
delayed in order to keep them out of the battle. They refused
rest, would not wait for the general, marched on in front of
the standards, hurrying on the bearers, and swiftly marched to
join Caecina.
Valens had a bad name with Caecina’s army. They com-
plained that despite their greatly inferior numbers he had
exposed them to the full force of the enemy. At the same time,
for fear of being despised as defeated cowards, they excused
themselves and flattered the new arrivals by exaggerating their
strength. In fact, though Valens’ numbers were larger, and he
had almost twice as many legionaries and auxiliaries as
Caecina, yet it was Caecina who enjoyed the confidence of the
men. Apart from his kindness, in which he seemed much
readier than Valens, they admired him for his youthful vigour
and commanding stature; but some of their partiality was also
quite irrational.
So there was rivalry between the generals. Caecina mocked
at Valens for his dirty and dishonest ways, Valens at Caecina’s
pompous vanity. But they smothered their dislike and worked
together for a common end, writing frequent letters in which
they sacrificed all hope of pardon and heaped abuse on Otho.
Otho’s generals refrained from retaliating upon Vitellius,
31 though his character offered richer scope. Certainly before
their respective deaths, in which Otho earned a noble name
and Vitellius a most infamous one, people were more afraid of
Otho’s burning passions than of Vitellius’ listless luxury.
Moreover, the murder of Galba had made Otho feared and
hated, while no one attributed to Vitellius the outbreak of the
war. It was felt that Vitellius’ gluttony was a personal dis-
grace: Otho’s self-indulgence, cruelty, and recklessness spelt
more danger to the country.*
Now that Caecina and Valens had combined forces, the
Vitellians had no longer anything to delay them from joining
[2, 32] book two 77
battle with their entire army. Otho held a council to decide
whether he should prolong the war or put his fortune to the
test. Suetonius Paulinus, who was considered the cleverest 32
general of his day, now felt that he owed it to his reputation
to deliver his views on the general conduct of the war. His
contention was that the enemy’s interests were best served by
haste, Otho’s by delay.
‘The whole of Vitellius’ force’, he argued, ‘has now arrived
and he has few reinforcements in his rear, for the Gallic
provinces are in a ferment, and it would be imprudent to
abandon the Rhine with tribes so hostile ready to swarm
across it. The troops in Britain are obstructed by their own
foes and the sea: the Spanish provinces can scarcely spare
any troops: the Narbonese are seriously alarmed by their
recent reverse and the inroads of our fleet. Italy north of the
Po is shut in by the Alps and denied all supplies by sea, and,
besides, the passage of their army has left it a wasteland.
Nowhere can they get grain, and without supplies no army
can be kept together. The German troops are their fiercest
fighting arm, but their constitutions will not be strong enough
to stand the change of climate and weather, if we protract the
war into summer. Often a force that is powerful when on the
offensive has dwindled to nothing through the tedium of
inaction.
‘On the other hand, our resources are rich and reliable. We
have on our side Pannonia, Moesia, Dalmatia, and the East:
the armies there are fresh and strong. We have Italy and
Rome, the capital of the world, and the Roman Senate and
People: those titles are never obscure, though their glory may
sometimes be veiled. We have large public and private re-
sources, and in civil war a vast quantity of money is stronger
than the sword. Our soldiers are inured to the Italian climate
or, at any rate, to heat. We are entrenched behind the Po: its
cities are protected by their walls and inhabitants, and the
defence of Placentia has shown that none of them will yield to
the enemy.’
Therefore, he said, Otho should prolong the war. In a few
days the Fourteenth Legion would arrive: its fame alone was
great, and the Moesian forces would be with it. He should, at
78 the histories [2, 33]
any rate, postpone his deliberations until then, and if he
determined on battle, they would fight with augmented
strength.
33 Marius Celsus supported Paulinus. Annius Gallus had been
hurt a few days before by a fall from his horse, but messengers
were sent to inquire his views, and they reported that he too
agreed. Otho inclined to a decisive engagement. His brother
Titianus and Proculus, the Prefect of the Guards, with all the
impatience of inexperience, stoutly maintained that fortune,
the gods, and Otho’s divine power inspired his policy, and
would inspire its performance. They had descended to
flattery* by way of checking opposition.
When it was decided to take the offensive, the question
arose whether Otho in person should take part in the battle or
hold himself in reserve. Those bad counsellors again carried
their point. Otho was to retire to Brixellum,* and, by with-
drawing from the hazards of the field, reserve himself for the
supreme control of the campaign and of the empire. To this
Paulinus and Celsus offered no further opposition, for fear of
seeming to endanger the person of their Emperor.
From this day dates the decline of Otho’s party. Not only
did he take with him a considerable force of the Guards, Body
Guard, and cavalry, but the spirit of the troops who remained
behind was broken. The men trusted no one but Otho, and
Otho no one but the men. His generals were under suspicion
and their authority left in doubt.
34 None of these arrangements failed to reach the ears of the
Vitellians. Desertions were frequent, as they always are in civil
war, and the scouts in their eagerness to discover the enemy’s
plans failed to conceal their own. Caecina and Valens, count-
ing on the fatal impatience of the enemy, remained quietly on
their guard to await another’s folly—a good substitute for
wisdom. Feigning an intention of crossing the Po, they began
to construct a bridge, partly against the gladiators on the
opposite bank, partly to find something for their idle troops to
do.* Boats were placed at equal intervals with their heads
upstream and fastened together by strong wooden planks.
They also cast anchors from them to ensure the solidity of the
bridge, but they allowed the hawsers to drift slack, so that
[2, 37] book two 79
when the river rose the boats might all rise with it without the
line being broken. To enclose the bridge a tower was built
on it, and extended out to the end boat; from it they could
repulse the enemy with engines and catapults. Meanwhile the
Othonians had built a tower on the bank and kept up a steady
shower of stones and torches.
In midstream there was an island, to which the gladiators 35
struggled in boats, while the Germans swam to it floating
downstream. It happened that the latter were across in some
numbers: Macer manned Liburnian cruisers and attacked
them with the keenest of his gladiators. But in battle gladia-
tors are less steadfast than soldiers, and from their unsteady
boats they could not shoot so well as the others, who had a
firm footing on the bank. Swaying this way and that in their
alarm, the sailors and the marines were beginning to get in
each other’s way, when the Germans took the initiative, leapt
into the shallows, caught hold of the sterns, and either clam-
bered up by the gangways or sunk them bodily with their own
hands. All this took place before the eyes of both armies, and
the greater the joy of the Vitellians, the fiercer the curses of
the Othonians against Macer, the author and cause of their
disaster.
The remainder of the boats were dragged off, and the battle 36
ended in flight. The army demanded Macer’s execution. He
had already been wounded by a lance that had been flung at
him, and the soldiers were rushing on him with drawn swords
when the tribunes and centurions intervened and rescued
him. Soon after this, Vestricius Spurinna, on Otho’s orders,
brought up a reinforcement of the Guards, leaving behind a
small garrison at Placentia; then Otho sent the consul-elect,
Flavius Sabinus, to take command of Macer’s force. This
change of generals pleased the soldiers, but the frequent mu-
tinies made the generals unwilling to assume such a perilous
command.
In some of my authorities I find a statement that either fear 37
of war or scorn for the two emperors, whose scandalous
misconduct grew daily more notorious, led the armies to
wonder whether they should not give up the struggle and
either negotiate jointly among themselves or refer the choice
80 the histories [2, 38]
of an emperor to the Senate. This, it is suggested, was the
motive of Otho’s generals in advising delay, and Paulinus in
particular had high hopes, since he was the senior ex-consul,
and a distinguished general who had earned a brilliant reputa-
tion by his operations in Britain. For my own part, while I am
ready to admit that a few people may have tacitly wished for
peace instead of civil war, or for a good and virtuous emperor
instead of two who were the worst of criminals, yet I imagine
that Paulinus was much too wise* to hope that in a time of
universal corruption the mob would show such moderation.
Those who had sacrificed peace in a passion for war were not
likely to stop the war from any affection for peace. Nor was
it possible that armies whose language and characteristics
differed so widely should ever come to such an agreement. As
for the officers and generals, hedonism, bankruptcy, and
crimes had left nearly all of them with guilty consciences: they
would not put up with any emperor who was not corrupt and
under an obligation for their services.
38 The old ingrained human passion for power has matured
and burst into prominence with the growth of the empire.
With straiter resources equality was easily preserved. But
when once we had brought the world to our feet and extermi-
nated every rival state or king, we were left free to covet
wealth without fear.* It was then that strife first flared up*
between patricians and plebeians: at one time arose seditious
tribunes, at another over-mighty consuls: in the Forum at
Rome they had trial runs for civil war. Before long, Gaius
Marius, rising from the lowest ranks of the people, and Lucius
Sulla,* the most cruel of all the nobles, crushed our liberty by
force of arms and substituted a despotism. Then came Gnaeus
Pompey, whose aims, though less patent, were no better.
From that time onwards the one end sought was autocracy.
Even at Pharsalia and Philippi the citizen armies did not lay
down their arms. How then can we suppose that the troops of
Otho and Vitellius would have willingly stopped the war? The
same anger of heaven, the same human frenzy, the same
criminal motives drove them into discord. True, these wars
were each settled by a single blow, but that was due to the
generals’ lack of spirit. However, my reflections on the ancient
[2, 41] book two 81
and the modern character have carried me too far: I must now
resume the thread of the narrative.
When Otho started for Brixellum, he left his brother 39
Titianus in nominal command, but power and control lay
with the Prefect Proculus. As for Celsus and Paulinus, no one
made use of their sagacity; their rank as general was a sham,
enabling them only to act as a screen for other people’s faults.
The tribunes and centurions were in two minds, since the
better ones had been slighted, and the worst were in charge.
The men were full of spirit, but preferred commenting upon
their officers’ orders to carrying them out.
It was decided to advance and encamp four miles from
Bedriacum—but it was done so ineptly that, though it was
spring, and rivers abounded, the men suffered from want of
water. Here they were in doubt whether to join battle, for
Otho kept sending dispatches urging haste, but the soldiers
kept clamouring for their Emperor to be present at the fight.
Many demanded that the troops stationed across the Po
should be brought up. It is not so easy to decide what was the
best thing to do, as to be sure that what they did do was the
worst.
They set out as if going on a campaign, not to a fight. Their 40
objective was the confluence of the Po and the Addua,* six-
teen miles away. Celsus and Paulinus refused to expose their
troops, fatigued by the march and heavily kitted out, to the
assault of an enemy who was battle-ready, had barely four
miles to cover, and who would certainly attack them, either
while they were in the disorder of a marching column, or
when they had broken up to build the ramparts. However,
Titianus and Proculus, worsted in argument, appealed to their
authority: and it is true that there had arrived post-haste a
Numidian with a savage directive from Otho, inveighing
against his generals’ inaction, and ordering them to bring
matters to a head. He was sick of delay and too impatient to
live on hope.
On that same day, while Caecina was busy with the bridge- 41
building operations, two tribunes of the Guards came and
demanded an interview. He was preparing to hear and answer
their proposals, when some scouts burst in with the news that
82 the histories [2, 42]
the enemy were close at hand. The tribunes’ conversation was
thus interrupted, and it was left uncertain whether they were
broaching a trick or a piece of treachery, or some honourable
plan. Caecina, dismissing the tribunes, rode back to the camp,
where he found that Fabius Valens had given orders to sound
for battle, and the troops were already under arms.
While the legions were balloting for their places in the
marching order, the cavalry rode out and charged. Strange to
say, they would have been hurled back upon the ramparts by
a smaller force of Othonians, had not the Italian Legion
bravely stopped them by drawing their swords and forcing
the retreating troops to go back and resume the fight. The
Vitellian legions formed without any disorder, for though the
enemy were close at hand, thick plantations hid the approach-
ing force. In the Othonian army the generals were nervous and
the men ill-disposed towards them: they were hindered by
carts and camp-followers, and the road, with its steep ditches
on either side, was too narrow even for a peaceful march.
Some of the men formed round their standards, others went
searching for their place: on every side there was an uproar as
men ran about shouting to each other: the boldest kept press-
ing on to the front, while the tide of the timid ebbed to the
rear.
42 Amid the confusion of this sudden panic some people in-
vented a story that Vitellius’ army had abandoned his cause:
whereupon an unwarrantable glee relaxed the Othonians’
efforts. It was never fully known whether this report was
spread by Vitellian scouts or whether it was started on Otho’s
own side, either by treachery or chance. Losing all their thirst
for battle, the Othonians broke into a spontaneous cheer. The
enemy answered with angry muttering, and most of Otho’s
soldiers, having no idea what caused the cheering, feared
treachery.
At this point the Vitellian line charged, their ranks unbro-
ken; they were stronger and more numerous. However, the
Othonians, despite their disorder, fewer numbers, and fatigue,
offered fierce resistance. The area was encumbered with trees
and vines, and the character of the battle varied. They fought
now from a distance, now at close quarters, and charged
[2, 44] book two 83
sometimes in detachment, sometimes in column. On the high
road they fought hand to hand, using the weight of their
bodies and their shields. They gave up throwing their javelins
and cut through helmet and breastplate with sword and axe.
Each man knew his foe; they were in view of their comrades;
they fought with the outcome of the whole war depending on
them.
It happened that two legions met in the open fields between 43
the road and the Po. These were: for Vitellius the Twenty-
First, commonly called Rapax, a regiment of old renown; and
for Otho the First Adiutrix, which had never been in battle
before,* but was full of spirit and eager to win its first laurels.
The First overthrew the front ranks of the Twenty-First, and
they carried off its eagle. Fired with indignation, the Twenty-
First rallied and charged the enemy, killing the commanding
officer, Orfidius Benignus, and capturing many of their
colours and standards.
Elsewhere in the battle, the Fifth drove the Thirteenth off
the field. The Fourteenth was attacked by superior numbers
and surrounded. Otho’s generals had long ago fled. Caecina
and Valens began to bring up the reserves to the support of
their men, and, as a fresh reinforcement, there arrived Alfenus
Varus with his Batavians. They had routed the gladiators by
confronting them and cutting them to pieces in the river
before their transports could land, and flushed by their victory
came charging in upon the flank of the enemy.
Their centre broken, the Othonians fled in disorder, making 44
for Bedriacum. The distance was immense; the roads encum-
bered with heaps of dead. This made the slaughter all the
greater, for in civil war captives cannot be turned to profit.
Suetonius Paulinus and Licinius Proculus, going by different
routes, avoided the camp. Vedius Aquila, who commanded
the Thirteenth Legion, panicked irrationally and so fell into
the hands of his indignant troops. It was still broad daylight
when he entered the ramparts. Immediately a crowd of
mutinous fugitives came clamouring round him. They spared
neither abuse nor violence, assailing him as a deserter and a
traitor. They could bring no special charge against him, but
the mob always accuses others of its own transgressions.
84 the histories [2, 45]
Night came to the aid of Titianus and Celsus, for Annius
Gallus had already placed sentinels on guard and got the men
under control. By words of advice, by prayers, by his personal
authority, he had induced them not to add to the disaster of
their defeat by brutally murdering their own friends. Whether
the war was over, or whether they wanted to fight again,
union, he told them, was the one thing that mitigated defeat.
All the other troops were crushed by the blow. The Guards
complained that they had been beaten, not by the enemy’s
valour, but by sheer treachery. ‘Why,’ they said, ‘even the
Vitellians have won no bloodless victory. We beat their cav-
alry and captured a eagle from one of their legions. We still
have Otho left and all the troops with him on the other side of
the Po. The Moesian legions are on their way. A large part of
the army was left behind at Bedriacum. These, at any rate,
have not been defeated yet: they would, if need be, die more
honourably in battle.’ These reflections made them savage or
else nervous: but their state of blank despair more often
aroused their anger than their fear.
45 The Vitellian army bivouacked at the fifth milestone on the
road from Bedriacum. Their generals would not venture to
storm the camp that same day, and hoped the enemy would
consent to surrender. However, although they had marched
out equipped only with what they needed for battle, their
weapons and their victory acted as their fortifications.
On the next day there was no doubt about the wishes of the
Othonians. Even those who showed most spirit had now
changed their minds. So they sent a deputation. The Vitellian
generals had no hesitation in granting terms.* However, they
detained the deputation for a short time, which caused some
qualms to those who did not know whether it had been
successful. At length the envoys returned, and the camp was
opened up. Then both victors and vanquished burst into tears,
and with sorrowful satisfaction cursed their fate of civil war.
Sitting in the same tents, they nursed wounded brothers or
other relatives. Their hopes of recompense were doubtful: all
that was certain was bereavement and grief, for no one was so
fortunate as to mourn no loss. They searched for the body of
the fallen commander, Orfidius, and burnt it with due solem-
[2, 47] book two 85
nity. Of the other dead, a few were buried by their relatives,
the great mass were left lying on the ground.
Otho was awaiting news of the battle with perfect confi- 46
dence and firm resolve.* First came a disquieting rumour.
Soon fugitives from the field revealed the ruin of his cause. But
the soldiers in their zeal did not wait to hear their Emperor
speak. ‘Keep a good heart,’ they said, ‘you still have fresh
forces left, and, as for us, we are ready to risk everything and
suffer everything.’ Nor was this flattery. In a wild passion of
enthusiasm they burned to march to the field and restore the
fortunes of their party. Those who were near him clasped his
knees, while those who stood further off stretched out their
arms to him. The most eager of all was Plotius Firmus, the
Prefect of the Guards, who besought Otho again and again
not to desert a supremely faithful army, men who had done
him such great service. He told him that it showed more
courage to bear misfortune than to desert it, that men of
vigour and courage cling to their hopes even in the face of
disaster: it is only cowards and faint-hearts who let their
terror hurry them into despair. Amid all these appeals the
soldiers now cheered, now groaned, according as Otho’s ex-
pression relaxed or hardened. Nor were these feelings con-
fined to the Guards, Otho’s own troops. The first arrivals
from Moesia assured him that the spirit of the advancing force
was just as firm, and that the legions had already entered
Aquileia. There is no room for doubt that it was still possible
to revive this cruel and pitiable war,* so full of uncertainty to
both victors and vanquished.
But Otho himself disliked the policy of fighting. ‘Am I’, he 47
said, ‘to expose all your splendid courage and valour to fur-
ther risks? That would, I think, be too great a price to pay for
my life. Your high hopes of succeeding, if I were minded to
live, will only swell the glory of my death. We have learnt to
know each other, Fortune and I. Do not merely count length
of time. Self-control is all the harder when a man knows that
his fortune cannot last. It was Vitellius who began the civil
war: he initiated our contest* for the throne. But one battle is
enough. This is the precedent that I will set: let posterity judge
Otho by it. I do not grudge Vitellius his brother, or wife, or
86 the histories [2, 48]
children. I want neither revenge nor consolation. Others may
have held the sceptre longer, but no one can ever have laid it
down so bravely. Am I the man to allow the flower of Rome
in all these famous armies to be mown down once again and
lost to the country? Let me take with me the consciousness
that you would have died for me. But you must stay and live.
I must no longer interfere with your chance of pardon, nor
you with my resolve. It is a sort of cowardice to go on talking
about the end. Here is your best proof of my determination: I
complain of no one. To blame gods or men is the mark of one
who desires to live.’
48 After some such speech, he addressed each courteously in
turn, according to their age and position. He urged them to
hurry away and not to exasperate the victor by their hesita-
tion, using his authority with the young and persuasion with
his elders, while his quiet looks and firm speech helped to
control their ill-timed tears. He gave orders for boats and
carriages to be provided for their departure. All petitions and
letters containing any marked compliments to himself, or
insults to Vitellius, he destroyed, and distributed his money
carefully,* not like a man at the point of death. He then went
out of his way to comfort the sorrowful fears of his brother’s
young son Salvius Cocceianus, by praising his attachment and
chiding his alarm.
‘Do you imagine’, he said, ‘that Vitellius will be so hard-
hearted as not to show me some gratitude for saving his whole
household? By promptly putting an end to myself, I deserve to
earn some mercy from the victor. For it is not in blank despair,
but with my army clamouring for battle, that I have saved my
country from the last calamities. I have won enough fame for
myself and ennoblement for my posterity; for, after the line of
the Julians, Claudians, and Servians,* I have been the first to
bring the principate into a new family. So go on with your life
with a lofty heart. Never forget that Otho was your uncle—
and never remember it overmuch.’*
49 After this he made them all retire, and rested for a while.
But his last preparations were interrupted by a sudden distur-
bance and the news of a mutinous outbreak among the troops.
They were threatening to kill those who were leaving, and
[2, 50] book two 87
turned with especial violence against Verginius, whose house
was in a state of siege. Otho rebuked the ringleaders and
returned, consenting to receive the adieux of those who were
going, until they were able to depart in safety.
As the day deepened into evening he quenched his thirst
with a drink of iced water. Two daggers were brought to him
and, after trying them both, he put one under his pillow. Being
assured on enquiry that his friends had started, he spent a
peaceful night, not, it is said, without sleep. At break of day he
fell upon his dagger.* Hearing his dying groan, his slaves
and freedmen entered with Plotius Firmus, the Prefect of the
Guards, and found a single wound in his breast.
The funeral was hurried forward out of respect for his own
earnest entreaties, for he had been afraid his head might be cut
off and subjected to outrage. The Guard carried the body,
sounding his praises with tears in their eyes, and covering his
hands and wounded breast with kisses. Some of the soldiers
killed themselves beside the pyre, not through servility or fear,
but from love of their Emperor, and to follow his noble
example. Similar suicides became common afterwards at
Bedriacum and Placentia, and in other encampments. An
inconspicuous tomb was built for Otho, as being less likely to
be disturbed: and thus he ended his life in his thirty-seventh
year.
Otho came originally from the town of Ferentium.* His 50
father had been consul and his grandfather praetor. His
mother’s family was inferior, but not without distinction.
His boyhood and youth were such as I have indicated. By
two acts, one most criminal and the other heroic, he
earned in equal measure the praise and the reprobation of
posterity.
I am of the view that it is beneath the dignity of my task to
collect fictions and fables for the amusement of my readers,
but there are certain popular traditions which I cannot ven-
ture to contradict. On the day of the battle of Bedriacum,
according to the account of the locals, a bird of unprecedented
appearance was seen in a much-frequented grove near Regium
Lepidum.* There it sat, unterrified and unmoved, either by the
crowds of people or by the birds which fluttered round it, until
88 the histories [2, 51]
the moment at which Otho killed himself. Then it vanished. A
calculation of the time showed that the prodigy’s appearance
and disappearance coincided with Otho’s death.
51 At his funeral the rage and grief of the soldiers broke out
into another mutiny. This time there was no one to control
them. They turned to Verginius and begged him with threats
now to accept the principate, now to head a deputation
to Caecina and Valens. However, Verginius escaped them,
slipping out by the back door of his house just as they broke
in at the front. Rubrius Gallus* carried a petition from the
Guards at Brixellum, and obtained immediate pardon. Flavius
Sabinus surrendered to the victor the troops under his
command.
52 Now that the war was everywhere ended, a large number of
senators, who had quitted Rome with Otho and been left
behind at Mutina, found themselves in a critical position.
When the news of the defeat reached Mutina, the soldiers
paid no heed to what they took for a baseless rumour, and,
believing the senators to be hostile to Otho, they treasured up
their conversation and put the worst interpretation on their
looks and behaviour. In time they broke into abusive re-
proaches, seeking a pretext for starting a general massacre,
while the senators suffered at the same time from another
source of alarm, for they were afraid of seeming to be slow in
welcoming the victory of the now predominant Vitellian
party.
Terrified at their double danger, they held a meeting. For no
one dared to form any policy for himself; each felt safer in
sharing his guilt with others. The town council of Mutina,
too, kept adding to their anxiety by offering them arms
and money, styling them with ill-timed respect ‘Conscript
Fathers’.*
53 A remarkable quarrel arose at this meeting. Licinius
Caecina attacked Eprius Marcellus* for the ambiguity of his
language. Not that the others disclosed their sentiments, but
Caecina, who was still a nobody, recently raised to the Senate,
sought to distinguish himself by quarrelling with someone of
importance, and selected Marcellus, because the memory of
his career as an informer made him an object of loathing.
[2, 55] book two 89
They were parted by the prudent intervention of their betters,
and all then retired to Bononia,* intending to continue the
discussion there, and hoping for more news in the meantime.
At Bononia they dispatched men along the roads in every
direction to question all newcomers. From one of Otho’s
freedmen they inquired why he had come away, and were told
he was carrying his master’s last instructions: the man said
that when he had left, Otho was still indeed alive, but had
renounced the pleasures of life and was devoting all his
thoughts to posterity. This filled them with admiration. They
felt ashamed to ask any more questions—and in their hearts
unanimously favoured Vitellius.
Vitellius’ brother Lucius was present at their discussion, 54
and now displayed his willingness to receive their flattery; but
one of Nero’s freedmen, called Coenus, suddenly startled
them all by inventing the atrocious falsehood that the Four-
teenth Legion had joined forces with the troops at Brixellum,
and that their sudden arrival had turned the fortune of the
day: the victorious army had been cut to pieces. He hoped by
inventing this good news to regain some authority for Otho’s
safe-conducts,* which were beginning to be disregarded. He
did, indeed, thus ensure for himself a quick journey to Rome,
but was punished by order of Vitellius a few days later.*
However, the Senate’s danger was augmented because
Otho’s soldiers believed the news. Their fears were the more
acute, because it looked as if their departure from Mutina was
an official move, by which they had deserted Otho’s party. So
they refrained from holding any more meetings, and each
looked after himself, until a letter arrived from Fabius Valens
which quieted their fears. Besides, the news of Otho’s death
travelled all the more quickly because it excited admiration.
At Rome, however, there was no sign of panic. The festival 55
of Ceres was being celebrated with the usual spectacle. When
it was reported in the theatre* on reliable authority that Otho
had ended his life, and that Flavius Sabinus, the City Prefect,
had made all the troops in Rome swear allegiance to Vitellius,
the audience cheered Vitellius. The populace decked busts of
Galba with laurel-leaves and flowers, and carried them round
from temple to temple. The garlands were eventually piled up
90 the histories [2, 56]
into a sort of tomb near the Lacus Curtius, on the spot which
Galba had stained with his life-blood.
In the Senate the distinctions devised during the long reigns
of other emperors were all conferred on Vitellius at once. To
these was added a vote of thanks and congratulation to the
German army, and a deputation was dispatched to express the
Senate’s satisfaction. Letters were read which Fabius Valens
had addressed to the consuls in very moderate terms. But
Caecina’s moderation was still more gratifying: he had not
written at all.*
56 However, Italy found peace a more ghastly burden than the
war. Vitellius’ soldiers scattered through all the boroughs and
colonial towns, indulging in plunder, violence, and rape. Im-
pelled by greed or venality, they cared nothing for right and
wrong: kept their hands off nothing sacred or profane. Even
civilians put on uniform and seized the opportunity to murder
their enemies. The soldiers themselves, knowing the country-
side well, marked down the richest fields and wealthiest
houses for plunder—or murder, if anyone offered resistance.
Their generals were too much in their debt to venture any
opposition. Of the two Caecina was driven less by greed, more
by ambition. Valens had earned a bad name by his own ill-
gotten gains, and was therefore bound to shut his eyes to
others’ shortcomings. The resources of Italy had long been
exhausted; all these thousands of infantry and cavalry, all this
violence and damage and outrage was almost more than the
country could bear.
57 Meanwhile Vitellius knew nothing of his victory. With the
remainder of his German army he continued to advance as
though the war had just begun. A few of the veterans were left
in winter quarters, and troops were hurriedly enlisted in the
Gallic provinces, to fill up the vacancies in the legions left
behind. Leaving Hordeonius Flaccus to guard the line of the
Rhine, Vitellius advanced with a picked detachment from the
army in Britain, 8,000 strong.
After a few days’ march he received news of the victory of
Bedriacum and the collapse of the war on the death of Otho.
He summoned a meeting and heaped praise on the courage of
the troops. When the army demanded that he should confer
[2, 59] book two 91
equestrian rank on his freedman Asiaticus, he checked their
shameful flattery. Then with characteristic instability he
granted at a private banquet what he had refused in public.
This Asiaticus, who was thus decorated with the gold rings,
was an infamous menial who sought to rise by his vices.*
During these same days news arrived that Albinus, the 58
governor of Mauretania, had been murdered, and both prov-
inces had declared for Vitellius. Appointed by Nero to the
province of Mauretania Caesariensis, Lucceius Albinus* had
further received from Galba the governorship of Tingitana,
and thus commanded a very considerable force of auxiliaries:
nineteen cohorts of infantry, five regiments of horse, and an
immense horde of Moors, well trained for war by their prac-
tice in brigandage and plunder. After Galba’s murder he in-
clined to Otho’s side and, not contented with Africa, began to
threaten Spain on the other side of the narrow strait. Cluvius
Rufus, alarmed at this, moved the Tenth Legion down to the
coast as though for a crossing. He also sent some centurions
ahead to gain the sympathies of the Moors for Vitellius. The
great reputation of the German army throughout the prov-
inces facilitated this task, and they also spread a rumour that
Albinus was not contented with the title of ‘Procurator’, and
wanted to adopt a regal style under the name of Juba.* So the 59
sympathies of the army shifted. Asinius Pollio, who com-
manded the cavalry, one of Albinus’ most loyal friends, was
assassinated. The same fate befell Festus and Scipio, who were
in command of the infantry. Albinus himself was journeying
from Tingitana to Mauretania Caesariensis, and was mur-
dered as he landed. His wife confronted the assassins and was
murdered too. How all this happened Vitellius never inquired.
He passed by events of the highest importance after a few
moments’ attention, being quite unable to cope with serious
matters.
On reaching the Arar,* Vitellius ordered his army to march
overland while he sailed down the river. Travelling with no
imperial state, he had nothing but his original poverty to make
him conspicuous, until Junius Blaesus, governor of the Lyons
division of Gaul, a member of an eminent family,* whose
liberality matched his wealth, provided the Emperor with a
92 the histories [2, 60]
retinue and escorted him in lavish style, which earned him no
thanks, although Vitellius concealed his malice under servile
flattery.
At Lyons he found the generals of the victorious and
vanquished parties awaiting him. Valens and Caecina were
openly commended at a public meeting, and given places on
either side of the Emperor’s throne. He then sent the whole
army out to meet his infant son,* and when they brought him
wearing a general’s cloak, Vitellius took him up in his arms
and named him Germanicus, at the same time decorating him
with all the insignia of his imperial position. The exaggerated
honours of these days of prosperity proved a consolation in
the evil times which followed.
60 The most energetic of Otho’s centurions were now ex-
ecuted, which did more than anything else to alienate the
armies of Illyricum. The other legions also caught the infec-
tion, and their dislike of the German troops made them
harbour thoughts of war. Suetonius Paulinus and Licinius
Proculus were left in misery and squalor while their case was
adjourned. When at last it was heard, their pleas savoured
more of necessity than honour. They positively claimed credit
for treachery, alleging that the long march before the battle,
the fatigue of their troops, the confusion created by the
wagons in their lines, and various chance events, were due to
their own deceit. Vitellius believed their protestations of
treason, and acquitted them of all suspicion of loyalty. Otho’s
brother Salvius Titianus was in no danger. His affection for
his brother and his personal inefficiency excused him. Marius
Celsus was allowed to keep his consulship. But it was ru-
moured, and believed, that Caecilius Simplex had tried to
purchase the consulship and to secure Celsus’ destruction
(Simplex later was charged with this in the Senate). Vitellius,
however, refused, and afterwards allowed Simplex to hold the
consulship without detriment to his conscience or his purse.
Trachalus was protected against his accusers by Galeria,
Vitellius’ wife.
61 With so many of the great in danger of their lives, I am
ashamed to say that a certain Mariccus, a commoner of the
tribe of the Boii, boldly endeavoured to thrust himself into
[2, 63] book two 93
greatness and to challenge the armies of Rome, pretending to
be divine.* This champion of Gaul, and god, as he had entitled
himself, had already gathered a force of 8,000 men, and was
beginning to influence the neighbouring Aeduan cantons. But
the chief community of the Aedui wisely sent out a picked
force, and Vitellius provided auxiliaries in support; they
scattered the mob of fanatics. Mariccus was captured in
the engagement, and later thrown to wild beasts. As they
refused to devour him, the common people stupidly believed
him invulnerable, until he was executed in the presence of
Vitellius. There was no further brutality against the rebels, or 62
against anyone’s property. The estates of those who had fallen
fighting for Otho were allowed to devolve by will or else by
the law of intestacy.
Indeed, if Vitellius had set limits to his luxury, there was no
need to fear his greed for money. It was his foul and insatiable
gluttony. Rome and Italy were scoured for dainties to tickle
his palate: from shore to shore the high roads rang with the
traffic. The leading provincials were ruined by having to
provide for his feasts. The very towns were impoverished.
Meanwhile the soldiers were acquiring luxurious habits,
learning to despise their general, and gradually losing their
former efficiency and courage.
Vitellius forwarded an edict to Rome, in which he declined
the title of Caesar, and postponed calling himself Augustus
without giving up any portion of his power. All astrologers
were exiled from Italy, and rigorous provision was made to
restrain Roman knights from the disgrace of appearing at the
games in the arena.* Previous emperors had paid, or more
often compelled, them to take part, and many of the provin-
cial towns vied with one another to lure the most profligate
young aristocrats with gold.
The arrival of his brother, and the influence of those worm- 63
ing themselves in as his tutors in tyranny, made Vitellius more
haughty and cruel. He gave orders for the execution of
Dolabella, whom Otho, as we have seen, had exiled to the
colonial town of Aquinas. On hearing of Otho’s death, he
had ventured back to Rome. Whereupon an ex-praetor,
named Plancius Varus,* one of Dolabella’s closest friends, laid
94 the histories [2, 64]
information before the City Prefect, Flavius Sabinus, main-
taining that he had broken from custody to put himself at the
head of the defeated party. He added that Dolabella had tried
to tamper with the cohort stationed at Ostia. Varus had no
proof of these very serious charges; he then repented and
begged for his friend’s forgiveness. But it was too late: the
crime was committed. While Flavius Sabinus was hesitating
what to do in such a serious matter, Lucius Vitellius’ wife
Triaria, whose cruelty was altogether unwomanly, terrified
him by suggesting that he was trying to get a reputation for
mercy at the expense of his Emperor’s safety. Sabinus was
naturally of a kindly disposition, but easily changed under the
influence of fear. Though it was not he who was in danger, he
was alarmed for himself, and hastened Dolabella’s impending
64 ruin for fear of being supposed to have helped him. Vitellius,
accordingly, from motives both of fear and of hatred
(Dolabella had married his divorced wife Petronia), sum-
moned him by letter, and ordered that Dolabella was to avoid
the crowded thoroughfare of the Flaminian Way and to turn
off to Interamna,* where he was to be murdered. The assassin
thought this tedious; he flung his victim to the floor at a
wayside inn, and cut his throat. This gave the new government
a very bad name. People took it as a symbol of what to expect.
Triaria’s shameless behaviour was further emphasized by be-
ing set beside the exemplary moderation of Galeria, the Em-
peror’s wife, who kept clear of these dreadful doings. Equally
admirable was the character of the mother of the Vitellii,
Sextilia, a woman of the old school. It was even on record
that, on receiving her son’s first letters, she said, ‘It was no
Germanicus, but a Vitellius that I brought into the world.’
From that time neither the attractions of her high station nor
the flattery of Rome could win her over to complacence. She
shared only the sorrows of her house.
65 When Vitellius left Lyons, Cluvius Rufus, who had aban-
doned Spain, caught up with him. He knew that accusations
had been made against him, and his smiling congratulations
hid an anxious heart. A freedman of the imperial court,
Hilarus by name, had given evidence against him, alleging
that, when Cluvius heard of the rival claims of Otho and
[2, 66] book two 95
Vitellius, he had endeavoured to set up an independent au-
thority of his own in Spain, and to this end had issued safe-
conducts with no emperor’s name at the head. Certain phrases
in his speeches were also construed as insulting to Vitellius
and as a bid for his own popularity. However, Cluvius’ influ-
ence carried the day, and Vitellius even had his own freedman
punished. Cluvius was given a place in the Emperor’s entou-
rage, while still retaining Spain, of which he was absentee
governor, following the precedent of Lucius Arruntius.* In
Arruntius’ case, however, the Emperor Tiberius’ motive had
been fear, whereas Vitellius detained Cluvius without any
such qualms. Trebellius Maximus was not allowed the same
privilege. He had fled from Britain to escape the fury of his
troops. Vettius Bolanus, who was then about the court, was
sent out to take his place.
The soldiers of the defeated legions still gave Vitellius a 66
good deal of anxiety. Their spirit was by no means broken.
They were distributed all over Italy, mingling with the victors
and talking treason. The most uncompromising of all were the
Fourteenth, who refused to acknowledge their defeat. At the
battle of Bedriacum, they argued, it was only a detachment
that had been beaten: the main strength of the legion was
not present. It was decided to send them back to Britain,
whence Nero had summoned them, and meanwhile they were
to share their quarters with the Batavian cohorts, because of
the long-standing feud between them.
Quartered as they were under arms, their strong mutual
hatred soon broke out into disorder. At Turin one of the
Batavians was cursing a workman for having cheated him,
when a legionary, who lodged with the workman, took his
part. Each quickly gathered his fellow-soldiers round him, and
from abuse they came to bloodshed. Indeed, a fierce battle
would have broken out, had not two cohorts of Guards
sided with the Fourteenth, thus giving them confidence and
frightening the Batavians.
Vitellius gave orders that the Batavians should be attached
to his army as a mark of their fidelity, while the legion was to
be marched over the Graian Alps by a detour which would
avoid Vienne (its inhabitants were another cause for alarm).
96 the histories [2, 67]
On the night on which the legion started they left fires burning
all over Turin, and part of the town was burnt down. This
disaster, like so many others in the war, has been obliterated
by the greater calamities which befell other cities. No sooner
were the Fourteenth across the Alps than the most mutinous
spirits started off to march for Vienne, but they were stopped
by the unanimous action of the better men, and the legion was
shipped across to Britain.
67 Vitellius’ next cause of anxiety was the Guards. At first they
were quartered apart, and then, appeased by an honourable
discharge, they gave up their arms to their tribunes. But when
the war started by Vespasian intensified, they enlisted again
and formed the main strength of the Flavian party.
The First Legion of marines was sent to Spain to cultivate
docility in peace and quiet. The Eleventh and the Seventh were
sent back to their winter quarters. The Thirteenth was set to
work to build amphitheatres. For Caecina at Cremona and
Valens at Bononia were each preparing to give a gladiatorial
show. Vitellius never let his anxieties interfere with his
pleasures.
68 Vitellius had shown restraint in dispersing the losing party;
but disorder broke out in the victorious camp. It originated in
sport, but the number of deaths increased the feeling against
Vitellius. He had invited Verginius to a feast at Ticinum, and
had settled down to eat. The conduct of senior officers is
always determined by the behaviour of their generals: whether
they imitate his austerity or enjoy elaborate banquets. This
again determines whether the troops are alert or undisci-
plined. In Vitellius’ army disorder and drunkenness were uni-
versal: it was more like a midnight orgy than a properly
disciplined camp. So it happened that two of the soldiers, one
belonging to the Fifth Legion, the other to the Gallic auxilia-
ries, in an unruly frolic were excited into a wrestling match.
The legionary fell; and when the Gaul began to exult over
him, the soldiers who had gathered round took sides; the
legionaries broke out against the auxiliaries with murderous
intent, and cut to pieces a couple of cohorts. This commotion
was only cured by another. A cloud of dust and the glitter of
arms appeared on the horizon. Suddenly a cry arose that the
[2, 70] book two 97
Fourteenth had turned back and were marching on them.
However, it was the army’s own rearguard; this discovery
quieted their alarm.
Meanwhile, coming across one of Verginius’ slaves, the
soldiers charged him with intending to assassinate Vitellius,
and rushed off to the banquet clamouring for Verginius’ head.
No one really doubted his innocence, not even Vitellius, who
always quailed at a breath of suspicion. Yet, though it was the
death of an ex-consul, their own former general, which they
demanded, it was with difficulty that they were quieted. No
one was the target of every mutinous act as regularly as
Verginius. He still retained the admiration and esteem of the
men, but they hated him for disdaining them.
On the next day Vitellius granted an audience to the depu- 69
tation of the Senate, which he had told to await him at
Ticinum. He then entered the camp and spontaneously
complimented the troops on their devotion to him. This made
the auxiliaries grumble at the extensive impunity* and arro-
gance now enjoyed by the legions. So, to keep the Batavian
cohorts from desperate acts of still greater savagery, they were
sent back to Germany: this was to be the origin, contrived by
Fate, of a war that was at once both civil and foreign.
The Gallic auxiliaries were also sent home. Their numbers
were very large, and had been used at the first outbreak of the
rebellion for an empty parade of force. Indeed, the imperial
finances were already embarrassed by the distribution of
largess, to meet the expenses of which Vitellius gave orders
for depleting the strength of the legions and auxiliaries.
Recruiting was forbidden, and discharges offered without re-
striction. This policy was disastrous for the country and un-
popular among the soldiers, who found that their turn for
work and danger came round all the more frequently, now
that there were so few to share the same duties. Besides, their
energy was being corroded by luxury, the reverse of the old-
fashioned discipline and the good rules of our ancestors, who
preferred to base the security of Rome on character than on
money.
Leaving Ticinum, Vitellius turned off to Cremona. There he 70
witnessed Caecina’s games and conceived a wish to stand
98 the histories [2, 71]
upon the field of Bedriacum, and to see the traces of the recent
victory with his own eyes. Within forty days of the battle, it
was a disgusting and horrible sight; mangled bodies, mutilated
limbs, rotting carcasses of men and horses, the ground foul
with clotted blood. Trees and crops all trampled down: the
countryside a miserable waste. No less heartless was the
stretch of road which the people of Cremona had strewn with
laurel-leaves and roses, erecting altars and sacrificing victims
as if in honour of an Oriental despot. The rejoicings of the
moment soon turned to their destruction.
Valens and Caecina were in attendance and showed
Vitellius over the battlefield: this was where their legions had
charged: the cavalry launched their attack from here: this was
where the auxiliaries had outflanked the enemy. The various
officers each magnified his own exploits, adding a few false or,
at any rate, exaggerated touches. The common soldiers, too,
turned gaily shouting from the high road to inspect the scene
of the struggle, gazing with wonder at the huge pile of arms
and heaps of bodies. There were a few who reflected with
tears of pity on the shifting chances of life. But Vitellius never
took his eyes off the field: never shuddered at the sight of all
these thousands of Roman citizens lying unburied. On the
contrary, he was very well pleased,* and, unconscious of
his own impending doom, he offered a sacrifice to the local
deities.
71 They next came to Bononia, where Fabius Valens gave a
gladiatorial show, for which he had all the apparatus brought
from Rome. The nearer they drew to the city, the greater
became the depravity of the march, which was now joined by
troops of actors, eunuchs, and the like, all in the true spirit of
Nero’s court. For Vitellius always had a great personal admi-
ration for Nero. He used to follow him about to hear him
sing, not under compulsion—many a decent man suffered that
fate—but because he was the slave of his stomach, and had
sold himself to luxury.
To secure a few months of office for Valens and Caecina,
the other consuls of the year had their terms shortened, while
Martius Macer’s claim was ignored on the grounds that he
was a leader of Otho’s party. Valerius Marinus, who had been
[2, 74] book two 99
nominated by Galba, had his term postponed, not for any
offence, but because he was a mild creature and too lazy to
resent an injury. The name of Pedanius Costa* was omitted
altogether. Vitellius had never forgiven him for rising against
Nero and instigating Verginius; however, he alleged other
reasons. They all moreover observed the servile custom of the
time, and offered their thanks to Vitellius.
An imposture, received at first with great excitement, failed 72
to last more than a few days. A man had appeared who gave
out that he was Scribonianus Camerinus,* and that during
Nero’s reign of terror he had taken refuge in Histria, where
the Crassi still had their old connections and estates, and their
name was much respected. He accordingly took all the rascals
he could find and cast them for parts. The credulous mob and
some of the soldiers, who were either victims of the imposture
or anxious for a riot, eagerly flocked to join him. However, he
was taken before Vitellius and questioned as to his identity.
When it was found that there was no truth in his story, and his
master recognized him as a runaway called Geta, he suffered
the execution of a slave.*
When his couriers brought news from Syria and Judaea that 73
the East had sworn allegiance to him, Vitellius’ vanity and
indolence reached a pitch which is almost incredible. For
already, though the rumours were still vague and unreliable,
Vespasian’s name was in everybody’s mouth, and the mention
of him generally shocked Vitellius. But now he and his army
seemed to reck of no rival: they at once broke out into the
unbridled cruelty, debauchery, and oppression more usual
among foreigners.
Vespasian, on the other hand, was meditating war* and 74
reckoning all his forces both distant and near at hand. He had
so much attached his troops to himself, that when he dictated
to them the oath of allegiance and prayed that ‘all might be
well’ with Vitellius, they listened in silence. Mucianus’ feelings
were not hostile to him, and were even more sympathetic to
Titus. Tiberius Alexander, the governor of Egypt, had made
common cause with him. The Third Legion,* since it had
crossed into Moesia from Syria, he could reckon as his own,
and there was good hope that the other legions of Illyria
100 the histories [2, 75]
would follow its lead. The whole army, indeed, was incensed
at the arrogance of Vitellius’ soldiers: truculent in action and
rough of tongue, they scoffed at all the other troops as their
inferiors.
But a war of such magnitude usually causes hesitation. High
as were his hopes, Vespasian would sometimes calculate his
risks. He realized that it would be a critical day for him when
he committed his sixty summers and his two youthful sons* to
the chances of war. In his private ambitions a man may feel his
way and rely less or more on fortune according as he feels
inclined; but when one covets a throne there is no middle way
75 between the zenith of success and headlong ruin. Moreover, as
a soldier he realized the strength of the German army, and
always kept it in view. His own legions, he knew, had no
experience of civil war, while Vitellius’ troops were fresh from
victory: and the defeated party were richer in grievances than
in troops. Civil strife had undermined the loyalty of the
troops: there was danger in each single man. What would be
the good of all his horse and foot regiments, if one or two
traitors should seek the reward the enemy offered and assas-
sinate him then and there? It was thus that Scribonianus had
been killed in Claudius’ reign, and his murderer, Volaginius,
raised from a common soldier to the highest rank. It is easier
to move men in the mass than to take precautions against
them singly.
76 These anxieties made Vespasian hesitate. Meanwhile the
other generals and his friends continued to encourage him. At
last Mucianus, after several private interviews, went so far as
to address him in public, as follows:*
‘Everybody’, he said, ‘who plans some great exploit is
bound to consider whether his project serves both the public
interest and his own reputation, and whether it is easily
practicable or, at any rate, not impossible. He must also weigh
the advice which he gets. Are those who offer it ready to
run the risk themselves? And, if fortune favours the undertak-
ing, who gains the supreme glory? I myself, Vespasian, call
you to the throne. How that may bring benefit to the country,
and grandeur to you, lies with you—under Providence—to
decide.
[2, 77] book two 101
‘You need not be afraid that I may seem to flatter you. It
is more of an insult than a compliment to be chosen to suc-
ceed Vitellius. It is not against the powerful intellect of the
deified Augustus that we are rising in revolt; not against the
cautious prudence of the old Tiberius; nor even against a long-
established imperial family like that of Gaius, Claudius, or
Nero. You even gave way to Galba’s ancient lineage. To
remain inactive any longer, to leave your country to ruin and
pollution, that would appear sheer sloth and cowardice, even
if such slavery were as safe for you as it would be dishonour-
able. The time is long past when you could look unambitious:
the throne is now your only refuge. Have you forgotten
Corbulo’s murder?* He was a man of better family than we,
I admit, but so was Nero more nobly born than Vitellius. A
man who is feared is always illustrious enough for the one
who fears him.
‘That an army can make an emperor Vitellius himself has
proved. He had neither experience nor military reputation,
but merely rose on Galba’s unpopularity. Even Otho fell not
by the generalship of his opponent or the might of his army,
but by his own precipitate despair. And today he seems a great
and desirable emperor, when Vitellius is disbanding his le-
gions, disarming his Guards, and daily sowing fresh seeds of
civil war. Why, any spirit or enthusiasm which his army had
is being dissipated in carouses in cookshops: for they imitate
their Emperor. But you, in Judaea, in Syria, in Egypt, you have
nine fresh legions. War has not weakened nor mutiny demor-
alized them. The men are trained to discipline and have al-
ready won a foreign war. Besides these, you can rely on the
strength of your fleet, and of your auxiliaries both horse and
foot, on the faithful allegiance of foreign princes, and on your
own unparalleled experience.
‘For myself I make but one claim. Let me not rank below 77
Valens and Caecina. Nor must you despise Mucianus’ help
because you do not encounter his rivalry. I rank myself above
Vitellius and below you. Your house has received the insignia
of a triumph.* You have two youthful sons, one of whom
already has the qualifications to be a ruler, and in his first
years of service made a name for himself in the German
102 the histories [2, 78]
armies. It would be absurd for me not to give way to one
whose son I should adopt, were I emperor myself. Apart
from this, we shall stand on a different footing in success and
in failure, for if we succeed I shall have such honour as
you grant me: of the risk and the dangers we shall share the
burden equally. Or rather, do what is better still. Dispose your
armies yourself and leave me the conduct of the war, and the
uncertainties of battle.
‘At this moment the defeated are more strictly disciplined
than their conquerors: indignation, hatred, the passion for
revenge, all serve to fire their courage. The Vitellians are
dulled by pride and mutiny. The course of the war will soon
bring to light and reopen the hidden and festering sores of the
victorious party. I rely on your vigilance, your economy, your
wisdom, and still more on the indolence, ignorance, and
cruelty of Vitellius. Above all, our cause is far safer in war
than in peace: for to plan rebellion is to have rebelled already.’
78 At the end of Mucianus’ speech the others all pressed round
with new confidence, offering their encouragement and quot-
ing the answers of soothsayers and the movements of the
stars. Nor was Vespasian uninfluenced by such superstition.
In later days, when he was master of the world, he made no
secret of keeping an astrologer called Seleucus to help him by
his advice and prophecy. Early omens began to recur to his
memory. A tall and conspicuous cypress on his estate had
once suddenly collapsed: on the next day it had risen again on
the same spot to extend its verdure high and broader than
ever. The soothsayers had agreed that this was an omen of
great success, and augured the height of fame for the still
youthful Vespasian. At first his triumphal honours, his consul-
ship, and the name he won by his Jewish victory seemed to
have fulfilled the promise of this omen.* But having achieved
all this, he began to believe that it portended his rise to the
throne.
On the frontier of Judaea and Syria lies a hill called
Carmel.* A god of the same name is there worshipped accord-
ing to ancient ritual. There is no image or temple: only an altar
where they reverently worship. When Vespasian was sacrific-
ing on this altar, brooding on his secret ambition, the priest,
[2, 80] book two 103
Basilides, after repeatedly inspecting the omens said to him:
‘Whatever it is which you have in mind, Vespasian, whether
it is to build a house or to enlarge your estate, or to increase
the number of your slaves, there is granted to you a great
habitation, vast acres, and a multitude of men.’
Rumour had immediately seized on this riddle and now
began to solve it. Nothing was more talked of, especially
in Vespasian’s presence: conversation increases with hope.
Having come to a definite decision they departed, Mucianus
to Antioch, Vespasian to Caesarea—the former is the capital
of Syria, the latter of Judaea.
The move to confer the throne on Vespasian began at 79
Alexandria, where Tiberius Alexander with great promptitude
administered the oath of allegiance to his troops on 1 July.
This was later celebrated as his day of accession, although
it was not until the third* that the Jewish army took the
oath in his presence. So eager was their enthusiasm that they
would not even wait for the arrival of Titus, who was on his
way back from Syria, where he had been conducting the
negotiations between his father and Mucianus.
What happened was all due to the impulse of the soldiers:
there was no parade, no formal assembly of the troops. The 80
time and the place were still under discussion, as was the
hardest point of all—who should speak first. While minds
were still busy with hopes and fears, reasons and chances,
Vespasian happened to come out of his quarters. A few of the
soldiers, forming up in the usual way to salute him as com-
mander, saluted him as emperor. The others promptly rushed
up calling him Caesar and Augustus, and heaping on him all
the imperial titles. Fears at once gave way to confidence.
Vespasian himself, unchanged by the change of fortune,
showed no sign of vanity or arrogance. His sudden elevation
made his eyes mist over; but the instant he recovered he
addressed the troops in simple soldier fashion, and received a
shower of congratulations from every quarter.
Mucianus, who had been waiting for this, administered the
oath of allegiance to his eager troops, and then entered the
theatre at Antioch, where the Greeks ordinarily hold their
debates. There he addressed the fawning crowd as it came
104 the histories [2, 81]
flocking in. For he could speak quite elegantly, even in Greek,
and had the art of making the most of all he said or did. What
most served to inflame the province and the army was his
statement that Vitellius had determined to transfer the
German legions to peaceful service in the rich province of
Syria, and to send the Syrian legions to endure the rigorous
climate and toils of a winter in Germany. The provincials were
accustomed to the soldiers’ company and liked to have them
quartered there, and many were bound to them by ties of
intimacy and kinship, while the soldiers in their long term of
service had come to know and love their old camp like a
home.
81 Before 15 July the whole of Syria had sworn allegiance. The
party also gained the support of Sohaemus, with all the
resources of his kingdom and a considerable force, and of
Antiochus, the richest of the subject princes, who owed his
importance to his ancestral treasures. Before long Agrippa,*
too, received a secret summons from his people, and leaving
Rome without the knowledge of Vitellius, sailed as fast as he
could to join Vespasian. His sister Berenice showed equal
enthusiasm for the cause. She was then in the flower of her
youth and beauty, and her munificent gifts to Vespasian quite
won the old man’s heart too.* Indeed, every province on
the seaboard as far as Asia and Achaia, and inland to Pontus
and Armenia, swore allegiance, but their governors were
without troops, for as yet no legions had been assigned
to Cappadocia.
A meeting was held at Beirut to discuss the general situa-
tion. To this came Mucianus with all his senior officers and
the most distinguished of his centurions and soldiers, besides
the impressive élite of the Jewish army. All this pageant
of cavalry and infantry, and of subject princes vying with
each other in splendour, gave the meeting an air of imperial
grandeur.
82 The first step was to levy new troops and to recall the
veterans to the standards. Some strong towns were designated
for the manufacture of arms. New gold and silver were coined
at Antioch. All these works were promptly carried out, each in
the proper place, by competent officials. Vespasian came and
[2, 83] book two 105
inspected them himself, encouraging good work by his praises
and rousing the inefficient by example rather than compul-
sion, always more ready to conceal the faults than the merits
of his friends. Many were rewarded by being made prefects or
procurators. A number were raised to senatorial rank: they
were mostly men of distinction who soon rose high, and with
others success atoned for their lack of merit. A donation for
the troops had been mentioned by Mucianus in his first
speech, but only a modest one. Even Vespasian offered for the
civil war no more than others gave in time of peace, for he had
set his face with admirable firmness against largess to the
soldiers, and his army was the better for it.
Envoys were dispatched to Parthia and Armenia to ensure
that the legions, while engaged in the civil war, should not be
exposed to attack in the rear. It was arranged that Titus
should carry on the war in Judaea, while Vespasian held the
keys of Egypt.* Against Vitellius it seemed sufficient to send a
part of their forces under the command of Mucianus. He
would have Vespasian’s name behind him and the irresistible
force of destiny. Letters were written to all the armies and
their generals with instructions that they should try to win
over those of the Guards who were hostile to Vitellius by
promising them renewal of service.
Meanwhile Mucianus, who acted more as the Emperor’s 83
partner than his subordinate,* moved forward with troops
ready for action, neither marching so slowly as to look like
holding back, nor so rapidly that rumours would not have
time to spread. He realized that his force was small, and that
things are magnified by those who cannot see them. However,
he had a solid column following in support, composed of
the Sixth Legion and some special detachments numbering
13,000 men. He had ordered the fleet to move from the Black
Sea to Byzantium, for he was half-minded to leave Moesia and
instead attack Dyrrachium* with infantry and cavalry, at the
same time using his warships to blockade the Adriatic. He
would thus secure Greece and Asia in his rear, which would
otherwise be at the mercy of Vitellius, unless furnished with
troops. Vitellius also would himself be in doubt what points
of the Italian coast to defend, if Mucianus with his ships
106 the histories [2, 84]
threatened both Brundisium* and Tarentum and the whole
coastline of Calabria and Lucania.
84 Thus the provinces rang from end to end with the prepara-
tions for ships, soldiers, and arms. But the heaviest burden
was the raising of money. ‘Funds’, said Mucianus, ‘are the
sinews of civil war,’* and in his assessments he cared for
neither equity nor truth, but solely for the amount of the sum.
Informers abounded, and pounced on every rich man as their
prey. This intolerable oppression, excused by the necessities of
war, was allowed to continue even in peace. It was not so
much that Vespasian at the beginning of his reign had made
up his mind to maintain unjust decisions, but later fortune
spoilt him; he learnt in a bad school and made a bold use
of his lessons.* Mucianus also contributed to the war-effort
from his private means, of which he was generous, as he
hoped to get a high rate of interest out of the country. Others
followed his example in making contributions, but very few
had his opportunity of recovering their money.
85 In the mean time Vespasian’s progress was accelerated by
the enthusiasm with which the Illyrian army espoused his
cause.* The Third set the example to the other legions of
Moesia, the Eighth and the Seventh Claudian, both supporters
of Otho through and through, although they had not been
present at the battle. On their arrival at Aquileia they had
mobbed the couriers who brought the news of Otho’s fall,
and torn to pieces the colours bearing Vitellius’ name, finally
looting the camp-chest and dividing the money among them-
selves. These were hostile acts. Alarmed at what they had
done they began to reflect that, while their conduct needed
excuse before Vitellius, they could make a merit of it with
Vespasian. Accordingly, the three Moesian legions addressed
letters to the Pannonian army, inviting their co-operation, and
meanwhile prepared to meet refusal with force.
Amid this upheaval, Aponius Saturninus, the governor of
Moesia, attempted an abominable crime. He sent a centurion
to murder Tettius Julianus, who commanded the Seventh
Legion, cloaking a personal quarrel by claiming that it was in
the interests of his party. Julianus heard of his danger and,
taking some guides who knew the country, escaped into the
[2, 86] book two 107
wilds of Moesia and got beyond Mount Haemus. After that he
meddled no more in civil war; he prolonged his journey to
Vespasian by various expedients, retarding or hastening his
pace according to the nature of the news he received.
In Pannonia, however, the Thirteenth Legion and the 86
Seventh Galbian had not forgotten their resentment and fury
after the battle of Bedriacum. They lost no time in joining
Vespasian’s cause, being chiefly instigated by Antonius
Primus.* This man was a criminal who had been convicted of
fraud during Nero’s reign. Among the many evils of the war
had been his recovery of senatorial rank. Galba gave him
command of the Seventh Legion, and he was believed to have
written repeatedly to Otho offering his services as general to
the party. But, as Otho took no notice of him, he played no
part in the war. When Vitellius’ cause began to decline, he
joined Vespasian and proved a significant acquisition. He was
a man of great physical energy and a ready tongue; an artist
in calumny, invaluable in riots and sedition; light-fingered
and free-handed, abominable in peace, but by no means
contemptible in war.
The union of the Moesian and Pannonian armies soon
attracted the troops in Dalmatia to the cause. Tampius
Flavianus and Pompeius Silvanus, the two ex-consuls who
governed respectively Pannonia and Dalmatia, were wealthy
old gentlemen who had no thought of rising. But the procura-
tor, Cornelius Fuscus,* a vigorous young man of good family,
was close at hand. In his early youth a lack of ambition had
led him to resign his senatorial rank. He had headed the men
of his colony in declaring for Galba, and his services had won
him a position as procurator. Then he joined Vespasian’s
party, giving a fierce stimulus to the war; for, being attracted
more by danger itself than by its prizes, he disliked what was
certain and long established, preferring everything that was
new and dangerous and doubtful.
So the Vespasian party used all their efforts to fan every
spark of discontent throughout the empire. Letters were sent
to the Fourteenth Legion in Britain and to the First Legion in
Spain, since both had stood for Otho against Vitellius. In
Gaul, too, letters were scattered broadcast. All in an instant a
108 the histories [2, 87]
mighty war was in full flame. The armies of Illyricum openly
revolted, and all the others were ready to follow the first sign
of success.
87 While Vespasian and his generals were showing such activ-
ity in the provinces, Vitellius grew more contemptible and
indolent every day.* Halting at every town or country house
that offered any attractions, he made his way to Rome with a
heavy marching column of 60,000 troops, ruined by loose
discipline, and an even greater number of soldiers’ servants, as
well as those camp-followers who are more impudent than
any slaves. Besides these he had the vast retinue of his generals
and friends, whom not even the strictest discipline could have
kept under control. This mob was further encumbered by
senators and knights, who came from Rome to meet him,
some from fear, many from servility; and gradually all the
others followed, so as not to be left behind by themselves.
There flocked in, too, a crowd of low-bred buffoons, actors,
and chariot-drivers, who had gained Vitellius’ acquaintance
by various dishonest services. He took remarkable delight in
such discreditable connections. To furnish supplies for this
host not only were the colonies and country towns laid waste,
but the farmers as well. The crops were just ripe and the fields
were ravaged like an enemy country.
88 Many murderous affrays took place among the soldiers, for
after the mutiny at Ticinum there were ceaseless quarrels
between the legions and the auxiliaries. They only united
to harry the villagers. But the worst bloodshed took place at
the seventh milestone from Rome. Here Vitellius had ready-
cooked food served to each of the soldiers, as if he were
fattening up gladiators,* and the common people had flocked
out from Rome and wandered all over the camp. Some of
these visitors indulged in a cheap practical joke, and robbed
the soldiers, quietly cutting their belts while their attention
was diverted. Then they kept asking them, ‘Have you got your
sword on?’ The troops were not used to being laughed at, and
refused to tolerate it. They attacked the defenceless crowd
with their swords. Amongst others, the father of one of the
soldiers was killed while in his son’s company. When it was
[2, 90] book two 109
discovered who he was, and the news spread, they shed no
more innocent blood.
Still, there was some panic in the city as the first soldiers
rushed in on all sides. They mostly made for the Forum,
anxious to see the spot where Galba had fallen. They them-
selves were a sufficiently grim sight with their rough skin coats
and long pikes. Unused to towns, they failed to pick their way
in the crowd: or they would slip on the greasy streets, or
collide with someone and tumble down, whereupon they took
to abuse and before long to fists and swords. Their officers,
too, terrified the city by swarming along the streets with their
bands of armed men.
After crossing the Mulvian Bridge, Vitellius himself rode on 89
a conspicuous horse, wearing his sword and general’s uni-
form, with the Senate and people trooping in front of him.
However, as this looked too much like an entry into a cap-
tured city, his friends persuaded him to change into civilian
dress and walk on foot at the head of his column. The eagles
of four legions led the way, surrounded by the colours belong-
ing to four other legions. Next came the standards of twelve
cavalry regiments, then the files of infantry and the cavalry
behind them. Then came thirty-four cohorts of auxiliaries,
arranged according to their nationality or the nature of their
weapons. In front of the eagles came the camp prefects and
tribunes, and the senior centurions, all dressed in white. The
other centurions marched each at the head of his company,
glittering with their armour and decorations. Gaily, too,
shone the soldiers’ medals and their chains of honour. It was
a noble spectacle, an army worthy of a better emperor. Thus
Vitellius entered the Capitol, where he embraced his mother
and conferred on her the title of Augusta.
On the following day Vitellius delivered a grandiloquent 90
eulogy on his own merits. He might have been addressing the
Senate and people of some other state, for he extolled his own
industry and self-control, although each member of his audi-
ence had seen his infamy for himself, and the whole of Italy
had witnessed during his march the shameful spectacle of his
sloth and luxury. However, the irresponsible crowd could not
110 the histories [2, 91]
discriminate between truth and falsehood. They had learnt the
usual flatteries by heart and chimed in with loud shouts of
applause. In the face of his protests they forced him to take the
title of Augustus. But neither his refusal nor their insistence
made any difference.
91 In Rome nothing passes without comment, and it was re-
garded as a fatal omen that Vitellius took office as Chief
Pontiff, and issued an ordinance on public worship, on 18
July, which, as the anniversary of the disasters on the Cremera
and the Allia,* had long been considered an unlucky day. But
his ignorance of all civil and religious precedent was only
equalled by the incapacity of his freedmen and friends. He
seemed to live in a society of drunkards. However, he con-
ducted the consular elections in the presence of the candidates
according to the law; and in everything strove for a good
report among the lowest classes, attending performances in
the theatre and backing his favourite at the races. This would
undoubtedly have made him popular had his motives been
good, but the memory of his former life made his conduct
seem cheap and discreditable.
He constantly attended the Senate, even when the debates
were on trivial matters. It once happened that Helvidius
Priscus, then praetor-elect, opposed Vitellius’ policy. At first
the Emperor showed annoyance, but was content to appeal to
the tribunes of the people to come to the rescue of his slighted
authority.* Afterwards, when his friends, fearing that his re-
sentment might be deep-seated, tried to smooth matters,
he replied that there was nothing strange in two senators
disagreeing on a question of public policy: he himself had
often even opposed Thrasea.* Most people laughed at the
impudence of this comparison; others were gratified that he
had selected Thrasea, and not some mighty politician, as an
example of real distinction.
92 Vitellius had given the command of the Guards to Publilius
Sabinus, who had commanded an auxiliary cohort, and Julius
Priscus, hitherto only a centurion. Priscus owed his promi-
nence to Valens’ support, Sabinus to that of Caecina. The
rivalry between Valens and Caecina left Vitellius no authority
at all. They managed the government between them. They had
[2, 93] book two 111
long felt the strain of mutual hatred. During the war they had
concealed it imperfectly; lately it had been fanned by dishon-
est friends and by life at Rome, which so easily breeds quar-
rels. They were constant rivals, comparing their respective
popularity, the number of their retinue, the size of the crowds
that came to wait upon them. Vitellius let his favour alternate
between them, for excessive power is never to be relied upon.
Meanwhile, they both feared and despised the Emperor him-
self, who veered between sudden brusqueness and unseason-
able flattery. However, they were not in the least deterred
from seizing on the houses, gardens, and imperial funds, while
the crowd of miserable and needy nobles, whom Galba had
recalled from exile with their children, derived no assistance
or compassion from the Emperor. He earned the approval
both of the upper classes and of the people by granting to the
restored exiles full rights over their freedmen.* But the latter
employed all their slavish cunning to invalidate the edict. They
would hide their money in the pocket of someone obscure or
influential. Some, indeed, passed into the imperial household
and became more powerful than their masters.
As for the soldiers, the barracks were crowded, and the 93
overflow spread through the city, finding shelter in colonnades
and temples. They ceased to observe the roll-call, to go on
guard, or to keep themselves in training, but fell victims to the
attractions of city life and its unmentionable vices, until they
deteriorated both physically and morally through idleness and
debauchery. Many of them even imperilled their lives by set-
tling in the pestilent Vatican quarter, thus increasing the rate
of mortality. They were close to the Tiber, and the Germans
and Gauls, who were peculiarly liable to disease and could ill
stand the heat, ruined their constitutions by their passion for
the river. Moreover, the rules of the service were tampered
with, the result of perversity or bribery. Sixteen cohorts of
Guards* were enrolled, and four for the City Garrison, each
composed of 1,000 men. In enlisting these troops Valens was
more brazen than Caecina, whose life he claimed to have
saved. It is true, indeed, that his arrival had consolidated the
party, and by his successful engagement he had silenced the
criticism of his slow marching. Besides which, the whole of
112 the histories [2, 94]
the army of Lower Germany was attached to Valens, and
this is said to be the reason why Caecina’s loyalty first
wavered.
94 Whatever indulgence Vitellius showed to his generals, he
allowed still more licence to the troops. Each man chose his
duties. However unfit, he might enlist in the City Garrison, if
he preferred it. On the other hand, good soldiers were al-
lowed, if they wished, to remain in the legions or the auxiliary
cavalry. Many wished to do this who suffered from ill health
and complained of the climate. However, the best soldiers
were withdrawn from the legions and from the cavalry; and
the prestige of the City Garrison was shattered when 20,000
men were not so much selected for service with them as
drafted at random from the whole army.
While Vitellius was addressing the troops, they demanded
the execution of three Gallic chieftains, Asiaticus, Flavus, and
Rufinus, on the ground that they had fought for Vindex.
Vitellius never checked such outcries. For, apart from his
innate sloth, he knew that his donation to the soldiers was
nearly due, and that he had no money for it; so he freely
granted all their other demands. The imperial freedmen were
forced to contribute a sort of tax, proportionate to the
number of their slaves. Meanwhile, his one occupation was
extravagance. He built stables for chariot-drivers, filled the
arena with shows of gladiators and wild beasts, and fooled
away his money as though he had more than he wanted.
95 Moreover, Valens and Caecina celebrated Vitellius’ birth-
day* by holding gladiatorial shows in every quarter of Rome
on a scale of magnificence hitherto unknown. Vitellius then
gratified the vile rabble and scandalized all decent people by
building altars in the Campus Martius, and holding a funeral
service in honour of Nero. Victims were killed and burnt in
public: the torch was applied by the Augustales, members of
the college which Tiberius Caesar had founded in honour of
the Julian family, just as Romulus had similarly commemo-
rated King Tatius.*
It was not yet four months* since Vitellius’ victory, and yet
his freedman Asiaticus was as bad as a Polyclitus or a
Patrobius, or any of the favourites whose names were hated in
[2, 97] book two 113
earlier days. At this court no one strove to rise by honesty or
industry. There was only one road to power. By lavish ban-
quets, costly profusion, and feats of gastronomy, you had to
try and satisfy Vitellius’ insatiable gluttony. He himself, with-
out thought for the morrow, was well content to enjoy the
present. It is believed that he squandered 900 million sesterces
in these brief months. Truly it shows Rome’s greatness and
misfortune, that she endured Otho and Vitellius both in the
same year, and suffered humiliation of every kind at the hands
of men like Vinius and Fabius, Icelus and Asiaticus, until at
last they gave way to Mucianus and Marcellus—a change of
men but not of manners.
The first news of rebellion which reached Vitellius came 96
from Aponius Saturninus, who, before himself going over to
Vespasian’s side, wrote to announce the desertion of the Third
Legion. But a sudden crisis makes a man nervous: Aponius did
not tell the whole story. So the Emperor’s flattering friends
began to explain it all away: what was the defection of a
single legion, while the loyalty of the other armies remained
unshaken? Vitellius himself used the same language to the
soldiers. He accused the men who had been recently dis-
charged from the Guards of spreading false rumours, and kept
assuring them there was no fear of civil war. All mention of
Vespasian was suppressed, and soldiers were sent round the
city to frighten the public into silence—which did more than
anything else to make them talk.
Vitellius, nevertheless, sent for reinforcements from Ger- 97
many, Britain, and the Spanish provinces, though lethargi-
cally and concealing his straits. The provinces and their
governors showed the same want of enthusiasm. Hordeonius
Flaccus’ suspicions of the Batavi left him uneasy that he would
have a war of his own,* while Vettius Bolanus never had
Britain under complete control: nor was the loyalty of either
beyond doubt. The Spanish provinces, where there was at the
time no governor, were equally slow. The three legionary
commanders held an equal authority, and if Vitellius’ cause
had prospered, would have each outbid the other for his
favour: but they all shared the resolve to leave his misfortunes
alone.
114 the histories [2, 98]
In Africa the legion and auxiliaries enlisted by Clodius
Macer, and subsequently disbanded by Galba, mobilized
again at Vitellius’ orders, and at the same time the remaining
young men of the province eagerly enlisted. Vitellius had been
an honest and popular governor in Africa, while Vespasian
had been distrusted and disliked.* The provincials took this
as a foretaste of their reigns; but experience proved them
wrong.
98 The commander Valerius Festus* at first loyally seconded
the enthusiasm of the province. After a while he began to
waver. In his official letters and edicts he still acknowledged
Vitellius, while in secret communication with Vespasian and
ready to support whichever party proved successful.
In Raetia and the Gallic provinces some soldiers and
centurions carrying letters and edicts from Vespasian were
taken prisoner and sent to Vitellius, who had them executed.
But most of these envoys escaped capture either by their own
ingenuity or by the loyal help of friends. Thus, while Vitellius’
plans were known, Vespasian’s were for the most part still a
secret. This was partly due to Vitellius’ negligence, but also to
the fact that the garrisons on the Pannonian Alps stopped all
messengers. By sea, too, the Etesian winds* favoured ships
sailing eastward, but hindered the voyage from the East.
99 It was the enemy invasion and the alarming news that
reached him from all quarters that at last terrified Vitellius
into instructing Caecina and Valens to prepare for war.
Caecina was sent on ahead, Valens, who was just recovering
from a serious illness, being delayed by his weak state of
health. Great, indeed, was the change in the appearance of the
German army as it marched out of Rome. There was neither
energy in their muscles nor fire in their hearts. Slowly the
column straggled on, their horses spiritless, their weapons
dangling. The men grumbled at the sun, the dust, the weather,
and their readiness to quarrel grew as their capacity to endure
toil was dulled.*
To these disadvantages were added Caecina’s inveterate
self-seeking and his newly acquired indolence. An overdose of
success had made him slack and self-indulgent, or, if he was
plotting treachery, this may have been one of his devices
[2, 101] book two 115
for demoralizing the army. It has often been believed that
Caecina’s loyalty was shaken by the strategy of Flavius
Sabinus who, using Rubrius Gallus as his agent, promised
that, if Caecina came over, Vespasian would ratify any condi-
tions. Caecina was also reminded of his hatred and rivalry
with Fabius Valens: as he did not stand first with Vitellius, he
had better acquire credit and influence with a new emperor.
Caecina’s departure was marked by warm embraces and 100
tremendous accolades from Vitellius; he then dispatched a
body of cavalry to occupy Cremona. Detachments of the First,
Fourth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Legions soon followed; then
the Fifth and Twenty-Second; and in the rear of the column
came the Twenty-First Rapax and the First Italian Legion,
with detachments from the three legions of Britain and a select
force of auxiliaries.
When Caecina had started, Fabius Valens wrote instruc-
tions to the army of which he had been general to await him
on the march, saying that he and Caecina had arranged this.
Caecina, however, took advantage of being on the spot, and
pretended that this plan had been altered so as to enable them
to meet the first outbreak of the war with their full strength.
So some legions were ordered to hurry forward to Cremona,
others to head for Hostilia.* Caecina himself turned aside to
Ravenna on the pretext of giving instructions to the fleet. But
soon it became apparent that he in fact sought secrecy for his
treacherous designs. For Lucilius Bassus,* who had been a
cavalry commander, and whom Vitellius had raised to the
supreme command of the two fleets at Ravenna and Misenum,
felt aggrieved at not being immediately given the Prefectship
of the Guards, and sought in vile treachery the remedy for his
unjustifiable annoyance. It can never be known whether he
influenced Caecina or whether one was as dishonest as the
other (there is seldom much to choose between rascals). The 101
historians who compiled the records of this war in the days of
the Flavian dynasty perverted their explanation of this be-
trayal for the sake of flattery: they attributed it to patriotism
and the interests of peace.* We cannot think them right. Apart
from the innate fickleness of the rebels and the worthlessness
of fidelity after Galba’s betrayal, they seem to have been led by
116 the histories [2, 101]
jealousy and rivalry into destroying Vitellius himself for fear
that they might lose the first place in his favour.
After Caecina joined his army, he used every device to
undermine the staunch fidelity of the centurions and soldiers
to Vitellius. Bassus found the same task less difficult, for the
fleet remembered that they had lately been in Otho’s service,
and were liable to slip towards rebellion.
book three 117
BOOK THREE
On the Flavian side the generals arranged their plans for the 1
war with greater loyalty and greater success. They had met at
Poetovio* at the winter quarters of the Thirteenth Legion,
where they debated whether they should block the passage of
the Pannonian Alps and wait until their whole strength came
up to reinforce them, or whether they should take a bolder
line and go to join battle and fight for Italy. Those who were
in favour of waiting for reinforcements and prolonging the
war dwelt on the strength and reputation of the German
legions, and pointed out that the flower of the British army
had lately arrived in Rome with Vitellius; their own forces
were numerically inferior and had recently suffered defeat;*
moreover, conquered troops, however fierce their language,
never show the same courage. On the other hand, if they
occupied the Alps, Mucianus would soon arrive with the
forces from the East. Besides, Vespasian still commanded the
sea and the fleets, and could count on the support of
the provinces, where he could set in motion what was virtually
a colossal second war. A salutary delay would bring them
fresh forces without in any way prejudicing their present
position.
In answer to these arguments Antonius Primus, who was 2
the most enthusiastic instigator of war, maintained that
prompt action would help them and ruin Vitellius. ‘Their
victory’, he said, ‘has not served to inspirit but to enervate
them.’* The men are not held in readiness in camp, but are
loitering in towns all over Italy. No one but their hosts has any
call to fear them. The more ferocious they showed themselves
before, the greater the greed with which they now indulge in
unwonted draughts of pleasure. The circus, the theatre, and
the charms of the capital have ruined their hardness and their
health. But if we give them time to train for war they will
regain their energy. It is not far to Germany, whence they
draw their main strength. Britain is only separated by a nar-
row channel. Close at hand they have Gaul and Spain, from
118 the histories [3, 3]
the provinces of which they can get men, horses, and subsi-
dies. Then again, they can rely on Italy itself and all the
resources of the capital, while, if they want to take the offen-
sive, they have two fleets and full command of the Illyrian Sea.
What good to us will the barrier of the mountains be then?
Why should we drag on the war into another summer? Where
can we get funds and supplies in the meanwhile? No, let us
seize our opportunity. The Pannonian legions are burning to
rise in revenge. They were not defeated but deceived.* The
Moesian army has not yet lost a man. If you count not legions
but men, our forces are stronger and untouched by licentious-
ness. The very shame of our defeat makes for good discipline.
And even then our cavalry was not beaten. For though we lost
the day, they shattered Vitellius’ line.
‘And what was the force that broke through the Vitellians?
Two regiments of cavalry from Pannonia and Moesia. What
have we now? Sixteen regiments. Will not their combined
forces, as they roar and thunder down upon the enemy,
burying them in clouds of dust, overwhelm these horses and
horsemen that have forgotten how to fight? I have given you
my plan, and, unless I am stopped, I will put it in operation.
Some of you have not yet burnt your boats. Well, you can
keep back the legions. Give me the auxiliaries in light march-
ing order. They will be enough for me. You will soon hear that
the door of Italy is open and the power of Vitellius over-
thrown. You will be glad enough to follow in the footsteps of
my victory.’
3 All this and much else of the same tenor Antonius poured
out with flashing eyes and savage voice, so as to reach the
centurions and some of the soldiers who had gathered round
to share in their deliberations. He carried away even the more
cautious and far-seeing, while the rest, and the common sol-
diers, were filled with contempt for the sloth of the other
generals, and cheered their one and only leader to the echo.
He had already established this reputation at the original
meeting, when Vespasian’s letter was read. Most of the gener-
als had then taken an ambiguous line, intending to interpret
their language in the light of subsequent events. But Antonius
seemed to have taken the field without any disguise, and this
[3, 5] book three 119
carried more weight with the men, who saw that he must
share their guilt or their glory.
Next to Antonius in influence stood Cornelius Fuscus, the 4
procurator. He, too, always attacked Vitellius in no mild
terms, and had left himself no hope in case of failure. Tampius
Flavianus was a man whose disposition and advanced years
made him dilatory, and he aroused the suspicion of the sol-
diers, who felt he had not forgotten his kinship with Vitellius.
Besides this, when the legions first rose, he had fled, and
subsequently returned of his own free will, which looked
like meditating treachery. Having given up his province of
Pannonia and returned to Italy, he was out of the reach of
danger, but the passion for revolution had induced him to
resume the title of governor and meddle in the civil war. It was
Cornelius Fuscus who had persuaded him to this—not that
he needed the energy of Flavianus, but because he felt that,
especially at the outset of the rising, the prestige of an
ex-consul would give the party an honourable veneer.
In order to make their march across into Italy safe and 5
effective, letters were sent to Aponius Saturninus to bring the
Moesian army up as quickly as possible. To prevent the expo-
sure of the defenceless provinces to the attacks of foreign
tribes, the chiefs of the Sarmatian Iazyges,* who formed the
government of the tribe, were enlisted in the service. They also
offered their tribal force, consisting entirely of cavalry, but
were excused from this contribution for fear that the civil war
might give them the opportunity to work in foreign interests,
or that an offer of higher pay from the enemy might tempt
them to sacrifice their duty and their honour. Sido and
Italicus, two princes of the Suebi,* were induced to join
Vespasian’s side. They had long acknowledged Roman sover-
eignty, and their tribe preferred being trusted to being com-
manded. Some auxiliaries were stationed on the flank towards
Raetia, where hostilities were expected, since its governor
Porcius Septiminus remained incorruptibly loyal to Vitellius.
Sextilius Felix was therefore dispatched with Aurius’ Cavalry
and eight cohorts of auxiliary infantry, together with the
native levies of Noricum, to hold the bank of the River Inn,
which forms the frontier of Raetia and Noricum. But neither
120 the histories [3, 6]
side provoked a battle: the fortune of the rival parties was
decided elsewhere.
6 Meanwhile, at the head of a picked band of auxiliaries and
part of the cavalry, Antonius hurried on to invade Italy. He
took with him an energetic soldier named Arrius Varus, who
had made his reputation while serving under Corbulo in his
Armenian victories. He was also supposed to have sought a
private interview with Nero, at which he maligned Corbulo’s
character. His infamous treachery brought him the Emperor’s
favour and a post as senior centurion. This ill-gotten prize
delighted him now, but ultimately proved his ruin.
After occupying Aquileia, Antonius and Varus found a
ready welcome at Opitergium and Altinum* and all the other
towns in the neighbourhood. At Altinum a garrison was left
behind to guard against an attack by the fleet at Ravenna, for
the news of its desertion* had not as yet arrived. Pressing
forward, they won Padua and Ateste* for the party. At the
latter place they learnt that three Vitellian auxiliary cohorts
and a regiment known as Sebosus’ Cavalry were established at
Forum Alieni, where they had constructed a bridge. The re-
port added that they were off their guard, so this seemed a
good opportunity to attack them. They accordingly rushed the
position at dawn, and cut down many of the men without
their weapons. Orders had been given that, after a few had
been killed, the rest should be terrorized into desertion. Some
surrendered at once, but the majority succeeded in destroying
the bridge, and thus checked the enemy’s pursuit. The first
bout had gone in the Flavians’ favour.
7 When the news of the victory had spread, the Seventh
Galbian and the Thirteenth Gemina hurried in high spirits to
Padua under the command of Vedius Aquila. At Padua they
were given a few days’ rest, during which Minicius Justus, the
camp prefect of the Seventh Legion, who endeavoured to
enforce a standard of discipline too severe for civil war, had to
be rescued from the fury of his troops and sent to Vespasian.
Antonius conceived that his party would gain in prestige if
they showed approval of Galba’s government, and stood for
the revival of his cause. So he gave orders that all the statues
of Galba, which had been thrown down during the civil war,
[3, 9] book three 121
should be replaced for worship throughout the country towns.
This was a thing that had long been desired, but the creditable
construction placed on it meant that it assumed an undue
importance.
The question then arose where they should choose their 8
base for the war. The best place seemed to be Verona. The
open country round it was suited for a cavalry battle, in which
the Flavian strength lay: and they would gain both prestige
and profit by wresting from Vitellius a powerful and wealthy
town. On the road they occupied Vicetia.* In itself this was a
very small matter, since the town had only moderate resouces,
but it gained considerable importance when one reflected that
it was Caecina’s birthplace: the enemy’s general had thus lost
his native town.* But Verona was well worth while. The
inhabitants aided the party by their example and their funds:
and the army was thrust midway between Raetia and the
Julian Alps, and had thus blocked all passages by that route
for the German armies.
This move had been made either without the knowledge or
against the orders of Vespasian. His instructions were to
suspend operations at Aquileia and wait for the arrival of
Mucianus. He had additionally set out his plan: that so long
as he held Egypt, the key to the corn supply, as well as the
revenue of the richest provinces, he could reduce Vitellius’
army to submission from sheer lack of money and provisions.
Mucianus had sent letter after letter with the same advice,
pointing to the prospect of a victory without bloodshed or
bereavement, and using other similar pretexts to conceal his
real motive: ambition.* He wanted to keep all the glory of the
war to himself. However, the distance was so great that events
outran his instructions. Antonius accordingly made a sudden 9
sally against the enemy’s outposts, and after a slight skirmish,
in which they tested each other’s nerve, both sides withdrew
without advantage.
Soon after, Caecina entrenched a strong position between a
Veronese village called Hostilia and the marshes of the River
Tartaro. Here he was safe, with the river in his rear and the
marsh to guard his flanks. Had he added loyalty to his other
advantages, he might have employed the full strength of the
122 the histories [3, 10]
Vitellian forces to crush the enemy’s two legions before they
were reinforced by the Moesian army, or at least have forced
them to retire in ignominious flight and abandon Italy. But
Caecina used various pretexts for delay, and at the outset of
the war treacherously yielded all his advantages to the enemy.
While it was open to him to rout them by force of arms, he
preferred to pester them with letters and to wait until his
intermediaries had settled the terms of his treason.
In the mean time, Aponius Saturninus arrived with the
Seventh Claudian Legion, commanded by the tribune
Vipstanus Messala, a distinguished member of a famous
family,* and the only man who brought any honesty to this
war. To these forces, still only three legions and no match for
the Vitellians, Caecina addressed his letters. He criticized their
rash attempt to sustain a lost cause, and at the same time
praised the courage of the German army in the highest terms.
His allusions to Vitellius were few and casual, and he re-
frained from insulting Vespasian. In fact he used no language
calculated either to seduce or to terrorize the enemy. The
Flavian generals made no attempt to explain away their
former defeat. They proudly championed Vespasian, showing
their loyalty to the cause, their confidence in the army, and
their hostile prejudice against Vitellius. To the tribunes and
centurions they held out the hope of retaining all the favours
they had won from Vitellius, and they urged Caecina himself
in plain terms to desert. These letters were both read before a
meeting of the Flavian army, and served to increase their
confidence, for while Caecina wrote humbly and seemed
afraid of offending Vespasian, their own generals had an-
swered contemptuously and apparently scoffed at Vitellius.
1o When two more legions arrived, the Third commanded by
Dillius Aponianus and the Eighth by Numisius Lupus,
Antonius decided to enclose Verona with ramparts and make
a demonstration in force. It so happened that the Galbian
Legion, who had been told to work on the rampart facing the
enemy, catching sight of some of their allies’ cavalry in the
distance, took them for the enemy, and fell into a groundless
panic. Fearing treachery, they seized their arms and visited
their fury on Tampius Flavianus. They could prove no charge
[3, 11] book three 123
against him, but he had long been unpopular, and a blind
impulse made them clamour for his head. He was Vitellius’
kinsman, they howled; he had betrayed Otho; he had embez-
zled their donative. They would listen to no defence, although
he implored them with outstretched hands, repeatedly grovel-
ling flat upon the ground, his clothes all torn, his face and
chest shaken with sobs. This only served to inflame the sol-
diers’ hostility. His very excess of terror* seemed to prove his
guilt.
Aponius tried to address them, but his voice was drowned
in their shouts. The others, too, were contemptuously howled
down. They would give no one a hearing except Antonius,
who had the power of authority as well as the arts of elo-
quence necessary to quiet a mob. When the riot grew worse,
and they began to pass from insulting speeches to murderous
violence, he gave orders that Flavianus should be put in
chains. Realizing that this was a farce, the soldiers broke
through the guards round the general’s platform, prepared to
resort to extreme violence. Whereupon Antonius, drawing his
sword, bared his breast and vowed that he would die either by
their hands or his own. Whenever he saw a soldier whom he
knew and was wearing military decorations, he called on him
by name to come to the rescue. At last he turned towards the
standards and the gods of war,* and prayed incessantly that
they would rather inspire the enemy’s army with this mad
spirit of mutiny. At last the riot died away, and at nightfall
they all dispersed to their tents. Flavianus left that same night,
and on his way met letters from Vespasian which delivered
him from danger.
The infection seemed to spread among the legions. They 11
next attacked Aponius Saturninus, who was in command of
the Moesian army. This fresh disturbance was caused by the
circulation of letters which Saturninus was supposed to have
written to Vitellius, and it was all the more brutal since it
broke out not when they were tired by their labours but in the
middle of the day. Once soldiers had vied with each other in
courage and discipline: now they were rivals in ribaldry and
riot. They were determined that the fury with which they
demanded the execution of Aponius should not fall short of
124 the histories [3, 12]
their outcry against Flavianus. The Moesian legions remem-
bered that they had helped the Pannonian army to take their
revenge; while the Pannonian troops, feeling that their com-
rades’ mutiny acquitted them of blame, were glad enough to
repeat the crime. They made for the country house in which
Saturninus was living. He escaped, however, aided not so
much by the efforts of Antonius, Aponianus, and Messala,
who did everything in their power to rescue him, but rather by
the security of his hiding-place, for he concealed himself in the
furnace of some baths* that were fortuitously not in use.
Eventually he gave up his lictors* and retired to Padua.
The departure of both the governors left Antonius in su-
preme command of the two armies. His colleagues deferred
to him and the men gave him enthusiastic support. It was
even supposed by some that he had cunningly promoted both
outbreaks, to secure for himself the full profit of the war.
12 Vitellius’ party was likewise a prey to disquiet, and there the
dissension was the more fatal, since it was aroused not by
the men’s suspicions but by the treachery of the generals. The
sailors of the fleet at Ravenna were mostly drawn from the
provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia, which were both held
by Vespasian, and while they were still wavering, the com-
mander, Lucilius Bassus, decided them in favour of the
Flavian party. Choosing the night-time for their treason, the
conspirators assembled at headquarters without the know-
ledge of the other sailors. Bassus, who was either ashamed or
uncertain of their success, awaited developments in his house.
Amid great disturbance the ships’ captains attacked the im-
ages of Vitellius and cut down the few men who offered any
resistance. The rest of the fleet were glad enough of a change,
and their sympathies soon came round to Vespasian. Then
Lucilius appeared and publicly claimed responsibility. How-
ever, the fleet appointed Cornelius Fuscus as their com-
mander, and he came hurrying onto the scene. Bassus was put
under honourable arrest and conveyed with an escort of
Liburnian cruisers to Atria,* where he was imprisoned by
Vibennius Rufinus, who commanded a cavalry regiment in
garrison there. However, he was soon set free on the interven-
[3, 14] book three 125
tion of Hormus, one of the imperial freedmen. For he, too,
ranked as a general.
When the news that the navy had gone over became known, 13
Caecina, carefully selecting a moment when the camp was
deserted, and the men had all gone to their various duties,
summoned to headquarters the senior centurions and a few of
the soldiers. He then proceeded to praise the spirit and the
strength of Vespasian’s party: they themselves had been de-
serted by the fleet; they were cramped for supplies; Spain and
Gaul were against them; Rome could not be trusted. In every
way he exaggerated the weakness of Vitellius’ position. Even-
tually, when some of his accomplices had given the cue and
the rest were dumbfounded by his change of front, he made
them all swear allegiance to Vespasian. Immediately the por-
traits of Vitellius were torn down and messengers dispatched
to Antonius.
However, when rumours of the treason got abroad in the
camp, and the men returning to headquarters saw Vespasian’s
name on the standards and Vitellius’ portraits scattered on the
ground, at first there was an ominous silence: then everything
broke out at once. Had the pride of the German army sunk so
low that without a battle and without a blow they should let
their hands be shackled and render up their arms? What
had they against them? None but defeated troops. The only
solid legions of Otho’s army, the First and the Fourteenth,
Vespasian had not got, and even those they had routed and
cut to pieces on that very field.* And all for what? That these
thousands of fighting men should be handed over like a drove
of slaves to Antonius, the convict! ‘Eight whole legions are to
follow the lead of one miserable fleet. Such is the pleasure of
Bassus and Caecina. They have robbed the Emperor of his
home, his estate, his wealth, and now they want to rob the
troops of their Emperor. We have not lost a man nor shed a
drop of blood. Even the Flavians will despise us. What answer
can we give when we are questioned about our victory or our
defeat?’
Thus they shouted one and all as their indignation urged 14
them. Led by the Fifth Legion, they replaced the portraits of
126 the histories [3, 15]
Vitellius and put Caecina in irons. They selected Fabius
Fabullus, commanding the Fifth Legion, and the camp prefect,
Cassius Longus, to lead them. Some marines who arrived at
this point from three Liburnian cruisers, quite innocent and
unaware of what had happened, were promptly butchered.
Then the men deserted their camp, broke down the bridge,
and marched back to Hostilia, and thence to Cremona to join
the two legions, the First Italian and Twenty-First Rapax,
which Caecina had sent ahead with some of the cavalry to
occupy Cremona.*
15 When Antonius heard of this he determined to attack the
enemy while they were still at variance and their forces di-
vided. The Vitellian generals would soon recover their author-
ity and the troops their discipline, and confidence would
return if the two divisions were to unite. He guessed also that
Fabius Valens had already started from Rome and would
hasten his march when he heard of Caecina’s treachery.
Valens was loyal to Vitellius and an experienced soldier.
There was good reason, besides, to fear an attack on the side
of Raetia from an immense force of Germans. Vitellius had
already summoned auxiliaries from Britain, Gaul, and Spain
in sufficient numbers to blight their chances utterly, had not
Antonius in fear of this very prospect seized the victory by
hurriedly forcing an engagement. In two days he marched his
whole force from Verona to Bedriacum. On the next day he
left his legions behind to fortify the camp, and sent out his
auxiliary cohorts into territory belonging to Cremona, to taste
the joys of plundering their compatriots under pretext of
collecting supplies. To secure greater freedom for their depre-
dations, he himself advanced at the head of 4,000 cavalry
eight miles along the road from Bedriacum. The scouts, as is
usual, sped on ahead.
16 About eleven in the morning a mounted scout galloped
up with the news that the enemy were at hand; there was a
small body in advance of the rest, but the noise of an army
in movement could be heard over the countryside. While
Antonius was debating what he ought to do, Arrius Varus,
who was greedy for action, rushed out with the keenest of the
troopers and charged the Vitellians, inflicting only slight loss;
[3, 18] book three 127
for reinforcements arrived, the tables were turned, and those
who had been hottest in pursuit were now hindmost in the
rout.
Their haste had no sanction from Antonius, who had fore-
seen what would happen. Encouraging his men to engage the
enemy with brave hearts, he drew off the cavalry onto each
flank and left a free passage in the centre to receive Varus and
his troopers. Orders were sent to the legions to arm and
signals were displayed to the foraging party, summoning them
to cease plundering and join the battle by the quickest possible
path. Meanwhile, Varus came plunging in terror into the
middle of their ranks, spreading confusion among them. The
fresh troops were swept back along with the wounded, sorely
discomfited by their own panic and the narrowness of the
road.
In all the confusion of the rout Antonius never for a mo- 17
ment forgot what befitted a determined general and a brave
soldier.* Staying the panic-stricken, checking the fugitives,
wherever the fight was thickest, wherever he saw a gleam of
hope, he schemed, he fought, he shouted, always conspicuous
to his own men and a mark for the enemy. At last, in the heat
of his impatience, he thrust through with a lance a standard-
bearer, who was in full flight, then seized the standard and
turned it to face the enemy. Whereupon for very shame a few
of his troopers, not more than a hundred, made a stand. The
nature of the ground helped them. The road there was nar-
rower; a stream barred their way, and the bridge was broken;
the riverbed was treacherous and the steep banks checked
their flight. Thus necessity or chance restored their fallen
fortunes. Forming in close order, they received the Vitellians’
reckless and disordered charge, and flung them into confu-
sion. Antonius pressed hard on their shattered ranks and cut
down all who blocked his path. The others followed each his
own inclination, rifling the dead, capturing prisoners, seizing
arms and horses. Meanwhile, summoned by their shouts of
triumph, those who had just now been in full flight across the
fields came hurrying back to share the victory.
Four miles from Cremona the standards of the Rapax and 18
Italian Legions gleamed in the sun. They had marched out
128 the histories [3, 19]
thus far during their cavalry’s original success. When fortune
turned against them, they neither opened their ranks to receive
the routed troops nor marched out to attack the enemy,* who
were wearied with fighting and their long pursuit. The
Vitellians had no systematic leadership; but in the hour of
danger they realized their loss. The victorious cavalry came
charging into their wavering line, and at the same time the
tribune Vipstanus Messala arrived with the Moesian auxilia-
ries and a good number of men from the legions, who had
kept up with the pace of their forced march. This combined
force of infantry and cavalry broke the opposing column, and
the proximity of Cremona’s walls gave the Vitellians more
hope of refuge and less stomach for resistance.
Antonius did not follow up his advantage. He realized that,
although the issue had been successful, the battle had long
been doubtful, and had cost the troopers and their horses
19 many wounds and much hard fighting. As evening fell, the
whole strength of the Flavian army arrived. They had
marched among heaps of corpses and the still reeking traces of
slaughter, and now, feeling that the war was over, they clam-
oured to advance at once on Cremona and either receive its
submission or take it by storm. This sounded well for public
utterance, but each man in his heart was thinking that they
could easily rush a city on the plain: in a night assault men
were just as brave and had a better chance of plunder. But if
they waited for day it would be all peace and petitions; what
then would they get for their wounds and their labours? A
reputation for mercy—there was no money in that. All the
wealth of Cremona would find its way into the commanders’
pockets. Storm a city, and the plunder goes to the soldiers: if
it surrenders, the generals get it. They refused to listen to their
centurions and tribunes and drowned their voices in a rattle of
arms, swearing they would break their orders unless they were
led out.
20 Antonius then went round among the companies. When his
authoritative bearing had obtained silence, he assured them
that he had no wish to rob them of the glory and the reward
they so well deserved. ‘But’, he said, ‘an army and a general
have different functions. It is right that soldiers should be
[3, 21] book three 129
greedy for battle, but the general more often does good by
foresight, deliberation, and delay than by temerity. I have
done all I could to aid your victory with sword in hand: now
I will serve you by the general’s proper arts of calculation and
strategy. The risks that face us are obvious. It is night; we
know nothing of the lie of the city; the enemy are behind the
walls; everything favours an ambush. Even if the gates were
open, we cannot safely enter except by day and after due
reconnoitring. Are you going to begin storming the town
when you cannot possibly see where the ground is level and
how high the walls are? How do you know whether to assault
it with engines and showers of missiles, or with siege-works
and mantlets?’ Then he turned to individuals, asking one after
another whether they had brought hatchets and pickaxes and
other implements for storming a town. When they answered
no, ‘Well,’ he said, ‘could any troops possibly break through
walls or undermine them with swords and javelins? Suppose it
proves necessary to construct a mound and to shelter our-
selves with screens and fascines, are we going to stand idle like
a lot of helpless idiots, gaping at the height of the enemy’s
towers and ramparts? Why not rather wait one night till our
siege-engines arrive and then carry the victory by force?’*
So saying, he sent the camp-followers and servants with the
freshest of the troopers back to Bedriacum to bring up sup-
plies and whatever else was wanted. The soldiers indeed 21
chafed at this, and mutiny was imminent, when some of the
mounted scouts, who had ridden right up to the walls, cap-
tured a few Cremonese stragglers, and learnt from them that
six Vitellian legions and the whole army that had been at
Hostilia had that very day covered thirty miles, and, hearing
of their comrades’ defeat, were already arming for battle and
would be on them immediately. This alarming news cured
their obstinate deafness to the general’s advice. He ordered the
Thirteenth Legion to take up their position on the actual
embankment of the Postumian Way. In touch with them on
the left wing in the open country were the Seventh Galbian,
beside whom stood the Seventh Claudian, with their front
protected by one of the local drainage ditches. On the right
wing were the Eighth, drawn up along an open path, and next
130 the histories [3, 22]
to them the Third, distributed among some thick clumps of
trees. Such, at any rate, was the order of the eagles and
standards. In the darkness the soldiers were confused and
took their places at random. The band of Guards was next
to the Third, and the auxiliaries on the wings, while the
cavalry were disposed in support round the flanks and the
rear. The Suebi Sido and Italicus with a picked band of their
compatriots fought in the front line.
22 For the Vitellians, the right course was to rest at Cremona
and recuperate their strength with food and sleep, and then on
the next day to extirpate and annihilate the Flavians when
they were weak from cold and hunger. But they had no
general; they had no plan. Though it was nearly nine at night
they flung themselves upon the Flavians, who were standing
steady in their places to receive them. In their fury and the
darkness the Vitellian line was so disordered that I should
hardly dare vouch for the disposition of their troops. How-
ever, it has been stated that the Fourth Macedonian Legion
were on the right flank; in the centre were the Fifth and
Fifteenth with the detachments of the Ninth, the Second, and
the Twentieth from Britain; the Sixteenth, the Twenty-Second,
and the First formed the left wing. The men of the Rapax and
Italian Legions were distributed among all the companies. The
cavalry and auxiliaries picked their own positions.
All night the battle raged with varying fortune, never
decided, always savagely contested. Disaster threatened now
one side, now the other. Courage, strength were of little
use: their eyes could not even see in front of them. Both sides
were armed alike; the watchwords, constantly demanded,
soon became known; the standards were all in confusion,
as they were captured and carried off from one band to
another. The Seventh Legion, raised recently by Galba,* suf-
fered most severely. Six of the senior centurions fell and
several standards were lost. They nearly lost their eagle too,
but it was rescued by the senior centurion Atilius Verus, who
after great slaughter of the enemy fell finally himself.
23 Antonius called up the Guards to reinforce his wavering
line. Taking up the fight, they repulsed the enemy, only to be
[3, 24] book three 131
repulsed in their turn. For the Vitellian artillery, which had at
first scattered its fire, discharging upon the bushes without
hurting the enemy, was now massed upon the high road,
and swept the open space in front. One immense catapult in
particular, which belonged to the Fifteenth,* mowed down
the Flavian line with huge stones. The slaughter thus caused
would have been enormous, had not two of the Flavian sol-
diers performed a memorable exploit. Concealing their iden-
tity by snatching up shields from the enemy’s dead, they cut
the ropes which suspended the weights of the engine. They fell
immediately, riddled with wounds, and so their names have
perished; but of their deed there is no doubt.
Fortune had favoured neither side when, as the night wore
on, the moon rose, revealing and deceiving the armies. Shining
from behind the Flavians the moon was in their favour. It
magnified the shadows of their men and horses so that the
enemy took the shadow for the substance, and their missiles
were misdirected and fell short. The Vitellians, on the other
hand, had the moon shining full on them and were unaware
that they were exposed to the Flavians, shooting as it were out
of cover.
Antonius was thus enabled to recognize his own men, and 24
to be recognized by them. He fired some by taunting their
honour, many by words of praise and encouragement, all by
promising hope of reward. He asked the Pannonian legions
why they had drawn their swords again. Here on this field
they could regain their glory and wipe out the stain of their
former disgrace. Then turning to the Moesian troops, he
called on them as the chief promoters of the war: it was no
good challenging the Vitellians with verbal threats, if they
could not bear to face their looks and blows. Thus he ad-
dressed each legion as he reached it. To the Third he spoke at
greater length, reminding them of their victories both old and
new. Had they not under Mark Antony defeated the Parthians
and the Armenians under Corbulo?* Had they not but lately
crushed the Sarmatians? Then he turned in fury on the
Guards. ‘Peasants that you are,’ he shouted, ‘have you another
emperor, another camp waiting to shelter you, if you are
132 the histories [3, 25]
defeated? There in the enemy’s line are your standards and
your arms: defeat means death. You have drained disgrace
already to the dregs.’
These words roused cheers on all sides, and the Third,
25 following the Syrian custom,* saluted the rising sun. From this
there arose a casual rumour—or possibly it was deliberately
concocted by the general—that Mucianus had arrived, and
that the two armies were cheering each other. On they
pressed, feeling they had received fresh reinforcements. The
Vitellian line was more ragged now, for, having no general to
marshal them, their ranks now filled, now thinned, according
to each individual’s passion or fear. As soon as Antonius saw
them crumble, he kept thrusting at them in massed column.
The line disintegrated and then broke, and the inextricable
confusion of wagons and engines prevented their rallying. The
victorious troops scattered them along the straight road in
headlong pursuit.
The massacre was especially noteworthy, because during it
a son killed his father. I give the facts and names on the
authority of Vipstanus Messala. One Julius Mansuetus, a
Spaniard who had joined the Rapax Legion, had left a young
son at home. This boy subsequently grew up and enlisted in
the Seventh Legion, raised by Galba. Chance now sent his
father in his way, and he felled him to the ground. While he
was ransacking the dying man, they recognized each other.
Flinging his arms round the now lifeless corpse, in a piteous
voice he implored his father’s spirit to be appeased and not to
turn against him as a parricide. The crime was his country’s,
he cried; what share had a single soldier in these civil wars?
Meanwhile he lifted the body and began to dig a grave and
perform the last rites for his father. Those who were nearest
noticed this; then the story began to spread, till there ran
through the army astonishment, complaints, and curses
against this most brutal war. Yet they never ceased busily
killing and plundering relatives, in-laws, and brothers;
and while they talked of the crime they were committing it
themselves.
26 When they reached Cremona a fresh task of vast difficulty
awaited them. During the war with Otho the German army
[3, 27] book three 133
had entrenched their camp round the walls of Cremona and
then erected a rampart round the camp; and these fortifica-
tions had been further strengthened. The sight of them
brought the victors to a halt, and their generals were uncertain
what instructions to give. The troops had had no rest for a day
and a night. To storm the town at once would be an arduous
and, in the absence of reserves, a perilous task. On the other
hand, a retreat to Bedriacum would involve the intolerable
fatigue of a long march, and destroy the value of their victory.
Again, it would be dangerous to entrench themselves so close
to the lines of the enemy, who might at any minute sally forth
and rout them while they were dispersed and digging trenches.
But the chief anxiety lay in the temper of their own men,
who were much more ready to face danger than delay. To
them discretion was disagreeable and hazard spelt hope. Their
thirst for plunder outweighed all fears of slaughter, wounds,
and bloodshed.
Antonius also inclined to this view* and gave orders for 27
them to surround the rampart. At first they stood back and
exchanged volleys of arrows and stones, suffering themselves
the severer loss, for a storm of missiles rained down from the
walls. Antonius then assigned each legion to assault a different
part of the rampart and gates, hoping that by thus separating
their tasks he could distinguish the cowards from the brave
and inflame them with a spirit of honourable rivalry. The
Third and Seventh took the position nearest the road to
Bedriacum; the Eighth and Seventh Claudian assaulted the
right-hand side of the rampart; the Thirteenth swept up to the
Brixian Gate. A brief delay was caused while some fetched
mattocks and pickaxes from the nearby fields, and others
hooks and ladders. Then holding their shields above their
heads in close ‘tortoise’ formation,* they advanced under the
rampart.
Both sides employed Roman tactics. The Vitellians rolled
down huge masses of stones, and, as the ‘tortoise’ parted and
wavered, they thrust at it with lances and poles, until at last
the whole structure of shields was broken up and they mowed
down the torn and bleeding soldiers beneath with terrible
slaughter. The men began to hesitate; but the generals, realiz-
134 the histories [3, 28]
ing that they were too tired to respond to encouragements that
28 seemed futile, pointed significantly to Cremona. Whether this
was Hormus’ idea, as Messala records, or whether we should
rather follow Gaius Pliny,* who accuses Antonius, it is not
easy for me to determine. This one may say: however abomi-
nable the crime, in committing it neither Antonius nor
Hormus belied their reputation or their lives.
After this neither wounds nor bloodshed could stay the
Flavian troops. They demolished the rampart, shook the
gates, climbed up on each other’s shoulders and over the re-
formed ‘tortoise’, and caught hold of the enemy’s weapons
and limbs. Thus the wounded and unwounded, the half-dead
and the dying, all came rolling down and perished together by
every imaginable kind of death.
29 The fight raged fiercest round the Third and Seventh Le-
gions, and the general, Antonius, came up with a picked band
of auxiliaries to support their assault. The Vitellians, finding
themselves unable to resist the attack of troops stubbornly
vying with each other, and seeing their missiles all glide off the
‘tortoise’, at last sent their catapult crashing down upon their
heads. For the moment it scattered and crushed beneath it the
men on whom it fell, but it dragged with it the battlements
and the top of the rampart. At the same moment an adjoining
tower gave way under a shower of stones. While the men of
the Seventh struggled up to the breach in close column, the
Third hewed down the gate with hatchets and swords. All the
authorities agree that Gaius Volusius of the Third Legion was
the first man in. Emerging on the top of the rampart, he hurled
down those who barred his path; and, attracting attention by
his gestures and shouts, yelled that the camp was taken. The
others poured through, while the Vitellians in panic flung
themselves down from the rampart, and the whole space
between the camp and the walls became a seething scene of
carnage.
30 Here, once again, a new type of task appeared to the
Flavians. Here were high walls, stone towers, iron-barred
gates, and soldiers hurling javelins. The citizens of Cremona
were numerous and devoted to the cause of Vitellius, and half
Italy had gathered there for the fair which fell just at that time.
[3, 31] book three 135
Their numbers were a help to the defenders, but the prospect
of plundering them offered an incentive to their assailants.
Antonius ordered his men to bring fire and apply it to the most
beautiful of the buildings outside the walls, hoping that the
loss of their property might induce the citizens to turn traitor.
The houses that stood nearest to the wall and overtopped
them he crowded with his bravest troops, who dislodged the
defenders with showers of beams and tiles and flaming
torches.
Meanwhile, some of the legionaries were collecting for a 31
‘tortoise’ formation, while others kept up a steady fire of
javelins and stones. Gradually the spirit of the Vitellians
ebbed. The higher their rank, the more easily they gave way to
misfortune. For they were afraid that if Cremona too was
demolished, there would be no hope of pardon; the victors’
fury would fall not on the common poor but on the tribunes
and centurions, whom it would pay to kill. The common
soldiers felt safe in their obscurity, and, careless of the future,
continued to offer resistance. They roamed the streets or hid
themselves in houses, and though they had given up the war,
refused even so to sue for peace. Meanwhile the tribunes and
centurions did away with the name and portraits of Vitellius.
They released Caecina, who was still in irons, and begged his
help in pleading their cause. When he turned from them in
haughty contempt they besought him with tears. It was the
ultimate evil that all these brave men should invoke a traitor’s
aid.
They then hung olive-branches and ritual bands* out on the
walls, and when Antonius had given the order to cease firing,
they carried out their standards and eagles, followed by a
miserable column of disarmed soldiers, dejectedly hanging
their heads. The victors had at first crowded round, heaping
insults on them and threatening violence, but when they found
that the vanquished had lost all arrogance, but turned to face
the taunts and endured every indignity, they gradually began
to recollect that these were the men who had made such a
moderate use of their recent victory at Bedriacum. But when
the crowd parted, and Caecina advanced in his consular
robes, attended by his lictors in full state, their indignation
136 the histories [3, 32]
broke into flame. They charged him with insolence and
cruelty, and they even—so hateful is crime—flung his treach-
ery in his teeth. Antonius restrained them and sent Caecina
under escort to Vespasian.
32 Meanwhile the citizens of Cremona suffered sorely from the
violence of the troops, and it was only when the soldiers were
on the point of a general massacre that the entreaties of their
generals calmed them down. Antonius summoned a mass
meeting where he eulogized his victorious army, promised
mercy to the vanquished, but spoke non-committally of
Cremona. Besides the troops’ natural passion for plunder,
there was an old grudge which urged them to annihilate the
Cremonese. The town was believed to have given assistance to
the Vitellian cause* before this in the war with Otho; and
again, when the Thirteenth had been left behind to build an
amphitheatre, the populace had shown its town-bred imperti-
nence by assailing them with insolent ridicule. Other causes
increased this bad feeling: it was here that Caecina had given
his show of gladiators; the town had become for a second time
the theatre of the war; the citizens had conveyed food to the
Vitellians during the battle; some women had been killed,
whose enthusiasm for the cause had led them to the battle-
field. Besides all this, the fair had filled the rich city with an
even greater display of wealth than usual.
All eyes were now centred on Antonius, whose fame and
good fortune overshadowed all the other generals. He hurried
off to the baths to wash off the stains of blood. Finding fault
with the temperature of the water, he was heard to quip, ‘It
will not be long before it is hot.’ This vulgar joke brought on
him all the odium, as it was taken to be his signal to set fire to
Cremona, which was already in flames.
33 Forty thousand soldiers* burst into the town, with a yet
larger crowd of servants and sutlers even more depraved in
their readiness for cruelty and lust. Without any respect for
age or for authority they added rape to murder and murder to
rape. Aged men and decrepit old women, who were worthless
as booty, were hustled off to make sport for them. Any grown
girl or handsome youth who fell into their clutches was torn to
pieces by the violence of rival rapists, leaving the plunderers
[3, 35] book three 137
themselves to cut each other’s throats. Whoever carried off
money or the solid gold offerings in the temples was cut to
pieces, if he met others stronger than himself. Some, disdain-
ing easy finds, hunted for hidden hoards, and dug out buried
treasure, flogging and torturing the householders. They held
torches in their hands and, having once secured their prize,
would fling them wantonly into the empty houses and bare
temples. Composed as the army was of citizens, allies, and
foreign troops, differing widely in language and customs, the
objects of the soldiers’ greed differed also. But while their
views of what was right might vary, they all agreed in thinking
nothing wrong. Cremona lasted them four days. While all
other buildings sacred and secular sank in the flames, only the
Temple of Mefitis* outside the walls was left standing, saved
either by its position or by the power of the deity.
Such was the end of Cremona, 286 years after its founda- 34
tion. It had been originally built in the consulship of Tiberius
Sempronius and Publius Cornelius,* while Hannibal was
threatening Italy, to serve as a bulwark against the Gauls
beyond the Po, and to resist any other power that might break
in over the Alps. And so it grew and flourished, aided by its
large number of settlers, its conveniently situated rivers, the
fertility of its territory, and its connections through intermar-
riage with local tribes. Foreign invasions had left it untouched
only to become the victim of civil war.
Antonius, ashamed of his crime, and realizing the growing
odium against him, proclaimed that no citizen of Cremona
was to be kept prisoner; and, indeed, the unanimous feeling in
Italy against buying such slaves had already frustrated the
soldiers’ hope of profit. So they began to kill their captives,
whose relatives and in-laws, when this became known, cov-
ertly bought their release. After a while, the surviving inhab-
itants returned to Cremona, and the squares and temples were
rebuilt by the munificence of the Italian towns and under
Vespasian’s direct patronage.
However, the soil was so foully infected that it was impos- 35
sible for the Flavians to encamp for long on the ruins of the
buried city. They advanced along the road to the third mile-
stone, and mustered the Vitellians, still straggling and panic-
138 the histories [3, 36]
stricken, each under his own standard. The defeated legions
were then distributed through Illyricum, for the civil war was
still in progress and their fidelity could not be relied on. They
then dispatched couriers to carry the news to Britain and the
Spanish provinces. To Gaul they sent a tribune named Julius
Calenus, to Germany Alpinius Montanus, who had com-
manded an auxiliary cohort. Montanus was a Treviran and
Calenus an Aeduan; both had fought for Vitellius and thus
served to advertise Vespasian’s victory. At the same time
garrisons were sent to hold the passes of the Alps, for fear that
Germany might gird herself to support Vitellius.
36 When Caecina had left Rome,* Vitellius, after an interval of
a few days, sent Fabius Valens hurrying to the front, and then
proceeded to mask his cares with self-indulgence. He neither
made any provision for the war, nor fortified his troops either
by haranguing or by drilling them. He did not keep himself
in the public eye, but retired into the pleasant shade of his
gardens, regarding past, present, and future with equal indif-
ference, like one of those listless animals which lie sluggish
and torpid so long as you supply them with food. While he
thus loitered languid and indolent in the woods of Aricia,* he
was startled by the news of Lucilius Bassus’ treachery and the
disaffection of the fleet at Ravenna. Soon afterwards he heard
with mixed feelings of distress and satisfaction that Caecina
had deserted him, but had been imprisoned by the army. On
his insensate nature joy had more effect than concern. He
returned triumphantly to Rome and at a crowded meeting
praised the devotion of the troops in extravagant terms. He
gave orders for the imprisonment of Publilius Sabinus, the
Prefect of the Guards, on the ground of his intimacy with
Caecina, and appointed Alfenus Varus in his place.
37 He next delivered in the Senate a speech constructed to
appear grand, and was eulogized with studied obsequiousness
by the senators. Lucius Vitellius rose to propose a harsh
sentence against Caecina. The rest of the house inveighed with
assumed indignation against the consul who had betrayed his
country, the general who had betrayed his commander-in-
chief, the friend who had betrayed his benefactor to whom he
owed all his riches and distinction. But in their protestations
[3, 38] book three 139
of sympathy with Vitellius they really voiced their personal
vexation. None of the speeches contained any disparagement
of the Flavian generals. They threw the blame on the mis-
guided and impolitic action of the armies, and with anxious
circumlocution avoided all direct mention of Vespasian.
Caecina’s consulship had still one day to run, and Rosius
Regulus actually made humble petition for this one day’s
office, Vitellius’ offer and his acceptance exciting widespread
derision. Thus on 31 October he entered and abdicated his
office. Men who were learned in constitutional history
pointed out that no one before had ever filled a vacancy when
no bill had been passed rescinding the magistracy;* there was,
however, precedent for the one-day consulship in the case of
Caninius Rebilus* when Julius Caesar was dictator and the
civil war necessitated prompt rewards.
It was at this time that the news of the death of Junius 38
Blaesus gave rise to much talk. I give the story as I find it.
Vitellius was lying seriously ill at his house in the Servilian
Park,* and noticed that a neighbouring mansion was bril-
liantly illuminated at night. On asking the reason, he was told
that Caecina Tuscus* was giving a large dinner party, at
which Junius Blaesus was the chief guest. To this was added
an exaggerated account of their extravagance and dissipation.
Then informants appeared with accusations against Tuscus
and others, but especially slandering Blaesus for spending his
days in revelry while his Emperor lay ill. There are people who
keep a sharp eye on every sign of an emperor’s displeasure.
They soon made sure that Vitellius was furious and that
Blaesus’ ruin would be an easy task, so they cast Lucius
Vitellius in the role of informer. He had a mean and jealous
hatred of Blaesus, whose spotless reputation far outshone his
own, which was tainted with every kind of infamy. Bursting
into the Emperor’s apartment, he caught up Vitellius’ young
son* in his arms and fell at his feet. When asked the reason for
his consternation, he said it was due to no personal fear or
anxiety for himself; all his prayers and tears were for his
brother and his brother’s children. Their fears of Vespasian
were idle: between him and Vitellius lay all the legions of
Germany, all those brave and loyal provinces, and an immeas-
140 the histories [3, 39]
urable space of land and sea. ‘It is here in Rome,’ he cried, ‘in
our very bosom that we have an enemy to fear, one who
boasts that the Junii and Antonii are his ancestors,* one who
shows himself affable and munificent to the troops, posing as
a descendant of imperial stock. It is to him that Rome’s
attention turns, while you, careless who is friend or foe,
cherish a rival, who sits feasting and watches his Emperor
suffering. You must requite his unseasonable gaiety with a
night of deadly sorrow, in which he may both know and feel
that Vitellius lives and is emperor, and, if anything should
happen, has a son to be his heir.’
39 Vitellius hesitated anxiously between his criminal desires
and his fear that, if he deferred Blaesus’ death, he might hasten
his own ruin, or by giving official orders for it might raise a
storm of indignation. He decided to proceed by poison. He
made his culpability credible by going to see Blaesus and
showing obvious satisfaction. Moreover, he was heard to
make the savage boast that he had, to quote his own words,
‘feasted his eyes on his enemy’s death-bed’.
Blaesus, besides his distinguished origin and refined charac-
ter, was steadfastly loyal. Even before the decline of Vitellius’
cause he had been canvassed by Caecina and other party
leaders, who were turning against the Emperor, and had met
them with a persistent refusal. He was a man of quiet and
blameless life, with no ambition for the principate or, indeed,
for any sudden distinction, but he could not escape the danger
of being considered worthy of it.
40 Meanwhile Fabius Valens, with a long and languid train of
harlots and eunuchs, was conducting a leisurely advance,*
most unlike a march to the front, when couriers arrived post-
haste with the news that Lucilius Bassus had surrendered the
Ravenna fleet. If he had hurried forward on his march he
might have been in time to save Caecina’s faltering loyalty, or
to have joined the legions before the critical engagement was
fought. Some, indeed, advised him to avoid Ravenna and with
his most reliable troops to make his way by obscure by-roads
to Hostilia or Cremona. Others wanted him to send to Rome
for the Guards and to break through the enemy’s lines with a
strong force. Valens himself, with futile indecision, let the time
[3, 42] book three 141
for action go by while he took advice; and then rejecting the
advice he was offered, chose the middle course, which is
always the worst in a crisis, and thus failed both in courage
and in caution. He wrote to Vitellius demanding reinforce- 41
ments, and there arrived three cohorts of Guards and a
regiment of cavalry from Britain, too many to slip through
unobserved and too few to force a passage.
But even in such a crisis as this Valens’ reputation was
as unsavoury as ever. He was still believed to be grabbing
illicit pleasures and defiling the homes of his hosts by seducing
their wives and families. He had power and money to help
him, and the lustful impatience of one whose star is on the
wane.
At last the arrival of the infantry and cavalry revealed the
perversity of his strategy. He had too few men to take the road
through the enemy, even if they had been unquestionably
loyal—and their loyalty was under grave suspicion. However,
their sense of decency and respect for the general restrained
them for a while, though such ties are soon broken when
troops are scared of danger and indifferent to disgrace. Fear-
ing trouble, he sent the cohorts forward to Ariminum* with
the cavalry to secure the rear. Valens himself, with a few
companions, whose loyalty had survived misfortune, turned
off into Umbria and thence to Etruria, where he learnt the
result of the battle of Cremona. Thereupon he formed a plan,
which was far from cowardly and would have had alarming
consequences, if it had succeeded. This was to seize ships and
cross to some point on the coast of Narbonese Gaul, whence
he could rouse the provinces of Gaul, the armies, and the
German tribes for a fresh outbreak of war.
As Valens’ departure had dispirited the troops at 42
Ariminum, Cornelius Fuscus advanced his force and, sending
Liburnian cruisers along the adjoining coast, invested the
town by land and sea. The Flavians thus occupied the
Umbrian plain and the Adriatic seaboard of Picenum; and
the Apennines now divided Italy between Vitellius and
Vespasian. Valens, embarking from the Bay of Pisa, was either
becalmed on a slow sea or caught by an unfavourable wind
and had to put in at the harbour of Hercules Monoecus.*
142 the histories [3, 43]
Stationed in the neighbourhood was Marius Maturus, the
governor of the Maritime Alps, who had remained loyal to
Vitellius, and, though surrounded by enemies, had so far been
faithful to his oath of allegiance. He gave Valens a friendly
welcome and strongly advised him not to venture rashly into
Narbonese Gaul: this alarmed Valens, who found also that his
43 companions’ loyalty was yielding to their fears. For Valerius
Paulinus, the procurator in Narbonese Gaul, was an energetic
soldier who had been friendly with Vespasian before his eleva-
tion, and had lately sworn the surrounding communities to his
cause. Having summoned to his flag all the Guards discharged
by Vitellius, who needed no persuasion to resume the war, he
was now holding the colony of Forum Julii, the key to the
command of the sea. His influence carried the more weight
since Forum Julii was his native town and, having once been
tribune of the Guards, he was respected by the men. Besides
this, the inhabitants supported their fellow-citizen, and in the
hope of future aggrandizement rendered enthusiastic service
to the party.
The news of these efficient preparations, somewhat exag-
gerated by rumour, dinned in the ears of the Vitellians, who
were already in some doubt; Fabius Valens returned to the
ships with four men of the Body Guard, three of his friends,
and three centurions, while Maturus and the rest preferred
to remain and swear allegiance to Vespasian. As for Valens,
though he felt safer at sea than among the cities on the coast,
he was still full of doubts for the future, since he was more
clear about what he had to avoid than whom he could trust.
Eventually a gale drove him upon the Stoechades,* some
islands belonging to Marseilles, and there he was caught by
the cruisers which Paulinus had sent in pursuit.
44 With the capture of Valens the tide had now fully turned in
favour of Vespasian. The movement began in Spain with the
First Legion Adiutrix, whose reverence for Otho’s memory
made them hate Vitellius. They carried the Tenth and the
Sixth with them. The provinces of Gaul soon followed suit.
Britain tended to support Vespasian’s cause, since he had been
sent there by Claudius* in command of the Second Legion,
and had fought there with great distinction. But the adherence
[3, 46] book three 143
of the province was to some extent opposed by the other
legions, in which many of the centurions and soldiers had
been promoted by Vitellius. They were used to their Emperor
and felt some doubt about the change.*
This quarrel between the legions, and the constant rumours 45
of civil war, encouraged the Britons to take heart. Their chief
instigator was one Venutius. He was of a ferocious disposition
and hated the name of Rome, but his strongest motive was a
private quarrel with Queen Cartimandua, a member of a
powerful family, who ruled the Brigantes.* Her authority had
lately increased, since she had betrayed King Caratacus* into
the hands of the Romans, and was thus considered to have
provided the Emperor Claudius with his triumph. Thus she
had grown rich, and with prosperity came dissipation. She
threw over Venutius, who was her husband, and gave her
hand and kingdom to his squire Vellocatus. This scandal soon
proved the ruin of her house. The husband was backed by
popular zeal: the lover by the queen’s brutal lusts. Venutius
therefore summoned assistance and, aided by the simultane-
ous revolt of the Brigantes, brought Cartimandua into dire
straits. She petitioned for troops from Rome. Our auxiliaries,
both horse and foot, then fought several engagements with
varying success, but eventually rescued the queen. The king-
dom was left in Venutius’ hands—and the war in ours.
Almost simultaneously a disturbance broke out in 46
Germany, where the inefficiency of the generals, the disaffec-
tion of the troops, the strength of the enemy, and the treachery
of our allies all combined to bring the Roman government
into serious danger. The causes and history of this protracted
struggle—for such it proved—we must leave to a later
chapter.
Amongst the Dacians also there was trouble. They could
never be trusted, and now that the army was moved from
Moesia they were no longer restrained by fear. At first they
remained quiet and awaited developments. But when they saw
Italy in the flames of war, and found the whole world divided
into hostile camps, they fell upon the winter quarters of the
cohorts and cavalry and began to occupy both banks of the
Danube. They were on the point of storming the legionary
144 the histories [3, 47]
camp as well, when Mucianus, who knew of the victory at
Cremona, sent the Sixth Legion* against them. For the empire
was in danger of a double foreign invasion, if the Dacians and
the Germans had broken in from opposite directions. But
here, as so often, Rome’s good fortune saved her by bringing
Mucianus on the scene with the forces of the East just at the
moment when we had settled matters at Cremona. Fonteius
Agrippa,* who had for the last year been governor in Asia,
was transferred to the government of Moesia. His forces were
strengthened by a draft from the defeated Vitellian army, for
in the interest of peace and prudence these troops were distrib-
uted over the provinces and had their hands tied by foreign
war.
47 The other peoples soon made their voices heard. Pontus*
had suddenly risen in a general rebellion at the instigation of
a foreign menial, who was in command of what had once been
the royal fleet. He was one of Polemo’s freedmen, by name
Anicetus, who had formerly been influential and resented the
change which had converted the kingdom into a province of
the Roman Empire. He accordingly enlisted in Vitellius’ ser-
vice the tribes neighbouring on Pontus, attracting with prom-
ises of plunder all the most needy. At the head of no mean
force he suddenly fell upon Trapezus,* an ancient and famous
city, founded by Greek settlers at the eastern end of the Pontic
coast. There he cut to pieces a cohort that had once formed
the king’s Body Guard, and, after receiving the Roman fran-
chise, had adopted our ensigns and equipment, while still
retaining all the inefficiency and insubordination of Greek
troops. Anicetus also set fire to the fleet and thus had free play
on an empty sea, since Mucianus had moved the pick of his
cruisers and all his troops to Byzantium.
The sea was insolently overrun by natives too, who had
hurriedly built themselves boats. These, which they call ‘arks’,
are broad-bottomed boats that narrow above the waterline,
built without any brass or iron rivets. In a rough sea, as the
waves rise higher and higher, the height of the sides is raised
by the addition of planks which, in the end, enclose the whole
boat under a sort of roof. They are thus left to toss up and
down on the waves. They have bows at both ends and can be
[3, 49] book three 145
rowed either way, since it is as easy and as safe to land in one
direction as in the other.
This state of things attracted Vespasian’s attention. He sent 48
out a picked force of detachments from the legions under
Virdius Geminus, a soldier of experience. He attacked the
enemy while they were dispersed in all directions in quest of
plunder, and drove them back to their ships. He then had
some Liburnian cruisers hurriedly constructed and ran
Anicetus to ground in the mouth of the River Chobus,* where
he had taken refuge with the king of the Sedochezi tribe,
whose alliance he had purchased by bribes. At first, indeed,
the king endeavoured to protect his petitioner by using violent
threats, but he soon saw that it was a choice between making
war or being paid for his treachery. As usual, the barbarian
sense of honour dissolved. He arranged for Anicetus’ death
and surrendered the other fugitives, and thus put an end to the
slaves’ war.
This victory delighted Vespasian: everything was succeed-
ing beyond his hopes, and to crown all the news of the battle
of Cremona now reached him in Egypt. He hurried forward
all the faster towards Alexandria with the object of bringing
starvation upon Vitellius’ defeated troops and the inhabitants
of Rome, who were in need of imports: he was at the same
time making preparations for an invasion of the adjacent
province of Africa by land and sea. By cutting off their corn
supply he hoped to reduce the enemy to famine and disunion.
Thus a world-wide convulsion marked the passing of the 49
imperial power into new hands. Meanwhile, after Cremona,
the behaviour of Antonius Primus was not so blameless as
before. He had settled the war, he felt; the rest would be plain
sailing. Or perhaps in such a nature as his success only
brought to light his greed and arrogance and all his other
dormant vices. While harrying Italy like a conquered country,
he courted the goodwill of his troops as if they were his own,
and he used every word and every action to pave his way to
power. He allowed his men to appoint centurions themselves
in place of those who had fallen, and thus gave them a taste
for insubordination; for they voted for the most turbulent
spirits. The generals no longer controlled the men, but were
146 the histories [3, 50]
dragged along by their violence. This revolutionary system,
utterly fatal to good discipline, was exploited by Antonius
for his own profit. Of Mucianus’ approach he had no fears,
and thus made a mistake even more fatal than despising
Vespasian.*
50 As winter was at hand, however, and the Po had inundated
the meadows, his column marched unencumbered by heavy
baggage. The main body of the victorious legions was left
behind at Verona: the soldiers who were incapacitated by
wounds or old age, and many besides who were still in good
condition. Having already broken the back of the campaign,
Antonius felt strong enough with his auxiliary cohorts, horse
regiments, and some picked detachments from the legions.
The Eleventh* had voluntarily joined the advance. They had
held back at first, but, seeing Antonius’ success, were dis-
tressed to think they had had no share in it. The column was
also accompanied by a force of 6,000 Dalmatian troops,
which had been recently raised. The ex-consul Pompeius
Silvanus commanded the column, but the actual control was
in the hands of the legionary commander Annius Bassus.*
Silvanus was quite ineffective as a general, and wasted every
chance of action in talking about it. Bassus, while showing all
due respect, managed him completely, and was always ready
with quiet efficiency to do anything that had to be done. Their
force was further increased by enlisting the best of the marines
from the Ravenna fleet, who were clamouring for service
in the legions; the vacancies in the fleet were filled by
Dalmatians.
The army and its generals halted at Fanum Fortunae,* still
hesitating what policy to adopt, for they had heard that the
Guards were on the move from Rome, and supposed that the
Apennines were held by troops. And they had fears of their
own. Supplies were scarce in a district devastated by war. The
men were mutinous and demanded ‘boot-money’, as they
called the donative. No provision had been made either for
money or for stores. The precipitate greed of the soldiers made
further difficulties, for they looted what they could otherwise
have been given.
[3, 52] book three 147
In some famous authorities, I find evidence which shows 51
how wickedly careless were the victorious army of all consid-
erations of right and wrong. They tell how a trooper declared
that he had killed his brother in the last battle, and demanded
a reward from his generals. Common morality forbade them
to remunerate such a murder, but in the interests of civil war
they dared not punish it. They had put him off with the plea
that they could not at the moment reward his service ad-
equately. And there the story stops. However, a similar crime
had occurred in earlier civil wars. In the battle which
Pompeius Strabo fought against Cinna at the Janiculum,* one
of his soldiers killed his own brother and then, realizing what
he had done, committed suicide. This is recorded by Sisenna.*
Our ancestors had a livelier sense than we have both of the
glory of good deeds and the shame of bad. I may appropri-
ately cite these and other such instances from past history,
whenever the subject demands either an example of good
conduct or some consolation for a crime.
Antonius and his fellow generals decided to send the cavalry 52
ahead to explore the whole of Umbria and to see whether the
summit of the Apennines was accessible by a gentler route.
They would summon the main body of the forces and all the
remaining troops at Verona, and fill the Po and the sea with
supply ships.
Some of the generals contrived to delay progress; Antonius,
they felt, had grown too big for his place, and they had surer
hopes of reward from Mucianus. Mucianus was distressed
that victory had come so soon, and felt that, if he was not
present when Rome was taken, he would lose his share in the
war and its glory. So he kept on writing to Antonius and
Varus in ambiguous terms, sometimes urging them to ‘press
forward on their path’, sometimes expatiating on ‘the mani-
fold value of delay’. He thus managed to arrange that he could
disclaim responsibility in case of a reverse, or acknowledge
their policy as his own if it succeeded.
To Plotius Grypus, whom Vespasian had lately raised to
senatorial rank and put in command of a legion, and to his
other trusty friends he sent less ambiguous instructions, and
148 the histories [3, 53]
they all wrote back criticizing the haste with which Antonius
and Varus acted. This was just what Mucianus wanted. He
forwarded the letters to Vespasian with the result that
Antonius’ plans and deeds were not appreciated as highly as
Antonius had hoped.
53 This Antonius took very ill; he threw the blame on
Mucianus, whose charges, he conceived, had cheapened his
perilous exploits. Being little accustomed to control his tongue
or to obey orders, he was most unguarded in his conversation.
He composed a letter to Vespasian in presumptuous language
which ill befitted a subject, making various covert charges
against Mucianus. ‘It was I’, he wrote, ‘who brought the
legions of Pannonia into the field: it was I who goaded into
activity the officers in Moesia: it was by my persistence
that we broke through the Alps, seized hold of Italy, and
cut off the German and Raetian auxiliaries. When Vitellius’
legions were all scattered and disunited, it was I who routed
them, flinging the cavalry on them like a whirlwind, and
then pressing home with the infantry all day and all night.
That victory is my greatest achievement and it is entirely my
own. As for the mishap at Cremona, that was the fault of the
war. In old days the civil wars cost the country far more
damage and involved the destruction of more than one town.
It is not with couriers and dispatches that I serve my master,
but with my sword in my hand. Nor can it be said that I have
interfered with the glory of the men who have meanwhile
settled matters in Dacia. What peace in Moesia is to them, the
safety and welfare of Italy are to me. It was my encourage-
ment which brought the provinces of Gaul and of Spain, the
strongest parts of the whole world, over to Vespasian’s side.
But my labours will prove useless,* if the reward for the
dangers I have run is to fall to those who were not there to
share them.’
All this reached the ears of Mucianus and a serious quarrel
resulted. Antonius fostered it in a frank spirit of dislike, while
Mucianus showed a cunning which was far more implacable.
54 After the crushing defeat at Cremona Vitellius stupidly
suppressed the news of the disaster, thus postponing not the
evil itself but only its cure. Had he admitted the facts and
[3, 55] book three 149
sought advice, hope and strength were still left to him: his
pretence that all went well only made matters worse. In his
presence there prevailed an extraordinary silence about the
war, and in Rome all discussion of the subject was forbidden.
This only increased the number of people who, if permitted,
would have told the truth, but in the face of this prohibition
spread grossly exaggerated rumours. Nor were the Flavian
leaders slow to foster these stories. Whenever they captured
Vitellian spies they escorted them round the camp to show
them the strength of the winning army, and sent them back
again. Vitellius cross-examined each of them in secret and
then had them murdered.
A centurion named Julius Agrestis, after many interviews,
in which he endeavoured in vain to fire Vitellius’ courage, at
last with remarkable and heroic persistence induced the Em-
peror to send him to inspect the enemy’s forces and discover
what had really happened at Cremona. He made no attempt
to deceive Antonius by concealing the object of his mission,
but openly avowed the Emperor’s instructions, stated his in-
tentions, and demanded to be shown everything. He was given
guides, who showed him the field of battle, the ruins of
Cremona, and the captured legions. Back went Agrestis to
Vitellius. Finding that the Emperor disbelieved his report and
even suggested that he had been bribed, he said, ‘You want
some certain evidence: since you have no further use for me
either alive or dead, I will give you evidence that you can
believe.’ Going straight from the Emperor’s presence, he cor-
roborated his report by committing suicide.* Some say he was
killed by order of Vitellius, but they give the same account of
his heroic devotion.
Vitellius was like a man roused from sleep. He dispatched 55
Julius Priscus and Alfenus Varus with fourteen cohorts of
Guards and all his available cavalry to hold the Apennines; a
legion levied from the marines was sent after them. This large
army of picked men and horses was strong enough to have
even taken the offensive—if it had had another general. His
other cohorts were given to his brother Lucius Vitellius, for
the protection of the city. The Emperor himself gave up none
of his habitual luxuries, but pessimism made him hasty. He
150 the histories [3, 56]
hurried on the elections and nominated consuls for several
years in advance. He lavished treaties on allied communities
and extended Latin rights* to foreign towns: he remitted
taxation here, granted immunities there. In fact, he took no
thought for the future and crippled the empire. However, the
mob accepted these munificent grants with open mouths.
Fools paid money for them, but wise men held them invalid,
since they could be neither given nor received without destroy-
ing the state. At last he yielded to the demands of the army
and joined the camp at Mevania,* where they had taken up
their position. A long train of senators followed him, many
moved by their ambition, but most by their fears. Here he was
still undecided and at the mercy of treacherous advice.
56 During one of his speeches a portent occurred. A black
cloud of ill-omened birds flew over his head, and its density
obscured the daylight. To this was added another omen of
disaster. A bull broke from the altar, scattered the utensils for
the ceremony, and was impaled a distance away instead of
being sacrificed according to the proper ritual. But the chief
portent was Vitellius himself. He was ignorant of soldiering,
incapable of forethought: knew nothing of marching order or
scouting, or how far operations should be pressed forward or
protracted. He always had to ask someone else. At every fresh
piece of news his expression and gait betrayed his alarm. And
then he would get drunk.
At last he found camp life too tedious, and on learning of a
mutiny in the fleet at Misenum he returned to Rome. Every
fresh blow terrified him, but of the real crisis he was insens-
ible. For it was open to him to cross the Apennines and with
his full strength unimpaired to attack the enemy while they
were worn out with cold and hunger. But by breaking up his
forces he sent his keenest soldiers, stubbornly loyal to the last,
to be killed or taken prisoner. The more experienced of his
centurions disapproved of this policy and would have told
him the truth, if they had been consulted. But Vitellius’s
intimates refused them admittance. The Emperor had, indeed,
formed a habit of regarding wholesome advice as unpleasant,
and listening only to what was agreeable—and ultimately
fatal.
[3, 58] book three 151
In civil war individual enterprise counts for much. The 57
mutiny of the fleet at Misenum had been engineered by
Claudius Faventinus, a centurion whom Galba had dismissed
in disgrace. To obtain his object he had forged a letter from
Vespasian, promising rewards for treachery. The admiral,
Claudius Apollinaris, was neither a staunch loyalist nor an
enthusiastic traitor. Accordingly Apinius Tiro, an ex-praetor
who happened to be at Minturnae, volunteered to lead the
rebels. They proceeded to win over the colonies and country
towns. Puteoli in particular was strong for Vespasian, while
Capua remained loyal to Vitellius, for they dragged their local
jealousies into the civil war.
To pacify the excited troops Vitellius chose Claudius
Julianus, who had lately been in command of the fleet at
Misenum and had allowed lax discipline. He was given to
back him up one cohort of the City Garrison and the force of
gladiators already serving under him. The two parties en-
camped close to one another, and it was not long before
Julianus came over to Vespasian’s side. They then occupied
Tarracina,* which owed its strength more to its walls and
situation than to the character of its new garrison.
When news of this reached Vitellius, he left part of his force 58
at Narnia* with the Prefects of the Guards, and sent his
brother Lucius with six cohorts and 500 horse to cope with
the threatened outbreak in Campania. His own nervous de-
pression was somewhat relieved by the enthusiasm of the
troops and of the populace, who clamoured loudly for arms.
For he dignified this poor-spirited mob, which would never
dare to do anything but shout, by the specious titles of ‘the
army’ or ‘his legions’. His friends were all untrustworthy in
proportion to their eminence; but on the advice of his freed-
men he held a tribal assembly and swore in all who gave their
names. As their numbers were too great, the consuls handled
the conscription jointly. From each of the senators he levied a
fixed number of slaves and a weight of silver. The knights
offered money and personal service, while even freedmen
volunteered similar assistance. Indeed, feigned loyalty
prompted by fear had changed into real sympathy. People
began to feel pity, not so much for Vitellius as for the throne
152 the histories [3, 59]
and its misfortunes. He himself by his looks, his voice, his
tears made ceaseless demands upon their compassion, promis-
ing rewards lavishly and, as men do when they are frightened,
beyond all limits. He had hitherto refused the title of Caesar,
but he now expressed a wish for it. He had a superstitious
respect for the name, and in moments of terror one listens as
much to gossip as to sound advice. However, while an under-
taking that is based on irrational emotion may prosper at the
outset, in time it always begins to flag. Gradually the senators
and knights deserted him. At first they hesitated and waited
till his back was turned, but soon they ceased to care and
openly showed their disrespect. At last Vitellius grew ashamed
of the failure of his efforts and excused them from the services
which they refused to render.
59 The occupation of Mevania had terrified Italy: there was the
sense that the war had begun afresh. But now Vitellius’ cow-
ardly retreat perceptibly strengthened the popularity of the
Flavian party. The Samnites, Paelignians, and Marsians were
jealous of Campania for stealing a march on them, and the
change of masters, as so often happens, made them perform
all their military duties with the utmost alacrity. But in cross-
ing the Apennines Antonius’ army suffered severely from the
rough December weather. Though they met with no opposi-
tion, they found it hard enough to struggle through the snow,
and realized what danger they would have had to face if
Vitellius had not happened to turn back. Chance helped the
Flavian generals quite as often as strategy.
Here they came across Petillius Cerialis,* who had been
enabled by his knowledge of the country to elude Vitellius’
outposts, disguised as a peasant. As he was a near relative of
Vespasian and a distinguished soldier he was given a place
on the staff. Several authorities say that Flavius Sabinus
and Domitian were also afforded facilities for escape, and
Antonius sent messengers who contrived by various tricks to
get through to them, and made arrangements for an interview
and safe conduct. Sabinus, however, pleaded that his health
was unequal to the fatigue of such a bold step. Domitian was
quite ready to venture, but he had been detained on Vitellius’
orders; the guards promised that they would share his flight,
[3, 61] book three 153
but he was afraid they might be laying a trap for him. As a
matter of fact, Vitellius was too anxious for the safety of his
own relatives to plot any harm against Domitian.
The Flavian generals arrived at Carsulae, took a few days’ 60
rest, and awaited the arrival of the main legionary force. The
place suited them admirably for an encampment. It com-
manded a wide view, and with so many prosperous towns in
the rear their supplies were safe. The Vitellians too were only
ten miles away, and they had hopes of negotiating treason
with them. The soldiers chafed at this delay, preferring victory
to peace. They did not even want to wait for their own
legions, for there would be more plunder than peril to share
with them.
Antonius accordingly summoned a meeting of the men and
explained to them that Vitellius still had troops at his com-
mand. Reflection might make them waver, despair would steel
their hearts. In civil war, he told them, the first steps may be
left to chance; nothing but careful strategy can win the final
victory. The fleet at Misenum and the richest part of the
Campanian coastline had already deserted Vitellius, and in the
whole world nothing was left to him now except the country
between Tarracina and Narnia. The battle of Cremona had
brought them credit enough, the destruction of Cremona
more than enough discredit. Their desire must be not to take
Rome but to save it. They would gain richer rewards and far
the highest glory if they sought to save the Senate and People
of Rome without shedding a drop of blood.
Such considerations as these calmed their excitement, and it 61
was not long before the legions arrived. Alarmed by the report
of this enlarged army, Vitellius’ cohorts began to waver. There
was no one to encourage them to fight, while many urged
them to desert and competed to hand over their companies
or squadrons to the enemy and by such a gift to secure the
victor’s gratitude for the future. From them the Flavians
learned that the camp on the nearby plains at Interamna had
a garrison of 400 cavalry. Varus was promptly sent off with a
light marching force, and the few who offered resistance were
killed—the majority threw away their arms and begged for
quarter. Some escaped to the main camp and spread universal
154 the histories [3, 62]
panic by exaggerating the strength and prowess of the enemy,
in order to mitigate the disgrace of losing the fort.
In the Vitellian camp all offences went unpunished: deser-
tion met with sure reward. Their loyalty soon gave way and
a competition in treachery began. Tribunes and centurions
deserted daily, but not the common soldiers, who had grown
stubbornly faithful to Vitellius. At last, however, Priscus
and Alfenus abandoned the camp and returned to Vitellius,
releasing all the others from any obligation to blush for their
treachery.
62 About the same time Fabius Valens was executed in his
prison at Urbinum,* and his head was exhibited to Vitellius’
Guards to show them that further hope was vain. For
they cherished a belief that Valens had made his way into
Germany, and was there mustering armies old and new. This
evidence of his death threw them into despair. The Flavian
army was vastly inspirited by it and regarded Valens’ death as
the end of the war.*
Valens had been born at Anagnia* of an equestrian family.
He was a man of loose morality, not without intellectual gifts,
who by indulging in frivolity posed as a wit. In Nero’s time he
had acted in a farce at the Juvenalian Games,* at first pleading
compulsion, but afterwards voluntarily; his performances
were clever rather than respectable. Rising to the command of
a legion, he supported Verginius and then defamed his charac-
ter. He murdered Fonteius Capito when he had corrupted
him—or perhaps it was because he had failed to corrupt him.
He betrayed Galba and remained faithful to Vitellius, a merit
given lustre by the treachery of others.
63 Now that their hopes were crushed on all sides, the
Vitellians prepared to go over to the enemy. But even now
they saved their honour by marching down with their stand-
ards and colours to the plains below Narnia, where the
Flavian army was drawn up in full array ready for battle in
closed ranks on either side of the road. The Vitellians marched
in between and were surrounded. Antonius then spoke to
them kindly and told them to remain, some at Narnia and
some at Interamna. He also left behind some of the victorious
[3, 65] book three 155
legions, which were strong enough to quell any outbreak but
would not molest them so long as they remained quiet.
During these days Antonius and Varus kept sending mes-
sages to Vitellius, in which they offered him his life, a gift of
money, and the choice of a safe retreat in Campania, if he
would stop the war and surrender himself and his children to
Vespasian. Mucianus wrote him letters to the same effect.
Vitellius usually took these offers seriously and talked about
the number of slaves he would have and the choice of a seaside
place. He had sunk, indeed, into such mental torpor that, if
other people had not remembered that he was an emperor, he
would have forgotten it himself.
However, it was to Flavius Sabinus, the City Prefect, that 64
the leading men at Rome addressed themselves. They urged
him secretly not to lose all share in the glory of victory. They
pointed out that the City Garrison was under his own com-
mand, and that he could count on the Watch and their own
bands of slaves, to say nothing of the good fortune of the
party and all the advantage that victory gives. He must not
leave all the glory to Antonius and Varus. Vitellius had noth-
ing left but a few cohorts of Guards, who were seriously
alarmed at the bad news which came from every quarter. As
for the populace, their feelings soon changed, and if he put
himself at their head, they would be just as loud in their
flattery of Vespasian. Vitellius himself could not even cope
with success, and disaster had positively paralysed him. The
credit of ending the war would go to the man who seized
the city. It was eminently fitting that Sabinus should secure the
throne for his brother, and that Vespasian should hold him
higher than any one else.
Age had enfeebled Sabinus,* and he showed no alacrity to 65
listen to such talk as this. Some people covertly insinuated that
he was jealous of his brother’s success and was trying to delay
its realization. And in fact Flavius Sabinus was the elder
brother and, when they were both private citizens, he had
been the richer and more influential. It was also believed that
when Vespasian’s finances were in jeopardy, Sabinus had
begrudged him assistance, and had taken a mortgage on his
156 the histories [3, 66]
house and estates. Consequently, though they remained
openly friendly, there were suspicions of a secret enmity
between them.
The more charitable explanation is that Sabinus’ gentle
nature shrank from the idea of bloodshed and massacre, and
that this was his reason for so constantly discussing with
Vitellius the prospects of peace and a capitulation on terms.
After several interviews at their homes they finally came to a
settlement—so the report went—at the Temple of Apollo. To
the actual conversation there were only two witnesses,
Cluvius Rufus and Silius Italicus,* but their faces were
watched from a distance. Vitellius was said to look abject and
ignoble: Sabinus showed less sign of mockery than of pity.
66 Had Vitellius found it as easy to persuade his friends as to
make his own renunciation, Vespasian’s army would have
marched into Rome without bloodshed.* But as it was, the
greater their loyalty, the more they persisted in refusing terms
of peace. They pointed to the danger and disgrace. Would
their conqueror keep his promises any longer than he liked?
However great Vespasian’s arrogance, he could not allow
Vitellius to live as a private citizen; nor would even the losers
agree to it. So appealing to mercy brings peril. ‘Of course,’
they said, ‘you are an old man.* You have had your fill of
fortune, good or bad. But what name or position will your son
Germanicus enjoy? At present they are promising you money
and a household, and the pleasant shores of Campania. But
when once Vespasian has seized the throne, neither he nor his
friends nor even his army will feel their safety assured until the
rival claimant is dead. They imprisoned Fabius Valens and
meant to make use of him if a crisis occurred, but they found
him too great an incubus. You may be sure that Antonius and
Fuscus, and that typical representative of the party, Mucianus,
will have no choice but to kill you. Julius Caesar did not let
Pompey live unmolested, nor Augustus Antony.* Do you sup-
pose that Vespasian’s is a loftier disposition? Why, he was
dependant of a Vitellius when that Vitellius was Claudius’
colleague.* No, think of your father’s censorship, his three
consulships, and all the honour your great house has won.
You must not disgrace them. Despair, at least, should nerve
[3, 68] book three 157
you to audacity. The troops are steadfast; you still enjoy the
people’s favour. Indeed, nothing worse can happen to you
than what we are rushing into of our own free will. If we are
defeated, we must die; if we surrender, we must die. All that
matters is whether we breathe our last amid mockery and
insult or bravely and with honour.’
But Vitellius was deaf to all courageous counsel. His mind 67
was obsessed with pity for his wife and children, and anxiety
that obstinate resistance might make the conqueror merciless
towards them. He had also a mother, very old and infirm, but
she forestalled the ruin of her house, opportunely dying* a few
days before. All she had got out of her son’s principate was
sorrow and a fine reputation.
On 18 December he heard the news that the legion and
the cohorts at Narnia had deserted him and surrendered to the
enemy. He at once put on sombre garments and left the
palace, surrounded by his sorrowful household. His small son
was carried in a little litter, as though this had been his
funeral. The populace uttered untimely flatteries: the soldiers
kept an ominous silence.
No one could have been so indifferent to the tragedy of 68
human life as to be unmoved by this spectacle. A Roman
emperor, yesterday master of the inhabited world, had left the
seat of his authority, and was now passing through the streets
of the city, through the crowding populace, quitting the
throne. Such a sight had never been seen or heard of before.
The dictator, Caesar, had been the victim of sudden violence;
Gaius of a secret conspiracy. Nero’s* had been a stealthy flight
to some obscure country house under cover of night. Piso and
Galba might almost be said to have fallen on the field of
battle. But here was Vitellius—before the assembly of his own
people, his own soldiers around him, with even women look-
ing on—uttering a few sentences suitable to his miserable
situation. He said it was in the interest of peace and of his
country that he now resigned. He begged them only to retain
his memory in their hearts and to take pity on his brother, his
wife, and his innocent little children. As he said this, he held
out his son to them and commended him, now to individuals,
now to the whole assembly. At last tears choked his voice.
158 the histories [3, 69]
Turning to the consul Caecilius Simplex, who was standing
by, he unstrapped his dagger from his side, and offered to
surrender it as a symbol of his power over the life and death
of his subjects. The consul refused, and the people standing by
shouted ‘No’. So he left them with the intention of depositing
the imperial regalia in the Temple of Concord and then going
to his brother’s house. But he was faced with a still louder
uproar. They refused to let him enter a private house, and
shouted to him to return to the palace. They blocked every
other way and only left open the road leading into the Sacred
Way.* Not knowing what else to do, Vitellius returned to the
palace.
69 A rumour of his abdication had preceded him, and Flavius
Sabinus had sent written instructions to the officers of the
cohorts to keep the men under control. Thus the whole
empire seemed to have fallen into Vespasian’s lap. The chief
senators, the majority of the knights, and the whole of the
City Garrison and the Watch came flocking to the house of
Flavius Sabinus.* There they heard the news of the popular
enthusiasm for Vitellius and the threatening attitude of the
German Guards. But Sabinus had gone too far to draw back,
and when he showed hesitation, they all began to urge him to
fight, each being afraid for his own safety if the Vitellians were
to fall on them when they were disunited and consequently
weaker. However, as so often happens on these occasions,
everyone offered advice but few exposed themselves to
danger.
While Sabinus’ armed escort were marching down by the
Fundane Pool they were attacked by the most determined
Vitellians. The trouble was unforeseen, but the Vitellians got
the best of an unimportant skirmish. In the panic Sabinus
chose what was at the moment the safest course, and occupied
the summit of the Capitol,* where his mixture of troops were
joined by a few senators and knights. It is not easy to record
their names, since after Vespasian’s victory crowds of people
claimed credit for this service to the party. There were even
some women who endured the siege, the most famous being
Verulana Gratilla,* who was drawn there neither by children
nor relatives, but by the war itself.
[3, 70] book three 159
The Vitellians blockading them kept a half-hearted watch,
and Sabinus was thus enabled to send for his own children
and his nephew Domitian at dead of night, and to dispatch a
courier by an unguarded route to tell the Flavian generals that
he and his men were under siege, and would be in great straits
unless they were rescued. All night, indeed, he was quite
unmolested, and could have escaped with perfect safety. The
Vitellian troops could face danger with spirit, but were much
too careless in the task of keeping guard; besides which a
sudden storm of chilly rain interfered with their sight and
hearing.
At daybreak, before the two sides commenced hostilities, 70
Sabinus sent Cornelius Martialis, who had been a senior
centurion, to Vitellius with instructions to complain that the
conditions were being violated; that he had evidently made a
mere empty show of abdication, meant to deceive a number of
eminent gentlemen. Why else had he gone from the meeting to
his brother’s house, which caught the eye from a conspicuous
position overlooking the Forum, and not rather to his wife’s
home on the Aventine?* That was the proper course for a
private citizen, anxious to avoid all pretension to supreme
authority. But no, Vitellius had returned to the palace, the
very stronghold of imperial majesty. From there he had
launched a column of armed men, who had strewn with
innocent dead the most crowded quarter of Rome, and even
laid violent hands upon the Capitol. As for Sabinus himself, he
was only a civilian, a mere member of the Senate. While the
issue was being decided between Vespasian and Vitellius
by the engagement of legions, the capture of towns, the ca-
pitulation of cohorts, even when the provinces of Spain, of
Germany, of Britain, had risen in revolt, he, though
Vespasian’s brother, had still remained faithful to his alle-
giance, until Vitellius, unasked, invited him to a conference.
Peace and union serve the interest of the losers, but only the
reputation of the winners. If Vitellius regretted their compact,
he ought not to take arms against Sabinus, whom he had
treacherously deceived, or against Vespasian’s son, who was
all but a boy. What was the good of killing one youth and one
old man? He ought rather to march out against the legions
160 the histories [3, 71]
and fight for the empire one the field. The result of the battle
would decide all other questions.
Greatly alarmed, Vitellius replied with a few words in
which he tried to excuse himself and throw the blame on his
soldiers. ‘I am too unassuming’, he said, ‘to cope with their
overpowering impatience.’ He then warned Martialis to make
his way out of the building by a secret passage, for fear that
the soldiers should kill him as an ambassador of the peace to
which they were so hostile. Vitellius himself was not in a
position to issue orders or prohibitions; no longer an emperor,
merely an excuse for war.*
71 Martialis had hardly returned to the Capitol when the
furious soldiery arrived. They had no general to lead them:
each was a law to himself. Their column marched at full speed
through the Forum and past the temples overlooking it. Then
they advanced up the hill in front of them, until they reached
the lowest gates of the fortress on the Capitol. In those days
there was a series of colonnades at the side of this slope, on the
right as you go up. Emerging onto the roof of these, the
besieged overwhelmed the Vitellians with showers of stones
and tiles. The attacking party carried nothing but swords, and
it seemed a long business to send for siege-engines and mis-
siles. So they flung torches into a projecting colonnade and,
following in the wake of the flames, would have burst through
the burnt gates of the Capitol, if Sabinus had not torn down
all the available statues—the monuments of our ancestors’
glory—and built a sort of barricade on the very threshold.
They then attacked the Capitol by two opposite approaches,
one near the ‘Grove of Refuge’* and the other by the 100 steps
which lead up to the Tarpeian Rock.* This double assault
came as a surprise; but that by the Refuge was the closer and
more vigorous. Nothing could stop the Vitellians, who
climbed up by some adjoining buildings, which in the days of
prolonged peace had been raised to such a height that their
roofs were level with the floor of the Capitol. It is uncertain
whether the houses at this point were fired by the assailants
or—the most common account*—by the besieged in trying to
dislodge their enemies who had struggled up so far. The fire
spread to the colonnades adjoining the temple;* and then the
gables supporting the roof, which were made of very old
[3, 73] book three 161
wood, caught the flames and fed them. And so the Capitol,
with its doors fast shut, undefended and unplundered, was
burnt to the ground.
Since the foundation of the city no such deplorable and 72
horrible disaster had ever befallen the people of Rome. It was
no case of foreign invasion. Had our own wickedness allowed,
the country might have been enjoying the blessings of a benign
Providence; and yet here was the seat of Jupiter Optimus
Maximus—the temple solemnly founded by our ancestors as
the guarantee of their imperial greatness, which not even
Porsenna, when Rome surrendered, nor the Gauls, when they
took it, could have defiled*—being brought utterly to ruin by
the mad folly of rival emperors! The Capitol had been burnt
before in civil war,* but that was the crime of private persons.
Now it had been openly besieged and openly burnt. And
what was the military justification? What recompense for such
disaster?
While we fought for our country, the temple stood firm.
King Tarquinius Priscus had vowed to build it in the Sabine
war, and had laid the foundations on a scale that suited rather
his hope of the city’s future greatness than the still moderate
fortunes of the Roman people. Later Servius Tullius, with the
support of Rome’s allies, and Tarquinius Superbus,* with the
spoils of the Volscians after the capture of Suessa Pometia,*
continued the building. But the glory of completing it was
reserved for the days of freedom. After the expulsion of the
kings, Horatius Pulvillus in his second consulship* dedicated
this monument on such a magnificent scale that in later days,
with all her boundless wealth, Rome was able to embellish
but never to enlarge it. After an interval of 415 years, in
the consulship of Lucius Scipio and Gaius Norbanus,* it was
burnt and rebuilt on the same foundations. Sulla after his
victory undertook the task of restoring it, but did not dedicate
it: this one thing his famous ‘Fortune’* denied him. Much as
the emperors did to it, the name of Lutatius Catulus* still
remained upon it up to the time of Vitellius. This was the
temple that was now ablaze.
The besieged suffered more panic than their assailants. The 73
Vitellian soldiers lacked neither cunning nor steadiness in
moments of crisis. But on the other side the troops were
162 the histories [3, 74]
terrified, the general inert and apparently so paralysed that he
was deaf and dumb. He neither adopted others’ plans nor
formed any of his own, but only drifted about from place to
place, attracted by the shouts of the enemy, banning what
he had commanded and commanding what he had banned.*
The result was what always happens in a hopeless disaster:
everybody gave orders and nobody obeyed them. At last
they threw away their weapons and began to look round for
a way of escape or some means of hiding. Then the Vitellians
came bursting in, and with blood, fire, and sword made
havoc. A few good soldiers dared to show fight and were cut
to pieces: of these the most notable were Cornelius Martialis,
Aemilius Pacensis, Casperius Niger, and Didius Scaeva.
Flavius Sabinus, who stood unarmed and made no attempt to
escape, was surrounded together with the consul Quintius
Atticus, who was a marked man thanks to his empty title, as
well as his fatuous vanity, which had led him to distribute
manifestos full of encomia of Vespasian and insults against
Vitellius. The rest escaped by various means. Some disguised
themselves as slaves: some were sheltered by faithful clients
and hid among the baggage. Others, again, overheard the
password by which the Vitellians recognized each other,
and actually went about demanding it and giving it when
challenged, thus escaping under a cloak of effrontery.
74 When the enemy first broke in, Domitian had taken refuge
with the sacristan, and was enabled by the ingenuity of a
freedman to escape among a crowd of worshippers disguised
in a linen mantle,* and took refuge near the Velabrum with
Cornelius Primus, one of his father’s clients. When his father
came to the throne, Domitian pulled down the sacristan’s
lodging and built a little chapel to Jupiter the Saviour with an
altar, on which his adventures were depicted in marble relief.
Later, when he became emperor, he dedicated a huge temple
to Jupiter the Guardian with a statue of himself in the lap of
the god.
Sabinus and Atticus were loaded with chains and taken to
Vitellius, who received them without any hostility in language
or looks, despite the protests of those who wanted to see them
punished with death and themselves rewarded for their suc-
[3, 76] book three 163
cessful labours. When those who stood nearest started an
outcry, the dregs of the populace soon began to demand
Sabinus’ execution with mingled threats and flatteries.
Vitellius came out onto the steps of the palace prepared to
plead for him: but they forced him to desist. Sabinus was
stabbed and mutilated: his head was cut off and the trunk
dragged away to the Gemonian Steps.*
Such was the end of a man who certainly merits no con- 75
tempt. He had served his country for thirty-five years, and
won credit both as civilian and soldier. His integrity and
fairness were beyond criticism. He talked too much, but this is
the one charge which rumour could hint against him in the
seven years when he was governor of Moesia, and the twelve
years during which he was Prefect of the City. At the end of
his life some thought he showed a lack of enterprise, but many
believed him a moderate man, who was anxious to save his
fellow-citizens from bloodshed.* In this, at any rate, all would
agree, that before Vespasian became emperor the reputation
of his house rested on Sabinus. It is said that Mucianus was
delighted to hear of his murder, and many people maintained
that it actually served the interests of peace by putting an end
to the jealousy of two rivals, one of whom counted on the fact
that he was the Emperor’s brother, the other that he was his
partner in the empire.
When the people demanded the execution of the consul,
Vitellius withstood them. He had forgiven Atticus, and felt
that he owed him a favour. For Atticus, when asked who had
set fire to the Capitol, had taken the blame on himself, and by
this avowal—or well-timed falsehood—he had apparently
fixed all the guilt and odium on himself and exonerated the
Vitellian party.
About this same time Lucius Vitellius, who had pitched his 76
camp at the Temple of Feronia,* made every effort to destroy
Tarracina, where he had shut in the gladiators and sailors,
who did not venture to leave the shelter of the walls or to face
death in the open. The gladiators were commanded, as I have
already said, by Julianus, and the sailors by Apollinaris, men
whose dissolute inefficiency better suited gladiators than gen-
erals. They set no watch, and made no attempt to repair the
164 the histories [3, 77]
weak places in the walls. Day and night they idled loosely; the
soldiers were dispatched in all directions to find them luxuries;
that beautiful coast rang with their revelry; and they spoke
of war only in their cups. A few days earlier, Apinius Tiro
had started on his mission, and, by cruelly requisitioning
gifts of money in all the country towns, was winning more
unpopularity than assistance for the cause.
77 In the mean time, one of Vergilius Capito’s* slaves deserted
to Lucius Vitellius, and promised that, if he were provided
with men, he would put the abandoned citadel into their
hands. Accordingly, at dead of night he established a few
lightly armed cohorts on the top of the hills which overlooked
the enemy. Thence the soldiers came charging down more to
butchery than battle. They cut down their victims standing
helpless and unarmed or groping for their weapons, or newly
startled from their sleep—all in a bewildering confusion of
darkness, panic, bugle-calls, and savage cries. A few of the
gladiators resisted and sold their lives dearly. The rest rushed
to the ships; and there the same panic and confusion reigned,
for the villagers were all mixed up with the troops, and the
Vitellians slaughtered them without distinction. Just as the
first uproar began, six Liburnian cruisers slipped away with
the commander Apollinaris on board. The rest were either
captured on the beach or overweighted and sunk by the
crowds that clambered over them. Julianus was taken to
Lucius Vitellius, who had him humiliatingly flogged and then
slaughtered before his eyes. Some upbraided Lucius Vitellius’
wife Triaria for putting on a soldier’s sword and behaving
with insolent cruelty among the misery and horrors of
captured Tarracina.
Lucius himself sent a laurel wreath to his brother in token
of his success, and inquired whether he wished him to return
at once or to continue subjugating Campania. This delay
saved not only Vespasian’s party but the state as well. Had
he marched on Rome while his men were fresh from their
victory, with the flush of success added to their natural stead-
fastness, there would have been a tremendous struggle, which
must have involved the city’s destruction. For Lucius Vitellius,
for all his evil repute, was a man of action. Good men owe
[3, 79] book three 165
their power to their virtues; he was one of that worst sort who
derive it from their vices.
While this was happening on Vitellius’ side, the Flavian 78
army after leaving Narnia spent the days of the Saturnalian
holiday* quietly at Ocriculum.* The object of this misguided
delay was to wait for Mucianus. Antonius has been suspected
of delaying treacherously after receiving a secret communica-
tion from Vitellius; he was in fact offered as the price of
treason the consulship, Vitellius’ young daughter’s hand, and
a rich dowry. Others hold that this story was invented to
gratify Mucianus. Some people consider that the policy of all
the Flavian generals was rather to threaten the city than to
attack it. They realized that Vitellius had lost his strongest
cohorts, and now that all his forces were cut off they expected
he would abdicate. But this prospect was spoilt first by
Sabinus’ precipitation and then by his cowardice, for, after
rashly taking arms, he failed to defend against three cohorts
the powerful fortress of the Capitol, which ought to have been
impregnable even to a large army.
However, it is not easy to assign to any one man the blame
which they all share. Mucianus helped to delay the victors’
advance by the ambiguity of his dispatches, while Antonius
was also to blame for his compliance, which was wrong-
headed—or aimed at deflecting popular resentment.* The
other generals thought the war was over, and thus gave its
final scene all the more notoriety. Petillius Cerialis was sent
forward with 1,000 cavalry to make his way across country
through Sabine territory, and enter the city by the Salarian
Way.* But even he failed to make sufficient haste, and at last
the news of the siege of the Capitol brought them all at once
to their senses.
Marching up the Flaminian Way, it was already deep night 79
when Antonius reached ‘The Red Rocks’.* His help had come
too late. There he heard that Sabinus had been killed, and the
Capitol burnt; the city was in panic; everything looked black;
even the populace and the slaves were arming for Vitellius.
Petillius Cerialis, too, had been defeated in a cavalry engage-
ment: he had pushed on without caution, thinking the enemy
already beaten, and the Vitellians with a mixed force of horse
166 the histories [3, 80]
and foot had caught him unawares. The engagement had
taken place near the city among buildings, gardens, and wind-
ing lanes, with which the Vitellians were familiar, while the
Flavians were terrified by their ignorance. Besides, the troop-
ers were not all of one mind; some of them belonged to the
force which had recently surrendered at Narnia, and were
waiting to see which side won. Julius Flavianus, who com-
manded a regiment of cavalry, was taken prisoner. The rest
fell into a disgraceful panic and fled, but the pursuit was not
continued beyond Fidenae.*
80 This success served to increase the popular excitement. The
city rabble now took arms. A few had service shields: most of
them snatched up any weapons they could find and clamoured
to be given the sign for battle. Vitellius expressed his gratitude
to them and bade them sally forth to protect the city. He then
summoned a meeting of the Senate, at which envoys were
appointed to go to the two armies and, supposedly for the
sake of the country, urge them to accept peace.
The fortunes of the envoys varied. Those who approached
Petillius Cerialis found themselves in dire danger, for the
soldiers indignantly refused their terms. The praetor, Arulenus
Rusticus,* was wounded. Apart from the wrong done to a
praetor and an envoy, the man’s own acknowledged worth
made this all the more scandalous. His companions were
beaten up, and the lictor nearest to him was killed for ventur-
ing to make a way through the crowd. Indeed, if the guard
provided by the general had not intervened, the sanctity of
ambassadors, which even foreign nations respect, in the mad
rage of civil strife would have been violated by murder under
the very walls of Rome.
Those who went to Antonius met with a more reasonable
reception; not that the soldiers were less violent, but the
81 general had more authority. A knight named Musonius
Rufus* had attached himself to the envoys. He was a student
of philosophy and an enthusiastic advocate of Stoicism. He
mingled with the companies, offering the armed soldiers ad-
vice and discoursing on the advantages of peace and the perils
of war. This amused many of them and bored still more.
Some, indeed, wanted to knock and trample him down, but
[3, 82] book three 167
the advice of the more sober spirits and the threats of others
persuaded him to cut short his ill-timed lecture. The Vestal
Virgins,* too, came in procession to bring Antonius a letter
from Vitellius, in which he demanded one day’s postponement
of the final crisis, saying that everything could easily be settled
if only they would grant this respite.
Antonius sent the Virgins away with all respect, and wrote
in answer to Vitellius that with the murder of Sabinus and the
burning of the Capitol all negotiations were terminated. How- 82
ever, he summoned the legions to a meeting and endeavoured
to mollify them, proposing that they should pitch their camp
near the Mulvian Bridge and enter the city on the following
day. His motive for delay was a fear that the troops, when
once their blood was up after a skirmish, would have no
respect for civilians or senators, or even for the temples and
shrines of the gods. But they suspected every postponement as
a hindrance to their victory. Moreover, some colours which
were seen glittering along the hills gave the impression of
a hostile force, although none but inexperienced civilians
accompanied them.
The Flavian attack was made in three columns. One ad-
vanced from its original position on the Flaminian Way, one
kept near the bank of the Tiber, and the third approached the
Colline Gate* along the Salarian Way. The cavalry rode into
the mob and scattered them. But the Vitellian troops faced the
enemy, themselves, too, in three separate divisions. Again and
again they clashed before the walls with varying success. But
the Flavians had the advantage of being well led and thus
more often won success. Only one of the attacking parties
suffered at all severely, that which had made its way along
narrow, greasy lanes to Sallust’s Gardens* on the left side of
the city. Standing on the garden walls, the Vitellians hurled
stones and javelins down upon them and held them back until
late in the day. But at last the cavalry forced an entrance by
the Colline Gate and encircled the defenders. Then the oppos-
ing forces met on the Campus Martius itself. Fortune and the
awareness of their many victories favoured the Flavians. The
Vitellians charged simply through despair, but, though driven
back, they gathered again in the city.
168 the histories [3, 83]
83 The people came and watched the fighting, cheering and
applauding now one side, now the other, like spectators at a
gladiatorial contest. Whenever one side gave ground, and the
soldiers hid in shops or sought refuge in some private house,
they clamoured for them to be dragged out and slaughtered.
In this way they got the greater part of the plunder for them-
selves: for while the soldiers were busy with the bloody work
of massacre, the spoil fell to the crowd.
The scene throughout the city was cruel and distorted: on
the one side fighting and wounded men, on the other baths
and restaurants: here lay heaps of bleeding dead, and close at
hand were harlots and their ilk. All the vice and licence of
luxurious peace, and all the crime and horror of a captured
town. You would have thought the city mad with fury and
riotous with pleasure at the same time. Armies had fought in
the city before this, twice when Sulla mastered Rome, once
under Cinna;* nor were there less horrors then. What was
now so inhuman was the people’s indifference. Not for one
minute did they interrupt their life of pleasure. The fighting
was a new amusement for their holiday.* Caring nothing for
either party, they enjoyed themselves in riotous dissipation
and took pleasure in their country’s disaster.
84 The storming of the Guards’ camp* was the most trouble-
some task. It was still held by the bravest Vitellians, who saw
in it their final hope; this made the victors all the more eager
to take it, especially those who had previously served in the
Guards. They employed against it every means ever devised
for the storming of the most strongly fortified towns, a ‘tor-
toise’, artillery, earthworks, firebrands. This, they cried, was
the crown of all the toil and danger they had undergone in all
their battles. They had restored the city to the Senate and
People of Rome, and the temples to the gods. But the soldier’s
pride is his camp, it is his country and his home. If they could
not regain it at once, they must spend the night in fighting.
The Vitellians, for their part, had numbers and fortune against
them, but by marring their enemy’s victory, by postponing
peace, by fouling houses and altars with their blood, they
embraced the last consolations that the conquered can enjoy.
Many lay half-conscious on the towers and ramparts of the
[3, 86] book three 169
walls and there expired. When the gates were torn down, the
remainder faced the conquerors in a body. And there they fell,
every man of them facing the enemy with all his wounds in
front: even as they died they took care to make an honourable
end.
When the city was taken, Vitellius left the palace by a back
way and was carried in a litter to his wife’s house on the
Aventine. If he could lie hidden during the day, he hoped to
make his escape to the cohorts with his brother at Tarracina.
But it is in the very nature of terror that, while any course
looks dreadful, one’s current situation seems worst of all. In
his endemic restlessness he returned to the vast, deserted pal-
ace. Even the lowest of his menials had slipped away, or at
least avoided meeting him. The solitude and hushed silence of
the place terrified him; he tried locked doors, he shuddered at
the emptiness. At last, wearied with his miserable search, he
crept into some shameful hiding-place.* There Julius Placidus,
a tribune of the Guards, found him and dragged him out. His
hands were tied behind his back, his clothes were torn, and he
was led forth—a disgraceful spectacle at which many hurled
insults, no one shed a single tear of pity. The ignominy of
his end had wiped out all compassion. On the way a soldier of
the German army* either aimed an angry blow at him, or tried
to put him out of his shame, or meant, perhaps, to strike
the tribune—it is unclear which. At any rate, he cut off the
tribune’s ear and was immediately stabbed to death.
With the points of their swords they forced Vitellius to hold 85
up his head and face their insults, then to watch his own
statues hurtling down, but above all to look at the Rostra and
the site of Galba’s murder.* At last he was thrust along to the
Gemonian Steps, where the body of Flavius Sabinus had lain.
Just one thing that he was heard to say had a ring of true
nobility. When some tribune jeered at him, he answered, ‘And
yet I was once your Emperor.’ After that he fell under a
shower of wounds; and the mob in their perversity abused him
in his death, just as they had flattered him in his lifetime.
Vitellius’ father* . . . Vitellius’ home was at Luceria.* He 86
was 57 years old, and had won the consulship, priesthoods,
and a name and position among Rome’s greatest men, all of
170 the histories [3, 86]
which he owed to no efforts of his own, but solely to his
father’s eminence. Those who offered him the throne did not
know him; and yet his slothful cowardice won from his sol-
diers an enthusiasm which the best of generals have rarely
evoked. Nevertheless, he was candid and generous, although
these qualities in excess will prove disastrous. He believed that
friendship is maintained not by moral stamina, but by ex-
travagant presents; thus though he deserved friends, he had
few. It was indubitably good for the country that Vitellius
should be beaten. But those who betrayed him to Vespasian
can hardly make a merit of their perfidy, for they were the
very men who had deserted Galba for Vitellius.*
The day was already sinking into evening. The magistrates
and senators in terror had slipped out of the city, or were still
in hiding at clients’ houses: it was therefore impossible to call
a meeting of the Senate. When all fear of violence was at an
end,* Domitian emerged and presented himself to the generals
of his party. The crowds of soldiers hailed him as Caesar, and,
still in full armour, escorted him to his father’s house.
book four 171
BOOK FOUR
The death of Vitellius had ended the war without inaugurat- 1
ing peace. The victors remained under arms, and the defeated
Vitellians were hunted through the city with implacable
hatred, and butchered indiscriminately wherever they were
found. The streets were choked with corpses; squares and
temples ran with blood. Soon the riot knew no restraint; they
began to hunt for those who were in hiding and to drag them
out. All who were tall and of youthful appearance were cut
down, without distinction between soldiers and civilians.
While their rage was fresh they sated their savage cravings
with blood; but now the instinct of greed had prevailed. On
the pretext of hunting for hidden enemies, they would leave
no door unopened and respect no privacy. Thus they began to
burst into private houses or else made resistance an excuse for
murder. There were plenty of needy citizens, too, and villain-
ous slaves, who without prompting betrayed their wealthy
masters. Others were denounced by their friends. From all
sides came cries of mourning and misery. Rome was like a
captured city. People even longed to have the insolent soldiers
of Otho and Vitellius back again, much as they had been
hated. The Flavian generals, who had fanned the flame of civil
war with such energy, were incapable of acting temperately in
victory. In riot and disorder the worst characters take the lead;
peace and quiet call for the highest qualities.
Domitian had secured the title and the official residence of 2
a Caesar, but did not as yet busy himself with serious matters.
Instead, he played the role of emperor’s son by devoting
himself to rape and adultery. Arrius Varus took command of
the Guards, but the supreme authority rested with Antonius
Primus. He removed money and slaves from the Emperor’s
house as though he were plundering Cremona.* The other
generals, through their excess of modesty or humble origins,
shared neither the distinctions of the war nor its profits.
People in Rome were now so nervous and so resigned to
despotism that they demanded that Lucius Vitellius and his
172 the histories [4, 3]
force of Guards should be surprised on their way back from
Tarracina, and the last sparks of the war stamped out. Some
cavalry were sent forward to Aricia, while the column of the
legions halted short of Bovillae. Vitellius, however, lost no
time in surrendering himself and his Guards to the conquer-
or’s discretion, and the men flung away their unlucky swords
more in anger than in fear. The long line of prisoners filed
through the city between ranks of armed guards. None looked
like begging for mercy. With sad, set faces they remained
sternly indifferent to the applause or the mockery of the ribald
crowd. A few tried to break away, but were surrounded and
overpowered. The rest were put in prison. Not one of them
uttered an unseemly word. Through all their misfortunes they
preserved their reputation for courage. Lucius Vitellius was
then executed. He was as flawed as his brother, though during
his principate he showed himself more alert. Without sharing
his brother’s success, he was carried away on the flood of his
disaster.
3 At this time Lucilius Bassus was sent off with a force of light
horse to quell the disquiet in Campania, which was caused
more by the mutual jealousy of the townships than by any
arrogant opposition to the Emperor. The sight of the soldiers
restored order. The smaller colonies were pardoned, but at
Capua the Third Legion was left in winter quarters and some
leading families suffered severely. Tarracina, on the other
hand, received no relief. It is always easier to requite an injury
than a service: gratitude is a burden, but revenge is found to
pay. Their only consolation was that one of Vergilius Capito’s
slaves, who had, as we have seen, betrayed the town, was
hanged on the gallows with the very rings on his fingers which
Vitellius had given him to wear.
At Rome the Senate decreed to Vespasian all the usual
powers of the principate. They were now happy and confi-
dent. Seeing that the civil war had broken out in the provinces
of Gaul and Spain, and, after causing a rebellion first in
Germany and then in Illyricum, had spread to Egypt, Judaea,
Syria, and in fact to all the provinces and armies of the empire,
they felt as if the world had been purged of guilt and that all
was now over. Their satisfaction was still further enhanced by
[4, 5] book four 173
a letter from Vespasian, which at first sight seemed to be
phrased as if the war was still going on. Still his tone was that
of an emperor: he portrayed himself as a simple citizen, and
spoke with high esteem for the state. The Senate for its part
showed no lack of deference. They decreed that Vespasian
himself should be consul with his son Titus for his colleague,
and on Domitian they conferred the praetorship with the
powers of a consul.*
Mucianus had also addressed a letter to the Senate which 4
gave rise to a good deal of talk. If he were a private citizen,
why adopt the official tone? He could have expressed the same
opinions a few days later from his place in the House. Besides,
his attack on Vitellius came too late to prove his independ-
ence, and what seemed particularly humiliating for the coun-
try and insulting to the Emperor was his boast that he had
held the empire in the palm of his hand, and had given it to
Vespasian. However, they concealed their ill-will and made a
great show of flattery, decreeing to Mucianus in the most
complimentary terms full triumphal honours, which were
really given to him for his success against his fellow-country-
men, though they trumped up an expedition to Sarmatia as a
pretext.* On Antonius Primus they conferred the insignia of
the consulship; and those of the praetorship on Cornelius
Fuscus and Arrius Varus. Then came the turn of the gods: it
was decided to restore the Capitol.*
These proposals were all moved by the consul-elect,
Valerius Asiaticus.* The others signified assent by their ex-
pressions and gestures, though a few, who were particularly
distinguished, or especially practised in the art of flattery,
delivered set speeches. When it came to the turn of Helvidius
Priscus, the praetor-elect, he expressed himself in terms which,
while doing honour to a new emperor,* were frank and hon-
est. The Senate showed their keen approval, and it was this
day above all that was the start of his great disfavour and
great distinction.
Since I have had occasion to make a second allusion to a 5
man whom I shall often have to mention again, it may be well
to give here a brief account of his character and ideals, and of
his fortune in life.* Helvidius Priscus came from the country
174 the histories [4, 6]
town of Cluviae. His father had been a senior centurion in the
army. From his early youth Helvidius devoted his great mental
powers to intellectual studies, not as many people do, with the
idea of using a philosopher’s reputation as a cloak for indo-
lence, but rather to fortify himself against the caprice of
fortune when he entered public life. He became a follower of
that school of philosophy* which holds that morality is the
one good thing in life and vice the only evil, while power and
rank and other things that are not qualities of character are
neither good nor bad. He had risen no higher than the rank
of quaestor when Thrasea Paetus chose him for his son-in-
law, and of Thrasea’s virtues he absorbed none so much as
his independence. As citizen, senator, husband, son-in-law,
friend, in every sphere of life he was thoroughly consistent,
always showing contempt for money, stubborn persistence in
6 the right, and courage in the face of danger. But some people
thought him too ambitious, for even with philosophers the
passion for fame is the last weakness to be discarded.
After Thrasea’s fall Helvidius was banished, but he returned
to Rome under Galba and proceeded to prosecute Eprius
Marcellus,* who had informed against his father-in-law. This
attempt to secure a revenge, perhaps no less pointless than
justified, divided the Senate into two parties, for the fall of
Marcellus would involve the ruin of a whole army of similar
offenders. At first the struggle was full of recrimination, as the
outstanding speeches on either side testify; but after a while,
finding that Galba’s attitude was doubtful and that many of
the senators begged him to desist, Helvidius dropped the
prosecution. On his action in this matter men’s comments
varied with their character, some praising his moderation,
others asking what had become of his tenacity.
To return to the Senate: at the same meeting at which they
voted powers to Vespasian they had also decided to send a
deputation to address him. This gave rise to a sharp alterca-
tion between Helvidius Priscus and Eprius Marcellus. The
former thought that the members of the delegation ought to
be nominated by magistrates acting under oath; Marcellus
demanded their selection by lot. The consul-elect had already
7 spoken in favour of the latter method, but Marcellus’ motive
[4, 8] book four 175
was fear of personal disgrace, for he was afraid that if others
were chosen he would seem slighted.
Their exchange of views gradually grew into a formal and
acrimonious debate. Helvidius inquired why it was that
Marcellus was so afraid of the magistrates’ judgement, seeing
that he himself had great advantages of wealth and of elo-
quence over many others. Could it be the memory of his
misdeeds that so oppressed him? The fall of the lot could not
discern character; but the whole point of submitting people to
the vote and to scrutiny by the Senate was to get at the truth
about each man’s life and reputation. In the interest of the
country, and out of respect to Vespasian, it was important
that he should be met by men whom the Senate considered
beyond reproach, men who would give the Emperor a taste
for the language of integrity. Vespasian, Helvidius pointed
out, had been a friend of Thrasea, Soranus, and Sentius,* and
even though there might be no need to punish their prosecu-
tors, still it would be wrong to put them forward. Moreover,
the Senate’s selection would be a sort of hint to the Emperor
whom to approve and whom to avoid. ‘Good friends’, he
concluded, ‘are the most effective instruments of good govern-
ment. Marcellus ought to be content with having driven Nero
to destroy so many innocent people. Let him enjoy the impu-
nity and the profit he has won from that, and leave Vespasian
to more honest advisers.’
Marcellus replied that the opinion which was being im- 8
pugned was not his own. The consul-elect, he said, had al-
ready advised them to follow the established precedent, which
was that deputations should be chosen by lot, so that there
should be no room for intrigue or personal animosity. Noth-
ing had happened to justify them in setting aside such an
ancient system. Why turn a compliment to the Emperor into a
slight upon someone else? Anybody could do homage. What
they had to avoid was the possibility that some people’s
obstinacy might irritate the Emperor at the outset of his reign,
while he was hesitating and still busy watching everybody’s
face and listening to what was said.
‘I have not forgotten’, he went on, ‘the days of my youth
or the constitution which our fathers and grandfathers
176 the histories [4, 9]
established. But while admiring a distant past, I support the
existing state of things. I pray for good emperors, but I take
them as they come. As for Thrasea, it was not my speech
but the Senate’s verdict which ruined him. Nero took a
savage delight in farces like that trial, and the friendship of
such an emperor cost me as much anxiety as banishment did
to others.
‘To conclude, Helvidius may be as brave and as firm as any
Brutus or Cato;* I am but a senator, and we have all been
slaves together. Besides, I advise him not to try and get an
upper hand with our Emperor or to force his tuition on a man
of Vespasian’s age,* who wears the insignia of a triumph and
is the father of grown sons. Bad rulers like absolute sover-
eignty, and even the best of them must set some limit to their
subjects’ independence.’
This heated interchange of arguments found supporters for
both views. The party which wanted the deputies chosen by
lot eventually prevailed, since even the moderates were anx-
ious to observe the precedent, and all the most prominent
members tended to vote with them, for fear of encountering
ill-feeling if they themselves were selected.
9 This dispute was followed by another. The Praetors, who in
those days administered the Treasury,* had complained that
the exchequer was impoverished, and demanded some restric-
tion on expenditure. The consul-elect said that, as the respon-
sibility was so vast and the remedy so difficult, he was in
favour of leaving it for the Emperor. Helvidius maintained
that it ought to be settled by the Senate’s decision. When the
consuls began to take each senator’s opinion, Vulcacius
Tertullinus, one of the tribunes, interposed his veto,* on the
ground that they could not decide such an important question
in the Emperor’s absence. Helvidius had previously moved
that the Capitol should be restored at the public cost, and with
the assistance of Vespasian. The moderates all passed over this
suggestion in silence and soon forgot it, but there were others
who took care to remember it.*
10 Then Musonius Rufus attacked Publius Celer* on the
ground that it was only by perjury that he had secured the
conviction of Barea Soranus. It was felt that an inquiry would
[4, 11] book four 177
rekindle the loathing felt for professional accusers. But the
defendant was worthless and guilty, and could not be shel-
tered, and, moreover, Barea’s memory was sacred. Celer had
set up as a teacher of philosophy and then committed perjury
against Barea, thus treacherously violating the very principles
of friendship which he professed to teach. The case was put
down for the next meeting. But now that a taste for revenge
was aroused, people were waiting not so much for Musonius
and Publius as for Priscus and Marcellus and the rest.
Thus the Senate quarrelled; the defeated party nursed their 11
grievances; the winners had no power to enforce their will;
law was in abeyance and the Emperor absent. This state of
things continued until Mucianus arrived in Rome and took
everything into his own hands. This shattered the supremacy
of Antonius Primus and Arrius Varus, for, though Mucianus
tried to show a friendly face towards them, he was not very
successful in concealing his dislike. But the people of Rome
were skilful in detecting signs of displeasure, and had already
transferred their allegiance. Mucianus was now the sole object
of their flattering attentions, and he lived up to them. He
surrounded himself with an armed escort, and kept changing
his house and gardens. His display, his parades, his body-
guard, all showed that he had adopted the power of an
emperor* while forgoing the title.
The greatest alarm was aroused by his execution of
Calpurnius Galerianus, son of Gaius Piso.* He had attempted
no treachery, but his distinguished name and handsome pres-
ence made the youth a subject of common talk, and the
country was full of turbulent spirits who delighted in revolu-
tionary rumours and idly talked of his coming to the throne.
Mucianus gave orders that he should be arrested by the sol-
diers, and to avoid a conspicuous execution in the heart of the
city, they marched him forty miles along the Appian Way,
where they severed his veins and let him bleed to death. Julius
Priscus, who had commanded the Guards under Vitellius,
committed suicide, more from shame than of necessity.
Alfenus Varus survived the disgrace of his cowardice.
Asiaticus, who was a freedman, paid for his malign influence
by dying the death of a slave.
178 the histories [4, 12]
12 The growing rumour of a reverse in Germany had not as yet
caused any alarm in Rome. People alluded to the loss of
armies, the capture of the legions’ winter quarters, the defec-
tion of the Gallic provinces as matters of indifference. I must
now go back and explain the origin of this war, and of the
widespread rebellion of foreign and allied tribes which now
broke into flame.
The Batavi were once a tribe of the Chatti,* living beyond
the Rhine. But an outbreak of civil war had driven them out,
and they settled in a still unoccupied district on the frontier of
Gaul and also in the neighbouring island,* enclosed on one
side by the ocean and on the other three sides by the Rhine.
There they fared better than most tribes who ally themselves
to a stronger power. Their resources remained intact, and they
had only to contribute men and arms for the imperial army.
After a long training in the German wars, they increased their
reputation still further in Britain, where their troops had been
sent, commanded according to an ancient custom by some of
the noblest chiefs. There still remained behind in their own
country a picked troop of horsemen with a peculiar knack of
swimming, which enabled them to cross the Rhine in unbro-
ken ranks without losing control of their horses or their
weapons.
13 Of their chieftains two far outshone the rest. These were
Julius Paulus* and Julius Civilis, both of royal stock. Paulus
had been executed by Fonteius Capito on a false charge of
rebellion; Civilis was sent in chains to Nero. Galba, however,
set him free, and under Vitellius he again ran great risk of his
life, when the army clamoured for his execution. This gave
him a motive for hating Rome, and our misfortunes fed his
hopes. He was, indeed, far cleverer than most barbarians, and
professed to be a second Sertorius* or Hannibal—all three
had the same physical defect. He was afraid that if he openly
rebelled against the Roman people they would treat him as an
enemy, and march on him at once, so he pretended to be a
friend of Vespasian and keen supporter of his party. This
much was true, that Antonius Primus had written instructing
him to divert the auxiliaries whom Vitellius had summoned,
and to delay the legions on the pretence of a rising in
[4, 14] book four 179
Germany. Moreover, Hordeonius Flaccus had given him the
same advice in person, for Flaccus was inclined to support
Vespasian and was anxious for the safety of Rome, which was
threatened with utter disaster if the war were to break out
afresh and all these thousands of troops come pouring into
Italy.
Having thus made up his mind to rebel, Civilis concealed in 14
the mean time his ulterior design, intending to guide his ulti-
mate policy by future events, and proceeded to initiate the
rising as follows. The young Batavians were by Vitellius’
orders being pressed for service, and this burden was being
rendered even more irksome than it need have been by the
greed and depravity of the recruiting officers. They took to
enrolling elderly men and weaklings so as to get bribes for
excusing them: or, as most of the Batavian children are tall,
they would drag off and rape the handsomest boys. This
caused bitter feeling; an insurrection was organized, and the
Batavians were persuaded to refuse service.
On the pretext of giving a banquet, Civilis summoned the
chief nobles and the most determined of the commoners to a
sacred grove. Then, when he saw them excited by their night-
time revelry, he began to speak of the glorious past of the
Batavi, then enumerated the injustices, extortions, and all the
other evils of their servitude. ‘We are no longer treated’,
he said, ‘as we used to be, like allies, but like slaves. Why, we
are never even visited by a governor—irksome and arrogant
though his staff would be. We are given over to prefects* and
centurions; and when these subordinates have had their fill of
extortion and bloodshed replacements come seeking new
pockets to ransack and a new language of plunder.
‘Now conscription is upon us: children are to be torn from
parents, brother from brother, never, perhaps, to meet again.
And yet the Roman state has never been weaker. Their can-
tonments contain nothing but loot and old men. Lift up your
eyes and look at them: there is nothing to fear from legions
that exist in name alone. And we are strong. We have infantry
and cavalry: the Germans are our kinsmen: the Gallic prov-
inces share our ambition. Even the Romans will be grateful if
we go to war—if it ends in stalemate, we will acquire credit
180 the histories [4, 15]
with Vespasian: if we succeed, there will be no one to call us
to account.’
15 His speech was received with great approval, and he swore
them all to union, using barbarous ceremonies and traditional
imprecations. Envoys were then sent to the Canninefates to
make common cause with them. This tribe inhabits part of the
Island,* and though inferior in numbers to the Batavi, they are
of the same race and language and the same courageous spirit.
Civilis next sent secret messages to win over the Batavian
troops, which after serving as Roman auxiliaries in Britain
had been sent, as we have already seen, to Germany and were
now stationed at Mogontiacum.*
One of the Canninefates, Brinno by name, was a man of
distinguished family and foolhardy recklessness. His father
had often ventured acts of hostility, and had with complete
impunity shown his contempt for Gaius’ farcical expedi-
tions.* To belong to such a family of rebels was in itself a
recommendation. He was accordingly after the fashion of the
tribe placed on a shield, swung up on the shoulders of his
friends, and thus elected leader. Summoning to his aid the
Frisii*—a tribe from beyond the Rhine—he fell upon two
cohorts of auxiliaries whose camp lay close to the shore. The
attack was unexpected, and the troops, even if they had fore-
seen it, were not strong enough to offer resistance: so the
camp was taken and looted. They then fell on the Roman
camp-followers and traders, who had wandered off in all
directions as if peace were assured. Finding the forts now
threatened with destruction, the commanders of the Roman
cohorts set fire to them, as they had no means of defence. The
remaining troops with their standards and colours retired in a
body to the upper end of the Island, led by Aquilius, a senior
centurion. But they were an army in name only, not in
strength, for Vitellius had withdrawn all the efficient soldiers
and had replaced them by a useless mob drawn from the
neighbouring Nervian* and German villages and loaded up
with armour.
16 Civilis thought it best to proceed by guile, and pre-empted
the Romans by himself blaming their commanders for
abandoning the forts. He could, he told them, with the
[4, 17] book four 181
cohort under his command, suppress the outbreak of the
Canninefates without their assistance: they could all go back
to their winter quarters. However, it was plain that treachery
underlay his advice: it would be easier to crush the cohorts if
they were separated, and Civilis, not Brinno, was at the head
of this war. Evidence of this gradually leaked out, as the
Germans loved war too well to keep the secret for long.
Finding his artifice unsuccessful, Civilis tried force instead,
forming the Canninefates, Frisii, and Batavi into three sepa-
rate columns. The Roman line faced them, positioned near the
Rhine bank. They had brought their ships there after the
burning of the forts, and these were now turned with their
prows towards the enemy.
Soon after the engagement began a Tungrian cohort de-
serted to Civilis, and the Romans were so startled by this
unexpected treachery that they were cut to pieces by their
allies and their enemies combined. Similar treachery occurred
in the fleet. Some of the rowers were Batavians, and, feigning
clumsiness, tried to impede the sailors and marines in the
performance of their functions; then they openly resisted them
and steered the ships towards the enemy’s bank. Finally, they
killed the pilots and centurions who refused to join them, and
thus all the twenty-four ships of the flotilla either deserted to
the enemy or were captured by them.
This victory made Civilis immediately famous, and subse- 17
quently proved very useful. Having now got the ships and the
weapons which they needed, he and his followers were enthu-
siastically proclaimed as champions of liberty throughout
Germany and Gaul. The German provinces immediately sent
envoys with offers of help, while Civilis endeavoured by diplo-
macy and bribery to secure an alliance with the Gauls. He sent
back the auxiliary commanders whom he had taken prisoner,
each to his own tribe, and offered the cohorts the choice of
either going home or remaining with him. Those who re-
mained were given an honourable position in his army: and
those who went home received presents out of the Roman
spoil.
At the same time Civilis talked to them confidentially, re-
minding them of the miseries they had endured for all these
182 the histories [4, 18]
years, in which they had disguised their wretched slavery
under the name of peace. ‘The Batavi’, he would say, ‘were
excused from taxation, and yet they have taken arms against
the common tyrant. In the first engagement the Romans were
routed and beaten. What if Gaul throws off the yoke? What
forces are there left in Italy? It is with the blood of provincials
that their provinces are won.
‘Don’t think of the defeat of Vindex. Why, it was Batavian
cavalry which trampled underfoot the Aedui and Arverni,*
and there were Belgic auxiliaries in Verginius’ force. Thinking
it through properly, we see that Gaul succumbed to her own
armies. But now we are all united in one party, fortified,
moreover, by the military discipline which once prevailed in
Roman camps: and we have on our side the veterans before
whom Otho’s legions lately bit the dust. Let Syria and Asia
play the slave: the East is used to tyrants:* but there are many
still living in Gaul who were born before the days of tribute.*
Indeed, it is only the other day that Quintilius Varus was
killed,* when slavery was driven out of Germany, and they
were challenging not the Emperor Vitellius but Caesar
Augustus himself. Why, liberty is the natural prerogative even
of dumb animals: courage is the peculiar attribute of man.
Heaven helps the brave. Come, then, fall upon them while
your hands are free and theirs are tied, while you are fresh and
they are weary. Some of them are for Vespasian, others for
Vitellius; now is your chance to crush both parties at once.’
18 Civilis thus had his eye on Gaul and Germany and aspired,
had his project prospered, to become king of the strongest and
wealthiest countries of the world.
Hordeonius Flaccus at first furthered Civilis’ schemes by
shutting his eyes to them. But when messengers kept arriving
in panic with news that a camp had been stormed, cohorts
wiped out, and not a Roman left in the Batavian Island,
he instructed Munius Lupercus, who commanded the two
legions in winter quarters, to march against the enemy.
Lupercus lost no time in crossing the river, taking with him
some of his legionaries, some Ubii* who were close at hand,
and the Treviran cavalry who were stationed not far away. To
this force he added a regiment of Batavian cavalry, who,
[4, 19] book four 183
though their loyalty had long ago succumbed, still concealed
the fact, because they hoped their desertion would fetch a
higher price if they actually betrayed the Romans on the field.
Civilis set the standards of the defeated cohorts round him
in a ring to keep before the eyes of his men their new-won
glory, and to terrify the enemy by reminding them of their
disaster. He also gave orders that his own mother and sisters
and all the wives and small children of his soldiers should be
stationed in the rear* to spur them to victory or shame them
if they were beaten. When his line raised their battle-cry, the
men singing and the women shrieking, the legions and their
auxiliaries replied with a comparatively feeble cheer, for their
left wing had been exposed by the desertion of the Batavian
cavalry, who promptly turned against us. However, despite
the confusion, the legionaries gripped their swords and kept
their places. Then the Ubian and Treviran auxiliaries broke
in shameful flight and scattered all over the country. The
Germans pressed hard on their heels and meanwhile the
legions made good their escape into the camp, which was
called Vetera.*
Claudius Labeo, who commanded the Batavian cavalry,
had opposed Civilis as a rival in some petty municipal dispute.
Civilis was afraid that, if he killed him, he might offend his
countrymen, while if he spared him his presence would give
rise to dissension; so he had him taken away to the Frisii.
It was at this time that Civilis’ messenger caught up with the 19
cohorts of Batavians and Canninefates on their way to Rome
under orders from Vitellius. They promptly fell into a ferment
of unruly insolence and demanded a special grant as payment
for their journey, double pay, and an increase in the number
of their cavalry.* All these things had doubtless been promised
by Vitellius, but they were not attempting to obtain them: they
wanted an excuse for rebellion. Flaccus made many conces-
sions, but the only result was that they redoubled their vigour
and demanded what they knew he would refuse. Paying no
further heed to him they made for Lower Germany, to join
Civilis.
Flaccus summoned the tribunes and centurions and debated
with them whether he should use force to check this defiance
184 the histories [4, 20]
of authority. After a while he gave way to his natural coward-
ice and the fears of his subordinates, who were anxious be-
cause the loyalty of the auxiliaries was doubtful and the levy
by which the legions were reinforced had been rushed. It was
decided, therefore, to keep the soldiers in camp. However, he
soon changed his mind when he found himself criticized by
the very men whose advice he had taken. He now seemed bent
on pursuit, and wrote to Herennius Gallus in command of the
First Legion,* who was holding Bonn, telling him to bar the
path of the Batavians, and promising that he and his army
would follow hard upon their heels. The rebels could certainly
have been crushed had Flaccus and Gallus each advanced their
forces from opposite directions and thus surrounded them.
But Flaccus soon gave up the idea, and wrote another letter to
Gallus, warning him to let the rebels pass untroubled. This
gave rise to a suspicion that the commanders were purposely
promoting the war; and all the disasters which had already
occurred or were feared in the future were attributed not to
the soldiers’ inefficiency or the strength of the enemy, but to
the treachery of the generals.
20 On nearing the camp at Bonn, the Batavians sent forward a
messenger to explain their intentions to Herennius Gallus.
Against the Romans, for whom they had fought so often, they
had no wish to make war: but they were worn out after a long
and unprofitable term of service and wanted to go home and
rest. If no one opposed them they would march peaceably by;
but if hostility was offered they would find a way through
with the points of their swords. Gallus hesitated,* but his men
induced him to risk an engagement. Three thousand legionar-
ies, some hastily recruited Belgic auxiliaries, and a mob of
peasants and camp-followers, who were as cowardly in action
as they were boastful before it, came pouring out simultane-
ously from all the gates, hoping with their superior numbers
to surround the Batavians. But these were experienced veter-
ans. They formed up into columns in deep formation that
defied assault on front, flank, or rear. They thus pierced our
thin line. The Belgae gave way, the legion was driven back and
ran in terror to reach the rampart and gates of the camp. It
was there that they suffered the heaviest losses. The trenches
[4, 22] book four 185
were heaped with dead, who were not all killed by the blows
of the enemy: for many perished from their fall or on their
own swords. The victorious cohorts avoided Cologne and
marched on without attempting any further hostilities. For the
battle at Bonn they continued to excuse themselves. They had
asked for peace, they said, and when peace was persistently
refused, had merely acted in self-defence.
After the arrival of these veteran cohorts Civilis was now at 21
the head of a respectable army. But being still uncertain of his
plans, and reckoning up the strength of Rome, he made all
who were with him swear allegiance to Vespasian, and sent
envoys to the two legions which after their defeat in the
former engagement had retired into the camp at Vetera, ask-
ing them to take the same oath. The answer came back that
they never followed the advice either of a traitor or of an
enemy: Vitellius was their Emperor, and they would keep their
allegiance and their arms for him so long as they had breath in
their bodies. A Batavian deserter need not try to decide the
destiny of Rome; he should rather expect the punishment he
richly deserved. When this was reported to Civilis he flew into
a passion, and called the whole Batavian people to take arms.
They were joined by the Bructeri and Tencteri,* and Germany
was summoned to share the plunder and the glory.
Threatened with this gathering storm of war, Munius 22
Lupercus and Numisius Rufus, who were in command of the
two legions, proceeded to strengthen the rampart and walls.
They pulled down the buildings near the military camp, which
had grown into a small town during the long years of peace,
fearing that the enemy might make use of them. But they
omitted to provide for provisions to be brought into the camp,
and allowed them to be looted, with the result that what
might have supplied their needs for a long time was wantonly
consumed in a few days.
Meanwhile Civilis advanced, himself holding the centre
with the flower of the Batavi: on both banks of the Rhine he
massed large bands of Germans so as to look more savage: the
cavalry charged through the fields, while the ships were simul-
taneously moved up the stream. Here could be seen the stand-
ards of veteran Roman cohorts, there the figures of beasts
186 the histories [4, 23]
which the Germans had brought from their woods and groves,
as their tribes do when they go to battle. It seemed a civil and
a foreign war at once; and this strange confusion astounded
the besieged.
The hopes of the assailants rose when they saw the circum-
ference of the ramparts, for there were barely 5,000 Roman
soldiers to defend a camp which had been laid out to hold two
legions.* However, a large number of camp-followers had
collected there after the disruption of peace, and remained to
give what assistance they could to the military operations.
23 Part of the camp was built on the gentle slope of a hill, part
was approachable on level ground. Augustus had believed
that it would serve as a base of operations and a check upon
the German tribes: as for their actually coming to assault our
legions, such a disaster never occurred to him. Consequently,
no trouble had been taken over the site or defences: the
strength of the troops had always seemed sufficient.
The Batavians and the Germans from across the Rhine now
formed up tribe by tribe—the separation was designed to
show their individual prowess—and opened fire from a dis-
tance. Finding that most of their missiles fixed harmlessly in
the turrets and pinnacles of the walls, and that they were being
wounded by stones hurled from above, they charged with a
wild shout and surged up to the rampart, some using scaling-
ladders, others climbing over their comrades who had formed
a ‘tortoise’. But no sooner had some of them begun to scale
the wall, than they were hurled down by the besieged, who
thrust at them with sword and shield, and buried them under
a shower of stakes and javelins.
The Germans are always impetuous at the beginning of an
action and over-confident when they are winning; but on this
occasion their greed for plunder even steeled them to face
difficulties. They actually attempted to use siege-engines, with
which they were quite unfamiliar. But though they had no
skill themselves, some of the deserters and prisoners showed
them how to build a sort of bridge of timber; they fitted
wheels onto it and rolled it forward. Thus some of them stood
on this platform and fought as though from a mound, while
others, concealed inside, tried to undermine the walls. How-
[4, 25] book four 187
ever, stones hurled from catapults soon destroyed this crude
device. Then they began to get ready fascines and mantlets,
but the besieged shot blazing spears on to them from engines,
attacking the assailants themselves with fire. At last they
gave up all hope of an assault and resolved to try a waiting
policy, being well aware that the camp contained only a few
days’ provisions and a large number of non-combatants. They
hoped that famine would breed treason, and counted, besides,
on the wavering loyalty of the slaves and the usual hazards of
war to aid them.
Meanwhile, Flaccus, who had received news of the siege of 24
Vetera, dispatched a party to recruit auxiliaries in Gaul, and
gave Dillius Vocula, in command of the Twenty-Second, a
force of picked soldiers from his two legions. Vocula was to
hurry by forced marches along the bank of the Rhine, while
Flaccus himself was to approach by water, since he was in bad
health and unpopular with his men. Indeed, they grumbled
openly that he had let the Batavian cohorts get away from
Mogontiacum, had shut his eyes to Civilis’ schemes, and
invited the Germans to join the alliance. Vespasian, they said,
owed his rise more to Flaccus than to all the assistance of
Antonius Primus or of Mucianus, for overt hatred and vio-
lence can be openly crushed, but treachery and deceit cannot
be detected, much less parried. Civilis took the field himself
and arranged his own fighting line; Hordeonius lay on a couch
in his bedroom and gave whatever orders best suited the
enemy’s convenience. Why should all these companies of
brave soldiers be governed by one miserable old man’s health?
Let them rather kill the traitor and free their brave hearts and
good hopes from this incubus. Having worked on each other’s
feelings by these complaints, they were still further incensed
by the arrival of a letter from Vespasian. As this could not be
concealed, Flaccus read it before a meeting of the soldiers, and
the messengers who brought it were sent to Vitellius in chains.
The army was appeased by this, and marched on to Bonn, 25
the headquarters of the First Legion. There the men were still
more indignant with Flaccus, on whom they laid the blame of
their recent defeat. It was by his orders, they argued, that they
had taken the field against the Batavians on the understanding
188 the histories [4, 26]
that the legions from Mogontiacum were in pursuit.* But no
reinforcements had arrived, and his treachery was responsible
for their losses. The facts, moreover, were unknown to the
other armies, nor was any report sent to their Emperor,
although this treacherous outbreak could have been nipped in
the bud by rapidly bringing aid from numerous provinces.
In answer Flaccus read out to the army copies of all the
letters which he had sent all over Gaul and Britain and Spain
to ask for assistance, and introduced the disastrous practice of
having all letters delivered to the standard-bearers of the
legions, who read them to the soldiers before the officers had
seen them. He then gave orders that one of the mutineers
should be put in irons, more by way of vindicating his author-
ity than because one man was especially to blame.
Leaving Bonn, the army moved on to Cologne, where they
were joined by large numbers of Gallic auxiliaries, who at
first zealously supported the Roman cause: later, when the
Germans prospered, most of the tribes took arms against us,
actuated by hopes of liberty and an ambition to establish an
empire of their own when once they had shaken off the yoke.
Meanwhile the army’s indignation steadily increased. The
imprisonment of a single soldier was not enough to terrify
them, and, indeed, the prisoner actually accused the general
of complicity in crime, alleging that he himself had carried
messages between Flaccus and Civilis. ‘It is because I can
testify to the truth’, he said, ‘that I am being suppressed with
a false charge.’ Thereupon Vocula, with admirable self-
possession, mounted the Tribunal and, in spite of the man’s
protestations, ordered him to be seized and led away to execu-
tion. This alarmed the disaffected, while the better sort obeyed
him promptly. The army then unanimously demanded that
Vocula should lead them, and Flaccus accordingly resigned
the chief command to him.
26 However, there was much to exasperate the disaffected.
They were short both of pay and of provisions: the Gauls
refused either to enlist or to pay tribute: drought, unfamiliar
in that climate, made the Rhine almost too low for navigation,
and thus hampered their commissariat: patrols had to be
posted at intervals all along the bank to prevent the Germans
[4, 27] book four 189
fording the river: and in consequence of all this they had less
food and more mouths to eat it. To the ignorant the scarcity
of water seemed in itself an evil omen, as though the rivers
too, the ancient bulwarks of the empire, were now failing us.
In peace they would have called it bad luck or the course of
nature: now it was ‘fate’ and ‘the anger of heaven’.*
On entering Novaesium* they were joined by the Sixteenth
Legion. Their general, Herennius Gallus, now shared with
Vocula the responsibility of command. As they could not
venture out against the enemy, they encamped . . .* at a place
called Gelduba.* Here the soldiers were trained in deploy-
ment, in building fortifications and ramparts, and in all the
other military manœuvres. To inspire their courage with the
further incentive of plunder, Vocula led out part of the force
against the neighbouring cantons of the Cugerni, who had
accepted Civilis’ offers of alliance.
The rest of the troops were left behind with Herennius
Gallus, and it happened that a corn-ship with a full cargo, 27
which had run aground close to the camp, was towed over by
the Germans to their own bank. This was more than Gallus
could tolerate, so he sent an auxiliary cohort to the rescue.
The number of the Germans soon increased: both sides gradu-
ally gathered reinforcements and a regular battle was fought,
with the result that the Germans removed the ship, inflicting
heavy losses. The defeated troops followed what had now
become their regular custom, and threw the blame not on
their own inefficiency but on their commanding officer’s
treachery. They dragged him from his quarters, tore his uni-
form and flogged him, bidding him tell them how much he
had got for betraying the army, and who were his accom-
plices. Then their indignation recoiled on Hordeonius Flaccus:
he was the real criminal: Gallus was only his tool. At last their
threats of murder so terrified Gallus that he, too, accused
Flaccus. He was put in irons until the arrival of Vocula, who
at once set him free, and on the next day had the ringleaders
of the riot executed.
This demonstrated the army’s inconsistency: its equal readi-
ness to mutiny and to submit to punishment. The common
soldiers’ loyalty to Vitellius was beyond question, while the
190 the histories [4, 28]
higher ranks inclined towards Vespasian. Thus we find crimes
and penalties in succession, frenzied violence joined to obedi-
ence: the troops could be punished though not controlled.
28 Meanwhile the whole of Germany was promoting Civilis,
sending him vast reinforcements and ratifying the alliance
with hostages from their noblest families. He gave orders that
the country of the Ubii and Treviri was to be laid waste by
their nearest neighbours, and sent another party across the
River Maas to harass the Menapii and Morini* and other
frontier tribes of Gaul. In both lands they plundered freely,
and were especially savage towards the Ubii, because they
were a tribe of German origin who had renounced their
fatherland and adopted the name of Agrippinenses.* Ubian
cohorts were cut to pieces at the village of Marcodurum,*
where they were off their guard, trusting to their distance
from the Rhine. The Ubii did not take this quietly, nor hesitate
to seek reprisals from the Germans, which they did at first
with impunity. In the end, however, the Germans caught
them: throughout the war the Ubii were always more
conspicuous for good faith than good fortune.
Their collapse strengthened Civilis’ position, and, embold-
ened by success, he now vigorously pressed on the blockade of
the legions at Vetera, and redoubled his vigilance to prevent
any message creeping through from the relieving army. The
Batavians were set to look after the engines and siege-works:
the Germans from across the Rhine, who clamoured for
battle, were sent to demolish the rampart and renew the fight
directly they were beaten off. There were so many of them
29 that their losses mattered little. Nightfall did not see the end
of their task. They built huge piles of wood all round the
ramparts, kindled them, and sat by feasting; then, as the wine
warmed each man’s heart, he dashed into the fight with point-
less impetuosity. In the darkness their missiles were ineffec-
tive, but the barbarian troops were clearly visible to the
Romans, and any one whose daring or bright ornaments made
him conspicuous at once became a mark for their aim.
When Civilis realized this, he gave orders to extinguish the
fires and plunge the whole scene into a confusion of darkness
and weapons. Discordant shouts now arose: men clashed
[4, 31] book four 191
blindly: no one could see to strike or to parry. Wherever a
shout was heard, they would wheel round and lunge in that
direction. Valour was useless: chance and chaos ruled su-
preme: and the bravest soldier often fell under a coward’s
bolt. The Germans fought with blind fury; the Roman troops
were more familiar with danger, and hurled down iron-
clamped stakes and heavy stones with sure effect. Wherever
the sound of siege-work or the clang of a scaling-ladder be-
trayed the presence of the enemy, they thrust them back with
their shields and followed them with a shower of javelins.
Many appeared on top of the walls, and these they stabbed
with their short swords.
Thus the night wore on; day dawned upon new methods of
attack. The Batavians had built a wooden tower of two stories 30
and moved it up to the main gate, the area with the flattest
approach. However, the Romans, by using strong poles and
hammering it with wooden beams, soon battered it to pieces,
with great loss of life to those standing on it. While they were
reeling from this, the defenders made a sudden and successful
sally. Meanwhile the legionaries, with remarkable skill and
ingenuity, invented still further contrivances. The one which
caused most terror was a crane with a movable arm suspended
over their assailants’ heads: this arm was suddenly lowered,
snatched up one or more of the enemy into the air before his
fellows’ eyes, and, as the heavy end was swung round, tossed
him into the middle of the camp. Civilis now gave up hope of
storming the camp and renewed a leisurely blockade, trying
all the time by messages and offers of reward to undermine the
loyalty of the legions.
Such was the course of events in Germany up to the date of 31
the battle of Cremona. News of this arrived by letter from
Antonius Primus, who enclosed a copy of Caecina’s edict;*
and Alpinius Montanus, who commanded one of the defeated
auxiliary cohorts, came in person to confess that his party had
been beaten. The troops were variously affected by the news.
The Gallic auxiliaries, who had no feelings of affection or
dislike to either party and served without sentiment, promptly
took the advice of their commanders and deserted Vitellius.
The veterans hesitated; under pressure from their tribunes
192 the histories [4, 32]
they eventually took the oath of allegiance administered by
Flaccus, but it was clear from their faces that their hearts were
not in it, and while repeating the rest of the formula they
balked at the name of Vespasian, either muttering it under
32 their breath or more often omitting it altogether. Their suspi-
cions were further inflamed when Antonius’ letter to Civilis
was read out before the meeting; it seemed to address Civilis
as an ally of the Flavian party, and to express hostility to the
German army.
The news was next brought to the camp at Gelduba, where
it gave rise to the same comments and the same scenes.
Montanus was sent to carry instructions to Civilis that he was
to cease from hosilities and not to make war on Rome under
a false pretext; if it was to help Vespasian that he had taken
arms, he had now achieved his object.
Civilis at first replied in guarded terms. Then, as he saw that
Montanus was an impetuous person who would welcome a
revolution, he began to complain of all the dangers he had
endured in the service of Rome for the last twenty-five years.
‘A fine reward I have received’, he cried, ‘for all my labours—
my brother’s execution, my own imprisonment, and the
bloodthirsty clamours of this army. Since they have sought my
destruction, I claim satisfaction from them under interna-
tional law. As for you Trevirans and all the rest that have the
souls of slaves, what reward do you hope to gain for shedding
your blood so often, except thankless military service, eternal
taxation, and their rods, axes, and tyrannical caprices? Look
at me! I have only a single cohort under my command, and yet
with the Canninefates and Batavi, a mere fraction of the Gallic
peoples, I have destroyed their great and useless camps, or else
am grinding them down with famine and the sword. In short,
either our venture will end in freedom or, if we are beaten, we
shall be no worse off than before.’
Having thus inflamed Montanus, he told him to take back
a milder answer and dismissed him. On his return Montanus
pretended that his errand had been fruitless, and said nothing
about all the rest: but it soon came to light.
33 Retaining a portion of his force, Civilis sent the veteran
cohorts with the most efficient of the German troops against
[4, 34] book four 193
Vocula and his army. He gave the command to Julius
Maximus and Claudius Victor, his sister’s son. After plunder-
ing the winter quarters of a cavalry regiment at Asciburgium*
on their way, they swept down upon the Roman camp and
so completely surprised it that Vocula had no time to address
his army or to form it for battle. In the general panic he
could only advise them to mass the reserves in the centre; the
auxiliaries were scattered all around them.
The Roman cavalry charged, but found the enemy in good
order ready to receive them, and came flying back onto their
own infantry. What followed was more of a massacre than a
battle. The Nervian cohorts, either from panic or treachery,
left our flanks exposed; thus the legions had to bear the brunt.
They had already lost their standards and were being cut
down behind the rampart, when a fresh reinforcement sud-
denly changed the fortune of the fight. Some Basque auxilia-
ries, originally levied by Galba and now summoned to
Germany, on nearing the camp heard the sound of fighting;
while the enemy were occupied, they came charging in on
their rear. This caused more consternation than their numbers
warranted, the enemy taking them for the whole Roman
force, either from Novaesium or from Mogontiacum. This
mistake encouraged the Roman troops: their confidence in
others restored confidence in themselves. The best Batavians,
at least of their infantry, fell. The cavalry made off with the
standards and prisoners taken in the first stage of the battle.
Though our losses that day were numerically larger, they were
of lower-quality fighters, whereas the Germans lost their best
troops.
On both sides the generals deserved defeat, and failed to 34
make good use of their success. Their fault was the same. Had
Civilis furnished the attacking column with more troops, they
could never have been surrounded by such a small force, but
would have broken into the camp and destroyed it. Vocula, on
the other hand, had not even reconnoitred the enemy’s attack,
and consequently no sooner sallied out than he was beaten.
Then, when he had won the victory, he showed great lack of
confidence, and wasted day after day before moving against
the enemy. If he had made haste to follow up his success and
194 the histories [4, 35]
struck at the enemy at once, he might have raised the siege of
Vetera at one blow.
Meanwhile, Civilis had been playing upon the feelings of
the besieged by pretending that the Romans had been defeated
and success had favoured his army. The captured standards
and colours were carried round the walls and the prisoners
also displayed. One of these did a deed of outstanding hero-
ism: shouting at the top of his voice, he revealed the truth. The
Germans at once struck him dead, which only served to con-
firm his information; while the besieged saw the harried fields
and burning farms and realized that the victorious army was
approaching.
When he was in sight of the camp Vocula ordered his men
to plant the standards and construct a trench and rampart
round them: they were to deposit all their baggage there and
fight unencumbered. Instead, this made them shout at the
general and demand to fight; and they were now accustomed
to use threats. Without even taking time to form their line they
started the battle, all tired as they were and in disorder. Civilis
was ready waiting for them, trusting quite as much to their
mistakes as to the merits of his own men.
The Romans fought with varying fortune. All the most
mutinous proved cowards: some, however, remembered their
recent victory and stuck to their place, cutting down the
enemy, and encouraging themselves and their neighbours.
After re-forming the battle-line, they waved their hands and
signalled to the besieged not to lose their opportunity. These
were watching all that happened from the walls, and now
came bursting out at every gate. It chanced that at this point
Civilis’ horse fell and threw him; both armies believed the
rumour that he had been wounded or killed. This caused
immense consternation to his army and immense encourage-
ment to the enemy. However, Vocula failed to pursue them
when they fled, and merely set about strengthening the ram-
part and turrets of his camp, apparently in fear of another
blockade. His victories were so often botched as to give colour
to the suspicion that he preferred war.
35 What chiefly distressed our troops was the lack of supplies.
The baggage-train of the legions was sent to Novaesium with
[4, 36] book four 195
a crowd of non-combatants to fetch grain by land, the enemy
being now masters of the river. The first convoy got through
safely, while Civilis’ control was still shaky. Then he heard
that a second foraging-party had been sent to Novaesium
under guard of several auxiliary cohorts, and that they were
proceeding on their way as if it was a time of perfect peace,
few keeping to the standards, their weapons piled in the
wagons, all wandering at will. He sent some men forward to
hold the bridges and any places where the road was narrow,
and then formed up and attacked. The battle was fought on a
long straggling line, and the issue was still doubtful when
nightfall broke it off. The cohorts made their way through to
Gelduba, where the camp remained as it was, garrisoned by
the soldiers who had been left behind there.
It was obvious just how much danger the convoy would
have to face on the return journey; they would be heavily
laden and had already lost their nerve. Vocula accordingly
added to his force 1,000 picked men from the Fifth and
Fifteenth Legions who had been at Vetera during the siege, all
tough soldiers with a grievance against their generals. Against
his orders, more than the 1,000 started with him, openly
complaining on the march that they would not put up with
famine and the treachery of their generals any longer. On the
other hand, those who stayed behind grumbled that they were
left to their fate now that part of the garrison had been
removed. Thus there was a double mutiny, one party calling
Vocula back, the others refusing to return to camp.
Meanwhile Civilis laid siege to Vetera. Vocula retired to 36
Gelduba, and thence to Novaesium, shortly afterwards win-
ning a cavalry skirmish just outside Novaesium. The Roman
soldiers, however, alike in success and in failure, were as eager
as ever to make an end of their generals. Now that their
numbers were swelled by the arrival of the detachments from
the Fifth and the Fifteenth they demanded their donative,
having learnt that money had arrived from Vitellius. Without
further delay Flaccus gave it to them in Vespasian’s name, and
this did more than anything else to promote mutiny. They
indulged in wild dissipation, banquets, and nocturnal gather-
ings, and revived their old grudge against Hordeonius Flaccus.
196 the histories [4, 37]
None of the senior officers ventured to interfere with them—
the darkness had somehow abolished all shame; the mutineers
dragged Flaccus out of bed and murdered him. They were
preparing to do the same with Vocula, but he narrowly
escaped in the darkness, disguised as a slave.
37 When the excitement subsided, their fears returned, and
they sent letters round by centurions to all the Gallic commu-
nities, asking for reinforcements and pay. But without a leader
a mob is always rash, timorous, and inactive: on the approach
of Civilis they hurriedly snatched up their arms, and then
immediately dropped them and took to flight. Misfortune
now bred disunion, and the army of the Upper Rhine dissoci-
ated itself from the rest. However, they set up the statues of
Vitellius again in the camp and in the neighbouring Belgic
villages, although by now Vitellius was dead. Soon the sol-
diers of the First, Fourth, and Twenty-Second repented of
their folly and rejoined Vocula. He made them take a second
oath of allegiance to Vespasian and led them off to raise the
siege of Mogontiacum. The besieging army, a combined force
of Chatti, Usipi, and Mattiaci,* had already retired, having
got sufficient loot and suffered some loss: our troops had
surprised them while they were scattered. Moreover, the
Treviri had built a rampart and breastwork all along their
frontier and fought the Germans with heavy loss to both sides.
Before long, however, they rebelled, and thus sullied their
great services to the Roman people.
38 During these events Vespasian took up his second consul-
ship and Titus his first, both in absence. Rome was depressed
and beset by manifold anxieties. Apart from the real miseries
of the moment, it was plunged into a groundless panic on the
rumour of a rebellion in Africa, where Lucius Piso was sup-
posed to be plotting revolution.* Piso, who was governor of
the province, was far from being a firebrand. But the severity
of the winter delayed the corn-ships, and the common people,
accustomed to buy their bread day by day, whose interest in
politics was confined to the corn supply, soon began to believe
their fears that the coast of Africa was being blockaded and
supplies withheld. The Vitellians, who had retained their par-
tisanship, fostered this rumour, and even the victors were not
[4, 39] book four 197
entirely displeased at it, for none of their victories in the civil
war had ever satisfied their greed, and even foreign wars fell
far short.
On 1 January the Senate was convened by the Urban 39
Praetor, Julius Frontinus,* and passed votes of thanks and
congratulation to the generals, armies, and foreign princes.
Tettius Julianus was deprived of his praetorship; this was
supposedly because he had left his legion when it went over to
Vespasian, but was in fact so that his office could be conferred
upon Plotius Grypus. Hormus was raised to equestrian rank.
Frontinus then resigned his praetorship and Domitian Caesar
succeeded him. His name now stood at the head of all
dispatches and edicts, but the real authority lay with
Mucianus, although Domitian, following the promptings of
his friends and of his own desires, frequently asserted his
independence.
But Mucianus’ chief cause of anxiety lay in Antonius
Primus and Arrius Varus. The fame of their exploits was still
fresh; the soldiers worshipped them; and they were popular in
Rome, because they had used no violence off the field of
battle. It was even hinted that Antonius had urged Crassus
Scribonianus* to seize the throne. He was a man who owed
his distinction to famous ancestors and to his brother’s
memory, and Antonius could promise him adequate support
for a conspiracy. However, Scribonianus refused. He had a
terror of all risks, and would hardly have been seduced even
by the certainty of success.
Being unable to crush Antonius openly, Mucianus show-
ered compliments on him in the Senate and overloaded him in
private with promises, hinting at the governorship of Nearer
Spain, which the departure of Cluvius Rufus had left vacant.
Meanwhile he lavished military commands on Antonius’
friends. Then, having filled his empty head with ambitious
hopes, he destroyed his influence at one stroke by moving
the Seventh Legion,* who were passionately attached to
Antonius, into winter quarters. The Third, who were simi-
larly devoted to Arrius Varus, were sent back to Syria,
and part of the army was taken out to the war in Germany.
Thus, on the removal of all disturbing factors, the city could
198 the histories [4, 40]
resume its normal life under the old regime of law and civil
government.
40 On the day of his first appearance in the Senate Domitian
said a few moderate words regretting the absence of his father
and brother, and concerning his own youth. His behaviour
was most proper, and, as his character was still an unknown
quantity, his repeated blushes were taken for signs of mod-
esty.* He moved from the chair that all Galba’s honours
should be restored, to which Curtius Montanus proposed an
amendment that respect should also be paid to the memory of
Piso. The Senate approved both proposals, though nothing
was done about Piso.* Next, various commissions were
appointed by lot to restore the spoils of war to the owners;
to examine and affix the bronze tablets of laws, which
in course of time had dropped off the walls; to lighten the
list of public holidays, which in these days of flattery had
been disgracefully tampered with;* and to introduce some
economy into public expenditure. Tettius Julianus was re-
stored to his praetorship as soon as it was discovered that he
had taken refuge with Vespasian:* but Grypus was allowed to
retain his rank.
It was then decided to resume the hearing of the case of
Musonius Rufus against Publius Celer. Publius was convicted
and the shade of Soranus satisfied. This strict verdict made the
day memorable in the annals of Rome, and credit was also due
to individual enterprise, for everybody felt that Musonius had
done his duty in bringing the action. On the other hand,
Demetrius, a professor of Cynic philosophy,* earned discredit
for defending an obvious criminal, his motive being self-
publicity rather than morality. As for Publius, as danger
threatened courage and fluency alike failed him.
This trial was the signal for further reprisals against
prosecutors. Junius Mauricus* petitioned Domitian that the
Senate might be allowed access to the minutes of the imperial
cabinet, in order to find out who had applied for leave to bring
a prosecution and against whom. The answer was that on
such a question as this the Emperor must be consulted.
41 Accordingly, at the instigation of its leading members, the
Senate framed an oath in these words: ‘I call Heaven to
[4, 42] book four 199
witness that I have never countenanced any action prejudicial
to any man’s civil status, nor have I derived any profit or any
office from the misfortune of Roman citizens.’ The magis-
trates vied with each other in their haste to take this oath, and
the other members did the same, when called upon to speak.
Those who had a guilty conscience were alarmed, and man-
aged to alter the wording of the oath by various devices. The
house meanwhile applauded every sign of scruple, and pro-
tested against each case of perjury. This kind of informal
censure fell most severely on Sariolenus Vocula, Nonius
Attianus, and Cestius Severus, who were notorious as habitual
informers under Nero. Against Sariolenus there was also a
fresh charge of having continued his practices under Vitellius.
The members went on shaking their fists at him until he left
the House. They next turned on Paccius Africanus and
hounded him out in the same way. He was supposed to
have suggested to Nero the murder of the two brothers
Scribonius,* who were famous for their friendship and their
wealth. Africanus dared not admit his guilt, though he could
not very well deny it. So he swung round on Vibius Crispus,*
who was pestering him with questions, and implicated him in
the charges which he could not rebut, thus deflecting odium
by having an accomplice.
On this occasion Vipstanus Messala, although he had not 42
attained the senatorial age,* gained a great reputation both
for dutiful affection and for eloquence by venturing to inter-
cede for his brother Aquilius Regulus.* Regulus had been
raised to the summit of disfavour for having brought about
the ruin of the noble families of the Crassi and of Orfitus. It
was supposed that, though quite a young man, he had volun-
tarily undertaken the prosecution, not to escape any danger
which was threatening him, but purely from ambition.
Crassus’ wife Sulpicia Praetextata and his four sons were
anxious to secure revenge if the Senate would grant a trial.
Messala therefore made no attempt to defend the case or the
accused, but tried to shelter his brother from peril, and had
already won over some of the senators.
Curtius Montanus opposed him with a fierce speech, and
even went so far as to charge Regulus with having given
200 the histories [4, 42]
money to Piso’s murderer after Galba’s death, and with
having bitten Piso’s head. ‘That at least’, said he, ‘Nero did
not compel you to do. You purchased neither position nor
safety by that savagery. We may put up with the pleas of those
wretches who preferred to ruin others rather than endanger
their own lives. But your father’s banishment had guaranteed
your security. His property had been divided amongst his
creditors.* You were not of an age to stand for office. Nero
had nothing either to hope or to fear from you. Your talents
were as yet untried and you had never exerted them in any
man’s defence, yet your lust for blood, your insatiable rapac-
ity, led you to stain them in the blood of Rome’s nobility. At
one swoop you caused the ruin of innocent boys, of old and
distinguished statesmen, of high-born ladies; and out of the
country’s disaster you secured for yourself the spoils of con-
suls, stuffed yourself with seven million sesterces,* and shone
with the glory of a priesthood. You blamed Nero’s lack of
enterprise because he took one household at a time, thus
causing unnecessary fatigue to himself and his informers,
when he might have toppled the whole Senate at a single
word. Why, gentlemen, you must indeed keep and preserve to
yourselves a counsellor of such ready resource. Let each gen-
eration have its good examples: and as our old men follow
Eprius Marcellus or Vibius Crispus, let the rising generation
emulate Regulus.
‘Villainy finds followers even when it fails. What if it
flourish and prosper? If we hesitate to offend a mere ex-
quaestor, shall we be any bolder when he has been praetor
and consul? Or do you suppose that the race of tyrants came
to an end in Nero? That is what the people believed who
outlived Tiberius or Gaius, and meanwhile there arose one
more infamous and more bloody still. We are not afraid of
Vespasian. We trust his years and his natural moderation. But
a good precedent outlives a good sovereign. Gentlemen, we
have grown effete: we are no longer that Senate which, after
Nero had been killed, clamoured for the punishment of his
informers and menials according to ancestral law. Once an
evil emperor is no more, the first day is the finest.’
[4, 44] book four 201
The Senate listened to Montanus’ speech with such sympa- 43
thy that Helvidius began to hope that even Marcellus might be
brought down. He began with a eulogy of Cluvius Rufus,
who, though his wealth and eloquence were no less celebrated
than Marcellus’, had never endangered anyone under Nero;
he went on to attack Marcellus, both by contrasting him with
Rufus and by pressing home the charge against him. Feeling
that the House was warming to this rhetoric, Marcellus got up
as though to leave, exclaiming, ‘I am off, Helvidius: I leave
you your Senate: you can tyrannize over it under Caesar’s
nose.’* Vibius Crispus began to follow Marcellus, and,
though both were angry, their expressions were very different:
Marcellus with flashing eyes, Crispus with a smile on his face.
Their friends, however, dashed forward and pulled them
back. Thus the struggle grew more and more heated between
a virtuous majority and a small but powerful minority; and
since they were both animated by irreconcilable hatred, the
day was spent in conflict.
At the next sitting Domitian opened by recommending 44
them to forget their grievances and grudges and the unavoid-
able exigences of the recent past. Mucianus then at great
length moved a motion in favour of the prosecutors, issuing
a mild warning, almost in terms of entreaty, to those who
wanted to revive actions which had been begun and dropped.
Seeing that their attempt at independence was being opposed,
the Senate gave it up. However, so that it would not seem as
if the Senate’s opinion was being flouted and complete impu-
nity granted for all crimes committed under Nero, Mucianus
forced Octavius Sagitta and Antistius Sosianus,* men of sena-
torial rank who had returned from exile, to go back to the
islands to which they had been confined. Octavius had se-
duced Pontia Postumina, and, on her refusal to marry him,
had murdered her in a fit of jealous fury. Sosianus was an
unprincipled scoundrel who had been the ruin of many. The
Senate had found them both guilty, and passed a heavy sen-
tence of exile, and the penalty was now reaffirmed, although
others were allowed to return. However, this failed to allay
the hatred felt for Mucianus, for Sosianus and Sagitta,
202 the histories [4, 45]
whether they returned or not, were of no importance, whereas
people were afraid of the professional prosecutors, who were
men of wealth and ability, and experts at employing their
power for evil.
45 Unanimity was gradually restored in the Senate by the
holding of a trial according to ancient precedent, before a
court of the whole House. A senator named Manlius Patruitus
complained that he had been beaten before a mob of people in
the colony of Sena* by order of the local magistrates. Nor had
the affront stopped there. They had held a mock funeral
before his eyes, and had accompanied their dirges and lamen-
tations with gross insults levelled at the whole Senate. The
accused were summoned; their case was tried; they were con-
victed and punished. A further decree of the Senate was passed
warning the commons of Sena to pay more respect to the laws.
About the same time Antonius Flamma was prosecuted by
Cyrene for extortion, condemned, and exiled for the in-
humanity of his conduct.
46 Meanwhile, a mutiny almost broke out among the sol-
diers.* The Guards who had been discharged by Vitellius
came together again in support of Vespasian, and demanded
re-admission. They were joined by the selected legionaries
who had also been led to hope for service in the Guards, and
they now demanded the pay they had been promised. Even the
Vitellians alone could not have been dispersed without serious
bloodshed, but it would require immense sums of money to
retain the services of such a large number of men. Mucianus
accordingly entered the barracks to make a more accurate
estimate of each man’s term of service. He formed up the
victorious troops with their own arms and distinctive decora-
tions, each man a few paces from the next. Then the Vitellians
who had surrendered, as we have described, at Bovillae, and
all the other soldiers who had been hunted down in the city
and its neighbourhood, were marched out almost naked.
Mucianus then had them sorted out, and drew up in separate
corps the troops of the German army, of the British army, and
of any others that were in Rome.
Their first glance at the scene had astounded them. Facing
them they saw what looked like a fighting front bristling with
[4, 48] book four 203
weapons and armour, while they were caught in a trap, naked
and foul with dirt. As soon as they began to be sorted out a
panic seized them all. The German troops in particular were
terrified at their isolation, and felt they were being marked off
for slaughter. They embraced their comrades and clung upon
their necks, asking for one last kiss, begging not to be left
alone, crying out, ‘Our cause is the same as yours, why should
our fate be different?’ They appealed now to Mucianus, now
to the absent Emperor, and lastly to the powers of Heaven,
until Mucianus came to the rescue of their imaginary terrors
by calling them all ‘soldiers under the same oath, and the same
Emperor’—for he found that the victorious army was joining
in and seconding their tears with cheering.
On that day the matter ended there. A few days later, when
Domitian addressed them, they received him with renewed
confidence, refused his offer of lands, and begged for enlist-
ment and pay instead. This was only a petition, but one that
could not be refused: so they were admitted to the Guards.
Subsequently, those who had grown old and completed the
regular term of service* were honourably discharged. Others
were dismissed for misbehaviour, but one by one at different
times, which is always the safest method of weakening a mass
movement.
To return to the Senate; a bill was now passed that a loan 47
of sixty million sesterces should be raised from private indi-
viduals and administered by Pompeius Silvanus. This may
have been a financial necessity, or they may have wanted it to
seem so. At any rate the necessity soon ceased to exist, or else
they gave up the pretence. Domitian then carried a proposal
that the consulships conferred by Vitellius should be can-
celled, and that a state funeral should be held in honour of
Flavius Sabinus. These proposals are striking evidence of the
fickleness of fortune, entangling prosperity with catastrophe.
It was about this time that Lucius Piso, the governor of 48
Africa, was killed. To give a true explanation of this murder I
must go back and make a brief survey; this is quite relevant to
the reasons for such crimes.
Under the deified Augustus and Tiberius, the governor of
Africa had in his command one legion and some auxiliaries
204 the histories [4, 49]
with which to guard the frontier of the empire. Subsequently
Gaius Caesar, who was restless by nature and harboured
suspicions of the then governor, Marcus Silanus,* withdrew
the legion from his control and put it under a commander
whom he sent out for the purpose. He deliberately created a
state of friction, giving each man an equal amount of patron-
age and overlapping functions; this was further aggravated by
regrettable quarrels. The greater permanence of his tenure
strengthened the commander’s position—or perhaps because
an inferior is more anxious to vie with his betters. The most
eminent governors, on the other hand, were more careful of
their safety than of their authority.
49 At the present time the legion in Africa was commanded by
Valerius Festus, an extravagant young man, immoderately
ambitious, whose kinship with Vitellius had given him some
anxiety. He had frequent interviews with Piso, and it is impos-
sible to tell whether he tempted Piso to rebel or resisted Piso’s
temptations. No one was present at their interviews, which
were held in private, and after Piso’s death most people were
inclined to ingratiate themselves with his murderer. Beyond
doubt the province and the garrison were unfavourable to
Vespasian. Besides, some of the Vitellian refugees from Rome
pointed out to Piso that the Gallic provinces were wavering;
that Germany was ready to rebel, and he himself was in
danger, and that if one earns suspicion in peace the safest
course is war.*
Meanwhile, Claudius Sagitta, who commanded ‘Petra’s
Cavalry’, made a good crossing, outstripping the centurion
Papirius, who had been sent out by Mucianus and was com-
missioned, so Sagitta affirmed, to assassinate Piso. Sagitta
further stated that Galerianus, Piso’s cousin and son-in-law,
had already been murdered, and told him that while his one
hope lay in taking a bold step, there were two courses open to
him: he might either take up arms on the spot, or he might
prefer to sail to Gaul and offer to lead the Vitellian armies.
This made no impression on Piso.
When the centurion whom Mucianus had sent arrived at
the port of Carthage, he kept on shouting all sorts of con-
gratulations to Piso on becoming emperor. The people he met,
[4, 50] book four 205
who were astounded at this unexpected miracle, were in-
structed to take up the cry. With a crowd’s usual credulity,
they rushed into the forum calling on Piso to appear, and as
they had a passion for flattery and took no interest in the
truth, they filled the whole place with a confused noise of
cheering. Piso, however, either at a hint from Sagitta, or from
his natural good sense, would not show himself in public or
give way to the excitement of the crowd. He examined the
centurion, and learnt that his object was to trump up a charge
against him and then kill him. He accordingly had the man
executed, more from indignation against an assassin than in
any hope of saving his life. He had found that the man had
been one of the murderers of Clodius Macer: after staining his
hands in the blood of the commander he had now reappeared
to slaughter the civil governor. Piso then reprimanded the
Carthaginians in a nervous edict, and refrained from perform-
ing even the routine of his office, shutting himself up in his
house, for fear that he might by accident provide some pretext
for further demonstrations.
The news of the popular excitement and the centurion’s 50
execution reached the ears of Festus, considerably exagger-
ated and, as usual with rumours, mingling truth with false-
hood; he then sent off a party of horsemen to murder Piso.
Riding at full speed, they reached the governor’s house in the
twilight of early dawn and broke in with drawn swords. As
Festus had mainly chosen Carthaginian auxiliaries and Moors
to do the murder, most of them did not know Piso by sight.
However, near his bedroom they happened on a slave and
asked him who he was and where they could find Piso. In
answer the slave told them a heroic lie and said he was Piso,
whereupon they immediately cut him down. However, Piso
himself was killed very soon after, for there was one man there
who knew him: Baebius Massa, one of the imperial agents in
Africa, who was already a danger to all the best men in Rome.
His name will recur again and again in this narrative,* as one
of the causes of the troubles which beset us later on.
Festus had been waiting at Adrumetum* to see how things
went, and he now hastened to rejoin his legion. He had the
camp prefect, Caetronius Pisanus, put in irons, alleging that
206 the histories [4, 51]
he was one of Piso’s accomplices, though his real motive was
personal animosity. He then punished some of the soldiers
and centurions and rewarded others; in neither case for their
deserts, but because he wanted it to be thought that he had
stamped out a war.
His next task was to settle the differences between Oea*
and Lepcis. These had had a trivial origin in thefts of crops
and cattle by the peasants, but they were now trying to settle
them in open warfare. Oea, being inferior in numbers, had
called in the aid of the Garamantes,* an untamed tribe
who were always a fruitful source of damage to their neigh-
bours. Thus the people of Lepcis were in great straits. Their
fields had been wasted far and wide, and they had fled
in terror under the shelter of their walls, when the Roman
auxiliaries, both horse and foot, arrived on the scene. They
routed the Garamantes and recovered all the booty, except
what the nomads had already sold among the inaccessible
hut-settlements of the far interior.
51 After the battle of Cremona and the arrival of good news
from every quarter, Vespasian now heard of Vitellius’ death.
A large number of people of all classes, who were as lucky as
they were adventurous, successfully braved the winter seas to
bring him the news. There also arrived envoys from King
Vologaeses offering the services of 40,000 Parthian cavalry. It
was, indeed, a proud and fortunate situation to be courted
with such splendid offers of assistance, and to need none of
them. Vologaeses was duly thanked and instructed to send his
envoys to the Senate and to understand that peace had been
made. Vespasian now devoted his attention to the affairs of
Italy and the capital, and received an unfavourable report of
Domitian, who seemed to be trespassing beyond the natural
sphere of an emperor’s youthful son. He accordingly handed
over the flower of his army to Titus, who was to finish off the
war with the Jews.
52 It is said that before his departure Titus had a long talk with
his father and begged him not to be rash and lose his temper
at these incriminating reports, but to meet his son in a forgiv-
ing and unprejudiced spirit. ‘Neither legions nor fleets’, he is
reported to have said, ‘are such sure bulwarks of the throne as
[4, 53] book four 207
a number of children. Time, chance, and often, too, ambition
and misunderstanding weaken, alienate, or extinguish friend-
ship: a man’s own blood cannot be severed from him; and
above all is this the case with a sovereign, for, while others
enjoy his good fortune, his misfortunes only concern his near-
est kin. Even brothers are unlikely to remain good friends
unless their father sets them an example.’
These words had the effect of making Vespasian delighted
at Titus’ loyalty rather than inclined to forgive Domitian.
‘You may ease your mind,’ he said to Titus. ‘It is now your
duty to increase the prestige of Rome on the field: I will
concern myself with peace at home.’
Though the weather was still very rough, Vespasian at once
launched his fastest corn-ships* with a full cargo: for the city
was teetering on the verge of disaster. Indeed, there were not
more than ten days’ supplies in the public granaries at the
moment when Vespasian’s convoy brought relief.
The task of restoring the Capitol was entrusted to Lucius 53
Vestinus,* who, though only a knight, yet in reputation and
influence ranked with the highest. He summoned the sooth-
sayers, and they recommended that the ruins of the former
temple should be carried away to the marshes and a new
temple erected on the same foundations: the gods were unwill-
ing, they said, that the original form of the building should be
changed. On 21 June, a day of bright sunshine, the whole
consecrated area of the temple was decorated with chaplets
and garlands. In marched soldiers, all men with names of
good omen, carrying branches of auspicious trees: then came
the Vestal Virgins accompanied by boys and girls, each of
whom had father and mother alive, and they cleansed it all by
sprinkling fresh water from a spring or river. Next, while the
pontiff, Plautius Aelianus,* dictated the proper formulae,
Helvidius Priscus, the praetor, first purified the site by a sol-
emn sacrifice of a pig, a sheep, and an ox,* and then, duly
offering the entrails on an altar of turf, he prayed to Jupiter,
Juno, and Minerva,* the guardian deities of the empire, to
prosper the enterprise, and by divine grace to raise on high
this house of theirs which human piety had here begun. He
then took hold of the chaplets around the foundation-stone,
208 the histories [4, 54]
to which ropes were attached. At the same moment the other
magistrates and the priests and senators and knights and large
numbers of the populace in joyous excitement with one great
effort dragged the huge stone into its place. On every side gifts
of gold and silver were flung into the foundations, blocks of
virgin ore unscathed by any furnace, just as they had come
from the womb of the earth. For the soothsayers had given out
that the building must not be desecrated by the use of stone or
gold that had been put to any other purpose. The height of the
roof was raised. This was the only change that religious scru-
ples would allow, and it was felt to be the only point in which
the former temple lacked grandeur.
54 Meanwhile, the news of Vitellius’ death had spread through
Gaul and Germany and redoubled the vigour of the war.
Civilis now dropped all pretence and hurled himself upon the
Roman Empire. The Vitellian legions felt that even foreign
slavery was preferable to the rule of Vespasian. The Gauls too
had taken heart. A rumour had been spread that our winter
camps in Moesia and Pannonia were being blockaded by
Sarmatians and Dacians: similar stories were fabricated about
Britain: the Gauls began to think that the fortune of the
Roman armies was the same all the world over. But above all,
the burning of the Capitol encouraged them to believe that the
empire was coming to an end.* Once in old days the Gauls
had captured Rome, but Jupiter’s home was left unscathed
and the empire stood firm. But now (so the Druids* with
superstitious folly kept dinning into their ears) this fatal fire
was a sign of Heaven’s anger, and meant that the Transalpine
tribes were destined now to rule the world. It was also ru-
moured that the Gallic chieftains, whom Otho had sent
against Vitellius, had agreed before they parted that if Rome
was shattered by its internal troubles and an unbroken se-
quence of civil wars, they would not fail the cause of Gallic
freedom.
55 Prior to the murder of Hordeonius Flaccus nothing had
leaked out to arouse suspicions of a conspiracy, but when he
had been assassinated, messages passed between Civilis and
Classicus, who commanded the Treviran cavalry. Classicus
was far above the rest both in birth and in wealth. He came of
[4, 56] book four 209
royal line and his ancestors were famous in both peace and
war. It was his boast that his family had given Rome more
enemies than allies. These two were now joined by Julius
Tutor and Julius Sabinus, the one a Treviran, the other a
Lingonian. Tutor had been appointed by Vitellius as com-
mander of the bank of the Rhine. Sabinus’ natural vanity was
further inflamed by spurious pretensions of high birth, for he
alleged that his great-grandmother’s beauty had caught the
fancy of the deified Julius Caesar during the campaign in
Gaul, and that they had committed adultery.*
These four tested the temper of the rest in private inter-
views, and having bound to the conspiracy those who were
considered fit, they held a conference at Cologne in a private
house, the general feeling in the city being hostile to such plans
as theirs. A few of the Ubii and Tungri, indeed, attended, but
the Treviri and Lingonians were the backbone of the con-
spiracy. Nor would they tolerate deliberation or delay. They
vied with each other in protesting that the Roman people were
crazed with their internal quarrels; legions had been cut to
pieces, Italy devastated, the city was on the point of being
taken, while all her armies were occupied with wars of their
own in different quarters. They need only garrison the Alps
and then, when liberty had taken firm root, the Gallic prov-
inces could debate what limits they desired to their power. All 56
this was no sooner spoken than applauded.
About the remnant of Vitellius’ army they were in some
doubt. Many held that they ought to be killed as being treach-
erous and insubordinate and stained with the blood of their
generals. However, the policy of sparing them carried the day.
To destroy all hope of pardon would only steel their obsti-
nacy: it was much better to seduce them into alliance. Only
the generals need be killed; a guilty conscience and the hope of
pardon would soon bring the common soldiers flocking over
to their flag.
Such was the tenor of their first meeting. Agitators were
sent all over Gaul to stir up war. The conspirators themselves
feigned loyalty to Vocula, hoping to catch him off his guard.
There were, indeed, traitors who reported all this to Vocula,
but he was not strong enough to crush the conspiracy, his
210 the histories [4, 57]
legions being short-handed and unreliable. Caught between
suspect troops on one side and secret enemies on the other, it
seemed his best course under the circumstances to dissemble
in his turn, and thus use their own weapons against them. So
he marched down the river to Cologne. There he found
Claudius Labeo, who after being taken prisoner, as described
above, and exiled to the Frisii, had bribed his guards and
escaped to Cologne. He promised that if Vocula would pro-
vide him with troops, he would go to the Batavi and win back
the better part of their community to the Roman alliance. He
was given a small force of horse and foot; but ventured
nothing among the Batavi. Instead he attracted a few of the
Nervii and Baetasii to his standard, and proceeded to harass
the Canninefates and Marsaci* more by stealth than open
warfare.
57 Lured by the treachery of the Gauls, Vocula marched out
against his enemy. Not far from Vetera, Classicus and Tutor
rode forward on the pretext of scouting, and ratified their
compact with the German leaders. They now for the first time
separated from the legions, and entrenched themselves in a
camp of their own. At this, Vocula protested that Rome was
not as yet so shattered by civil war as to earn the contempt of
tribes like the Treviri and Lingones. She could still rely on
loyal provinces and victorious armies, on the good fortune of
the empire and the avenging hand of the gods. Thus it was
that in former days Sacrovir* and the Aedui, and more lately
Vindex and the Gallic provinces, had each been crushed at a
single battle. Now again these treaty-breakers must expect to
face the same powers of Providence and Destiny. The deified
Julius and the deified Augustus had understood these people
better: it was Galba’s reduction of the tribute* that had
clothed them in enmity and pride. The Gauls were enemies
today because their yoke was easy: when they had been
stripped and plundered they would be friends.
After these spirited words, seeing that Classicus and Tutor
still persisted in their treachery, he turned back and retired to
Novaesium, while the Gauls encamped a couple of miles away
on the plain. There centurions and soldiers flocked to and fro
selling their souls. This was, indeed, an unheard of villainy:
[4, 58] book four 211
that Roman soldiers should swear allegiance to a foreign
power, and offer as a pledge for this heinous crime to kill or
imprison their generals.
Though many urged Vocula to escape, he felt that he must
make a bold stand, so he summoned a meeting and spoke
somewhat as follows:
‘Never before have I addressed you with such feelings of 58
anxiety for you, or with such indifference to my own fate.
That plans are being laid for my destruction I am glad enough
to hear: in such a parlous case as this I look for death as the
end of all my troubles. It is for you that I feel shame and pity.
It is not that a field of battle awaits you, for that would only
accord with the laws of warfare and the just rights of combat-
ants, but because Classicus hopes that with your hands he can
make war upon the Roman people, and flourishes before you
an oath of allegiance to All Gaul. What if fortune and courage
have deserted us for the moment: have we not glorious exam-
ples in the past? Have not often Roman soldiers chosen to die
rather than be driven from their post? Often our allies have
endured the destruction of their cities, and have given them-
selves and their wives and children to the flames,* without any
other reward for such an end save the name of honourable
men.
‘At this very moment Roman troops are enduring famine
and siege at Vetera, and neither fear nor promises can move
them, while we, apart from arms and men and a magnificently
fortified camp, have grain and supplies enough to last through
any length of war. Money, too—the other day there was
enough even for a donative, and whether you choose to say
that it was given you by Vespasian or Vitellius, at any rate you
got it from a Roman emperor. After all the engagements you
have won, after routing the enemy at Gelduba, at Vetera, it
would to be sure be shameful to shirk battle; but you have
your trenches and your walls, and there are ways of gaining
time until armies come flocking from the neighbouring prov-
inces to your rescue. Granted that you dislike me: well, there
are others to lead you, whether general, tribune, centurion,
and even private soldier. But do not let this portent be trum-
peted over the whole world, that Civilis and Classicus are
212 the histories [4, 59]
going to invade Italy with you in their train. Suppose the
Germans and Gauls lead the way to the walls of Rome, will
you turn your arms upon your fatherland? The mere thought
of such a crime is horrible. Will you stand sentry for Tutor the
Treviran? Shall a Batavian give you the signal for battle? Will
you swell the ranks of German hordes? And what will be the
issue of your crime, when the Roman legions take the field
against you? Desertion upon desertion, treachery upon treach-
ery! You will be drifting miserably between the old allegiance
and the new, with the curse of Heaven on your heads. Jupiter
Optimus Maximus, whom we have worshipped at triumph
after triumph for 820 years; and Quirinus,* Father of the city
of Rome, if it was not your pleasure that under my command
this camp be kept from the stain of dishonour, grant at the
least, I humbly beseech you, that it never be defiled with the
pollution of Tutor or Classicus; and to these soldiers of Rome
give either innocence of heart or a speedy repentance before
the harm is done.’
59 The speech was variously received, with feelings fluctuating
between hope, fear, and shame. Vocula withdrew and began
to prepare for his end, but his freedmen and slaves prevented
him from forestalling by his own hand a dreadful death. As it
was, Classicus dispatched Aemilius Longinus, a deserter from
the First Legion, who quickly murdered him. For the com-
manders Herennius and Numisius imprisonment was thought
sufficient. Classicus then assumed the uniform and insignia
of a Roman general, and thus entered the camp. Hardened
though he was to every kind of crime, words failed him, and
he could only read out the oath. Those who were present
swore allegiance to the Empire of All Gaul. He then gave high
promotion to Vocula’s assassin, and rewarded the others each
according to the villainy of his service.
The command was now divided between Tutor and
Classicus. Tutor at the head of a strong force besieged Co-
logne and forced the inhabitants and all the soldiers on
the Upper Rhine to take the same oath of allegiance. At
Mogontiacum he killed the tribunes and drove away the camp
prefect, who had refused to swear. Classicus ordered all the
greatest scoundrels among those who had surrendered to go
[4, 61] book four 213
to Vetera and offer pardon to the besieged if they would yield
to circumstances: otherwise there was no hope for them:
they would suffer famine and sword and every extremity. The
messengers further cited their own example. Torn by a conflict 60
of loyalty and hunger the besieged vacillated between honour
and disgrace. While they hesitated, all their sources of food,
both normal and abnormal, began to fail them. They had
eaten their mules and horses and all the other animals which,
though foul and unclean, necessity had forced them to use. At
last they took to grubbing up the shrubs and roots and the
grass that grew between the stones, and became a model of
endurance in wretchedness—until they sullied their outstand-
ing glory by a shameful conclusion. Envoys were sent to
Civilis begging for their lives. Even then he refused to receive
their petition until they had sworn allegiance to All Gaul.
They agreed that the camp should be plundered; and he sent
guards, some to secure the money, servants, and baggage, and
others to conduct the men themselves out of the camp empty-
handed. About five miles down the road their line was sur-
prised by an ambush of Germans. The bravest fell on the spot;
many were cut down as they scattered; the rest got back to
camp. Civilis, indeed, complained that the Germans had
criminally broken faith and rebuked them for it. There is no
evidence to show whether this was a pretence or whether he
was really unable to restrain his savage troops. The camp was
plundered and torched, and all who had survived the battle
were devoured by the flames.
When Civilis first took up arms against Rome he vowed, as 61
is common with barbarians, to let his ruddled hair grow wild;
now that he had at last accomplished the destruction of the
legions he had it cut. It is said also that he put up some of the
prisoners for his little son to shoot in sport with arrows and
javelins. However, he did not himself swear allegiance to All
Gaul, nor did he force any of the Batavi to do so. He felt that
he could rely on the strength of the Germans, and that if any
quarrel arose with the Gauls* over control of the empire, his
fame would give him an advantage.
Munius Lupercus, one of the legionary commanders,
was sent among other presents to Veleda,* a virgin of the
214 the histories [4, 62]
Bructeran tribe who wielded widespread authority. It is an
ancient custom in Germany to consider many women to be
prophets and (as superstition grows) goddesses. At this mo-
ment Veleda’s influence was at its height, for she had proph-
esied the success of the Germans and the destruction of the
Roman army. However, Lupercus was killed on the journey.
A few of the centurions and tribunes who had been born in
Gaul were detained as a security for good faith. The winter
camps of the legions and of the auxiliary infantry and cavalry
were all dismantled and burnt, with the sole exception of
those at Mogontiacum and Vindonissa.*
62 The Sixteenth Legion and the auxiliary troops who had
surrendered with it now received orders to migrate from their
quarters at Novaesium to Trier, and a date was fixed by which
they had to leave their camp.* They spent the mean time
brooding on various anxieties, the cowards all shuddering at
the precedent of the massacre at Vetera, the better sort cov-
ered with shame at the stigma. What sort of a march would
this be? Whom would they have to lead them? Everything
would be decided by the will of those into whose hands they
had put their life and death. But others were quite indifferent
to the disgrace, and simply stowed their money or cherished
possessions about their persons, while many got their armour
ready and buckled on their swords, as if for battle.
Amidst these reflections the hour struck for their departure,
and it proved more bitter than they had expected. Within the
rampart their degradation was not so noticeable. The open
country and the light of day revealed their depth of shame.
The emperors’ medallions had been torn down and their
standards desecrated, while Gallic ensigns glittered all around
them. They marched in silence, like a long funeral procession,
led by Claudius Sanctus, a man whose sinister appearance—
he had lost one eye—was only surpassed by his weakness of
intellect. Their disgrace was doubled when they were joined
by the other legion, who had left their camp at Bonn. More-
over, the news of their capture had spread, and all the people
who shortly before had trembled at the very name of Rome
now came flocking out from fields and houses, and scattered
far and wide in transports of joy at this unwonted sight. The
[4, 64] book four 215
mob’s insulting glee was too much for the Picenum cavalry
regiment. Defying all Sanctus’ threats and promises, they
turned off to Mogontiacum, and coming by chance upon
Longinus, the man who killed Vocula, they slew him with a
shower of javelins—and thus made a beginning of future
amends. The legions continued without changing their route,
and camped before the walls of Trier.
Highly elated by their success, Civilis and Classicus debated 63
whether they should allow their troops to sack Cologne. Their
natural savagery and lust for plunder inclined them to destroy
the town, but policy forbade it; and they felt that in inaugurat-
ing a new empire a reputation for clemency would be an asset.
Civilis was also moved by the memory of a past service, for at
the beginning of the outbreak his son had been arrested in
Cologne, but they had kept him in honourable custody. How-
ever, the tribes across the Rhine were jealous of this rich and
rising community, and held that the war could only be ended
either by throwing the settlement open to all Germans without
distinction or by destroying it, thereby dispersing the Ubii.
Accordingly the Tencteri, Cologne’s nearest neighbours across 64
the Rhine, dispatched a deputation to lay their demands
before a public meeting of the town. The most belligerent
delegate set them out in some such terms as these:
‘We give thanks to the national gods of Germany, and to
Mars, supreme among gods,* that you are again incorporated
in the German nation and the German name, and we con-
gratulate you that you will now at last become free members
of a free community. Until today the Romans had closed to us
the rivers,* the earth, and almost the very air of heaven, to
prevent all communication or association between us; or else
they offered a still fouler insult to born warriors, that we
should meet under supervision, unarmed and almost naked,
and should pay for the privilege. Now, so that our friendly
alliance may be ratified for all eternity, we demand of you that
you pull down those bulwarks of slavery, the walls of your
town, for even wild beasts lose their spirit if you keep them
caged: that you put to the sword every Roman on your soil,
since tyrants are incompatible with freedom; that all the prop-
erty of those killed form a common stock and no one be
216 the histories [4, 65]
allowed to conceal anything or to secure any private advan-
tage. It must also be open both for us and for you to live on
either river-bank, as our forefathers could in earlier days. As
daylight is the natural heritage of all mankind, so every land
is free to all brave men. Resume again the customs and man-
ners of your own country and throw off those luxurious
habits which enslave Rome’s subjects* far more effectively
than Roman arms. Then, pure and uncorrupt, you will forget
your past slavery and either know none but equals or hold
empire over others.’
65 The townspeople took time to consider these proposals,
and, feeling that their apprehensions for the future forbade
them to assent, while their present nervousness forbade them
to return a plain negative, they answered more or less as
follows:
‘We have seized our first opportunity of freedom with more
haste than prudence, because we wanted to be joined with you
and all our other German kinsmen. As for our town walls,
seeing that the Roman armies are massing at this moment, it
would be safer for us to heighten them than to pull them
down. All the foreigners from Italy or the provinces who lived
on our soil have either perished in the war or fled to their own
homes. As for the original settlers, who are united to us by ties
of marriage, they and their offspring regard this as their home,
and we do not think you are so unreasonable as to ask us to
kill our parents and brothers and children. All trade duties
and tariffs we remit. You may cross the Rhine without super-
vision, but you must come in daylight and unarmed until
today’s novel laws grow into a long-established custom. As
arbitrators we will appoint Civilis and Veleda, and we will
ratify our compact in their presence.’
Thus the Tencteri were pacified. A deputation was sent with
presents to Civilis and Veleda, and obtained all that the people
of Cologne desired. They were not, however, allowed to ap-
proach and speak to Veleda or even to see her, but were kept
at a distance to inspire in them the greater awe. She herself
lived at the top of a high tower, and one of her relatives was
appointed to carry the questions and answers like a mediator
between God and man.
[4, 67] book four 217
Now that the alliance with Cologne had enhanced his 66
power, Civilis determined to win over the neighbouring com-
munities or to attack any who opposed him. He took control
of the Sunuci* and formed their fighting strength into cohorts,
but then found his advance barred by Claudius Labeo at the
head of a hastily recruited band of Baetasii, Tungri, and
Nervii. He had forestalled the enemy in securing the bridge
over the Maas, and relied on the strength of his position. A
skirmish in this narrow space proved indecisive, until the
Germans swam across* and took Labeo in the rear. At this
point Civilis by a bold move—or possibly by arrangement—
rode into the lines of the Tungri and called out in a loud voice,
‘Our object in taking up arms is not to secure empire for the
Batavi and Treviri over other tribes. We are far from any such
arrogance. Take us as allies. I am come to join you; whether
as general or as private it is for you to choose.’
This had a great effect on the common soldiers, who began
to sheathe their swords. Then two of their chieftains,
Campanus and Juvenalis, surrendered the entire tribe. Labeo
escaped before he was surrounded. Civilis also received the
allegiance of the Baetasii and Nervii, and added their forces to
his own. His power was now immense, for all the Gallic
communities were either terrified or ready to offer willing
support.
In the mean time, Julius Sabinus, who had destroyed every 67
memorial of the Roman alliance, assumed the title of Caesar
and proceeded to hurry a large unwieldy horde of his tribes-
men against the Sequani, a neighbouring community faithful
to us. The Sequani accepted battle: the good cause prospered:
the Lingones were routed. The terror with which Sabinus fled
the field matched the rash haste with which he had plunged
into battle. Wishing to spread a rumour of his death, he took
refuge in a house and set fire to it, and was thus supposed to
have perished by his own act. I shall, however, relate in due
course the devices by which he lay in hiding* and prolonged
his life for nine more years, and describe also the loyalty of his
friends and the memorable example set by his wife Epponina.
This success on the part of the Sequani removed all momen-
tum from the war. The Gallic communities gradually came to
218 the histories [4, 68]
their senses and began to remember their moral and legal
obligations. In this movement the Remi* took the lead. They
circulated a notice throughout Gaul, summoning a meeting
of delegates to consider whether liberty or peace was the
preferable alternative.
68 At Rome, however, everything was exaggerated into a dis-
aster, and Mucianus began to feel anxious. He had already
appointed Annius Gallus and Petillius Cerialis to the chief
command, and, distinguished officers as they were, he was
afraid the conduct of such a war might be too much for them.
Moreover, he could not leave Rome without government; he
was afraid of Domitian’s indomitable passions,* and, as I
have said, was suspicious of Antonius Primus and Arrius
Varus. Varus, as commanding the Guards, still controlled a
powerful military force; Mucianus accordingly displaced him,
but, as a compensation, made him director of the corn supply.
As he had also to placate Domitian, who was inclined to
support Varus, he appointed to the command of the Guards
Arrecinus Clemens,* who was connected by marriage with
Vespasian and greatly favoured by Domitian. He also im-
pressed it upon Domitian that Clemens’ father had filled this
command with great distinction under Gaius:* that it would
please the troops to have someone of the same name, and that,
although he was a member of the Senate, he was quite able to
fill both positions.*
Mucianus then chose his staff, some the most eminent men
in the country, others recommended by private influence.
Meanwhile both he and Domitian made ready to start, but
with very different feelings. Domitian was full of the sanguine
haste of youth, while Mucianus kept devising delays to check
this enthusiasm. He was afraid that if Domitian once seized
control of an army, his youthful aggression and his bad ad-
visers would lead him into action prejudicial to both peace
and war. Three victorious legions, the Eighth, Eleventh, and
Thirteenth; the Twenty-First—one of Vitellius’ legions—and
the Second,* which had been newly enrolled, all started for
the front, some by way of the Pennine and Cottian Alps,
others over the Graian Alps. The Fourteenth Legion was
summoned from Britain, and the Sixth and First from Spain.
[4, 70] book four 219
The rumour that this force was on its way, along with their
own natural character, inclined the Gallic communities to
adopt a sober policy. Their delegates now met in the territory
of the Remi, where they found the representatives of the
Treviri awaiting them. One of these, Julius Valentinus, who
was the keenest instigator of a hostile policy, delivered a set
speech, in which he heaped spiteful aspersions on the Roman
people, making all the charges which are usually brought
against great empires. He was an unruly agitator, whose de-
ranged rhetoric made him popular with the crowd. However, 69
Julius Auspex, a chieftain of the Remi, enlarged upon the
power of Rome and the blessings of peace. Any sluggard can
begin a war, he said, but in conducting it the risks are run by
the energetic: and the legions were already upon them. Thus
he restrained them, awakening a sense of respect and duty in
all the sager breasts, and appealing to the fears of the younger
men. So, while applauding Valentinus’ courage, they followed
the advice of Auspex.
The Treviri and Lingones were manifestly handicapped in
Gaul by the fact that in Vindex’s rising they had sided with
Verginius. Many, too, were held back by inter-provincial jeal-
ousy. Where would the headquarters of the war be? To whom
were they to look for authority and auspices? If all went well,
which town would be chosen as the seat of government? So
without achieving victory, they were already in disunion.
Quarrels broke out, as some boasted of their great connec-
tions, others of their wealth and strength, others of their
ancient lineage, until the future appeared so wearisome that
they voted for the existing state of things. Letters were written
to the Treviri in the name of Gaul, bidding them cease hostili-
ties, suggesting that pardon might be obtained, and that many
were ready to plead their cause if they showed repentance.
Valentinus, however, opposed this, and made his tribesmen
offer a deaf ear to it; but he was less anxious to organize a
campaign than to make speeches on every possible occasion.
The result was that neither the Treviri nor the Lingones nor 70
the other rebel tribes behaved as if aware of the serious risks
they were undertaking. Even the leaders did not act in concert.
Civilis wandered over the wilds of the Belgic country, trying to
220 the histories [4, 70]
catch or expel Claudius Labeo. Classicus mainly lived a life of
leisure, as if he were enjoying the fruits of empire. Even Tutor
seemed in no hurry to garrison the Upper Rhine and block the
Alpine passes.
In the mean time, the Twenty-First Legion launched an
invasion from Vindonissa, while Sextilius Felix advanced
through Raetia with some auxiliary cohorts. These were
joined by the ‘Select’ cavalry regiment that had been raised by
Vitellius and then deserted to Vespasian. This was com-
manded by Julius Briganticus, the son of Civilis’ sister: for
uncle and nephew hated each other with all the aggravated
bitterness of near relatives. Tutor had swelled his force of
Treviri with fresh levies from the Vangiones, Triboci, and
Caeracates,* and now stiffened it with Roman veterans, both
horse and foot, tempting or intimidating some legionaries into
joining them. These soldiers first cut up an auxiliary cohort
sent forward by Sextilius Felix, but on the advance of the
Roman army with its generals they loyally deserted to their
old flag, and were followed by the Triboci, Vangiones, and
Caeracates. Tutor, accompanied by his Treviri, avoided
Mogontiacum and fell back on Bingium,* relying on his posi-
tion there, as he had broken down the bridge over the River
Nava.* However, Sextilius’ cohorts followed him up; a traitor
showed them a ford; Tutor was routed.
This disaster was a crushing blow to the Treviri. The rank
and file dropped their weapons and scattered through the
fields, while some of their chieftains, hoping it might be
thought that they had been the first to lay down arms, took
refuge among tribes who had never repudiated the Roman
alliance. The legions which had been moved, as I said above,
from Novaesium and Bonn to Trier, now administered to
themselves the oath of allegiance to Vespasian. This happened
in Valentinus’ absence. When he arrived in furious ex-
citement, ready to spread universal ruin and confusion,
the legions withdrew into the friendly territory of the
Mediomatrici. Valentinus and Tutor then led the Treviri for-
cibly back into the field, but first they killed the two com-
manders, Herennius and Numisius. By diminishing the hope
of pardon they tried to cement their bond of crime.
[4, 71] book four 221
Such was the position when Petillius Cerialis reached 71
Mogontiacum. His arrival roused high hopes. He was himself
thirsting for battle, and being always better at despising his
enemy than at taking precautions, he fired his men by deliver-
ing a spirited harangue, promising that directly there was a
chance of joining with the enemy he would engage battle
without delay. He dismissed the Gallic recruits to their homes
with a message that the legions were enough for the empire:
the allies could resume their peaceful occupations, feeling
assured that the war was practically ended, now that Roman
troops had taken it in hand. This action rendered the Gauls all
the more tractable. They made less difficulty about taxation,
now that they had got their men back again, while his disdain
for them only sharpened their sense of duty.
On the other side, when Civilis and Classicus heard of
Tutor’s defeat, the destruction of the Treviri, and the universal
success of their enemy’s arms, they fell into a panic, hastily
mobilized their own scattered forces, and kept sending mes-
sages to Valentinus not to risk a decisive battle. This only
hastened Cerialis’ movements. He sent guides to the legions
stationed in the country of the Mediomatrici to lead them
back onto the enemy by the shortest route. Then, assembling
all the troops to be found in Mogontiacum together with his
own force, he marched in three days to Rigodulum.* Here, on
a spot protected by the mountains on one side and the Moselle
on the other, Valentinus had already taken his stand with a
large force of Treviri. His camp had been strengthened with
trenches and stone barricades, but these fortifications had no
terrors for the Roman general. He ordered the infantry to
force the position in front, while the cavalry were to ascend
the hill. Valentinus’ hurriedly assembled forces filled him with
contempt, for he felt that whatever advantage their position
might give them, the courage of his men would outweigh it. A
short delay was necessary while the cavalry climbed, exposed
to the enemy’s fire. But when the close combat began, the
Treviri tumbled headlong down the hill like a landslide. Some
of our cavalry, who had ridden round by an easier gradient,
captured several Belgic chieftains, including their general,
Valentinus.
222 the histories [4, 72]
72 On the next day Cerialis entered Trier. The troops clam-
oured greedily for its destruction. It was, they said, the native
town of Classicus and of Tutor: these were the men who had
wickedly entrapped and slaughtered the legions. Its guilt was
far worse than that of Cremona, which had been wiped off the
face of Italy for causing the victors a single night’s delay. This
place stood untouched on the German frontier, glorying in the
spoil of Roman armies and the blood of Roman generals. The
plunder could go to the imperial Treasury. It would be enough
for them to see the rebel town in smoking ruins; that would be
some compensation for the destruction of so many camps.
Cerialis was afraid of soiling his reputation if it was said that
he gave his men a taste for cruelty and riot, so he suppressed
their indignation. They obeyed him, too, for now that civil
war was done with, there was less insubordination on foreign
service.
Their thoughts were now distracted by the pitiful appear-
ance of the legions who had been summoned from the country
of the Mediomatrici.* Miserably conscious of their guilt, they
stood with eyes rooted to the ground. When the armies met,
there were no greetings: they had no answer for those who
offered comfort and encouragement: they skulked in their
tents, shunning the light of day. It was not fear of punishment
so much as the shame of their disgrace which thus over-
whelmed them. Even the victorious army showed their bewil-
derment: hardly venturing to make an audible petition, they
craved pardon for them with silent tears. At length Cerialis
soothed their alarm. He insisted that all events caused by
dissension between officers and men, or by the enemy’s guile,
were to be regarded as acts of destiny. They should count this
as their first day of service and sworn allegiance: neither he
nor the Emperor remembered past misdeeds. He then gave
them quarters in his own camp, and sent orders round the
separate companies that no one in the heat of any quarrel
should taunt a fellow-soldier with mutiny or defeat.
73 Cerialis next summoned the Treviri and Lingones, and
addressed them as follows:
‘I am unpractised in public speaking, for it is only on the
field that I have asserted the valour of the Roman people. Yet
[4, 74] book four 223
since words have so much weight with you, and since you
judge good and evil not by their actual qualities but by what
agitators tell you, I have decided to make a few remarks,
which, as the war is practically over,* are likely to be more
profitable to you the audience than to me the speaker.
‘Roman generals and emperors originally set foot in your
country and the rest of Gaul from no motives of greed, but at
the call of your ancestors, who were worn almost to ruin by
dissension. The Germans who were summoned to help had
forced the yoke of slavery on allies and enemies alike.* You
know how often we fought against the Cimbri and the
Teutons,* with what infinite pains and with what striking
success our armies have undertaken German wars. All that is
famous. It was not to protect Italy that we occupied the Rhine,
but to prevent some second Ariovistus making himself master
of All Gaul. Do you imagine that Civilis and his Batavi and the
other tribes across the Rhine care any more about you than
their ancestors cared about your fathers and grandfathers?
The Germans have always had the same motives for crossing
into Gaul—lust, greed, and the desire to change their dwell-
ings. They wanted to leave their marshes and deserts, and to
make themselves masters of this magnificently fertile soil and
of you who live on it. Of course they use specious pretexts and
talk about liberty. No one has ever wanted to enslave others
and play the tyrant without making use of the very same
phrases.
‘Tyranny and warfare were always rife throughout the 74
length and breadth of Gaul, until you accepted Roman gov-
ernment. Often as we have been provoked, we have never
imposed upon you any burden by right of conquest, except
what was necessary to maintain peace. Tribes cannot be kept
quiet without troops. You cannot have troops without pay;
and you cannot raise pay without taxation. In every other
respect you are treated as our equals. You frequently com-
mand our legions yourselves: you govern this and other prov-
inces yourselves.* We have no exclusive privileges. Though
you live so far away, you enjoy the blessings of a praiseworthy
emperor no less than we do, whereas the tyrant only oppresses
his nearest neighbours.
224 the histories [4, 75]
‘You must put up with depravity and greed* in your mas-
ters, just as you put up with bad crops or excessive rain, or
any other natural disaster. Vice will last as long as mankind.
But these evils are not continual. There are intervals of good
government, which make up for them. You cannot surely
hope that the tyranny of Tutor and Classicus would mean
milder government, or that they will need less taxation for the
armies they will have to raise to keep the Germans and Britons
at bay. For if the Romans were driven out—which Heaven
forbid—what could ensue save universal warfare between all
races? During 800 years, by good fortune and good organiza-
tion, this structure of empire has been consolidated. It cannot
be uprooted without destroying the uprooters. And it is you
who would run the greatest risk of all, since you have gold and
rich resources, which are the prime causes of war. You must
learn, then, to love and foster peace and the city of Rome in
which we all, vanquished and victors alike, have the same
rights. You, who have tried both conditions, should take
warning that submission and safety are better than rebellion
and ruin.’
By such words as these he quieted and reassured his
audience, who had been afraid of more rigorous measures.
75 While the victorious army was occupying Trier, Civilis and
Classicus sent a letter to Cerialis, the gist of which was that
Vespasian was dead, though the news was being suppressed;
Rome and Italy were exhausted by civil war: Mucianus and
Domitian were mere names with no power behind them. If
Cerialis desired to be emperor of All Gaul, they would be
satisfied with the boundaries of their own states: but if he
should prefer battle, that, too, they would not deny him.
Cerialis made no answer to Civilis and Classicus, but sent the
letter and its bearer to Domitian.
The enemy now approached Trier from every quarter in
detached bands, and Cerialis was much criticized for allowing
them to unite, when he might have cut them off one by one.
The Roman army now threw a trench and rampart round
their camp, for they had rashly settled in it without seeing to
the fortifications.
[4, 77] book four 225
In the German camp different opinions were keenly de- 76
bated. Civilis contended that they should wait for the tribes
from across the Rhine, whose arrival would spread a panic
sufficient to crush the enfeebled forces of the Romans. The
Gauls, he urged, were simply a prey for the winning side and,
as it was, the Belgae, who were their sole strength, had
declared for him or were at least sympathetic.
Tutor maintained that delay only strengthened the Roman
force, since their armies were converging from every quarter.
‘They have brought one legion across from Britain, others
have been summoned from Spain, or are on their way from
Italy. Nor are they men recruited in haste, but experienced
veterans, while the Germans, for whose aid we hope, are
subject to no discipline or control but do whatever they like.
You can only bribe them with money or presents, and the
Romans have the advantage of us there: besides, however
keen he is to fight, a man always prefers peace to danger, so
long as the pay is the same. But if we engage them at once,
Cerialis has nothing but legions created from the remnants of
the German army, who have sworn allegiance to the Gallic
Empire. The very fact that they have just unexpectedly routed
Valentinus’ undisciplined band serves to fuel the imprudence
of both soldiers and general. They will venture out again and
will fall into the hands—not of an inexperienced boy, who is
more practised in words and speeches than in sword and steel,
but of Civilis and Classicus, at the sight of whom fear, flight,
and famine will be reawakened in their minds; and they will
remember how often their lives were at their captors’ mercy.
Nor is it any liking for the Romans that keeps back the Treviri
and Lingones: they will fly to arms again, when once their
fears are dispelled.’
Classicus finally settled the difference of opinion by declar-
ing for Tutor’s policy, and they promptly carried it out. The 77
Ubii and Lingones were placed in the centre, the Batavian
cohorts on the right, and on the left the Bructeri and Tencteri.
Advancing, some by the hills and some by the path between
the road and the River Moselle, they took the Romans com-
pletely by surprise. So sudden was their onslaught that
226 the histories [4, 78]
Cerialis, who had not spent the night in camp, was still in bed
when he heard almost simultaneously that the fighting had
begun and that his troops were losing. He cursed the messen-
gers for panicking, until he saw the whole extent of the
disaster with his own eyes. The legionary camp had been
forced, the cavalry routed, and the intervening bridge over the
Moselle, which connects the suburbs with the town, was held
by the enemy. But confusion had no terrors for Cerialis.
Pulling back fugitives bodily, flinging himself without any
armour into the rain of missiles, he succeeded by his inspired
imprudence and the assistance of the braver men in retaking
the bridge. Leaving a picked band to hold it, he hurried back
to the camp, where he found that the companies of the legions
which had surrendered at Bonn and Novaesium were all bro-
ken up, few men were left at their posts, and the eagles were
all but surrounded by the enemy.
He turned on them in blazing anger: ‘It is not Flaccus or
Vocula that you are deserting. There is nothing treasonable
about me. I have done nothing to be ashamed of, except that
I was rash enough to believe that you had forgotten your
Gallic ties and awakened to the memory of your Roman
allegiance. Am I to be numbered with the Numisiuses and
Herenniuses? Are all your generals to have fallen either by
your hands or the enemy’s? Go and tell the news to Vespasian,
or rather, to Civilis and Classicus—they are nearer at hand:
that you have deserted your general on the field of battle.
There will yet come legions who will not leave me unavenged
or you unpunished.’
78 All he said was true, and the officers heaped the same
reproaches on their heads. The men were drawn up in cohorts
and companies, since it was impossible to deploy with the
enemy swarming round them, and, the fight being inside the
rampart, the tents and baggage were a serious encumbrance.
Tutor and Classicus and Civilis, each at his post, were busy
rallying their forces, appealing to the Gauls to fight for free-
dom, the Batavians for glory, and the Germans for plunder.
Everything, indeed, went well for the enemy until the Twenty-
First Legion, who had rallied in a clearer space than any of the
others, first withstood their charge and then repulsed them.
[4, 79] book four 227
Then, by divine providence, the enemy suddenly lost their
nerve: the victors turned tail. They themselves attributed their
panic to the appearance of the Roman auxiliaries, who, after
being scattered by the first charge, formed again on the hill-
tops and were taken for fresh reinforcements. However, what
really cost the Gauls their victory was that they let their enemy
alone and indulged in ignoble squabbles over the spoil. Thus
after Cerialis’ carelessness had almost caused disaster, his
pluck now saved the day, and he followed up his success by
capturing the enemy’s camp and destroying it before nightfall.
Cerialis’ troops were allowed short respite. Cologne was 79
clamouring for help and offering to surrender Civilis’ wife and
sister and Classicus’ daughter, who had been left behind there
as pledges of the alliance. In the mean time the inhabitants had
massacred the Germans billeted separately in private house-
holds. They were now alarmed at this, and had good reason to
implore aid before the enemy could recover their strength and
prepare for their desired objective—or at any rate for revenge.
Indeed, Civilis already had designs on Cologne, and he
was still formidable, for the most ferocious of his cohorts,
composed of Chauci and Frisii, was still in full force at
Tolbiacum,* within the territory of Cologne. However, he
changed his plans on receiving the bitter news that this force
had been entrapped and destroyed by the inhabitants of
Cologne. They had entertained the Germans at a lavish ban-
quet, drugged them with wine, shut the doors upon them and
burned the place to the ground; at the same moment Cerialis
hurried his army to relieve the town.
A further anxiety haunted Civilis. He was afraid that the
Fourteenth Legion, in conjunction with the fleet from Britain,
might harry the Batavians encircled by the North Sea. How-
ever, Fabius Priscus, who was in command, led his troops by
land into the country of the Nervii and Tungri, who surren-
dered to him. The Canninefates made an unprovoked attack
upon the fleet and sank or captured the greater number of the
ships. They also defeated a mass of Nervian volunteers who
had been recruited in the Roman interest. Classicus secured a
further success against an advance guard of cavalry which
Cerialis had sent forward to Novaesium. These repeated
228 the histories [4, 80]
checks, though unimportant in themselves, served to dim the
lustre of the recent Roman victory.
80 It was about this time that Mucianus gave orders for the
murder of Vitellius’ son, on the plea that dissension would
continue until all the seeds of war were stamped out. He also
refused to allow Antonius Primus to go out on Domitian’s
staff, being alarmed at his popularity among the troops and
at the man’s own vanity, which would brook no equal, much
less a superior. Antonius accordingly went to join Vespasian,
whose reception, though not hostile, proved a disappoint-
ment. The Emperor was drawn two ways. On the one side
were Antonius’ services: it was undeniable that his generalship
had ended the war. In the other scale were Mucianus’ letters.
Besides which, everyone else raked up the scandals of his past
life and inveighed against his vanity and bad temper. In his
arrogance Antonius himself did his best to provoke hostility
by expatiating to excess on his services, decrying the other
generals as incompetent cowards, and stigmatizing Caecina as
a prisoner who had surrendered. Thus without any open
breach of friendship he gradually declined lower and lower in
the Emperor’s favour.
81 During the months which Vespasian spent at Alexandria
waiting for the regular season of the summer winds* to ensure
a safe voyage, there occurred many miraculous events mani-
festing the goodwill of Heaven and a certain favour of Provi-
dence towards him. At Alexandria a commoner, whose eyes
were well known to have wasted away, on the advice of
Serapis (whom this superstitious people worship as their chief
god) fell at Vespasian’s feet demanding with sobs a cure for
his blindness, and imploring that the Emperor would deign to
moisten his eyes and eyeballs with the spittle from his mouth.
Another man with a maimed hand, also inspired by Serapis,
besought Vespasian to imprint his footmark on it.
At first Vespasian laughed at them and refused, but they
insisted. He half-feared a reputation for gullibility, but was
half-moved to hope by their petition and the flattery of his
courtiers. He eventually told the doctors to form an opinion
whether such cases of blindness and deformity could be
remedied by human aid. The doctors discussed the question
[4, 83] book four 229
from various angles, saying that in the one case the power of
sight was not extinct and would return if the impediments
were removed; in the other case the limbs were distorted and
could be set right again by the application of an effective
remedy: this might be the will of Heaven and the Emperor had
perhaps been chosen as the divine instrument. They added
that he would gain all the credit if the cure were successful,
while, if it failed, the ridicule would fall on the unfortunate
patients.
This convinced Vespasian that there were no limits to his
destiny: nothing now seemed incredible. To the great excite-
ment of the bystanders, he stepped forward with a smile on his
face and did as the men desired him. Immediately the hand
recovered its functions and daylight shone once more in the
blind man’s eyes. Those who were present still attest both
miracles today, when there is nothing to gain by lying.
This occurrence deepened Vespasian’s desire to visit the 82
holy place and consult Serapis about the fortunes of the em-
pire. He gave orders that no one else was to be allowed in the
temple, and then went in. While absorbed in his devotions, he
saw behind him an Egyptian noble named Basilides, whom he
knew to be lying ill several days’ journey from Alexandria.
He inquired of the priests whether Basilides had entered the
temple that day; he inquired of everyone he met whether he
had been seen in the city. Eventually he sent some horsemen,
who discovered that at the time Basilides had been eighty
miles away. Vespasian therefore took what he had seen for a
divine apparition, and from the name ‘Basilides’ deduced the
tenor of the oracle’s response.*
The origins of the god Serapis have not yet been canvassed 83
in any Roman authorities.* The priests of Egypt give the
following account: King Ptolemy,* the first of the Macedoni-
ans to put the power of Egypt on a firm footing, was engaged
in building walls and temples, and instituting religious cults
for the newly founded city of Alexandria, when there ap-
peared to him in his sleep a young man of striking beauty and
superhuman stature, who advised him to send his most faith-
ful friends to Pontus to fetch his image: this would bring
blessings to the kingdom, and its resting-place would grow
230 the histories [4, 84]
great and famous. The youth then appeared to ascend into
heaven in a sheet of flame.
Impressed by this miraculous omen, Ptolemy revealed his
nocturnal vision to the priests of Egypt, who are used to
interpreting such things. As they had but little knowledge of
Pontus or of foreign matters, he consulted an Athenian named
Timotheus, a member of the Eumolpid clan, whom he had
brought over from Eleusis* to act as priest of the religious
rites, and asked him what strange cult and what god was
meant. Timotheus found some people who had travelled to
Pontus and learnt from them that near a town called Sinope
there was a temple, which had long been famous in the neigh-
bourhood as the seat of Jupiter Dis: indeed, near it there
also stood a female figure, which was commonly called
Proserpina.*
Ptolemy was like most despots: easily terrified at first, but
liable, when his panic was over, to think more of his pleasures
than of his religious duties. The incident was gradually forgot-
ten, and other thoughts occupied his mind until the vision was
repeated in a more terrible and impressive form than before,
and he was threatened with death and the destruction of his
kingdom if he failed to fulfil his instructions. He at once gave
orders that an embassy should be made ready with presents
for King Scydrothemis, who was then reigning at Sinope; on
the envoys’ departure he instructed them to consult the oracle
of Apollo at Delphi.* They made a successful voyage and
received a clear answer from the oracle: they were to go and
bring back the image of Apollo’s father* but leave behind his
sister’s.
84 On their arrival at Sinope they laid their king’s presents,
petition, and instructions before Scydrothemis. He was in
some perplexity. He was afraid of the god and yet alarmed by
the threats of his subjects, who opposed the project: then,
again, he often felt tempted by the envoys’ presents and prom-
ises. Three years passed. Ptolemy’s zeal never abated for a
moment. He persisted in his petition, and kept sending more
and more distinguished envoys, more ships, more gold. Then
a threatening vision appeared to Scydrothemis, bidding him
no longer thwart the god’s design. When he still hesitated, he
[4, 85] book four 231
was beset by every kind of disease and disaster: the gods were
plainly angry, and every day the burden of their wrath grew
greater. He summoned an assembly and laid before it the
divine commands, his own and Ptolemy’s visions, and the
troubles with which they were visited. The king found
the people unfavourable. They were jealous of Egypt and
fearful of their own future; they surged round the temple.
The story now grows grander still. The god himself, it says,
embarked unaided* on one of the ships that lay beached on
the shore, and by a miracle accomplished the long sea-journey
and landed at Alexandria within three days. A temple worthy
of so important a city was then built in the quarter called
Rhacotis, on the site of an ancient shrine of Serapis and Isis.*
This is the most widely accepted account of the god’s origin
and arrival.
Some people, I am well aware, maintain that the god was
brought from the Syrian town of Seleucia during the reign of
Ptolemy, the third of that name. Others, again, say it was this
same Ptolemy, but make the place of origin the famous town
of Memphis,* once the bulwark of ancient Egypt. Many take
the god for Aesculapius,* because he cures disease: others for
Osiris, the oldest of the local gods; many, again, for Jupiter, as
being the sovereign lord of the world. But the majority of
people, either judging by what are clearly attributes of the god
or by an ingenious process of conjecture, identify him with
Father Dis.
Domitian and Mucianus were now on their way to the Alps. 85
Before reaching the mountains they received the good news of
the victory over the Treviri, the truth of which was fully
attested by the presence of the enemy general Valentinus. His
courage was in no way crushed and his face still bore witness
to the proud spirit he had shown. He was allowed a hearing,
merely to see what he was made of, and condemned to death.
At his execution someone cast it in his teeth that his country
was conquered. He replied, ‘I have death as my consolation.’
Mucianus now gave utterance to an idea which he had long
cherished, though he pretended it was a sudden inspiration.
Since by Heaven’s grace, he said, the forces of the enemy had
been broken, it would ill befit Domitian, now that the war was
232 the histories [4, 86]
practically over, to stand in the way of those others to whom
the credit belonged. Were the fortunes of the empire or the
safety of Gaul at stake, it would be right that a Caesar should
take the field; the Canninefates and Batavi should be con-
signed to minor generals. Domitian should stay at Lyons and
there show the power and prosperity of the throne from close
quarters. By abstaining from trifling risks he would be ready
to cope with greater ones.
86 The ruse was detected, but Mucianus’ deference meant that
it could not be unmasked; they therefore proceeded to Lyons.
From there Domitian is supposed to have sent secret messen-
gers to Cerialis to test his loyalty, and to ask whether the
general would transfer his army and his authority to him,
should he present himself in person. Whether Domitian’s idea
was to plan war against his father or to acquire power and
support against his brother was unclear; for with salutary
restraint Cerialis parried his proposal and treated it as a boy’s
day-dream. Realizing that older men despised his youth,
Domitian gave up even those limited functions of government
which he had hitherto performed. He hid his thoughts from
scrutiny beneath an ingenuous and unassuming appearance,
feigning literary tastes and a passion for poetry. His aim was
to conceal his real self and withdraw from all rivalry with
his brother, whose gentler and altogether different nature he
utterly misconstrued.
book five 233
BOOK FIVE
Early in this same year Titus Caesar had been entrusted by his 1
father with the task of completing the reduction of Judaea.
While he and his father were both still ordinary citizens, Titus
had distinguished himself as a soldier. Now his efficiency and
reputation were steadily increasing, while the provinces and
armies vied with one another in their enthusiasm for him.
Wishing to seem independent of his good fortune, he always
showed dignity and energy in the field. His affable and
friendly conversation called forth devotion. He regularly
mingled with his soldiers at their duties or on the march
without compromising his dignity as general.
Three legions awaited him in Judaea, the Fifth, Tenth, and
Fifteenth, all veterans from his father’s army. These were
reinforced by the Twelfth from Syria, and by detachments of
the Twenty-Second and the Third brought over from Alexan-
dria. This force was accompanied by twenty auxiliary cohorts
and eight regiments of cavalry; also the Kings Agrippa and
Sohaemus and auxiliaries from King Antiochus, a strong force
of Arabs, who had the hatred for the Jews usual between
neighbours, and numerous individuals who had come from
Rome and the rest of Italy, each tempted by the hope of
securing the first place in the Emperor’s still unoccupied affec-
tions. With this force Titus entered the enemy’s country; his
column was drawn up in order, he sent out scouts everywhere,
and held himself ready to fight. He pitched his camp not far
from Jerusalem.
Since I am coming now to describe the last days of this 2
famous city, it may not seem out of place to recount here its
early history.
It is said that the Jews are refugees from Crete who settled
in the furthest part of Libya at the time when Saturn was
forcibly deposed by Jupiter.* Evidence for this is sought in the
name: Ida is a famous mountain in Crete inhabited by the
Idaei, whose name became lengthened into the foreign form
Judaei. Others say that in the reign of Isis* the superfluous
234 the histories [5, 3]
population of Egypt, under the leadership of Hierosolymus
and Juda, discharged itself upon the neighbouring districts;
while there are many who think the Jews of Ethiopian stock,
driven by fear and hatred to emigrate in the reign of King
Cepheus.* Another tradition makes them Assyrian refugees*
who, lacking lands of their own, occupied a district of Egypt,
and later took to building cities of their own and tilling
Hebrew territory and the frontierland of Syria. Yet another
version assigns to the Jews an illustrious origin as the descend-
ants of the Solymi—a tribe praised in the poems of Homer*—
who founded a city and called it Jerusalem* after their own
name.
3 Most authorities, however, agree* that a foul and disfigur-
ing disease once broke out in Egypt, and that King Bocchoris,*
on approaching the oracle of Ammon* and inquiring for a
remedy, was told to purge his kingdom and to transport all
the victims into another country, for they had earned the
disfavour of Heaven. A motley crowd was collected and aban-
doned in the desert. While all the other outcasts lay idly
lamenting, one of them, named Moses, advised them not to
look for help to gods or men, since both had deserted them,
but to trust rather in themselves and accept as divine the
guidance of the first being by whose aid they should get out of
their present plight. They agreed, and set out blindly to march
wherever chance might lead them. Their worst distress came
from lack of water. When they were already at death’s door
and lying prostrate all over the plain, a drove of wild asses
moved away from their pasture to a rock densely covered with
trees. Guessing the truth from the grassy nature of the ground,
Moses followed and disclosed some streams with an ample
flow of water. This restored them. Continuing their march for
six successive days, on the seventh they routed the natives and
gained possession of the country. There they consecrated their
city and their Temple.*
4 To ensure his future hold over the people, Moses intro-
duced a new cult, which was the opposite of all other reli-
gions. All that we hold sacred they held profane, and they
allowed practices which we abominate. They dedicated in the
innermost part of the Temple an image of the animal whose
[5, 5] book five 235
guidance had put an end to their wandering and thirst,* after
first killing a ram, apparently as an insult to Ammon.* They
also sacrifice bulls, because the Egyptians worship the bull
Apis. Pigs are subject to leprosy, the foul plague with which
they too were once infected; so they abstain from pork in
memory of their misfortune. Their frequent fasts bear witness
to the long famine they once endured, and, in token of their
rushed meal, Jewish bread is made without leaven.* They are
said to have devoted the seventh day to rest because that day
brought an end to their toils.* Later, finding idleness alluring,
they gave up the seventh year as well to sloth.* Others main-
tain that they do this in honour of Saturn, either because their
religious principles are derived from the Idaei, who are sup-
posed to have been driven out with Saturn and become the
ancestors of the Jewish people; or else because, of the seven
stars* which govern the lives of men, the star of Saturn moves
in the topmost orbit and exercises the mightiest influence, and
also because most of the heavenly bodies move round their
courses in multiples of seven.
Whatever their origin, these rites are sanctioned by their 5
antiquity. Their other customs are perverted and abominable,
and owe their prevalence to their depravity. All the most
worthless rascals, renouncing their national cults, started
showering them with offerings and tribute.* This is one cause
of Jewish prosperity. Another is that they are obstinately loyal
to each other and always ready to show compassion, whereas
they feel nothing but hatred and enmity for the rest of the
world. They separate themselves from others both in meals
and in bed: though immoderate in sexual indulgence, they
refrain from intercourse with foreign women: among them-
selves anything is allowed. They have introduced circumcision
to distinguish themselves from other people.* Those who are
converted to their customs adopt the same practice, and the
first lessons they learn are to despise the gods, to renounce
their country, and to regard parents, children, and brethren as
worthless.
However, they take steps to increase their numbers. They
count it a crime even to kill any of their later-born children,*
and they believe that the souls of those who die in battle or
236 the histories [5, 6]
under execution are immortal. Thus they think much of
having children and nothing of facing death. They prefer to
bury and not burn their dead. In this, as in their concern for
and belief in an underworld, they conform to Egyptian
custom. Their ideas of the divine are quite different. The
Egyptians worship most of their gods as animals, or in shapes
half animal and half human. The Jews acknowledge one god
only, of whom they have a purely spiritual conception. They
think it impious to make images of gods in human shape out
of perishable materials. Their god is almighty and eternal,
inimitable and without end. They therefore set up no statues
in their temples, nor even in their cities, refusing this homage
to their kings and this honour to the Roman emperors. How-
ever, the fact that their priests intoned to the flute and cymbals
and wore wreaths of ivy,* and that a golden vine* was found
in their Temple, has led some people to think that they wor-
ship Father Liber,* the conqueror of the East. But this is
completely out of accord with their cult. Liber instituted joy-
ous and cheerful rites, but the Jewish ritual is preposterous
and sordid.
6 The country of the Jews is bounded by Arabia on the east,
by Egypt on the south, and on the west by Phoenicia and the
sea. On the Syrian frontier they have a distant view towards
the north. Physically they are healthy and hardy. Rain is rare;
the soil fertile; its products are of the same kind as ours with
the addition of balsam and palms. Palm-groves have height
and beauty, the balsam is a mere shrub. When its branches are
swollen with sap one may open them with a sharp piece of
stone or crockery, for the sap-vessels shrink up at the touch of
iron. The sap is used in medicine. Lebanon, their chief moun-
tain, stands shaded in eternal snow, a strange phenomenon in
such a burning climate. Here, too, the River Jordan has its
source and comes pouring down, but does not emerge in the
Mediterranean. It flows undiminished through first one lake,
then another, and loses itself in a third.
This last is a lake of immense size,* like a sea, though its
water has a fouler taste and a most unhealthy smell, which
poisons the local inhabitants. No wind can stir waves in it: no
fish or water-fowl can live there. The sluggish water supports
[5, 8] book five 237
whatever is thrown onto it, as if its surface were solid, while
those who cannot swim float on it as easily as those who can.
Every year at the same time the lake yields asphalt. As with
other arts, it is experience which shows how to collect it. In its
natural state it is a black liquid; when congealed with a
sprinkling of vinegar, it floats on the surface of the water. The
men who collect it then take it into their hands and haul it on
deck. Then without further aid it trickles in and loads the boat
until you cut off the stream. But this you cannot do with iron
or brass: it is repelled only by blood or a garment stained with
a woman’s menstrual discharge. That is what the old author-
ities say, but those who know the district aver that floating
blocks of asphalt are pushed and dragged to shore by hand.
The steam out of the earth and the heat of the sun dries them,
and they are then split up with axes and wedges, like logs or
blocks of stone.
Not far from this lake are plains which they say were once 7
fertile and covered with large and populous cities; these plains
were destroyed by lightning.* Traces of the cities are said to
remain, and the ground, which looks scorched, has lost all
power of production. The plants, whether wild or artificially
cultivated, are black and sterile and wither into dust and
ashes, whether when in leaf or flower, or when they have
attained their full growth. Without denying that at some date
famous cities were there burnt up by fire from Heaven, I am
yet inclined to think that it is the exhalation from the lake
which infects the soil and poisons the surrounding atmos-
phere. Soil and climate being equally deleterious, the spring
and autumn crops all rot away. The River Belius* also flows
into the Jewish sea. Round its mouth is found a peculiar kind
of sand which is mixed with soda and smelted into glass.
Small though the beach is, its product is inexhaustible.
The greater part of Judaea is scattered with villages, but 8
they also have towns. Jerusalem is the Jewish capital, and
contained the Temple, which was enormously wealthy. A first
line of fortifications guarded the city, then came the palace,
and the inner defences enclosed the Temple.* None but a Jew
was allowed as far as the doors: none but the priests might
cross the threshold.*
238 the histories [5, 9]
When the East was in the hands of the Assyrians, Medes,
and Persians, they regarded the Jews as the meanest of their
slaves. During the Macedonian ascendancy King Antiochus*
endeavoured to abolish their superstitions and to introduce
Greek customs. But Arsaces at that moment rebelled,* and the
Parthian war prevented him from effecting any improvement
in the character of this grim people. Then, when Macedon
waned, as the Parthian power was not yet ripe and Rome was
still far away, they took kings of their own. The mob was
fickle and drove them out.* However, they recovered their
throne by force; banished their countrymen, sacked cities,
slew brothers, wives, and parents, and committed all the usual
royal crimes. But the kings fostered the Jewish superstition,
since they strengthened their authority by assuming the
priesthood.*
9 Gnaeus Pompey was the first Roman to subdue the Jews
and set foot in the Temple by right of conquest.* That is the
source of the information that the Temple contained no image
of any god: their shrine was empty, the innermost sanctuary
void. The walls of Jerusalem were destroyed,* but the Temple
was left standing. Later, during the Roman civil wars, when
the eastern provinces had come under the control of Mark
Antony, the Parthian king Pacorus seized Judaea and was
killed by Publius Ventidius.* The Parthians were driven back
over the Euphrates, and Gaius Sosius* subdued the Jews.
Antony gave the kingdom to Herod,* and Augustus, after his
victory, enlarged it. After Herod’s death, somebody called
Simon,* without awaiting the Emperor’s decision, forcibly
assumed the title of king. He was punished by Quintilius
Varus, who was governor of Syria;* the Jews were repressed
and the kingdom divided between three of Herod’s sons.*
Under Tiberius all was quiet. Gaius Caesar ordered them to
put up his statue in the Temple: they preferred war to that. But
Gaius’ death put an end to the rising. In Claudius’ reign the
kings had all either died or lost most of their territory. The
Emperor therefore made Judaea a province* to be governed
by Roman knights or freedmen. One of these, Antonius
Felix,* indulged in every kind of cruelty and lust, wielding a
king’s authority with all the instincts of a slave. He had
[5, 11] book five 239
married Drusilla, a granddaughter of Antony and Cleopatra,
so that he was Antony’s grandson-in-law, while Claudius was
Antony’s grandson.*
The Jews endured such oppression patiently until the gover- 10
norship of Gessius Florus,* under whom war broke out.
Cestius Gallus, the governor of Syria, tried to crush it, but met
with more reverses than victories. He died, either in the natu-
ral course or perhaps of disgust, and Nero sent out Vespasian,
who, within two summers,* thanks to his reputation, good
fortune, and able subordinates, had the whole of the flat
country and all the towns except Jerusalem under the heel of
his victorious army. The next year was taken up with civil
war, and passed quietly enough as far as the Jews were con-
cerned. But once peace was restored in Italy, foreign troubles
began again; Roman wrath was increased by the thought that
the Jews were the only people who had not given in. At the
same time it seemed advantageous to leave Titus at the head of
the army to meet all the eventualities of the new reign,
whether good or bad.
Thus, as I have said, Titus pitched his camp before the walls 11
of Jerusalem and proceeded to display his legions in battle
order. The Jews formed up at the foot of their own walls,
ready, if successful, to venture further, but assured of their
retreat in case of reverse. A body of cavalry and some light-
armed cohorts were sent against them, and fought an indeci-
sive engagement, from which the enemy eventually retired.
During the next few days a series of skirmishes took place in
front of the gates, and at last continual losses drove the Jews
behind their walls.
The Romans then determined to take the city by storm. It
seemed undignified to sit and wait for the enemy to starve,*
and the men all clamoured for the risks, some through cour-
age, but many others were wild and greedy for plunder. Titus
himself had the vision of Rome* with all her wealth and
pleasures before his eyes, and felt that their enjoyment was
postponed unless Jerusalem fell at once.
The city, however, stood high and had been fortified with
works vast enough to protect a city standing on the plain.
Two enormous hills were surrounded by walls ingeniously
240 the histories [5, 12]
built so as to project or slope inwards and thus leave the flanks
of an attacking party exposed to fire. The rocks were jagged at
the top. The towers, where the rising ground helped, were 60
feet high, and in the hollows as much as 120. They were a
wonderful sight and seemed from a distance to be all of equal
height. Within this ran another line of fortification surround-
ing the palace, and on a conspicuous height stands the
Antonia, a castle named by Herod in honour of Mark Antony.
12 The Temple was built like a citadel with walls of its own, on
which more care and labour had been spent than on any of the
others. Even the cloisters surrounding the Temple formed a
splendid rampart. There was a never-failing spring of water,
catacombs hollowed out of the hills, and pools or cisterns for
holding rainwater. Its original builders had foreseen that the
peculiarities of Jewish life would lead to frequent wars, conse-
quently everything was ready for the longest of sieges. Besides
this, when Pompey took the city, fear and experience taught
them several lessons, and they had taken advantage of the
avarice in the days of Claudius to buy rights of fortification,
and built walls in peacetime* as though war were imminent.
Their numbers were now swelled by floods of human refuse
and unfortunate refugees from other towns. All the most
desperate characters in the country had taken refuge there,
which only increased dissent.
They had three armies, each with its own general. The
outermost and largest line of wall was held by Simon; the
central city by John,* and the Temple by Eleazar. John and
Simon were stronger than Eleazar in numbers and equipment,
but he had the advantage of a strong position. Their be-
haviour towards each other mainly consisted of fighting,
treachery, and arson: a large quantity of corn was burnt.
Eventually, under pretext of offering a sacrifice, John sent a
party of men to massacre Eleazar and his troops, and by this
means gained possession of the Temple.* Thus Jerusalem was
divided into two hostile parties, but on the approach of the
Romans the necessities of foreign warfare reconciled their
differences.
13 Various portents had occurred at this time, but so sunk in
superstition are the Jews and so opposed to all religious prac-
[5, 14] book five 241
tices that they think it wicked to expiate them by sacrifices or
vows.* Embattled armies were seen to clash in the sky with
flashing arms, and the Temple shone with sudden fire from
heaven. The doors of the shrine suddenly opened, a superhu-
man voice was heard to proclaim that the gods were leaving,
and at once there came a mighty movement of their departure.
Few took alarm at all this. Most people held the belief that,
according to the ancient priestly writings, this was the mo-
ment at which the East was fated to prevail: men would now
start forth from Judaea and conquer the world. This enigmatic
prophecy really applied to Vespasian and Titus; but men are
blinded by their greed. The common people applied to them-
selves the promise of grand destiny, and even defeat could not
convince them of the truth.
The number of the besieged, men and women of every age,
is stated to have been 600,000.* There were arms for all who
could carry them, and far more were ready to fight than would
be expected from their total numbers. The women were as
determined as the men: if they were forced to leave their
homes they feared more in life than in death.
Such was the city and such the people with which Titus
Caesar was faced. As the nature of the ground forbade a
sudden assault, he determined to employ earthworks and
mantlets. The work was accordingly divided among the le-
gions, and there was a respite from fighting until they had got
ready every means of storming a town that had ever been
devised in ancient times or by modern ingenuity.
After the severe reverse at Trier Civilis reinforced his army 14
in Germany, and took his stand by the camp at Vetera. The
position was a safe one, and he hoped to inspirit his native
troops with the memory of their former victories there.
Cerialis followed in his footsteps, with forces now doubled by
the arrival of the Second, Sixth, and Fourteenth Legions,
besides auxiliary infantry and cavalry, who had long received
their summons and came hurrying on the news of victory.
Neither general was dilatory, but a vast plain lay between
them. It was by nature swampy, and Civilis had built a
dam projecting into the Rhine, which stemmed the current
and flooded the adjacent fields. The treacherous nature of
242 the histories [5, 15]
the ground, with its precarious shallows, told against our
men, who were heavily armed and afraid of swimming. The
Germans, on the other hand, were used to rivers, lightly
armed, and tall enough to keep their heads above water.
15 Provoked by the Batavi, the bravest of our troops opened
the engagement at once, but soon fell into a panic when their
arms and horses began to sink in the deep marshes. The
Germans, who knew where to find the shallows, came leaping
across them, often leaving our front alone and running round
to the flanks or the rear. It was not like an infantry engage-
ment at close quarters, but more like a naval battle. The men
floundered about in the water or, finding firm foothold, tried
to balance their whole body on it. Thus the wounded and the
whole, those who could swim and those who could not,
struggled with each other and perished all alike. However,
considering the confusion, our loss was less than might have
been expected, for the Germans, not daring to venture out of
the marsh, withdrew to their camp.
The result of this engagement gave each of the generals a
different motive for hastening on a decisive battle. Civilis
wanted to follow up his success, Cerialis to wipe out his
disgrace. The pride of the Germans thrilled with success;
shame stimulated the Romans. The natives spent the night
singing uproariously, while our men muttered angry threats.
16 At daybreak Cerialis formed up his cavalry and the aux-
iliary cohorts on his front, with the legions behind them, while
he himself held a picked body in reserve for emergencies.
Civilis did not extend his line, but halted them in wedge-
formation, with the Batavi and Cugerni on his right, and the
forces from across the Rhine near the river on the left.
Neither general followed the usual custom of haranguing
the whole army. They rode along and addressed their various
divisions in turn. Cerialis spoke of the ancient glory of the
Roman name and of their victories old and new. He urged
them to blot out for ever their treacherous, cowardly, and
defeated enemy. They had to punish, not fight them. They
had, he said, just fought against superior numbers and yet had
routed the pick of the German troops; the remnant were
fugitives in their hearts and wounded on their backs. He then
[5, 18] book five 243
gave special encouragement to each of the legions, calling the
Fourteenth the conquerors of Britain,* reminding the Sixth
that their authority had set Galba on the throne,* and telling
the Second that in the coming fight they would for the first
time dedicate their new colours and their new eagle to Rome’s
service. Then riding along to the army of Germany, he pointed
with his hand and bade them recover their own river-bank
and their own camp by the enemy’s blood. They all cheered
with increased eagerness. Some longed for battle after a
long spell of quiet: others were weary of war and pined for
peace. They hoped that the future would bring them recom-
pense and rest.
Nor was there silence in Civilis’ lines. As he formed them up 17
he appealed to the site to witness their valour. The Germans
and Batavians were standing, he told them, on the field of
their glory, trampling the charred bones of Roman soldiers
under foot. Wherever the Romans turned their eyes they
saw nothing but imprisonment, defeat, and catastrophe. The
Germans must not be alarmed by that sudden change of
fortune in the battle at Trier. It was their own victory which
hampered them there: they had dropped their weapons and
filled their hands with loot. Since then everything had gone in
their favour and against the Romans. He had taken every
possible precaution, as befitted a cunning general. They them-
selves were familiar with these soaking plains, but the swamps
would be a deadly trap for the enemy. They had the Rhine and
the gods of Germany before their eyes, and under the power
of these they must go to battle, remembering wives, parents,
and fatherland. This day would either gild the glory of their
ancestors or earn the execration of posterity.
They applauded his words according to their custom by
dancing and clashing their arms, and then opened the battle
with showers of stones, slingshot, and other missiles, trying
with taunts to lure on our men, who had not yet entered the
marsh. The missiles exhausted, the fight began to warm up; 18
the enemy made an angry charge. Thanks to their great height
and their very long spears they could thrust from some dis-
tance at our men, who were floundering and slipping about in
the marsh. While this went on, a group of Bructeri swam
244 the histories [5, 19]
across from the dam which, as I described above, had been
built out into the Rhine. This started a panic and the line of
our auxiliaries began to be driven back. Then the legions took
up the fight and equalized matters by staying the enemy’s wild
charge.
Meanwhile, a Batavian deserter approached Cerialis, avow-
ing that he could take the enemy in the rear if the cavalry were
sent round the edge of the swamp: the ground was solid there,
and the Cugerni, whose task it was to keep watch, were off
their guard. Two squadrons of horse were sent with the de-
serter, and succeeded in outflanking the unsuspecting enemy.
The legions in front, when the din told them what had
happened, redoubled their efforts. The Germans were beaten
and fled to the Rhine. This day might have brought the war to
an end, had the Roman fleet hurried after them. As it was,
even the cavalry were prevented from pursuit by a sudden
downpour of rain and the onset of nightfall.
19 On the next day the Fourteenth Legion were sent to join
Annius Gallus in Upper Germany, and their place in Cerialis’
army was filled by the Tenth from Spain. Civilis was rein-
forced by the Chauci. Not daring to hold the Batavian capi-
tal,* he took whatever was portable with him, burnt
everything else, and retired into the Island. He knew that the
Romans had not enough ships to build a bridge, and that they
had no other means of getting across. He also destroyed the
mole built by Drusus Germanicus.* As the bed of the Rhine
here falls towards the Gallic branch,* his removal of all obs-
tacles gave it free course; the river was practically diverted,
and the flow between the Germans and the island narrowed to
the point that the dry land appeared to be continuous. Tutor
and Classicus also crossed the Rhine, together with 113
senators from Trier, among whom was Alpinius Montanus,
who, as I said above, had been sent by Antonius Primus into
Gaul. He was accompanied by his brother Decimus Alpinius.
By arousing sympathy and by offering presents, the others,
too, were all busy raising reinforcements among these eagerly
adventurous tribes.
20 The war was far from being over. Dividing his forces in
four, Civilis in a single day attacked the strongholds of the
[5, 21] book five 245
auxiliary horse and foot and the legions: the Tenth Legion at
Arenacum,* the Second at Batavodurum, and the auxiliary
horse and foot at Grinnes and Vada. Civilis himself, Verax his
sister’s son, Classicus, and Tutor each led one of the attacking
parties. They could not hope all to be successful, but reckoned
that, if they made several ventures, fortune would favour one
or the other. Besides, Cerialis, they supposed, was off his
guard; on receiving news from several places at once he would
hurry from one garrison to another, and might be cut off on
his way.
The party assigned to attack the camp of the Tenth consid-
ered it no light task to storm a legion, so they fell on the
soldiers when they came outside and were occupied in cutting
timber, and killed the camp prefect, five senior centurions,
and a handful of the men. The rest defended themselves be-
hind the fortifications. Meanwhile another party of Germans
endeavoured to break the bridge which had been begun at
Batavodurum, but nightfall put an end to the battle while the
outcome was in the balance.
The attack on Grinnes and Vada proved more formidable. 21
Civilis led the assault on Vada, Classicus on Grinnes. Nothing
could stop them. The bravest of the defenders had fallen,
among them, commanding a cavalry squadron, Briganticus,
who was, as I have said, a faithful ally of Rome and a bitter
enemy of his uncle Civilis. However, when Cerialis came to
the rescue with a picked troop of horse, the tables were
turned, and the Germans were driven headlong into the river.
While Civilis was trying to stop the rout he was recognized,
and finding himself a target, he left his horse and swam across.
Verax escaped in the same way, while some small boats put in
to fetch Tutor and Classicus.
Even now the Roman fleet had not joined the fight. They
had, indeed, received orders, but fear held them back, and the
rowers were employed on various duties elsewhere. It must be
admitted, also, that Cerialis did not give them time enough to
carry out his orders. He was a man of sudden resolves and
brilliant successes. Even when his strategy had failed, good
luck always came to his rescue. Thus neither he nor his army
cared much about discipline.
246 the histories [5, 22]
A few days later, moreover, Cerialis narrowly escaped being
22 taken prisoner and did not evade disgrace. He had gone to
Novaesium and Bonn to inspect the winter quarters that were
being built for his legions, and was returning with the fleet.
The Germans noticed that his escort straggled,* and that the
sentries were careless: so they planned a surprise. Choosing a
night black with clouds they slipped downstream and made
their way unmolested into the camp. For the initial massacre
they called cunning to their aid: they cut the tent-ropes and
slaughtered the soldiers as they struggled under their own
canvas. Another party fell on the ships, attached hawsers to
the sterns, and towed them off. Having surprised the camp in
dead silence, when once the carnage began they added to the
panic by making the whole place ring with shouts. Awakened
by their wounds the Romans hunted for weapons and rushed
along the passages, a few in uniform, most of them with their
clothes wrapped round their arms and swords drawn in their
hand. The general, who was half-asleep and almost naked,
was only saved by the enemy’s mistake. His flagship being
easily distinguishable, they carried it off, thinking he was
there. But Cerialis had been spending the night elsewhere; as
most people believed, having an affair with a Ubian woman
named Claudia Sacrata. The sentries sheltered their guilt un-
der the general’s disgrace, pretending that they had orders to
keep quiet and not disturb his rest: so they had dispensed with
signals and calls, and had dropped off to sleep themselves.
In full daylight the enemy sailed off with their captive vessels
and towed the flagship up the River Lupia* as an offering to
Veleda.
23 Civilis was now seized with a desire to make a naval dis-
play. He manned all the available biremes* and all the ships
with single banks of oars, and added to this fleet an immense
number of small craft. These carry thirty or forty men apiece
and are rigged like Liburnian cruisers. The small craft he had
captured were worked with multi-coloured plaids, which
served as sails and made a fine show. He chose for review the
miniature sea of water where the Rhine comes pouring down
to the North Sea through the mouth of the Maas. His reason
for the demonstration—apart from typical Batavian vanity—
[5, 25] book five 247
was to scare away the provision convoys that were already on
their way from Gaul. Cerialis, who was less alarmed than
astonished, at once formed up a fleet. Though inferior in
numbers, he had the advantage of larger ships, experienced
rowers, and clever pilots. The Romans had the stream with
them, the Germans the wind. So they sailed past each other,
and after trying a few shots with light missiles they parted.
Civilis retired across the Rhine without attempting anything
further. Cerialis vigorously laid waste the Island of the Batavi,
and employed the common device of leaving Civilis’ houses
and fields untouched.* They were now at the start of autumn.
The heavy equinoctial rains had set the river in flood, covering
the marshy, low-lying island until it looked like a lake.
Neither fleet nor provision convoys had arrived, and their
camp on the flat plain began to be washed away by the force
of the current.
Civilis afterwards claimed that at this point the Germans 24
could have crushed the Roman legions and wanted to do so,
but that he had cunningly dissuaded them. Nor is this far from
the truth,* since his surrender followed in a few days’ time.
Cerialis had been sending secret messages, promising the
Batavians peace and Civilis pardon, and urging Veleda and
her relatives to change the fortune of a war that had only
brought disaster after disaster, by doing a timely service to
Rome. The Treviri, he reminded them, had been slaughtered;
the allegiance of the Ubii recovered; the Batavians robbed of
their homeland. By supporting Civilis they had gained nothing
but wounds, defeat, and bereavement. He was a fugitive exile,
a burden to those who harboured him. Besides, they had
earned blame enough by crossing the Rhine so often: if they
took any further steps, their side would take on itself the crime
and the guilt, the Romans could count on vengeance and the
wrath of Heaven.
Thus Cerialis mingled threats and promises. The loyalty of 25
the tribes across the Rhine was shaken, and murmurs began to
make themselves heard among the Batavi. ‘How much further
must our ruin be prolonged?’ they asked. ‘One tribe cannot
free the whole world from the yoke. What good have we done
by slaughtering and burning Roman legions except to bring
248 the histories [5, 26]
out others, larger and stronger? If it was to help Vespasian
that we have fought so vigorously, Vespasian is master of the
world. If we are challenging Rome in war—what an infinites-
imal fraction of the human race we Batavians are! We must
remember what burdens Raetia and Noricum and all Rome’s
other allies bear. From us they levy no tribute, only our
manhood and our men. That is next door to freedom.* And,
after all, if we have to choose our masters, it is less disgrace to
put up with Roman emperors than with German women.’
Thus the common people: the chieftains used more violent
language. It was Civilis’ lunacy, they said, that had driven
them to war. He wanted to remedy his private troubles by
ruining his country. The Batavians had incurred the wrath of
Heaven by blockading Roman legions, murdering Roman
commanders, and plunging into a war which was useful for
one man and deadly for the rest. Now they had reached the
limit, unless they came to their senses and openly showed their
repentance by punishing the culprit.
26 Civilis was well aware of their changed feelings and deter-
mined to forestall them. He was tired of hardship, and he felt,
besides, the desire to live which so often weakens great souls.
He demanded an interview. The bridge over the River Nabalia
was broken down in the middle, and the two generals
advanced onto the broken ends. Civilis began as follows:
‘If I were defending myself before one of Vitellius’ com-
manders, I could expect neither pardon for my conduct nor
credence for my words. Between him and me there has been
nothing but hatred. He began hostilities, I fostered them.
Towards Vespasian I have from the beginning shown respect.
When he was a private citizen, we were known as friends.
Antonius Primus was aware of this when he wrote urging me
to take up arms to prevent the legions from Germany and the
Gallic levies from crossing the Alps. The instructions which
Antonius gave in his letter Hordeonius Flaccus ratified by
word of mouth.* I raised the standard in Germany, as did
Mucianus in Syria, Aponius in Moesia, Flavianus in
Pannonia . . .’
The rest of the work is lost. Civilis’ own fate is unknown,
though it seems that his people were not seriously punished
book five 249
for their rebellion. The Jewish War was crushed by Titus that
summer, with the capture of Jerusalem and the destruction of
the Temple, though pockets of resistance held out until 73,
when Masada, the final stronghold, was taken.
Helvidius Priscus was exiled and put to death in about 74
for his opposition to Vespasian; and in 79 Caecina was ac-
cused of conspiring with Eprius Marcellus against the Em-
peror—the former was murdered at a dinner party on Titus’
orders, the latter forced to suicide. Mucianus died in 76 or 77,
writing several literary works in the final years of his life; his
rival Antonius Primus, now out of favour with Vespasian,
enjoyed a long and comfortable retirement in his home town
of Toulouse. Verginius Rufus also retired under the Flavians,
before emerging in his eighties to hold a final consulship in 97,
the year of his death. Tacitus himself delivered the funeral
eulogy.
Vespasian reigned as emperor for a further nine years, dying
in 79. Titus succeeded him, but his rule was brief. He died of
fever in 81 at the age of 40, and was succeeded by Domitian,
who reigned for fifteen years, becoming a byword for cruelty
and tyranny. He was assassinated by a palace conspiracy in
96, aged 44; and with him the Flavian dynasty came to an end.
explanatory notes 251
thousands of unarmed soldiers: the numbers are probably exag-
gerated: the reference is to some of the marines enrolled by Nero
(next paragraph), who met Galba with demands as he entered
Rome.
A legion had been brought from Spain: VII Hispana (Tacitus
calls it ‘Galbiana’): it in fact seems to have left Rome for
Pannonia before Galba’s fall. Tacitus distorts the picture to
emphasize the theme of an un-Roman Rome on the verge of
revolution.
Vindex: Roman senator of Gallic origin. While governor in Gaul
in 68 he revolted against Nero, precipitating the Emperor’s
downfall; he was however defeated in battle and committed
suicide.
Clodius Macer . . . Fonteius Capito: Macer was commander of
III Augusta in Africa. Capito, consul in 67, was governor of
Lower Germany.
Fabius Valens: the first introduction of one of the leading figures
in the work: he was then commander of the I Legion in Bonn.
Other sources make Galba’s responsibility more direct; Tacitus
shows the Emperor’s weakness, while Valens’ willingness to
act on his own account prefigures his domination of Vitellius’
rebellion.
7 looks and personal attraction: Nero had died at the age of 31;
Galba was 72, bald, and crippled by arthritis.
Cluvius Rufus: a favourite of Nero’s. He wrote a history of his
own times, which Tacitus later used for the Annals, and may
have consulted here. It appears from this that Galba had placed
him in command of all three Spanish provinces.
Verginius: Verginius Rufus (c.14–97); as governor of Upper
Germany he had defeated Vindex. Other sources imply greater
altruism in his refusal of the throne, and greater honesty on the
part of Galba. Tacitus (typically) imputes sinister motives, the
hints of jealous competition for the throne adding to the general
sense of political instability.
Hordeonius Flaccus: Verginius’ successor as governor.
8 thrice consul: in 34, 43, and 47. He was a favourite of Tiberius,
Gaius, and (especially) Claudius, under whom he wielded con-
siderable influence.
four legions: in fact there were currently only three legions there,
III Gallica having been sent to Moesia (cf. 1. 79). Tacitus repeats
the mistake at 2. 4, 2. 6, and 2. 76.
252 explanatory notes
The Jewish War: the Jews had risen against Rome in 66.
9 control of the Household: senators were banned from visiting
Egypt without the Emperor’s permission; hence the governor
was always a knight. He received the marks of honour previ-
ously enjoyed by Egyptian kings.
Tiberius Alexander: a Jew by birth, and nephew of the Jewish
philosopher Philo: he had governed Judaea 46–8, then Egypt
66–70.
procurators: imperial agents of non-senatorial status, who
governed minor provinces.
Titus Vinius his colleague: with this return to the opening words
of the work, Tacitus signals the end of his preliminary survey,
and the start of his narrative proper.
had broken their oath of allegiance: the rising was under
Vitellius: Tacitus describes it in 1. 51.
10 the rings of a knight: rings were worn by knights as a mark of
status. According to Plutarch, Galba 7, Icelus’ promotion was
for bringing Galba news of his elevation to the throne.
Suetonius, Galba 21 claims that he was Galba’s lover, but that
would not suit Tacitus’ picture of the Emperor’s old-fashioned
strictness.
Poppaea Sabina . . . Octavia: Octavia (c.40–62) was daughter
of Claudius and first wife of Nero, who divorced and banished
her, then had her killed. He then married Poppaea Sabina
(c.31–65); but soon killed her in a temper. Poppaea’s exact
relationship with Otho is very doubtful: Tacitus later gave a
completely different account in Annals 13. 45–6, and most
sources clearly state that they were lovers. Tacitus mutes that
here, throwing the blame more on Nero. Even as he explicitly
links Otho to Nero, his narrative begins to enhance his moral
character.
11 imperial election: a sarcastic oxymoron: the term ‘election’ was
not used of selecting imperial heirs, but was the Republican
word for when a magistrate was voted in by a citizens’ assembly.
Even under the Empire, such elections were largely in the hands
of the Senate, not the emperor alone.
Marius Celsus: he is known to have written on military tactics,
and may have been one of Tacitus’ sources for these events.
City Prefect: senator in charge of the administration of the city
of Rome and its garrison.
explanatory notes 253
at the insistence of Laco: in other sources the adoption is entirely
Galba’s own idea, and there is no reference to this conference.
Although Tacitus presents it as a possibility that Galba took the
initiative, the overriding image is of the Emperor under the sway
of evil subordinates.
Rubellius Plautus: a great-grandson of the Emperor Tiberius
and a prominent Stoic, executed by Nero.
addressed him as follows: this speech, with its lengthy defence of
an emperor adopting his heir, had strong contemporary
resonances for Tacitus’ audience: the current Emperor, Trajan,
had been adopted by his predecessor Nerva.
curial statute: a law passed by a Roman assembly was required
to adopt a man whose natural father was dead.
Gnaeus Pompey and of Marcus Crassus: Gnaeus Pompeius
Magnus (‘Pompey the Great’, 106–48 bc), an ancestor of Piso
on his mother’s side, was partner of Julius Caesar (100–44 bc)
in the unofficial ‘First Triumvirate’; he then was Caesar’s chief
opponent in the civil war leading to the end of the Republic.
Marcus Licinius Crassus (115–53 bc) was the third member of
the ‘First Triumvirate’; he was in fact not Piso’s blood ancestor
(his grandson had adopted Piso’s grandfather).
Sulpician and Lutatian houses: two leading Republican families,
with many distinguished members.
Marcellus . . . Agrippa . . . his grandsons . . . Tiberius Nero:
Marcus Claudius Marcellus (42–23 bc), son of Augustus’ sister,
married Augustus’ daughter Julia and was given honours appar-
ently marking him for the succession. After his death, Marcus
Vipsanius Agrippa (c.63–12 bc), Augustus’ closest ally, married
Julia and was similarly given exceptional honours. Then their
sons Gaius Caesar (20 bc–ad 4) and Lucius Caesar (17 bc–ad
2) were both adopted by Augustus and designated his heirs.
Finally, when they too died, Tiberius Claudius Nero (42 bc–ad
37), the son of Augustus’ wife Livia by her first marriage, was
adopted by Augustus and succeeded him on his death as the
Emperor Tiberius.
12 an elder brother: Crassus Scribonianus.
only experienced misfortune: Piso’s parents and eldest brother
were put to death under Claudius; another brother was killed
under Nero, and he himself had been exiled.
14 each man chose another: in early Italy, troops were raised by
choosing one man, who chose another, who chose another, etc.
254 explanatory notes
Fourth and Twenty-Second Legions: IV Macedonica and XXII
Primigenia, both in Upper Germany.
15 The next question was one of finance: this had in fact happened
earlier: Tacitus, by altering the sequence of events, gives the
impression of discontent growing at Rome after Piso’s adoption.
Antonius Naso . . . Aemilius Pacensis . . . Julius Fronto: Naso
subsequently had a successful military and civilian career under
Otho and Vespasian; Pacensis and Fronto appear later in the
Histories as supporters of Otho.
16 proscribing them and keeping them by us: astrologers were
widely consulted at Rome, but were also subject to repression,
not least because of their potential for political subversion. It
was illegal to consult them about the Emperor’s future, and they
were frequently expelled from the city.
17 Tigellinus: a close associate of Nero’s: see 1. 72.
18 Temple of Apollo: a famous temple attached to the imperial
palace on the Palatine Hill; the precise site is uncertain.
Umbricius: the most distinguished of the ‘haruspices’, one of
the official societies of diviners at Rome: he wrote a book on
divination.
19 favourable to his plans: Plutarch, Galba 24 says that Otho was
terrified by this omen, thinking that the god was identifying him
to Galba. Tacitus, by contrast, does not raise the possibility that
Galba might have avoided his fate at this point.
Tiberius’ House . . . the Velabrum . . . the Golden Milestone:
Tiberius’ House was a large imperial palace overlooking the
Roman Forum; the Velabrum was a low-lying area near the
Forum, the site of a market; the Golden Milestone was the
monument marking the meeting-point of all the roads leading
into the city.
20 spared the sight of blood: at best a half-truth. There had been a
massacre just outside the city (1. 6).
21 bounty for your loyalty: at last the offer of bounty comes, but
too late, and noticeably not proposed by Galba himself.
Vipsanian Arcade: a colonnade in the north or Rome, built
under Augustus.
inclined to be passive: Suetonius, Galba 20 says that they dashed
to help Galba, but lost their way: Tacitus increases the sense of
the army’s abandonment of the Emperor.
explanatory notes 255
22 Otho had been killed in the camp: other sources make this the
key in Galba’s decision to leave the palace. In Tacitus, Galba has
already decided to go—the main factor is the malign influence of
Laco and Icelus.
24 Polyclituses and Vatiniuses and Aegialuses: Polyclitus, a freed-
man, was a favourite of Nero executed by Galba. Vatinius was
another lower-class favourite of Nero; Aegialus is otherwise
unknown.
25 plain-clothes cohort: the palace watch of the Praetorian Guard
wore civilian clothes.
arsenal: within the Guards’ barracks was the only permanent
arsenal in Italy. Otho’s actions here belie his words—he had just
suggested that violence would be unnecessary.
Rostra: a platform by the Forum from which speakers addressed
the crowd.
26 Arsacids: The royal family of Parthia. Vologaeses I was King of
Parthia in 69; his son Pacorus II ruled in Tacitus’ own day.
effigy of Galba: an image of the Emperor was attached to the
pole of the standard.
Lacus Curtius: a monument in the Roman Forum, as were the
temples of Julius and Vesta mentioned below.
27 assigned by Galba to protect Piso: Plutarch Galba 26 says that
Densus protected Galba, not Piso. Tacitus’ version shows Galba
totally abandoned, and also explains Piso’s brief escape.
28 henceforward supreme: in fact, Otho almost certainly controlled
these appointments; but Tacitus is contrasting his licence with
the old-fashioned strictness of Piso, whom he showed predicting
exactly this at 1. 30.
29 held that post: from 62 to 68. Galba had deprived him of it.
into civil war: a close imitation of the famous description in
Sallust, Histories 1. 12 of the corruption of Rome when her
enemies were no more. The disasters of that earlier collapse into
civil war are being replayed; but Tacitus focuses his analysis on
the soldiers alone, on whose morals the whole state depends.
murder him: Plutarch, Galba 27 implies that Laco had been
murdered earlier, with Galba, Piso, and Vinius.
30 brothers had been executed: Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus in 46;
Marcus Licinius Crassus Frugi in 67.
fifty-seven years: Vinius was probably 47; either Tacitus or the
transmitted text are in error.
256 explanatory notes
mother’s father was one of the proscribed: more probably his
father’s father: a Titus Vinius is known to have been proscribed
(officially outlawed, and subject to summary execution) by the
Second Triumvirate in 43 bc.
A scandal: in 39, when Calvisius was governor of Pannonia. He
and his wife were recalled, and both committed suicide. Vinius
was freed on Gaius’ assassination in 41.
31 distinction in Germany . . . governed Africa . . . Nearer Spain:
among other posts in his long career, Galba governed Upper
Germany 39–41 (achieving a notable victory over the Chatti),
Africa 45–7, and Nearer Spain 60–8.
32 Pharsalia, Philippi, Perusia, and Mutina: battles of the civil wars
that had destroyed the Republic. Pharsalia and Philippi are both
in north Greece; at the former, Julius Caesar defeated Pompey
(48 bc); at the latter, Mark Antony and Octavian (the future
Augustus) defeated Brutus and Cassius (42 bc). Octavian sacked
the Etruscan town of Perusia (the modern Perugia) in 41 bc; and
at Mutina (Modena) in north Italy Antony had been defeated in
43 bc by the combined forces of Octavian, Decimus Brutus,
Hirtius, and Pansa.
intervention of Vespasian: Vespasian is in fact unlikely to have
been a serious contender this early. As the scene shifts to
Vitellius, Tacitus briefly reminds the reader of his ultimate
conqueror.
provincial frontier: i.e. the frontier between Upper and Lower
Germany.
33 Sequani and Aedui: two important tribes of central Gaul that
had supported Vindex.
grants to their community: true: see 1. 8.
stubborn attachment to Nero: a major fire had devastated Lyons
in 65; Nero had donated 4,000,000 sesterces to rebuild it.
34 Treviri and Lingones: Rhineland tribes that had supported the
army against Vindex.
35 leave the camp by night: Tacitus here provides a foretaste of his
depiction of Hordeonius in Book 4: a man who crassly adopts
schemes which then backfire.
oath of allegiance: military oaths were taken on enlistment, or to
a new commander; they were renewed at the start of each year.
Fifth . . . Fifteenth: V Alaudae and XV Primigenia.
36 quarters of the First Legion: at Bonn.
explanatory notes 257
37 usually held by freedmen: Vitellius may have done this merely
because appropriate freedmen were not available in Germany;
but it is also true that senior administrative posts that under
earlier emperors were held by freedmen from 69 on were in-
creasingly occupied by knights.
furlough fees: cf. Otho’s similar action at 1. 46.
Pompeius Propinquus: see 1. 12—he had warned Galba of
Vitellius’ revolt.
a cheaper sacrifice: as often, Tacitus hints at real motives with-
out explicitly citing them. He indicates his belief in Burdo’s
innocence, but leaves the reader to remember that the real guilty
party who was to be protected was in fact Vitellius’ chief lieuten-
ant Valens (1. 7, 1. 52).
Batavi: a German tribe living at the mouth of the Rhine; Civilis
was ultimately to lead them in a revolt against Rome (Books 4–
5). Tacitus’ account of Vitellius’ motives is ironic: his actions
have exactly the opposite of their intended effect.
38 Italian Legion: I Italica, founded by Nero in 66/7.
Trebellius Maximus: governor of Britain 63–9. Tacitus had
given a slightly different version of these events in Agricola 16.
Twentieth Legion: XX Valeria Victrix, stationed in Britain.
Pennine Pass: the Great St Bernard.
39 Twenty-First Legion: XXI Rapax.
Germanicus: this title implied victory over Germany, where
Vitellius had been governor (though in fact without military
success); but it was also a family title of Gaius, Claudius, and
Nero.
Divodorum: Metz.
40 nearly 4,000 people had already been killed: an emblematic
episode. Tacitus shows the Vitellians out of control of their own
forces: in his account, this is a major cause of their ultimate
downfall.
Leuci: Gallic tribe living around Toul, between the Marne and
the Moselle.
41 part of the army: Roman troops were levied from Lyons, and
armies were garrisoned there. However, the citizens’ argument is
tendentious: Vienne was also a source of legionaries for Rome.
in supplication: the traditional dress and behaviour of suppliants
in the ancient world.
260 explanatory notes
Pile Bridge: the oldest bridge in Rome, for religious reasons built
entirely of wood. Its destruction by floods was frequent, but
always treated as an evil omen.
Flaminian Way: the main route north from the city.
purification of the city: to propitiate the gods after the por-
tents—a sacrificial victim was led round the religious boundary
of the city.
55 freedman Moschus: freedmen had regularly commanded the
fleet under Nero. For Aemilius Pacensis cf. 1. 20.
Suetonius Paulinus: a senior ex-consul, most famous for crush-
ing the rebellion of Boudicca when governor of Britain in 58–61.
Aquinas: Aquino.
kinship to Galba: Dolabella was Galba’s great-nephew, and
according to Plutarch, Galba 23 had been named as a possible
heir. Tacitus highlights the paradoxes of Otho’s behaviour by
juxtaposing this with his generosity towards Vitellius’ younger
brother: his current enemy is treated with greater magnanimity
than his past one.
56 Scribonianus’ rising: in Dalmatia in 42: he was defeated within
five days.
sacred shields: these were kept in the Temple of Mars, but were
removed every 1 March, taken round the shrines, and replaced
on the 23rd.
57 Galerius Trachalus: a well-known orator. He was probably
related to Vitellius’ wife (cf. 2. 60), an additional reason for his
moderation here. Tacitus does not mention this: he concentrates
instead on the servility resulting from political instability.
59 years now fitted him: he was then 29.
if Vespasian himself assumed sovereignty: Tacitus has the
Flavians planning their coup earlier than in any other writer;
throughout this section Titus’ own imperial ambitions are re-
vealed. In Josephus they look more disinterested: he delays
discussing their plans until after Vitellius becomes the sole (and
immoral) ruler.
Queen Berenice: great-granddaughter of Herod the Great of
Judaea; she ruled jointly with her brother Agrippa II over Galilee
and the East Bank of the Jordan. She and Titus were lovers, and
remained so for another ten years.
60 origin of this worship: Tacitus here gives two alternative ver-
sions of the cult’s origins; others were also current in antiquity.
explanatory notes 261
sea gave her birth: one version of the birth of Venus (later made
famous by Botticelli) has her born in the sea from the castrated
genitals of the sky-god Uranus. Cinyras was a famous mythical
king of Cyprus, where she arrived.
Tamiras: in fact the name of a Semitic fertility goddess: possibly
the original name of the goddess in this cult.
61 Only the siege of Jerusalem remained: not quite true: several
fortresses, including Masada, were still uncaptured; but Tacitus
is overstating the ease of the task, so as to stress Vespasian’s
opportunity to take the throne.
62 seldom saw one: the last visit by a member of the Emperor’s
family had been in 19.
63 ‘Nero was at hand’: these two chapters serve to move the action
from the East to Rome and Otho. The theme of Nero, reintro-
duced here, is then continued further in 10, reminding the reader
of Otho’s ambiguous relationship to him.
Misenum: Miseno.
64 Vibius Crispus: a famous orator, prominent both before and
after 69. He later was known as a close friend of Vespasian. His
brother was Vibius Secundus, who had been exiled in 60 for
corruption while governor of Mauretania.
65 rebellion in Britain: of Boudicca.
First Legion: I Adiutrix.
shameful support: it was thought dishonourable to use gladia-
tors, who were slaves, as soldiers: legionaries were always free
men.
Vestricius Spurinna: Tacitus probably knew Vestricius, as they
shared a mutual friend in the Younger Pliny. He was now in his
mid-forties.
an iron breastplate: usually worn only by ordinary soldiers.
66 Albantimilium: Ventimiglia.
Tungri: a tribe from Belgian Gaul.
Forum Julii: Fréjus.
67 Antipolis: Antibes.
Albingaunum: Albenga.
68 Liburnian cruisers: a form of swift warship.
utter servility: again the traditional Roman theme made famous
by Sallust: the moral corruption of peace (cf. 1. 46). Tacitus, as
262 explanatory notes
Sallust had before him, presents a stark and virtually inescapable
choice of evils: with the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean
the one remaining form of war that can arrest this moral decline
is civil war. Yet civil war is for him not a solution; it is itself, as
here, the appalling consequence of that decline.
Placentia and Ticinum: Piacenza and Pavia.
69 the Po in sight: Placentia is itself on the Po, but Tacitus here (a
little confusingly) refers to another point of the river, at the end
of Spurinna’s march.
70 parti-coloured plaid and trousers: Gallic costume.
73 Castores: named for the twin gods Castor and Pollux, who had
a shrine there.
Prince Epiphanes: son of Antiochus IV of Commagene; see 2.
81.
74 betray the army to his brother: an ironic twist to the theme of
the fratricide of civil war that Tacitus elsewhere exploits. Both
sides distrust the potential brotherly loyalty, and assume that
their man will betray them; manifestly at least one of the accu-
sations is false.
76 mutiny nearly broke out afresh: this contradicts 2. 27, where
Caecina’s defeat is said to prevent the troops from mutiny.
Tacitus is now bringing to the fore the indiscipline of the civil
war, not least so as to link it with the destructive rivalry of the
commanders.
danger to the country: such character comparisons were com-
mon in ancient historical writing; but Tacitus here, as often,
filters his judgements through contemporary perceptions, and
indicates their limitations in the light of events. The ultimate
fates of the two emperors provide a partial corrective to the
criticisms expressed here; and it was, as he showed, Vitellius’
rebellion that had indirectly prompted Otho’s coup.
78 descended to flattery: in Plutarch, Otho 8 Titianus and Proculus
give more serious reasons why Otho should fight at once, and
Paulinus’ counter-arguments are less extensive. Tacitus weights
the argument strongly in favour of delay, and thus suggests the
irrationality of Otho’s haste.
Brixellum: Brescello.
something for their idle troops to do: Caecina probably had
more serious reasons also: to strike (or at least look as if he
would strike) at the Othonians south of the Po. Tacitus plays
explanatory notes 263
down its seriousness, again making the Othonians appear irra-
tional by undermining the case for fighting immediately.
80 Paulinus was much too wise: Plutarch, Otho 9 says directly that
it was indeed in hope of peace that some of the commanders
argued for delay. Tacitus introduces this interpretation only to
reject it with characteristically cynical reasoning. For him the
moral corruption that pervaded both armies is more significant
for understanding events.
free to covet wealth without fear: an idea closely derived from
Sallust (e.g. Catiline 10–13, Jugurtha 41–2, Histories 1. 11–
12)—central to his work is the sense that Rome’s defeat of her
enemies led to avarice and hence to moral and political ruin. Cf.
also 2. 17.
strife first flared up: according to the legends of early Rome
reported in historians like Livy, class conflict was present virtu-
ally from the beginning of the Republic. Tacitus is here imitating
Sallust’s polarized and over simplified picture of Roman history,
reinforcing the sense of the degeneracy of his own day by con-
trasting it with the values of the past. In imitating Sallust,
however, he caps him: for Marius, Sulla, and Pompey figured in
Sallust’s work as examples of late-Republican degeneracy—but
Otho and Vitellius are implied to be worse still.
Gaius Marius . . . Lucius Sulla: Marius (157–86 bc) was the
leading political and military figure of his day (consul seven
times). In his last consulship (86), held after capturing Rome
from his leading noble enemy Sulla (138–78 bc), he behaved
with notorious (and illegal) cruelty. After his death, Sulla estab-
lished himself as dictator (82–79), having numerous opponents
killed in the process. Marius came from a provincial Italian
town, but in fact, despite the widespread legend of his lower-
class origins, his family was equestrian.
81 the confluence of the Po and the Addua: this is impossible: the
Addua meets the Po much further away, and is an improbable
objective for Otho’s army. Either Tacitus is confused, or the text
is corrupt.
83 never been in battle before: I Adiutrix had in fact fought at
Castores (2. 24). XXI Rapax had been founded by Octavian (the
future Augustus) a century earlier.
84 no hesitation in granting terms: Plutarch, Otho 13 provides
much more detail on the negotiations; Tacitus moves swiftly to
Otho’s own response, on which he is to focus.
264 explanatory notes
85 firm resolve: this is not fully consistent with the account of
Otho’s behaviour earlier. Tacitus now introduces the greater
heroism associated with his imminent death.
possible to revive this cruel and pitiable war: Tacitus (unlike
Plutarch, Otho 15) does not only present this point as the view
of the characters, but endorses it with his own voice, and so
implicitly enhances the nobility of Otho’s actions.
he initiated our contest: a misleading statement: it is true only in
that Vitellius revolted against Galba a few days before Otho
independently assassinated him.
86 distributed his money carefully: to his tenants, according to
other sources.
Servians: a loose identification of Galba, whose family name was
in fact Sulpicius—Servius was his first name.
never remember it overmuch: there is tragic irony in this conclu-
sion: Cocceianus was years later executed by Domitian for
celebrating Otho’s birthday.
87 fell upon his dagger: Plutarch, Otho 17 tells how the soldiers
continued to oppose Otho’s suicide, and to rebuke themselves
for not preventing it. As before, Tacitus focuses all the picture
on Otho’s own actions.
Ferentium: Ferento.
Regium Lepidum: Reggio Emilia.
88 Rubrius Gallus: Nero’s commander against Galba and Vindex.
‘Conscript Fathers’: the formal term of address to senators.
Eprius Marcellus: an informer under Nero, also a famous
orator.
89 Bononia: Bologna.
safe-conducts: these would entitle him, among other things, to
the use of post-horses for public business.
a few days later: if this is true, the order cannot have come from
Vitellius himself, who was not yet in Italy.
reported in the theatre: on 18 April (the festival of Ceres was
celebrated with shows and games on 12–19 April). The news, if
this is true, reached Rome with unparalleled speed, given that
Otho committed suicide on the 16th.
90 not written at all: official addresses of this sort were usually sent
only by the emperor himself.
explanatory notes 265
91 rise by his vices: Suetonius, Vitellius 12 has numerous details of
Asiaticus’ earlier relationship with Vitellius, including that they
had been lovers. Tacitus shows Vitellius’ weakness, but throws
more blame on Asiaticus himself.
Albinus: previously a notoriously corrupt governor of Judaea.
Juba: the name of a famous past king of Mauretania. For procu-
rators, cf. 1. 11 and p. xxvii.
Arar: the Saône.
eminent family: apparently a descendant of Mark Antony: see
3. 38.
92 infant son: he was 6 years old.
93 pretending to be divine: this brief episode highlights the un-
Roman side to Gallic culture, prefiguring Books 4 and 5, where
this theme is to the fore. However, the end of the paragraph
unexpectedly elides the Gauls with the supporters of Otho: this
also prefigures the later books, where the division between for-
eign and Roman continually breaks down. See in general the
Introduction pp. xix–xxii.
the disgrace of appearing at the games in the arena: only gladi-
ators, who were slaves, would normally fight in the arena. For
astrologers cf. 1. 22; Suetonius, Vitellius 14 suggests Vitellius
exiled them through fear of their criticisms of him—in Tacitus it
looks more creditable. He makes Vitellius a paradoxical figure,
juxtaposing his degenerate gluttony with his restoration of old
values.
Plancius Varus: later governor of Bithynia under Vespasian.
94 Interamna: Terni.
95 Lucius Arruntius: Tiberius had appointed him governor of
Spain, but then had kept him at Rome for at least ten years.
97 extensive impunity: contrast the favour previously shown to the
Batavians (2. 66). The indiscipline of the troops, for Tacitus, is
promoted by Vitellius’ fickleness.
98 very well pleased: compare Tacitus’ comment on the
Cremonans’ callousness in the previous paragraph. Their syco-
phancy is bound up with Vitellius’ brutality, and both will meet
with nemesis.
99 Valerius Marinus . . . Pedanius Costa: Marinus and Costa had
been due to be consuls in October, Macer in November and
December. Tacitus fails to mention that Marinus promptly went
266 explanatory notes
over to Vespasian; it is more important to him to emphasize
everybody’s complaisance towards Vitellius.
Scribonianus Camerinus: nephew of Galba’s heir Piso, executed
in 67.
execution of a slave: crucifixion.
meditating war: with what follows we may contrast Josephus,
Jewish War 4. 588–604, who makes Vespasian’s decision to
take the throne not the result of personal ambition, but of
disinterested patriotism and pressure from others.
Third Legion: III Gallica. It had in fact already rioted against
Vitellius, and this may well have been crucial in encouraging
Vespasian to claim the throne. Tacitus, however, does not nar-
rate the riot until 2. 85: he shows the Flavian rising fundamen-
tally stemming from the Flavians themselves.
100 youthful sons: Titus was then 29, Domitian 17.
as follows: with Mucianus’ speech here, compare Galba’s adop-
tion speech to Piso (1. 15–16) and Valens’ arguments to Vitellius
(1. 52), both concerned with the relationship between noble
lineage and imperial ambition. In Josephus, Jewish War 4. 592–
600 there is much less on this subject, and it is presented as
general discussion, not Mucianus’ own views.
101 Corbulo’s murder: a famous general during the reigns of
Claudius and Nero, murdered on the orders of the latter in 67.
He was for Tacitus a particularly apposite example to have
Mucianus introduce here: Domitian later married Corbulo’s
daughter.
insignia of a triumph: ornaments given to successful generals.
Vespasian had won them while a commander during Claudius’
conquest of Britain.
102 promise of this omen: this and other, much clearer omens are
listed in various sources. Tacitus chooses to focus on the one
whose meaning is vaguest: for him, Vespasian’s power is not as
clearly favoured by the gods, but is the result of his own ambi-
tions. The interpretation specifically promising the throne is
Vespasian’s own.
Carmel: the site had been used for worship since Canaanite
times, but the god’s cult title at this period is doubtful.
103 the third: the 11th, according to Suetonius, Vespasian 6.
104 Sohaemus . . . Antiochus . . . Agrippa: Sohaemus was a notable
pro-Roman, king of Emesa in Syria since 54. Antiochus IV
explanatory notes 267
Epiphanes, king of Commagene on the upper Euphrates, 42–72;
he was a descendant of the Seleucid dynasty that had once
controlled much of the Near East. Agrippa II ruled with Berenice
over a large part of eastern Palestine; he had gone to Rome with
Titus (2. 1), but unlike Titus had not turned back en route.
old man’s heart too: i.e. as well as Titus’: see 2. 2.
105 the keys of Egypt: i.e. the coastal area, especially Alexandria.
more as the Emperor’s partner than his subordinate: contrast his
words at 77. Tacitus regularly presents Mucianus’ relationship
to Vespasian in such terms (compare 1. 10 and 2. 5): the theo-
retical subordinate who possesses a dangerously large share of
imperial power—a typically Tacitean theme that becomes still
more central in the Annals.
Dyrrachium: Durazzo.
106 Brundisium: Brindisi.
‘Funds . . . are the sinews of civil war’: a (near) quotation from
Cicero, Philippics 5. 5: ‘the sinews of war, funds without end.’
bold use of his lessons: cf. 2. 5 for Vespasian’s avarice;
Suetonius, too, treats this as his leading vice.
the Illyrian army espoused his cause: they were disaffected with
Vitellius (2. 60).
107 Antonius Primus: a leading figure in Book 3. His crime under
Nero was (in 61) to have witnessed a forged will.
Tampius Flavianus and Pompeius Silvanus . . . Cornelius
Fuscus: the careers of Flavianus and Silvanus went in parallel:
both had been governors of Africa; subsequently under
Vespasian they were successively put in charge of Rome’s aque-
ducts; and they finally were colleagues in a second consulship.
Cornelius Fuscus was ultimately Prefect of the Guard under
Domitian.
108 more contemptible and indolent every day: Vitellius’ march was
in fact not especially slow: he covered 1,100 (English) miles in at
most 100 days. Tacitus distorts the picture to accentuate the
contrast with the Flavians’ vigour.
fattening up gladiators: soldiers would normally purchase and
prepare their own food; gladiators (who were despised as slaves)
were fed by their owners to ensure their health.
110 the Cremera and the Allia: two battles in early Roman history.
At the Cremera in c.479 bc, virtually the entire Fabian clan was
268 explanatory notes
destroyed; at the Allia in c.387 bc, the Gauls wiped out the
Roman army and subsequently sacked the city. The events are
couched in legend, but 18 July was traditionally seen as the
anniversary of both, and was observed as a so-called ‘black day’,
on which public business should not be transacted.
rescue of his slighted authority: tribunes under the Republic had
the right to protect citizens from abuse of power. An appeal to
them would imply that Vitellius was actually threatened by
Helvidius; Tacitus ironically treats it as a mild measure. There is
also irony in the word ‘authority’: that authority included
Vitellius’ own tribunician power as emperor, which should have
made such an appeal unnecessary.
Thrasea: Thrasea Paetus, Helvidius’ father-in-law, distinguished
for his Stoic philosophy; this led him to resist Nero, who forced
him to suicide. Vitellius had indeed opposed him—in order to be
sycophantic to Nero.
111 full rights over their freedmen: these included the right to inherit
from them, and to be supported by them in need: hence the
freedmen’s response. Earlier, especially under Claudius, freed-
men in the imperial household had held senior administrative
posts, but this practice was now dying out; for Tacitus, however,
the existence of powerful freedmen is a consistent symbol of the
evil reversal of the moral order.
Sixteen cohorts of Guards: an unprecedented number. Vitellius
seems also to have allowed non-Italians into the Guards, con-
trary to normal practice.
112 Vitellius’ birthday: Probably 7 September. This therefore in fact
came after the events of the following paragraph: Tacitus com-
pletes the narrative of Vitellius’ behaviour at Rome, then moves
back in time to summarize the situation when the first news
came of the Flavian revolt (2. 96).
King Tatius: the Sabine King Tatius had, in legend, ruled for a
time jointly with Romulus, Rome’s founder. The priestly college
called the Titii was supposedly named after him.
not yet four months: i.e. it was August.
113 war of his own: Tacitus here again prefigures Book 4:
Hordeonius’ fears were in the event justified.
114 distrusted and disliked: Vespasian had governed Africa c.62.
Tacitus is here emphasizing the contrast with Vitellius, and
suppresses the idea, found in Suetonius, Vespasian 4, that
Vespasian’s administration was admired by many.
explanatory notes 269
Valerius Festus: a relative of Vitellius, as we learn at 4. 49. He
later had a meteoric rise under Vespasian.
Etesian winds: regular summer north-westerly winds in the
Mediterranean.
capacity to endure toil was dulled: this picture of the German
troops’ loss of military virtue draws on standard Roman images
of Romans corrupted by provincial luxury, but reverses them:
the provincials here are corrupted by Vitellius’ Rome.
115 Hostilia: Ostiglia.
Lucilius Bassus: Vespasian later made him governor of Judaea
to finish crushing the Jewish revolt; but he died before complet-
ing the task.
attributed it to patriotism and the interests of peace: Josephus,
Jewish War 4. 635, the one Flavian historian we possess, actu-
ally attributes it to Caecina’s fear of the Flavian troops; but
Tacitus has an interest in claiming that his predecessors were
mere flatterers.
117 Poetovio: Pettau.
recently suffered defeat: the Thirteenth Legion had fought on
Otho’s side at Bedriacum.
enervate them: Antonius’ key argument: Tacitus’ words at 2. 99
have supported it.
118 not defeated but deceived: the Thirteenth Legion’s own argu-
ment at 2. 44, but Tacitus showed it then as clearly false.
Likewise, the claim that the cavalry shattered Vitellius’ line is an
exaggeration.
119 Sarmatian Iazyges: a Hungarian tribe east of the Danube.
Suebi: a group of German tribes north of the Danube; Sido and
Italicus ruled the Suebian tribes Marcomanni and Quadi in
Bohemia-Moravia.
120 Opitergium and Altinum: Oderzo and Altino.
news of its desertion: the fleet does not actually revolt until 3.
12, but Tacitus has described the preparations for its defection
at 2. 100–1, and presents the desertion itself as inevitable.
Ateste: Este.
121 Vicetia: Vicenza.
the enemy’s general had thus lost his native town: an ironic
point, given that Tacitus has told the reader that Caecina himself
is about to join the Flavians.
270 explanatory notes
ambition: Tacitus questions Mucianus’ motives, but also shows
his warning in the event proved correct, given the actual brutal-
ity that results from Antonius’ attack.
122 a famous family: Messala was probably descended from
Valerius Messala Corvinus (64 bc–ad 8), himself of a distin-
guished ancient family, a writer, and a close political associate of
Augustus. Messala wrote a history of this campaign, which
Tacitus used as a source (3. 25, 3. 28); he is also one of the
characters in Tacitus’ Dialogus. Although only tribune, he was
now in charge of the legion, since the legionary commander had
fled to Vespasian (2. 85).
123 excess of terror: Flavianus’ extravagant fear anticipates the no-
torious cowardice of Vitellius himself at the end of the book,
and contrasts with Antonius’ resoluteness.
gods of war: medallions depicting these gods were on the shafts
of the standards.
124 furnace of some baths: sited beneath the floor of the bath-
house’s heated room.
lictors: attendants who accompanied senior officials.
Atria: Adria.
125 that very field: i.e. Bedriacum. This is not strictly true, as they
were then some miles from the field, but it prepares the way for
the idea that another key battle is about to be fought on the
same spot. Josephus, Jewish War 4. 640 treats this change of
heart by the army as more the result of fear of Vitellius than
pride; but to Tacitus the German army’s loyalty to Vitellius is a
central theme.
126 occupy Cremona: there was a lunar eclipse that night, which
the Vitellians took as an evil omen, but to which Tacitus makes
no reference; Heaven, for him, is not clearly on Antonius’
side.
127 a brave soldier: this description of Antonius is closely modelled
on Sallust’s description of the rebel Catiline at his final battle
(Catiline 60). The overtones are especially resonant: Catiline’s
combination of military heroism and moral perversity fits
Antonius all too well.
128 nor marched out to attack the enemy: contrast the good gen-
eralship of Antonius in the same circumstances (3. 16–17): by
the parallel Tacitus shows that the loss of Caecina has made all
the difference to the Vitellians.
explanatory notes 271
129 victory by force: Antonius does not, contrary to the soldiers’
fears, claim to be aiming for a surrender. The events that follow
the town’s actual surrender (3. 31ff.) should be read in the light
of this speech.
130 raised recently by Galba: it had been formed in Spain in the
previous year.
131 Fifteenth: the manuscript actually reads ‘Fourteenth’; but that
legion was not involved in the battle. ‘Sixteenth’ has also been
proposed as an emendation.
Mark Antony . . . Corbulo: Mark Antony (82–30 bc) had part-
nered Octavian (the future Augustus) in the Second Triumvirate;
then opposed him in the civil war. He had led III Gallica against
Parthia in 36 bc (unsuccessfully, despite Antonius’ words here).
Corbulo had led it against the Armenians in ad 62–3.
132 the Syrian custom: III Gallica had served in Syria since 40 bc.
133 inclined to this view: to the decision to attack, or to the men’s
eagerness for plunder? Tacitus leaves it, and hence also
Antonius’ responsibility for the sequel, unclear.
‘tortoise’ formation: the shields were interlocked to form a
continuous cover.
134 Gaius Pliny: Pliny the Elder, the author of the surviving Natural
History. Among his many other scholarly works was a history of
this period, now lost.
135 olive-branches and ritual bands: symbols of surrender: cf. 1. 66.
136 assistance to the Vitellian cause: Tacitus’ account does not en-
tirely support this charge; but cf. 2. 70.
Forty thousand soldiers: Dio 64. 15 has the plundering largely
carried out by the Vitellians themselves; for Tacitus the Flavians
are entirely responsible.
137 Mefitis: goddess who protected against malaria.
the consulship of Tiberius Sempronius and Publius Cornelius:
218 bc. In that same year Hannibal, the great Carthaginian
general, crossed the Alps and invaded Italy; he was forced out
only in 203 bc. The Gauls had also invaded Italy just a few years
previously, in 225–222 bc.
138 When Caecina had left Rome: the story moves a month back,
picking up events in Rome from the end of Book 2. This accen-
tuates the irony of Vitellius’ complacent apathy: Tacitus has just
shown us the collapse of his cause.
272 explanatory notes
Aricia: Ariccia.
139 no bill had been passed rescinding the magistracy: such a bill
would have to be passed by a popular assembly. Under the
Principate these were a mere formality; but formalities still
mattered.
Caninius Rebilus: lieutenant of Caesar, who was made consul
for the last day of 45 bc, after his predecessor had died in office.
Servilian Park: an imperial mansion at Rome.
Caecina Tuscus: son of Nero’s wet-nurse. Nero had made him
governor of Egypt, then banished him.
caught up Vitellius’ young son: a standard oratorical technique
to attract sympathy. Vitellius is taken in, but has also, of course,
ulterior reasons for being ‘persuaded’.
140 Junii and Antonii are his ancestors: distinguished Republican
families. Blaesus was probably a descendant of Mark Antony,
and possibly Nero’s cousin.
a leisurely advance: compare Vitellius’ own march to Rome (2.
71); Valens’ behaviour is shown as essentially ‘Vitellian’. In fact
his tardiness may have been the result of his earlier illness (2.
99), which Tacitus now ignores.
141 Ariminum: Rimini.
Hercules Monoecus: Monaco.
142 Stoechades: the Îles d’Hyères.
sent there by Claudius: in 43.
143 doubt about the change: the Twentieth was especially slow to
change its loyalties.
Brigantes: a powerful tribe of northern England.
King Caratacus: king of the Catuvellauni, in southern England;
he led a revolt against the Romans under Claudius, but was
defeated in 51.
144 Sixth Legion: VI Ferrata; the legion that went over to Vespasian
in 3. 44 was VI Victrix.
Fonteius Agrippa: according to Josephus, Jewish War 7. 91, he
was killed here in battle soon after. Tacitus ignores this after-
math of the story: his main interest is in the responsibility for the
turbulent empire being transferred into Flavian hands.
Pontus: in northern Turkey. It had been a ‘client kingdom’—
nominally independent, but under Roman control. In 64 it had
explanatory notes 273
been incorporated into the Roman province of Galatia. Polemo
II had been its king from 38 to 64.
Trapezus: Trabzon.
145 Chobus: the Khobi.
146 despising Vespasian: Antonius’ troops’ fatal insubordination is,
for Tacitus, thus mirrored in his own attitude towards his
superiors; compare 3. 53, and Bassus and Silvanus at 3. 50.
Eleventh: XI Claudia, stationed in Dalmatia.
Annius Bassus: he had previously served under Vespasian in the
Jewish War.
Fanum Fortunae: Fano.
147 Pompeius Strabo fought against Cinna at the Janiculum:
Pompeius Strabo was father of Pompey the Great; he defended
Rome when in 87 bc, during the civil war, it came under attack
from Cinna. The Janiculum is the hill across the River Tiber
from the main area of ancient Rome.
Sisenna: a politician of the first half of the 1st century bc, about
which he wrote an influential history.
148 my labours will prove useless: a revealing comment. Desire for
personal glory was thought a perfectly acceptable and indeed
admirable trait among the Romans, but such an exclusive con-
centration on it would still be uncomfortable. Antonius does not
appear to rate his side’s success as valuable in itself.
149 committing suicide: other sources tell a similar story involving
Otho; but, given Tacitus’ portrayal of their respective charac-
ters, it suits his Vitellius much better.
150 Latin rights: these gave all citizens of such towns certain legal
rights, but without full Roman citizenship; full citizenship was
given only to their magistrates.
Mevania: Bevagna.
151 Tarracina: Terracina.
Narnia: Narni.
152 Petillius Cerialis: a major figure in Book 4. His career advanced
under Vespasian: twice consul, and governor of Britain 71–4.
154 Urbinum: Urbino.
the end of the war: the close identification of Valens and
Vitellius culminates here: his death is linked to the end of
Vitellius’ cause.
274 explanatory notes
Anagnia: Anagni.
Juvenalian Games: games instituted by Nero in 59 to celebrate
his coming of age.
155 Age had enfeebled Sabinus: he was about 61.
156 Silius Italicus: politician and poet: his Punica, a long epic poem
on the Hannibalic War, still survives.
without bloodshed: with Vitellius, as with Sabinus, Tacitus
shows imperfectly realized good intentions as a key factor in the
disaster that follows.
an old man: he was 57 (3. 86).
Pompey . . . Antony: misleading examples: Pompey was mur-
dered without Caesar’s knowledge, while Antony committed
suicide.
Claudius’ colleague: Lucius Vitellius had Claudius as his col-
league in his last two consulships and his censorship (cf. 1. 9).
However, to call Vespasian his ‘dependant’ is probably an exag-
geration: Vespasian rose to prominence at the time of Vitellius’
father’s greatest influence, but we know of no further connec-
tion between them.
157 opportunely dying: Suetonius, Vitellius 14 records a rumour
that Vitellius killed her. Tacitus omits this: he has consistently,
as here, shown Vitellius’ love for his family (e.g. 1. 75, 2. 59, 2.
89).
Caesar . . . Gaius . . . Nero’s: Caesar was assassinated by a
group of other senators at a meeting of the Senate. Gaius was
killed in 41 by a small group of conspirators in a corridor of the
palace. Nero fled Rome on the news of Galba’s revolt, and went
to a villa a bit under four (English) miles away, where he killed
himself.
158 Sacred Way: the oldest street in Rome. It ran from the Roman
Forum (where the Temple of Concord was also sited) towards
the palace.
house of Flavius Sabinus: on the Quirinal Hill in the north-east
of the city.
Capitol: fortified hill in the centre of Rome, containing the
famous temple to Jupiter Optimus Maximus.
Verulana Gratilla: wife of Arulenus Rusticus (3. 80); she was
exiled after his execution in 93. Tacitus’ words hint at an
unfeminine lack of modesty on her part, of which Romans
traditionally disapproved.
explanatory notes 275
159 Aventine: hill in the southern quarter of the city.
160 merely an excuse for war: other sources have Vitellius actively
arranging the attack on Sabinus; Tacitus shows him as increas-
ingly passive and ineffectual.
‘Grove of Refuge’: the saddle between the two peaks of the
Capitol. In legend Romulus, the first king of Rome, had estab-
lished a right of asylum there.
Tarpeian Rock: a cliff, probably on the south-east side of the
Capitol; condemned criminals were traditionally executed by
being flung from it.
the most common account: in fact, other surviving sources
(probably deriving from Flavian propaganda) make the
Vitellians clearly responsible. Tacitus here weights the evidence
in the other direction, but allows no side to escape blame.
the temple: of Jupiter Optimus Maximus.
161 could have defiled: Tacitus here refers to various legends con-
nected with the Capitol. Omens at its foundation were said to
have promised it as the ‘Capital of an Empire’ [‘caput imperii’],
a significant play on the name ‘Capitol’. Then the Etruscan king
Lars Porsenna supposedly attacked Rome in c.507 bc seeking to
restore the monarchy; the ultimate negotiated settlement left
Rome a republic. Tacitus here says that Rome surrendered to
Porsenna; the normal patriotic account had the Romans success-
fully withstanding him, but Tacitus chooses the version which
most closely parallels the current situation. Finally, the Gauls
sacked Rome in c.387 bc; patriotic legend had the Romans on
the Capitol holding out against them.
burnt before in civil war: in 83 bc, during the civil war that
brought Sulla to power. The perpetrator was never identified.
Tarquinius Priscus . . . Servius Tullius . . . Tarquinius Superbus:
in legend Tarquinius Priscus, Servius Tullius, and Tarquinius
Superbus (⫽ ‘The Proud’) were, respectively, the fifth, sixth, and
seventh (and last) kings of Rome.
Suessa Pometia: a town of the Volscians, a neighbouring Italian
tribe.
his second consulship: about 507 bc.
consulship of Lucius Scipio and Gaius Norbanus: i.e. 83 bc: the
gap was in fact about 425 years.
his famous ‘Fortune’: Sulla was nicknamed ‘Felix’—‘The
Fortunate’.
276 explanatory notes
Lutatius Catulus: major politician of the early 1st century bc,
who dedicated the rebuilt temple in 69.
162 commanding what he had banned: cf. the similar behaviour of
Vitellius: both sides, for Tacitus, are now controlled from
below.
a linen mantle: dress of a worshipper of the Egyptian goddess
Isis.
163 Gemonian Steps: flight of steps leading up to the Capitol, on
which the bodies of executed criminals were exposed.
from bloodshed: Tacitus presents these as alternatives, but his
own account has supported both interpretations.
Temple of Feronia: just under three (English) miles outside
Tarracina.
164 Vergilius Capito’s: he had been governor of Egypt 47–52.
165 Saturnalian holiday: festival celebrated in a carnival atmos-
phere, starting on 17 December.
Ocriculum: Otricoli.
deflecting popular resentment: i.e. by placing responsibility for
the disaster on Mucianus’ shoulders.
Salarian Way: road leading into Rome from the north-east.
‘The Red Rocks’: a prominent cliff-face a few miles north of the
city.
166 Fidenae: Castel Giubileo.
Arulenus Rusticus: husband of Verulana Gratilla (3. 69). He
was a Stoic associate of Thrasea Paetus and Helvidius Priscus
(see 2. 91), and was eventually executed by Domitian after
publishing eulogies of them.
a knight named Musonius Rufus: an influential teacher (his
pupils included Epictetus), some of whose discourses still sur-
vive. He was banished by Nero in 65 and recalled by Galba;
later he was banished again by Vespasian and recalled by Titus.
However, at 4. 10 he is not a knight, but a senator. Tacitus may
be wording this passage loosely, and mean only that he was of
equestrian family; but he also hints at the derogatory implica-
tion that he joined the embassy illegitimately.
167 Vestal Virgins: the important cult of Vesta at Rome was served
by six aristocratic women, vowed to virginity for thirty years.
Colline Gate: in the north-east corner of the city.
explanatory notes 277
Sallust’s Gardens: a park lying outside the city walls to the west
of the Colline Gate.
168 twice when Sulla mastered Rome, once under Cinna: Sulla’s
armies had conquered Rome in 88 and 82 bc, Cinna’s in 87 bc.
their holiday: the Saturnalia (3. 78).
Guards’ camp: it lay just outside the Colline Gate.
169 shameful hiding-place: other sources give more detail of
Vitellius’ humiliating attempts to escape: Tacitus now treats him
more sympathetically, drawing a veil over his degradation.
soldier of the German army: i.e. one of his own troops.
the site of Galba’s murder: the people had celebrated Vitellius’
accession in similar fashion (2. 55): the parallel reinforces
Tacitus’ portrait of the mob’s fickleness.
Vitellius’ father: the text is unclear here: probably some words
are missing in which Vitellius’ father was described.
Luceria: Nocera.
170 deserted Galba for Vitellius: Caecina in particular.
all fear of violence was at an end: Tacitus’ ironic hint at
Domitian’s cowardice is noteworthy: so too is the reminder of
the last and worst of the Flavians directly after the death of their
unworthy predecessor.
171 plundering Cremona: unlike in Josephus, Jewish War 4. 654
Antonius is not here restrained by Mucianus. The reminder of
the atrocity against Cremona (3. 32–4) emphasizes once again
Antonius’ brutality against his own people, now turned against
the very city of Rome; we may contrast his noble sentiments at
3. 60. Through the whole of the opening of this book Tacitus
casts over the Flavian victory the shadow of future tyranny.
173 praetorship with the powers of a consul: this position is unpar-
alleled. It was presumably connected with the fact that
Vespasian and Titus were both still absent, as well as with a
desire to honour the three Flavians equally.
a pretext: a triumph could only be obtained for a victory over a
foreign enemy. The Sarmatian expedition may be connected
with the Dacian attack at 3. 46; Tacitus does not make the
connection, and so denies the triumph even a shred of validity.
restore the Capitol: a significant move: the temples on the Capi-
tol were believed central to the prosperity of Rome. However,
under standard senatorial procedure religious matters ought to
have been transacted before secular ones.
278 explanatory notes
Valerius Asiaticus: son-in-law of Vitellius; he apparently died
within a few weeks of this episode.
honour to a new emperor: the text is missing some words here,
although the general sense is clear.
fortune in life: this famous digression is significantly placed: as
the Flavian rule begins, Helvidius is established as the paradig-
matic opponent of tyranny. It also establishes Eprius Marcellus
as his enemy, and so gives him too a paradigmatic role, prepar-
ing the way for the debate that follows.
174 that school of philosophy: i.e. Stoicism.
Eprius Marcellus: he ultimately committed suicide after being
accused of conspiracy against Vespasian; hence there is an irony
in his complaisant stance towards the Emperor in the following
scene.
175 Soranus and Sentius: like Thrasea, Barea Soranus had been
forced to commit suicide under Nero. Sentius may be Cn.
Sentius Saturninus, who must have known Vespasian, as they
both held commands under Claudius during his conquest of
Britain; but details of his fate are unknown.
176 any Brutus or Cato: two Brutuses were famous opponents of
tyranny: Lucius Junius Brutus in legend expelled Tarquinius
Superbus, the last king of Rome, and became the first consul of
the new Republic; Marcus Junius Brutus (85–43 bc) led the
assassins of Julius Caesar. Marcus Porcius Cato (234–149 bc)
was famed for his unbending rectitude, as was his great-
grandson of the same name (95–46 bc), who fought against
Julius Caesar.
Vespasian’s age: he was now 60.
in those days administered the Treasury: in Tacitus’ own day,
two ex-praetors were selected by the Emperor to be the chief
treasury officials; this had also been the practice under Nero.
interposed his veto: under the Republic, tribunes had the right to
veto senatorial motions. This is the last known case when the
veto was used—and it is striking that it is on behalf of the
autocrat, not an assertion of liberty. Of course, the Emperor
himself also had tribunician power: this formed the legal basis of
his authority to override the Senate.
took care to remember it: i.e. to pass on to Vespasian that
Helvidius had allotted him only a subordinate role.
Publius Celer: a Stoic who had been bribed to give evidence
against Barea Soranus in 66.
explanatory notes 279
177 adopted the power of an emperor: Tacitus consistently shows
Mucianus taking over imperial prerogatives: see 2. 83, and cf. 2.
5, 4. 44–7, and 4. 68.
Gaius Piso: this Piso had led a conspiracy against Nero, but was
betrayed and forced to commit suicide.
178 Chatti: a powerful people of western Germany.
the neighbouring island: i.e. the part of the Netherlands between
the diverging mouths of the Rhine.
Julius Paulus: the text has been corrupted around this point—
‘Claudius Paulus’ has also been conjectured as the name.
Sertorius: Quintus Sertorius (c.123–72 bc), a Roman governor
of Spain who for some years led the Spaniards in a war against
Rome, claiming to be the legitimate Roman authority. His am-
biguous position between Roman and foreign is mirrored in
Tacitus’ portrait of Civilis; and Tacitus’ phrasing here directly
imitates Sallust’s description of Sertorius (Histories 1. 88).
Sertorius, like Hannibal, had only one eye.
179 prefects: subordinate officials with this title were in charge of
local military districts.
180 the Island: see 4. 12.
Mogontiacum: Mainz.
Gaius’ farcical expeditions: Gaius had visited Germany in 39–
40, and sought to stage-manage a military victory for himself.
Frisii: they inhabited modern Friesland, in the north-east
Netherlands.
Nervian: the Nervii were a tribe inhabiting land near Brussels.
182 Aedui and Arverni: the Arverni were a powerful tribe inhabiting
the Auvergne. For the Aedui see 1. 51. Both had supported
Vindex.
the East is used to tyrants: a standard Roman stereotype of the
submissive Easterner. However, Tacitus undermines Civilis’ case
by putting this argument in his mouth. On the one hand, the
Jews were currently in revolt; on the other, he has shown Civilis
himself aiming at kingship (4. 18).
born before the days of tribute: an exaggeration—tribute began
to be levied in 27 bc, nearly a hundred years earlier.
Quintilius Varus was killed: when governor on the Rhine in 9,
Varus had been surprised by a German attack: his three legions
were wiped out and he committed suicide.
Ubii: German tribe inhabiting the area round Cologne.
280 explanatory notes
183 stationed in the rear: a regular German custom, according to
Roman writers.
Vetera: Xanten.
increase in the number of their cavalry: cavalry were better paid
than infantry.
184 First Legion: I Adiutrix.
Gallus hesitated: Tacitus leaves it unclear whether Gallus had
received Hordeonius’ messages in 4. 19: he shows the troops
taking the actual responsibility for fighting, and the command-
ers’ motivation as doubtful. We can compare the hints of treach-
ery in the same paragraph; all this reinforces the sense that
Civilis may indeed have Roman support, as alleged, and thus
that the war with him is a civil war.
185 Bructeri and Tencteri: tribes on the east bank of the Rhine, the
Tencteri opposite Cologne, the Bructeri to their north.
186 to hold two legions: at full strength each legion would have
about 5,000 men.
188 the legions from Mogontiacum were in pursuit: cf. 4. 19: how-
ever, Hordeonius had countermanded the order. Again Tacitus
leaves unclear how much was known and the troops’ precise
motivation.
189 ‘the anger of heaven’: such sceptical rationalism towards omens
is typical of ancient historians: but the inclusion of the omen in
the narrative at all would carry for a Roman hints at disaster to
follow.
Novaesium: Neuss.
they encamped . . .: some words are missing from the text here.
Gelduba: Gellep bei Krefeld.
190 Menapii and Morini: Gallic tribes on the west bank of the Maas.
Agrippinenses: their chief town, the modern Cologne, took the
name ‘Colonia Agrippinensis’ after a colony was placed there in
50 by Agrippina (the wife of Claudius and mother of Nero),
whose birthplace it was. The tribe took its new name from the
town.
Marcodurum: Düren.
191 Caecina’s edict: Caecina was entitled to issue edicts as consul.
This was presumably a manifesto in favour of joining the
Flavians.
193 Asciburgium: Asberg.
explanatory notes 281
196 Chatti, Usipi, and Mattiaci: the Usipi were a tribe of the east
bank of the Rhine south of Cologne; the Mattiaci were a branch
of the Chatti, inhabiting the area round Wiesbaden.
supposed to be plotting revolution: Tacitus pointedly highlights
the panic of the Roman populace at the supposed rebellion in
Africa, juxtaposing it with the real threat in Germany, towards
which they show no response. The real story behind the African
‘rebellion’ is told in 4. 48–50.
197 Julius Frontinus: he later had an outstanding career: thrice con-
sul, governor of Britain, and supervisor of the city’s aqueducts.
He wrote treatises, which still survive, on military strategy and
Rome’s aqueduct system.
Crassus Scribonianus: brother of Galba’s heir Piso: see 1. 48.
Seventh Legion: VII Galbian; VII Claudia had in fact also fought
for the Flavians at Cremona, and was sent to Pannonia.
198 repeated blushes were taken for signs of modesty: Tacitus here
ironically alludes to Domitian’s notoriously florid complexion.
nothing was done about Piso: as Galba’s ‘rightful heir’, Piso was
still potentially controversial. By juxtaposing this episode with
the reference to a potential coup by his brother Tacitus rein-
forces the point.
disgracefully tampered with: Nero had not only added various
festivals, but had altered the names of the months.
taken refuge with Vespasian: at 4. 39, however, Tettius’ sup-
posed anti-Flavianism was only an excuse for his demotion; the
real motive was to honour Grypus. By showing that his actual
flight to Vespasian achieved his restoration of rank, Tacitus
hints at conflict and embarrassment among the Flavians.
Demetrius, a professor of Cynic philosophy: a famous philo-
sopher, often referred to by Seneca; he was eventually banished
by Vespasian on the advice of Mucianus. The hostility that he
aroused here may have been because of his own well-known
friendship with Stoics like Soranus, whom Publius had betrayed.
His allegiance was to Cynicism, an influential school of Greek
philosophy advocating the adoption of a primitive life according
to nature. Despite what Tacitus implies here, Demetrius’ defence
of Publius may well have been consistent with Cynic doctrine,
which stressed the importance of reconciliation and justice, and
combined harangues against vice with understanding for those
who strayed from the moral line.
282 explanatory notes
Junius Mauricus: brother of Arulenus Rusticus (3. 80). He was
exiled by Domitian after his brother’s execution, then recalled
by Nerva in 97; he became an adviser to Trajan.
199 Paccius Africanus . . . suggested to Nero the murder of the two
brothers Scribonius: Paccius Africanus had been consul in 67;
this episode does not seem to have seriously hindered his career,
since he later became governor of Africa. His alleged victims
were Publius Sulpicius Scribonius Proculus and Scribonius
Rufus; they had been summoned by Nero to Greece in 67, then
were forced to commit suicide.
Vibius Crispus: cf. 2. 10 for Vibius’ own ambiguous behaviour
under Nero.
the senatorial age: the minimum age for a senator was 25.
Aquilius Regulus: Messala’s half-brother, and a notorious in-
former under Nero. In 67 he had accused Marcus Licinius
Crassus Frugi (brother of Galba’s heir Piso), and Crassus’
father-in-law (Quintus Sulpicius Camerinus Pythicus) and
brother-in-law; all three were executed. Orfitus was the consul
of 51, executed in 66 by Nero as a result of Regulus’ accusation.
200 divided amongst his creditors: so there was no money to tempt
Nero.
stuffed yourself with seven million sesterces: an informer
obtained a quarter of his victim’s estate after his conviction.
201 under Caesar’s nose: i.e. Domitian, who was presiding.
Antistius Sosianus: he had actually been exiled for his treason
against Nero, but he had subsequently obtained his recall by
informing against his fellow exiles. However, there is an irony in
the senators ‘reaffirming the original penalty’, since the original
exile was under the very laws they are now opposing.
202 Sena: Siena.
a mutiny almost broke out among the soldiers: with what fol-
lows compare the mutiny of the Batavians at 4. 19: Mucianus’
control of the situation here contrasts with Flaccus’ vacillation.
203 the regular term of service: Guards served for a term of sixteen
years; regular legionaries for twenty.
204 the then governor, Marcus Silanus: in 39. However, Tacitus is
apparently mistaken about the governor at the time: it was not
Silanus (whose tenure there had been some years earlier), but
another Lucius Piso, the father of the current governor.
explanatory notes 283
the safest course is war: Mucianus himself had used similar
arguments to Vespasian at 2. 76–7. Tacitus now hints that the
risk of revolution in Africa is real, contrary to what he had
suggested at 4. 38: however, the implication of what he says here
is that it was at least partly those groundless suspicions at Rome
that encouraged Piso to consider rebellion now. Certainly
Mucianus’ assassin seems, in Tacitus’ account, to have been sent
on the basis of rumour alone.
205 His name will recur again and again in this narrative: he became
infamous as an informer under Domitian; but he was eventually
himself convicted of corruption and exiled.
Adrumetum: Sousse.
206 Oea: Tripoli.
Garamantes: they inhabited the desert interior of modern
Libya.
207 at once launched his fastest corn-ships: this had probably hap-
pened before Titus’ departure for Judaea. Tacitus uses the move-
ment of the ships to effect the transition back to Rome; he also
closes the narrative of events in Rome and Africa with
Vespasian’s solution to the grain crisis that had triggered them
at 4. 38.
Lucius Vestinus: a friend of Claudius; he had been governor of
Egypt in 59–62.
Plautius Aelianus: he had had a long political career, and was
now the senior of the pontiffs, one of the four major colleges of
priests at Rome, to which only a limited number of senior
aristocrats might be appointed.
a pig, a sheep, and an ox: this triple sacrifice to Mars was a
standard part of the purification ceremony.
Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva: Juno and Minerva, as well as
Jupiter, were worshipped in the Capitoline temple.
208 the empire was coming to an end: Tacitus’ irony is apparent,
given that he has just described the temple’s restoration.
Druids: priests of the Celtic tribes: they had been subjected to
major Roman prohibitions and persecutions.
209 committed adultery: Caesar had a notorious reputation as a
womanizer, not least during his campaign in Gaul.
210 Baetasii . . . Marsaci: the Baetasii were a Belgic tribe; the
Marsaci inhabited the Netherlands.
286 explanatory notes
took over part of the country himself. In the end, Julius Caesar
defeated him in battle, and proceeded to conquer the rest of
Gaul in 58–51 bc, claiming always to be there at the invitation
of the Gauls themselves.
223 the Cimbri and the Teutons: German tribes from what is now
Denmark. In the late 2nd century bc they had migrated and
attacked southern Gaul and Italy, only to be defeated by the
Romans in a series of battles.
you govern this and other provinces yourselves: this was in fact
very rare at that time. Vindex had been the one prominent
example.
224 depravity and greed: Cerialis repeats Tacitus’ phrase from 4. 14:
this was indeed the Roman behaviour that had provoked the
revolt.
227 Tolbiacum: Zülpich.
228 the regular season of the summer winds: late August or early
September.
229 deduced the tenor of the oracle’s response: the name ‘Basilides’
is Greek for ‘son of a king’: Tacitus has Vespasian taking it as a
divine confirmation of sovereignty. However, this story seems to
belong more naturally to a time before Vespasian was aware of
his victory, and it appears as such in Suetonius, Vespasian 7.
Tacitus’ transferring it here focuses attention instead on the
future rule of Vespasian’s own sons, and especially Domitian, to
whom the book will shortly turn.
not yet been canvassed in any Roman authorities: the following
story, found also in Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 28, is in fact not
the correct origin of the Serapis cult. Ptolemy took an existing
cult at the previous capital of Memphis, where the dead Apis,
the Egyptian sacred bull, was identified with the god Osiris
under the name Oserapis; he then transformed this into the
central royal cult of Alexandria. Tacitus alludes to the true story
among the alternatives he offers at the end of his main version:
see 4. 84.
King Ptolemy: Ptolemy I Soter (c.367–283 bc), general of Alex-
ander the Great, made himself king of Egypt when Alexander’s
empire broke apart after his death. He made Alexandria his
capital; it had been founded by Alexander after his conquest of
Egypt in 332 bc.
explanatory notes 287
230 Eleusis: A town near Athens, the site of the Eleusinian Myster-
ies, a famous initiation cult worshipping the goddess Demeter
(identified with the Roman Ceres). The Eumolpids were the clan
supplying the cult’s hereditary priests.
Jupiter Dis . . . Proserpina: Jupiter Dis was Pluto, god of the
underworld; Proserpina was goddess of the underworld, daugh-
ter of Ceres and Jupiter.
the oracle of Apollo at Delphi: Apollo was god of prophecy; his
oracle at Delphi was the most famous in the Greco-Roman
world.
image of Apollo’s father: Apollo was the son of Jupiter and Leto;
hence his ‘father and sister’ are Jupiter and Proserpina respec-
tively. This, of course, depends on identifying the image of
Jupiter Dis which Ptolemy is to bring back with Jupiter himself.
231 embarked unaided: a standard element in ancient stories of the
introduction of new cults.
an ancient shrine of Serapis and Isis: this temple in Rhacotis (in
the west of the city) was in fact built under Ptolemy III Euergetes
(reigned 246–221 bc). Tacitus’ confusion is shown by the fact
that he now seems to admit that the cult of Serapis already
existed in Egypt.
Memphis: the correct version: see 4. 83.
Aesculapius: Roman god of healing.
233 Saturn was forcibly deposed by Jupiter: in mythology, Saturn
was Jupiter’s father: Jupiter overthrew him and became ruler of
the gods. The connection of Saturn with the Jews may be an
attempt to explain the institution of the Sabbath—see 5. 4.
the reign of Isis: in Egyptian myth, the wife of the god Osiris.
Some Greek writers believed them to be a historical king and
queen of Egypt.
234 King Cepheus: mythical Greek king; his supposed homeland
varies.
Assyrian refugees: perhaps a version of the story in Genesis 12:
Abraham went to Canaan from Haran in Syria.
poems of Homer: in Iliad 6. 184, 204: they appear to be a tribe
of south-west Turkey.
Jerusalem: in Greek and Latin ‘Hierosolyma’.
Most authorities, however, agree: the idea that the Jews were
descended from lepers expelled from Egypt was common
among Greek writers. The particular version here, which is only
288 explanatory notes
very loosely related to the biblical account, originated with
an Alexandrian Greek called Lysimachus. Tacitus omits
Lysimachus’ account of Jewish sacrilege during the Exodus: he
reserves the moral paradoxes of Judaism for later.
234 King Bocchoris: king of Egypt c.720–715 bc. This is impossibly
late: the Bible places the Exodus several centuries earlier.
the oracle of Ammon: a famous oracle at Siwa; the Egyptian god
Ammon was identified by the Romans with Jupiter.
their city and their Temple: in Jewish sources Jerusalem was
only captured by King David centuries later, and the Temple
was built by his son Solomon.
235 wandering and thirst: i.e. an ass. The myth that there was an
image of an ass in the Holy of Holies was widespread among
Greek and Roman authors; however Tacitus contradicts it him-
self at 5. 5 and 5. 9 below.
insult to Ammon: among the Egyptians, rams were sacred to
both Ammon and Osiris. This is unlikely to be the true explana-
tion of the Jewish use of rams (and bulls) in sacrifice; but it was
one found among Jews themselves to explain the use of a lamb
for the Passover offering (Philo, Questions and Answers on
Exodus 1. 8; also Midrash Exodus Rabbah 16: 3). Tacitus’
introduction of it here suits his picture of paradoxical Jewish
reversal of existing practices.
without leaven: unleavened bread was certainly distinctively
Jewish. However, it was prescribed only for Passover (e.g. Exo-
dus 12: 15–20, 12: 34) and for certain sacrificial rituals (e.g.
Leviticus 2: 4–11; also Mishnah Menachot 5: 1–2); at all other
times leaven was eaten. Tacitus’ failure to mention this again
reinforces his polarized opposition between Jews and non-Jews.
end to their toils: according to Tacitus, crossing the wilderness
took seven days, as opposed to the forty years in the Bible. The
biblical explanations for the Sabbath are, of course, very differ-
ent: e.g. Genesis 2: 3, Deuteronomy 5: 15.
the seventh year as well to sloth: a reference to the Sabbatical
year, when the land was to lie fallow and debts were remitted:
see e.g. Leviticus 25: 2–7, Deuteronomy 15: 1–18.
the seven stars: the seven zodiacal ‘planets’: Sun, Moon,
Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn.
offerings and tribute: before the destruction of the Temple, all
Jews, including converts, sent it annual tribute; other offerings
explanatory notes 289
were also common. After the destruction of the Temple, the
Romans compelled all Jews to send the offerings as tribute to
Rome.
distinguish themselves from other people: in fact other Eastern
nations, including the Egyptians, also practised circumcision.
Once again, the Bible explains the custom differently (Genesis
17: 11–14).
later-born children: i.e. extra children born once the father
claimed to have reached the desired family size, or after he had
made a will (under Roman law, a new living child would auto-
matically invalidate the old will). The Romans regularly exposed
unwanted infants, abandoning them to die or be picked up by
others; this was prohibited under Jewish law.
236 wreaths of ivy: this is untrue. The error may arise from a
misinterpretation of the feast of Tabernacles, where branches of
palm, myrtle, and willow were used in the ceremony; but it is
also likely that Tacitus is adapting his account of Judaism to
reinforce the apparent similarity with the cult of Bacchus, a
similarity which he can then expose as merely superficial.
a golden vine: it hung above the gate of the sanctuary.
Father Liber: Bacchus, the god of wine; his worshippers wore
ivy wreaths and danced to music.
a lake of immense size: i.e. the Dead Sea.
237 destroyed by lightning: a reference to the story of the destruction
of Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis 18–19).
the River Belius flows into the Jewish sea: the Nahal Naaman: it
in fact flows into the Mediterranean near Acre.
enclosed the Temple: both here and at 5. 11 Tacitus seems to
have misinterpreted his source. Jerusalem had three sets of walls,
but they were not concentric, as he implies; nevertheless, an
enemy attacking from the north-west (the easiest approach)
would have to carry all three before reaching the Temple, which
stood on Mount Moriah at the eastern extremity of the city. The
Temple, however, had its own fortifications, which were in
addition to these three walls.
cross the threshold: an oversimplification. The Temple had four
courts, and foreigners could enter the first, but only priests the
fourth.
238 King Antiochus: Antiochus IV Epiphanes of Syria (reigned 175–
164 bc). He banned Jewish religious practices in 167, but was
290 explanatory notes
faced with a revolt led by the priestly family of the Hasmoneans;
after his death, his anti-Jewish decrees were rescinded. The
Hasmoneans ultimately took the kingship, obtaining substantial
autonomy for the Jews in 142 bc, though true independence did
not come until after the death of Antiochus VII in 129 bc.
238 Arsaces at that moment rebelled: an anachronism. Antiochus IV
campaigned against Parthia in 165; but the revolt of Arsaces I,
the founder of the Parthian Empire, had in fact occurred in 247,
under Antiochus II.
The mob was fickle and drove them out: entirely false. Tacitus
is constructing a picture without regard to the actual events,
simply relying on the standard Roman stereotype of tyrannical
rule.
assuming the priesthood: from 152 bc the Hasmonean rulers
took the title of High Priest. Earlier Jewish kings, unlike the
Hasmoneans, claimed direct descent from David, and so were
not even of priestly family.
right of conquest: in 63 bc.
The walls of Jerusalem were destroyed: they were, however,
rebuilt shortly afterwards.
Publius Ventidius: Antony controlled the East 42–31 bc.
Pacorus (not in fact king, but the son of King Orodes) captured
Jerusalem in 40 bc and placed the Hasmonean Antigonus on the
throne, but in 38 bc was defeated by Publius Ventidius Bassus,
Antony’s chief lieutenant.
Gaius Sosius: governor of Syria, who helped Herod capture
Jerusalem in 37 bc.
gave the kingdom to Herod: Herod the Great (c.73–4 bc).
Antony had in fact already made him king in 40.
Simon: a slave of Herod’s: he was in fact only one of several
aspirants to the throne in the anarchy after Herod’s death.
governor of Syria: for Varus see 4. 17; he governed Syria 6–4 bc.
three of Herod’s sons: Archelaus, Antipas, and Philip. But
Tacitus does not mention that Archelaus was deposed in 6, and
his domain turned into a Roman province.
made Judaea a province: the part of Judaea formerly ruled by
Archelaus had in fact been put under governors by Augustus in
6. In 41 Claudius gave it to Agrippa I, grandson of Herod the
Great, but on Agrippa’s death in 44 it reverted to direct Roman
rule.
explanatory notes 291
Antonius Felix: governor of Judaea 52–60; he was a freed slave
of Claudius’ mother.
239 Antony’s grandson: Claudius’ mother was Antony’s daughter.
Felix’s wife Drusilla was the daughter of the Jewish king
Agrippa I, and no relation to Antony. An earlier wife, the
daughter of Juba II of Numidia, was the granddaughter of
Antony and Cleopatra. Her name is unknown; conceivably she
too was called Drusilla, but it is more likely that Tacitus has
conflated the two women.
Gessius Florus: governor 64–6.
two summers: i.e. 67–8.
wait for the enemy to starve: however, according to Josephus
famine did ultimately play a major role in the Jewish defeat.
vision of Rome: an ambiguous motivation: the soldiers wish for
the wealth of Jerusalem; for Titus, the main ‘conquest’ will be
of Rome. Tacitus sets the war with the ‘foreign’ Jews against
a reminder of the moral problems arising from the Flavians’
conquest of their compatriots: see Introduction pp. xvii–xxii.
240 built walls in peacetime: the northernmost wall was built by
Agrippa I before his death in 44.
the central city by John: John of Gischala had headed the recent
resistance in Galilee; he then had fled to Jerusalem and taken it
over. However, most of the city was captured from him by the
powerful revolutionary leader Simon bar Giora. Tacitus is again
confused over Jerusalem’s topography: Simon in fact now con-
trolled virtually all the city except the area of the Temple, John
held only the outer area around the Temple.
gained possession of the Temple: according to Josephus, Jewish
War 5. 98–105, this in fact happened after Titus had begun his
siege of the city. Tacitus has the Romans facing more united
opposition after Eleazar’s fall, and less exploiting enemy
divisions.
241 expiate them by sacrifices or vows: i.e. as the Romans tradition-
ally did.
600,000: this seems exaggerated; it may derive from Titus’ own
attempts to play up the magnitude of his victory.
243 the conquerors of Britain: XIV Gemina had served in Britain
since its conquest in 43.
set Galba on the throne: VI Victrix in Spain had been the first
legion to hail Galba as Emperor.
292 explanatory notes
244 the Batavian capital: Batavodorum. It lay in the north-eastern
suburbs of the modern Nijmegen.
Drusus Germanicus: Nero Claudius Drusus Germanicus (38–9
bc); brother of Tiberius and father of Claudius.
the Gallic branch: i.e. the Waal.
245 Arenacum: Rindern.
246 his escort straggled: i.e. while marching along the bank.
Lupia: the Lippe.
biremes: ships with two banks of oars.
247 houses and fields untouched: so as to make Civilis’ supporters
suspect that he was secretly in league with the Romans. The
same tactic had been employed by various characters in earlier
historians, including Coriolanus and Hannibal in Livy.
Nor is this far from the truth: however, Tacitus’ subsequent
narrative implies that the Germans wished to hand Civilis over,
and that his voluntary surrender forestalled them. He subtly
corrects Civilis’ argument, even as he apparently endorses it.
248 next door to freedom: contrast 4. 14: Tacitus’ own narrative has
shown the actual extent of Roman repression.
ratified by word of mouth: Civilis had used the same half-true
pretexts at 4. 13: Tacitus closes the narrative of the revolt by
referring back to its opening.
1, 8]
[ book one 293
GLOSSARY OF PLACE-NAMES
Adrumetum Sousse Interamna Terni
Albingaunum Albenga Luceria Nocera
Albantimilium Ventimiglia Lucus Luc-en-Diois
Altinum Altino Lupia Lippe
Anagnia Anagni Marcodurum Düren
Antipolis Antibes Mevania Bevagna
Aquinas Aquino Misenum Miseno
Arar Saône Mogontiacum Mainz
Arenacum Rindern Mutina Modena
Aricia Ariccia Narnia Narni
Ariminum Rimini Nava Nahe
Asciburgium Asberg Novaesium Neuss
Ateste Este Novaria Novara
Atria Adria Ocriculum Otricoli
Aventicum Avenches Oea Tripoli
Batavodorum in north-east Opitergium Oderzo
Nijmegen Pennine Pass Great St Bernard
Belius Nahal Naaman Perusia Perugia
Bingium Bingen Placentia Piacenza
Bononia Bologna Poetovio Pettau
Brixellum Brescello Regium Lepidum Reggio Emilia
Brundisium Brindisi Rigodulum Riol
Byzantium Istanbul Sena Siena
Chobus Khobi Stoechades Îles d’Hyères
Divodurum Metz Tarentum Tarento
Dyrrachium Durazzo Tarracina Terracina
Emerita Merida Ticinum Pavia
Eporedia Ivrea Tolbiacum Zülpich
Fanum Fortunae Fano Trapezus Trabzon
Ferentium Ferento Urbinum Urbino
Fidenae Castel Giubileo Vercellae Vercelli
Forum Julii Fréjus Vetera Xanten
Gelduba Gellep bei Krefeld Vicetia Vicenza
Hercules Monoecus Monaco Vindonissa Windisch
Hispalis Seville Vocetius Botzberg
Hostilia Ostiglia
294 glossary of place-names
The following places have not been definitively identified, or else have
no modern equivalent: Actium, Aquileia, Bedriacum, Bovillae,
Castores, Forum Alieni, Grinnes, Minturnae, Pharsalia, Philippi,
Sinuessa Spa, Vada.
index 295
INDEX
Except in the case of foreign monarchs with Roman citizenship (who are
normally referred to, in Tacitus and elsewhere, by their local name, not their
full Roman names), and of well-known Roman authors like Livy, Sallust, and
Cicero, the index gives the full names of people, as far as these are known.
Where Tacitus employs only some of these names in referring to a character,
the names that we know from other sources (apart from the abbreviated
personal names listed below) are italicized.
Standard Roman abbreviations are used for the following personal names:
Appius (abbreviated as Ap.), Aulus (A.), Decimus (D.), Gaius (C.), Gnaeus
(Cn.), Lucius (L.), Marcus (M.), Publius (P.), Quintus (Q.), Servius (Ser.),
Sextus (Sex.), Tiberius (Ti.), Titus (T.). These names are ignored in
alphabetization: the exception is the Emperors Gaius, Tiberius, and Titus, who
are invariably referred to by their personal names. For a full explanation of
Roman names, see Introduction pp. xxix–xxx.
Abraham 287 Alexander, see Julius Alexander
Achaia 59–60, 63, 104 Alexandria 21, 103, 145, 228–
Actium 3 31, 233, 267, 287
Addua 81 Alfenus Varus 75, 83, 138, 149,
Adriatic 105, 141 154, 177
Adrumetum 205 Allia 110
Aedui 33, 40, 93, 138, 182, 210 Allobroges 41–2
Aegialus 24 D. Alpinius 244
Aemilius Longinus 212, 215 Alpinius Montanus 138, 191–2,
Aemilius Pacensis 15, 55, 65, 244
162 Alps 17, 42, 43–4, 56, 65, 68,
Aerias 60 69, 77, 96, 117–18, 137,
Aesculapius 231 138, 148, 209, 220, 231,
Africa 6, 9, 24, 31, 43, 45, 47, 248
48, 91, 114, 145, 196, 203– Cottian Alps 38, 54–5, 218
6, 267, 282 Graian Alps 95, 218
Africanus, see Paccius Africanus Julian Alps 121
Agrippa, see Vipsanius Agrippa Maritime Alps 65–6, 142
Agrippa I (Jewish ruler) 290, Pannonian Alps 114, 117
291 Raetian Alps 44
Agrippa II (Jewish ruler) 104, see also Pennine Pass
233, 260 Altinum 120
Albani 6 Ammon 234–5
Albantimilium 66 Amullius Serenus 21
Albingaunum 67 Anagnia 154
Albinus, see Lucceius Albinus Anicetus 144–5
Alexander III of Macedon L. Annius Bassus 146
(Alexander the Great) 286 Annius Faustus 64
296 index
Ap. Annius Gallus 55, 65, 71–2, Apeninnes 141, 146–7, 149, 150,
78, 84, 218, 244 152
Antigonus 290 Apinius Tiro 151, 164
Antioch 103, 104 Apis 235, 286
Antiochus II Theos (king of Apollinaris, see Claudius
Syria) 290 Apollinaris
Antiochus IV Epiphanes (king of Apollo 230
Syria, 175–164 bc) 238 see also Temples
Antiochus IV Epiphanes (king of Aponianus, see Dillius Aponianus
Commagene) 104, 233, 262 M. Aponius Saturninus 49, 106,
Antiochus VII (king of Syria) 290 113, 119, 122–4, 248
Antipas 290 Appian Way 177
Antipolis 67 Aquileia 85, 106, 120, 121
Antistius Sosianus 201–2 Aquilius 180
Antoninus Pius (T. Aelius M. Aquilius Regulus 199–200
Hadrianus Antoninus Pius, Aquinas 55, 93
emperor 138–61) 258, 259 Aquinus, see Cornelius Aquinus
M. Antonius, see Antony Aquitania, see Gaul
Antonius Felix 238–9 Arabia, Arabs 233, 236
Antonius Flamma 202 Arar 91
L. Antonius Naso 15 Archelaus 290
Antonius Novellus 55, 65 Arenacum 245
M. Antonius Primus xv–xvii, Argius 31
125, 149, 156, 173, 187, Aricia 138, 172
191–2, 244 Ariminum 141
character 107, 118–19, 123, Ariovistus 223
127, 134, 148, 165, 228 Armenia, Armenians 62, 104,
advocates invasion 117–19, 105, 120, 131
178–9, 248 M. Arrecinus Clemens 218
invades Italy 120–2 Arrius Antoninus 48
and the army 123–4, 127, Arrius Varus 120, 126–7, 147–8,
128–9, 131–2, 136, 145–6, 153, 155, 171, 173, 177,
153, 197 197, 218
at 2nd battle of Bedriacum L. Arruntius 95
126–32 L. Arruntius Camillus
and sack of Cremona 128–9, Scribonianus 56, 100
132–7, 148, 153, 171 Arsaces I (king of Parthia) 238
advances on Rome 146–7, Arulenus Rusticus, see Junius
152–3, 154–5, 165–7 Arulenus Rusticus
rivalry with Mucianus 146–8, Cn. Arulenus Caelius Sabinus
177, 197, 218 48
actions at Rome 171, 197 Arverni 182
loses favour with Vespasian Asciburgium 193
148, 228, 249 Asia vii, 8, 60, 62, 63, 64, 104,
Antonius Taurus 15 105, 144, 182
Mark Antony (M. Antonius) ix, Asiaticus (freedman of Vitellius)
62, 131, 156, 238–9, 240, 90–1, 112–13, 177
250, 256, 265 Asiaticus (Gallic chieftain) 112
index 297
Asinius Pollio 91 Black Sea 105
Asprenas, see Nonius Calpurnius Blaesus, see Junius Blaesus
Asprenas Bocchoris 234
Assyria, Assyrians 234, 238 Boii 92
Ateste 120 Bonn 184–5, 187–8, 214, 220,
Atilius Vercilio 26 226, 246, 251, 256
Atilius Verus 130 Bononia 84, 96, 98
Atria 124 Boudicca 260, 261
Atticus, see Quintius Atticus Bovillae 172, 202
Augustales 112 Brigantes 143
Augustus (emperor 27 bc–ad Briganticus, see Julius Briganticus
14) ix, 9, 11, 14, 32, 56, 57, Brinno 180–1
101, 156, 182, 186, 203, Britain, Britons 3, 6, 8, 27, 34,
210, 238, 250, 254, 263, 38, 44, 65, 74, 77, 80, 90,
270, 271 95–6, 107, 113, 115, 117,
T. Aurelius Fulvus 49 126, 130, 138, 141, 142–3,
Auspex, see Julius Auspex 159, 178, 180, 188, 202,
Aventicum 43 208, 218, 224, 225, 227,
Aventine 159, 169 243, 250, 260, 266, 273,
281
Baebius Massa 205 Brixellum 78, 81, 88, 89
Baetasii 210, 217 Brixian Gate (at Cremona) 133
Baetica, see Spain Bructeri 185, 214, 225, 243–4
Barbius Proculus 17–18 Brundisium 106
Barea Soranus 175, 176–7, 198 Brutus, see Junius Brutus
Basilides (priest of Carmel) 102– Burdo, see Julius Burdo
3 Byzantium 105, 144
Basilides (Egyptian noble) 229
Basques 193 C. Cadius Rufus 48
Bassus, see Annius Bassus, Cn. Caecilius Simplex 92, 158
Lucilius Bassus A. Caecina Alienus 101, 121,
Batavi 37–8, 40, 68–9, 71, 74–5, 191, 270
83, 95, 97, 113, 178–87, character 33–4, 42, 69–70, 72,
190–5, 210, 212, 213, 217, 76, 90, 114
223, 225–7, 232, 242–9 plots against Galba 33–4
Batavodurum 244–5, 291 invades Italy 38–9, 42–4, 56,
Bedriacum 72, 81, 83–4, 87, 90, 65, 68–9
95, 98, 107, 126, 133, 269, fights against Otho 69–74, 76,
270 78, 81–4
Beirut 104 rivalry with Valens 72, 76,
Belgae 182, 184–5, 219–20, 221, 110–12, 115
225 in aftermath of victory 88, 90,
Belgica, see Gaul 92, 96, 97–8, 136
Belius 237 actions at Rome 110–12
Berenice 59–60, 104 betrays Vitellius 112, 114–16,
Betuus Cilo 24 121–2, 125–6, 135–6, 138–
Bingium 220 9, 140, 228, 277
Bithynia 258, 265 death 249
298 index
C. Caecina Tuscus 139 Cartimandua 143
Caecina, see Licinius Caecina Casperius Niger 162
Caelius Sabinus, see Arulenus Caspian Pass 6
Caelius Sabinus Cassius Dio xii, 271
Caeracates 220 C. Cassius Longinus 62, 256
Caesarea 103 Cassius Longus 126
Caetronius Pisanus 205–6 Castores 73
Calabria 106 Catiline, see Sergius Catilina
Calenus, see Julius Calenus Ti. Catius Asconius Silius Italicus
Caligula, see Gaius 156
C. Calpetanus Rantius Quirinalis Cato, see Porcius Cato
Valerius Festus 114, 204–6 Catuvellauni 272
Calpurnius Asprenas, see Nonius Caudine Forks 284, 285
Calpurnius Asprenas Celer, see Egnatius Celer
Calpurnius Galerianus 177, 204 Celsus, see Marius Celsus
C. Calpurnius Piso (conspirator Cepheus 234
against Nero) 177 Ceres 89, 286, 287
L. Calpurnius Piso (governor of Cerialis, see Petillius Cerialis
Africa in 39/40) 282 C. Cestius Gallus 239
L. Calpurnius Piso (governor of Cestius Severus 199
Africa in 69/70) 196, 203–6 Cetrius Severus 21
L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi Chatti 178, 196, 256
Licinianus (Galba’s heir) 11– Chauci 227, 244
14, 15–16, 19–21, 22, 25–8, Chobus 145
30–1, 157, 198, 200, 259, Cicero 267
266, 281 Cilicia 60
Calpurnius Repentinus 36, 38 Cimbri 223
Calvia Crispinilla 45–6 Cingonius Varro 6, 24
C. Calvisius Sabinus 30 Cinna, see Cornelius Cinna
Campania 4, 17, 151–3, 155–6, Cinyras 60
164, 172 Civilis, see Julius Civilis
Campanus 217 Classicus, see Julius Classicus
Campus Martius 54, 112, 167 Claudia Octavia 10
Camurius 27 Claudia Sacrata 246
C. Canilius Rebilus 139 Claudii (family) ix–x, 12, 86
Canninefates 180–1, 183, 192, Claudius (Ti. Claudius Nero
210, 227, 232 Drusus Germanicus, emperor
Capito, see Fonteius Capito 41–54) ix, 8, 12, 30, 48, 56,
Capitol 4, 22, 25–6, 30, 44, 54, 100, 101, 142, 143, 156,
109, 158–63, 165, 167, 173, 238–9, 240, 250, 251, 252,
176, 207–8 253, 257, 266, 268, 283,
Cappadocia 48, 62, 104 292
Capua 151, 172 Claudius Apollinaris 141, 163–4
Caratacus 143 Claudius Cossus 43
Carmel 102 Claudius Faventinus 151
Carsulae 153 Claudius Julianus 151, 163–4
Carthage, Carthaginians 47, 204, Claudius Labeo 183, 210, 217,
205 220
index 299
M. Claudius Marcellus 11 Coriolanus 292
Claudius Pyrrhicus 68 Corsica 67–8
Claudius Sagitta 204–5 Cottian Alps, see Alps
Claudius Sanctus 214–15 Crassus, see Licinius Crassus
Claudius Severus 42 Cremera 110
Claudius Victor 193 Cremona 68, 71–2, 96, 97–8,
Clemens, see Arrecinus Clemens 115, 126–30, 132–7, 140,
Cleopatra 239 141, 144, 145, 148, 149,
T. Clodius Eprius Marcellus 88– 153, 171, 191, 206, 222,
9, 113, 174–6, 177, 200–1, 281
249, 278 Crescens 47
L. Clodius Macer 6, 9, 24, 45, Crete 233
114, 205 Crispina 30
P. Clodius Thrasea Paetus 110, Crispinus (centurion) 37
174, 175, 176, 276 Crispinus, see Varius Crispinus
Cluviae 174 Crispus, see Junius Vibius Crispus
Cluvius Rufus 7, 47, 91, 94–5, Cugerni 189, 242, 244
156, 197, 201 Curtius Montanus 198, 199–201
Cocceius Proculus 17 Cynicism 198
Coelius, see Roscius Coelius Cyprus 60
Coenus 89 Cyrene 202, 258
Colline Gate 167 Cythnus 63
Cologne 36–7, 185, 188, 209,
210, 212, 215–17, 227, 279, Dacia, Dacians 4, 143–4, 148,
280, 284 208, 277
Commagene 267 Dalmatia, Dalmatians 47, 64, 77,
Corbulo, see Domitius Corbulo 107, 124, 146, 260
Corinth 59 Danube 143
Cornelius Aquinus 6 David 288, 290
L. Cornelius Cinna 147, 168 Dead Sea 236–7
P. Cornelius Dolabella 55, 93–4 Delphi 230
Cornelius Fuscus 107, 119, 124, Demetrius 198
141, 156, 173 Didius Scaeva 162
Cornelius Laco 6, 10–11, 15, 17, C. Dillius Aponianus 122, 124
18, 22, 26, 29 C. Dillius Vocula 187–9, 192–6,
L. Cornelius Marcellus 24 209–12, 215, 226
Cornelius Martialis 159–60, 162 Dio, see Cassius Dio
Cornelius Primus 162 Dis, see Jupiter
L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus Divodurum 39–40
(consul 83 bc) 161 Dolabella, see Cornelius
P. Cornelius Scipio (consul 218 Dolabella
bc) 137 Domitian (T. Flavius Domitianus,
Ser. Cornelius Scipio Salvidienus emperor 81–96) 3, 224, 228,
Orfitus 199 266, 286
L. Cornelius Sisenna (historian) character 171, 198, 206–7,
147 218, 232
L. Cornelius Sulla Felix 80, 161, in Rome under Vitellius 152–3,
168 159, 162, 170
300 index
Domitian (cont.): invades Italy 38–42, 46, 72,
takes official role 173, 197, 74–6
198, 201, 203, 218, 231–2 fights against Otho 66, 76, 78,
withdraws from public life 232 82–4
his reign 162, 249, 264, 267, rivalry with Caecina 76, 110–
276, 281, 283 12
death 249 in aftermath of victory 88, 89,
Cn. Domitius Corbulo 101, 120, 90, 92, 96, 98
131 actions at Rome 110–13
Domitius Sabinus 21 marches from Rome 114–15,
Donatius Valens 36, 38 126, 138, 140–2
Druids 208 captured and executed 142,
Drusilla 239 154, 156
Drusus, see Nero Claudius Fanum Fortunae 146
Drusus Faustus, see Annius Faustus
A. Ducenius Geminus 11 Ferentium 87
Dyrrachium 105 Festus (auxiliary commander) 91
Festus, see Calpetanus Rantius
P. Egnatius Celer 176–7, 198 Quirinalis Valerius Festus
Egypt, Egyptians xxvii, 9, 43, 47, Fidenae 166
62, 64, 99, 101, 105, 121, Flaccus, see Hordeonius Flaccus
145, 172, 228–31, 233–6, Flaminian Way 54, 94, 165, 167
272, 283 Flavianus, see Tampius Flavianus
Eleazar bar Simon 240 T. Flavius Sabinus (brother of
Eleusis 230 Vespasian) 29, 89, 94, 115,
Emerita 48 152, 155–6, 158–60, 162–3,
Emesa 266 165, 167, 169, 203, 258
Epictetus 276 T. Flavius Sabinus (nephew of
Epiphanes (prince of Vespasian) 48, 79, 88
Commagene) 73 Flavus 112
Eporedia 44 C. Fonteius Agrippa 144
Epponina 217 C. Fonteius Capito 6–7, 24, 33,
Eprius Marcellus, see Clodius 34, 37, 154, 178
Eprius Marcellus Forum 22, 25–7, 30, 80, 109,
Ethiopians 234 159, 160, 254, 274
Etruria 54, 141 Forum Alieni 120
Eumolpids 230 Forum Julii 66, 142
Euphrates 238, 267 Frisii 180–1, 183, 210, 227
Frontinus, see Julius Frontinus
Fabius Fabullus 126 Fundane Pool 158
M. Fabius Priscus 227 Fuscus, see Cornelius Fuscus
Fabius Valens 101
character 33, 36, 41–2, 76, 90, Gaius (‘Caligula’, C. Julius
140–1, 154 Caesar, emperor 37–41) ix,
murders Fonteius Capito 6, 12, 30, 56, 101, 157, 180,
33–4, 154, 257 200, 204, 218, 238, 251,
plots against Galba 33–4, 36, 257
154 Galatia 63, 273
index 301
Galba (Ser. Sulpicius Galba, see also Aedui, Allobroges,
emperor 68–9) 3, 30, 35–6, Arverni, Baetasii, Belgae,
44, 62, 89, 101, 116, 120–1, Boii, Helvetii, Leuci,
154, 170, 198, 281 Lingones, Marsaci,
character 5–7, 14, 23, 24, 31 Mediomatrici, Menapii,
accession x, 20, 243 Morini, Nervii, Remi,
and the army 5–6, 13–14, 17– Sequani, Treviri, Tungri,
18, 23, 25, 26–7, 64, 107, Vocontii
130, 132, 193 Gelduba 189, 192, 195, 211
executions 6–7, 21, 24, 55, Gemonian Steps 163, 169
255 Germanicus, see Vitellius
actions at Rome 7, 14–15, 34, Germanicus
45, 46, 48, 99, 111, 174, Germany, Germans xix–xxii, 6,
276 7–8, 9–10, 14, 18, 21,
actions in the provinces 6–8, 24, 31–9, 42–4, 46, 47–8,
33–4, 40–1, 63, 91, 114, 52–3, 68, 71, 77, 79, 90, 91,
178, 210 92, 97, 100, 101–2, 104,
chooses successor 9–14, 25, 111, 113, 114, 117, 121,
59 122, 125, 138, 139, 141,
plotted against by Otho 15–25 143–4, 148, 154, 158, 159,
murdered 25–8, 40, 42, 59, 76, 169, 172, 178–96, 197,
90, 91, 109, 157, 169, 200, 202–3, 204, 208–17, 221–8,
264 241–9
Galeria Fundana (wife of Lower Germany 8, 33–5, 39,
Vitellius) 85, 92, 94, 157, 111–12, 183, 251, 256
159, 169, 260 Upper Germany 7–9, 31, 34–6,
Galerianus, see Calpurnius 39, 196, 212, 220, 244, 251,
Galerianus 254, 256
P. Galerius Trachalus 57, 92 see also Baetasii, Batavi, Belgae,
Galilee 260, 291 Bructeri, Caeracates,
Gallus, see Annius Gallus, Canninefates, Chatti, Chauci,
Herennius Gallus Cimbri, Cugerni, Nervii,
Garamantes 206 Mattiaci, Suebi, Sunuci,
Gaul, Gauls x, xx–xxii, 3, 7, 24, Tencteri, Teutons, Treviri,
32–3, 38–44, 55, 56, 62, 65, Triboci, Tungri, Ubii, Usipi,
75, 77, 90, 95, 96–7, 111, Vangiones
112, 117–18, 125, 126, 137, Gessius Florus 239
138, 141, 142, 148, 161, Geta 99
172, 178, 179, 181–2, 187– Golden Milestone 19
8, 190, 191–2, 196, 204, Graian Alps, see Alps
208–15, 217–18, 219–27, Greece, Greeks 60, 105, 144,
231–2, 244, 247, 248, 251, 238, 281, 287
268 see also Achaia
Aquitania 47 Grinnes 245
Belgica 9, 37, 38 Grove of Refuge 160
Lyons Division 38, 91–2 Grypus, see Plotius Grypus
Narbonese 30, 47, 55, 65–7, Guards’ camp 13–14, 18–19, 23–
75, 77, 141–2 5, 28, 168–9
302 index
Haemus 107 Juba II (king of Numidia) 291
Hall of Liberty 21 Juda 234
Hannibal 137, 178, 284, 292 Judaea, Jews xvii–xix, xxi–xxii,
Hasmoneans 289–90 8, 47, 59, 61–2, 99, 101,
Helvetii 42–3 102–3, 104, 105, 172, 206,
C. Helvidius Priscus 110, 173–6, 233–41, 249, 252, 265, 269,
177, 201, 207, 249, 276 273, 279
Hercules Monoecus 141 Julia 253
Herennius Gallus 184, 189, 212, Julian Alps, see Alps
220, 226 Julianus, see Claudius Julianus,
Herod the Great (king of Judaea) Tettius Julianus
238, 240, 260 Julii (family) ix–x, 12, 86, 112
Herodotus xix Julius Agrestis 149
Hierosolymus 234 Ti. Julius Alexander 9, 99, 103
Hilarus 94–5 Julius Alpinus 43
A. Hirtius 256 Julius Atticus 23
Hispalis 48 Julius Auspex 219
Histria 99 Julius Briganticus 71, 220, 245
Homer 234 Julius Burdo 37
M. Horatius Pulvillus 161 C. Julius Caesar (dictator) ix, 27,
Hordeonius Flaccus 7–8, 34–6, 32, 54, 57, 139, 156, 157,
90, 113, 179, 182–4, 187–9, 209, 210, 250, 253, 258,
192, 195–6, 208, 226, 248 278, 285
Hormus 124–5, 134, 197 L. Julius Calenus 138
Hostilia 115, 121, 126, 129, 140 Julius Carus 27
Julius Civilis:
Iazyges 119 character 178, 213, 215, 223
Icelus Marcianus 10, 22, 24, 29, imprisoned and freed 37, 178,
113 192
Ida 233 secretly urges rebellion 178–80,
Idaei 233, 235 181–2, 183, 187, 188, 191,
Illyricum, Illyrians 3, 6, 8, 21, 192, 208–9, 224
47, 92, 99–100, 106–7, 138, professes support for
172 Vespasian 178–9, 179–80,
see also Dalmatia, Pannonia 185, 191–2, 248
Inn 119 fights against Romans 181,
Interamna 94, 153, 154 182–3, 185–7, 190–1, 192–6,
Isis 231, 233–4, 276 211–13, 215–17, 219–21,
Italicus 119, 129 224–7, 241–7
acquires supporters 180–1,
Janiculum 147 183, 185, 189, 190, 208–9,
Jerusalem 61, 233–4, 237–41, 217
249 surrenders 247–8
Jews, see Judaea Julius Classicus 66, 208–13, 215,
John of Gischala 240 220–2, 224–7, 244–5
Jordan 236, 260 Q. Julius Cordus 47
Josephus xi–xii, 260, 266, 269, Julius Flavianus 166
270, 272, 277, 291 Sex. Julius Frontinus 197
index 303
Julius Fronto 15, 74 M. Licinius Crassus Frugi (father
Julius Gratus 74 of Piso Licinianus) 11
Julius Mansuetus 132 M. Licinius Crassus Frugi
Julius Martialis 19, 50–1 (brother of Piso Licinianus)
Julius Maximus 193 30, 199
Julus Paulus 178 Licinius Crassus Scribonianus
Julius Placidus 169 (brother of Piso Licinianus)
Julius Priscus 110, 149, 154, 177 30, 197, 253
Julius Sabinus 209, 217 C. Licinius Mucianus 132, 187,
Julius Sacrovir 210 224
Julius Tutor 209–12, 220–2, 224, character 8, 61, 104, 106
225–6, 244–5 in Syria 8, 47, 156
Julius Valentinus 219–21, 225, encourages Vespasian to claim
231 throne 61–3, 99–102, 103–
L. Julius Vestinus 207 4, 282
C. Julius Vindex x, 6, 7, 12, 32– usurps imperial role 8, 61,
3, 43, 56, 74, 112, 182, 210, 101–2, 105–6, 163, 173,
219, 251, 264, 285 177, 197
Q. Junius Arulenus Rusticus 166, plans campaign against
274, 281 Vitellius 104–6, 117, 121,
Junius Blaesus 38, 91–2, 139–40 144, 155, 165, 248
D. Junius Brutus 256 rivalry with Antonius 121,
L. Junius Brutus 176 146–8, 177, 197, 218, 228
M. Junius Brutus 32, 62, 176 victory over Dacia 143–4
Junius Mauricus 198 actions at Rome 106, 113,
M. Junius Silanus 204 173, 177, 197, 201–3, 204,
L. Junius Q. Vibius Crispus 64, 218, 228, 277, 281
199, 200–1 campaigns against Civilis 218,
Jupiter 233, 287, 288 231–2
Jupiter Dis 230–1 death 249
Jupiter Optimus Maximus 212 Licinius Proculus 29, 51, 55, 78,
see also Temples 81, 83, 92
Juvenalian Games 154 Liguria, Ligurians 66–7
Juvenalis 217 Lingones 34–5, 37, 38, 40, 48,
74, 209–10, 217, 219, 222–
Labeo, see Claudius Labeo 4, 225
Laco, see Cornelius Laco Livia 253
Lacus Curtius 26, 90 Livy xi, 250, 259, 263, 284, 285,
Laecanius 27 292
Lebanon 236 Longinus, see Aemilius Longinus
Lepcis 206 Lucania 106
Leto 287 Lucceius Albinus 91
Leuci 40 Luceria 169
Liber 236 Sex. Lucilius Bassus 115–16,
Libya 233 124–5, 138, 140, 172
P. Licinius Caecina 88–9 Lucus 42
M. Licinius Crassus (triumvir) Lupercus, see Munius Lupercus
11 Lupia 246
304 index
Lusitania, see Spain Moesia, Moesians 47, 49, 77, 84,
Q. Lutatius Catulus 161 85, 99, 106–7, 118, 119,
Lyons 33, 38, 40–1, 46, 92, 232 122, 123–4, 128, 131, 143–
Lyons Division, see Gaul 4, 148, 163, 208, 248, 251
Lysimachus 287 Mogontiacum 180, 187, 188,
193, 196, 212, 214, 215,
Maas 190, 217, 246 220, 221
Macedonia 229, 238 Montanus, see Alpinius
Macer, see Clodius Macer, Montanus, Curtius
Martius Macer Montanus
Maevius Pudens 17 Morini 190
Magnus, see Pompeius Magnus Moschus 55
Manlius Patruitus 202 Moselle 221, 225–6, 257
C. Manlius Valens 40 Moses 234
Marcellus, see Claudius Mucianus, see Licinius Mucianus
Marcellus, Clodius Eprius Mulvian Bridge 55, 109, 167
Marcellus Munius Lupercus 182–3, 185,
Marcodurum 190 213–14
Mariccus 92–3 C. Musonius Rufus 166–7, 176–
Maritime Alps, see Alps 7, 198
C. Marius 80 Mutina 32, 88–9
A. Marius Celsus 11, 21, 25, 28,
44–5, 55, 57, 72–4, 78, 81, Nabalia 248
84, 92 Narbonese Gaul, see Gaul
Marius Maturus 66, 142 Narnia 151, 153, 154, 157, 165,
Mars 215, 283 166
see also Temples Nava 220
Marsaci 210 Nero (Ti. Claudius Drusus
Marseilles 142 Germanicus Caesar, emperor
Marsians 152 54–68) vii, viii, 12, 16, 29,
Martialis, see Cornelius Martialis 30, 56–7, 99, 101, 107, 154,
Martius Macer 72, 79, 98 175–6, 178, 239, 253, 260,
Masada 249, 260 272, 278, 279
Mattiaci 196 and the army 5–6, 8, 17, 20,
Mauretania 9, 91, 261 21, 40, 43, 65, 74, 95, 109,
Caesarensis 91 257
Tingitana 91 his death viii, x, 5, 56, 61,
Medes 238 112, 157, 250
Mediomatrici 39, 220, 221–2 followers and admirers 5–6, 7,
Memphis 231, 286 10, 13, 15, 18, 33, 45, 48,
Menapii 190 63, 64, 89, 98, 112, 120,
Mercury 284 199–201, 254, 264, 268
Messala, see Vipstanus Messala pretenders 4, 63–4
Mevania 150, 152 Nero Claudius Drusus
Milan 44 Germanicus 244
Minicius Justus 120 Nerva (M. Cocceius Nerva,
Minturnae 151 emperor 96–8) 3, 253, 281
Misenum 63, 115, 150–1, 153 Nervii 180, 193, 210, 217, 227
index 305
Nonius Attianus 199 actions at Rome 28, 44–6, 47–
L. Nonius Calpurnius Asprenas 8, 53–4, 93
63–4 communicates with Vitellius
Nonius Receptus 36, 38 46–7
C. Norbanus (consul 83 bc) 161 policy in provinces 48
Noricum 9, 44, 119, 248 expedition against Vitellius 54–
Novaesium 189, 193, 194–5, 7, 64–8, 77–84, 208
210, 214, 220, 226, 227, commits suicide 76, 85–8, 89,
246 90, 93, 101, 106
Novaria 44
Numidia, Numidians 81 C. Paccius Africanus 199
Numisius Lupus 49, 122 Pacensis, see Aemilius Pacensis
Numisius Rufus 185, 212, 220, Pacorus (conqueror of Judaea)
226 238
C. Nymphidius Sabinus 5–6, 18, Pacorus II (king of Parthia) 26
24 Padua 120, 124
Paelignians 152
Obultronius Sabinus 24 Pamphylia 63
Ocriculum 165 Pannonia, Pannonians 18, 42, 47,
Octavia, see Claudia Octavia 64, 66, 68, 77, 106–7, 118,
Octavian, see Augustus 119, 124, 131, 148, 208,
Octavius Sagitta 201–2 248, 251, 256, 281
Oea 206 Pansa, see Vibius Pansa
Ofonius Tigellinus 17, 45 Paphos 60
Onomastus 17, 19 Papirius 204
Opitergium 120 Parthia, Parthians 4, 62, 105,
Orfidius Benignus 83, 84–5 131, 206, 238, 255
Orfitus, see Cornelius Scipio Patrobius 31, 112
Salvidienus Orfitus Paulinus, see Suetonius Paulinus,
Orodes II (king of Parthia) 290 Valerius Paulinus
Osiris 231, 286, 287, 288 Paulus, see Julius Paulus
Ostia 50, 94 Pedanius Costa 99
Otho (M. Salvius Otho, emperor Pedius Blaesus 48
Jan.–Apr. 69) 3, 43, 59, 62, Pennine Pass 38–9, 44, 54–5,
69, 71, 73–4, 91, 92, 107, 218
113, 116, 123, 125, 132, Persians 238
136, 171, 182, 250, 254, Perusia 32
269, 273 Q. Petillius Cerialis Caesius
character 10, 15–16, 20, 31–2, Rufus 152, 165–6, 218,
46, 62–3, 65, 72, 76, 79–80, 221–8, 232, 241–8
81, 85–7, 89 Petronia 94
early life 10, 48, 87 P. Petronius Turpilianus 6, 24
plots against Galba 15–25 Petronius Urbicus 44
declared emperor 19, 24, 29– Pharsalia 32, 80
30, 40, 46–7 Philip 290
murders Galba 25–32, 40, 76 Philippi 32, 80
and the army 17–18, 23–5, Philo 252, 288
28–9, 49–53, 64–5 D. Picarius 67–8
306 index
Picenum 141 Ptolemy I Soter (king of Egypt)
Pile Bridge 54 229–31
Pisa, Bay of 141 Ptolemy III Euergetes (king of
Piso, see Calpurnius Piso Egypt) 231
Placentia 68–9, 70–2, 77, 79, 87 Publilius Sabinus 110, 138
M. Plancius Varus 93–4 Puteoli 151
Ti. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus Pyrenees 17
207
C. Pliny (Pliny the Elder) 134 P. Quintilius Varus 182, 238
Pliny the Younger 261 C. Quintius Atticus 162–3
Plotius Firmus 28–9, 51, 85, 87 Quintius Certus 68
L. Plotius Grypus 147, 197, 198 Quirinal 274
Plutarch xi, xiii, 252, 254, 255, Quirinus, see Romulus
258, 259, 260, 262, 263,
264, 286 Raetia, Raetians 9, 38, 42–3,
Po 43, 65, 68–9, 70, 71, 72, 77, 114, 119, 121, 148, 220,
78–9, 81, 83, 84, 137, 146, 248
147 Raetian Alps, see Alps
Poetovio 117 Ravenna 115, 120, 124, 138,
Polemo 144 140, 146
Polyclitus 24, 112 Red Rocks 165
Pompeius Longinus 21 Regium Lepidum 87–8
Cn. Pompeius Magnus (brother Regulus, see Aquilius Regulus
of Piso Licinianus) 30 Remi 218, 219
Pompeius Propinquus 9, 37 Rhacotis 231
M. Pompeius Silvanus 107, 146, Rhine 32, 37, 68, 77, 90, 178,
203 180, 185–6, 187, 188, 190,
Cn. Pompeius Strabo 147 209, 215–16, 223, 225, 241–
L. Pompeius Vopiscus 48 4, 246–7, 257
Cn. Pompey (Cn. Pompeius Rhodes 60
Magnus, triumvir) 11, 32, Rhoxolani 48–9
62, 80, 156, 238, 240, 273 Rigodulum 221
Pontia Postumina 201 Romilius Marcellus 36, 38
Pontus 62, 63, 104, 144–5, 229– Romulus 112, 275
31 Quirinus 212
Poppaea Sabina 10, 16, 48 M. Roscius Coelius 38
M. Porcius Cato (234–149 Rosius Regulus 139
bc) 176 Rostra 25, 169
M. Porcius Cato (95–46 bc) Rubellius Plautus, see Sergius
176 Rubellius Plautus
Porcius Septiminus 119 Rubrius Gallus 88, 115
Porsenna 161 Rufinus 112
Postumian Way 129 Rufus, see Cluvius Rufus
Priscus, see Helvidius Priscus,
Julius Priscus Sabines 165
Proculus, see Licinius Proculus Sabinus, see Flavius Sabinus,
Proserpina 230 Julius Sabinus, Publilius
Ptolemy (astrologer) 16 Sabinus
index 307
Sacred Way 158 Sergius Rubellius Plautus 11
Sacrovir, see Julius Sacrovir Q. Sertorius 178
Saevinus Propinquus 48 Servius Tullius 161
Sagitta, see Claudius Sagitta, Sextilia (mother of Vitellius) 47,
Octavius Sagitta 94, 109, 157
Saguntum 284 Sextilius Felix 119, 220
Salarian Way 165, 167 Sido 119, 129
Sallust xi, 250, 255, 261–2, 263, Silanus, see Junius Silanus
270, 279, 284 Silius Italicus, see Catius Asconius
Sallust’s Gardens 167 Silius Italicus
Salonina 70 Silvanus, see Pompeius Silvanus
L. Salvius Otho Cocceianus 86 Simon (slave of Herod the Great)
L. Salvius Otho Titianus 46–7, 238
57, 72, 78, 81, 84, 92 Simon bar Giora (revolutionary
Samnites 152, 284 leader) 240
Sanctus, see Claudius Sanctus Simplex, see Caecilius Simplex
Sardinia 67 Sinope 230
Sariolenus Vocula 199 Sinuessa Spa 45
Sarmatia, Sarmatians 3–4, 48–9, Sisenna (centurion) 63
119, 131, 173, 208 Sisenna, see Cornelius Sisenna
Saturn 233, 235 Siwa 288
see also Temples Sodom and Gomorrah 289
Saturnalia 165, 277 Sohaemus 104, 233
Saturninus, see Aponius Solomon 288
Saturninus Solymi 234
Scipio (auxiliary commander) 91 Soranus, see Barea Soranus
Scipio, see Cornelius Scipio Sosianus, see Antistius Sosianus
Scribonia 11 C. Sosius 238
Scribonianus, see Arruntius Sostratus 61
Camillus Scribonianus, Spain, Spaniards x, 6, 7, 16–17,
Licinius Crassus Scribonianus 24, 39, 47, 77, 91, 94–5,
Scribonianus Camerinus 99 107, 113, 117–18, 125, 126,
Scribonius, see Sulpicius 132, 138, 142, 148, 159,
Scribonius 172, 188, 218, 225, 271,
Scydrothemis 230–1 279, 284, 291
Sedochezi 145 Baetica 34, 48
Seleucia 231 Lusitania 10, 16, 44
Seleucus 102 Tarraconensis (Nearer Spain)
Sempronius Densus 27 31, 197, 250, 285
Ti. Sempronius Longus (consul Spurinna, see Vestricius Spurinna
218 bc) 137 Staius Murcus 27
Sena 202 Stoechades 142
Seneca 281 Stoicism 166, 253, 268, 276,
Cn. Sentius Saturninus 175 278, 281
Sequani 33, 217 Sex. Subrius Dexter 21
Serapis 228–31 Suebi 3–4, 119, 129, 285
L. Sergius Catilina (Catiline) T. Suedius Clemens 55, 65
270 Suessa Pometia 161
308 index
Suetonius (biographer) xi, 252, of Vesta 27
254, 259, 265, 266, 267, Tencteri 185, 215–16, 225
268, 274 Terentius 27
C. Suetonius Paulinus 55, 57, L. Tettius Julianus 49, 106–7,
72–4, 77–8, 80, 81, 83, 92 197, 198
Sulla, see Cornelius Sulla Teutons 223
Sulpicia Praetextata 199 Thrace, Thracians 9, 43
Q. Sulpicius Camerinus Pythicus Thrasea Paetus, see Clodius
282 Thrasea Paetus
Sulpicius Florus 27 Tiber 54, 111, 167, 273
P. Sulpicius Scribonius Proculus Tiberius (Ti. Claudius Nero,
199 emperor 14–37) xi, 11, 12,
P. Sulpicius Scribonius Rufus 199 56, 95, 101, 112, 200, 203,
Sunuci 217 238, 251, 253, 292
Syria 8, 60, 61–2, 63, 64, 99, Tiberius’ House 19
101, 102–4, 132, 172, 182, Ticinum 68, 74, 76, 96, 97, 108
197, 231, 233, 234, 236, Tigellinus, see Ofonius Tigellinus
238, 248, 290 Timotheus 230
Titianus, see Salvius Otho
Tamiras 60 Titianus
L. Tampius Flavianus 107, 119, Titus (T. Flavius Vespasianus,
122–4, 248 emperor 79–81) 3, 8, 173,
Tarentum 106 196, 198, 285
Tarpeian Rock 160 character 59–60, 101–2, 206–
Tarquinius Priscus 161 7, 232, 233, 239
Tarquinius Superbus 161, 278 acquires support for Vespasian
Tarracina 151, 153, 163–4, 169, 60–2, 99, 103
172 campaigns in Judaea 105, 206,
Tarraconensis, see Spain 239, 241, 249
Tartaro 121 reign and death 249, 276
Tatius 112 Tiu 284
Temples: Tolbiacum 227
of Apollo 18, 156 Toulouse 249
of Concord 158 Trachalus, see Galerius Trachalus
of Feronia 163 Trajan (M. Ulpius Traianus,
Jewish Temple 234–8, 240–1, emperor 98–117) 3, 253,
249 281
of Deified Julius 27 Trapezus 144
of Juno 54, 207–8 M. Trebellius Maximus 38, 95
of Jupiter the Guardian 162 Trebonius Garrutianus 6
of Jupiter Optimus Maximus Treviri 34–5, 37, 39, 66–7, 75,
160–1, 207–8, 274 138, 182–3, 190, 192, 196,
of Mars 260 208–10, 212, 217, 219–24,
of Mefitis 137 225, 231, 247
of Minerva 207–8 Triaria 94, 164
of Saturn 19 Triboci 220
of Venus 60 Trier 214–15, 220, 222, 224,
index 309
241, 243, 244 Verulana Gratilla 158, 276
Tungri 66–7, 75, 181, 209, 217, Vespasian (T. Flavius
227 Vespasianus, emperor 69–
Turin 95–6 79) 3, 29, 60, 136, 146,
Turullius Cerialis 71 148, 152, 155, 159, 162,
Tutor, see Julius Tutor 163, 164, 174–6, 178–9,
198, 204, 208, 211, 218,
Ubii 182–3, 190, 209, 215–16, 224, 226, 254, 261, 265,
225, 246, 247 269, 282
Umbria 141, 147 character 32, 61, 106, 114,
Umbricius Melior 18 156, 200, 222
Uranus 260 early career 101, 114, 142,
Urbinum 154 155–6
Usipi 196 in Judaea 8–9, 47, 61, 239,
273
Vada 245 aims at throne 9, 32, 59, 61–3,
Valens, see Fabius Valens 99–103
Valentinus, see Julius Valentinus portents of victory 9, 60–1,
D. Valerius Asiaticus 38, 173 102–3, 228–9, 241, 259,
Valerius Festus, see Calpetanus 270
Rantius Quirinalis Valerius and the army 61, 104–5, 123
Festus acquires supporters 62–3, 99–
P. Valerius Marinus 98–9 100, 103–6, 107–8, 113,
M. Valerius Messala 117–19, 120, 122, 124–5,
Corvinus 270 138, 139, 141–2, 151, 158,
Valerius Paulinus 142 170, 178–9, 182, 185, 187,
Vangiones 220 190, 191–2, 196, 197, 202,
Varius Crispinus 50 220, 248
Vatican Quarter 111 and his sons 100, 101–2,
Varus, see Arrius Varus, Plancius 206–7
Varus declared emperor 103–4,
Vatinius 24 172–3
Vedius Aquila 83, 120 launches war 96, 104–6,
Velabrum 19, 162 107–8, 114, 117–19, 121,
Veleda 213–14, 216, 246, 247 145
Vellocatus 143 first actions as emperor 105,
P. Ventidius Bassus 238 147
Venutius 143 in Alexandria 105, 121, 145,
Verania Gemina 30 206–7, 228–9
Verax 245 actions in Rome 106, 137,
Vercellae 44 206–7, 249, 276, 281
Cn. Vergilius Capito 164, 172 actions in the provinces 145,
L. Verginius Rufus 7, 8, 34–5, 206, 233
47–8, 87–8, 96–7, 99, 154, death 249
182, 219, 249 deification 250
Verona 71, 121, 122, 126, 146, Vestal Virgins 167, 207
147 Vestinus, see Julius Vestinus
310 index
T. Vestricius Spurinna 65, 69, first actions as emperor 37–8,
71, 79 43–4, 90–1, 178
Vetera 183, 185–7, 190–1, 194, armies invade Italy 38–40, 52–
195, 210, 211, 212–13, 241 3, 55, 77, 82–3, 90
M. Vettius Bolanus 95, 113 communicates with Otho
Veturius 17–18 46–7
Vibennius Rufinus 124 and his family 46–7, 85–6, 92,
Vibius Crispus, see Junius Vibius 109, 139–40, 156–7, 165
Crispus after victory 47, 89–91
C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus marches to Rome 90–9, 108–9
256 visits field at Bedriacum 97–8
L. Vibius Secundus 261 enters Rome 109, 117
Vicetia 121 actions at Rome 28, 48, 92–5,
Vienne 40–1, 48, 75, 95–6 98–9, 109–11, 115, 138–40,
Vindex, see Julius Vindex 149–50, 160, 162–3, 166,
Vindonissa 214, 220 172, 203
T. Vinius xii–xiv, xv, 3, 6, 9, 10– actions in the provinces 90–1,
11, 22, 25, 27–8, 30–1, 45, 95, 150, 179, 180, 209
113 campaigns against Vespasian
Vipsanian Arcade 21 113–15, 126, 138, 141,
M. Vipsanius Agrippa 11 178
C. Vipstanus Apronianus 47 response to sack of Cremona
Vipstanus Messala 122, 124, 148–52
128, 132, 134, 199 attempts to abdicate 155–8,
Virdius Geminus 145 159
Vitellius (A. Vitellius, emperor death 76, 169–70, 196, 206,
Apr.–Dec. 69) 3, 42, 52, 54, 208
57, 62, 66, 68, 71, 100, 106, L. Vitellius (father of emperor) 8,
107, 116, 118, 119, 123–6, 34, 156, 169
134, 135, 144, 153–4, 165, L. Vitellius (brother of emperor)
167, 171, 173, 177, 182, 55, 85, 89, 93–4, 138, 139–
185, 187, 211, 248, 251, 40, 149, 151, 158, 163–5,
278 169, 171–2
character 33–4, 39, 46, 62–3, Vitellius Germanicus (son of
76, 79–80, 90–4, 96, 97, 98, emperor) 92, 139–40, 156–
101–2, 108–13, 114, 138, 7, 228
140, 149–50, 151–2, 155, Vitellius Saturninus 50–1
157, 169–70, 270, 272 Vocetius 43
and Nero 98, 112 Vocontii 41–2
arrives in Germany 8 Vocula, see Dillius Vocula
revolts against Galba 10, 31–4, Volaginius 100
36–9, 59, 74, 85, 252 Vologaeses I (king of Parthia) 26,
and the army 33–4, 37, 43–4, 206
90–1, 93, 95–7, 101, 104, Volscians 161
105, 108, 112–13, 122, 138, C. Volusius 134
142, 183, 202, 218, 220 Vulcacius Tertullinus 176
declared emperor 36–7, 46–7,
89–90 Wodan 284