Chapter Two

Historical Dynamics of the Horn of Africa

2.1. Colonialism and Post-Colonialism Period

Like the whole parts of Africa, modern states of the horn of Africa are created by colonialism
except Ethiopia. The main colonial powers involved in the Horn were Italy and England.
France weighed in as a colonial power with a few possessions (the small French Somalia, the
current Republic of Djibouti), but also because it competed with Italy and England for
influence in the region.

The Large part of the region was colonized by Italy: Eritrea, Italian Somali Land and brief
occupation of Ethiopia for short period of years (from 1936-1941). Britain colonized British
Somali land (the present day northern parts of Somalia) and Sudan as an Aglo-Egptian
Condominium Rule. The remaining is Djibouti, the smallest portion of the Horn Region
Colonized by France named as French Somali Land.

The Postcolonial Realities and Challenges in the Horn

With the background of mental enslavement, orchestrated ethnic divisions, invented

ethnicities and nations, and cultivated loyalty to colonial masters, colonies in the zone
became states and plunged into prolonged disputes. Since the agitation for independence had
aimed at removing white political rule in specific territories, it did not challenge the colonial
structures that were inherently divisive. This inherent conflict between the remnants of
colonial attitudes and the desire to cut clean from the colonial past constitutes an aspect of
post-coloniality. It is a struggle on the cultural and political ‘what’ that should be acceptable
from the two ‘pasts’ in the light of the present. The end result is a borrowing from both the
pre-colonial and colonial past in order to shape new African futures. And this has been the
problem, one of postcolonial identities designed to fit colonial structures.

Nowhere was this attempted fusing of the pre-colonial and the colonial past more pronounced
than the discussions at the founding of the Organization of African Unity, the OAU, where
delegates debated how much of colonial legacies they should accept. One group was
aggressive as it adopted the concept of elasticity of new states and argued that colonial
territorial boundaries needed dismantling because few Africans, if any, had participated in
determining those boundaries. Such states had irredentist desires on their neighbours and they
included Morocco, targeting Western Sahara and parts of Algeria. It also strangely included
both Ethiopia and Somalia that were targeting each other. Ethiopia’s intentions for Somalia
were conveyed quietly but Somalia was loud in its desire to absorb all outlying ethnic
Somali-occupied territories beyond the official Somali borders, namely, French Somaliland,
the Ogaden in Ethiopia, and north-eastern Kenya.

The other side was defensive and it insisted on the sanctity of colonial boundaries as a way of
preventing the eruption of conflicts not only over boundaries but also over what would
exactly constitute the state. Such states rejected elasticity and irredentism and instead
believed in not only the concept of inelasticity of state but also in the incontractibility of the
colonial state. The concept of inelasticity of state was essentially a defence against outsiders
or neighbours who had irredentist ambitions. The concept of incontractibility, in contrast, was
a defence against domestic challengers who refused to identify with the new postcolonial
state and might even be encouraged by neighbouring states that had irredentist inclinations.

Without external interference, each state then tried to become viable and acceptable to its
‘peoples’. Subsequently, each state tended to concentrate on keeping the peace, meaning law
and order, at the expense of maintaining generic peace (Munene 2009:218-228). In the
process of maintaining the peace, however, the idea of state ran into friction with the idea of
nations within the state who refused to identify with the state. At times encouraged by
outsiders, despite the OAU decision, internal disputes in one country tended to spread to
neighbours and to become regional problems (Jackson 2006:426).

The zone has not known much internal peace partly because of two reasons:

 First, the idea of state failed to converge with the idea of nation in many of the
countries. Given that acceptance of the fact of any state is crucial to the survival of the
state (Goldsmith and Posner 2005:4), the new states tended to remain fragile which
made it difficult for them to protect people or adapt to new international realities that
affected internal political and economic well-being.
 Second is the influence of external players who, in colonial and postcolonial times,
considered countries in the zone to be in their strategic interests, which presumably
gave them a right to determine what should happen. In part, this is because the zone is
hemmed in by a triangle of three large bodies of water that are considered crucial to
the survival or wellbeing of other countries and regions.

The bodies of water are the long River Nile in the west that is considered strategic to Egypt,
the Red Sea in the north that is important to the oil-producing Arabian Peninsula, and the
Indian Ocean in the east that is part of a shipping route from Asia to Africa and to the
Western Hemisphere. By being considered ‘strategic’ to the interests of others, the people of
the zone found themselves having to respond to those interests that in turn influenced their
identity and orientation.

There are three assets that seemingly attract external attention and make it difficult for
countries of the zone to control their environment and resources. These are the Nile, oil and
minerals, and land.

Egypt, which controls the shipping lanes in the Red Sea, tries to have total control of the Nile
by stopping riparian states from using the Nile waters. It has occasionally engineered
instability against countries in the Horn. Saudi Arabia shows interests in the Horn mainly
because Eritrea, Djibouti, and the Somalian mini-states of Puntland and Somaliland border
the Red Sea and can affect oil shipping. Besides, Puntland and Somaliland provide safe haven
to pirates that cause havoc to oil shipment.
Oil is the determinant of the current competition for supremacy between Euro-Americans on
one side and the Indo-Chinese on the other. India would like to make the Indian Ocean really
‘Indian’ and thereby bury the notion of the ocean being a ‘British lake’ but it has to contend
with the ever-growing presence of the United States whose naval activities in eastern Africa
have intensified officially to fight terrorists and pirates. The discovery of oil in commercial
quantities in Sudan and Uganda has added to the region’s strategic value as far as the
extracontinental players are concerned.

But it is not simply oil that is attracting other regions. There are minerals and a growing
belief that agricultural land is finite and increasingly in short supply and this has led to a new
scramble for African land. Well-endowed countries that are worried about their food security
have mounted a spree of land grabs in places like Ethiopia and Sudan with the arrangement of
government officials. Arab and Asian countries have taken to leasing huge tracts of land to
grow the food in African countries that is then shipped directly out, to their own consumers.
After the agreement, the African country loses control of the said territory thereby creating a
strange phenomenon in which a country pleads for food aid while a lot of food is shipped out
to another country as export. What this implies is that the leasing countries have thought
strategically about food security and this has made African countries geo-strategic to the
interests of Arab and Asian countries. It is also a reflection of the culture of dependency and
lack of forward thinking on the part of many government officials who, from colonial times,
were and are conditioned to depend on ‘aid’ from ‘development partners’ or ‘donors’ rather
than be self-reliant.

Cold war and post-Cold war period

During the Cold War, the Horn of Africa was constantly affected by unexpected and sudden
conflicts, tense ideological confrontations, territorial disputes, cross-border destabilisation
and continued militarisation. Accordingly, prominent authors called the Horn of Africa either
a crisis zone or a mere battleground between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two
superpowers were not only deeply involved in the regional states’ political and security
affairs, but also consistently encouraged the escalation of a regional arms race in the Horn of
Africa.

Accordingly, there were four major inter-state wars and at least three violent Conflicts in the
post-independence era of the Horn African region. These major wars are primarily fought
over border and territorial dispute. For instance, the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and
Somalia, Ethio-Eritrean war from (1960s-1991) are border related conflict caused by arbitrary
colonial state boundary making along with other factors.

Among the Horn regions inter-state wars, the three fought between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Accordingly, the first war started in 1961, escalated in 1964 and lingered until 1967 as low
intensity conflict which resulted because of Somalia’s claim of the Somali-inhabited Ogaden
region of Ethiopia (see also Belete, 2012: ch-2). The Second war of the two countries was the
Ogaden war between 1977-1978. In the Ogaden war there were also direct involvements of
external powers particularly the Soviet Union and Cuban in support of Ethiopia (see also
Gebru, 2009). The third war between the two countries occurred between 2006 and 2009. The
Islamic Court Union (ICU) ascendancy after a long year collapse of Somalia beginning from
1991, has been seen by Ethiopia as threat for its security and territorial integrity. Thus,
Ethiopia directly involved in Somalia civil from in support of Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) against the Islamic Court Union (ICU) from November 2006 up to
January 2009. The fourth inter-state war and the other largest in terms of causality figure and
most resent both in the continent border war in the Horn region was the 1998-2000 Ethio-
Eritrean war.

Cold War Super Power Rivalries in the Horn

The ‘political divisions’ imposed during this colonial period were partially obliterated when
on 1 July 1960, the former Italian and British Somalilands united to form the Somali
Republic and to constitute themselves into the core of a Somali state which aspired to unite
French-controlled Djibouti (about half Somali), the NFD of Kenya (overwhelmingly Somali)
and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (almost exclusively Somali) to the new Republic.

One of the major Cold war rivalries the directly involved the USA and USSR was the 1977-
1978 Ogaden war/Ethio-Somalian war. The USSR which was once a close ally for Somalia
now it turned its face and military aid to Ethiopia. It was a surprising event for the Somalia’s
while Soviet Union left them and aligned with Ethiopia. As a result of the Cold war bipolar
rivalries Somalia immediately supported by the US and its satellite including UK, and the
Arab league member countries). In fact, Soviet assistance to Ethiopia was instrumental for
the Somalis defeat and their expulsion.

Post-Cold War period

Yet, in the Post-Cold War period and beyond the dramatic redrawing of its political map, the
Horn of Africa still hosts the deadliest cluster of conflicts globally: South Sudan, Somalia,
Eritrea-Ethiopia, Darfur and Ogaden. Eight times as many people have died in the region’s
recent conflicts as have perished in the more publicized Balkan conflicts. Since the Second
World War, no other regional zone of conflicts has produced a greater concentration of
deaths and destruction than the Horn of Africa, despite abundant diplomatic initiatives and
peace processes. Hence, in terms of sheer human life and the highest rate of population
displacement in the world, more is at stake in resolving the deeply inter-linked conflicts in the
Horn of Africa than anywhere else in the world.

Above all, conflicts divert resources and governments’ attention from bringing about
sustainable development, rehabilitating vital infrastructure and effectively fighting drought.
Conflicts have seriously undermined the regional states’ efforts to ensure long-term stability
and prosperity for millions of people who are at risk from rising food and energy prices and
who are fighting over water, grazing, firewood and other scarce natural resources. Conflicts
have resulted in the massive displacement sometimes of whole populations, leaving millions
homeless. The social fabric and coping mechanisms of entire societies are affected and the
return to normal community life can take years, if not decades, following the destruction of
social institutions and ways of life.

All this is compounded by interference from external powers, solidifying the current
divisions of the Horn of Africa. The eff orts by China, which doubtlessly makes major
investments in the region’s infrastructure and economic development, to secure supplies of
natural resources, the desire of Egypt and Israel to maintain their influence in the region and
United States counter-terrorism policies influence politics and security in the Horn of Africa.
The US’ counterterrorism policy has recently been particularly significant, deepening
political fissures in the region between states aligned with US counter-terrorism initiatives
and those at odds with US policy, particularly those believed to support al-Qaeda affiliated
groups. Somalia is at the epicenter of this dynamic, as it has become the focus of the US
counter-terrorism policy in the region as well as a proxy battleground between Ethiopia and
Eritrea.

As another post-cold war reality, the Horn of Africa also remains a region afflicted by a
diverse of natural and manmade calamities. Countries of the region are known for their poor
performances in key international rankings and surveys on democratic governance, human
rights, human security and human development. According to the 2013 HDI of UNDP, all
countries in the region are in the category of “low human development.” Somalia and South
Sudan are not surveyed in the 2013 edition of the HDI, possibly, because obtaining up-to-date
data from these two countries was not easy. But the overall record of the other countries of
the region shows unpromising achievements in the area of human development, with Djibouti
at a rank of 164 from 186 countries, relatively scoring better than the other three countries.
Sudan is ranked 171, Ethiopia 173, and Eritrea 181.

All countries of the Horn of Africa that are assessed by the 2013 HDI are placed not only in
the category of “low human development” but also below the regional average for sub-
Saharan Africa, which is 0.475. The group average for least development countries (LDCs),
to which all countries of the Horn belong, is 0.449. Yet, the score of all countries of the
region (individually and by collective average) is lower than that of the average score for
LDCs, which is 0.449. Individually, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan scored an HDI of
0.445, 0.351, 0.396, and 0.414, respectively. The combined regional average for the four
countries is 0.401, which is below the regional average of sub-Sahara Africa and the group
average for LDCs.

Again in the area of state fragility, all countries in the Horn of Africa make part of the 25
Most Failed States on Earth.11 Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan in particular appear within
the five most fragile states, with Somalia widely recognised as a failed state. In the words of
Plaut, Somalia appears to be the country that perfectly fits the list of indicators developed by
the FSI. Plaut in particular notes that: “For the international community there is little doubt
that Somalia is the epitome of the failed state.”

In post-cold period terrorisms and Islamic extremism exists in the Horn of Africa and has
flowed down from the Arabian Peninsula. Osama bin Laden was welcomed to Sudan in the
early 1990s by Islamist leader Husain al-Turabi and built al-Qaeda there. In 1996 the
Sudanese regime asked bin Laden to leave. In 1993 Islamic extremists arose in Somalia in
opposition to US, UN, and Western intervention.

Since the mid-1990s, the states in the Horn of Africa have witnessed hundreds of acts of
terrorism against foreign as well as local citizens and interests. The region is accordingly
considered both as a breeding ground and a safe haven for terrorist organisations, especially
after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US in 2001. Nowadays, a terrorist group Al
Shabaab is the chronic security headache not only to Somalia but also for Horn of Africa or
the international communities by large. Al Shabaab was “a relatively moderate Islamic
organization” while its ascendancy began in the early 2006 Its earliest period movement was
as a militant Islamic guerrilla fighter against TFG, motivated by the Ethiopian intervention in
Somalia. However, from the early 2008 onwards Al Shabaab’s movement has two-fold
character: a nationalist organization using a conventional militarily means to attack its
enemy, and a transitional terrorist group having a tie with al Qaeda.