TDOA-based Position Verification of ADS-B Information Using a Sensor Network
TDOA-based Position Verification of ADS-B Information Using a Sensor Network
Abstract—Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast transmitted transponder signals (like ADS-B) without having
(ADS-B) is an established surveillance technology providing to rely on the included position information [1]. The TDOA-
receivers with aircraft state information including aircraft based localization problem itself is well investigated [2]–[6].
position (Mode S). However, this position data might be
imprecise or even spoofed. Drawing the attention of an air Even though the costs of a single sensor node may be quite
traffic controller to aircraft sending false position data could low, the added costs of a dense sensor network can be quite
2022 Sensor Data Fusion: Trends, Solutions, Applications (SDF) | 978-1-6654-8672-9/22/$31.00 ©2022 IEEE | DOI: 10.1109/SDF55338.2022.9931704
enhance situational awareness, at the same time reduce work high resulting from maintenance, network connectivity and site
load, and increase general aviation safety. In this paper, we rent. It may also be beneficial to use a reduced coverage for
investigate the position verification together with localization of each sensor to avoid a high number of message collisions.
ADS-B transmitters using time difference of arrival (TDOA)
methods based on a synchronized sensor network to validate The idea of this contribution is not to estimate the position
ADS-B position information. of the emitter in the first place (which would require at least
the signal reception by four sensor nodes in a 3D scenario)
I. INTRODUCTION but to validate the transmitted ADS-B position. Only in the
Airspace surveillance and air traffic management rely on case of implausible information, the attention of an air traffic
the accurate knowledge of each aircraft’s position. The state controller needs to be directed towards the respective air-
of the art techniques to acquire necessary information basically craft. The investigated ADS-B messages are transmitted using
build upon three systems: Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) the 1090 MHz extended squitter link. The discussion of the
which determines the position of the aircraft using active drawbacks of this technology mainly include non-encrypted
radar systems on ground, Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) information transmission [7] (everyone can identify the aircraft
where the aircraft’s position is derived by the angle between using the included ICAO address and track its position), the
the ground station and an aircraft’s response to interrogations possibility to send faulty information (accidentally or inten-
of the ground station, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance- tionally), and the extensively used frequency band without
Broadcast (ADS-B) where aircraft automatically and periodi- any channel access method or collision detection. However,
cally transmit information of their current state (position, etc.) the last mentioned drawback can also be exploited, since a lot
to ground stations and other planes. The position information of messages from different aircraft are received nearly at the
is derived by the plane using navigation systems, such as GPS, same time.
and barometric pressure sensors. The reliability and accuracy In [10], a statistical position verification technique and a
of the ADS-B position reports in its currently deployed stage grid-based position estimation approach was proposed to deal
however is limited. The data may even be actively spoofed. with attacks on modern air traffic communication networks. A
Especially, in highly congested airspace, where distances theoretical performance model for ADS-B position verification
between aircraft become relatively small, the received data using TDOA methods was presented in [11], where a model
has to be reliable and consistent. ADS-B position verification was derived by considering the effects of receiver aircraft
techniques, e.g. by checking for consistency between received geometry, TDOA accuracy, latency, self-localization accuracy,
signal measurements and decoded position, can be of assis- and detection threshold.
tance. In our previous work we have presented a method to
For gap-free wide area surveillance, radar systems can determine accurate TOAs of 1090 MHz transponder signals
be assisted and the overall coverage and accuracy can be [8], investigated various aspects of aircraft tracking using wide
enhanced by using passive emitter localization and multilater- area multilateration (WAM) [9], and presented field experi-
ation techniques. Time of Arrival (TOA) or Time Difference ments using a WAM sensor network [1]. Enriched by position
of Arrival (TDOA) measurements are one basis of position verification, this contribution considers a sensor network based
estimation. Therefore, an accurate time synchronization and a on realistic sensor node placement, synchronization accuracies
communication infrastructure to transmit its measurements to and sensor detection ranges. The general localization accuracy
one or multiple fusion centers/nodes is needed. is compared to the Cramér-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB), which
A multilateration sensor network with a large number of defines a lower bound on the achievable localization accuracy.
sensors is well suited to localize aircraft based on their Simulated ADS-B positions, realistic as well as flawed, are
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successfully validated with an automatic threshold adjustment Estimating the emitter position requires a set of sufficient
even by only using two sensors out of the full network. As an TOA measurements τn , n ∈ {1, . . . , N } taken by N sensors
application this work can be used to assess ADS-B sensor in- (might vary over time instances). These TOA measurements
frastructure in terms of possible localization performance and translate to a full TDOA measurement set of all possible
further safety features in form of ADS-B position verification. combinations of TDOA pairings without repetition
II. P ROBLEM F ORMULATION {τ̂a,b }, a ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, b ∈ {a + 1, . . . , N }, a 6= b .
To approach the position verification we start by modeling
the general TDOA problem as in [1]. Here, a network of N Hence, this full TDOA set contains M = N (N − 1)/2
spatially distributed stationary sensors observe appropriate RF measurements.
signals of Q emitters in a synchronized manner. Let the sensor 1) Detection Range: In practice, sensor nodes are often
positions be given by pn = (xn , yn , zn )T , n ∈ {1, . . . , N }. placed over large areas and not all sensor nodes receive the
The unknown position of a corresponding emitter is denoted correspondent emitter signal due to signal range limitations. To
by x = (xe , ye , ze )T , see Fig. 1. model this behavior a detection range per sensor is introduced.
Each sensor node has a specific detection range rn , up to
where a signal can be received (see green circles in Fig. 1).
The emitter lies within the detection range of the n-th sensor
and a TOA measurement can be (correctly) measured, if
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C. Verification Problem The Fisher Information matrix for the TDOA-based emitter
Under the assumption of a sufficient number of TDOA localization problem using a sensor network with N 0 sensor
measurements (and good localization geometry), the proposed nodes in detection range and the assumption of correlated
ADS-B position verification considers an aircraft emitter po- measurement errors can then be expressed by (see [3])
sition as valid, if the estimated emitter position is consistent ∂τ1,2 ∂τ1,3 ∂τ1,N 0
with the appropriately decoded ADS-B/Mode-S position in- ∂xe ∂xe ... ∂xe
formation.
∂τ1,2 ∂τ1,3 ∂τ1,N 0
−1
JTDOA (x) = ... R
However, due to the range limitations of the sensor nodes ∂ye ∂ye ∂ye
(see (3)), the number of correctly receiving sensor nodes might ∂τ1,2 ∂τ1,3 ∂τ1,N 0
not be sufficient to completely solve the localization problem. ∂ze ∂ze ... ∂ze
∂τ1,2 ∂τ1,2 ∂τ1,2
As described before, it is not possible to estimate the emitter ∂xe ∂ye ∂ze
position in a 2D plane with only two sensors, i.e. one resulting
∂τ1,3 ∂τ1,3 ∂τ1,3
TDOA measurement implying all possible emitter positions ∂xe ∂ye ∂ze
, (8)
located on a hyperbola. But exactly this information about
.. .. ..
possible emitter positions can be utilized to compare with . . .
the decoded ADS-B position. If the ADS-B position fits the ∂τ1,N 0 ∂τ1,N 0 ∂τ1,N 0
TDOA measurement(s) in terms of (5), the ADS-B position ∂xe ∂ye ∂ze
gets a low verification score and is therefore considered valid. with R being the matrix of the TOA measurement variances
The verification score consists of the root mean squared error
over all measured TDOAs for sensors in range (or just one στ21 + στ22 στ21 στ21
...
TDOA of one sensor pair) compared to the TDOAs derived στ21 στ1 + στ23
2
... στ21
from the transmitted ADS-B position and the positions of R= .. .. .. . (9)
..
the sensor nodes. In case of only two sensors in range, the
. . . .
verification problem becomes challenging, especially if a false στ21 στ21 ... στ21 + στ2N 0
ADS-B position lies on the hyperbola (2D) corresponding to In the simulation results, the term RCRLB denotes the square
the TDOA measurement. However, this becomes unlikely to root of the corresponding diagonal entry of the CRLB to
happen for every ADS-B position over time. compare it with the localization error.
III. C RAM ÉR -R AO L OWER B OUND (CRLB) IV. SIMULATIONS
To get a prediction of the ideal achievable localization Now, the TDOA localization and position verification is ap-
accuracy of certain areas and its effect on position verification, plied in a simulation environment considering realistic sensor
the CRLB can be analyzed. The CRLB provides a lower bound placement.
on the estimation accuracy and its parameter dependencies
reveal characteristic features of the estimation problem. The
parameters to be estimated T from the available sensor data
T = τ̂(1) , . . . , τ̂(M 0 ) are given by the emitter state x. In
this case, the CRLB is related to the covariance matrix C of
the estimation error 4x = x− x̂(T ) of any unbiased estimator
x̂(T ) as
C = E 4x 4xT ≥ J−1 (x) ,
(6)
where the inequality means that the matrix difference is
positive semidefinite. If the estimator attains the CRLB then
it is called efficient. The CRLB is given by the inverse Fisher
Information Matrix (FIM) [13]
( T )
∂L(T ; x) ∂L(T ; x)
J(x) = E , (7)
∂x ∂x
where L denotes the log-likelihood function.
A. Cramér-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) for TDOA-based Emit-
ter Localization
The TDOA measurements might generally not be indepen-
dent from each other, since they are gained by subtracting Fig. 2: Investigated scenario. Area of interest (blue border),
TOA measurements. As described before, the variance of the sensor positions (black dots) and coverage (colormap).
TDOA measurement τa,b is στ2a,b = στ2a + στ2b .
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Fig. 3: Ideally achievable XY localization accuracy (RCRLB, [m]). On the left for στn = 25 ns, right for στn = 100 ns.
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xy RCRLB, = 25 ns
TOA
200 RCRLB vs. Simulation, TOA
= 25 ns RCRLB vs. Simulation, TOA
= 25 ns
55 Target 1 Target 2
180 200 200
RCRLB RCRLB
54 180 RMSE Sim 180 RMSE Sim
160
160 160
53 140
140 140
120
52
xy-Error/[m]
xy-Error/[m]
120 120
Latitude
rcrlb/[m]
100
51 100 100
80
80 80
50
60 60 60
49
40
40 40
48 20 20
20
0 0
47 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Longitude Index Index
xy RCRLB, = 100 ns
TOA
200 RCRLB vs. Simulation, TOA
= 100 ns RCRLB vs. Simulation, TOA
= 100 ns
55 Target 1 Target 2
180 200 200
RCRLB RCRLB
54 180 RMSE Sim 180 RMSE Sim
160
160 160
53 140
140 140
120
52
xy-Error/[m]
xy-Error/[m]
120 120
Latitude
rcrlb/[m]
100
51 100 100
80
80 80
50
60 60 60
49
40
40 40
48 20 20
20
0 0
47 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Longitude Index Index
Fig. 4: Simulated aircraft trajectories (left) and corresponding localization results (right) as XY-Error [m] plotted over flight
time (index). On the top for στn = 25 ns, on the bottom for στn = 100 ns.
lower TOA measurement accuracy of 100 ns, as can be seen verification, the false targets are almost all correctly assigned
in Fig. 5. Here, 10 simulated targets (Q = 10) are flying over with red scores, see Fig. 5, on the right. The threshold at
the area of interest. 8 of these targets have ADS-B position which positions are considered invalid is here automatically
errors with standard deviation in XYZ-space according to adjusted. If more than one TDOA measurement is available
σ = (100, 100, 100) m (colored in blue). 2 targets broadcast from the sensor network, the TDOA from the sensor pair with
false position information according to errors with standard the maximum TDOA value is selected. This shows that the
deviations of σ = (100, 2000, 100) m (colored in red from position verification also works by just using 2 sensors, i.e. in
West to East) and σ = (2000, 2000, 2000) m (colored in red areas, where sensor coverage might be sparse.
from South to North). Already by inspecting the color of
the target trajectories, false targets can be correctly identified, V. CONCLUSION
since a red color denotes a high verification score. In this contribution, the general TDOA localization perfor-
On the left of Fig. 5, the position verification approach mance and ADS-B position verification by a sensor network
uses all possible sensors that are in detection range to the with realistic operational placement considering sensor detec-
target. The ADS-B position is validated for every single flight tion ranges and sensor synchronization has been investigated.
time index as a ”one-shot-verification”, no fusion over time The proposed position verification works well and can cor-
(tracking) is applied. So, every flight time index, the targets get rectly identify false ADS-B messages, even under suboptimal
automatically assigned to corresponding verification scores, synchronization conditions and by using two sensors only.
depicted in the colormap. Whereas with a low (blue) score the Overall, this kind of work could be used when choosing
ADS-B position is considered valid, it is considered invalid or different sensor sites in operational applications to get a
false with a higher (red) score. Invalid ADS-B positions could general overview of the possible localization capabilities and
then be processed and signalized to an air traffic controller dependencies between different sensor characteristics. This
to enhance situational awareness and increase general aviation could help to minimize infrastructural costs and add possible
safety. If enough sensors detect the signal, the aircraft position safety features. The herein presented methods are the foun-
calculated using the proposed TDOA localization methods dation of further investigations into our position verification
could even be used to initiate further steps. approach with its limitations and extensions. In the future,
Even by only using a single sensor pair for the position combining TDOA with other localization methods such as
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ADS-B Verification, = 100 ns ADS-B Verification, TOA
= 100 ns
TOA
All Sensors in Range TDOAmax-Pair of Sensors in Range
55 55
11
9
10 54
54
8
53 53 7
8
Latitude
Latitude
6 5
51 51
5
4
50 50
4
3
3
49 49
2
2
48 48
1
1
47 47
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Longitude Longitude
Fig. 5: Results of proposed position verification: by all sensors in range (left) and by only 2 sensors (right).
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