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CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN
ADVANCED MATHEMATICS
EDITORIAL BOARD
B. BOLLOBAS, W. FULTON, A. KATOK, F. KIRWAN,
P. SARNAK
GEORGE TOURLAKIS
York University
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
Preface page ix
I Basic Logic 1
I.1 First Order Languages 5
I.2 A Digression into the Metatheory:
Informal Induction and Recursion 19
I.3 Axioms and Rules of Inference 28
I.4 Basic Metatheorems 42
I.5 Semantics; Soundness, Completeness, Compactness 52
I.6 Substructures, Diagrams, and Applications 75
I.7 Defined Symbols 112
I.8 Computability and Uncomputability 123
I.9 Arithmetic, Definability, Undefinability,
and Incompletableness 155
I.10 Exercises 191
II The Second Incompleteness Theorem 205
II.1 Peano Arithmetic 206
II.2 A Formal β-Function 232
II.3 Formal Primitive Recursion 248
II.4 The Boldface and 256
II.5 Arithmetization 265
II.6 Derivability Conditions; Fixed Points 272
II.7 Exercises 316
Bibliography 319
List of Symbols 321
Index 323
vii
Preface
Both volumes in this series are about what mathematicians, especially logicians,
call the “foundations” (of mathematics) – that is, the tools of the axiomatic
method, an assessment of their effectiveness, and two major examples of ap-
plication of these tools, namely, in the development of number theory and set
theory.
There have been, in hindsight, two main reasons for writing this volume.
One was the existence of notes I wrote for my lectures in mathematical logic
and computability that had been accumulating over the span of several years
and badly needed sorting out. The other was the need to write a small section
on logic, “A Bit of Logic” as I originally called it, that would bootstrap my
volume on set theory† on which I had been labouring for a while. Well, one
thing led to another, and a 30 or so page section that I initially wrote for the
latter purpose grew to become a self-standing volume of some 300 pages. You
see, this material on logic is a good story and, as with all good stories, one does
get carried away wanting to tell more.
I decided to include what many people will consider, I should hope, as
being the absolutely essential topics in proof, model, and recursion theory –
“absolutely essential” in the context of courses taught near the upper end of
undergraduate, and at the lower end of graduate curricula in mathematics, com-
puter science, or philosophy. But no more.‡ This is the substance of Chapter I;
hence its title “Basic Logic”.
† A chapter by that name now carries out these bootstrapping duties – the proverbial “Chapter 0”
(actually Chapter I) of volume 2.
‡ These topics include the foundation and development of non-standard analysis up to the ex-
treme value theorem, elementary equivalence, diagrams, and Löwenheim-Skolem theorems, and
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem (along with Rosser’s sharpening).
ix
x Preface
But then it occurred to me to also say something about one of the most
remarkable theorems of logic – arguably the most remarkable – about the lim-
itations of formalized theories: Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. Now,
like most reasonable people, I never doubted that this theorem is true, but, as the
devil is in the details, I decided to learn its proof – right from Peano’s axioms.
What better way to do this than writing down the proof, gory details and all?
This is what Chapter II is about.†
As a side effect, the chapter includes many theorems and techniques of one
of the two most important – from the point of view of foundations – “applied”
logics (formalized theories), namely, Peano arithmetic (the other one, set theory,
taking all of volume 2).
I have hinted above that this (and the second) volume are aimed at a fairly
advanced reader: The level of exposition is designed to fit a spectrum of math-
ematical sophistication from third year undergraduate to junior graduate level
(each group will find here its favourite sections that serve its interests and level
of preparation – and should not hesitate to judiciously omit topics).
There are no specific prerequisites beyond some immersion in the “proof
culture”, as this is attainable through junior level courses in calculus, linear al-
gebra, or discrete mathematics. However, some familiarity with concepts from
elementary naı̈ve set theory such as finiteness, infinity, countability, and un-
countability will be an asset.‡
A word on approach. I have tried to make these lectures user-friendly, and thus
accessible to readers who do not have the benefit of an instructor’s guidance.
Devices to that end include anticipation of questions, frequent promptings for
the reader to rethink an issue that might be misunderstood if glossed over
(“Pauses”), and the marking of important passages, by , as well as those that
can be skipped at first reading, by .
Moreover, I give (mostly) very detailed proofs, as I know from experience
that omitting details normally annoys students.
† It is strongly conjectured here that this is the only complete proof in print other than the one
that was given in Hilbert and Bernays (1968). It is fair to clarify that I use the term “complete
proof” with a strong assumption in mind: That the axiom system we start with is just Peano
arithmetic. Proofs based on a stronger – thus technically more convenient – system, namely,
primitive recursive arithmetic, have already appeared in print (Diller (1976), Smoryński (1985)).
The difficulty with using Peano arithmetic as the starting point is that the only primitive recursive
functions initially available are the successor, identity, plus, and times. An awful amount of work
is needed – a preliminary “coding trick” – to prove that all the rest of the primitive recursive
functions “exist”. By then are we already midway in Chapter II, and only then are we ready to
build Gödel numbers of terms, formulas, and proofs and to prove the theorem.
‡ I have included a short paragraph nicknamed “a crash course on countable sets” (Section I.5,
p. 62), which certainly helps. But having seen these topics before helps even more.
Preface xi
The first chapter has a lot of exercises (the second having proportionally
fewer). Many of these have hints, but none are marked as “hard” vs. “just about
right”, a subjective distinction I prefer to avoid. In this connection here is some
good advice I received when I was a graduate student at the University of
Toronto: “Attempt all the problems. Those you can do, don’t do. Do the ones
you cannot”.
What to read. Consistently with the advice above, I suggest that you read this
volume from cover to cover – including footnotes! – skipping only what you
already know. Now, in a class environment this advice may be impossible to
take, due to scope and time constraints. An undergraduate (one semester) course
in logic at the third year level will probably cover Sections I.1–I.5, making light
of Section I.2, and will introduce the student to the elements of computability
along with a hand-waving “proof” of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem (the
“semantic version” ought to suffice). A fourth year class will probably attempt
to cover the entire Chapter I. A first year graduate class has no more time than
the others at its disposal, but it usually goes much faster, skipping over familiar
ground, thus it will probably additionally cover Peano arithmetic and will get
to see how Gödel’s second theorem follows from Löb’s derivability conditions.
George Tourlakis
Toronto, March 2002
I
Basic Logic
1
2 I. Basic Logic
Volume 1 is a brief study of the other three areas of logic† mentioned above.
This is the point where an author usually apologizes for what has been omitted,
blaming space or scope (or competence) limitations. Let me start by outlin-
ing what is included: “Standard” phenomena such as completeness, compact-
ness and its startling application to analysis, incompleteness or unprovabil-
ity (including a complete proof of the second incompleteness theorem), and a
fair amount of recursion theory are thoroughly discussed. Recursion theory,
or computability, is of interest to a wide range of audiences, including stu-
dents with main areas of study such as computer science, philosophy, and, of
course, mathematical logic. It studies among other things the phenomenon of
uncomputability, which is closely related to that of unprovability, as we see in
Section I.9.
Among the topics that I have deliberately left out are certain algebraic tech-
niques in model theory (such as the method of ultrapowers), formal interpre-
tations of one theory into another,‡ the introduction of “other” logics (modal,
higher order, intuitionistic, etc.), and several topics in recursion theory (oracle
computability, Turing reducibility, recursive operators, degrees, Post’s theorem
in the arithmetic hierarchy, the analytic hierarchy, etc.) – but then, the decision
to stop writing within 300 or so pages was firm. On the other hand, the topics
included here form a synergistic whole in that I have (largely) included at every
stage material that is prerequisite to what follows. The absence of a section on
propositional calculus is deliberate, as it does not in my opinion further the
understanding of logic in any substantial way, while it delays one’s plunging
into what really matters. To compensate, I include all tautologies as “proposi-
tional” (or Boolean) logical axioms and present a mini-course on propositional
calculus in the exercises of this chapter (I.26–I.41, pp. 193–195), including the
completeness and compactness of the calculus.
It is inevitable that the language of sets intrudes in this chapter (as it indeed
does in all mathematics) and, more importantly, some of the results of (informal)
set theory are needed here (especially in our proofs of the completeness and
compactness metatheorems). Conversely, formal set theory of volume 2 needs
some of the results developed here. This “chicken or egg” phenomenon is often
called “bootstrapping” (not to be confused with “circularity” – which it is not§ ),
the term suggesting one pulling oneself up by one’s bootstraps.¶
† I trust that the reader will not object to my dropping the qualifier “mathematical” from now on.
‡ Although this topic is included in volume 2 (Chapter I), since it is employed in the relative
consistency techniques applied there.
§ Only informal, or naı̈ve, set theory notation and results are needed in Chapter I at the meta-level,
i.e, outside the formal system that logic is.
¶ I am told that Baron Münchhausen was the first one to apply this technique, with success.
I. Basic Logic 3
This is a good place to outline how our story will unfold: First, our objective is to
formalize the rules of reasoning in general – as these apply to all mathematics –
and develop their properties. In particular, we will study the interaction between
formalized rules and their “intended meaning” (semantics), as well as the limi-
tations of these formalized rules: That is, how good (= potent) are they for
capturing the informal notions of truth?
Secondly, once we have acquired these tools of formalized reasoning, we start
behaving (mostly† ) as users of formal logic so that we can discover important
theorems of two important mathematical theories: Peano arithmetic (Chapter II)
and set theory (volume 2).
By formalization (of logic) we understand the faithful representation or
simulation of the “reasoning processes” of mathematics in general (pure logic),
or of a particular mathematical theory (applied logic: e.g., Peano arithmetic),
within an activity that – in principle – is driven exclusively by the form or syntax
of mathematical statements, totally ignoring their meaning.
We build, describe, and study the properties of this artificial replica of the
reasoning processes – the formal theory – within “everyday mathematics” (also
called “informal” or “real” mathematics), using the usual abundance of mathe-
matical symbolism, notions, and techniques available to us, augmented by the
descriptive power of English (or Greek, or French, or German, or Russian,
or . . . , as particular circumstances or geography might dictate). This milieu
within which we build, pursue, and study our theories is often called the meta-
theory, or more generally, metamathematics. The language we speak while at
it, this mélange of mathematics and “natural language”, is the metalanguage.
Formalization turns mathematical theories into mathematical objects that
we can study. For example, such study may include interesting questions such
as “is the continuum hypothesis provable from the axioms of set theory?” or
“can we prove the consistency of (axiomatic) Peano arithmetic within Peano
arithmetic?”‡ This is analogous to building a “model airplane”, a replica of the
real thing, with a view of studying through the replica the properties, power,
and limitations of the real thing.
But one can also use the formal theory to generate theorems, i.e., discover
“truths” in the real domain by simply “running” the simulation that this theory-
replica is.§ Running the simulation “by hand” (rather than using the program
† Some tasks in Chapter II of this volume, and some others in volume 2, will be to treat the “theory”
at hand as an object of study rather than using it, as a machine, to crank out theorems.
‡ By the way, the answer to both these questions is “no” (Cohen (1963) for the first, Gödel (1938)
for the second).
§ The analogy implied in the terminology “running the simulation” is apt. For formal theories such
as set theory and Peano arithmetic we can build within real mathematics a so-called “provability
4 I. Basic Logic
of the previous footnote) means that you are acting as a “user” of the formal
system, a formalist, proving theorems through it. It turns out that once you get
the hang of it, it is easier and safer to reason formally than to do so informally.
The latter mode often mixes syntax and semantics (meaning), and there is
always the danger that the “user” may assign incorrect (i.e., convenient, but not
general ) meanings to the symbols that he† manipulates, a phenomenon that has
distressed many a mathematics or computer science instructor.
“Formalism for the user” is hardly a revolutionary slogan. It was advocated
by Hilbert, the founder of formalism, partly as a means of – as he believed‡ –
formulating mathematical theories in a manner that allows one to check them
(i.e., run “diagnostic tests” on them) for freedom from contradiction,§ but also
as the right way to “do” mathematics. By this proposal he hoped to salvage
mathematics itself, which, Hilbert felt, was about to be destroyed by the Brouwer
school of intuitionist thought. In a way, his program could bridge the gap
between the classical and the intuitionist camps, and there is some evidence
that Heyting (an influential intuitionist and contemporary of Hilbert) thought
that such a rapprochement was possible. After all, since meaning is irrelevant to
a formalist, then all that he is doing (in a proof) is shuffling finite sequences of
symbols, never having to handle or argue about infinite objects – a good thing,
as far as an intuitionist is concerned.¶
predicate”, that is, a relationP(y, x) which is true of two natural numbers y and x just in case y
codes a proof of the formula coded by x. It turns out that P(y, x) has so simple a structure that it
is programmable, say in the C programming language. But then we can write a program (also in
C) as follows: “Systematically generate all the pairs of numbers (y, x). For each pair generated,
if P(y, x) holds, then print the formula coded by x”. Letting this process run for ever, we obtain
a listing of all the theorems of Peano arithmetic or set theory! This fact does not induce any
insomnia in mathematicians, since this is an extremely impractical way to obtain theorems. By
the way, we will see in Chapter II that either set theory or Peano arithmetic is sufficiently strong
to formally express a provability predicate, and this leads to the incompletableness phenomenon.
† In this volume, the terms “he”, “his”, “him”, and their derivatives are by definition gender-neutral.
‡ This belief was unfounded, as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems showed.
§ Hilbert’s metatheory – that is, the “world” or “lab” outside the theory, where the replica is
actually manufactured – was finitary. Thus – Hilbert advocated – all this theory building and
theory checking ought to be effected by finitary means. This ingredient of his “program” was
consistent with peaceful coexistence with the intuitionists. And, alas, this ingredient was the one
that – as some writers put it – destroyed Hilbert’s program to found mathematics on his version
of formalism. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems showed that a finitary metatheory is not up to
the task.
¶ True, a formalist applies classical logic, while an intuitionist applies a different logic where, for
example, double negation is not removable. Yet, unlike a Platonist, a Hilbert-style formalist does
not believe – or he does not have to disclose to his intuitionist friends that he might believe – that
infinite sets exist in the metatheory, as his tools are just finite symbol sequences. To appreciate the
tension here, consider this anecdote: It is said that when Kronecker – the father of intuitionism –
was informed of Lindemann’s proof (1882) that π is transcendental, while he granted that this was
an interesting result, he also dismissed it, suggesting that “π ” – whose decimal expansion is, of
I.1. First Order Languages 5
In support of the “formalism for the user” position we must definitely men-
tion the premier paradigm, Bourbaki’s monumental work (1966a), which is a
formalization of a huge chunk of mathematics, including set theory, algebra,
topology, and theory of integration. This work is strictly for the user of mathe-
matics, not for the metamathematician who studies formal theories. Yet, it is
fully formalized, true to the spirit of Hilbert, and it comes in a self-contained
package, including a “Chapter 0” on formal logic.
More recently, the proposal to employ formal reasoning as a tool has been
gaining support in a number of computer science undergraduate curricula, where
logic and discrete mathematics are taught in a formalized setting, starting with
a rigorous course in the two logical calculi (propositional and predicate), em-
phasizing the point of view of the user of logic (and mathematics) – hence with
an attendant emphasis on “calculating” (i.e., writing and annotating formal)
proofs. Pioneering works in this domain are the undergraduate text (1994) and
the paper (1995) of Gries and Schneider.
course, infinite but not periodic – “does not exist” (see Wilder (1963, p. 193)). We are not to pro-
pound the tenets of intuitionism here, but it is fair to state that infinite sets are possible in intuition-
istic mathematics as this has later evolved in the hands of Brouwer and his Amsterdam “school”.
However, such sets must be (like all sets of intuitionistic mathematics) finitely generated – just
as our formal languages and the set of theorems are (the latter provided our axioms are too) – in
a sense that may be familiar to some readers who have had a course in “automata and language
theory”. See Wilder (1963, p. 234)
† For a less abstract, but more detailed view of theories see p. 38.
6 I. Basic Logic
I.1.1 Remark . What is a “rule”? We run the danger of becoming circular or too
pedantic if we overdefine this notion. Intuitively, the rules we have in mind are
string manipulation rules, that is, “black boxes” (or functions) that receive string
inputs and respond with string outputs. For example, a well-known theorem-
building rule receives as input a formula and a variable, and returns (essentially)
the string composed of the symbol ∀, immediately followed by the variable and,
in turn, immediately followed by the formula.†
(1) First off, the ( first order) formal language, L, where the theory is “spoken”,‡
is a triple (V , Term, Wff), that is, it has three important components, each
of them a set.
V is the alphabet or vocabulary of the language. It is the collection of the
basic syntactic “bricks” (symbols) that we use to form expressions that
are terms (members of Term) or formulas (members of Wff). We will
ensure that the processes that build terms or formulas, using the basic
building blocks in V , are intuitively algorithmic or “mechanical”.
Terms will formally codify “objects”, while formulas will formally
codify “statements” about objects.
(2) Reasoning in the theory will be the process of discovering true statements
about objects – that is, theorems. This discovery journey begins with certain
formulas which codify statements that we take for granted (i.e., we accept
without “proof” as “basic truths”). Such formulas are the axioms. There are
two types of axioms:
Special or nonlogical axioms are to describe specific aspects of any
specific theory that we might be building. For example, “x + 1 = 0”
is a special axiom that contributes towards the characterization of
number theory over the natural numbers, N.
The other kind of axiom will be found in all theories. It is the kind that is
“universally valid”, that is, not theory-specific (for example, “x = x”
is such a “universal truth”). For that reason this type of axiom will be
called logical.
(3) Finally, we will need rules for reasoning, actually called rules of inference.
These are rules that allow us to deduce, or derive, a true statement from
other statements that we have already established as being true.§ These
rules will be chosen to be oblivious to meaning, being only concerned with
Logical Symbols
† Conventions such as this one are essentially agreements – effected in the metatheory – on how
to be sloppy and get away with it. They are offered in the interest of user-friendliness.
‡ The quotes are not part of the symbol. They serve to indicate clearly here, in particular in the
case of “∨”, what is part of the symbol and what is not (the following period).
8 I. Basic Logic
The logical symbols will have a fixed interpretation. In particular, “=” will
always be expected to mean equals.
The theory-specific part of the alphabet is not fixed, but varies from theory
to theory. For example, in set theory we just add the nonlogical (or special)
symbols, ∈ and U . The first is a special predicate symbol (or just predicate) of
arity 2, the second is a predicate symbol of arity 1.†
In number theory we adopt instead the special symbols S (intended meaning:
successor, or “ + 1” function), +, ×, 0, <, and (sometimes) a symbol for the
exponentiation operation (function) a b . The first three are function symbols of
arities 1, 2, and 2 respectively. 0 is a constant symbol, < a predicate of arity 2,
and whatever symbol we might introduce to denote a b would have arity 2.
The following list gives the general picture.
Nonlogical Symbols
NLS.1. A (possibly empty) set of symbols for constants. We normally use
the metasymbols‡ a, b, c, d, e, with or without subscripts or primes, to
stand for constants unless we have in mind some alternative “standard”
formal notation in specific theories (e.g., ∅, 0, ω).
NLS.2. A (possibly empty) set of symbols for predicate symbols or relation
symbols for each possible “arity” n > 0. We normally use P, Q, R
generically, with or without primes or subscripts, to stand for predicate
symbols. Note that = is in the logical camp. Also note that theory-
specific formal symbols are possible for predicates, e.g., <, ∈.
NLS.3. Finally, a (possibly empty) set of symbols for functions for each possi-
ble “arity” n > 0. We normally use f, g, h, generically, with or without
primes or subscripts, to stand for function symbols. Note that theory-
specific formal symbols are possible for functions, e.g., +, ×.
I.1.3 Remark. (1) We have the option of assuming that each of the logical
symbols that we named in LS.1–LS.5 have no further “structure” and that the
symbols are, ontologically, identical to their names, that is, they are just these
exact signs drawn on paper (or on any equivalent display medium).
In this case, changing the symbols, say, ¬ and ∃ to ∼ and E respectively
results in a “different” logic, but one that is, trivially, “isomorphic” to the one
† “Arity” is a term mathematicians have made up. It is derived from “ary” of “unary”, “binary”,
etc. It denotes the number of arguments needed by a symbol according to the dictates of correct
syntax. Function and predicate symbols need arguments.
‡ Metasymbols are informal (i.e., outside the formal language) symbols that we use within
“everyday” or “real” mathematics – the metatheory – in order to describe, as we are doing here,
the formal language.
I.1. First Order Languages 9
we are describing: Anything that we may do in, or say about, one logic trivially
translates to an equivalent activity in, or utterance about, the other as long as
we systematically carry out the translations of all occurrences of ¬ and ∃ to ∼
and E respectively (or vice versa).
An alternative point of view is that the symbol names are not the same as
(identical with) the symbols they are naming. Thus, for example, “¬” names
the connective we pronounce not, but we do not know (or care) exactly what
the nature of this connective is (we only care about how it behaves). Thus, the
name “¬” becomes just a typographical expedient and may be replaced by other
names that name the same object, not.
This point of view gives one flexibility in, for example, deciding how the
variable symbols are “implemented”. It often is convenient to think that the
entire sequence of variable symbols was built from just two symbols, say, “v”
and “|”.† One way to do this is by saying that vi is a name for the symbol
sequence‡
“v | . . . | ”
i|’s
Or, preferably – see (2) below – vi might be a name for the symbol sequence
“v | . . . | v”
i|’s
† We intend these two symbols to be identical to their names. No philosophical or other purpose
will be served by allowing “more indirection” here (such as “v names u, which actually names
w, which actually is . . . ”).
‡ Not including the quotes.
§ What we have stated under (2) are requirements, not metatheorems! That is, they are nothing of
the sort that we can prove about our formal language within everyday mathematics.
10 I. Basic Logic
Wait a minute! If formal set theory is “the foundation of all mathematics”, and
if, ostensibly, this chapter on logic assists us to found set theory itself, then
how come we are employing natural numbers like 1200000000560000009 as
subscripts in the names of object variables? How is it permissible to already talk
about “sets of symbols” when we are about to found a theory of sets formally?
Surely we do not “have”‡ any of these “items” yet, do we?
First off, the presence of subscripts such as 1200000000560000009 in
v1200000000560000009
is a non-issue. One way to interpret what has been said in the definition is
to view the various vi as abbreviated names of the real thing, the latter being
strings that employ the symbols v and | as in Remark I.1.3. In this connection
saying that vi is “implemented” as
v|...|v (1)
i|’s
especially the use of “i” above, is only illustrative, thus totally superfluous. We
can say instead that strings of type (1) are the variables which we define as
follows without the help of the “natural number i” (this is a variation of how
this is done in Bourbaki (1966b) and Hermes (1973)):
An “|-calculation” forms a string like this: Write a “|”.§ This is the “current
string”. Repeat a finite number of times: Add (i.e., concatenate) one | imme-
diately to the right of the current string. Write this new string (it is now the
current string).
† This phenomenon will be studied in some detail in what follows. By the way, any additions are
made to the nonlogical side of the alphabet. All the logical symbols have been given, once and
for all.
‡ “Do not have” in the sense of having not formally defined – or proved to exist – or both.
§ Without the quotes. These were placed to exclude the punctuation following.
I.1. First Order Languages 11
Let us call any string that figures in some |-calculation a “|-string”. A variable
either is the string vv, or is obtained as the concatenation from left to right of
v followed by an |-string, followed by v.
All we now need is the ability to generate as many as necessary distinct
variables (this is the “non-ending sequence” part of the definition, p. 7): For
any two variables we get a new one that is different from either one by forming
the string “v, followed by the concatenation of the two |-parts, followed by v”.
Similarly if we had three, four, . . . variables. By the way, two strings of | are
distinct iff† both occur in the same |-calculation, one, but not both, as the last
string.
Another, more direct way to interpret what was said about object variables
on p. 7 is to take the definition literally, i.e., to suppose that it speaks about the
ontology of the variables.‡ Namely, the subscript is just a a string of meaningless
symbols taken from the list below:
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Again we can pretend that we know nothing about natural numbers, and when-
ever, e.g., we want a variable other than either of v123 or v321 , we may offer
either of v123321 or v321123 as such a new variable.
O.K., so we have not used natural numbers in the definition. But we did say
“sets” and also “non-ending sequence”, implying the presence of infinite sets!
As we have already noted, on one hand we have “real mathematics”, and on
the other hand we have syntactic replicas of theories – the formal theories –
that we built within real mathematics. Having built a formal theory, we can then
choose to use it (acting like formalists) to generate theorems, the latter being
codified as symbol sequences (formulas). Thus, the assertion “axiomatic set
theory is the foundation of all mathematics” is just a colloquialism proffered
in the metatheory that means that “within axiomatic set theory we can construct
the known sets of mathematics, such as the reals R and the complex numbers
C, and moreover we can simulate what we informally do whenever we are
working in real or complex analysis, algebra, topology, theory of measure and
integration, functional analysis, etc., etc.”
There is no circularity here, but simply an empirical boastful observation in
the metatheory of what our simulator can do. Moreover, our metatheory does
† If and only if.
‡ Why not just say exactly what a definition is meant to say rather than leave it up to interpretation?
One certainly could, as in Bourbaki (1966b), make the ontology of variables crystal-clear right in
the definition. Instead, we have followed the custom of more recent writings and given the defi-
nition in a quasi-sloppy manner that leaves the ontology of variables as a matter for speculation.
This gives one the excuse to write footnotes like this one and remarks like I.1.3.
Another Random Document on
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scaled from any chart, because of the error due to the distortion of
paper in printing.
The use of protractors on charts in plotting by angles in the three-
point problem will be referred to later.
The course to be steered to allow for a set due to current or wind
may be obtained by a graphical solution on the chart, though it will
be preferable to do this on other paper, using a larger scale. (Fig.
38.) The direction and velocity of the set and the course and speed
of the ship may be considered as two sides of a parallelogram of
forces, of which the diagonal is the distance and course made good.
To obtain the course to steer to reach a given point with a given
current and speed of vessel, lay down the direction of the
destination; from the starting point lay off the direction of set and
the amount in one hour; from the extremity of this describe an arc
with radius equal to the speed of the vessel in one hour. A line
drawn from the extremity of the direction of set to the point of
intersection of the arc and the course to be made good will give the
direction of the course to be steered, and the point of intersection
will also be the estimated position of the vessel at the end of the
hour's run.
Methods of locating a vessel. The principal methods used for
locating the position of a vessel are by astronomical observations, by
dead reckoning, by compass bearings, by ranges, by horizontal
angles, by soundings, by vertical angles, and by sound. The full
discussion of these methods pertains to navigation and pilotage, and
they will be only briefly referred to here as to their graphical
application to charts.
Astronomical methods. There are a number of methods of
obtaining the position of a vessel by astronomical observations.
When the position is computed the chart enters into these only in
the plotting of the final result, so that with one exception these
methods will not be referred to further here.
The elegant method discovered by an American seaman, Captain
Sumner, in 1843, is in part graphical, to be worked out upon the
chart. This method is based on the obvious fact that at any instant
there is a point on the earth having the sun in its zenith and which is
the center of circles on the earth's surface along the circumference
of any one of which the sun's altitude is the same at all points. A
short portion of such a circle may be considered as a straight line
and can be determined by locating one point and its direction, or
two points in it. This is known as a Sumner line. (Fig. 39.)
From an observation of the sun's altitude and azimuth and an
assumed latitude a position is computed and plotted and a line
drawn on the chart through this position at right angles to the
azimuth of the sun as taken from the azimuth tables and laid off
from a meridian. Another method is to compute positions with two
assumed latitudes and plot the two resulting positions and draw a
line through them. The vessel must be somewhere on the resulting
Sumner line. A good determination may be obtained by the
intersection of two Sumner lines obtained from two observations of
the sun with sufficient interval so that there will be a change of
azimuth of as much as 30 degrees to give a fair intersection.
Allowance must be made for the movement of the vessel between
the two observations by drawing a line parallel to the first and at a
distance equal to the distance made good. An excellent intersection
may be obtained by observation of the sun, and before or after it of
a star in the twilight at a different azimuth.
CO URSE TO AL LO W FO R SET, GRAP HIC AL
SO L UTIO N
FIG. 3 8.
P O SITIO N BY INTERSEC TIO N O F SUM NER
L INES
FIG. 3 9.
FIG. 4 0.
DANGER BEARING
FIG. 4 1.
P O SITIO N BY SUC CESSIVE
BEARINGS TWO AND FO UR P O INT
BEARINGS
FIG. 4 2.
RANGE TO AVO ID
DANGER
FIG. 4 3.
FIG. 4 4.
HO RIZO NTAL DANGER ANGL E
FIG. 4 5.
FIG. 4 6.
Earthquakes, 109
Electrotyping plates, 89
Elevations, 122
Engraving machines, 89
Engraving on copper, 84
Engraving on stone, 93
Eskimo map, 1
Etching on copper, 95
Explanatory sheets, 159
Ranges, 132
Reading charts, 112
Reliance on charts, 144
Reports of dangers, erroneous, 57
Requirements for charts, 23
Revision of charts, need of, 97
Rock, Brooklyn, 50
Uniformity in charts, 21
Use of charts in navigation, 124
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