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Military Aspects of the Manchu Wars against the Čaqars

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MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE MANCHU WARS

AGAINST THE ’AQARS

Nicola Di Cosmo

The war fought by Hung Taiji (Qing Taizong, r. 1627–1643) and

his Mongol allies against the ’aqar leader Ligdan Khan was a
defining moment in the rise of Manchu power to the north of the
Great wall.1 Throughout the political and military confrontation,
which lasted from 1619 to 1633, alliances were forged between sev-
eral Mongols tribes and the Manchus, which were crucial to the
growth of the Manchu state. Most Mongols simply joined the Manchus
out of a desire for survival or revenge against their ’aqar enemies.
They not only accepted Manchu sovereignty but were absorbed into
the very fabric of the Manchu military and political machine, the
Eight Banner system. The type of relationship that was established
between Hung Taiji and several Mongol leaders also gave the Manchus
the possibility to issue laws among the Mongols and to assume the
role of judicial authority. At the end of the ’aqar wars, the politi-
cal map of inter-Mongol and Manchu-Mongol relations had been
fully redrawn, and the Manchus had eliminated a most serious chal-
lenge, while the incorporation of the tribes of eastern and southern
Mongolia strengthened enormously their position against the Ming.2
By the rise to power of Hung Taiji, hostilities between ’aqars
and Manchus had been brewing for some time, as both of them
had been engaged in a nation-building effort whose success rested
on their respective ability to control increasing amounts of human
and economic resources. The early stage of this confrontation can
be traced back to 1619, when the brash Ligdan decided to occupy
the Chinese city of Guangning, a frontier trading post whose impor-
tance lay in its horse markets.3 Access to the markets and to the

1
On Ligdan Khan see Walther Heissig, Die Zeit des letzten mongolischen Grosskhans
Ligdan (1604 –1634). (Opladen, 1979).
2
On the history of the Mongol tribes south of the Gobi in the late Ming see
the excellent work by Dalizhabu, Mingdai Mo nan Menggu lishi yanjiu, pp. 251–336
(Hailar, 1997).
3
On this see Michael Weiers, “Die Kuang-Ning Affäre, Beginn des Zerwürfnisses
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334   

revenues and food supplies that could be obtained through trade

with China were crucial factors to Ligdan’s strategy of regional dom-
inance. On the other hand the Manchus, being by now openly at
war with the Ming, whose large expeditionary army had been crushed
at the battle of Mount Sarhû, were on the verge of launching a
campaign of territorial expansion into Chinese areas, leading even-
tually to their conquest of Liaodong.4 Clearly, Ligdan’s independent
actions to control the areas into which the Manchus were planning
to expand set the two leaders on a collision course. While direct
hostilities had not yet come to the surface, the language of diplo-
matic relations between Nurhaci and Ligdan became more intran-
sigent and left no room for a reconciliation.5 As the diplomatic
situation deteriorated, the other Mongol tribes were placed in the
extremely uncomfortable position of having to choose between the
two camps, knowing perfectly well that the wrong choice could cost
them dearly. In addition, in the 1620s the Ming were far from an
inconsiderable military presence in the region, and represented an
alternative possibility for economic and military support, which
attracted at least some Mongols, such as the Bagarin. The system
of Mongol-Manchu relations was made even more complex by the
network of marital and family ties established between the various
tribes as a common means of expanding one’s political reach. The
fact that Ligdan’s wife Sutai was the granddaughter of the Yehe
chieftain Gintaisi, a fierce adversary of Nurhaci’s who had been killed
with the destruction of the Yehe tribe, did not contribute to a
smoothening of their mutual relations.
The situation became more heated after Nurhaci’s defeat at the
hands of the Chinese general Yuan Chonghuan in 1626, when
Manchu troops were repelled as they attempted in vain to storm the
Ming fortress of Ningyuan.6 Nurhaci himself died a few months later
presumably as a result of wound suffered in this battle. Considering

zwischen den Mongolischen Tsakhar und den Manschuren,” Zentralasiatische Studien

13 (1979): 73–91. On the general issue of horse trade during the Ming see Morris
Rossabi, “The Tea and Hose Trade in inner Asian during the Ming,” Journal of
Asian History 4.2 (1970): 136–168.
4
Ray Huang, “The Liao-tung Campaign of 1619,” Oriens Extremus 28.1 (1981):
30–54.
5
Veronika Veit, “Die mongolischen Völkerschaften vom 15. Jahrhundert bis
1691,” in Die Mongolen: Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur, ed. Michael Weiers,
p. 397 (Darmstadt, 1986).
6
There are many studies on the Ningyuan battle. One of the best, especially
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the leadership crisis that followed the death of Nurhaci and the
weaker position of the Manchus, it is not surprising that the ’aqar
stepped up their military challenge.7 On the Manchu side, the polit-
ical direction and “management” of the relations with the Mongol
tribes was from the beginning in the hands of Hung Taiji, and for
the first eight years of his reign the struggle with the ’aqar con-
tinued to occupy him politically and militarily.
Under both Nurhaci (Qing Taizu, r. 1616–1626) and Hung Taiji,
many Mongols joined the Manchus as a direct or indirect conse-
quence of the ’aqar wars. For instance, the Bayut joined the Manchus
on 24 February 24 1624, and the Qor‘in under Oba with the Jalayid,
Dörbed and Gorlos concluded a treaty on 3 April 1624. On 15
August 1627 the Aoqan and the Naiman joined with the Manchus,
and on 14 December 1627 the first ’aqar cheiftains defected to the
Manchu camp. The Bagarin joined Hung Taiji, after a rather trou-
bled relationship, on 28 May 28 1628, and some chiefs of the Qara‘in
swore an oath on 31 August 1628.8 The Tümed presented tribute
on 2 August 1629. The Dörben-Keüked joined on 31 December
1630, followed by the the Ongnigud in 1631, by the Kesigten in
1633, and by the Moominggan on 10 March 1634. The large Qalqa
confederation first entered a treaty on 6 December 1619 but rela-
tions were not smooth. Various Qalqa groups joined at different
stages (e.g., on 30 December 1621, and 27 March 1622).9 When
Ligdan finally fled Mongolia, in 1634, the territory, size, and polit-
ical affiliation of the southern Mongol tribes had been entirely trans-
formed.

with the respect to the broader military context is: Yan Chongnian, “Lun Ningyuan
zhengju,” in Yan Chongnian, Manxue lunji, pp. 110–45 (Beijing, 1999).
7
On 18 April 1622 Nurhaci issued an edict that sanctioned a system of collec-
tive rulership of a council of eight ho“oi beile (Cardinal Noblemen) who not only
nominate the Han but can also demote him. The position of the Han was initially
subordinated to the collective will of the council. Hung Taiji was elected Han on
21 October 1626, and swore an oath that admitted to his initial subordination to
the other Councillors. See Tongki Fuka Sindaha Hergen I Dangse: ‘The Secret Chronicles
of the Manchu Dynasty’ 1607–1637 A.D. Trans. and Annotated by Kanda Nobuo,
et al., vol. 2, pp. 554–58 (Tokyo, 1955–1963) (hereafter TFSHD). On this system
see also Zhou Yuanlian, “Hou Jin ba heshuo beile ‘gongzhi guozheng’ lun,” Qingshi
luncong 2 (1980): 244–62. On the accession of Hung Taiji see also Jiang Liangqi,
Dong Hua Lu (Beijing, 1980), pp. 16–17.
8
TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 138–139.
9
See Veit, “Die mongolischen Völkerschaften,” pp. 398–99, and Weiers, “Die
Kuang-Ning Affäre,” pp. 78–79.
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336   

How did the Manchus win this war? The historiography has con-
centrated on general flaws in the ’aqar leadership, especially on
Ligdan’s scorched-earth strategy that alienated potential allies.10 While
this is certainly true, it may be argued that scorched-earth campaigns
were nothing new in Inner Asian warfare, and were not, by definition,
doomed to fail. This essay explores more closely some of the strate-
gical and tactical aspects of these wars, in particular logistic ques-
tions, military regulations and discipline, treatment of refugees and
the conduct of troops of both sides, tactical aspects in respect to
both battles fought in the steppes and the use of static fortifications,
and finally diplomatic and political aspects that impinged closely
upon military operations.

Logistic issues: the rendezvous problem

Strategy in steppe warfare traditionally required meticulous prepa-

ration and precise arrangements.11 The most difficult part of the
preparation stage of a military campaign was the coordination among
the various groups of armed men that were to take part in the expe-
dition, and, once time and place had been fixed by sending mes-
sengers back and forth, it was imperative that everyone be punctual.
Failure to observe this obligation could potentially lead to disastrous
consequences for the party left to fend for itself. It is therefore not
surprising that missing a rendevous was an offense that typically car-
ried grave consequences.
This is the case of an episode in the turbulent relationship between
the Manchus and the Qor‘in tribe, led by Tüsiyetü Khan, which
led to Hung Taiji’s public denunciation of his “three crimes and
nine sins.” Two of these “sins” refer specifically to the Qor‘in leader’s
failure to cooperate adequately in military operations against the
’aqar. Hung Taiji thundered: “Many times you [Tüsiyetü Khan]
sent envoys to us wishing that we would send an army against the

10
See, for instance, Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Great Enterprise: The Manchu
Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China, vol. 1, p. 202, n. 136.
(Berkeley, 1985).
11
See Denis Sinor, “On Mongol Strategy,” in Proceeding of the Fourth East Asian
Altaistic Conference, ed. Ch’en Chieh-hsien, pp. 238–249 (Tainan, 1975) [rpt. Denis
Sinor, Inner Asia and its Contacts with Medieval Europe, XVI (London, 1977)].
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’aqars. In fact, when we resolved to send an army, you did not

come [to the rendezvous],12 and while we were confronting an enemy
state, you withdrew early; is this how you are going to reach an old
age? This evil scheme in which you did not keep your own word
is your eighth sin.”13 As it is reported in the Manchu sources, Hung
Taiji was extremely angry (“ambula jili”)14 at the failure of the Qor‘in
to join the expedition.
The same anger, however, was directed at the Manchu leader by
the Tümed leader Jobiltu Qong Taiji for failing to join an expedi-
tion against the ’aqar in 1629. The text off the document speaks
for itself:
Se‘en Qagan, you presented a letter to these many noblemen: Jolbitai
Qong Taiji, Oombu ’ügekür Taiji, Agun Sonum Taiji, and Abatai
Taiji, [which said:] “Did the ’aqar Qagan seize anything from me?
The well-known reason for my setting out on an expedition [against
the ’aqar] is that the Qagan of the Qara‘in, Donui Günji, and Buyan
Qong Taiji sent a messenger to me, asking that I avenge [them] against
[their] enemy. They said that the evil-minded black Qagan [i.e., Ligdan]
killed all the noblemen of the eastern Mongol tribes, and [aked] that
I should destroy him.”
When I heard that, I thought that these words were right, and
swearing an oath to Heaven I set out on an expedition. But you did
not join this alliance. Were [then] the ’aqar your ally, while they
were our enemy? Now you do not think anything of us. I am furious
at you [bi tandu agurlanam bi ]. If you wish to cleanse this fault of yours,
immediately find out about the people of the Black Qagan, and send
immediately a messenger here. While I was riding [against the ’aqar],
you had gone far enough to reach the border [of ’aqar territory];
why did you not proceed [to attack them]?
Are the Mongol tribes of the right wing, headed by the noblemen
Bo“ug-tu Qagan, Jinong Qagan, Yung“iyebu, and the Qara‘in Qagan,
not relatives of yours? Are they [only] my relatives? Why do you not
know your relatives?15

12
On this expedition see TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 176–78. This took place on 13
October 1628.
13
Arban dolodugar jagun-u emün-e qagas-tu qolbagdaqu monggol-un bi‘ig debter. Shiqi shiji
menggu wen wenshu dang’an (1600–1650), ed. Li Baowen, pp. 35–37 (Tongliao, 1997)
(hereafter AQMBD). The Manchu version is reported in the TFSHD vol. 4, pp.
184:4–8.
14
TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 177:11.
15
AQMBD, pp. 137–39.
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338   

While the Mongol chieftain is understandably irate, his anger did

not lead to a breach with the Manchus, who later on even rewarded
his son with a high-ranking post.16
Given the seriousness of the offence, several chiefs tried to justify
a missed rendezvous and prevent that retaliatory action may be taken
against them. Darqan Taiji, that is, the Dörbet chief Adu‘i, sent
Hung Taiji a letter of apology in November-December 1628 in which
he attempted to justify his failure to appear at the rendezvous for
the planned expedition against the ’aqar—the same which Tüsiyetü
Khan and other Mongol chiefs had also deserted. According to the
document in question, Darqan Taiji claimed to have sent a mes-
senger to another Mongol chief (the brother of Tüsiyetü Khan, Qatan
Bagatur) announcing that he was going to be late at the rendezvous
and requesting instructions. Then waited for a messenger to be sent
back to him. After several days, this messenger had not yet arrived,
and when the Mongol chief finally heard that Hung Taiji’s army
had already left the rendezvous place, he set out trying to catch up
with the main army, but did not succeed, at which point he turned
back.17 In practice, he was shifting the blame from himself to Tüsiyetü
and his brother, who failed to send instructions.
Another document, sent by an unknown Mongol chieftain around
1632 to Hung Taiji, explains the reason for a failed rendezvous with
Hife Bagsi.18 The troops led by the Mongol chieftain had been
delayed initially because they had to fight some enemies on the way.
They sent a messenger ahead to inform Hife of the delay, but when
they finally arrived at the rendezvous place Hife was no longer there,
and since no words came from either Hife or the Manchu army,
they turned back. Other reasons mentioned by the author of this
document to exculpate himself were that the soldiers lacked “suits
of armor”—meaning that they were not sufficiently equipped to
undertake a campaign—and that he needed to take care of the
wounded.19

16
A record of this episode can be seen in the TFSHD vol. 6, pp. 1103:7–8.
17
AQMBD, pp. 3–4.
18
Hife (d. 1652) was a prominent Manchu commander and statesman, well versed
in languages and often in charge of diplomatic relations, in Mongol documents his
name is Kibe Bagsi. See Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period,
p. 663 (Washington, 1943; [rpt. Taipei, 1970)].
19
AQMBD, p. 157.
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While punctuality was of crucial importance to the proper func-

tioning of a military joint operations, those who missed the ren-
dezvous could present apologies and justifications, and although trust
must have been eroded by such episodes, they rarely led to an auto-
matic breach of diplomatic relations, retaliations, or war. As we can
see below, these offences were usually dealt with as breaches of
military procedure, which incurred certain specific penalties and
sanctions.

Regulations

Several sources mention regulations that the army and their com-
manders had to observe while in the field. I have selected here two
examples: the first refers to the rules to be observed in preparation
of a military expedition. The second refers to the discipline of the
troops in battle. The latter were issued in Manchu when an expe-
ditionary army was assembled; copies in Mongols were handed out
to the Mongol allies and read aloud to the troops by their com-
manders.
A decree issued on 3 March 1629 by Hung Taiji to various Mongol
leaders, of which we have the Mongol version, expresses some of
the main concerns and relative rules.20 The document distinguishes
between the regulations to be observed in the campaign against the
’aqars and those that apply instead to campaigns against the Ming.
Against the ’aqar, all the members of the aristocracy between the
ages of thirteen and seventy-three were obliged to join. The noble-
men who could not join the campaign, however, could pay a fine
of one hundred horses and ten camels. Further fines were postulated
for those who failed to arrive at the place of rendezvous at the
appointed time, in the following order: ten horses for those who fail
to arrive within three days from the established time, and one hun-
dred horses and ten camels for those who do not arrive by the time
the whole army had set out.
When the army faced the Chinese, then each “large banner” was
supposed to provide “one hundred good soldiers” under the leader-
ship of a ruling nobleman (Mo. jasaq noyan, Ma. dalaha taiji ) and two

20
AQMBD, pp. 47–49.
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340   

princes.21 The punishment for failing to join was one thousand horses
and one hundred camels to be taken from the “large banner.” The
same penalty was imposed for failing to arrive at the rendezvous
place by the time the army set out, while only ten horses were to
be paid in case they joined the main body of the army with a delay
of more than three days. Those who took individual action and
attacked before joining the other troops at the rendezvous were to
be charged a fine of one hundred horses and ten camels. The time
required by an army to reach the place of the rendezvous was cal-
culated with an “excess” of five days, that is, fifteen days were allo-
cated to cover the distance of ten-day march and twenty days for a
fifteen-day march.
Additional regulations referred to the obligation for the nobleman
in charge to deal effectively with any type of criminal behavior that
may arise among his troops. Severe fines and punishments were
imposed in case a messenger from the Manchu khan was beaten,
delayed, or was not given an appropriate replacement horse. At the
same time, the envoys were punished in case they tried to use horses
they were not supposed to ride.
As we can see, a delay of more than three days was not pun-
ished, and sufficient extra time was allocated to minimize the pos-
sibility that appointments may be missed. The main distinction made
between the campaigns against the ’aqars and those against the
Ming seems to seem to concern in particular the type of military
levy. Whereas with regard to the ’aqars this was universal, only a
portion of the potentially available troops was supposed to take part
in the operations against the Ming. Also, whereas in the first case
the fines were allocated individually, in the second it seems that the
whole tribe would have to respond for their leaders’ misdemeanours.
A similar set of regulations are reported in the Manchu annals,
dated 12 May 1631,22 but this text is more extensive, and includes
a larger number of provisions and possible violations.23 For instance,
with respect to what legal codes should be applied and under what
circumstances, the text says:

21
On the Mongol “banner” qosigu, and on the meaning of Ruling Nobleman
see J. Legrand, L’Administration dans la domination Sino-Mandschue en Mongolie Qalq-a,
pp. 105–123 (Paris, 1976).
22
TFSHD vol. 5, pp. 504–508.
23
The Mongol text of these regulations can also be found in the Jiu Manzhou
Dang (Old Manchu Archives). It is translated in Michael Weiers, “Mandschu-
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When a Manchu goes to the Qor‘in and Abaga and commits a crime,
[the crime] must be dealt with according to the laws of the Qor‘in
an Abaga. When a Qor‘in and Abaga goes to the Manchus and com-
mits a crime, [this crime] must be dealt with according to the rules
of the Manchus. When one commits a crime exactly in the middle of
two nations, [the crime] must be dealt with according to each per-
son’s laws.24
This type of provision shows that, in a situation in which different
legal and customary traditions came into close contact, order needed
to be reaffirmed beyond the specific requirements of a given mili-
tary campaign, but in relations to any level of interaction: while eth-
nic traditions were respected, the law-issuing authority rested with
the Manchus.
The same document also includes provisions regarding the refugees,
both to protect their legal rights, as they were often subject to mis-
treatment, and to punish them in case of misconduct. In keeping
with the aristocratic nature of Manchu and Mongol societies, differences
in treatment can be noticed between nobles and commoners, but
also between hereditary nobles and nobles in a position of political
authority. For instance, one rule established that “when the noyan of
the Nonni-Qor‘in, Abaga, Auqan, Naiman, Qalqa, Qara‘in and
Tümed commit a robbery, they should forfeit one hundred horses
and ten camels. When a commoner commits a robbery, one should
kill the thief, and take his wife and son without getting any money
and give them [to the victim].” Another rule set the penalty for a
nobleman that injured state-owned horses at twenty horses and two
camels, but members of the hereditary nobility would pay only half
of that. The supreme judicial authority, above any Mongol author-
ity, remained Hung Taiji.25
An altogether different type of regulations refers to the behavior
of the troops towards the enemy. The text of the document can be
quoted in extenso:26

Mongolische Strafgesetze aus dem Jahre 1631 und deren Stellung in der Gesetzgebung
der Mongolen,” Zentralasiatische Studien 13 (1979): 137–90.
24
TFSHD vol. 5, pp. 506–507.
25
We refer here expressly to the Mongol version included in the old-script Manchu
documents, or Chiu Man-chou Tang (CMCT); see Weiers, “Mandschu-Mongolische
Strafgesetze aus dem Jahre 1631,” pp. 152–57.
26
TFSHD vol. 5, pp. 756–57. See also a similar set of regulations issued a few
days later, on pp. 762–63.
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On the 28th (of the fourth month of the sixth year of Tiancong [15
June 1632]) after resting, the commanders of the Ju“en, Mongol and
Nikan troops gathered their soldiers and read alod the imperial decree:
“By decree of the Han: In the areas under military occupation, kill
whoever resists or flees; do not kill those who do not resist. Do not
separate husbands and wives; do not have intercourse with women
before the prisoners have been distributed. If you separate husbands
and wives, or rape women, these are capital crimes. If you kill peo-
ple who do not resist, or remove and take the clothes they wear, your
[portion of] booty will be reduced and [this part] given to the plaintiff,
and you will be beaten according to the crime. You can only kill a
pig or a chicken, but cannot kill a sheep, or goat or larger animal. If
you do, an equivalent amount will be deducted from your [allocated]
booty and given to the plaintiff, and will be beaten according to the
crime. Do not destroy temples. Do not loot any of the paraphernalia
placed in the temple to perform rituals. If you disobey, this is capital
crime. Do not take prisoner [lit. loot] the monks who live in the tem-
ple and do not take anything that belongs to them. Make a record of
the number of monks [in the temple] and report it. If there are peo-
ple or livestock who have fled inside the temple, take them. Do not
set up camp inside the temple’s premises.” A Mongol copy of this doc-
ument has been made and distributed to each of the chieftains of each
tribe of the Korcin, Jarut, Aru, Aohan, Naiman, Karacin, and Jalait.
It may be of interest to compare these rules with those of another
document issued in the course of an expedition against the Ming,
issued on 4 December 1629 as the troops were resting at the Qara‘in
city of Qara Qota in the course of an expedition against the Ming
garrison at Hongshankou. This text says:
Kill anyone fighting you. Do not seize any [animal] larger than a pig
or a chicken from the people who surrender. Of the people taken as
booty, do not separate father and son or husband and wife, do not
rape women; do not take their clothes and wear them; do not ruin
houses and temples; do not damage any arm or weapon; do not chop
down fruit trees. Those who, disregarding these words, kill surrendered
people, or rape women, will be killed. Those who ruin houses and
buildings, chop down fruit trees, take their clothes, or, splitting from
their unit, rake up a village, will be beaten to death. Do not eat or
drink immoderately the food and alcoholic beverages of the Chinese.
There are many poisons inside the Shanhaiguan [i.e., in China]. Do
not give excessive dry fodder to the horse; to skinny horses give a lit-
tle [dry fodder] after having boiled it; to fat horses give grass. Make
them eat after they have rested.27

27
TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 235–6.
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The soldiers in the Manchu army were always forbidden not only
to mistreat the enemy, but also to engage in any form of wasteful
and destructive actions. However, the emphasis of the preservation
of property, down to food and fodder, was more explicit (and the
punishments harsher) when fighting in Chinese territory than in
Mongolia. Scrupulous care to preserve dry fodder may have derived
from the need to economize on a terrain that may not have sup-
ported many horses. Similar concerns were not voiced in the case
of wars against the ’aqars. The regulations common to both cam-
paigns were aimed at protecting the common interest of the army,
and the interests of the enemies who surrendered or did not oppose
resistance. The loot was going to be assigned according to equitable
distribution, and therefore any appropriation that took place outside
the distribution was regarded as a crime. Raping women was not
allowed, or, to be more precise, their “appropriation” was allowed
only after the distribution of the spoils, that is, after the women cap-
tured had become the “legal” property of the soldier. The prohibi-
tion of separating husbands and wives probably referred to need to
keep families united as they were going to be assigned as a family.
Some families were also freed and turned into commoners (see below,
section on “attacking the enemy”). The distribution of the spoils, as
we learn from a later Manchu source, was an extremely lengthy and
hierarchical process, which established a firm priority for the mili-
tary top brass and aristocracy, and therefore the regulations served
to protect what we might call the “class privilege” of the Manchu
and Mongol elites.28

Conduct of war

An important clue into the economic ramifications of the ’aqar-

Manchu war comes from some documents that mention the mas-
sacre of ’aqar merchants who had reached the city of Bayan Süme,
(in Mongol, Temple of Wealth; Ma. Bayan Sube, Ch. Changjiakou)
but had failed to establish trading relations with them. On their way

28
A vivid description of the distribution of the spoils of war by the Qing army
can be seen in the military diary of the Manchu officer. See Dzeng“eo [Zeng Shou],
Sui jun ji xing yizhu. Trans. Ji Yonghai. (Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu xueyuan chuban-
she, 1987), p. 72.
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344   

back, they were intercepted by Qara‘in troops, who “massacred them

without sparing any.”29 The number of three thousand merchants,
as described in the document, seems excessive, and it is possible
that this figure included the merchants and their military escort.
Nevertheless, it is a shocking statement that reveals the ferocity of
this war.
In the same document, the Mongol author lists a series of evil
actions by the ’aqar khan Ligdan. He was accused of having “ille-
gally killed and plundered his own clan members,” and of “oppress-
ing the Qara‘in people by abducting women, children, and livestock.”30
Ligdan, as we know, had a reputation for cruelty, and was denounced
repeatedly for arbitrary killing and other crimes. Another Mongol
report sent to Hung Taiji by a Tümed chief informed him on the
’aqar, who were retreating in a hurry in front of a joint expedi-
tion of several Mongol tribes. As they retreated, they left behind the
poor Tümed people they had captured on a previous campaign,
while keeping the rich ones, and then killing them after having seized
their property. Of course, in the long run this strategy would pre-
vent the numerically growth of Ligdan’s camp. The perceptive com-
ment of the author of this document, was that “[Ligdan’s] troops
are not being increased.”31
It is especially in the accounts of refugees that the extent of the
tragedy is perceived more directly, as the murder of noblemen (even
related to the ’aqars by ties of kinship and marriage) and the seizure
of their daughters were common practice.32 The level of violence
created a steady stream of refugees who entered Manchu territory
or the territory of other Mongol tribes. In some cases the migra-
tions from one area to the other were marred with all sorts of dan-
gers. The Manchus needed to deal with the refugee problem, and
the general attitude they took was to welcome and feed such refugees,
thereby increasing their political capital among the Mongols. A let-
ter sent by Se‘en Dai‘ing, a leader of the Asud tribe of the Qara‘in
nation, explicitly states that after they were attacked by the ’aqars,
out of seven groups (“banners”) five were captured and only two
made it through and into Manchu territory. There they received

29
AQMBD, pp. 23 and 26; TFSHD vol. 4, p. 119.
30
AQMBD, p. 26.
31
AQMBD, p. 89.
32
AQMBD, p. 144.
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food and other provisions out of the public purse, which literally
saved their lives.33
In some cases a degree of competition arose between different
political leaders as to who should “welcome” the refugee tribes dis-
placed by the ’aqars. A sense of this competition can be detected
in a letter sent by Tüsiyetü Khan to Hung Taiji after the Bagarin
and Jaragud tribes had fled to his territory. The powerful Qor‘in
leader asked Se‘en Qagan whether these tribes should be allowed
to stay independent. The implicit question was whether Hung Taiji
would allow the Qor‘in to keep these tribes as their retainers.34 Surely
there is no indication that he Qor‘in were unwilling to support them.
However, in the Manchu record we find that after the Jaragud (Ma.
Jarut) were defeated by the ’aqar and Qalqa, and went over to the
Qor‘in for protection, but since “the Qor‘in noblemen were unable
to support them,” they then went to the Manchus.35 Likewise, when
the chiefs of the Barin tribes were attacked by the ’aqars and had
to flee, they entered the territory of the Qor‘in of the Nonni river,
but, according again to the Manchu records, they decided to leave
and go over to the Manchus because the Nonni-Qor‘in were treat-
ing them harshly.36 One might wonder whether the lack of support
and oppression met by Mongol refugees at the hands of other Mongol
tribes was real, or war rather, at least in some cases, a pretext to
cover the political pressure applied by the Manchus to attract these
refugees to their camp. Eventually these tribes as a matter of course
swore oaths of alliances with the Manchus.
The dilemma of a number of Mongol chieftains, who found them-
selves squeezed between the ’aqar and the Manchus, can be exem-
plified in the situation faced by the Qor‘in leader Manggus.37 Being
attacked by a coalition of ’aqar and Qalqa, he turned to the Manchus
for protection. This happened in the aftermath of the aforemen-
tioned defeat suffered by the Manchus at Ningyuan. Manggus faced
three problems, the first was that the Manchus appeared to be weak,
the second that the Manchus and the Qalqa has made a pact of

33
AQMBD, p. 109.
34
AQMBD, p. 134.
35
TFSHD vol. 4, p. 192.
36
TFSHD vol. 4, p. 129.
37
The sender of this letter is not specified, but since it says that he was related
to Hung Taiji by marriage, this is probably Manggus, whose daughter married
Hung Taiji in 1614.
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allegiance in the fourth year of tian ming (1619–20) which bound the
Manchus to a pact of mutual protection.38 The third was the internal
disagreement among Qor‘in chieftains. The decisive factors in the
request for protection are a pact made between the Qor‘in and the
Manchus on 3 April 1624 (sixteenth day, second month, of the ninth
year of Tianming)39 and the marriage relations contracted between
Hung Taiji and the sender. These two conditions seem to carry an
obligation for the Manchus to extend their protection to the refugees.
By order of Kündülen Qagan [Nurhaci], two bagsi [that is, Hife and
Kurcan] came [to us]. We sacrificed a white horse to Heaven and a
black bull to Earth, and pledged to one another that we would pro-
tect each other until death and that would not break [this pact]. The
’aqar and the Qalqa have come to kill and to plunder us. They say
that until you have killed eight hundred thousand Chinese, you shall
protect [them], but I think this is a lie. I heard that three noblemen
and hundreds of thousands of you [Manchu people] were killed. My
elder brothers [and I] are not in harmony on this matter, and [there-
fore, the Qalqa] are now discussing about mounting an expedition. If
the Kündülen Qagan does not protect me mercifully, I will not have
the strength to engage them in battle. Since my older and younger
brothers are in disagreement, and because our life is dear [to us], we
shall keep on offering tribute. Qong Taiji, please disregard the faulty
words [that may be contained] in this letter, and, adding your own
opinion to those words that may be right, timidly present this letter
to the Qagan. If we are not protected by you, we shall have no place
to flee and no strength to fight. Do not think that there are ulterior
motives in my words. Since you, Qong Taiji, are a relative of mine
by marriage, I told you the truth.40
In the end, the Mongol chieftains who cast their lot in with the
Manchus were rewarded with honours, acquired Manchu princesses
as wives, and rose to the upper ranks of the Manchu political hier-
archy. But Hung Taiji was careful never to alienate those who, hav-
ing opposed him, decided to turn back and submit to him. Even
the son of Ligdan, Erke Qonggor Eje (1622–1641), was rewarded
after he surrendered in 1635, married a Manchu princess, and was
raised to the rank of prince of the first degree.41

38
See on this Michael Weiers, “Die Vertragstexte des Mandschu-Khalkha Bundes
von 1919/20,” Aetas Manjurica 1 (1987): 119–65.
39
See Manzhou shilu (hereafter MZSL), p. 367 (Beijing, 1986).
40
AQMBD, pp. 3–4.
41
Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 304.
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Cities and fortifications

One intriguing question raised by the correspondence refers to the

use of fortified cities in what was essentially a “steppe” war. One of
the key victories against Ligdan had been achieved by a federations
of tribes which included Ordos, Abaga, Qalqa, and Qara‘in who
had united in retaliation to a ’aqar attack on the Qara‘in in late
1627. The retaliatory attack took place against the ’aqar army sta-
tioned in Köke Qota, located in the Tümed territory, and led to
the expulsion of forty thousand ’aqar from the city.42
This was not the only example of the use of fortresses in this war.
Already Nurhaci had persuaded the Qor‘in chieftain Oba to build
a fortress in 1625. For the Mongols, however, this manner of fighting,
relying on defensive structures, was anomalous, and the suggestion
had not been heeded. One of these pieces of correspondence refers
to a letter written by Nurhaci to Oba Taiji, dated September 18,
1625, the Qor‘in leader, in which Nurhaci explains the rationale for
building fortresses in the steppe.43
As for the troops you are bringing, if you wish to bring many, then
bring many; if you wish to bring few, then bring few. You need not
worry too much. The question is not whether [the soldiers] are many
or few; the question is Heaven’s will. All nations have been established
by Heaven. If the many kill the few, is not still Heaven that shall
allow it? If you repair and fortify your town, or attack and capture a
city, the ’aqar would not be able to capture a city and would with-
draw.. If this is not so, then they would be defeated and flee, and
their power would be destroyed. If they withdraw without have been
routed, they will still think that they cannot conquer you. And there-
fore, at this point, your heart will be in peace. Sometime ago Jasaktu
Khan could not defeat five hundred troopers and fifty armored sol-
diers of the Hoifa [tribe] and withdrew; thereupon he was unable to
raid the Hoifa. Giving battle in the steppe [tala] is like throwing knuckle-
bone dice,44 they can fall on one side or the other. People who wish
to fight in the steppe are cowards. Do not trust their words. Those
who wish to conquer a city and then give battle, they are brave peo-
ple. Those who fight in the city, and then, when the enemies with-
draw as they are unable to prevail, they seize the opportunity, go
out [of the city], give battle and defeat them, these are especially

42
TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 118–119.
43
TFSHD vol. 3, pp. 981–983.
44
A game consisting of throwing dice made out of sheep knuckle bones.
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348   

courageous men. Now you wish to become reconciled with the ’aqar
and put an end to this matter. Ever since the time of Tumen Han
up to now ’aqar and Qalqa have been raiding and looting you. Have
you committed any fault? Although you intend to become reconciled
and settle the matter, if they so wish they may decide to kill you, can
you avoid it by saying that you have no fault? The Chinese, Korean,
Ula, Hoifa, Yehe, Hada and our Manchu state [have towns], if we
did not have fortified towns, would you Mongols have fed us a single
bowl of food?45 In our incompetence [or, stupidity], we still rely on
and live in towns.
The sarcastic conclusion of this letter shows that Nurhaci held the
Mongols in considerable contempt, and was defending the Manchu
way or warfare, which had been one of gradual territorial expan-
sion by the acquisition of towns. The defensive advantages of towns
stressed again in another document. On 10 July 1626, Nurhaci wrote
a letter to Oba (here addressed by his title of Tusiyetu Han), in the
following terms:
You [Tusiyetu Han] told me: “After I build a fortified town [hoton] I
shall not have high officials stay there, and [instead] I will let only
commoners live there.” In my heart I did not agree, but could not
say it face to face. Therefore I decided to send you these words [of
mine]. If you only let commoners stay in the city, [then] you, high
officials and princes, will not build your own houses, and will be liv-
ing outside. If anything happens, and [you] enter the town, will then
the houses of the common people, and their food and fodder, be
sufficient? If you exhaust whatever little livelihood the common peo-
ple have, how will they survive? This would be a catastrophe. This

45
This sentence in Manchu reads “nikan, solho, ula, hoifa, yehe, hada, meni manju
gurun, mende hoton akûci, suweni monggo membe emu moro buda ulebumbio.” This seems to
be elliptic and has been understood differently. The Chinese translation of this last
passage (Manwen Laodang, vol. 1, p. 638:27 reads: “The Ming, Korean, Ula, Hoifa,
Yehe Hada, opposed (dui ) our Manchu state; if we did not have fortified towns,
could you Mongols have fed us a single bowl of food?” The word “opposed” is
not in the Manchu text in either the JMZD or the TFSHD. On the comparison
between the two texts see Michael Weiers, “Konkordanz zum Aktenmaterial der
Chiu Man-chou Tang und Man-wen lao-tang Jahrgänge 1620–1630,” Aetas Manjurica 1
(1987): 343. While the Chinese interpretation is historically sensible, since all the
people mentioned before “our Manchu state” were enemies of the Manchus, it does
require an additional verb. The Japanese translation (TFSHD vol. 6, p. 983) reads
the list, from nikan to manju gurun as a single subject of “did not have fortresses,”
but then sacrifices mende, “we,” which is the grammatical subject of akûci. The sen-
tence could also be read as I have translated it, but still requires an emendation,
though less dramatic than the others. In my view, Nurhaci’s intention is to draw
a contrast between Chinese, Korean and Manchu peoples, who use fortresses, and
the Mongols. I offer this as an additional interpretation rather than as a solution.
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year, [the people of] Dai Darhan and Cing Joriktu have been added
to your [people], and your [provisions] are been consumed like [melt-
ing] ice. If the nobles and high officials built their houses, and gath-
ered and stored food and fodder, they can occupy themselves in
wandering with the herds, and when they are afraid can then come
to stay in the town for one or two months. Each of them would go
to their own houses and to their provisions right away, is this not so?
If you had the leaders [ambasa] of the commoners stay in the city, and
they were afraid [to stay there] then [the leaders] would take charge
and lead everyone together to move the herds, is this not so?46
In reply to this letter, the Mongol leader agreed to build a city and
also agreed that the nobles and high officials would build residences
in the city itself.
A third document asserts to the Manchu determination to mod-
ify the fighting ways of the Mongols by the introduction of forts in
the steppe. In a letter sent by Hung Taiji some time after June 3
1627, the urgent need to build fortresses is again emphasized.
In my opinion the three banners of Tü‘iy-e-tü Qagan, Dai Darqan
and and Jasag-tu Dügüreng, should build one fortress, Bingtü, Ildü‘i
and Badma should build one fortress, and the four banners of Jorig-
tu Qong Taiúi should build one fortress. After you have spotted a good
location you should build the three fortresses close by and immedi-
ately fortify them. Having done that, after you have fortified your own
territories, if the ’aqar attacked you, then in accordance with our for-
mer agreement, you should send some noblemen [to inform me] and
we will send you supplementary troops. If you do not fortify the land
and the towns, when the ’aqar attack you, where are you going to
fight, and how are we to know where to go?47
If we take these three documents together, we see that the Manchus
tried consistently to persuade their Mongol allies to rely on fortress
for a variety of reasons. First, fortified towns were important simply
as a temporary sanctuaries in case of enemy attack. It is relevant
that Nurhaci conceives of sieges as lasting “one or two months,” and
that enough provisions should be stored to suffice for that length of
time. It may be possible that this period was the longest that an
enemy army could keep a large number of horses in one place,
after which the siege had to be lifted as the horses had exhausted
the available pasture. But clearly the Manchus were running into

46
TFSHD vol. 3, pp. 1079–81.
47
AQMBD, pp. 17–19.
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350   

something of a cultural resistance. The appeal to bravery and courage

clearly seems to counter a Mongol reluctance to fighting behind walls
as being unmanly and cowardly. Finally, there is an important logis-
tic advantage in having towns, and that is that the many problems
related to arranging a rendezvous in the steppes, which led, as we
have seen above, to numerous complications and dangers, would be
avoided by the simple method of locating the allied troops by reach-
ing them as a fixed location.
On yet another occasion the Manchus sent the Qara‘in chieftain
”amba Tabunung to defend the city of Da’ankou that they had cap-
tured from the Chinese. But ”amba left the city to “nomadize” (nuk-
tembi ).The Chinese of Da’ankou then reported to the Ming army
that there were no soldiers in the city, and Chinese troops—three
thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry—then walked into the
open city gates. At that point the Manchus were forced to send their
commander Unege to retake the city.48 This episode may be witness
to the Mongol discomfort with being enclosed behind city walls.

Attacking the enemy

Gathering information about the whereabouts of the enemy was a

vital part in the preparation for an attack. Spies were sent by all
parties involved. From the following document, which contains a
spy’s report, it is clear that the decision to attack was based on these
secret reports:
According to Se‘en Qagan’s order, we sent a person to investigate the
tribe of the ’aqar Qagan. The person we sent came back with an
envoy of the [Chinese] governor49 of our White City.50 The ’aqar
tribe was staying at the city of Jau [i.e. Köke Qota, Huhhot]. They
know that you joined forces with the Jür‘id, and captured the south-
ern tümen. As of right now, the might of the ’aqar is feeble. At this
very moment, as I am reporting to you, we shall ride [to battle] imme-
diately. I am also informing you that, if [you] hesitate and do not go
to battle, then we will give battle for you, and our own people will
fight to the death.51

48
TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 347–48.
49
Mo. sulang from Chinese shilang.
50
In Mongol ‘agan qota, corresponds to the city of Yanghe, near the city of
Datong in Shanxi province.
51
AQMBD, p. 84.
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Valuable information was also gathered from refugees, who, as we

have seen, were pouring into Manchu-controlled territory.
War in the steppe occurred by a series of attacks and raids that
forced people either to leave or to surrender to the enemy. The
’aqar were particularly adept at this sort of “blitzkrieg”. Keeping
open lines of communication among the different tribes was another
was a serious problem, as messengers could be intercepted by the
enemy. In the following document we can see how a “steppe” war-
fare attack was carried out. The alleged reason for seeking out and
destroying the Dolot camp was to prevent them from intercepting
envoys.
The envoys sent by the Manchu Sure Han [Hung Taiji] to the Qara‘in
had been intercepted and killed twice by the Dolot tribe of the ’aqar,
then Sure Han with a few troops set out on the eighth or the second
month to attack the ’aqar tribe of the Alaqcot, and spent the night
at Dadai Subargan. On that day, the khan gathered all the nobles
and officials and ordered them “Those who come this time must be
specially selected all able men; why should we need many soldiers?
Act smartly, and don’t create confusion!” On the fifteen, Sure Han
told his nobles: take the soldiers you have selected and go in front. If
you meet the enemy, stop and seize them cleverly. Then report here
every bit of information [from the enemy]. With our troops we shall
be right behind you.” The people who went forward captured and
interrogated people, and reported that Sereng Cing Baturu and the
encampment of the tribal leaders was on the Oo river. Thereupon
[the Han] waited for all the troops and had everyone wear armor.
With the Han and the lords personally at the head they charged at
gallop, Dorji Hatan Baturu of the Dolot, was wounded but fled and
got away. We captured all the women and killed Guru Taiji. We cap-
tured 11,200 prisoners, of these 1,200 Mongols and Chinese were orga-
nized into families [of commoners]. The remaining ones were kept as
prisoners.52
We then learn that these prisoners were distributed among the sol-
diers and officers who had suffered battle wounds. In this descrip-
tion we find several elements of interest. First the Manchu reliance
of a relatively small group of valiant soldiers. Then, the scouting and
interrogation of “enemies” which in fact must have included anyone
they came across who could provide information. Once the enemy
camp has been identified, the Manchus hit them at high speed in
full armor, which suggests a shock tactic. Only ten percent of the

52
TFSHD vol. 4, pp. 122–124.
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prisoners are effectively set free as commoners. What is interesting

is that Chinese people are included in this number, who may have
been artisans and craftsmen working for the Mongols. The distrib-
ution of the loot favours those who had been wounded in action,
which was undoubtedly a good incentive for the soldiers to do their
utmost.
Another document alerts us to another type of tactic. The ’aqar
had become partly reliant on agriculture, and were therefore tilling
fields. In one letter probably dated 1631 or 1632 Hung Taiji orders
three Mongol allies of the Naiman and Auqan tribes to attack the
’aqar camp and seize the crops’ seeds. They are explicitly told to
take the seeds so that they could use them the following year, but
in fact this was also to prevent the ’aqar from harvesting.53
Finally, an indication of the importance of fodder for the animals
in the planning of a campaign comes from a letter sent by Tüsiyetü
Khan to Hung Taiji. Here it is mentioned that the ’aqar were
dithering, not knowing what course of action to take, and therefore,
because “the grass is now high” (ene nogun degere), the Qor‘in and
the Manchus could set out on an expedition.54 As we have seen
above, considerations regarding the best time to set off on a mili-
tary expedition had to include the foraging of the animals: leaving
an area empty and unguarded could become a liability as the “high
grass” might allow the enemy to make military use of it.

Diplomacy

In steppe warfare diplomacy and military operations proceeded

together in a single political context. Propaganda was a key element
of the diplomatic correspondence, and the Manchus revealed sub-
stantial skills in the “war of words” that raged almost as intense as
the war of swords. Manchu anti-’aqar propaganda was based on
two cardinal principles, the ability to preserve order, and their being
fighting a “righteous war.”
Divided by fratricidal struggles, the Mongol tribes were in a state
of disarray, to the point that the whole period of the ’aqar wars is

53
AQMBD, pp. 82–3.
54
AQMBD, p. 144.
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often referred to in the Manchu records as the time in which the

Mongol nation was in chaos ( facuhûn). In a letter sent to the Qor‘in
nobleman Yeldeng Taiji in November-December 1629, Hung Taiji
makes it clear that he would not tolerate abuses among the people
who have pledged allegiance to him.55 Yeldeng was accused by Hung
Taiji of raiding his own tribesmen, and of being in cahoots with the
’aqars. Therefore, he was regarded as an element of disturbance in
the restoration of law and order among his own co-tribesmen, the
Qor‘in. Hung Taiji ask the rhetorical questions: “Would it not be
good if all of you noyans of the Nagun Qor‘in lived happily embrac-
ing peace and law, settling where the water is good, and breeding
your own livestock? Would it not be bad if you acted in such a way
as to destroy the political order and to stir up disorder and vio-
lence?” Hung Taiji felt he could address the problems caused by
Yeldeng among the Qor‘in because “we have become relatives and
have an alliance.” By doing so, Hung Taiji consciously assumed the
role of guarantor of order among the Mongol tribes, and makes
good behavior not only towards him, but also towards the other
Mongol tribes who have become allied or subjects of the Manchus
as a condition for the establishment or continuation of an alliance.
This role was appealed to, for instance, by the Qara‘in nobleman
’oski in a letter dated June-July 1629. He and his people had become
the retainers of the Qara‘in lord Qong Taiji (Buyan Aqai) but after
his death had been inherited by his son Birasi. Because Birasi had
mistreated them, ’oski moved under another Qara‘in lord, Subudi
Dügüreng, but Biraci was threatening to kill him. Hence, ’oski went
to Hung Taiji to request protection. That the Manchu perseverance
to intervene in defence of peoples’ rights contributed greatly to the
rise of their influence among the Mongols is confirmed in several
other items of correspondence, such as a letter sent by a Mongol
nobleman, Qola‘i Bagatur, in which it is said that his tribe decided
to join the Manchus of their free will because there they could find
peace, and not because they felt an obligation to do so.56
Second, Hung Taiji affirmed the justness of his intervention on
several grounds. In the following document, dated March 18, 1627,
and addressed to the Qong Bagatur of the Naiman nation, we can
appreciate the “historical depth” of the “just war” theme as it was

55
AQMBD, pp. 72–75.
56
AQMBD, pp. 69–71.
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354   

applied to the current situation. In this case, Hung taiji is attempt-

ing to persuade Qong Bagatur of the wisdom of an alliance with
the Manchus against the ’aqars. The case of the Qalqa tribes, which
had been recently attacked by the ’aqars, is brought up to explain
why the Manchus had not intervened in their defence ven though
there was a treaty of alliance between Qalqa and Manchus, and
therefore assuage them as to the truthfulness and reliability of the
Manchu offer. The Naiman were at this point being squeezed be-
tween Manchus and ’aqars, and were also receiving offers of aid
from the Ming. Eventually they agreed to sign a treaty with the
Manchus.
From my ancestors down to me, our course of action has been such
that we have not encroached upon people who held correct princi-
ples, and have not yielded to those people who behaved badly or
immorally. We have not fought with other nations with the intention
of being their enemy. Praying for Heaven [’s protection], we have
[only] fought against the countries that hated [us]. We wanted to keep
friendly relation with the Chinese state, but did not succeed. They
protected the Yehe [people] . . . they gave our betrothed to the Mongols.
Moreover, sending troops, they did not allow the Jurchen [i.e., Manchus]
who lived near the border walls to harvest their crops. They set all
the houses of the local people on fire and chased them away; their
evil deeds were too many to enumerate. In this way, we became indig-
nant and waged war to the Chinese.
For two generations we got along with the Qalqa quite well. [Then]
Jaisai attacked our city of Ujilu town; he killed the messenger that I
sent, and married our betrothed. Baga Darqan also married our
betrothed. Afterward, when we caught Jaisai, all the Qalqa noblemen
of the five tribes in the year of the Yellowish Sheep [1619] established
an alliance with us.57 We sacrificed a white horse to Heaven, and a
black bull to Earth, and we swore [the following] oath:
“Should one of us fight the Chinese, we shall fight together; should
one of us join [the Chinese] we shall join together in harmony. If the
Qalqa fall under the crafty scheme and attractive goods of the Chinese
and become reconciled with China without a [ previous] agreement
with the Manchus, we will bring retribution to the Qalqa. If the
Manchus should reach an accord with the Chinese without the Qalqa’s
agreement, you will bring retribution to the Manchus.”
The Qalqa did not abide by these sworn words. They did not attack
the Chinese, but fell to their valuable goods and crafty schemes; they
protected the Chinese, and, sending troops, killed our sentry and

57
On this see also MZSL juan 6, p. 286.
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brought the corpse to the Chinese.58 Moreover, they attacked us many

times and seized our livestock.59 In such a way they committed evil
deeds. But we said nothing. When our troops attacked Qaratai, we
could not capture it because the city walls had frozen, so we with-
drew our troops.60 After that, thinking that many of our soldiers had
been killed by the Chinese, the Qalqa intended to attack us by adding
their troops to the Chinese ones, and so they moved to the pasture
grounds near our border.
They constantly intercepted and killed the messengers we sent to
the Qor‘in and you wished to obstruct our expedition against the
Qaratai. As they acted in this way we attacked the Qalqa.
Our nation and the Korean nation had also been on good terms
for generations without [mutual] harm. Later on, when they came [to
attack us] having added their troops to the Chinese [army], being
Heaven merciful to us, all the Korean nobles, and soldiers were cap-
tured by us. We did not kill them but released them, and wanted to
find an agreement, but they refused. Then they sheltered Chinese peo-
ple. In order to pursue these fugitives we attacked Korea.61 We have
never harbored hostility and attacked any country unless this country
was at fault. What good is there in having enemies? what harm is
there in having a peaceful government?
The Qagan of the ’aqar wiped out the Qalqa and carried off [peo-
ple and property], and appointed a common man as a commander
over the noblemen. Separating the noblewomen from their husbands,
he seized them; separating the unmarried women from their parents,
he gave them to his bodyguards and servants. Of this speech of mine,
is there something that you do not (already) know? If you believe that
these words [of mine] are true, please send this letter to the noble-
men of the two [wings of the] Kesigten tribe [living] near you.62
The message was quite explicit, but nonetheless cleverly argued. The
Manchus never harbored evil intentions, but had to react to exter-
nal aggressions. The Chinese, the Qalqa, and the Koreans were, in
principle, not Manchu enemies but they became so through their
hostile actions. The impressive list of enemies that had been in one

58
The term ‘ongji in Manchu is tai niyalma, lit. “tower person” that is, a person
in charge of a look-out tower, or a sentry. The corpse probably indicates only one
part of the body, most likely the head, as indicated in the MZSL juan 8, p. 400.
59
On this event see Taizong Wenhuangdi shilu (hereafter QTZSL) juan 1, p. 27
(Beijing, 1985).
60
Qaratai is probably the Mongol name of Ningyuan. The reference to frozen
walls is confirmed in the Manchu record. See TFSHD vol. 4, p. 12:9.
61
This episode refers to the war of 1627, when The Manchus attacked Korea
for harboring the Ming general and guerrilla fighter Mao Wenlong. See TFSHD
vol. 4, pp. 39–42.
62
On the Kesigten tribe see TFSHD vol. 4, p. 13.
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356   

way or another beaten by the Manchus was surely intimidating for

an enfeebled Mongol tribe. The crucial point is the reminder that
the Manchus would not attack anyone arbitrarily. The concluding
paragraph, reminding them the fate they would suffer in case they
did not make the right choice, was significant in that it did not
threaten the Naiman directly, but exposed them to the realities of
a situation that was already familiar to them. The choice was between
the orderly and reliable support the Manchus could provide (in
exchange for loyalty) and a very treacherous course should they
decide to stay on their own.
In some of the treaties between the Manchus and the Mongols
an interesting element of flexibility. The text of a treaty-oath between
the Qara‘in and the Manchus written on June 28, 1628 (the actual
oath was to be sworn later by the parties involved) while clearly
meant to prevent any alliance with either ’aqar or Chinese, allowed
explicitly trade between Chinese and Qara‘in at the Ming city of
Datong.63 This is in my view another indication of the pragmatic
attitude of the Manchus, who cold not forbid Chinese trade because
they were probably not in a position to make up for Qara‘in losses
in trade revenues.
Another very important aspect of the Mongol-Manchu diplomacy
at this time concerns the forging of family ties by means of mar-
riage. Two of Hung Taiji’s primary consorts and five additional con-
sorts of varius ranks were Mongol, and came from the Qor‘in, Abaga,
Jarut, and ’aqar. Additional ties were established by the marriage
of Manchu women to Mongol nobles, including ten of Hung Taiji’s
daughters.64 In the aforementioned document sent by Hung Taiji to
some Qor‘in leaders the reason to endorse a marriage relationship
is explained in the following terms: “In my opinion our two nations
should marry each other’s daughters and the marriage relationship
should not be interrupted. If you were to be wiped out by the ’aqars,
then we would be able to continue [your] line with any other nation”65
The marital alliance, then, became a way to preserve, as it were,
the genetic pool of tribes threatened of extinction by the ’aqars.

63
AQMBD, p. 32.
64
Sechin Jagchid, “Mongolian-Manchu Intermarriage in the Ch’ing Period,”
Zentralasiatische Studien 19 (1986): 69–87.
65
AQMBD, p. 17.
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    -’  357

The chieftains involved Ug“an Batma and Gongkor Mafa both swore
an oath with the Manchus in 1627.

Conclusion

Inter-Inner Asian warfare was not, as von Clausewitz would put it,
the continuation of politics by other means. Rather, war contributed
to the definition of what remained essentially a political confronta-
tion, which encompassed also marriage relations, economic aid, and
legal matters. The hostilities between ’aqars and Manchus, which
lasted altogether sixteen years (1619–1635), are an example of the
function of warfare in steppe politics. If the ’aqar strategy was to
scare other Mongol tribes into submission by threatening them with
enslavement and physical extermination, the Manchu strategy was
articulated on different levels, which included trading military and
economic support for greater political and legal power, while allow-
ing most Mongols to enter a relationship of subordination in the
form of apparently equal treaties. Limiting our conclusion to the mil-
itary aspects of this overall strategy, we can come to the following
conclusions.
(1) Manchu military intervention helped introduce elements of leg-
islation among the Mongol tribes as a means of ordering and reg-
ulating the military operations. The anxiety shown in several documents
over the missed rendezvous describes well the treacherous nature of
this war, and therefore explains why the Manchus were keen to limit
the potential volatility of such agreements by imposing legal pun-
ishments, and by acquiring the role of legal authority. The legal
authority of the Manchus was later extended to criminal matters,
quite unrelated to the military expeditions per se.
(2) The Manchus made political capital out of their military aid
to the Mongols, weaving a web of alliances and effectively redefin-
ing traditional tribal alignments within a new political framework,
firmly controlled by Manchu interests and goals. The oaths signed
with the Mongols were surely in the first instance military alliances
against common Mongol enemies, the ’aqars and in some cases the
Qalqa. But they also forced the Mongols to side with the Manchus
in their anti-Chinese wars, so that Mongol tribes could not remain
neutral, while previously they had the freedom to choose any side
they wished, including the Ming. The inclusion of the Mongols within
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358   

the Manchu Eight-Banner army increased the manpower of the

Manchu army and limited the options available to the Chinese in
frontier diplomacy.
(3) The Manchu involvement also seems to have introduced tac-
tical changes in the way steppe warfare was fought. Manchu inter-
vention in the steppe may have caused an important change in the
way war was fought. Operations such as “punitive expeditions” and
raids were still conducted in classic Inner Asian style. The phases of
these operations included preliminary parleys to fix the size of the
armies and the time and place of the rendevous. The second stage
involved assembling the expeditionary force by having the various
tribal armies converge at a given place, and beginning the march
towards enemy territory. The third phase included gathering infor-
mation en route by a vanguard squadron and scout patrols. Once
the main enemy camp had been identified the attack could take
place, which was the fourth phase of the campaign. Assuming that
the attack was successful, the campaign would end in the distribu-
tion of the spoils. The Manchus, however, needed to limit the dam-
age that the ’aqars could inflict upon their Mongol allies, and also
make sure that relief armies could find the precise location where
these Mongols were staying without having to look for them. Therefore
we find several references to cities that the Mongols were strongly
encouraged to conquer or build and then garrison. An additional
military reason for seeking protection behind city walls was that the
’aqars probably could not carry out a siege that lasted longer than
two months. Two months was also possibly regarded as sufficient
time to prepare and send relief troops to succour the besieged towns.
Building cities may have also been a means to limit the flow of
refugees caused by the ’aqar attacks into Manchu as well as Mongol-
controlled areas—an additional source of social and economic dis-
ruption that the Manchus were eager to limit.
(4) While the ’aqar were feared because of their ruthlessness in
treating their prisoners, the Manchus took care to build a reputa-
tion for welcoming refugees, and for granting them asylum and sus-
tenance. The Manchus also tried to treat the prisoners better, by
limiting “war crimes” such as arbitrary killing and raping. A per-
centage of the prisoners was also granted free status. This strategy
carried several advantages. Ideologically, Hung Taiji could boast that
his rule guaranteed “law and order.” In military terms, fair handling
of prisoners reduced resistance, and therefore limited the Manchus’
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    -’  359

losses, while increasing their wealth and manpower. Socially, it allowed,

as we have already mentioned, the introduction of legal norms that
established the Manchus as the law-giving authority and supreme
judicial court.
(5) Finally, we should note that the ’aqar scorched-earth strat-
egy was dictated probably by considerations that went beyond Ligdan
Khan’s own proclivity for violence. The military operations against
other Mongol tribes seem to accelerate after the Manchu defeat at
Ningyuan. The ferocity with which they were conducted was prob-
ably meant to maximise their impact, and scare the other Mongols
into submission before the Manchus could organize a political and
military counter-offensive. Meanwhile, the ’aqar were also request-
ing and fighting over greater access to Chinese markets. If success-
ful, this strategy could have led to an isolation of the Manchus on
both the Chinese and the Mongol fronts. As it were, Hung Taiji
was able to react to this situation more rapidly than it was prob-
ably expected, a speed that is surprising considering the economic
difficulties the Manchus were facing in Liaodong.66 As the Manchus
were able to manoeuver their position inside Mongol politics, and
to exploit to their advantage both inter-Mongol divisions and the
chaos created by Ligdan’s attacks, the tide turned against Ligdan,
who eventually had to flee Mongolia and died probably of smallpox
in Qinghai in 1634.
While we have not analysed here every aspect of the ’aqar-
Manchu confrontation, the military aspects of it show that, para-
doxically, a potentially deadly threat turned into one of the greatest
assets for the Manchu conquest of China. Throughout the duration
of the war, Hung Taiji continued to recruit Mongol allies—thereby
increasing his military forces—and eliminated political competition
from the steppes. One might reasonably argue, then, that without
the ’aqar war the unification of so many Mongol tribes under the
Manchu standards (and into the Manchu Banners) would have been
a lengthier and far more convoluted process. As in many cases in
steppe history, it was the crisis that periodically hit the tribal order
that lay the foundation for the creation of new political alignments,
and the possibility of the rise of a new, more centralized, ruling elite.

66
Gertraude Roth, “The Manchu Chinese Relationship, 1618–1636,” in From
Ming to Qing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China, eds. Jonathan
D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr., pp. 26–27 (New Haven, 1979).
DiCosmo/F10/333-363 6/18/01 1:48 PM Page 360

360   

The crisis created by the ’aqar leader placed the Manchus in a

position to control and direct the process or re-establishment of order,
which they did with superb political skills and dogged determina-
tion. Hung Taiji, in his victory proclamation of January 28, 1636,
boasted to have finally conquered the seal of ’inggis Khan, which
Ligdan had claimed to possess to boost his political ambitions.67 In
the eyes of many Mongols, by unifying a large number of Mongol
tribes and restoring order, Hung Taiji, the Khan of the “Mongol
people with Red-Tasseled Hats” (as the Manchus were called),68
might have rightfully inherited the historical mantle of the great
Mongol empire-builder.

67
The ceremony in which Hung Taiji announces the acquisition of the precious
seal of the Mongol nation is reported in Chiu Man Chou Tang: ‘The Old Manchu
Archives’: The Ninth Year of T’ien-ts’ung, Trans. and Annotated by Kanda Nobuo
et al., vol. 2, p. 360 (Tokyo, 1972). On a comparison between the manchu and
the Chinese version of this episode see Nicola Di Cosmo, “Due ‘messaggi sacrificali’
dei Jin Posteriori,” Cina 18 (1982): 117–129.
68
AQMBD, p. 69.
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G

Datong
Da’ankou
Guangning
Hongshangkou
Hung Taiji
Ningyuan
Qing Taizu
Qing Taizong
Qinghai
Shanhaiguan
shilang
Tianming
Yanghe
Yuan Chonghuan
Zhangjiakou
DiCosmo/F10/333-363 6/18/01 1:48 PM Page 362

362   

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