TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY

** VOL. XX— PART 2 — FEBRUARY 2025**

IMPORTANT CASE LAWS

TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY

HEADQUARTERS, CHENNAI
No.30/95, P.S.K.R. Salai, R.A. Puram, Chennai – 600 028
Phone Nos. 044– 24958595 / 96 / 97 / 98 Fax: (044) 24958595
Website: www.tnsja.tn.gov.inE–Mail:[email protected]/[email protected]

REGIONAL CENTRE, COIMBATORE REGIONAL CENTRE, MADURAI

No.251, Scheme Road, Race Course, AlagarKoil Road, K. Pudur,
COIMBATORE, MADURAI,
Tamil Nadu, India. PIN: 641 018 Tamil Nadu, India. PIN: 625 002
Telephone No:(0422) 2222610, 710 Telephone No:(0452) 2560807, 811
E–Mail:[email protected] E–Mail:[email protected]
TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUPREME COURT – CIVIL CASES ...................................................................... 1

Jage Ram Vs. Ved Kaur & Ors. [Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 723 of 2023] ................... 1

Sukhdev Singh Vs. Sukhbir Kaur [Civil Appeal No. 2536 of 2019] ............................................ 2

Prakash Chand Sharma Vs. Rambabu Saini & Anr. [SLP (C) No. 3066 of 2024] .................... 4

Sunkari Tirumala Rao & Ors. Vs. Penki Aruna Kumari [Petition(s) for Special Leave to
Appeal (C). No. 30442/2019 ............................................................................................................. 5

SUPREME COURT – CRIMINAL CASES ............................................................... 7

Wahid Vs. State Govt. Of NCT of Delhi [Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 2020] ............................. 7

Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. Vs. The State of Karnataka [Criminal Appeal
No. 593 of 2022] .............................................................................................................................. 10

Raja Khan Vs. State of Chattisgarh [Criminal Appeal No. 70 of 2025] ................................... 13

Ramu Appa Mahapatar Vs. The State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 608 of 2013] . 15

Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu Vs. The State Of Chhattisgarh [Criminal Appeal No. 818 of 2025] 17

HIGH COURT – CIVIL CASES ...........................................................................19

Aburvakounder (Died) & Ors. Vs. Balamurugan & Anr. [CRP. No. 385 of 2024 and CMP.
No.1822 of 2024] [2025 (1) LW 97] ............................................................................................... 19

Thirunavukkarasu & Anr. Vs. Gowri (Died) and Ors. [S.A.No. 495 of 2021] [2025 (1) CTC 40]
.......................................................................................................................................................... 21

The Keela Eraal Kammavar Arakkattalai Vs. The State Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors.
[A.S. No.618 of 2014 & M.P. No.1 of 2014] [2025 (1) CTC 183] ................................................ 22

Padma Vs. Manickam [S.A. No.1275 of 2012 & M.P. No.1 of 2012] [2025 (1) CTC 363] ....... 24

V.Ekambaram (Died) and Ors. Vs. S.Sekar and Anr. [S.A. No.1041 of 2010 & M.P. No.1 of
2010] [2025(1) MWN(Civil) 75] ..................................................................................................... 26

K.Selvaraj Vs. V.Thangavelu [S.A. No.413 of 2020 & C.M.P. No.8523 of 2020] [2025(1) CTC
467]................................................................................................................................................... 28

HIGH COURT – CRIMINAL CASES ...................................................................30

TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

Anand Sathish Vs. The Superintendent of Police, Dindigul & Ors. [Crl. OP (MD) No.16013 of
2024 and Crl. M.P.(MD) No.10096 of 2024] [2025-1-L.W.(Crl.) 79] ......................................... 30

G.Venkatanarayanan & Anr. Vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Chennai

[Crl. OP No.9663 of 2024 and Crl. MP No.9102 of 2023] [2025-1-MWN(Cr.) 16 (DB)] ......... 32

State represented by the Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras Vs. Ponnuvel [Crl. A. No.130
of 2019] [2025-1-MWN(Cr.) 72 (DB)] ........................................................................................... 34

K. Shiva Kumar Vs. State rep by its Inspector of Police & Anr. [Crl. O.P. No.16673 of 2024
and Crl. M.P. Nos.9775 & 10069 of 2024] [2025 (1) MLJ (Crl.) 145] ........................................ 36
TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

SUPREME COURT – CIVIL CASES

Jage Ram Vs. Ved Kaur & Ors. [Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 723 of
2023]
Date of Judgment: 28.01.2025

Court fee can be refunded only if case is settled through ADR mechanisms
referred through court and not for out of court settlement.

The present Petition has been filed challenging the Judgment of the High Court in
dismissing the appeal filed by the Petitioner for refund of court fees paid by him in
the Trial Court.

The main issue that arose for consideration was whether court fee can be refunded
when the matter is settled out of court. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that refund
of court fees is permissible only if the matter is referred to Arbitration, Conciliation,
judicial settlement, including through Lok Adalat or mediation for settlement and the
case is decided in terms of such a settlement and not otherwise. However, in the
present case, the Court observed that the settlement in terms of which the second
appeal was decided by the High Court was not on reference to any of the ADR
mechanisms but rather it was an amicable settlement out of court.

Thus, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that that the petitioner was not entitled to refund
of the court fees and dismissed the Petition.

***
TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

Sukhdev Singh Vs. Sukhbir Kaur [Civil Appeal No. 2536 of 2019]
Date of Judgment: 12.02.2025

Section 24, 25 of Hindu Marriage Act - Spouse whose marriage has been
declared void is entitled to seek permanent alimony or maintenance from
the other spouse - Pending final disposal of the proceeding under Hindu
Marriage Act, court can grant maintenance pendente lite if the conditions
contemplated u/s 24 of Hindu Marriage Act are satisfied.

Due to conflicting Supreme Court decisions on the question of awarding permanent

alimony or maintenance (u/s 24, 25 of the HMA) to a spouse even after a marriage
has been declared void under Section 11 of HMA, the matter was referred by a two
Judge Bench of the Apex Court to a Larger Bench.

The main question of law that fell for consideration before the larger bench of the
Apex Court was (i) whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void by a competent
Court under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to claim permanent alimony and
maintenance under Section 25 of the 1955 Act? and (ii) Whether in a petition filed
seeking a declaration under Section 11 of the 1955 Act, a spouse is entitled to seek
maintenance pendent lite under Section 24 of the 1955 Act?

The Hon’ble Apex Court, after deliberating on Section 5, Section 11, Section 23,
Section 24, and Section 25 of the HMA and referring to various judgments of the Apex
Court, answered the reference by holding that (i) A spouse whose marriage has been
declared void under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent alimony
or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of the 1955 Act.
Whether such a relief of permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends
on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties. The grant of relief under
Section 25 is always discretionary; and (ii) Even if a court comes to a prima facie
conclusion that the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the final
disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the court is not precluded from
granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24

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are satisfied. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court
will have to take into consideration the conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the
grant of relief under Section 24 is always discretionary.

***

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Prakash Chand Sharma Vs. Rambabu Saini & Anr. [SLP (C) No. 3066 of
2024]
Date of Judgment: 10.02.2025

Motor Accident Cases - Disability Certificate - If tribunal had reason to

doubt the medical certificate it has to have the disability re-assessed but
cannot go into the details of the determination of disability.

The Appeal has been preferred by the Claimant/Appellant challenging the Judgment
of the High Court in modifying the compensation amount awarded by the Motor
Accident Claim Tribunal.

The brief facts of the case is that the Appellant met with an accident and sustained
injuries. He filed a claim Petition before the Tribunal. The Medical Board issued 100%
permanent disability. The Tribunal found that the certificate of the Medical Board was
not completely reliable and assessed the disability at 50%, awarding a certain sum as
compensation. The Appellant preferred appeal before the Hon’ble High Court. In that
appeal, the Hon’ble High Court held that the Tribunal had rightly assessed the
disability at 50% and that the Appellant did not prove the medical certificate by not
examining the neurosurgeon and treating doctor. However, it enhanced the award
amount as compensation. Aggrieved by that, the appellant had filed the present
appeal.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that if the Tribunal had reason to doubt the
medical certificate it has to have the disability re-assessed and cannot go into the
details of the determination of disability. Further, by relying on the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of K.S Murlidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi [ 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3385] and with regard to age, nature of disability and other relevant factors, the
Hon’ble Apex Court allowed the Appeal by enhancing the compensation amount along
with interest from the date of the claim petition.

*****

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Sunkari Tirumala Rao & Ors. Vs. Penki Aruna Kumari [Petition(s) for
Special Leave to Appeal (C). No. 30442/2019]
Date of Judgment: 17.01.2025

Section 69 of the Partnership Act is mandatory in character- Suit for

recovery of money in the capacity of partners of an unregistered
partnership firm is not maintainable.

The Petition has been preferred by the plaintiffs challenging the Judgment of the High
Court, which allowed the revision filed by the Defendant/Respondent and set aside
the order of the Trial Court allowing the suit for recovery of money in respect of an
unregistered partnership firm.

The issue that arose for consideration before the Trial Court was whether a partner
of an unregistered partnership firm can file a Suit for recovery of money, being hit by
Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The aforesaid issue was decided as a
preliminary issue and the Trial Court held that the suit was maintainable. The Trial
Court took the view that although there is a partnership deed on record yet as the
partnership business had not commenced, the suit could be said to be maintainable.
Aggrieved by it, the Defendant had filed a revision Petition before the High Court and
the same was allowed. Hence, the present Appeal.

The Apex Court observed that the suit had not been instituted by or on behalf of the
firm against any third persons so as to fall under the ambit of Section 69(2). The
petitioners have also not filed the instant suit for enforcing any statutory right
conferred under any other law or a common law right so as to exempt the application
of Section 69. Hence, the rigours of Section 69(1) would apply on such a suit and the
partnership firm being unregistered would prevent the petitioners from filing a bare
suit for recovery of money from the Respondent. Further, it would have instead been
appropriate for the petitioner/Plaintiff to have preferred a suit for dissolution of the
partnership firm and rendition of accounts, especially considering that the factum of
non-registration of the partnership firm would not have acted as bar in a suit for
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dissolution in light of the exception carved out under Section 69(3). The defence that
the partnership business had not yet commenced and thus, such a suit for dissolution
could not have been preferred, would not be of any avail to the petitioners, particularly
for overcoming the jurisdictional bar under Section 69(1).

Thus, the Apex Court held that the Hon’ble High Court was right in taking the view
that a suit of such nature could not be said to be maintainable in the absence of the
registration of the partnership firm and therefore, dismissed the Appeal.

*****

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SUPREME COURT – CRIMINAL CASES

Wahid Vs. State Govt. Of NCT of Delhi [Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 2020]
Date of Judgment: 04.02.2025

Meticulous Examination Needed in Cases Where FIR Was Against Unknown

Persons & Accused Are Not Known To Witnesses - when the manner in
which the accused persons were arrested and recovery effected appears
doubtful Court should proceed cautiously with other evidence and
determine whether all other circumstances were proved beyond reasonable
doubt- Dock Identification by few eye witnesses not reliable

The present appeal has been filed by the accused, challenging the judgment of the
High Court in convicting them for various offences under the IPC and the Arms Act.

The appellants, along with others, were alleged to have boarded a bus in which the
complainant was traveling with four other passengers. They were accused of
threatening the passengers with knives, a screwdriver, and a country-made pistol
before robbing them. The prosecution claimed that the investigating officer
apprehended the appellants near a bus depot based on information provided by the
complainant. At the time of arrest, knives, a country-made pistol, cash, and mobile
phones were allegedly recovered from them.

The appellants argued that they were falsely implicated, asserting that their arrest
was based on the unreliable testimony of a witness who claimed to have randomly
spotted them at a bus depot two days after the crime cannot be sustained. They
further contended that since they were unknown to the witnesses prior to the alleged
crime, the prosecution’s failure to conduct a Test Identification Parade (TIP) to
confirm their identification cast doubt on the case.

The trial court acquitted the accused. However, upon appeal by the State, the High
Court convicted them. Following this, the accused filed the present appeal

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The Apex Court found the eyewitness identification unreliable. It observed that the
robbery occurred at night, and although seven eyewitnesses were examined, only
three identified the accused in court. Three other eyewitnesses explicitly stated that
the accused were not the robbers, while a fourth stated that it was too dark to see
clearly. The Court emphasized the weakness of dock identification, particularly since
one witness identified the accused 16 months after the incident, and two others did
so nearly four years later, without any prior Test Identification Parade.

Further, relying on Manoj and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2023) 2 SCC 353],
the Apex Court stated that when the accused are unknown and unnamed in the FIR,
and the prosecution’s version of their arrest is disbelieved, courts must carefully assess
the remaining evidence to determine whether the case is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

The Apex Court also questioned the appellants' night-time arrest, which was based
solely on the lead witness’s claim that he recognized them near the bus depot two
days after the incident, still carrying similar weapons. The Court found the timing of
the arrest suspicious, particularly considering the improbability of the lead witness—
a robbery victim—being out at 10 PM in winter, supposedly on his way to the police
station to deliver a mobile phone purchase receipt when he "spotted" the accused.

The Apex Court stated that in cases where the FIR is lodged against unknown persons,
and the accused were not previously known to the witnesses, the material collected
during the investigation plays a crucial role in determining the credibility of the case.
Courts must meticulously examine:

(a) how the investigating agency identified the accused,

(b) the manner in which they were arrested, and
(c) how they were identified.

Moreover, the Apex Court noted the lack of corroborative evidence regarding the
recovery of looted items from the accused. Concluding that the appellants were

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entitled to the benefit of doubt, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal and
acquitted them.

***

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Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. Vs. The State of Karnataka
[Criminal Appeal No. 593 of 2022]
Date of Judgment: 11.02.2025

S. 34 IPC - Mere Presence at Crime Scene As Spectator Doesn't Establish

Common Intention Unless Active Participation Proven

Section 34 and 149 of IPC - Criminal liability u/s 149 IPC is determined not
by the intention of the various individual members constituting it but by
the common object of the assembly - Intention to be common, it should be
attributable to every member of the group and that the same intention
jointly existed in the mind of every individual member and that every
member shared it along with others – To attract section 34 IPC every
individual offender ought to have associated with the criminal act both
physically and mentally - If a person is present on the scene for the purpose
of participating in the offence, he would be guilty as a participator -
Presence on the spot for the purpose of facilitating the offence amounts to
actual participation in the criminal act - He is present there merely as a
spectator, he would not be guilty - Twin aspects of section 34 IPC i.e. he
must be a sharer of ‘criminal act’ and also the common intention.

The present appeal has been preferred by the husband and mother-in-law/accused,
challenging the judgment of the High Court, which set aside the trial court's judgment
acquitting both the accused under various provisions of the IPC and the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961.

The case of the prosecution is that the deceased who was the wife of the Appellant
was harassed for dowry and in connection with the domestic house hold work. On the
date of the incident at around 8.00 p.m. while the deceased was at her matrimonial
home, her mother-in-law i.e. the appellant no.2 herein is alleged to have poured
kerosene on her body and set her on fire. The deceased latter succumbed to the burn
injuries. The Investigating officer arrested both the mother-in-law and the husband

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and booked them under various provisions of IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The High Court had convicted the husband on the ground that he was present at the
crime scene and shared common intention with his mother.

The Court observed that it is a condition precedent of Section 34, IPC, that the
individual offender must have participated in the offence in both these respects. He
must have done something, however slight, or conduct himself in some manner,
however nebulous whether by doing an act or by omitting to do an act so as to indicate
that he was a participant in the offence and a guilty associate in it. He must also be
individually a party to an intention which he must share in common with others.
Further, by placing reliance in [Suresh Sakharam Nangare v. The State of
Maharashtra, 2012 (9) Judgements Today 116], the Apex Court observed that if
common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused,
Section 34 of the code will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious liability but
if participation of the accused in the crime is proved and common intention is absent
Section 34 cannot be invoked. In other words, it requires a pre-arranged plan and
pre-supposes prior concert therefore there must be meeting of mind.

Moreover, the Court had stated that although Section 34 deals with a criminal act
which is joint and an intention which is common, it cannot be said that it completely
ignores or eliminates the element of personal contribution of the individual offender
in both these respects. A person present on the scene might or might not be guilty by
the application of Section 34, IPC. If he is present on the scene for the purpose of
participating in the offence, he would certainly be guilty as a participator in the
offence. On the other hand, if he is present there merely as a spectator, he would not
be guilty. The Court stated that every person charged with the aid of Section 34, must
in some form or the other participate in the offence in order to make him liable
thereunder. Because the husband was merely present at the crime scene and didn't
commit an overt act to establish the common intention, the Court held that the
husband cannot be held guilty as the prosecution failed to bring direct evidence
proving that the husband actively participated or shared his mother's intention.

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Finding that the husband (appellant no.1) did not participate in the offence and finding
no cogent and reliable evidence to press section 34 of IPC against him, the Hon’ble
Apex Court held that he was not liable and not guilty of the offence of murder with
the aid of section 34 of IPC. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court confirmed the conviction
of the 2nd appellant (i.e. the mother in law). Thus, the appeal was partly allowed.

*****

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Raja Khan Vs. State of Chattisgarh [Criminal Appeal No. 70 of 2025]

Date of Judgment: 07.02.2025

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Where the case rests entirely on

circumstantial evidence, the chain of evidence must be so far complete,
such that every hypothesis is excluded but the one proposed to be proved
and such circumstances must show that the act has been done by the
accused within all human probability

The present Appeal has been filed by the accused challenging the Judgment of the
High Court in dismissing the Appeal and confirming the conviction and sentence
imposed on him by the Trial Court. The Appellant was convicted under section 302
and 201 of IPC.

The brief facts of the case is that two days after the deceased victim was reported
missing, his body was found floating in a quarry pond. The post-mortem report
concluded that the death was homicidal in nature. The police investigation pointed to
the Appellant as the primary suspect as there was a financial dispute between him
and the deceased. The prosecution alleged that the Appellant, along with a co-accused
(who was later acquitted), lured the deceased to the crime scene, assaulted him with
an iron pipe and battle axe (Gandasa), and disposed of his body in the quarry to
destroy evidence.

The Court observed that the entire case of the prosecution rested on circumstantial
evidence, as there was neither any eye-witness nor any judicially admissible
confession. The Court pointed out that the prosecution had claimed that weapons and
stolen gold chains were recovered based on the Appellant’s disclosure. However,
witness testimonies suggested that these items were found by the police without the
Appellant’s involvement, rendering the evidence unreliable. Further, the Court
observed that the Courts below were not justified in disregarding the glaring
inconsistencies with respect to the recoveries made by the police pursuant to the
alleged disclosure made by the Appellant-accused. Consequently, the manner of

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recovery and preparation of seizure memos raises grave doubts about the version of
disclosure and recovery put forth by the prosecution. Also, the testimony of
Prosecution Witness was not corroborated by the testimonies of other Prosecution
Witness, thus there was doubt with respect to the ‘last seen’ circumstance too.
Further, the Court observed that a bare perusal of the testimonies of the said
witnesses raises serious doubts regarding the version of the prosecution with respect
to the alleged disclosure made by the Appellant accused herein and the recoveries
pursuant to such alleged disclosure.

Hence, the prosecution failed to prove the chain of circumstances leading to the guilt
of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the appellant was given benefit of
doubt and was acquitted by the Apex Court.

***

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Ramu Appa Mahapatar Vs. The State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No.
608 of 2013]
Date of Judgment: 04.02.2025

Extra-judicial confession - Weak piece of circumstantial evidence -

Testimony of the witnesses clearly shows that no credence could be given
to the theory of extra-judicial confession - Such confession does not inspire
any confidence.

The Appeal has been preferred by the Accused challenging the Judgment of the High
Court in confirming the conviction and sentence imposed on him by the Trial Court.

The appellant was convicted for the murder of his partner. As per the prosecution's
case, the appellant lived with the deceased in a live-in relationship. A quarrel took
place between them and he assaulted her, leading to her death. Subsequently, the
appellant informed about this incident to his landlord and the deceased's relatives.
The Trial Court convicted him based on circumstantial evidence including the extra-
judicial confession made by the appellant. The High Court affirmed this conviction;
thus, the present appeal.

The issue that arose for consideration was whether reliance can be placed on extra
judicial confession.

The Court observed that it is a well settled law that circumstantial evidence is not
direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other facts which are
so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken together, they form a chain of
circumstances from which the existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or
presumed. The chain must be complete and each fact forming part of the chain must
be proved. In a case which rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, inference of
guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found
to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person.
All these circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the
chain of evidence. While there is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on

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circumstantial evidence great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial

evidence. If the evidence relied upon is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one
in favour of the accused must be accepted.

Citing State of Rajasthan Vs. Raja Ram [(2003) 8 SCC 180], the Apex Court stressed
that the confession must made by the accused voluntarily and in a fit state of mind.
Apart from this, after placing its reliance on Sahadevan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu
[(2012) 6 SCC 403], the Court reiterated that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece
of evidence. Further, the courts must ensure that such confession inspires confidence
and is corroborated by other evidence. Building on this, the Court analysed the
evidence placed on record. After examining the witnesses' testimonies, it noted that
before the Trial Court, the deceased's brother had stated that he found the accused
to be in a confused state of mind. Thus, the Court concluded that the accused was
not in a fit state of mind. The Court also noted several material omissions in the
witnesses' statements before the police and the one deposed before the Court.

Thus, while granting the benefit of the doubt to the accused, the Court held that
extrajudicial confession is one of the other instances of circumstantial evidence,
including the accused's guilt after the incident, recovery of evidence, and others. The
Court reiterated that in cases where reliance is placed solely on circumstantial
evidence, a conviction can only occur when all circumstances point towards the
accused's guilt and thus, the Court allowed the Appeal.

*****

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Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu Vs. The State Of Chhattisgarh [Criminal Appeal No.
818 of 2025]
Date of Judgment: 18.02.2025

S.437(6) CrPC /S.480 (6) BNSS - Be Liberal While Deciding Bail When
Magistrate Trial Hasn't Concluded In 60 Days

In an appeal arising from the High Court relating to cryptocurrency, an economic

offence denying bail to the appellant/accused for criminal offences including cheating.

The Apex Court observed the following factors relevant for considering Section 437(6)
application:

1. Whether the reasons for being unable to conclude trial within sixty days from the
first date fixed of taking evidence, are attributable to the accused?

2. Whether there are any chances of the accused tampering with evidence or causing
prejudice to the case of the prosecution in any other manner?

3. Whether there are any chances of abscondence of the accused on being bailed
out?

4. Whether accused was not in custody during the whole of the said period?

The Court observed that if the answer to any one of the above referred fact situations
or similar fact situations is in affirmative then that would work as a fetter on the right
that accrues to the accused under first part of sub-section (6) of Section 437 of the
Code. The right accrues to him only if he is in custody during the whole of the said
period as can be seen from the language employed in sub-section (6) of Section 437
of the Code. Apart from this, other things like the prescribed offence, time that the
trial is like to take, volume of evidence, number of witnesses, workload on the Court
and the number of accused being tried with the accused should also be taken into
account. The Court also clarified that these facts are not exhaustive in nature.

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Further, the Court observed that an applications under Section 437 (6) have to be
given a liberal approach and it would be a sound and judicious exercise of discretion
in favour of the accused by the Court concerned, more particularly where there is no
chance of tampering of evidence e.g. where the case depends on documentary
evidence which is already collected; where there is no fault on part of the accused in
causing of delay; where there are no chances of any abscondence by the accused;
where there is little scope for conclusion of trial in near future; where the period for
which accused has been in jail is substantial in comparison to the sentence prescribed
for the offence for which he is tried. Normal parameters for deciding bail application
would also be relevant while deciding application under Section 437(6) of the Code,
but not with that rigour as they might have been at the time of application for regular
bail.

Moreover, in the present case, the Apex Court observed that upto date only one
witness has been examined and in toto the prosecution is to examine 189 witnesses.
Further, the accused has been in custody since December 2023.

Thus, the Apex Court while allowing the appeal, held that the courts should adopt a
liberal approach while dealing with applications under Section 437(6) of CrPC in cases
where there is no chance of evidence tampering, absconding, or accused delaying the
trial.

*****

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HIGH COURT – CIVIL CASES

Aburvakounder (Died) & Ors. Vs. Balamurugan & Anr. [CRP. No. 385 of
2024 and CMP. No.1822 of 2024] [2025 (1) LW 97]
Date of Judgment: 03.01.2025

Civil Procedure Code, Section 152 – Amendment of decree, Order 20 Rule

18, decree in partition suit. Revision against order dismissing an
application filed to amend preliminary decree. Final decree passed before
the judgment in Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma (2020 5 LW 300).
Petitioners cannot get the benefits of the judgment, as the final decree has
been drawn up, signed and engrossed in stamp paper of requisite value, the
suit will come to an end.

The Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the Defendants/Petitioners challenging
the order of the Trial Court in rejecting the applications filed under section 152 of CPC
to amend the preliminary Decree.

The facts of the case is that the first plaintiff was a minor represented by his mother,
second plaintiff filed a suit for partition claiming ½ share in the suit properties stating
the suit properties are ancestral properties of one Rama Kounder, S/o.Perumal
Kounder. The said Rama Kounder got four sons, viz., Srinivasan, Aburvakounder,
Arumugam and Balakrishna. The plaintiffs have claimed oral partition in the year 1987
in which the suit properties have been allotted to the first petitioner. The
respondents/Plaintiffs have also stated that the properties items 1 to 9 had fallen to
the share of the first petitioner. Therefore, the 1st plaintiff as a co-parcener claimed
½ share and first defendant got ½ share obtained preliminary decree for partition of
½ share in the suit properties. Based on the preliminary decree, the respondents have
filed application for passing of final decree. Accordingly, final decree was passed.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs have filed a petition for delivery of the properties.

According to the revision petitioners, plaintiffs are not entitled to ½ share in the suit
properties as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vineeta

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma and others, wherein, the daughters are recognised as co-
parceners along with sons and the said law is retrospective viz., from 1956 when the
Hindu Succession Act came into force. Therefore, as per the above judgment, the
petitioners are equally entitled to a share along with their brother/first plaintiff.
Therefore, the first plaintiff is entitled to only ¼ share in the suit properties, as the
defendants 2 to 4 are each entitled to ¼ share. Thus, the application was filed seeking
to amend the preliminary decree to hold that the first plaintiff/first respondent is
entitled to 1/4th share in the suit properties and the defendants 2 to 4/petitioners 2
to 4 are jointly entitled to 1/4th share. The said application was dismissed and
challenging the said order, the present revision petition.

The Hon’ble High Court observed that the question of delivery of properties is a matter
to be considered at the stage of execution and is not a matter falling for contemplation
in the final decree stage. The same view was taken by Blakewell, J in the case of
Thiruvengadathamiah vs. Mungiah, [ILR (1912) 35 Mad 26] which was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Renu Devi vs Mahendra Singh [ (2003) 10 SCC 200]

Further, the Hon’ble High Court stated that when a final decree has been drawn up,
signed and engrossed in stamp paper of requisite value, the suit will come to an end
for all practical purpose. Therefore, once the decree has been passed by fixing metes
and bounds and the same is engrossed on the stamp paper on the requisite value,
the petitioners cannot seek enlargement of shares on the ground of change of law
and therefore, the Court dismissed the revision Petition.

****

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

Thirunavukkarasu & Anr. Vs. Gowri (Died) and Ors. [S.A.No. 495 of 2021]
[2025 (1) CTC 40]
Date of Judgment: 28.11.2024

Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 101: Burden of Proof in Suit for
bare Injunction. Plaintiff must prima facie establish Title to or possession
of the Suit property to obtain Injunction and cannot pick loopholes in
Defendant’s case. No evidence to establish Plaintiff’s Title, possession or
enjoyment of Suit property. When the Defendant denies Plaintiff’s Titles,
Plaintiff to amend Plaint to include prayer for declaration of Title, without
which mere Suit for bare Injunction would not survive.

A Suit was filed for bare Injunction restraining the Defendants from entering the Suit
property. The Defendants resisted the Suit stating that they have title over the
property. However, the Trial Court decreed the Suit on the basis that the Defendants
had failed to prove its title over the property. On Appeal, the First Appellate Court
also upheld the same. Hence, the present Second Appeal has been filed by the
Defendants.

The Hon’ble High Court observed that both the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate
Court wrongly casted the burden of proof upon the Defendants to prove their title and
possession of the Suit property. Further, there was not even a single document to
show that the Plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the Suit property. Also,
there was no clinching evidence to conclude that the Plaintiff was the Sole Legal Heir
of one (late) Mrs. Saradambal who was the owner of the suit property.

Further, in view of law laid down in Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy, reported
in [(2008) 4 SCC 594], and the Defendants having denied the title of the Plaintiff vide
Ex.B1 and Ex.B2 (Certified copies of Sale Deeds), the Plaintiff ought to have amended
the Plaint so as to include the prayer for declaration of his Title as well. The Plaintiff
failed to do so. Therefore, in these circumstances, the Court held that the Suit for
bare Injunction would not survive and thus, allowed the second Appeal.

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

The Keela Eraal Kammavar Arakkattalai Vs. The State Government of

Tamil Nadu and Ors. [A.S. No.618 of 2014 & M.P. No.1 of 2014] [2025 (1)
CTC 183]
Date of Judgment: 10.11.2022

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Order 1, Rule 8; Title to property

earmarked for public property in Layout. Plaintiff produced documents to
substantiate Title. The Revenue records show no rival claim. It is Settled
law that the local body does not become the owner of a property, which is
reserved for public purpose in a lay out. The Trial Court misled by approved
Layout Plan. Appellant not impleading promoter of Layout. Though an
irregularity, defendants did not raise objection. Court not inclined to
dismiss the Suit.

The Appellant/Plaintiff had filed a Suit for Declaration of Title of Suit property along
with consequential Injunction restraining Respondents/Defendants from interfering in
their peaceful possession. The Municipality / 3rd Defendant contested the Suit stating
that if a property is reserved for Public purpose in any approved Layout, the property
belongs to the Local body. The Trial Court dismissed the Suit. Against the dismissal,
the present Appeal Suit has been filed by the Plaintiff.

The Hon’ble High Court by placing reliance on the Judgment of the Apex Court in Chet
Ram Vashist (dead) vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported in [AIR 1995 SC 430]
observed that if the promoter shows a particular piece of land in a lay out for the
public purpose, he holds that property only as a trustee for the benefit of the owners
of the plots. However, to apply the said principle, it is to be established that the land
belongs to the promoter at the time when the lay out was formed. The third defendant
claimed title only through the lay out formed by the promoter, but it is unable to
produce any record to show that the promoter had title and the property lawfully
came under the control of the third defendant/local body. Further, it is also settled
law that the local body does not become the owner of a property, which is reserved
for public purpose in a lay out. The position of the local body/third defendant in this
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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

case cannot be better than the promoter himself who had no title. Even assuming that
the promoter executed a gift deed does not alter the situation. In the present case,
no gift deed was executed by the promoter of the lay out in favour of the local body.

Hence, the Court allowed the First Appeal, holding that the appellant/plaintiff has
established its title and lawful ownership. Consequently, the order of the third
defendant canceling the planning permission on the grounds of title cannot survive.

*****

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

Padma Vs. Manickam [S.A. No.1275 of 2012 & M.P. No.1 of 2012] [2025
(1) CTC 363]
Date of Judgment: 19.10.2024

Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), Sections 9 and 13: Defendant cannot deny
existing easement; once easement created, Servient Owner cannot
withdraw easement without consent of Dominant Owner.

The Second appeal has been filed by the Plaintiff challenging the decree of the Trial
Court and the lower appellate court for rejecting the suit for relief of declaration and
injunction. The Plaintiff obtained an Easementary right to use a Cart Track in terms
of a Sale Deed entered into with her Vendor. The 1st Defendant purchased the land
containing the Cart Track and obstructed Plaintiff from accessing the Cart Track. The
Plaintiff filed a Suit for Declaration declaring his right to use the Cart Tract. The Trial
Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the Suit on the basis that Plaintiff is claiming
Easement by Necessity and has not adduced evidence in support of the same.
Aggrieved by the same, the Second Appeal has been filed by the Plaintiff.

The Hon’ble High Court observed that both the Courts ought to have moulded the
relief, since there is categorical Easement by Grant in Sale Deed and there was no
denial of the fact that the Vendors of the First Defendant even prior to selling his land
in favour of the First Defendant has granted right of using the customary Cart Track,
which is running in the then unsold portion. The First Advocate Commissioner Report
has clearly indicated that the existing Cart Track was damaged by the Defendants
with a view to prevent the Plaintiff from using the same. It is also an admitted case
that the Contempt proceedings were initiated against him and there is a categorical
evidence that on the Western corner of the First Defendant’s land, the Cart Track is
running on the North South direction at the end of Plaintiff’s land. That being so,
both the Courts have failed to consider this material evidence regarding destruction
of the existing customary Cart Track.

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

Further, the Hon’ble High Court observed that the Lower Appellate Court had rejected
the Commissioner Report No.2, based on the fact that, it contains measurements of
Cart Track. However, the Court has not rejected the Report of the Advocate
Commissioner regarding the existence of Cart Track. In view of the discussions made
above, the Plaintiff was entitled for declaration that she was entitled to use the Cart
Track as stated in Commissioner Report No.1 and the Report shall form part of the
Decree and Judgment. Accordingly, the Substantial Questions of Law were answered
in favour of the Plaintiff.

Thus, the Hon’ble High Court partly allowed the second Appeal. The relief claimed by
the Plaintiff was granted to the extent that the Plaintiff was entitled for declaration
that she was entitled to use the Cart Track as described in the Advocate
Commissioner’s Report and Rough Sketch. Consequently, the Plaintiff was also
entitled for Permanent Injunction as prayed in the suit for the Suit Cart Track shown
in the Advocate Commissioners’ Report.

***

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

V.Ekambaram (Died) and Ors. Vs. S.Sekar and Anr. [S.A. No.1041 of 2010
& M.P. No.1 of 2010] [2025(1) MWN(Civil) 75]
Date of Judgment: 13.02.2024

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), Section 96 r/w Order 41, Rule
31: A valuable right available to parties. Lower Appellate Court must
independently analyse documents and evidence on record by following
procedure under Order 41, Rule 31.

The second appeal has been filed as against the judgment and decree of the Trial
Court. The Plaintiff was the absolute owner of the vacant land and building. Suit
property originally belonged to the Plaintiff’s brother which was registered as Sale
Deed by his brother to the Plaintiff. The Defendants are neighbours and tried to
trespass into the suit property. Therefore, the plaintiff had filed a Suit for bare
Injunction.

The Trial Court found that the Plaintiff has not proved his possession over the disputed
area, but whereas the Defendants have filed documents and established that they
have better title to the disputed portion and are in possession of the property. The
Lower Appellate Court, after reappraising the evidences and documents, by Judgment
and Decree dismissed the Appeal confirming the Decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved
by the same, the Plaintiff had filed the Second Appeal.

The Hon’ble High Court by placing reliance of the Judgment of the Apex Court in
Somakka (Dead) by Legal Representatives vs K.P. Basavaraj (Dead) by
Legal Representatives, [(2022) 8 SCC 261] observed that when the requirements
as contemplated under Order 41, Rule 31, C.P.C., is not followed and the Lower
Appellate Court has passed the Judgment in contravention to the procedures, the
Judgment and Decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court are not in consonance
with procedure set out under Order 41, Rule C.P.C., the Judgment and Decree of the
Lower Appellate Court was perverse and was liable to be interfered.

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

The Hon’ble High Court by allowing the second appeal held that the Judgment and
Decree of the Lower Appellate Court were set aside and the matter was remanded
back to the Lower Appellate Court to decide the First Appeal afresh by following the
procedure as set out under Order 41, Rule 31, C.P.C. Since the Suit is of the year
1999 and almost the parties have been litigating in Court for the past 25 years and
since the Appeal was remanded to the Lower Appellate Court, in the interest of justice,
the Lower Appellate Court was directed to dispose of the Appeal within the time
stipulated.
****

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

K.Selvaraj Vs. V.Thangavelu [S.A. No.413 of 2020 & C.M.P. No.8523 of

2020] [2025(1) CTC 467]
Date of Judgment: 18.10.2024

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118: When neither
execution of Promissory Note nor passing of consideration proved by
Plaintiff, presumption under Section 118 cannot be invoked.

The Second appeal was filed by the defendant against the judgment of the Trial Court.
The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had borrowed a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- from
the Plaintiff by executing a Promissory Note, and that despite repeated demands, the
Defendant failed to repay the Principal and the Interest. It is the case of the
Defendant that he never borrowed such amount from the Plaintiff as alleged by him,
and that the alleged Promissory Note is a forged one. The Plaintiff, thus, filed a Suit
for Recovery of money along with Interest. The Trial Court decreed the Suit by
holding that the Defendant admitted the signature on the alleged Promissory Note
and hence, the onus is upon him to prove his defence. However, he failed to do so.
Aggrieved with the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court, the Defendant preferred
an Appeal before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court also concurred
with the aforesaid finding of the Trial Court and dismissed the Appeal. Hence, the
Second Appeal has been filed by the Defendants.

The Hon’ble High Court had observed that the plaintiff has not proved the execution
of Ex-A.1- Promissory Note and pursuant passing of consideration. The defendant’s
admission that the signature in Ex-A.1 is his, has to be seen along with his defense.
When neither the execution of the Promissory Note nor the passing of consideration
has been proved, given the defence taken by the defendant, the mere fact that the
defendant admitted his signature in Ex-A.1 was not sufficient to invoke the
presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.The Hon’ble
High Court by allowing the second appeal, held that both the Trial Court as well as
the First Appellate Court had failed to consider the relationship between the plaintiff

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

and the defendant, other facts and circumstances of the case as well as the evidence
available on record in the right perspective.

*****

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

HIGH COURT – CRIMINAL CASES

Anand Sathish Vs. The Superintendent of Police, Dindigul & Ors. [Crl. OP
(MD) No.16013 of 2024 and Crl. M.P.(MD) No.10096 of 2024] [2025-1-
L.W.(Crl.) 79]
Date of Judgment: 06.11.2024

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), Sections 173(1), 528, Concept

of zero FIR, Jurisdiction, transfer of investigation – Zero FIR transferred.

The Criminal Original Petition has been filed by the accused under Section 528 BNSS,
to withdraw the investigation pending on the file of third respondent police (Inspector
of Police, Dindigul) and entrust the same to the fourth respondent (Inspector of Police
CCB-Madurai) with a direction to investigate the matter in accordance with law and
consequently to direct the second respondent (Commissioner of Police, Madurai) to
monitor the same.

The brief facts of the case is that the cause of action falls under the jurisdiction of the
fourth respondent, that all the companies mentioned in the FIR are having registered
office at Madurai, fifth respondent is a resident of Madurai, but chose to prefer a
complaint before the DCB, Dindigul / the third respondent. The Fifth respondent has
not shown any material to infer that the third respondent is having territorial
jurisdiction to register the case and proceed with the investigation and the Fourth
respondent alone is having jurisdiction to conduct the investigation.

The Hon’ble High Court has observed that Zero FIR has been given a statutory basis
under BNSS, 2023 by including the same in Section 173(1) which pertains to the
registration of FIR in cognizable cases. Considering the scope of Zero FIR, it is clear
that an Officer in charge of a Police Station, irrespective of his jurisdictional
competence, shall record every information received orally or in writing, relating to
the commission of a cognizable offence and that the power of an Officer in charge of
a Police Station to investigate into a cognizable offence is coextensive with that of the

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such Station, having
power to enquire into or try that offence.

The Hon’ble High Court also noted that the power of the Court to interfere with an
investigation is limited. Once an investigation has commenced, the Court cannot
question it solely on the ground that the police officer lacked territorial jurisdiction,
provided that the officer initiated the investigation in good faith without realizing the
lack of territorial jurisdiction. In the present case, the petitioner specifically alleged
that the fifth respondent had deliberately lodged a false complaint with the third
respondent and that there was collusion between the third respondent and the fifth
respondent. The petitioner further argued that this collusion led to the arrest of two
accused persons on the very same day the complaint was filed.

In such a scenario, the Court held that the third respondent could not be allowed to
continue with the investigation. Consequently, the third respondent was directed to
treat the FIR registered in the present case as a Zero FIR and transfer it to the
jurisdictional police, i.e., the fourth respondent. The fourth respondent was then
directed to register the case, proceed with the investigation, and file the final report
within the time stipulated by the Court. Thus, the Hon’ble High Court allowed the
Criminal Original Petition.

*****

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

G.Venkatanarayanan & Anr. Vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of

Enforcement, Chennai [Crl. OP No.9663 of 2024 and Crl. MP No.9102 of
2023] [2025-1-MWN(Cr.) 16 (DB)]
Date of Judgment: 27.11.2024

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 44(1)(d) :

Trial of offence under Act. Complaint filed under Section 45 cannot be
equated with Final Report in Predicate offence. the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, as a distinct code with its own procedures under Sections
65 and 71, prevails over general penal laws.

The Criminal Original Petition has been filed by the petitioners, A1 and A2, under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C to set aside a trial court order that dismissed their petition to
postpone the commencement of a PMLA trial (Spl. CC No. 2 of 2023) until the
predicate offence case (CC No. 22 of 2014) reaches finality.

The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners/accused, A1 and A2, are involved
in both the predicate offence and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
(PMLA) cases. The proceedings before the adjudicating authority were closed in view
of the orders passed by the High Court, based on the undertaking given by the
accused that they would not alienate the properties provisionally attached under
Section 5(1) of the PMLA. At that point, the petitioners filed a petition under Section
309 of Cr.P.C to stay all further proceedings in the PMLA case. The trial court
considered the issues raised between the parties and dismissed the petition, resulting
in the filing of the present Criminal Original Petition.

The petitioners contended that the PMLA case should be put on hold until the
predicate offense is disposed of, referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhry's case, which states that discharge or acquittal in the predicate
offence can be grounds for exoneration from PMLA proceedings. On the other hand,
the respondent contended that the offence under the PMLA is independent of the
investigation and trial of the predicate offense. The respondent further submitted that

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

the commission of the predicate offense is merely a trigger for investigation under
PMLA, since it is a distinct offence.

The Hon'ble High Court observed that the Prevention of Money Laundering Act is a
code in itself, and the procedures contemplated under it are distinct and different
from those under general penal laws. Sections 65 and 71 of the PMLA clarify this
position. Since the procedures under the PMLA are distinct from those of general penal
laws, the special enactment will prevail over the general law. The court noted that the
ground raised that the PMLA trial should be kept in abeyance until the completion of
the trial of the predicate offence is untenable and without merit. The seriousness of
economic offences and their implications at the national and international levels were
considered under the special enactments, namely, the PMLA. The court while
dismissing the Criminal Original Petition, held that the offences of money laundering
are to be dealt with under the provisions of PMLA in stricto sensu. Any attempt to
increase the longevity of PMLA trial at no circumstances be encouraged by the Courts.
The trial must go on, as it is clarified in explanation (i) to Section 44(1) of PMLA.

*****

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

State represented by the Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras Vs.

Ponnuvel [Crl. A. No.130 of 2019] [2025-1-MWN(Cr.) 72 (DB)]
Date of Judgment: 17.10.2024

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 378 & 386:
Appeal Against Acquittal. The High Court possesses full authority to review
the entire body of evidence. There exists a fine distinction between an
appeal against conviction and an appeal against acquittal. In an appeal
against acquittal, the presumption of innocence is reaffirmed. Unless there
is a compelling reason or an error apparent on the face of the record, no
interference is warranted.

The Criminal Appeal has been filed by the State under Section 378 of Cr.P.C against
the Order of Acquittal passed by the Trial Court.

A longstanding property dispute existed between the parties. The accused allegedly
attacked both the deceased and his wife (PW2). PW2, who sustained injuries, was
treated at the hospital; however, the Accident Register was not produced. PW1, the
son of the deceased, admittedly did not react at all to the gruesome incident at the
scene. The Trial Court raised reasonable doubt regarding PW1’s presence at the
scene. The conduct of PWs 1 and 2 was deemed unnatural, as they left the deceased
unattended despite him remaining alive for two hours after the alleged attack.
Additionally, there was a discrepancy between the testimonies of PWs 1 and 2
regarding the mode of conveyance used to travel to the hospital. The Trial Court’s
view was found to be plausible and reasonable. The mere omission of the scene of
occurrence in the rough sketch did not weaken the case, considering the other
reasonable doubts raised by the Trial Court. A reasonable doubt is not a minor
inconsistency but a serious concern that renders the prosecution’s case highly
questionable.

The Hon’ble High Court observed that although the non-mention of the deceased’s
body at the scene of occurrence and the absence of the cattle shed in the rough
sketch might appear to be perverse findings, they did not undermine the case in light
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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

of the other substantial doubts raised by the Trial Court. It is pertinent to note that a
reasonable doubt must be a significant concern rather than a minor inconsistency.
Such a doubt is one that renders the possibility of guilt highly uncertain. The Court
referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalinga Alias Kushal v. State
of Karnataka, reported in [(2024) 4 SCC 735]. In the present case, the doubts raised
by the Trial Court fell within the parameters of reasonable doubt. Thus, the Trial
Court’s findings were deemed plausible. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that, in line
with settled legal principles, even if an alternative view was possible, it could not serve
as a ground to interfere with the plausible findings of the Trial Court. Since views
favoring the accused must be preferred, the Court dismissed the appeal.

*****

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

K. Shiva Kumar Vs. State rep by its Inspector of Police & Anr. [Crl. O.P.
No.16673 of 2024 and Crl. M.P. Nos.9775 & 10069 of 2024] [2025 (1) MLJ
(Crl.) 145]
Date of Judgment: 06.01.2025

The Criminal Original Petition has been filed by the accused under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS) seeking to call for records and quash the FIR
registered by the first respondent police.

The petitioner previously served as the Commissioner of Pallavaram Municipality.

Based on a complaint filed by one Mr. Anbalagan, now deceased, the first respondent
initiated a preliminary inquiry and subsequently obtained approval as mandated under
Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Following this, an FIR was registered
against five individuals, including the petitioner, for offenses under Sections 120-B,
406, and 409 of the IPC, as well as Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The FIR contained specific allegations against the
petitioner along with other accused individuals.

The Hon'ble High Court noted that when an FIR involving offenses under Section 17A
of the Prevention of Corruption Act is challenged, the Court must assess the quality
of the application of mind involved in granting approval. The approval process under
Section 17A serves as a statutory safeguard to protect honest public servants from
vexatious and frivolous complaints arising from bona fide decisions they have taken.

After reviewing various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts, the
Court summarized the legal position as follows:

a) Approval under Section 17A is mandatory, and the approving authority must
primarily ensure that a public servant accused of criminality for an administrative
decision or recommendation is not wrongly prosecuted or victimized.

b) Before granting or refusing approval under Section 17A, the authority must apply
its mind not only to the complaint but also to any other relevant materials that could
shed light on the allegations and the necessity of prosecution.

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

c) The authority granting approval is not required to examine all the materials as a
Court would evaluate evidence, but must still apply its expertise, familiarity, and
knowledge in the field to assess whether the decision or recommendation made by
the public servant warrants a bona fide suspicion about their integrity.

d) An order granting approval under Section 17A is administrative in nature and

merely sets the prosecution process in motion. While it is not justiciable, it may be
subject to collateral challenge when an FIR is questioned.

e) When an FIR is challenged, the Court is entitled to assess the quality of the approval
granted under Section 17A.

f) If the Court, while considering a petition to quash an FIR, finds that the FIR appears
to be vexatious, motivated, or driven by malafide intent, or that the public servant’s
decision or recommendation was bona fide, then the approval granted under Section
17A without due application of mind becomes a critical factor in the outcome of the
case.

g) However, if during the proceedings, the Court determines that the approval suffers
from inadequate application of mind, but the investigating agency has gathered
incriminating material during the investigation, then the deficiency in approval may
not affect the FIR's sustainability.

Additionally, the Hon'ble High Court referred to Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana [2024
SCC Online SC 759], wherein it was held that when the High Court is approached to
quash an FIR on grounds of frivolity, vexation, or ulterior motive, it must examine the
FIR with care and closer scrutiny. The Court must not merely rely on the averments
in the FIR or complaint to determine whether the essential ingredients of the alleged
offense are met. In cases of frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court has a duty
to consider attendant circumstances emerging from the case record and, if necessary,
to carefully and circumspectly read between the lines.

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TAMIL NADU STATE JUDICIAL ACADEMY FEBRUARY 2025

Applying these principles, the present case falls within clause (f) mentioned above.
Consequently, the FIR as registered could not be sustained, and the Court allowed
the Criminal Original Petition.

*****

38