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of! The wielding of this immense power, and its fatal direction to the
destruction of the resuming banks, presents the prospect of a fearful
conflict ahead. Many of the local banks will doubtless perish in it;
many individuals will be ruined; much mischief will be done to the
commerce and to the business of different places; and all the
destruction that is accomplished will be charged upon some act of
the administration—no matter what—for whatever is given out from
the Philadelphia head is incontinently repeated by all the obsequious
followers, until the signal is given to open upon some new cry.
Sir, the honest commercial banks have resumed, or mean to
resume. They have resumed, not upon the fictitious and delusive
credit of legislative enactments, but upon the solid basis of gold and
silver. The hundred millions of specie which we have accumulated in
the country has done the business. To that hundred millions the
country is indebted for this early, easy, proud and glorious
resumption!—and here let us do justice to the men of this day—to
the policy of General Jackson—and to the success of the
experiments—to which we are indebted for these one hundred
millions. Let us contrast the events and effects of the stoppages in
1814, and in 1819, with the events and effects of the stoppage in
1837, and let us see the difference between them, and the causes of
that difference. The stoppage of 1814 compelled the government to
use depreciated bank notes during the remainder of the war, and up
to the year 1817. Treasury notes, even bearing a large interest, were
depreciated ten, twenty, thirty per cent. Bank notes were at an equal
depreciation. The losses to the government from depreciated paper
in loans alone, during the war, were computed by a committee of the
House of Representatives at eighty millions of dollars. Individuals
suffered in the same proportion; and every transaction of life bore
the impress of the general calamity. Specie was not to be had. There
was, nationally speaking, none in the country. The specie standard
was gone; the measure of values was lost; a fluctuating paper
money, ruinously depreciated, was the medium of all exchanges. To
extricate itself from this deplorable condition, the expedient of a
National Bank was resorted to—that measure of so much
humiliation, and of so much misfortune to the republican party. For
the moment it seemed to give relief, and to restore national
prosperity; but treacherous and delusive was the seeming boon. The
banks resumed—relapsed—and every evil of the previous suspension
returned upon the country with increased and aggravated force.
Politicians alone have taken up this matter and have proposed, for
the first time since the foundation of the government—for the first
time in 48 years—to compel the government to receive paper money
for its dues. The pretext is, to aid the banks in resuming! This,
indeed, is a marvellous pretty conception! Aid the banks to resume!
Why, sir, we cannot prevent them from resuming. Every solvent,
commercial bank in the United States either has resumed, or has
declared its determination to do so in the course of the year. The
insolvent, and the political banks, which did not mean to resume,
will have to follow the New York example, or die! Mr. Biddle's bank
must follow the New York lead, or die! The good banks are with the
country: the rest we defy. The political banks may resume or not, as
they please, or as they dare. If they do not, they die! Public opinion,
and the laws of the land, will exterminate them. If the president of
the miscalled Bank of the United States has made a mistake in
recommending indefinite non-resumption, and in proposing to
establish a confederation of broken banks, and has found out his
mistake, and wants a pretext for retreating, let him invent one.
There is no difficulty in the case. Any thing that the government
does, or does not—any thing that has happened, will happen, or can
happen—will answer the purpose. Let the president of the Bank of
the United States give out a tune: incontinently it will be sung by
every bank man in the United States; and no matter how ridiculous
the ditty may be, it will be celebrated as superhuman music.
But an enemy lies in wait for them! one that foretells their
destruction, is able to destroy them, and which looks for its own
success in their ruin. The report of the committee of the New York
banks expressly refers to "acts of deliberate hostility" from a
neighboring institution as a danger which the resuming banks might
have to dread. The reference was plain to the miscalled Bank of the
United States as the source of this danger. Since that time an
insolent and daring threat has issued from Philadelphia, bearing the
marks of its bank paternity, openly threatening the resuming banks
of New York with destruction. This is the threat: "Let the banks of
the Empire State come up from their Elba, and enjoy their hundred
days of resumption; a Waterloo awaits them, and a St. Helena is
prepared for them." Here is a direct menace, and coming from a
source which is able to make good what it threatens. Without hostile
attacks, the resuming banks have a perilous process to go through.
The business of resumption is always critical. It is a case of impaired
credit, and a slight circumstance may excite a panic which may be
fatal to the whole. The public having seen them stop payment, can
readily believe in the mortality of their nature, and that another
stoppage is as easy as the former. On the slightest alarm—on the
stoppage of a few inconsiderable banks, or on the noise of a
groundless rumor—a general panic may break out. Sauve qui peut—
save himself who can—becomes the cry with the public; and almost
every bank may be run down. So it was in England after the long
suspension there from 1797 to 1823; so it was in the United States
after the suspension from 1814 to 1817; in each country a second
stoppage ensued in two years after resumption; and these second
stoppages are like relapses to an individual after a spell of sickness:
the relapse is more easily brought on than the original disease, and
is far more dangerous.
The banks in England suspended in 1797—they broke in 1825; in
the United States it was a suspension during the war, and a breaking
in 1819-20. So it may be again with us. There is imminent danger to
the resuming banks, without the pressure of premeditated hostility;
but, with that hostility, their prostration is almost certain. The Bank
of the United States can crush hundreds on any day that it pleases.
It can send out its agents into every State of the Union, with sealed
orders to be opened on a given day, like captains sent into different
seas; and can break hundreds of local banks within the same hour,
and over an extent of thousands of miles. It can do this with perfect
ease—the more easily with resurrection notes—and thus excite a
universal panic, crush the resuming banks, and then charge the
whole upon the government. This is what it can do; this is what it
has threatened; and stupid is the bank, and doomed to destruction,
that does not look out for the danger, and fortify against it. In
addition to all these dangers, the senator from Kentucky, the author
of the resolution himself, tells you that these banks must fail again!
he tells you they will fail! and in the very same moment he presses
the compulsory reception of all the notes on all these banks upon
the federal treasury! What is this but a proposition to ruin the
finances—to bankrupt the Treasury—to disgrace the administration—
to demonstrate the incapacity of the State banks to serve as the
fiscal agents of the government, and to gain a new argument for the
creation of a national bank, and the elevation of the bank party to
power? This is the clear inference from the proposition; and viewing
it in this light, I feel it to be my duty to expose, and to repel it, as a
proposition to inflict mischief and disgrace upon the country.
But to return to the point, the contrast between the effects and
events of former bank stoppages, and the effects and events of the
present one. The effects of the former were to sink the price of labor
and of property to the lowest point, to fill the States with stop laws,
relief laws, property laws, and tender laws; to ruin nearly all debtors,
and to make property change hands at fatal rates; to compel the
federal government to witness the heavy depreciation of its treasury
notes, to receive its revenues in depreciated paper; and, finally, to
submit to the establishment of a national bank as the means of
getting it out of its deplorable condition—that bank, the
establishment of which was followed by the seven years of the
greatest calamity which ever afflicted the country; and from which
calamity we then had to seek relief from the tariff, and not from
more banks. How different the events of the present time! The
banks stopped in May, 1837; they resume in May, 1838. Their paper
depreciated but little; property, except in a few places, was but
slightly affected; the price of produce continued good; people paid
their debts without sacrifices; treasury notes, in defiance of political
and moneyed combinations to depress them, kept at or near par; in
many places above it; the government was never brought to receive
its revenues in depreciated paper; and finally all good banks are
resuming in the brief space of a year; and no national bank has been
created. Such is the contrast between the two periods; and now, sir,
what is all this owing to? what is the cause of this great difference in
two similar periods of bank stoppages? It is owing to our gold bill of
1834, by which we corrected the erroneous standard of gold, and
which is now giving us an avalanche of that metal; it is owing to our
silver bill of the same year, by which we repealed the disastrous act
of 1819, against the circulation of foreign silver, and which is now
spreading the Mexican dollars all over the country; it is owing to our
movements against small notes under twenty dollars; to our branch
mints, and the increased activity of the mother mint; to our
determination to revive the currency of the constitution, and to our
determination not to fall back upon the local paper currencies of the
States for a national currency. It was owing to these measures that
we have passed through this bank stoppage in a style so different
from what has been done heretofore. It is owing to our
"experiments" on the currency—to our "humbug" of a gold and silver
currency—to our "tampering" with the monetary system—it is owing
to these that we have had this signal success in this last stoppage,
and are now victorious over all the prophets of woe, and over all the
architects of mischief. These experiments, this humbugging, and this
tampering, has increased our specie in six years from twenty millions
to one hundred millions; and it is these one hundred millions of gold
and silver which have sustained the country and the government
under the shock of the stoppage—has enabled the honest solvent
banks to resume, and will leave the insolvent and political banks
without excuse or justification for not resuming. Our experiments—I
love the word, and am sorry that gentlemen of the opposition have
ceased to repeat it—have brought an avalanche of gold and silver
into the country; it is saturating us with the precious metals, it has
relieved and sustained the country; and now when these
experiments have been successful—have triumphed over all
opposition—gentlemen cease their ridicule, and go to work with their
paper-money resolutions to force the government to use paper, and
thereby to drive off the gold and silver which our policy has brought
into the country, destroy the specie basis of the banks, give us an
exclusive paper currency again, and produce a new expansion and a
new explosion.
Justice to the men of this day requires these things to be stated.
They have avoided the errors of 1811. They have avoided the pit
into which they saw their predecessors fall. Those who prevented
the renewal of the bank charter in 1811, did nothing else but
prevent its renewal; they provided no substitute for the notes of the
bank; did nothing to restore the currency of the constitution; nothing
to revive the gold currency; nothing to increase the specie of the
country. They fell back upon the exclusive use of local bank notes,
without even doing any thing to strengthen the local banks, by
discarding their paper under twenty dollars. They fell back upon the
local banks; and the consequence was, the total prostration, the
utter helplessness, the deplorable inability of the government to take
care of itself, or to relieve and restore the country, when the banks
failed. Those who prevented the recharter of the second Bank of the
United States had seen all this; and they determined to avoid such
error and calamity. They set out to revive the national gold currency,
to increase the silver currency, and to reform and strengthen the
banking system. They set out to do these things; and they have
done them. Against a powerful combined political and moneyed
confederation, they have succeeded; and the one hundred millions
of gold and silver now in the country attests the greatness of their
victory, and insures the prosperity of the country against the
machinations of the wicked and the factious.
 CHAPTER XXII.
MR. CLAY'S RESOLUTION IN FAVOR OF
RESUMING BANKS, AND MR. BENTON'S
REMARKS UPON IT.
After the New York banks had resolved to recommence specie
payments, and before the day arrived for doing so, Mr. Clay
submitted a resolution in the Senate to promote resumption by
making the notes of the resuming banks receivable in payment of all
dues to the federal government. It was clearly a movement in behalf
of the delinquent banks, as those of New York, and others, had
resolved to return to specie payments without requiring any such
condition. Nevertheless he placed the banks of the State of New
York in the front rank for the benefits to be received under his
proposed measure. They had undertaken to recommence payments,
he said, not from any ability to do so, but from compulsion under a
law of the State. The receivability of their notes in payment of all
federal dues would give them a credit and circulation which would
prevent their too rapid return for redemption. So of others. It would
be a help to all in getting through the critical process of resumption;
and in helping them would benefit the business and prosperity of the
country. He thought it wise to give that assistance; but reiterated his
opinion that, nothing but the establishment of a national bank would
effectually remedy the evils of a disordered currency, and
permanently cure the wounds under which the country was now
suffering. Mr. Benton replied to Mr. Clay, and said:
This resolution of the senator from Kentucky [Mr. Clay], is to aid
the banks to resume—to aid, encourage, and enable them to
resume. This is its object, as declared by its mover; and it is offered
here after the leading banks have resumed, and when no power can
even prevent the remaining solvent banks from resuming. Doubtless,
immortal glory will be acquired by this resolution! It can be heralded
to all corners of the country, and celebrated in all manner of
speeches and editorials, as the miraculous cause of an event which
had already occurred! Yes, sir—already occurred! for the solvent
banks have resumed, are resuming, and will resume. Every solvent
bank in the United States will have resumed in a few months, and no
efforts of the insolvents and their political confederates can prevent
it. In New York the resumption is general; in Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Maine, and New Jersey, it is partial; and every where the
solvent banks are preparing to redeem the pledge which they gave
when they stopped—that of resuming whenever New York did. The
insolvent and political banks will not resume at all, or, except for a
few weeks, to fail again, make a panic and a new run upon the
resuming banks—stop them, if possible, then charge it upon the
administration, and recommence their lugubrious cry for a National
Bank.
The resumption will take place. The masses of gold and silver
pouring into the country under the beneficent effects of General
Jackson's hard-money policy, will enable every solvent bank to
resume; a moral sense, and a fear of consequences, will compel
them to do it. The importations of specie are now enormous, and
equalling every demand, if it was not suppressed. There can be no
doubt but that the quantity of specie in the country is equal to the
amount of bank notes in circulation—that they are dollar for dollar—
that the country is better off for money at this day than it ever was
before, though shamefully deprived of the use of gold and silver by
the political and insolvent part of the banks and their confederate
politicians.
The solvent banks will resume, and Congress cannot prevent them
if it tried. They have received the aid which they need in the
$100,000,000 of gold and silver which now relieves the country, and
distresses the politicians who predicted no relief, until a national
bank was created. Of the nine hundred banks in the country, there
are many which never can resume, and which should not attempt it,
except to wind up their affairs. Many of these are rotten to the core,
and will fall to pieces the instant they are put to the specie test.
Some of them even fail now for rags; several have so failed in
Massachusetts and Ohio, to say nothing of those called wild cats—
the progeny of a general banking law in Michigan. We want a
resumption to discriminate between banks, and to save the
community from impositions.
We wanted specie, and we have got it. Five years ago—at the veto
session of 1832—there were but twenty millions in the country. So
said the senator from Massachusetts who has just resumed his seat
[Mr. Webster]. We have now, or will have in a few weeks, one
hundred millions. This is the salvation of the country. It compels
resumption, and has defeated all the attempts to scourge the
country into a submission to a national bank. While that one
hundred millions remains, the country can place at defiance the
machinations of the Bank of the United States, and its confederate
politicians, to perpetuate the suspension, and to continue the reign
of rags and shin-plasters. Their first object is to get rid of these
hundred millions, and all schemes yet tried have failed to counteract
the Jacksonian policy. Ridicule was tried first; deportation of specie
was tried next; a forced suspension has been continued for a year;
the State governments and the people were vanquished, still the
specie came in, because the federal government created a demand
for it. This firm demand has frustrated all the schemes to drive off
specie, and to deliver up the country to the dominion of the paper-
money party. This demand has been the stumbling block of that
party; and this resolution now comes to remove that stumbling
block. It is the most revolting proposition ever made in this
Congress! It is a flagrant violation of the constitution, by making
paper money a tender both to and from the government. It is
fraught with ruin and destruction to the public property, the public
Treasury, and the public creditors. The notes of nine hundred banks
are to be received into the Treasury, and disbursed from the
Treasury. They are to be paid out as well as paid in. The ridiculous
proviso of willingness to receive them on the part of the public
creditor is an insult to him; for there is no choice—it is that or
nothing. The disbursing officer does not offer hard money with one
hand, and paper with the other, and tell the creditor to take his
choice. No! he offers paper or nothing! To talk of willingness, when
there is no choice, is insult, mockery and outrage. Great is the loss
of popularity which this administration has sustained from paying out
depreciated paper; great the deception which has been practised
upon the government in representing this paper as being willingly
received. Necessity, and not good will, ruled the creditor;
indignation, resentment, and execrations on the administration, were
the thanks with which he received it. This has disgraced and injured
the administration more than all other causes put together; it has
lost it tens of thousands of true friends. It is now getting into a
condition to pay hard money; and this resolution comes to prevent
such payment, and to continue and to perpetuate the ruinous paper-
money payments. Defeat the resolution, and the government will
quickly pay all demands upon it in gold and silver, and will recover its
popularity; pass it, and paper money will continue to be paid out,
and the administration will continue to lose ground.
The resolution proposes to make the notes of 900 banks the
currency of the general government, and the mover of the resolution
tells you, at the same time, that all these banks will fail! that they
cannot continue specie payments if they begin! that nothing but a
national bank can hold them up to specie payments, and that we
have no such bank. This is the language of the mover; it is the
language, also, of all his party; more than that—it is the language of
Mr. Biddle's letter—that letter which is the true exposition of the
principles and policy of the opposition party. Here, then, is a
proposition to compel the administration, by law, to give up the
public lands for the paper of banks which are to fail—to fill the
Treasury with the paper of such banks—and to pay out such paper
to the public creditors. This is the proposition, and it is nothing but
another form of accomplishing what was attempted in this chamber
a few weeks ago, namely, a direct receipt of irredeemable paper
money! That proposition was too naked and glaring; it was too rank
and startling; it was rebuked and repulsed. A circuitous operation is
now to accomplish what was then too rashly attempted by a direct
movement. Receive the notes of 900 banks for the lands and duties;
these 900 banks will all fail again;—so says the mover, because
there is no king bank to regulate them. We have then lost our lands
and revenues, and filled our Treasury with irredeemable paper. This
is just the point aimed at by the original proposition to receive
irredeemable paper in the first instance: it ends in the reception of
such paper. If the resolution passes, there will be another explosion:
for the receivability of these notes for the public dues, and especially
for the public lands, will run out another vast expansion of the paper
system—to be followed, of course, by another general explosion.
The only way to save the banks is to hold them down to specie
payments. To do otherwise, and especially to do what this resolution
proposes, is to make the administration the instrument of its own
disgrace and degradation—to make it join in the ruin of the finances
and the currency—in the surrender of the national domain for
broken bank paper—and in producing a new cry for a national bank,
as the only remedy for the evils it has produced.
[The measure proposed by Mr. Clay was defeated, and the
experiment of a specie currency for the government was continued.]
 CHAPTER XXIII.
RESUMPTION BY THE PENNSYLVANIA UNITED
STATES BANK; AND OTHERS WHICH
FOLLOWED HER LEAD.
The resumption by the New York banks had its effect. Their
example was potent, either to suspend or resume. All the banks in
the Union had followed their example in stopping specie payments:
more than half of them followed them in recommencing payments.
Those which did not recommence became obnoxious to public
censure, and to the suspicion of either dishonesty or insolvency. At
the head of this delinquent class stood the Bank of the United
States, justly held accountable by the public voice for the
delinquency of all the rest. Her position became untenable. She was
compelled to descend from it; and, making a merit of necessity, she
affected to put herself at the head of a general resumption; and in
pursuance of that idea invited, in the month of July, through a
meeting of the Philadelphia banks, a general meeting in that city on
the 25th of that month, to consult and fix a time for resumption. A
few banks sent delegates; others sent letters, agreeing to whatever
might be done. In all there were one hundred and forty delegates,
or letters, from banks in nine States; and these delegates and letters
forming themselves into a general convention of banks, passed a
resolution for a general resumption on the 13th of August ensuing.
And thus ended this struggle to act upon the government through
the distresses of the country, and coerce it into a repeal of the
specie circular—into a recharter of the United States Bank—the
restoration of the deposits—and the adoption of the notes of this
bank for a national currency. The game had been overplayed. The
public saw through it, and derived a lesson from it which put bank
and state permanently apart, and led to the exclusive use of gold
and silver by the federal government; and the exclusive keeping of
its own moneys by its own treasurers. All right-minded people
rejoiced at the issue of the struggle; but there were some that well
knew that the resumption on the part of the Bank of the United
States was hollow and deceptive—that she had no foundations, and
would stop again, and for ever I said this to Mr. Van Buren at the
time, and he gave the opinion I expressed a better acceptance than
he had accorded to the previous one in February, 1837. Parting from
him at the end of the session, 1838-'39, I said to him, this bank
would stop before we meet again; that is to say, before I should
return to Congress. It did so, and for ever. At meeting him the
ensuing November, he was the first to remark upon the truth of
these predictions.
 CHAPTER XXIV.
PROPOSED ANNEXATION OF TEXAS: MR.
PRESTON'S MOTION AND SPEECH: EXTRACTS.
The republic of Texas had now applied for admission into the
federal Union, as one of its States. Its minister at Washington,
Memucan Hunt, Esq., had made the formal application to our
executive government. That was one obstacle in the way of
annexation removed. It was no longer an insult to her to propose to
annex her; and she having consented, it referred the question to the
decision of the United States. But there was still another objection,
and which was insuperable: Texas was still at war with Mexico; and
to annex her was to annex the war—a consequence which morality
and policy equally rejected. Mr. Preston, of South Carolina, brought
in a resolution on the subject—not for annexation, but for a
legislative expression in favor of the measure, as a basis for a
tripartite treaty between the United States, Mexico and Texas; so as
to effect the annexation by the consent of all parties, to avoid all
cause of offence; and unite our own legislative with the executive
authority in accomplishing the measure. In support of this motion,
he delivered a speech which, as showing the state of the question at
the time, and presenting sound views, and as constituting a link in
the history of the Texas annexation, is here introduced—some
extracts to exhibit its leading ideas.

"The proposition which I now submit in regard to this

prosperous and self-dependent State would be indecorous and
presumptuous, had not the lead been given by Texas herself. It
appears by the correspondence of the envoy extraordinary of
that republic with our own government, that the question of
annexation on certain terms and conditions has been submitted
to the people of the republic, and decided in the affirmative by a
very large majority; whereupon, and in pursuance of
instructions from his government, he proposes to open a
negotiation for the accomplishment of that object. The
correspondence has been communicated upon a call from the
House of Representatives, and thus the proposition becomes a
fit subject for the deliberation of Congress. Nor is it proposed by
my resolution, Mr. President, to do any thing which could be
justly construed into cause of offence by Mexico. The terms of
the resolution guard our relations with that republic; and the
spirit in which it is conceived is entirely averse to any
compromise of our national faith and honor, for any object, of
whatever magnitude. More especially would I have our
intercourse with Mexico characterized by fair dealing and
moderation, on account of her unfortunate condition, resulting
from a long-continued series of intestine dissensions, which all
who have not been born to liberty must inevitably encounter in
seeking for it. As long, therefore, as the pretensions of Mexico
are attempted to be asserted by actual force, or as long as
there is any reasonable prospect that she has the power and
the will to resubjugate Texas, I do not propose to interfere. My
own deliberate conviction, to be sure, is, that that period has
already passed; and I beg leave to say that, in my judgment,
there is more danger of an invasion and conquest of Mexico by
Texas, than that this last will ever be reannexed to Mexico.
"I disavow, Mr. President, all hostile purposes, or even ill
temper, towards Mexico; and I trust that I impugn neither the
policy nor principles of the administration. I therefore feel
myself at liberty to proceed to the discussion of the points made
in the resolution, entirely disembarrassed of any preliminary
obstacle, unless, indeed, the mode by which so important an act
is to be effected may be considered as interposing a difficulty. If
the object itself be within the competency of this government,
as I shall hereafter endeavor to show, and both parties consent,
every means mutually agreed upon would establish a joint
obligation. The acquisition of new territory has heretofore been
effected by treaty, and this mode of proceeding in regard to
Texas has been proposed by her minister; but I believe it would
comport more with the importance of the measure, that both
branches of the government should concur, the legislature
expressing a previous opinion; and, this being done, all
difficulties, of all kinds whatsoever, real or imaginary, might be
avoided by a treaty tripartite between Mexico, Texas, and the
United States, in which the assent and confirmation of Mexico
(for a pecuniary consideration, if you choose) might be had,
without infringing the acknowledged independence and free
agency of Texas.
"The treaty, Mr. President, of 1819, was a great oversight on
the part of the Southern States. We went into it blindly, I must
say. The great importance of Florida, to which the public mind
was strongly awakened at that time by peculiar circumstances,
led us precipitately into a measure by which we threw a gem
away that would have bought ten Floridas. Under any
circumstances, Florida would have been ours in a short time;
but our impatience induced us to purchase it by a territory ten
times as large—a hundred times as fertile, and to give five
millions of dollars into the bargain. Sir, I resign myself to what is
done; I acquiesce in the inexorable past; I propose no wild and
chimerical revolution in the established order of things, for the
purpose of remedying what I conceive to have been wrong
originally. But this I do propose: that we should seize the fair
and just occasion now presented to remedy the mistake which
was made in 1819; that we should repair as far as we can the
evil effect of a breach of the constitution; that we should re-
establish the integrity of our dismembered territory, and get
back into our Union, by the just and honorable means
providentially offered to us, that fair and fertile province which,
in an evil hour, we severed from the confederacy.
"But the boundary line established by the treaty of 1819 not
only deprives us of this extensive and fertile territory, but winds
with "a deep indent" upon the valley of the Mississippi itself,
running upon the Red River and the Arkansas. It places a
foreign nation in the rear of our Mississippi settlements, and
brings it within a stone's throw of that great outlet which
discharges the commerce of half the Union. The mouth of the
Sabine and the mouth of the Mississippi are of a dangerous
vicinity. The great object of the purchase of Louisiana was to
remove all possible interference of foreign States in the vast
commerce of the outlet of so many States. By the cession of
Texas, this policy was, to a certain extent, compromised.
"The committee, it appears to me, has been led to erroneous
conclusions on this subject by a fundamental mistake as to the
nature and character of our government; a mistake which has
pervaded and perverted all its reasoning, and has for a long
time been the abundant source of much practical mischief in the
action of this government, and of very dangerous speculation.
The mistake lies in considering this, as to its nature and powers,
a consolidated government of one people, instead of a
confederated government of many States. There is no one
single act performed by the people of the United States, under
the constitution, as one people. Even in the popular branch of
Congress this distinction is maintained. A certain number of
delegates is assigned to each State, and the people of each
State elect for their own State. When the functionaries of the
government assemble here, they have no source of power but
the constitution, which prescribes, defines, and limits their
action, and constitutes them, in their aggregate capacity, a trust
or agency, for the performance of certain duties confided to
them by various States or communities. This government is,
therefore, a confederacy of sovereign States, associating
themselves together for mutual advantages. They originally
came together as sovereign States, having no authority and
pretending to no power of reciprocal control. North Carolina and
Rhode Island stood off for a time, refusing to join the
confederacy, and at length came into it by the exercise of a
sovereign discretion. So too of Missouri, who was a State fully
organized and perfect, and self-governed, before she was a
State of this Union; and, in the very nature of things, this has
been the case with all the States heretofore admitted, and must
always continue to be so. Where, then, is the difficulty of
admitting another State into this confederacy? The power to
admit new States is expressly given. "New States may be
admitted by the Congress into this Union." By the very terms of
the grant, they must be States before they are admitted; when
admitted, they become States of the Union. The terms,
restrictions, and principles upon which new States are to be
received, are matters to be regulated by Congress, under the
constitution.
"Heretofore, in the acquisition of Louisiana and Florida,
France and Spain both stipulated that the inhabitants of the
ceded territories should be incorporated in the Union of the
United States as soon as may be consistent with the principles
of the federal constitution, and admitted to all the privileges,
rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States. In
compliance with this stipulation, Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Missouri have been admitted into the Union, and at no distant
day Florida will be. Now, if we contract with France and Spain
for the admission of States, why shall we not with Texas? If
France can sell to us her subjects and her territory, why cannot
the people of Texas give themselves and their territory to us? Is
it more consistent with our republican notions that men and
territory can be transferred by the arbitrary will of a monarch,
for a price, than that a free people may be associated with us
by mutual consent?
"It is supposed that there is a sort of political impossibility,
resulting from the nature of things, to effect the proposed
union. The committee says that "the measure is in fact the
union of two independent governments." Certainly the union of
twenty-seven "independent governments;" but the committee
adds, that it should rather be termed the dissolution of both,
and the formation of a new one, which, whether founded on the
same or another written constitution, is, as to its identity,
different from either. This can only be effected by the summum
jus, &c.
"A full answer to this objection, even if many others were not
at hand, as far as Texas is concerned, is contained in the fact
that the summum jus has been exercised.
"Her citizens, by a unanimous vote, have decided in favor of
annexation; and, according to the admission of the committee,
this is sufficiently potent to dissolve their government, and to
surrender themselves to be absorbed by ours. To receive this
augmentation of our territory and population, manifestly does
not dissolve this government, or even remodel it. Its identity is
not disturbed. There is no appeal necessary to the summum jus
populi for such a political arrangement on our part, even if the
summum jus populi could be predicated of this government,
which it cannot. Now, it is very obvious that two free States may
associate for common purposes, and that these common
purposes may be multiplied in number or increased in
importance at the discretion of the parties. They may establish a
common agency for the transaction of their business; and this
may include a portion or all of their political functions. The new
creation may be an agency if created by States, or a
government if created by the people; for the people have a right
to abolish and create governments. Does any one doubt
whether Texas could rejoin the republic of Mexico? Why not,
then, rejoin this republic?
"No one doubts that the States now composing this Union
might have joined Great Britain after the declaration of
independence. The learned committee would not contend that
there was a political impossibility in the union of Scotland and
England, or of Ireland and Britain; or that, in the nature of
things, it would be impossible for Louisiana, if she were a
 sovereign State out of this Union, to join with the sovereign
State of Texas in forming a new government.
"There is no point of view in which the proposition for
annexation can be considered, that any serious obstacle in point
of form presents itself. If this government be a confederation of
States, then it is proposed to add another State to the
confederacy. If this government be a consolidation, then it is
proposed to add to it additional territory and population. That
we can annex, and afterwards admit, the cases of Florida and
Louisiana prove. We can, therefore, deal with the people of
Texas for the territory of Texas, and the people can be secured
in the rights and privileges of the constitution, as were the
subjects of Spain and France.
"The Massachusetts legislature experience much difficulty in
ascertaining the mode of action by which the proposed
annexation can be effected, and demand "in what form would
be the practical exercise of the supposed power? In what
department does it lie?" The progress of events already, in a
great measure, answers this objection. Texas has taken the
initiative. Her minister has introduced the subject to that
department which is alone capable of receiving communications
from foreign governments, and the executive has submitted the
correspondence to Congress. The resolutions before you
propose an expression of opinion by Congress, which, if made,
the executive will doubtless address itself earnestly, in
conjunction with the authorities of Texas, to the consummation
of the joint wishes of the parties, which can be accomplished by
treaty, emanating from one department of this government, to
be carried into effect by the passage of all needful laws by the
legislative department, and by the exercise of the express
power of Congress to admit new States."

The proposition of Mr. Preston did not prevail; the period for the
annexation of Texas had not yet arrived. War still existing between
Mexico and Texas—the status of the two countries being that of war,
although hostilities hardly existed—a majority of the Senate deemed
it unadvisable even to take the preliminary steps towards annexation
which his resolution proposed. A motion to lay the proposition on the
table prevailed, by a vote of 24 to 14.
 CHAPTER XXV.
DEBATE BETWEEN MR. CLAY AND MR.
CALHOUN, PERSONAL AND POLITICAL, AND
LEADING TO EXPOSITIONS AND
VINDICATIONS OF PUBLIC CONDUCT WHICH
BELONG TO HISTORY.
For seven years past Mr. Calhoun, while disclaiming connection
with any party, had acted on leading measures with the opposition,
headed by Messrs. Clay and Webster. Still disclaiming any such
connection, he was found at the extra session co-operating with the
administration. His co-operation with the opposition had given it the
victory in many eventful contests in that long period; his co-
operation with the Van Buren administration might turn the tide of
victory. The loss or gain of a chief who in a nearly balanced state of
parties, could carry victory to the side which he espoused, was an
event not to be viewed without vexation by the party which he left.
Resentment was as natural on one side as gratification was on the
other. The democratic party had made no reproaches—(I speak of
the debates in Congress)—when Mr. Calhoun left them; they
debated questions with him as if there had been no cause for
personal complaint. Not so with the opposition now when the course
of his transit was reversed, and the same event occurred to
themselves. They took deeply to heart this withdrawal of one of their
leaders, and his appearance on the other side. It created a feeling of
personal resentment against Mr. Calhoun which had manifested itself
in several small side-blows at the extra session; and it broke out into
systematic attack at the regular one. Some sharp passages took
place between himself and Mr. Webster, but not of a kind to lead to
any thing historical. He (Mr. Webster) was but slightly inclined
towards that kind of speaking which mingles personality with
argument, and lessens the weight of the adversary argument by
reducing the weight of the speaker's character. Mr. Clay had a turn
that way; and, certainly, a great ability for it. Invective, mingled with
sarcasm, was one of the phases of his oratory. He was supreme at a
philippic (taken in the sense of Demosthenes and Cicero), where the
political attack on a public man's measure was to be enforced and
heightened by a personal attack on his conduct. He owed much of
his fascinating power over his hearers to the exercise of this talent—
always so captivating in a popular assembly, and in the galleries of
the Senate; not so much so in the Senate itself; and to him it
naturally fell to become the organ of the feelings of his party
towards Mr. Calhoun. And very cordially, and carefully, and amply,
did he make preparation for it.
The storm had been gathering since September: it burst in
February. It had been evidently waiting for an occasion: and found it
in the first speech of Mr. Calhoun, of that session, in favor of Mr. Van
Buren's recommendation for an independent treasury and a federal
hard-money currency. This speech was delivered the 15th of
February, and was strictly argumentative and parliamentary, and
wholly confined to its subject. Four days thereafter Mr. Clay
answered it; and although ready at an extemporaneous speech, he
had the merit, when time permitted, of considering well both the
matter and the words of what he intended to deliver. On this
occasion he had had ample time; for the speech of Mr. Calhoun
could not be essentially different from the one he delivered on the
same subject at the extra session; and the personal act which
excited his resentment was of the same date. There had been six
months for preparation; and fully had preparation been made. The
whole speech bore the impress of careful elaboration and especially
the last part; for it consisted of two distinct parts—the first,
argumentative, and addressed to the measure before the Senate:
and was in fact, as well as in name, a reply. The second part was an
attack, under the name of a reply, and was addressed to the
personal conduct of Mr. Calhoun, reproaching him with his desertion
(as it was called), and taunting him with the company he had got
into—taking care to remind him of his own former sad account of
that company: and then, launching into a wider field, he threw up to
him all the imputed political delinquencies of his life for near twenty
years—skipping none from 1816 down to the extra session;—
although he himself had been in close political friendship with this
alleged delinquent during the greater part of that long time. Mr.
Calhoun saw at once the advantage which this general and sweeping
assault put into his hands. Had the attack been confined to the mere
circumstance of quitting one side and joining the other, it might have
been treated as a mere personality; and, either left unnoticed, or the
account settled at once with some ready words of retort and
justification. But in going beyond the act which gave the offence—
beyond the cause of resentment, which was recent, and arraigning a
member on the events of almost a quarter of a century of public life,
he went beyond the limits of the occasion, and gave Mr. Calhoun the
opportunity of explaining, or justifying, or excusing all that had ever
been objected to him; and that with the sympathy in the audience
with which attack for ever invests the rights of defence. He saw his
advantage, and availed himself of it. Though prompt at a reply, he
chose to make none in a hurry. A pause ensued Mr. Clay's
conclusion, every one deferring to Mr. Calhoun's right of reply. He
took the floor, but it was only to say that he would reply at his
leisure to the senator from Kentucky.
He did reply, and at his own good time, which was at the end of
twenty days; and in a way to show that he had "smelt the lamp," not
of Demades, but of Demosthenes, during that time. It was
profoundly meditated and elaborately composed: the matter solid
and condensed; the style chaste, terse and vigorous; the narrative
clear; the logic close; the sarcasm cutting: and every word bearing
upon the object in view. It was a masterly oration, and like Mr. Clay's
speech, divided into two parts; but the second part only seemed to
occupy his feelings, and bring forth words from the heart as well as
from the head. And well it might! He was speaking, not for life, but
for character! and defending public character, in the conduct which
makes it, and on high points of policy, which belonged to history—
defending it before posterity and the present age, impersonated in
the American Senate, before which he stood, and to whom he
appealed as judges while invoking as witnesses. He had a high
occasion, and he felt it; a high tribunal to plead before, and he
rejoiced in it; a high accuser, and he defied him; a high stake to
contend for, his own reputation: and manfully, earnestly, and
powerfully did he defend it. He had a high example both in oratory,
and in the analogies of the occasion, before him; and well had he
looked into that example. I happened to know that in this time he
refreshed his reading of the Oration on the Crown; and, as the
delivery of his speech showed, not without profit. Besides its general
cast, which was a good imitation, there were passages of a vigor
and terseness—of a power and simplicity—which would recall the
recollection of that masterpiece of the oratory of the world. There
were points of analogy in the cases as well as in the speeches, each
case being that of one eminent statesman accusing another, and
before a national tribunal, and upon the events of a public life. More
happy than the Athenian orator, the American statesman had no foul
imputations to repel. Different from Æschines and Demosthenes,
both himself and Mr. Clay stood above the imputation of corrupt
action or motive. If they had faults, and what public man is without
them? they were the faults of lofty natures—not of sordid souls; and
they looked to the honors of their country—not its plunder—for their
fair reward.
When Mr. Calhoun finished, Mr. Clay instantly arose, and rejoined
—his rejoinder almost entirely directed to the personal part of the
discussion, which from its beginning had been the absorbing part.
Much stung by Mr. Calhoun's reply, who used the sword as well as
the buckler, and with a keen edge upon it, he was more animated
and sarcastic in the rejoinder than in the first attack. Mr. Calhoun
also rejoined instantly. A succession of brief and rapid rejoinders
took place between them (chiefly omitted in this work), which
seemed running to infinity, when Mr. Calhoun, satisfied with what he
had done, pleasantly put an end to it by saying, he saw the senator
from Kentucky was determined to have the last word; and he would
yield it to him. Mr. Clay, in the same spirit, disclaimed that desire;
and said no more. And thus the exciting debate terminated with
more courtesy than that with which it had been conducted.
In all contests of this kind there is a feeling of violated decorum
which makes each party solicitous to appear on the defensive, and
for that purpose to throw the blame of commencing on the opposite
side. Even the one that palpably throws the first stone is yet anxious
to show that it was a defensive throw; or at least provoked by
previous wrong. Mr. Clay had this feeling upon him, and knew that
the onus of making out a defensive case fell upon him; and he lost
no time in endeavoring to establish it. He placed his defence in the
forepart of the attack. At the very outset of the personal part of his
speech he attended to this essential preliminary, and found the
justification, as he believed, in some expressions of Mr. Calhoun in
his sub-treasury speech; and in a couple of passages in a letter he
had written on a public occasion, after his return from the extra
session—commonly called the Edgefield letter. In the speech he
believed he found a reproach upon the patriotism of himself and
friends in not following his (Mr. Calhoun's) "lead" in support of the
administration financial and currency measures; and in the letter, an
impeachment of the integrity and patriotism of himself and friends if
they got into power; and also an avowal that his change of sides
was for selfish considerations. The first reproach, that of lack of
patriotism in not following Mr. Calhoun's lead, he found it hard to
locate in any definite part of the speech; and had to rest it upon
general expressions. The others, those founded upon passages in
the letter, were definitely quoted; and were in these terms: "I could
not back and sustain those in such opposition in whose wisdom,
firmness and patriotism I had no reason to confide."—"It was clear,
with our joint forces (whigs and nullifiers) we could utterly
overthrow and demolish them; but it was not less clear that the
victory would enure, not to us, but exclusively to the benefit of our
allies, and their cause." These passages were much commented
upon, especially in the rejoinders; and the whole letter produced by
Mr. Calhoun, and the meaning claimed for them fully stated by him.
In the speeches for and against the crown we see Demosthenes
answering what has not been found in the speech of Eschines: the
same anomaly took place in this earnest debate, as reported
between Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun. The latter answers much which is
not found in the published speech to which he is replying. It gave
rise to some remark between the speakers during the rejoinders. Mr.
Calhoun said he was replying to the speech as spoken. Mr. Clay said
it was printed under his supervision—as much as to say he
sanctioned the omissions. The fact is, that with a commendable
feeling, he had softened some parts, and omitted others; for that
which is severe enough in speaking, becomes more so in writing;
and its omission or softening is a tacit retraction, and honorable to
the cool reflection which condemns what passion, or heat, had
prompted. But Mr. Calhoun did not accept the favor: and, neither
party desiring quarter, the one answered what had been dropt, and
the other re-produced it, with interest. In his rejoinders, Mr. Clay
supplied all that had been omitted—and made additions to it.
This contest between two eminent men, on a theatre so elevated,
in which the stake to each was so great, and in which each did his
best, conscious that the eye of the age and of posterity was upon
him, was an event in itself, and in their lives. It abounded with
exemplifications of all the different sorts of oratory of which each
was master: on one side—declamation, impassioned eloquence,
vehement invective, taunting sarcasm: on the other—close
reasoning, chaste narrative, clear statement, keen retort. Two
accessories of such contests (disruptions of friendships), were
missing, and well—the pathetic and the virulent. There was no
crying, or blackguarding in it—nothing like the weeping scene
between Fox and Burke, when the heart overflowed with tenderness
at the recollection of former love, now gone forever; nor like the
virulent one when the gall, overflowing with bitterness, warned an
ancient friend never to return as a spy to the camp which he had left
as a deserter.
 There were in the speeches of each some remarkable passages,
such only as actors in the scenes could furnish, and which history
will claim. Thus: Mr. Clay gave some inside views of the concoction
of the famous compromise act of 1833; which, so far as they go,
correspond with the secret history of the same concoction as given
in one of the chapters on that subject in the first volume of this
work. Mr. Clay's speech is also remarkable for the declaration that
the protective system, which he so long advocated, was never
intended to be permanent: that its only design was to give
temporary encouragement to infant manufactures: and that it had
fulfilled its mission. Mr. Calhoun's speech was also remarkable for
admitting the power, and the expediency of incidental protection, as
it was called; and on this ground he justified his support of the tariff
of 1816—so much objected against him. He also gave his history of
the compromise of 1833, attributing it to the efficacy of nullification
and of the military attitude of South Carolina: which brought upon
him the relentless sarcasm of Mr. Clay; and occasioned his
explanation of his support of a national bank in 1816. He was
chairman of the committee which reported the charter for that bank,
and gave it the support which carried it through; with which he was
reproached after he became opposed to the bank. He explained the
circumstances under which he gave that support—such as I had
often heard him state in conversation; and which always appeared
to me to be sufficient to exempt him from reproach. At the same
time (and what is but little known), he had the merit of opposing,
and probably of defeating, a far more dangerous bank—one of fifty
millions (equivalent to one hundred and twenty millions now), and
founded almost wholly upon United States stocks—imposingly
recommended to Congress by the then secretary of the Treasury, Mr.
Alexander J. Dallas. The analytical mind of Mr. Calhoun, then one of
the youngest members, immediately solved this monster proposition
into its constituent elements; and his power of generalization and
condensation, enabled him to express its character in two words—
lending our credit to the bank for nothing, and borrowing it back at
six per cent. interest. As an alternative, and not as a choice, he
supported the national bank that was chartered, after twice
defeating the monster bank of fifty millions founded on paper; for
that monster was twice presented to Congress, and twice repulsed.
The last time it came as a currency measure—as a bank to create a
national currency; and as such was referred to a select committee
on national currency, of which Mr. Calhoun was chairman. He
opposed it, and fell into the support of the bank which was
chartered. Strange that in this search for a national bank, the
currency of the constitution seemed to enter no one's head. The
revival of the gold currency was never suggested; and in that
oblivion of gold, and still hunting a substitute in paper, the men who
put down the first national bank did their work much less effectually
that those who put down the second one.
The speech of each of these senators, so far as they constitute the
personal part of the debate, will be given in a chapter of its own: the
rejoinders being brief, prompt, and responsive each to the other, will
be put together in another chapter. The speeches of each, having
been carefully prepared and elaborated, may be considered as fair
specimens of their speaking powers—the style of each different, but
each a first class speaker in the branch of oratory to which he
belonged. They may be read with profit by those who would wish to
form an idea of the style and power of these eminent orators.
Manner, and all that is comprehended under the head of delivery, is
a different attribute; and there Mr. Clay had an advantage, which is
lost in transferring the speech to paper. Some of Mr. Calhoun's
characteristics of manner may be seen in these speeches. He
eschewed the studied exordiums and perorations, once so much in
vogue, and which the rhetorician's rules teach how to make. A few
simple words to announce the beginning, and the same to show the
ending of his speech, was about as much as he did in that way; and
in that departure from custom he conformed to what was becoming
in a business speech, as his generally were; and also to what was
suitable to his own intellectual style of speaking. He also eschewed
the trite, familiar, and unparliamentary mode (which of late has got
into vogue) of referring to a senator as, "my friend," or, "the
distinguished," or, "the eloquent," or, "the honorable," &c. He
followed the written rule of parliamentary law; which is also the
clear rule of propriety, and referred to the member by his sitting-
place in the Senate, and the State from which he came. Thus: "the
senator from Kentucky who sits farthest from me;" which was a
sufficient designation to those present, while for the absent, and for
posterity the name (Mr. Clay) would be put in brackets. He also
addressed the body by the simple collective phrase, "senators;" and
this was, not accident, or fancy, but system, resulting from
convictions of propriety; and he would allow no reporter to alter it.
Mr. Calhoun laid great stress upon his speech in this debate, as
being the vindication of his public life; and declared, in one of his
replies to Mr. Clay, that he rested his public character upon it, and
desired it to be read by those who would do him justice. In justice to
him, and as being a vindication of several measures of his
mentioned in this work, not approvingly, a place is here given to it.
This discussion between two eminent men, growing out of support
and opposition to the leading measures of Mr. Van Buren's
administration, indissolubly connects itself with the passage of those
measures; and gives additional emphasis and distinction to the era
of the crowning policy which separated bank and state—made the
government the keeper of its own money—repulsed paper money
from the federal treasury—filled the treasury to bursting with solid
gold; and did more for the prosperity of the country than any set of
measures from the foundation of the government.
 CHAPTER XXVI.
DEBATE BETWEEN MR. CLAY AND MR.
CALHOUN: MR. CLAY'S SPEECH: EXTRACTS.
"Who, Mr. President, are the most conspicuous of those who
perseveringly pressed this bill upon Congress and the American
people? Its drawer is the distinguished gentleman in the white house
not far off (Mr. Van Buren); its indorser is the distinguished senator
from South Carolina, here present. What the drawer thinks of the
indorser, his cautious reserve and stifled enmity prevent us from
knowing. But the frankness of the indorser has not left us in the
same ignorance with respect to his opinion of the drawer. He has
often expressed it upon the floor of the Senate. On an occasion not
very distant, denying him any of the noble qualities of the royal
beast of the forest, he attributed to him those which belong to the
most crafty, most skulking, and the meanest of the quadruped tribe.
Mr. President, it is due to myself to say, that I do not altogether
share with the senator from South Carolina in this opinion of the
President of the United States. I have always found him, in his
manners and deportment, civil, courteous, and gentlemanly; and he
dispenses, in the noble mansion which he now occupies, one worthy
the residence of the chief magistrate of a great people, a generous
and liberal hospitality. An acquaintance with him of more than
twenty years' duration has inspired me with a respect for the man,
although, I regret to be compelled to say, I detest the magistrate.
"The eloquent senator from South Carolina has intimated that the
course of my friends and myself, in opposing this bill, was
unpatriotic, and that we ought to have followed in his lead; and, in a
late letter of his, he has spoken of his alliance with us, and of his
motives for quitting it. I cannot admit the justice of his reproach. We
united, if, indeed, there were any alliance in the case, to restrain the
enormous expansion of executive power; to arrest the progress of
corruption; to rebuke usurpation; and to drive the Goths and
Vandals from the capital; to expel Brennus and his horde from
Rome, who, when he threw his sword into the scale, to augment the
ransom demanded from the mistress of the world, showed his
preference for gold; that he was a hard-money chieftain. It was by
the much more valuable metal of iron that he was driven from her
gates. And how often have we witnessed the senator from South
Carolina, with woful countenance, and in doleful strains, pouring
forth touching and mournful eloquence on the degeneracy of the
times, and the downward tendency of the republic? Day after day, in
the Senate, have we seen the displays of his lofty and impassioned
eloquence. Although I shared largely with the senator in his
apprehension for the purity of our institutions, and the permanency
of our civil liberty, disposed always to look at the brighter side of
human affairs, I was sometimes inclined to hope that the vivid
imagination of the senator had depicted the dangers by which we
were encompassed in somewhat stronger colors than they justified.
"The arduous contest in which we were so long engaged was
about to terminate in a glorious victory. The very object for which
the alliance was formed was about to be accomplished. At this
critical moment the senator left us; he left us for the very purpose of
preventing the success of the common cause. He took up his
musket, knapsack, and shot-pouch, and joined the other party. He
went, horse, foot, and dragoon; and he himself composed the whole
corps. He went, as his present most distinguished ally commenced
with his expunging resolution, solitary and alone. The earliest
instance recorded in history, within my recollection, of an ally
drawing off his forces from the combined army, was that of Achilles
at the siege of Troy. He withdrew, with all his troops, and remained
in the neighborhood, in sullen and dignified inactivity. But he did not
join the Trojan forces; and when, during the progress of the siege,
his faithful friend fell in battle, he raised his avenging arm, drove the
Trojans back into the gates of Troy, and satiated his vengeance by
slaying Priam's noblest and dearest son, the finest hero in the
immortal Iliad. But Achilles had been wronged, or imagined himself
wronged, in the person of the fair and beautiful Briseis. We did no
wrong to the distinguished senator from South Carolina. On the
contrary, we respected him, confided in his great and acknowledged
ability, his uncommon genius, his extensive experience, his supposed
patriotism; above all, we confided in his stern and inflexible fidelity.
Nevertheless, he left us, and joined our common opponents,
distrusting and distrusted. He left us, as he tells us in the Edgefield
letter, because the victory which our common arms were about to
achieve, was not to enure to him and his party, but exclusively to the
benefit of his allies and their cause. I thought that, actuated by
patriotism (that noblest of human virtues), we had been contending
together for our common country, for her violated rights, her
threatened liberties, her prostrate constitution. Never did I suppose
that personal or party considerations entered into our views.
Whether, if victory shall ever again be about to perch upon the
standard of the spoils party (the denomination which the senator
from South Carolina has so often given to his present allies), he will
not feel himself constrained, by the principles on which he has
acted, to leave them, because it may not enure to the benefit of
himself and his party, I leave to be adjusted between themselves.
"The speech of the senator from South Carolina was plausible,
ingenious, abstract, metaphysical, and generalizing. It did not
appear to me to be adapted to the bosoms and business of human
life. It was aerial, and not very high up in the air, Mr. President,
either—not quite as high as Mr. Clayton was in his last ascension in
his balloon. The senator announced that there was a single
alternative, and no escape from one or the other branch of it. He
stated that we must take the bill under consideration, or the
substitute proposed by the senator from Virginia. I do not concur in
that statement of the case. There is another course embraced in
neither branch of the senator's alternative; and that course is to do
nothing,—always the wisest when you are not certain what you
ought to do. Let us suppose that neither branch of the alternative is
accepted, and that nothing is done. What, then, would be the
consequence? There would be a restoration of the law of 1789, with
all its cautious provisions and securities, provided by the wisdom of
our ancestors, which has been so trampled upon by the late and
present administrations. By that law, establishing the Treasury
department, the treasure of the United States is to be received,
kept, and disbursed by the treasurer, under a bond with ample
security, under a large penalty fixed by law, and not left, as this bill
leaves it, to the uncertain discretion of a Secretary of the Treasury.
If, therefore, we were to do nothing, that law would be revived; the
treasurer would have the custody, as he ought to have, of the public
money, and doubtless he would make special deposits of it in all
instances with safe and sound State banks; as in some cases the
Secretary of the Treasury is now obliged to do. Thus, we should
have in operation that very special deposit system, so much desired
by some gentlemen, by which the public money would remain
separate and unmixed with the money of banks.
"There is yet another course, unembraced by either branch of the
alternative presented by the senator from South Carolina; and that
is, to establish a bank of the United States, constituted according to
the old and approved method of forming such an institution, tested
and sanctioned by experience; a bank of the United States which
should blend public and private interests, and be subject to public
and private control; united together in such manner as to present
safe and salutary checks against all abuses. The senator mistakes his
own abandonment of that institution as ours. I know that the party
in power has barricaded itself against the establishment of such a
bank. It adopted, at the last extra session, the extraordinary and
unprecedented resolution, that the people of the United States
should not have such a bank, although it might be manifest that
there was a clear majority of them demanding it. But the day may
come, and I trust is not distant, when the will of the people must
prevail in the councils of her own government; and when it does
arrive, a bank will be established.
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