Now that we’ve explored Nagel’s argument, let’s shift our focus to its broader implications and

the criticisms it has received over the years. Understanding the debate surrounding Nagel’s
essay is crucial, as it helps us grasp why consciousness remains one of the most perplexing
problems in philosophy.

Implications for the Philosophy of Mind

Challenging Physicalism: Is Science Enough to Explain the Mind?

One of the biggest implications of Nagel’s argument is that it challenges a view called
physicalism. Physicalism is the idea that everything about the mind, including thoughts,
emotions, and consciousness, can ultimately be explained by physical processes in the brain. If
Nagel is correct, this view is incomplete because physical descriptions fail to capture subjective
experience.

To understand this, think about a phenomenon like love. Science can explain the hormones
involved—oxytocin, dopamine, serotonin—but does that truly capture what it feels like to love
someone? You could study all the brain scans in the world, yet still not experience another
person’s emotions firsthand. Nagel’s argument suggests that something essential is missing
from our scientific explanations of the mind.

The Limits of Third-Person Science

A key issue is that science primarily operates from a third-person perspective. It observes and
measures external facts—brain waves, neural activity, chemical reactions. But consciousness is
an inherently first-person phenomenon. It is lived from the inside, and this internal reality is
something no scientific instrument can fully access.

Let's Take an example of experiencing a sunset. Science can describe the wavelengths of light,
the way the retina processes colors, and how the brain interprets the scene. But none of this
scientific knowledge can convey the personal beauty of watching the sun dip below the horizon,
the emotions it stirs, or how it feels to you. This is the gap Nagel identifies—a gap that physical
science alone may never bridge.

Qualia: The Mystery of Subjective Experience

Nagel’s argument strengthens the idea of qualia, a term in philosophy that refers to the unique,
subjective qualities of experiences. Qualia are what make pain feel painful, what make the taste
of coffee distinctly bitter, and what allow you to recognize the warmth of sunlight on your skin.

Imagine a scientist who has spent her entire life in a black-and-white room, reading about
colors. She knows everything about the physics of light, how different wavelengths correspond
to different colors, and how the brain processes them. But if she steps outside and sees a bright
red apple for the first time, she experiences something new. No amount of scientific knowledge
could have prepared her for the actual sensation of seeing red.

Nagel’s argument suggests that, just like the scientist in the thought experiment, we can learn
about other beings, but we can never fully know what it’s like to be them. This idea has major
consequences not only for philosophy but also for fields like artificial intelligence, ethics, and
even neuroscience.

6. Criticisms of Nagel’s Argument

Dennett’s Objection: Consciousness as a Computational Process

Not everyone agrees with Nagel’s conclusions. One of his most vocal critics is Daniel Dennett,
who argues that consciousness is simply the result of complex information processing in the
brain. According to Dennett, the reason we struggle to imagine what it’s like to be a bat is not
because it’s unknowable—it’s because we are using the wrong approach.

Dennett believes that consciousness is not a deep metaphysical mystery but rather a function of
cognitive processes that can, in principle, be understood just like any other biological function.
He argues that what we call "subjective experience" is just the brain processing information in
ways we do not fully comprehend yet. But that doesn’t mean it’s beyond scientific explanation.

The Imagination Fallacy: Does Our Failure to Imagine Mean It’s Impossible?

Another criticism of Nagel’s argument is that it assumes that just because we cannot imagine
something, it must be unknowable. But is that necessarily true?

Consider quantum mechanics. Before modern physics, no one could have imagined that light
could behave as both a particle and a wave, or that two particles could be "entangled" across
vast distances. These ideas were unimaginable, yet they turned out to be true and explainable
through science.

Critics argue that just because we currently lack the ability to understand a bat’s subjective
experience, that doesn’t mean we never will. As neuroscience advances, we may develop
models that allow us to simulate different perspectives in ways we cannot yet conceive.
Now the question is
Can Science Bridge the Gap?

Some scientists believe that with enough research, we will eventually map out the brain in such
detail that we will understand how subjective experiences arise.

Imagine a future where we could create a perfect digital replica of a bat’s brain. If we could fully
simulate its neural activity, would that give us access to its experiences? Some philosophers
believe that with powerful enough technology, we may be able to "see" the world from another
being’s perspective.

But if Nagel is right, no matter how much we advance scientifically, the essence of subjective
experience—the what it feels like aspect—will always remain out of reach.

7. Modern Debates & Applications

Nagel’s essay helped inspire what philosopher David Chalmers calls "the hard problem of
consciousness." Chalmers distinguishes between:

The easy problems of consciousnes things like how the brain processes information, how we
recognize faces, or how memory works.

The hard problem—why does any of this feel like anything?

A computer can process information, but it doesn’t have experiences. Why do humans (and
possibly animals) have an inner world of thoughts and emotions, while a machine simply runs
calculations? This remains one of the biggest unresolved questions in philosophy and science.

Artificial Intelligence: Will Machines Ever Be Conscious?

Nagel’s argument also has huge implications for artificial intelligence. AI can process vast
amounts of data, recognize speech, and even generate art. But does it feel anything? Does a
chatbot experience emotions, or is it simply mimicking them?

If consciousness requires subjective experience, as Nagel argues, then AI will never be truly
conscious—it will always be an imitation of human intelligence, rather than possessing real
awareness. But some scientists believe that if AI becomes advanced enough, it may eventually
develop its own form of subjective experience, challenging Nagel’s claim.

Animal Consciousness and Ethics

If Nagel is correct that we cannot fully understand the experiences of other creatures, this raises
important ethical questions. If we don’t truly know what it’s like to be a bat, what about:

A dolphin, which communicates with complex vocalizations?

An octopus, with its highly independent and intelligent arms?

A cow in a factory farm, experiencing suffering we can’t fully grasp?

If animals have rich subjective experiences, how should this impact how we treat them? Should
our legal and moral systems change to reflect their inner worlds? These are ongoing debates in
fields like animal rights and ethics.

8. Conclusion

"Nagel’s argument in What Is It Like to Be a Bat? is a powerful challenge to how we think about
consciousness. It suggests that subjective experience is fundamentally beyond the reach of
physical science. This idea raises important questions:

Can we ever fully understand another being’s inner world?

Will AI or neuroscience one day bridge this gap, or will subjective experience remain forever
mysterious?

Nagel’s essay remains a cornerstone of modern philosophy, and whether you agree or disagree
with him, his challenge forces us to rethink the nature of mind, experience, and the limits of
human understanding. The debate is far from over.