Eng Lian Concrete SDN BHD V Mustapha Bin Nagoor
Eng Lian Concrete SDN BHD V Mustapha Bin Nagoor
A
Eng Lian Concrete Sdn Bhd v Mustapha bin Nagoor
Civil Procedure — Striking out — Appeal against order allowing striking out C
— When does cause of action accrue against guarantor or indemnity provider
— Whether appellant’s action was barred by limitation — Rules of Court 2012
O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), and (d)
This was an appeal against the decision of the sessions court allowing the D
respondent application to strike out the appellant’s claim. The appellant
supplied concrete mix to a company known as MBN Consortium Sdn Bhd
(‘MBN Consortium’). The appellant had obtained a judgment in default in
October 2018 for debts due to the appellant for the sale of goods and the E
judgment remains unsatisfied. The respondent had signed a guarantee and
indemnity with the plaintiff in connection to the payment obligations of
MBN Consortium. The terms of which, among others, provided that the
respondent would indemnify the plaintiff against all liabilities arising from the
supply of goods by the plaintiff to MBN Consortium. Having failed to obtain F
a satisfaction of its judgment against MBN Consortium, the appellant
commenced a writ action at the sessions’ court against the respondent premised
upon the guarantee and indemnity. The outstanding judgment debt together
with interest stood at more than RM786,000. The respondent applied to strike
out the appellant’s claim under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) and/or (d) of the G
Rules of Court 2012 (‘the ROC’) which was allowed on the basis that
limitation had set in. The issues to be determined were: (a) when did the right
to sue a surety or indemnity provider accrue; and (b) whether the appellant’s
claim was barred by the limitation.
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Held, dismissing the appeal with costs:
(1) The accrual of the cause of action of a lender against a guarantor or an
indemnity provider depended on the proper construction of the
guarantee or indemnity. In the circumstances where the guarantee and/or I
indemnity was not an on demand guarantee or indemnity and the
guarantor or indemnity provider had agreed: (a) for his obligations to be
directly owed to the lender as principal debtor; and (b) for his obligations
to be co-extensive with those of the borrower, the cause of action against
Eng Lian Concrete Sdn Bhd v Mustapha bin Nagoor
[2021] 8 MLJ (Azizul Azmi Adnan J) 583
[1] The appellant’s claim against the respondent was struck out by the
sessions court. It appealed against this decision. The appellant was the plaintiff
in the court below, and the respondent the defendant. They will be referred to I
here as they were there.
Eng Lian Concrete Sdn Bhd v Mustapha bin Nagoor
[2021] 8 MLJ (Azizul Azmi Adnan J) 585
A BACKGROUND
[2] The plaintiff case was as follows. It supplied concrete mix to a company
known as MBN Consortium Sdn Bhd (‘MBN Consortium’). MBN
Consortium failed to settle debts owed to the plaintiff arising from the sale of
B those goods. The plaintiff commenced a suit against MBN Consortium in
2018 and obtained a judgment in default of appearance in October 2018.
F [6] The defendant applied to strike out the plaintiff ’s claim under
O 18 rr 19(1)(a), (b) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 on grounds that the
plaintiff was barred by limitation. The sessions court judge hearing the matter
allowed the striking out, on the basis that the plaintiff ’s cause of action had
accrued against the defendant on 19 March 2013 and hence limitation had set
G in by 20 March 2019, some six months prior to the commencement of the suit.
[9] The accrual of the cause of action of a lender (or, more accurately, an
obligee) against a guarantor (referred to in the Contracts Act 1950 as a ‘surety’)
or an indemnity provider depends on the proper construction of the guarantee
or indemnity. B
[10] In AmBank (M) Bhd (formerly known as MBf Finance Bhd) v Glorious
Holidays Sdn Bhd & Anor [2012] MLJU 90; [2012] 1 LNS 68, the plaintiff
bank sued its borrower and a director of the borrower, who had provided a C
guarantee to the bank in respect of the repayment obligations of the borrower.
The bank obtained a judgment in default against the borrower, and summary
judgment against the guarantor. The guarantor appealed to the Court of
Appeal, which allowed his appeal and remitted the case for retrial. In so doing,
the Court of Appeal posed two questions for determination by the High Court: D
(a) in a situation where there is a principal debtor clause, when does the
cause of action arise? and
(b) where payment is made after the sale of property charged on security,
whether the cause of action against a guarantor as opposed to a chargor E
starts to run afresh after the sale.
[11] Mah Weng Kwai J found that the letter of guarantee signed by the
guarantor was in fact and law a guarantee and indemnity. The guarantor had
irrevocably guaranteed as principal debtor and not merely as surety to repay the F
loan together with interest and costs, in the event of a default in payment by the
borrower. The guarantor had also agreed for his liability to the bank to be
co-extensive with that of the borrower. The court also found that the letter of
guarantee on its true construction was not an on-demand guarantee, and hence
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the bank possessed a right to sue the guarantor without any notice. This meant
that the bank’s right to sue both the borrower and the guarantor accrued when
the borrower made its last repayment. Mah J stated:
6.16 In the case of MS Fashion Ltd and Others v BCCI SA and Others [1993] 2 Bank
LR 128 (Ch D), it was held by Lord Justice Hoffmann that, inter alia, the ‘principal H
debtor’ clauses had the effect of creating primary liability for the purposes of the rule
that the debt was not contingent upon demand. As already held by the court that
the second defendant’s liability was a primary liability as a principal debtor, there
was thus no requirement for a demand to be made on the second defendant
pursuant to the individual letter of guarantee. The letter of demand dated 29 April I
2010 issued by the Plaintiff did not postpone the commencement of the limitation
period from 29 November 1997 to 23 April 2010.
A 6.19 Thus, in answer to the two questions posed by the Court of Appeal, the court
holds that in a situation where there is a principal debtor clause the cause of action
against the second defendant arises immediately upon the default to pay by the first
defendant and no demand on the second defendant is necessary. And in answer to
the second question the court holds that where payment is made after the sale of
B property charged on security, the cause of action against a guarantor as opposed to
a chargor does not start to run afresh after the sale particularly when the loan
agreement specifically provides that the lender may proceed simultaneously with
foreclosure proceedings and civil action for the recovery of the debt.
[15] The main operative provisions of the guarantee and indemnity are
cll 1 and 2, reproduced below:
I
1 GUARANTEE
I/We will:
1.1 pay to you on demand all moneys and liabilities whether certain
now or hereafter owing and payable and remaining unpaid to you
588 Malayan Law Journal [2021] 8 MLJ
A me/us all sums payable by me/us under this Guarantee without fist availing of your
legal remedies against the Customer and/or any other surety and/or against any
security which you may now or at any time hereafter or from time to time have or
hold from or against the Customer and/or any other surety or person.
B [18] By these clauses, the defendant has agreed to be liable to the plaintiff as
though he were a principal debtor to the plaintiff, and he has also agreed that
his liability to the plaintiff would be co-extensive with the liability of MBN
Consortium to the plaintiff. When the defendant’s liability is expressed to be
co-extensive with that of MBN Consortium, this meant that the period of
C limitation applicable to both the borrower’s and MBN Consortium’s liabilities
would be identical. Of course, in this case, the defendant’s obligation cl 1.1 was
expressed to be subject to a demand being made. Reading cll 1.1 and 13
together, this meant that the defendant’s liability under the guarantee (but not
the indemnity under cl 2) was contingent upon a demand being first made, but
D that in all circumstances, limitation would set in after the lapse of six years from
the date on which the cause of action first accrued against MBN Consortium,
for the reason that the liabilities of MBN Consortium and the defendant were
co-extensive.
E [19] The ratio decidendi of the case of AmBank (M) Bhd (formerly known as
MBf Finance Bhd) v Glorious Holidays Sdn Bhd & Anor applies to this case.
[20] On the facts of the present case, there had been a failure by MBN
Consortium to make any payment after 19 March 2013 in respect of the
F facility provided to it by the plaintiff. This meant that the plaintiff ’s causes of
action against both MBN Consortium and the defendant accrued on this date,
and would have expired six years thereafter. The plaintiff was not out of time
when it sued MBN Consortium, but by the time the suit was commenced
against the defendant, limitation had set in some 168 days prior, on
G 20 March 2019.
[21] In my judgment, the learned sessions court judge was thus entirely
correct to have struck out the plaintiff ’s case. The appeal was accordingly
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dismissed with costs.