Protection Performance Study for

Secondary Systems with IEC61850

Process Bus Architecture

Submitted by Xin Sun

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
University of Bath
Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering

Supervisors: Dr Miles Redfern and Prof Raj K Aggarwal

August 2012

COPYRIGHT
Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with its author. This
copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation
from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the prior
written consent of the author.

This thesis may be available for consultation within the University Library and may
be photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purpose of consultation.
Abstract
Following the introduction of the microprocessor into the power system protection
field, modern microprocessor based numeric relays have developed very rapidly in the
last 20 years, and modern power system protection schemes are virtually all based on
microcomputers technology.

The International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) recently launched the standard

IEC61850, “Communication Networks and System in Substation”, which is having a
major impact on the structure of new protection systems and schemes. In itself it
describes the concepts for sub-station communications covering protection, control
and metering functions. However, although it is going to have a major impact on the
power systems communications, it will also influence the design of future protection
systems.

There will also be a host of other opportunities and advantages that can be realised.
These include easier upgrading, refurbishment and replacement of sub-station
protection. They also provide for greater use of general purpose Intelligent Electronics
Devices (IEDs), self-healing systems, and plug and play type facilities.

The Ethernet based communication network for data transfer between process level
switchyard equipment and bay level IEDs, the process bus, is defined in IEC61850
Section 9-2. This process bus facilitates the communication of two types of real-time,
peer-to-peer communication messages. Generic object-oriented substation event
messages, the GOOSE messages and the data sample values, SVs which include the
measured currents and voltages. Although this standard describes the message
structures and the timing requirements, it does not describe the process bus topology.

This work describes different LAN topologies that can be used in the design of
process bus for protection systems. It considers the implications of the different
structures on the operation of the protection scheme and how these relate to the
operational strategy of different operators.

i
It provides an assessment of the data handling capabilities of the system and how the
demands of the protection system can be met. Several potential problem areas are
identified and analyzed. The probabilistic nature of these systems is discussed and the
implications explained.

It also provides an insight into the implementation of the alternative topologies and
their performance when applied to a transmission line feeder protection and
transformer protection.

The digital substation and the implementation of IEC61850 are fundamental to the
future of protection ‘relays’. There are many pointers to the potential directions that
these systems will develop and the skills required for the protection engineers of the
future.

This project is seeking to overcome some of the ownership challenges presented by

modern protection and control (P&C) devices, which have an inherent short life due
to their dependence on modern electronics and software.

ii
Abstract .............................................................................................................. i

Contents ............................................................................................................ iii

Acknowledgements.................................................................................... viii

List of Figures .................................................................................................. ix

List of Tables.................................................................................................. xiii

List of Abbreviations................................................................................ xviii

List of Symbols............................................................................................. xxii

Chapter 1 Overview of AS3 Project ...................................................... 1

1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 2
1.2 Standard Interfaces..................................................................................... 5
1.3 Process Bus Architecture ........................................................................... 6
1.4 Installation ................................................................................................. 9
1.5 Test and Commission ............................................................................... 10
1.6 System Upgrade ....................................................................................... 11
1.7 Maintenance ............................................................................................ 12
1.8 Overview of WG5 – Protection Performance Study ................................. 13
1.8.1 Introduction...................................................................................... 13
1.8.2 Protection Schemes Applied in the Mesh Substation......................... 13
1.8.3 Implementation Plan ........................................................................ 15

iii
 1.9 Design of the Process Bus Architecture.................................................... 17
1.9.1 Introduction...................................................................................... 17
1.9.2 Advantages of the Standard Process Bus Architecture ...................... 23
1.10 Objectives and Contributions of This Study ............................................. 25
1.11 Thesis Outline .......................................................................................... 27

Chapter 2 Introduction of IEC61850 ................................................... 28

2.1 IEC61850 – Communication Networks and Systems in Substation........... 29
2.1.1 The Development of IEC61850 ........................................................ 29
2.1.2 The Scope and Outline of IEC61850 ................................................ 33
2.1.3 The Application of the Process Bus .................................................. 40
2.2 IEC61850 Based Substation Protection System........................................ 44
2.2.1 Conventional Substation Systems ..................................................... 44
2.2.2 The Integrated Protection System ..................................................... 45
2.2.3 IEC61850 Based Substation Systems ............................................... 47
2.2.4 Future Developments in IEC61850 Based Protection Schemes......... 48
2.3 Benefits of IEC61850............................................................................... 53
2.3.1 Key Features .................................................................................... 54
2.3.2 Major Benefits ................................................................................. 55

Chapter 3 Protection Performance Study with Standard

Protection Test Equipment ...................................................................... 58
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 59
3.2 Commercial Test Set ................................................................................ 60
3.3 Distance Relay Test ................................................................................. 65
3.4 Current Differential Relay Test ................................................................ 70
3.4.1 Introduction...................................................................................... 70
3.4.2 Time Alignment of Current Vector................................................... 71
3.4.3 Results and Discussion ..................................................................... 75
3.5 Conclusions ............................................................................................. 79

Chapter 4 Reliability and Availability Analysis of Process Bus

Topologies........................................................................................................ 82

iv
 4.1 Process Bus Configurations for IEC61850 Based Substation.................... 83
4.1.1 Cascaded Topology .......................................................................... 83
4.1.2 Star Topology................................................................................... 84
4.1.3 Ring Topology ................................................................................. 84
4.1.4 Time Synchronization of Merging Units........................................... 86
4.2 Reliability and Availability Analysis of Process Bus Topologies.............. 87
4.2.1 Device Reliability and Availability................................................... 87
4.2.2 System MTTF and Availability using Reliability Block Diagram ..... 88
4.2.3 Feeder Bay Study ............................................................................. 90
4.2.4 MTTF and Availability for Cascaded Topology ............................... 91
4.2.5 MTTF and Availability for Star Topology ........................................ 92
4.2.6 MTTF and Availability for Ring Topology....................................... 93

Chapter 5 Modelling and Simulation for Performance

Evaluation of Process Bus Topologies.............................................. 96
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 97
5.2 Building of IED Models ........................................................................... 98
5.2.1 Modelling of MU ............................................................................. 98
5.2.2 Modelling of CBC and P&C IED ....................................................101
5.3 Feeder Bay Study....................................................................................101
5.4 Process Bus Overload Simulation............................................................106
5.4.1 Star Topology Overload Test...........................................................106
5.4.2 Cascaded Topology Overload Test ..................................................108
5.4.3 Ring Topology Overload Test .........................................................110
5.5 Conclusions ............................................................................................112

Chapter 6 Protection Performance Study with RTDS

Simulator ..........................................................................................................114
6.1 Introduction of RTDS Simulator .............................................................115
6.1.1 Conventional RTDS Testing System ...............................................115
6.1.2 Design of a New RTDS Testing System ..........................................116
6.1.3 Implementation of this new RTDS testing system............................117
6.2 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test ...........................................121

v
 6.2.1 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test Using Cascaded Topology
........................................................................................................123
6.2.2 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test Using Star Topology ..127
6.2.3 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test Using Ring Topology.131
6.3 Distance Protection Relay Test................................................................136
6.4 Distance Protection Scheme Test ............................................................149
6.4.1 Distance Protection Scheme Test Using Cascaded Topology...........152
6.4.2 Distance Protection Scheme Test Using Star Topology ...................159
6.4.3 Distance Protection Scheme Test Using Ring Topology ..................166
6.5 Transformer Current Differential Protection Relay Test ..........................173
6.5.1 Transformer Current Differential Protection Relay Test Using
Cascaded Topology ........................................................................................175
6.5.2 Transformer Current Differential Protection Relay Test Using Star
Topology ........................................................................................................177
6.5.3 Transformer Current Differential Protection Relay Test Using Ring
Topology ........................................................................................................178
6.6 Process Bus Overload Test......................................................................179
6.6.1 Introduction.....................................................................................179
6.6.2 VLAN Priority of SV Ethernet packet .............................................180
6.6.3 Process Bus Overload Test Using Star Topology.............................180
6.6.4 Process Bus Overload Test Using Cascaded Topology ....................184
6.6.5 Process Bus Overload Test Using Cascaded Topology ....................185
6.7 Conclusions ............................................................................................187

Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Work ..........................................188

7.1 Conclusion ..............................................................................................189
7.2 Future Work............................................................................................195

Appendix 1 ......................................................................................................198

Appendix 2 ......................................................................................................208

Appendix 3 ......................................................................................................212

vi
Appendix 4 ......................................................................................................216

Appendix 5 ......................................................................................................220

Publications ....................................................................................................224

References......................................................................................................261

vii
Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to my esteemed supervisor, Dr. Miles
Redfern for his continuous and helpful support and guidance in my research all the
while.

I would also like to express my heartfelt gratefulness to the National Grid Company,
Scottish Power, Scottish and Southern Electricity, the Alstom Grid Company and the
University of Manchester for their support.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to express my deepest thanks to my

family especially to my beloved parents for their endless encouragement and affection
in my ten-year study period.

viii
Figure 1-1 Switching unit connection ........................................................................ 6
Figure 1-2 National Grid mesh topology substation ................................................. 13
Figure 1-3 The four switch mesh substation............................................................. 14
Figure 1-4 Communication system within feeder bay using the proposed standard
process bus architecture........................................................................................... 19
Figure 1-5 Communication system of feeder bay and transformer bay using the
proposed standard process bus architecture.............................................................. 21
Figure 1-6 Communication system of mesh corner substation using the proposed
standard process bus architecture............................................................................. 22
Figure 2-1 Data model layers in IEC61850 .............................................................. 35
Figure 2-2 Overview of IEC61850 functionality and associated communication
profiles .................................................................................................................... 38
Figure 2-3 Functional hierarchy of IEC61850 based SAS ........................................ 41
Figure 2-4 Process bus concept................................................................................ 42
Figure 2-5 Communication architecture of a conventional substation protection
system ..................................................................................................................... 44
Figure 2-6 Communication architecture of a conventional substation protection
system ..................................................................................................................... 46
Figure 2-7 Communication architecture of an IEC61850 based substation protection
system ..................................................................................................................... 47
Figure 2-8 The substation communication system.................................................... 50
Figure 2-9 The IEC61850 application of IED relay.................................................. 50
Figure 2-10 The use of multiple IEDs ...................................................................... 51
Figure 3-1 ALSTOM proposed process bus architecture.......................................... 60
Figure 3-2 OMICRON CMC 256+ test set .............................................................. 61
Figure 3-3 Usage of configuration information for testing ....................................... 62
Figure 3-4 “Fully Networked” protection testing ..................................................... 62
Figure 3-5 Feeder Local Panel (IEC61850) and Feeder Remote Panel (hardwired) .. 64
Figure 3-6 Test setup for feeder local and remote protection schemes...................... 64
Figure 3-7 LT IEC61850 based distance relay rear view .......................................... 65
Figure 3-8 Connection diagram of scenario 1 .......................................................... 66

ix
Figure 3-9 Connection diagram of scenario 2.......................................................... 66
Figure 3-10 Connection diagram of scenario 3......................................................... 67
Figure 3-11 Connection diagram of scenario 4......................................................... 67
Figure 3-12 Short test for three different zones ........................................................ 69
Figure 3-13 Connection diagram of current differential scheme test system............. 71
Figure 3-14 Propagation delay measurement ........................................................... 72
Figure 3-15 Data transmission ................................................................................. 74
Figure 3-16 Time offset for direct connection to the network card ........................... 76
Figure 3-17 Current differential bias characteristic .................................................. 77
Figure 4-1 Cascaded topology ................................................................................. 82
Figure 4-2 Star topology.......................................................................................... 83
Figure 4-3 Ring topology ........................................................................................ 85
Figure 4-4Series system with two components ........................................................ 87
Figure 4-5 Parallel system with two components ..................................................... 88
Figure 4-6 Cascaded topology for feeder bay........................................................... 90
Figure 4-7 RBD of MTTF and availability calculation for cascaded topology.......... 90
Figure 4-8 Star topology for feeder bay ................................................................... 91
Figure 4-9 RBD of MTTF and availability calculation for star topology.................. 91
Figure 4-10 Ring topology for feeder bay ................................................................ 92
Figure 4-11 RBD of MTTF and availability calculation for ring topology................ 92
Figure 5-1 MU model configuration ........................................................................ 97
Figure 5-2 Raw data sample Ethernet frame .........................................................1008
Figure 5-3 Cascaded topology model for feeder bay ...............................................100
Figure 5-4 Star topology model for feeder bay........................................................101
Figure 5-5 Ring topology model for feeder bay ......................................................102
Figure 5-6 Configuration of the star topology system model...................................104
Figure 5-7 SV ETE delay of 18 MUs on the star process bus ..................................106
Figure 5-8 Configuration of the cascaded topology system model...........................107
Figure 5-9 SV ETE delay of 18 MUs on the cascaded process bus..........................108
Figure 5-10 Configuration of the ring topology system model ................................109
Figure 5-11 SV ETE delay of 18 MUs in the ring process bus ................................110
Figure 6-1 Analogue signal based RTDS test system ..............................................113
Figure 6-2 Schematic diagram of RTDS close-loop testing design ..........................114
Figure 6-3 Connection diagram between RTDS system and CIM ...........................115

x
Figure 6-4 The GTNET cards .................................................................................116
Figure 6-5 RTDS test system using GTNET cards..................................................117
Figure 6-6 Feeder Local Panel (IEC61850) and Feeder Remote Panel (hardwired) .118
Figure 6-7 RTDS test bed for the protection schemes .............................................118
Figure 6-8 Modelled power transmission line for the current differential scheme test
...............................................................................................................................119
Figure 6-9 Configuration of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology
...............................................................................................................................121
Figure 6-10 Configuration of current differential scheme test using star topology...125
Figure 6-11 Configuration of current differential scheme test using ring topology ..129
Figure 6-12 Modelled power transmission line of P545 distance relay test..............134
Figure 6-13 Connection diagram of distance relay test............................................134
Figure 6-14 Modelled power transmission line of distance protection scheme test ..147
Figure 6-15 Permissive under-reach protection scheme characteristic .....................148
Figure 6-16 Configuration of distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology
...............................................................................................................................150
Figure 6-17 Configuration of distance protection scheme test using star topology...157
Figure 6-18 Configuration of distance protection scheme test using ring topology..164
Figure 6-19 Modelled power transmission line for the transformer current differential
protection relay test ................................................................................................171
Figure 6-20 Current differential bias characteristic .................................................172
Figure 6-21 Configuration of transformer protection relay test using cascaded
topology .................................................................................................................174
Figure 6-22 Configuration of transformer protection relay test using star topology.175
Figure 6-23 Configuration of transformer protection relay test using ring topology 176
Figure 6-24 Modelled power transmission line for process bus overload test ..........177
Figure 6-25 Configuration of process bus overload test using star topology............179
Figure 6-26 Sampled value packet frames captured by Wireshark Network Simulator
...............................................................................................................................180
Figure 6-27 MTT with respect to the loading of the star process bus traffic ............181
Figure 6-28 Configuration of process bus overload test using cascaded topology....182
Figure 6-29 MTT with respect to the loading of the cascaded process bus traffic ....183
Figure 6-30 Configuration of process bus overload test using ring topology ...........183
Figure 6-31 MTT with respect to the loading of the ring process bus traffic ............184

xi
Figure 7-1 Substation communication system using the proposed standard process bus
architecture.............................................................................................................189

xii
Table 1-1 Panels and protection relays issued by ALSTOM Grid ............................ 16
Table 2-1 Scope of IEC61850.................................................................................. 34
Table 3-1 Parameters of the distance protection relays for OMICRON test.............. 68
Table 3-2 Outline of distance relay test with OMICRON......................................... 68
Table 3-3 The MTT for each test point .................................................................... 69
Table 3-4 Parameters of the relay ............................................................................ 78
Table 3-5 Outline of current differential relay test ................................................... 78
Table 3-6 MTT of the four scenarios ....................................................................... 79
Table 4-1 MTTF and availability considered for each component............................ 89
Table 4-2 MTTF and availability of different process bus topologies....................... 93
Table 5-1 Parameters for OPNET simulation ..........................................................103
Table 5-2 SV ETE delay of different process bus topologies...................................103
Table 5-3 SV ETE delay of star topology ...............................................................105
Table 5-4 SV ETE delay of cascaded topology .......................................................107
Table 5-5 SV ETE delay of ring topology...............................................................109
Table 6-1 Parameters of relay and transmission line for current different scheme test
...............................................................................................................................120
Table 6-2 Outline of current differential scheme test...............................................120
Table 6-3a Trip times of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology
(15km) ...................................................................................................................122
Table 6-3b Trip times of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology
(50km) ...................................................................................................................123
Table 6-3c Trip times of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology
(85km) ...................................................................................................................124
Table 6-4a MTT of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology (15km)
...............................................................................................................................124
Table 6-4b MTT of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology (50km)
...............................................................................................................................124
Table 6-4c MTT of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology (85km)
...............................................................................................................................125

xiii
Table 6-5a Trip times of current differential scheme test using star topology (15km)
...............................................................................................................................126
Table 6-5b Trip times of current differential scheme test using star topology (50km)
...............................................................................................................................127
Table 6-5c Trip times of current differential scheme test using star topology (85km)
...............................................................................................................................128
Table 6-6a MTT of current differential scheme test using star topology (15km)......128
Table 6-6b MTT of current differential scheme test using star topology (50km) .....128
Table 6-6c MTT of current differential scheme test using star topology (85km)......129
Table 6-7a Trip times of current differential scheme test using ring topology (15km)
...............................................................................................................................130
Table 6-7b Trip times of current differential scheme test using ring topology (50km)
...............................................................................................................................131
Table 6-7c Trip times of current differential scheme test using ring topology (85km)
...............................................................................................................................132
Table 6-8a MTT of current differential scheme test using ring topology (15km).....132
Table 6-8b MTT of current differential scheme test using ring topology (50km).....132
Table 6-8c MTT of current differential scheme test using ring topology (85km).....133
Table 6-10 Outline of distance relay test.................................................................135
Table 6-11a Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (-45km) .........................136
Table 6-11b Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (-15km) .........................136
Table 6-11c Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (15km) ..........................137
Table 6-11d Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (50km) ..........................137
Table 6-11e Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (85km) ..........................138
Table 6-11f Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (110km) .........................138
Table 6-11g Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (130km) ........................139
Table 6-11h Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (230km) ........................139
Table 6-11i Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (270km) .........................140
Table 6-12a Trip times of conventional distance relay (-45km)...............................140
Table 6-12b Trip times of conventional distance relay (-15km) ..............................141
Table 6-12c Trip times of conventional distance relay (15km)................................141
Table 6-12d Trip times of conventional distance relay (50km)................................142
Table 6-12e Trip times of conventional distance relay (85km)................................142
Table 6-12f Trip times of conventional distance relay (110km) ..............................143

xiv
Table 6-12g Trip times of conventional distance relay (130km)..............................143
Table 6-12h Trip times of conventional distance relay (230km)..............................144
Table 6-12i Trip times of IEC61850 conventional relay (270km) ...........................144
Table 6-13a MMT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (-45km)
...............................................................................................................................145
Table 6-13b MMT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (-15km)
...............................................................................................................................145
Table 6-13c MMT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (15km)
...............................................................................................................................145
Table 6-13d MMT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (50km)
...............................................................................................................................145
Table 6-13e MMT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (85km)
...............................................................................................................................145
Table 6-13f MMT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (110km)
...............................................................................................................................145
Table 6-13g MMT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (130km)
...............................................................................................................................146
Table 6-13h MMT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (230km)
...............................................................................................................................146
Table 6-13i MMT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (270km)
...............................................................................................................................147
Figure 6-14 Permissive under-reach protection scheme characteristic .....................148
Table 6-14 Parameters of relay and transmission line for distance scheme test........149
Table 6-15 Outline of distance protection scheme test ............................................149
Figure 6-15 Configuration of distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology
...............................................................................................................................150
Table 6-16a Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture
...............................................................................................................................151
Table 6-16b Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture
...............................................................................................................................152
Table 6-16c Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture
...............................................................................................................................153
Table 6-16d Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture
...............................................................................................................................154

xv
Table 6-16e Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture
...............................................................................................................................155
Table 6-17a MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (-25km)
...............................................................................................................................155
Table 6-17b MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (15km)
...............................................................................................................................156
Table 6-17c MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (50km)
...............................................................................................................................156
Table 6-17d MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (85km)
...............................................................................................................................156
Table 6-17e MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (115km)
...............................................................................................................................156
Table 6-18a Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture ...158
Table 6-18b Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture...159
Table 6-18c Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture ...160
Table 6-18d Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture ...161
Table 6-18e Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture ...162
Table 6-19a MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (-25km) ......162
Table 6-19b MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (15km) .......163
Table 6-19c MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (50km)........163
Table 6-19d MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (85km) .......163
Table 6-19e MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (115km)......163
Table 6-20a Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture...165
Table 6-20b Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture...166
Table 6-20c Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture...167
Table 6-20d Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture...168
Table 6-20e Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture...169
Table 6-21a MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (-25km) ......169
Table 6-21b MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (15km).......170
Table 6-21c MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (50km).......170
Table 6-21d MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (85km) .......170
Table 6-21e MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (115km).....170
Table 6-22 Parameters of relay and transmission line for transformer relay test ......173
Table 6-23 Outline of transformer current differential relay test..............................173

xvi
Table 6-24 Trip times of transformer relay test using cascaded topology ................174
Table 6-25 MTT of transformer relay test using cascaded topology........................174
Table 6-26 Trip times of transformer relay test using star topology.........................175
Table 6-27 MTT of transformer relay test using star topology ................................175
Table 6-28 Trip times of transformer relay test using ring topology........................176
Table 6-29 MTT of transformer relay test using star topology ................................176
Table 6-30a MTT of process bus overload test using star topology (1 to 20 SVs) ...180
Table 6-30b MTT of process bus overload test using star topology (21 to 40 SVs) .180
Table 6-31a MTT of process bus overload test using cascaded topology (1 to 20 SVs)
...............................................................................................................................182
Table 6-31b MTT of process bus overload test using cascaded topology (21 to 40 SVs)
...............................................................................................................................182
Table 6-32a MTT of process bus overload test using ring topology (1 to 20 SVs)...184
Table 6-32b MTT of process bus overload test using ring topology (21 to 40 SVs).184

xvii
IEC International Electro-technical Commission
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
LAN Local Area Network
GOOSE Generic Object Oriented Substation Event
SV Sample Value
P&C Protection and Control
3
AS Architecture of Substation Secondary System
CT Current Transformer
VT Voltage Transformer
FAT Factory Acceptance Tests
MU Merging Unit
WG Working Group
HV High Voltage
CBC Circuit Breaker Controller
DBB Double Bus Bar
MC Mesh Corner
ERTS Emergency Return To Service
LCC Local Control Cubicle
SCT Supplier Site Commissioning
SAT Site Acceptance Test
PDSA Post Delivery Support Agreement
TP Transmission Procedure
SICAP Substation Information, Control & Protection
NG National Grid
GPS Global Positioning System
MP Main Protection
BP Backup Protection
BCU Bay Control Unit
M Metering
PMU Phase Measurement Unit
PB Process Bus

xviii
SB Switch Box
CTMP Measurement Class CT
RTDS Real Time Digital Simulator
DAS Data Acquisition System
SAS Substation Automation System
UCA Utility Communication Architecture
ISO International Standards Organization
OSI Open System Interconnection
TC Technical Committee
EMS Energy management System
API Application Program Interface
SIDM System Interfaces for Distribution Management
EMS Distribution Management System
DER Distribution Energy Resources
ACSI Abstract Communication Service Interface
CDC Common Data Class
SCSM Specific Communication Service Mapping
SCL Substation Configuration Language
XML eXtensible Makeup Language
SSD System Specification Description
ICD IED Capability Description
SCD Substation Configuration Description
CID Configured IED Description
GSE Generic Substation Event
GSSE Generic Substation State Event
MMS Manufacturing Messaging Specification
CSMA/CD Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection
VLAN Virtual LAN
HMI Human Machine Interface
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
AMU Analogue Merging Unit
DMU Digital Merging Unit
EHV Extra High Voltage

xix
MTT Mean Trip Time
STP Spanning Tree Protocol
RSTP Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol
SNTP Simple Network Time ProtocolReliability
NTP Network Time Protocol
PTP Precision Time Protocol
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
PDU Protocol Data Unit
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
ASDU Application Service Data Unit
ETE End-To-End
GTNET Giga-Transceiver Network Communication Card
POW Point On Wave
PUR Permissive Under-Reach

xx
Failure rate
Reliability Function R
Period under consideration t
Availability A
Mean time to failure MTTF
Mean time to repair MTTR

xxi
xxii
Chapter 1 Overview of AS3 Project

T
HIS chapter briefly describes the background, motivation,
objectives, and contribution of this work. It also provides an
overview of the thesis.

Page 1
Chapter 1 Overview of AS3 Project

1.1 Introduction

IEC61850 is the new approved international standard for communication in

substations. It enables integration of all protection, control, measurement and
monitoring functions within a substation, and additionally provides the means for
high-speed substation protection applications, interlocking and intertripping. It
combines the convenience of Ethernet with the performance and security which is
essential in substations, and also offers new possibilities for maximising economic
and effective utilisation of the transmission asset and network.

IEC61850 has already made a significant impact on the development of different

devices or systems used in the substation. All major substation protection and control
equipment manufacturers have products the implement different forms of IEC61850
communication to simplify integration in substation automation systems and improve
the functionality of the system, and reduce the overall system cost at the same time.
New protection solutions are also being developed in order to take full advantage of
the functionality supported in the new standard.

To take full advantages of this new technology, National Grid Electricity

Transmission launched the Architecture of Substation Secondary System (AS3) [1].
This project is seeking to overcome some of the ownership challenges presented by
modern protection and control (P&C) devices, which have an inherent short life due
to their dependence on modern electronics and software. This will be achieved by
implementation of a process bus.

Compared with the substation primary plants and instrument transformers which
generally remain in-service for long life-cycles, renewed only when physically or
mechanically life-expired, the secondary systems (P&C equipments) are often
changed more frequently. The short life of P&C equipment means that during the
typical 40 year asset life of primary switchgear the secondary equipment needs to be
replaced at least once and probably twice. Based on the statistics from UK
construction, currently achievable replacement rate for protection and control systems
is about 5% per annual. It would take around 20 years to complete a whole cycle of a

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replacement. However, the modern P&C equipments asset life is 15 years, and in
many cases, they only last 10 years due to the availability of technical support and
technology change. In addition, the replacement and maintenance of substation
secondary equipment may also lead to downtime, which negatively influences the
overall availability of the substation. One factor which contributes to this problem is
the complex wiring required for the installation of a relay. Another possible
contributing factor is relay obsolescence. If a new relay has to be installed, it may
require a new configuration in order to communicate with the existing substation
equipment, and this may not be possible without the use of expensive protocol
converters. Normally, outages for replacement of P&C devices are eight weeks in
duration and National Grid would like to reduce these to typically one to two weeks.

One way to overcome the problem is to develop a new architecture for substation
secondary systems by deploying some new technologies such as standard interface
modules, process bus and IEC61850 communication protocol. The deployment of
IEC61850 process bus technology will allow ongoing substation secondary equipment
retrofitting (refurbishment) projects to proceed whilst limiting the duration and
frequency of circuit outages, required to facilitate the work. Once the new technology
is installed, secondary equipment renewals occurring mid-life in the primary plant
lifecycle can be undertaken in a safer, quicker and easier way with much reduced
outages of primary systems.

This will also enable vendor interoperability and easier modification and extension of
the secondary schemes, particularly allowing reconfiguration and feature
enhancement by software means, rather than the modification of wiring as would have
been the case in the past. As the new secondary systems transmit data of CT and VT
analogue signals via the process bus, this poses no safety risks of opening CT circuits,
and hence improving the safety when the protection replacement is carried out with
primary circuit in service.

To improve installation and commission of protection systems and to aid lifetime

management issues, the following design features are required which can be provided
by the AS3 project:

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Chapter 1 Overview of AS3 Project

a) Standard Interface or “switching boxes” must be provided as the secondary

interface to primary switchgear.

b) An architecture must be provided which satisfies some Standard Rules.

c) Installation practices need to be simplified.

d) Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) need to be the main form of commissioning

and on site testing and commissioning needs to be simplified.

e) A means of upgrade and maintenance of the systems including a means of

physical isolation needs to be inherent in the design.

To achieve all the requirements, AS3 project in divided into 13 working groups which
are listed below:

WG1: Current Policy & Practice Review

WG2: Strategy Analysis (Risk assessment, Business case)

WG3: Implementation Strategy

WG4: Architecture & Reliability

WG5: Protection Performance Study

WG6: I/O Standardisation

WG7: IEC61850 Configuration/Merging Unit (MU) Specifications

WG8: Test & Commissioning Philosophy

WG9: Safety & Operation

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4 WGs with National Grid main suppliers/alliances (ABB, ALSTOM,

Mitsubishi & Siemens)

This project is part of WG5 and is concerned with the implementation of the digital
sub-station for power system local protection and control. In particular it explores the
implementation of IEC61850 9-2 which proposes an Ethernet based communication
network between switchyard equipments and bay level protection and control, P&C.
This process bus connects transducers and actuators to Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IEDs), which are responsible for the decision making. The process bus, an Ethernet
LAN, facilitates the communication of time-critical messages, including SV and
GOOSE messages.

1.2 Standard Interfaces

Standard interface “switching boxes” with a 40 year asset life need to be specified
across the supplier base. The switching box is designed to fit between the high voltage
(HV) equipment hardwired secondary interface and the AS3 system merging units and
circuit breaker controllers. The merging unit is the direct interface to the process bus.
The switching box simplifies safety isolation for work on both HV and/or secondary
equipment and allows for short outage durations during asset replacement of the
shorter life MUs, CBCs, process buses and IEDs. In the substation, the process bus
will use fibre optic equipment.

The switching box will be a combination of separate types of switching units; Current
Transformer (CT), Voltage Transformer (VT) and General Input/Output
Disconnection. The number and types used will depend on the bay configuration.

With reference to Figure 1-1, the HV equipment side external wiring is directly
connected to switching units, which then connect to a bay standard marshalling field
using plugs and sockets. The protection and control side external wiring interface with
the process bus (the merging unit and circuit breaker controller) is connected by plugs
and sockets to the other side of the marshalling field. The marshalling field should be
made standard for a particular bay type and can be used both on site and for factory
acceptance testing [1].

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Figure 1-1 Switching unit connection

The means of physical isolation shall be suitable for use as a “point of isolation” in
the National Grid Electricity Safety Rules.

1.3 Process Bus Architecture

To aid lifetime management issues the system architecture on the process bus must be
designed to allow simple disconnection – switch box or merging unit isolation
particular to an IED.

For example, first and second main protection systems should have separate merging
units and process buses. Physical isolation of hardwired interfaces and the ability to
disconnect LAN switches whilst keeping most of the protection systems in service is a
necessity to minimise the risks of incidents to the utility. These are part of the
National Grid Company’s “Golden Rules” [2].

Primary aims of AS3 process bus architecture are:

A. Allow replacement of faulty IED with minimum outage requirements.

B. Allow secondary refurbishment of a bay with minimum outage requirement.

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C. Simplify isolation procedures between primary and secondary systems.

D. Reduce risks of mal-operation.

Each protection bay type should be based on a standard architecture. Primary

equipment associated with a bay will contain circuit breakers, isolators, voltage
transformers (VTs), Current Transformers (CTs), Interposing Transformers, and Earth
Switches.

The number and layout of the primary equipment will vary with the type of bay, for
example a double busbar (DBB) or a mesh corner (MC).

The inputs and outputs of the primary equipment shall be routed through switching
boxes, this provides isolation of the primary equipment from the protection equipment
and vice versa.

There are seven golden rules which must be followed in the design of the process bus
Architecture [2]:

1. The design principles of the AS3 scheme must be standard for all bay types –
DBB feeder, DBB Bus Section, DBB Bus Coupler, MC Mesh Corner, MC
Transformer, MC Feeder.

The number of process buses, the means of collating information, the means of
isolation, and the means of tripping shall be identical in philosophy across bay
types.

2. The switching box should be located as close as possible to the Primary

equipment

Analogue and digital signals are to be converted to SVs on to the bay process
buses by merging units. These shall be installed as close as possible to the primary
equipment to provide the greatest saving in copper cabling. CT merging units

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Chapter 1 Overview of AS3 Project

shall be normal resolution for protection and control CTs, and high resolution for
measurement CTs.

3. No single activity on the MAIN 1 system shall affect the MAIN 2 system.

4. No single failure shall result in the loss of control of more than one bay.

5. Physical facilities shall be available to isolate a bay for testing (Protection &
Control).

Switching boxes, test/normal switches and gateway LAN switches shall be

provided.

6. The Protection and Control application/philosophy shall be functionally

identical to the existing bay solution currently provided by National Grid
suppliers.

There shall be 3 IEDs on a standard bay – MAIN 1, MAIN 2, and bay controller.

The IEDs shall trip their own bay circuit breakers directly via the process bus and
CBCs.

The IEDs shall trip other busbar bay circuit breakers via the process bus, gateway
switch and busbar process bus.

7. All trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms (excluding
intertrip send).

The gateway switches shall provide isolation for the protection bay as well as a
connection to the busbar process bus for passing on tripping to keep the transfer
trip time across bays to a minimum.

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1.4 Installation

For current feeder protection asset replacement schemes, outages of six weeks are
the norm with 3-4 weeks spent on installation. The time is generally taken up by
interfacing with existing systems using hardwiring, and engineering of one off
issues such as Emergency Return to Service (ERTS). An additional constraint
applies when the new protection cannot be installed in situ pre-outage.

To improve installation times significantly, it is suggested the following

requirements.

A. Pre-Outage works should be maximised. Previous asset replacement over the

last 10 years should have freed significant room in relay rooms allowing pre-
outage installation of panels and other works. Where this is not possible this
will likely increase installation times by up to 1 week.

B. Standard interface “switching boxes” need to be specified across the supplier

base. This should minimise hardwired interfaces. ERTS can be easily achieved
by the use of standard plugs and sockets (or similar) to connect the merging
units to the “switching boxes”.

C. Merging units/CBCs and switching boxes should be placed as close to the

plant interface as possible. The use of suitable weatherproof marshalling
kiosks or small dispersed relay rooms may need to be considered for sites
without existing dispersed relay rooms or Local Control Cubicles (LCCs).
There may be such sites where wiring to the common relay room can be
retained - dependant on the suitability of the existing marshalling of cross site
cables. New bays added to such sites would likely require a dispersed relay
room.

D. Connections from the merging unit to the IED’s should be either fibre optic or
Ethernet cable to minimise hardwiring.

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Initial installation of a switching box and AS3 bay solution with 1-4 above
implemented should be possible in two weeks outage. Note that two – three weeks
pre-outage work may be required to fit relay panels, cabling, Site Acceptance Testing
and Stage 1 commissioning. Subsequent installation of a bay solution to an existing
switching box should be possible in circa one week outage.

1.5 Test and Commission

For feeder protection asset replacement schemes within National Grid, outages of six
weeks are the norm with 2-3 weeks spent on commissioning. The time is generally
taken up by testing of hardwire interfaces and hardwiring in cubicles, witnessing
supplier SCT sheets, fault finding, trip and alarm tests, settings loading verification
[3], and stage 2 commissioning; all as per National Grid Procedure TP106 [4].

To improve testing and commissioning times significantly it is suggested the

following is required in addition to the points in 1.4 above:

A. FAT testing needs to be the major part of the commissioning process with the
full involvement of National Grid commissioning engineers. Testing of fibre
interfaces on site should be minimal to ensure correct connections. The FAT
should be carried out on the contract specific hardware using a fully connected
system. This shall comprise functional testing and include all interfaces.

B. All hardwiring installed or interfered with should be fully tested on site in line
with current National Grid procedures. It is thus advantageous to reduce this as
much as possible.

C. IEC61850 “emulators” should be engineered across the supplier base to

simplify FAT testing.

D. Suppliers should have ‘test platforms’ available within their FAT facilities that
emulate exactly the switching box interface. This ensures a standard approach
for connections during the FAT.

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E. Supplier Site Commissioning Test (SCT) sheets should be part of the FAT test.

F. The supplier should ensure a general Site Acceptance Test (SAT) is carried
out on site for all delivered hardware and interface connections prior to
installation to the “switching boxes”. This should simply ensure the hardware
is not damaged and include minimal overlap tests.

G. To ensure correct operation of the protection functions it is suggested that

generic functional SCT sheets are provided by National Grid to formalise the
trip and alarm tests. These tests should be carried out by National Grid and
should take up to two days.

Settings Load Verification and Stage 2 Commissioning would complete the testing
and commissioning prior to return to service.

Initial testing and commissioning of a switching box and AS3 bay solution with the
above implemented should be possible in two weeks circuit outage.

Subsequent testing and commissioning of a bay solution to an existing switching box

should be possible in circa one week.

1.6 System Upgrade

Upgrades or replacements to IEDs and or merging units/CBCs under a Post Delivery

Support Agreement (PDSA) should be relatively straightforward provided the
following is applied or adhered to:

A. FAT testing of the IED is carried out with sufficient overlap.

B. The system is designed to allow simple disconnection – switch box or merging

unit isolation particular to an IED. For example first and second main systems
should have separate merging units and LANs.

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C. Testing on site for fibre interfaces is minimal to provide correct connection

and transfer of a signal over the network between associated IEDs.

D. The use of outages should be minimised by the design.

E. Prior to returning to service the normal Transmission Procedure TP107 [5]

procedures must be followed on site to ensure the correct settings and
configurations are loaded i.e. file comparisons.

F. Following upgrade or replacement sufficient on load testing is carried out to

ensure that, as a minimum, the device is correctly reading both power systems
values and plant status , is stable and is in full communication both local and
any remote ends.

1.7 Maintenance

Maintenance shall comprise the following:

A. Secondary injection of each switching box to prove AC quantities both at the

merging units and the IEDs.

B. Testing of hardwired I/O from the switching box to the merging units and
IEDs.

C. Trip testing of all Main Protection IED’s.

A Suitable means of interrogation of the IEDs and process bus using an IEC61850
emulator is to be provided.

Test/Normal switches to assist general maintenance and fault investigation are to be

provided on all IEDs and Merging Units.

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1.8 Overview of WG5 – Protection Performance

Study

1.8.1 Introduction

The project of protection performance study is undertaken by the University of Bath

and the University of Manchester, which is sponsored by National Grid, ALSTOM
Grid, Scottish and Southern Energy and Scottish Power.

The aim of the project is to investigate, quantify and optimise the level of security,
dependability and operating speed in secondary schemes with an appropriate
IEC61850 process bus topology on a National Grid’s mesh substation as shown in
Figure 1-2.

Figure 1-2 National Grid mesh substation

1.8.2 Protection Schemes Applied in the Mesh Substation

A mesh station is a type of primary substation configuration that is economical in its

use of circuit breakers. Although there are many variants, the typical configurations

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are single switch and four switch meshes, the names inferring the number of circuit
breakers used to accomplish the layout.
A mesh corner is where busbars connect circuit breakers, transformers and feeders. A
four switch mesh has four mesh corners as shown in Figure 1-3. Feeders or
transformers connect to mesh corners via motorized disconnectors to provide
individual isolation and it is possible to have more than one transformer connected to
the mesh corner. A mesh corner would typically have a feeder and up to two
transformers connected which means with four circuit breakers. A station could be
built with 4 feeder and 8 transformer circuits. If a circuit breaker requires maintenance,
it may be taken out of the mesh without any loss of supply.

Figure 1-3 The four switch mesh substation

The main differences between the protection arrangements at a mesh substation

compared to those at a double-busbar substation concern the protection provided for
the busbar. At a mesh substation, the number of circuit breaker required to be tripped
in the event of a busbar fault is much smaller than at a double-busbar substation and

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Chapter 1 Overview of AS3 Project

the operational consequences of an inadvertent operation of the busbar protection are

very much less severe, hence there is no need for a “two out of two” logic in the
tripping sequence. The busbar protection at a mesh substation is normally of the high
impedance differential type and is arranged in a “one out of two” logic.

The National Grid mesh station has one mesh corner which is connected to a feeder
and a transformer similar as the mesh corner 1 in Figure 1-3. In the project, the mesh
corner will be protected by an IEC61850 based mesh corner protection relay. The
transformer will be protected by an IEC61850 based transformer protection relay. The
feeder will be protected by the current differential and distance protection schemes. In
these schemes, the local end of the feeder is equipped with the IEC61850 based
protection relays, and the remote end of the feeder is equipped with the conventional
protection relays.

The study assesses the security, dependability and operating speed of the process bus
based protection schemes, and compares them with the traditional hardwired schemes.
The lab tests are also be carried out to verify the performance. As a precursor to wide
deployment of the philosophy in AS3 project, it must be ensured that the performance
of the protection and control schemes using IEC61850 meets or exceeds that of its
hardwired Substation Information, Control & Protection (SICAP) predecessors.

1.8.3 Implementation Plan

The project is managed under the steering group consisting of representatives from all
parties, University of Bath, University of Manchester, National Grid, ALSTOM Grid,
Scottish and Southern Energy and Scottish Power, delivering agreed deliverables
annually in line with agreed project plan-detail in development with steering group:

Two full-time PhD students, Mr. Xin Sun supervised by Dr. Miles Redfern at
University of Bath and Ms. Li Yang supervised by Professor Peter Crossley at
University of Manchester, work on this project, with specialist support from
ALSTOM Grid and NG for applications of the new protection and control
system.

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ALSTOM Grid has free issued the new protection relays and built the panels.
The Panels are listed in Table 1-1 below.

Table 1-1 Panels and protection relays issued by ALSTOM Grid

Name of Panel Components Quantity
Feeder Local Panel IEC61850 based MiCOM P545 Distance 1
Protection Relay,
IEC61850 based MiCOM P545 Current 1
Differential Protection Relay
MiCOM P594 GPS Synchronization Unit 1
Remote Local Panel Conventional MiCOM P545 Distance 1
Protection Relay,
Conventional MiCOM P545 Current 1
Differential Protection Relay
MiCOM P594 GPS Synchronization Unit 1
HV Transformer Panel IEC61850 based MiCOM P643 Transformer 1
Protection Relay,
IEC61850 based MiCOM P841 Multifunction 1
Line Terminal IED
LV Transformer Panel IEC61850 based MiCOM P643 Transformer 1
Protection Relay
MiCOM P594 GPS synchronization unit 1
Mesh Corner Panel IEC61850 based MiCOM P645 Mesh Corner 1
Protection Relay
IEC61850 based MiCOM P841 Multifunction 1
Line Terminal IED
MiCOM P594 GPS Synchronization Unit 1

Both universities develop their abilities for detailed system testing and
demonstration.

The task of the University of Bath is testing and analyzing the protection
performance of feeder bay and transformer bay.

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Chapter 1 Overview of AS3 Project

Detailed Scope-Responsibility matrix and project plan have been developed

and are managed by the project steering group and progress meetings are held
quarterly.

Interaction with AS3 project and team via planned workshops, conferences and
seminars to all participants.

NG’s site engineers and the development engineers from key manufactures are
invited to comment on the new secondary systems during lab tests.

1.9 Design of the Process Bus Architecture

1.9.1 Introduction

A standard process bus architecture which can achieve the four primary aims and
obey the seven golden rules of AS3 project must be established, before the protection
performance study take place.

1. Allow replacement of faulty IED with minimum outage requirements.

2. Allow secondary refurbishment of a bay with minimum outage requirement.

3. Simplify isolation procedures between primary and secondary systems.

4. Reduce risks of mal-operation.

5. The design principles of the AS3 scheme must be standard for all bay types –
DBB feeder, DBB Bus Section, DBB Bus Coupler, MC Mesh Corner, MC
Transformer, MC Feeder.

6. The switching box should be located as close as possible to the Primary

equipment.

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Chapter 1 Overview of AS3 Project

7. No single activity on the MAIN 1 system shall affect the MAIN 2 system.

8. No single failure shall result in the loss of control of more than one bay.

9. Physical facilities shall be available to isolate a bay for testing (Protection &
Control).

10. The Protection and Control application/philosophy shall be functionally

identical to the existing bay solution currently provided by National Grid
suppliers.

11. All trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms (excluding
intertrip send).

Therefore, each party of the working group puts forward their own standard process
bus architecture design. In the process bus architecture design of the University of
Bath, each protection IED (main protection, backup protection and bay control unit)
and its associated MUs and CBCs are connected to one dedicated process bus, which
makes the different protection schemes are totally separated and independent.

After working with WG4 – Architecture & Reliability (PhD student Miss Uzoamaka
Anombem supervised by Doctor Haiyu Li at the University of Manchester working on
this project), a process bus architecture has been finally proposed and have already
been agreed by National Grid.

Figure 1-4 illustrated the substation communication system within feeder bay which
adopts the standard process bus architecture.

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Figure 1-4 Communication system within feeder bay using the proposed standard
process bus architecture

Where:

MP: Main Protection;

BP: Backup Protection;
BCU: Bay Control Unit;
M: Metering;
PMU: Phase Measurement Unit;
PB: Process Bus;
GPS: Global Position System;
MU: Merging Unit;
CBC: Circuit Breaker Controller;
SB: Switch Box;
CTMP: Measurement Class CT;

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Chapter 1 Overview of AS3 Project

VT: Voltage Transformer;

CB: Circuit Breaker.

The blocks on PB1 and PB2 are Ethernet switches, and the blocks on Station Bus
and Measurement Bus are gateway switches.

The gateway switches shall provide isolation for the protection bay as well as a
connection to the busbar process bus for passing on tripping instruction and to
keep the transfer trip time across bays to a minimum.

In this process bus architecture, each CT and VT is connected to a MU, while each
CB is connected to a CBC. The MU1 and CBC1 are connected to the bay process bus
1, while the MU2 and CBC2 are connected to the bay process bus 2. There is a switch
box between each CT/VT and MU and also between each CB and CBC, which is used
for isolation purposes. The protection IEDs, MP1, MP2 and BP, are connected to the
process bus and station bus. The dashed arrow shows the bay level IED process bus
connections are not dedicated, which can be switch to the other process bus when
necessary. Therefore, the MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 are totally separated and independent.
The BCU, M and PMU devices are connected to the measurement process bus. The
measurement CT MU and CBC are connected via a gateway switch to the
measurement process bus.

Figure 1-5 illustrated the substation communication system for the feeder bay and the
transformer bay.

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Figure 1-5 Communication system of feeder bay and transformer bay using the
proposed standard process bus architecture

In the transformer bay, the MP and the BP are connected to PB1 and PB2 respectively,
which are independent. There is one inter bay process bus which is the measurement
bus in this substation communication system.

Therefore, the complete communication system of the mesh corner substation is

derived as shown in Figure 1-6.

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In the feeder bay, the MP1, BP and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB1,
the MP2 and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB2, which makes the
feeder MAIN1 and MAIN2 protections totally separated and independent.

In the transformer bay, the MP and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB1,
the BP and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB2, which makes the
transformer main and back up protections totally separated and independent.

In the mesh corner bay, the MP and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB1,
the BP and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB2, which makes the mesh
corner main and back up protections totally separated and independent.

Three phases switch box is used to isolate CT/VT and MU. One phase switch box is
used to isolate CB and CBC.

All the BCUs used for control and monitoring of switchgear, transformers and other
equipments in the substation, metering devices, PMU and associated MUs and CBCs
are connected to the inter bay measurement PB. A station bus is used to provide
primary communications between the IEDs, which provide the various station
protection, control, monitoring, and logging functions. All the process buses and the
station bus are synchronized by GPS.

1.9.2 Advantages of the Standard Process Bus Architecture

The main advantages of this process bus architecture are described below in terms of
the four primary aims and seven golden rules of AS3 project.

1. Allow replacement of faulty IED with minimum outage requirements.

With the application of switching box, two independent bay process buses and
gateway switches, the, any single faulty IED can be replaced without an outage or
impacting any other IEDs.

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2. Allow secondary refurbishment of a bay with minimum outage requirement.

The secondary system of a bay can be refurbished without an outage.

3. Simplify isolation procedures between primary and secondary systems.

The primary system of a bay can be refurbished in an isolated way.

4. Reduce risks of mal-operation.

By using the independent MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 protection systems, each

protection IED is capable of tripping the circuit breaker. Therefore, the risk of
mal-operation is reduced.

5. The design principles of the AS3 scheme must be standard for all bay types –
DBB feeder, DBB Bus Section, DBB Bus Coupler, MC Mesh Corner, MC
Transformer, MC Feeder.

The process bus architecture is proposed as a standard for all bay types.

6. The switching box should be located as close as possible to the Primary

equipment.

The switching box is capable of being located next to the Primary equipment

7. No single activity on the MAIN 1 system shall affect the MAIN 2 system.

The MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 systems are totally separated and independent.

8. No single failure shall result in the loss of control of more than one bay.

All the BCUs are connected to the inter-bay process bus and station bus through
gateway switches. Any single failure would influence one BCU at most.

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9. Physical facilities shall be available to isolate a bay for testing.

The application of switching box and gateway switches can fulfil this requirement.

10. The Protection and Control application/philosophy shall be functionally

identical to the existing bay solution currently provided by National Grid
suppliers.

The new substation communication system will not influence the protection and
control schemes that the substations are using at the moment.

11. All trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms (excluding
intertrip send).

This rule will be tested and demonstrated in the following chapters

1.10 Objectives and Contributions of This Study

This research is focusing on the communications needs associated with the protection
scheme for an EHV mesh-corner operated by a transmission network operator. The
main objectives of this project are shown below:

1. The design and implementation of the different process bus topologies as

applied to the mesh-corner protection.

As described in section 1.9 above, the double bay process bus architecture (PB1
and PB2) is established. However, there are different Ethernet LAN topologies
which can be applied on the design of PB1 and PB2.

In this study, the mesh-corner substation model is built by using the Real Time
Digital Simulator (RTDS) software. Different process bus communication systems
are built for the University of Bath’s RTDS hardware and IEDs.

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Chapter 1 Overview of AS3 Project

2. The reliability and availability analysis of the different process bus

communication topologies.

The reliability and availability of the different process bus topologies are
calculated and analyzed before tested on the experiment platform.

3. The performance of an Ethernet switched communication networks in terms of

communications volume and latency.

Different process bus topologies are modelled by using the OPNET

communication network simulation tool. The latency of each process bus topology
is estimated in terms of the communication volume.

4. The effects on the protection scheme performance in respect to limitations in

the communications volume and its latency.

Adopting different process bus topologies, the performance of the protection

relays with different protection schemes are evaluated in terms of the
communication volume.

The main contributions of this study can be summarized below:

1. Configuration of various existing and new substation automation system, SAS,

process bus structures.

2. Modelling of these using commercially available simulation tools. These

configurable IED models allow the engineers to easily build SAS network
model with different topologies for all kinds of substations, so that the
dynamic performance issues could be studied and rules could be developed to
guide the SAS network planning and design.

3. Investigation of the impact of the various process bus structures on the power
system network operator’s primary operation aims and the golden rules.

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1.11 Thesis Outline

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:

Chapter two describes the development, concept, and major benefits of

IEC61850. It also compares the conventional substation protection system with the
IEC16850 based protection system.

Chapter three evaluates the performance of IEC61850 based and conventional

relays using a commercial Test Universe. Two feeder protection schemes, distance
and current differential protection schemes, are involved in the tests. The trip times of
both relays are recorded and mean trip times are calculated.

Chapter four describes three different process bus topologies, their

implementations and their relative advantages and disadvantages. It also puts forward
mean time to failure and availability analysis of a transmission line protection scheme
using different Ethernet based process bus topologis based on the reliability block
diagram method, RBD.

Chapter five evaluates the performance of SV messages over the three Ethernet
switch based process bus topologies by using OPNET communication network
simulation tool. In these tests, ETE delay of the SV messages under normal and
process bus overload conditions are simulated.

Chapter six evaluates the performance of different protection schemes, which

include distance protection scheme, feeder current differential protection scheme and
transformer current differential protection scheme, with cascaded, star and ring
process bus architecture using RTDS Simulator. It also examines the performance of
the IEC61850 relay when the data transfer traffic on the process bus exceeds its
capability and data packets are therefore lost.

Chapter seven summarizes the key findings from the research and the major
contributions of the work and provides some potential research topics in IEC61850.

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T
HIS chapter introduces the development, concept, and key
benefits of IEC61850.

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2.1 IEC61850 – Communication Networks and

Systems in Substation

2.1.1 The Development of IEC61850

Communication has always played a critical role in the real-time operation of the
power system. In the beginning, the telephone was used to transmit the transmission
line loads back to the control centre, and also to dispatch the instructions to be
performed by the operators at substations. Telephone-switching based remote control
units were carried out as early as the 1930’s and were able to provide status and
control for a few points. As digital communications in substations became practical in
the 1960’s, the data acquisition systems (DAS) were installed to automatically collect
measurement data from the substations. Because bandwidth was limited, DAS
communication protocols were only optimized to operate over low-bandwidth
communication channels. Therefore, the time that it would take to configure, map and
document the location of the various data bits received by the protocol was relatively
long, which was the “cost” of this optimization.

Since the mid 1970s, power system engineers have sought ways to use
microprocessors to improve the control, protection, and monitoring of power system
substations. This led to the rapid development of the modern microprocessor relays.
The microprocessors combine the advantages of semiconductor technology with the
flexibility of the digital computer. Software offers considerable flexibility in scheme
logic and the possibility of switching selectable scheme logics and operating
characteristics. Hardware provides for general purpose system and standardized
protection platforms. It enables relays to be easily modified to meet new and varied
requirement of particular customers, by changing the software without the need to
redesign the relay’s hardware.

Modern microprocessor relays integrate multiple functions, such as protection,

control, automation, metering, digital fault recording and reporting, and are therefore
able to efficiently accommodate various power system services. For this reason, they
are also referred to as Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) which are widely used in
today’s electrical protection systems.

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The development of IEDs and network communication technologies led to the success
of substation automation system (SAS), which could facilitate the effective substation
monitoring, local & remote control, protection, primary equipment condition
monitoring and many other functions that couldn’t be easily realized with
conventional protection and control devices.

Since stepping into a digital era, literally thousands of analogue and digital data points
are available in a single IED and the communication bandwidth is not a limiting factor
any more. At present, it is common that the communication data paths between
substations and master can operate at 64,000 bits per second, and it is obvious that it
will migrate to the data paths with much higher rates. With this migration in
technology, the “cost” component of a data acquisition system has now become the
configuration and documentation component. Therefore, a key component of a
communication system is able to describe themselves from both a data and services
(communications functions that an IED performs) perspective. Other key
requirements include:

High-speed IED to IED communication

Network operation throughout the utility enterprise

High-availability

Guaranteed delivery times

Standards based

Multi-vendor interoperability

Support for Voltage and Current samples data

Support for File Transfer

Auto-configurable / configuration support

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Support for security

The absence of a common communication protocol has already become a major

deterrent for the use of communication in SAS. Until recently, manufacturers were
using their own proprietary communication protocols. Therefore, a huge investment
was needed to develop costly and complicated protocol converters [6]. It has been
estimated that across that information technology industry around US$82 billion was
spent on application integration in 1998, which amounted to 40% of the corporate IT
budgets [7]. To address these SAS issues, an international communication standard is
imperative.

The work on the development of a next generation communication architecture began

with the establishment of the Utility Communication Architecture (UCA) in 1988.
The result of this work was a profile of recommended protocols for the various layers
of the International Standards Organization (ISO) Open System Interconnection (OSI)
communication system model. This architecture resulted in the definition of a profile
of protocols, data models and abstract services definitions that became the UCA. The
concepts and fundamental work done in UCA became the foundation for the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee Number 57
(TC 57), this developed and maintained international standards for power system
control, distribution automation, teleprotection, and associated information exchange
for real-time and non-real-time information, used in the planning, operation and
maintenance of power systems. Working Group 10 (WG10) of TC 57 launched the
International Standard – IEC61850 – Communication Networks and Systems in
Substations in 1995, and the first edition issued in 2002. The scope of each IEC61850
related working group is described below.

1. TC 57 Working Group 10: Power systems IED communication and associated data
models [8]

Scope: To develop communication standards for substations – Functional architecture

and general requirements.

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2. TC 57 Working Group 13: Energy management system application program

interface (EMS – API) [8]

Scope: To produce standard interface specification for “plug-in” application for an

electric utility power control centre Energy management System (EMS) or other
system performing the same or similar functions. A “plug-in” application is defined to
be software that may be installed on a system with minimal effort and no modification
of source code. This standard facilitates installation of the same application program
on different platforms by reducing the efforts currently required.

3. TC 57 Working Group 14: System interfaces for distribution management (SIDM)

[8]

Scope: Identify and establish requirements of standard interfaces of a Distribution

Management System (DMS) based on an interface architecture. The standard is the
first in a series of standards that, taken as a whole, define Distribution Management
Systems. Subsequent standards will be developed in accordance with the interfaces
defined in this task.

4. TC 57 Working Group 15: Data and communication security [8]

Scope: Undertake the development of standards for security of the communication

protocols defined by the IEC TC 57.

5. TC 57 Working Group 17: Communications Systems for Distribution Energy

Resources (DER) [8]

Scope: Undertake the development of IEC61850 information models to be used in the

exchange of information with distributed energy resources (DER).

6. TC 57 Working Group 18: Hydroelectric power plants – Communication for

monitoring and control [8]

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Scope: IEC61850-7-410 is part of the IEC61850 series. This part of IEC61850

specifies the additional common data classes, logical nodes and data objects required
for the use of IEC61850 in hydropower plant.

7. TC 57 Working Group 19: Interoperability within TC 57 in the long term [8]

Scope: Harmonization of IEC61850 and common information model

The standard IEC61850 “Communication networks and systems in substation” has

been published by IEC between 2003 and 2005. This global communication standard
for the SAS, defines the communication protocol, data format, and the configuration
language, thus provides the interoperability within power substation. In an IEC61850
based substation automation system, the cables which carry binary or analogue
information between different equipments will be replaced with a standardized
communication.

2.1.2 The Scope and Outline of IEC61850

The stated scope of IEC61850 was communications within the substation. The
document defines the various aspects of substation communication network in 10
major sections as show in Table 2-1 [9].

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Table 2-1 Scope of IEC61850

Part # Title
1 Introduction and Overview
2 Glossary of Terms
3 General Requirements
4 System and Project Management
5 Communication Requirements for Functions and Device Models
6 Configuration Description Language for Communication in Electrical
Substations Related to Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)
7 Basic Communication Structure for Substation and Feeder Equipment
7.1 - Principles and Models
7.2 - Abstract Communication Service Interface (ASCI)
7.3 - Common Data Classes (CDC)
7.4 - Compatible Logical Node Classes and Data Classes
8 Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM)
8.1 - Mapping to MMS (ISO/IEC 9506 – Part 1 and Part 2) and to ISO/IEC
8802-3
9 Specific communication Service Mapping (SCSM)
9.1 - Sample Values over Serial Unidirectional Multidrop Point-to-Point Link
9.2 - Sample Values over ISO/IEC 8802-3
10 Conformance Testing

Part 1 and 2: Provide an overview to the IEC61850 standard and contain the glossary
of the terminology used in the different parts of the standard [10].

Parts 3, 4, and 5 of the standard identify the general and specific functional
requirements for communications in a substation. These requirements are then used as
forcing functions to aid in the identification of the services and data models needed,
application protocol required, and the underlying transport, network, data link, and
physical layers that will meet the overall requirements [11].

From a system perspective, a significant amount of configuration is required to put all

the pieces together and make them work. In order to facilitate this process and

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eliminate the human error, part 6 defines a Substation Configuration Language (SCL)
which is based on the eXtensible Makeup Language (XML) to describe the
configuration of IEC61850 based system. SCL specifies a hierarchy of configuration
files that enable multiple levels of the system to be described in unambiguous and
standardized XML files. The various SCL files include system specification
description (SSD), IED capability description (ICD), substation configuration
description (SCD), and configured IED description (CID) files. All these files are
constructed in the same methods and format but have different scopes depending on
the need.

Part 7 provides the basic communication structure for substation and feeder
equipment, including the principles and data models, the Common Data Classes
(CDC), the Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) and the compatible
logical node and data classes [12] [13] [14].

To ease understanding, the data model of the IEC61850 IED can be viewed as a
hierarchy of information as shown in Figure 2-1. The categories and naming of this
information is standardized in the IEC61850 specification.

Figure 2-1 Data model layers in IEC61850

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The levels of this hierarchy can be described as follows:

1) Physical device: identifies the actual IED within a system. Typically the device’s
name or IP address can be used (for example Feeder_1 or 10.0.0.1).

2) Logical device: identifies groups of related Logical Nodes within the Physical
Devices.

3) Wrapper/logical node instance: identifies the major functional areas within the
IEC61850 data model. Either 3 or 6 characters are used as a prefix to define the
functional (wrapper) while the actual functionality is identified by a 4 character
Logical Node name suffixed by an instance number. For example, XCBR1
(circuit breaker), MMXU1 (measurements), FrqPTOF2 (overfrequency
protection, stage 2)

4) Data object: this next layer is used to identify the type of data you will be
presented with. For example, Pos (position) of Logical Node type XCBR.

5) Data attribute: this is the actual data (measurement value, status, description,
etc.). For example, stVal (status value) indicating actual position of circuit
breaker for Data Object type Pos of Logical Node type XCBR.

“Abstracting” the definition of the data items and services which can create data
items/objects and services that are independent of any underlying protocols is the
major architectural construction that IEC61850 adopts. The abstract definitions allow
“mapping” of the data objects and services to any other protocol which can meet the
data and service requirement. The definition of the abstract services is found in
IEC61850 part 7.2. The two relevant ACSI services are show below:

1. Transmission of sampled values model

MULTICAST-SAMPLE-VALUE-CONTROL-BLOCK:
SendMSVMessage; GetMSVCBValues; SetMSVCBValues

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UNICAST-SAMPLE-VALUE-CONTROL-BLOCK
SendUSVMessage; GetUSVCBValues; SetUSVCBValues

2. Generic substation event model (GSE)

Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE):

SendGOOSEMessage; GetGoReference; GetGOOSEElementNumber;
GetGoCBValues; SetGoCBValues

Generic Substation State Event (GSSE):

SendGSSEMessage; GetGsReference; GetGSSEDataOffset; GetGsCBValues;
SetGsCBValues

The abstraction of the data objects (referred to as Logical Nodes) is found in

IEC61850 part 7.4. Because most data objects are made up of common pieces, such as
Status, Control, Measurement and Substitution, etc. the concept of CDC is developed
to define common building blocks for creating the larger data objects. The CDC
elements are defined in part 7.3. In short, the part 7 achieves the naming of the
massive data and forming of data objects and services.

The abstract data and object models of IEC61850 define a standardized method of
describing power system devices that enables all IEDs to present data using identical
structures that are directly related to their power system function. The ACSI models
of IEC61850 define a set of services and the responses to those services that enable all
IEDs to behave in an identical manner from the network behaviour perspective. While
the abstract model is critical to achieving this level of interoperability, these models
need to be operated over a real set of protocols that are practical to implement and that
can operate within the computing environments commonly found in the power
industry.

IEC61850 Part 8.1 defines the mapping of the abstract data object and services onto
the Manufacturing Messaging Specification (MMS) of ISO9506 [9]. MMS is the only
public (ISO standard) protocol that has proven implementation track record that can
easily support the complex naming and service models of IEC61850. Although

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IEC61850 can be theoretically mapped to any protocols, this mapping can get very
complex and cumbersome when IEC61850 objects and services are tried to be
mapped to a protocol that only provides read/write/report services for simple variables
that are accessed by register numbers or index numbers. That was the reason why
MMS was chosen for UCA in 1991 and kept for IEC61850.

In addition to the mapping to the application layer, IEC61850 Part 8.1 defines profiles
for the “other” layers of the communication stack that are dependent on the service
provided which is shown in Figure 2-2. the Sampled Values and GOOSE applications
map directly into the Ethernet data frame thereby eliminating processing of any
middle layers; the MMS Connection Oriented layer can operate over TCP/IP or ISO;
the Generic Substation Status Event (GSSE) is the identical implementation as the
UCA GOOSE and operates over connectionless ISO services; all data maps onto an
Ethernet data frame using either the data type “Ethertype” in the case of Sampled
Values, GOOSE, TimeSync, and TCP/IP or “802.3” data type for the ISO and GSSE
messages. IEC61850 Part 8.1 defines which is known as the station bus.

Figure 2-2 Overview of IEC61850 functionality and associated communication profiles

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IEC61850 Parts 9.1 and 9.2 define the mapping of the Sample Measured Values
(unidirectional point-to-point and bi-directional multipoint accordingly) onto an
Ethernet data frame [16]. The IEC61850 part 9.2 defines what has become known as
the process bus.

The IEC61850 part 9.2 is only restricted to the mapping of the ASCI model for the
transmission of sampled values. However, to get full benefit of the process bus,
additional ASCI models need to be supported in accordance to the IEC61850 part 8.1.
In short, IEC61850 parts 9.2 and 8.1 can be used onto the process bus simultaneously.

Finally, the IEC61850 part 10 defines a testing methodology in order to determine

“conformance” with the numerous protocol definitions and constraints defined in the
document [9].

The standard defines and offers much more than just a protocol. It provides:

standardized models for IEDs and other equipment within the substation;

standardized communication services (the methods used to access and

exchange data);

standardized formats for configuration files;

peer-to-peer (e.g. relay to relay) communication.

The standard includes mapping of data onto Ethernet. The use of Ethernet in the
substation offers many advantages, the most significant ones are shown below [17].

high-speed data rates (currently 100Mbit/s, rather than 10’s of kbits/s or less
used by most serial protocols);

multiple masters (called “clients”);

Ethernet is an open standard in every-day use.

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2.1.3 The Application of the Process Bus

Ethernet technology has evolved from the initial CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Detection) mechanism to native switched-base Ethernet, which
is almost collision free [18]. This advanced networking protocol can now be designed
with deterministic transmission times, suitable for real-time and mission-critical tasks.
Contemporary switched Ethernet Local Area Networks (LANs) is able to create a full-
duplex and collision-free communication environment, by means of twisted paired
optical fibre cables and separate Ethernet switch. Therefore, the development of
Ethernet technology provides an opportunity to design a new communication system
for power system protection applications.

The IEC61850 part 8.1 and part 9.2 defines two real-time peer-to-peer communication
messaging protocol which are GOOSE messages and Sample Value (SV) messages.
Both GOOSE and SV messages behave in a multicast mode which permits
simultaneous delivery of the same event message to multiple recipient IEDs through
the process bus which is an Ethernet LAN.

Hardwired interface between the primary transducers and the secondary protection
devices is the basis of the existing protection system. IEC61850 introduces a
communication based interface between instrument transformers, circuit breakers and
IEDs. According to the concept of IEC61850, a substation distribution protection
system is separated into three distinct levels: substation level, bay/unit level and
process level. The three levels of functional hierarchy of IEC61850 are shown in
Figure 2-3. These include:

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Figure 2-3 Functional hierarchy of IEC61850 based SAS

- Process level: This level includes switchyard equipments such as CTs / VTs,
Remote I/O, actuators, etc.

- Bay level: Bay level includes protection and control IEDs of different bays.

- Station level: The functions requiring data from more than one bay are
implemented at this level.

In the process layer, all the information such as instrument transformer output and
status from breakers and switches are gathered. IEC61850 defines the collection of
these data through two different protocols. Part 9.1 defines a Unidirectional Multidrop
Point-to-Point fixed link carrying a fixed dataset. Part 9.2 defines a configurable
dataset which can be transmitted on a multi-cast basis from one publisher to multiple
subscribers.

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Figure 2-4 Process bus concept [9]

Figure 2-4 illustrates the basic concept of the process bus. The interface of the
instrument transformers which include both conventional and non-conventional ones
with different types of substation protection, control, monitoring and recording
equipment is through a device which is called Merging Unit (MU). The Merging Unit
is defined in IEC61850-9-1 as: “Merging unit: interface unit that accepts multiple
analogue CT/VT and binary inputs and produces multiple time synchronized serial
unidirectional multi-drop digital point to point outputs to provide data communication
via the logical interfaces.” The Merging Units sample the signals at an agreed,
synchronized rate. Therefore, any IED can input data from multiple MUs and
automatically align and process the data. There is an implementation agreement that
defines a base sample rate of 80 samples per power system cycle for basic protection
and monitoring and a “high” rate of 256 samples per power system cycle for high-
frequency applications such as power quality and high-resolution oscillography.

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Merging Units have the following functions:

signal processing of all sensors - conventional or non-conventional;

synchronization of all measurements - 3 currents and 3 voltages;

analogue interface – high and low level signals, IEC61850 9-2;

digital interface - IEC 60044-8 [9].

IEC61850 part 9.1 specifies a preconfigured or “universal” dataset as defined in

IEC60044-8. This dataset includes 3-phase voltage, bus voltage, neutral voltage, 3-
phase currents for protection, 3-phase currents for measurement and two 16-bit status
words. Note that the analogue data values are mapped into 16 bits register in this
mapping.

IEC61850 part 9.2 is a more generalized implementation of SV data transfer. In part

9.2, the dataset or “payload” is user-defined by using the SCL. As a dataset, data
values of various sizes and types can be integrated together.

However, IEC61850-9-2 is restricted to the transmission of SVs. To get full benefit of

the process bus, the transmission of GOOSE messages need to be supported in
accordance to the IEC61850 8-1 [19] [20] [21]. In this manner, the Circuit Breaker
Controllers (CBC) which receive the GOOSE messages from protection IEDs to
control the circuit breakers are able to share the process bus Ethernet LAN with the
MUs.

In brief, the data from conventional or optical/electronic sensors as well as status

information is collected and converted to digital representation, and formatted for
subsequent transmission via the process bus LAN [22]. The collection points can be
redundant Ethernet switches that support Ethernet priority and Ethernet Virtual LAN
(VLAN) [23]. Process Level information is then communicated over the LAN to the
protection and control devices which are located at the Bay/Unit Level. Protective

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functions are performed at the Bay Level. By applying the new standard, an integrated
protection system can be established.

2.2 IEC61850 Based Substation Protection System

2.2.1 Conventional Substation Systems

The existing protection schemes are based on hardwired interface between the
primary substation equipment, such as transformers, breakers, instrument
transformers, etc. and the secondary protection and control devices [24] [25] [26]. A
simplified diagram of the communication architecture of conventional strategy is
shown in Figure 2-5.

Figure 2-5 Communication architecture of a conventional substation protection system

In the conventional strategy, the CTs and VTs will transfer the analogue values or
digital values to the interface module which includes both the analogue and digital
input module through hardwires. After processing of the protection module, the output
module will send control commands to other electrical equipments, such as trip a
circuit breaker, also through hardwires. The Human Machine Interface (HMI) is
directly installed in the protection relay in this strategy.

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Considering the requirements for redundancy in protection functions, in conventional

protection systems numerous primary and backup protection devices need to be
installed, wired to the substation equipments.

The interface requirements of the relays are separate from these of the metering
devices. As a result, they need their own instrument transformers which allow a wide
dynamic range of fault currents.

2.2.2 The Integrated Protection System

The modern microprocessor relays (IEDs) are able to accomplish more protection
functions within one protective device. There are functionalities in different units,
such as protection, metering, automation, control, digital fault recording and
reporting. This research of integrated function is focused on the protection of
individual components, not multiple apparatuses. Recently, the dramatic development
in signal processing ability of hardware platform, the availability of suitable
communication schemes and the introduction of non conventional instrument
transformers has enabled the establishment of new concepts of power system
protection. Therefore, the research of the new integrated protection system is
encouraged, which is considered unsuitable in the past. The results show that the
information obtained from multiple power system components can be used for new
protection principles and schemes, which could have significant benefits over the
existing techniques [27] [28] [29].

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Figure 2-6 Communication architecture of a conventional substation protection system

Figure 2-6 illustrates a new advanced protection scheme which integrates all the
protection functions for a substation busbar into one relay to form a centralized
protection system. In this system, all the essential measured information collected
from multiple lines in the substation busbar are sent to a centralized integrated relay
unit through a redundant communication network for the implementation of multi-
protection functions. In the fault situation, the relay would process the data and then
send trip commands and control signals back to the circuit breakers to trip the faulty
line. Therefore, real time and dependable transmission of the sampled values and trip
signals through the network becomes an essential part of the integrated protection
communication system.

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2.2.3 IEC61850 Based Substation Systems

By applying the IEC61850 based solutions, a significant improvement in functionality

and reduction of the cost of integrated substation protection and control systems can
be achieved. In these solutions, the interface of the instrument transformers which
include both conventional and non-conventional ones with different types of
substation protection, control, monitoring and recording equipment is through a
Merging Unit. MUs could be physically located either in the field or in the control
house.

It is very important to be able to interface with both the conventional and non-
conventional sensors in order to allow the implementation of the system in both
existing and new substations.

A simplified diagram of the communication architecture of an IEC61850 based

substation protection system is shown in Figure 2-7.

Figure 2-7 Communication architecture of an IEC61850 based substation protection

system

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In this architecture, the MUs multicast sets of sampled values and status information
of breakers and switches to multiple IEDs in the substation through the process bus.
Ethernet switches deliver datasets to only those switch ports/IEDs that have
subscribed to the data.

After receiving the sampled values, the protection IEDs process the data and make
decisions regarding the fault detection, faulted phase selection and protection
operation, and then transmit the instructions as required. The typical actions include
operating their relay output or sending a high-speed peer-to-peer GOOSE message to
other IEDs in order to trip a breaker or initiate some other protection or control
functions, such as breaker failure protection, autoreclosing, etc.

At the substation level, the station bus provides primary communications between the
various Logical Nodes, which provide the various station protection, control,
monitoring, and logging functions.

Finally, this architecture supports remote network access for all types of data. As all
communication is network enabled, multiple remote “clients” will desire access the
wide variety of available information. Typical clients would include local HMI,
operations, maintenance, engineering, and planning. The remote access point is one
logical location to implement security functions such as encryption and authentication.
This implementation unburdens the individual IEDs from performing encryption on
internal data transfers but still provide security on all external transactions.

2.2.4 Future Developments in IEC61850 Based Protection Schemes

IEC61850 has grown out of the world of computing and communications. Many of
the future developments in protection relaying and the associated areas of sub-station
control and metering will mirror developments in computing. The overriding driving
forces will be financial, in terms of lower equipment prices, ease of manufacture,
lower installation costs, ease of installation, ease of commissioning, maintenance,
updating, and finally de-commissioning and replacement with future systems.

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There are many challenges in the general management of protection and control
schemes which will have to be re-examined in adopting the concepts included in
IEC61850.

Health and safety considerations are paramount in the management of protection

systems. Electrical systems are inherently dangerous and several elements associated
with protection are potentially a health and safety hazard. CTs are the obvious
example.

Any activity associated with the protection systems has a potential impact on the
working of the primary plant. If a system outage can be avoided, there are great cost
savings. Can maintenance and refurbishment work be undertaken with the primary
plant remaining live? It is achieved in the world of computer networks, therefore how
can it be done in power systems?

Although the computing and communications world provides an existing roadmap,

there will be situations where power system and protection considerations will
demand different solutions. Also, different utilities will demand solutions which meet
their particular considerations. The software solutions preferred by the computer
worlds may not be acceptable to all power system and protection engineers. In some
cases, hardware isolation may be demanded.

Relay development is one area where there may well be many interesting
developments. Will the ‘relay’ of the future be recognised as a relay as understood
today?

Modern relays, albeit invariably microprocessor based and fully equipped for high
level communications, still resemble the relays of many generations ago. They have
inputs from current and/or voltage transducers, they have output closing contacts, they
have a decision making capability and they have a human-machine interface.

In the ‘relay’ shown in Figure 2-8, the protection IED is interfaced to the current and
voltage transducers via merging units and the process bus. The output closing contacts
are also interfaced using the process bus, merging units and actuators. The IED is

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reduced to the processing element and the human-machine interface, as shown in

Figure 2-9.

Figure 2-8 The substation communication system

Figure 2-9 The IEC61850 application of IED relay

The immediate opportunity is to relocate the physical human-machine interface. The

human-machine interface need not be a dedicated piece of hardware, but simply one
of many screens included in the management and control system. Whenever an
engineer needs to examine settings, they could access the screen either in the control

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centre or in the sub-station. This would include facilities to adjust settings and extract
any stored data.

The ‘relay’ or protection IED will consist of a suitable processing unit alone, a
protection processor. It could be a dedicated protection system processor, or if
developments follow the trends seen in the computer world, it is more likely that it
will be a general purpose processor system, designed for the environment and more
than capable of handling the variety of tasks that it could be called upon to undertake.

This development would immediately provide a cost saving in terms of ‘relay’

hardware. A general purpose IED would be expected to satisfy a variety of protection,
control and metering duties. Its specific role would be defined by the software it uses.
This commonality of hardware would immediately offer further potential cost savings.

This would also provide a cost saving in terms of housing the ‘relay’ systems since
there would be no need to have general access to the equipment to examine the front
panel for the human-machine interface.

Figure 2-10 The use of multiple IEDs

The system using a variety of IEDs providing the processing capability for protection,
control and metering is illustrated in Figure 2-10. The specific role of each IED would

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be defined by the specific system configuration as set by the system designer or

operator. All of these IEDs will be designed for the sub-station environment.
Provided that they have the processing capability, they could perform protection,
control or metering duties.

Similar considerations could be adapted for merging units, transducers, actuators and
status contacts. The concepts of ‘plug and play’ could be adopted by the sub-station
designers.

Accepting the fundamental requirement that the IEDs must have the ability to handle
the processing required for the specific applications, the choice of processor or
processors becomes irrelevant. This ensures that they are future proofed and earlier
IEDs can be replaced by more modern equivalents.

Similarly, IEDs from different manufacturers should be interchangeable, including

devices from new entrants to the market. The over-riding considerations being are
they designed for the sub-station environment and are they able to undertake their
duties.

In addition to the aims of IEC61850, such a system provides a platform for the
realisation of automatic self-healing protection, control and metering systems. Built in
testing facilities are virtually universal in microprocessor based equipment. Should an
IED’s application detect that that device is suspect and could be faulty, this could be
communicated to the management and control systems and that IED could be flagged
for replacement. This could be done by system engineers or it could be done under a
predefined automatic procedure. Again, such procedures are available in today’s
computer systems. If accepted by the power system engineers, they could be readily
adopted.

A further opportunity is the provision of automatic adaptive protection. The sub-

station’s management and control systems will have direct communications with local
protection and control as well as communications with other systems, hence there will
be the opportunity of using this to automatically reassess protection settings and
change them as appropriate.

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2.3 Benefits of IEC61850

Justifying substation automation investments is one of the significant challenges

which the substation engineers face. The positive impacts of automation which
includes operating costs, increased power quality, and reduce outage responses are
well known. However, little attention is paid to how a communication standard could
impact on the cost of building and operating the substation. Former communication
protocols were typically developed with the dual objectives of providing the necessary
functions required by electric power systems while minimizing the number of bytes
used by the protocol. That was because when many of those protocols were initially
developed, severe bandwidth limitations were typical for the serial link technology of
10 to 15 years ago. Later, as the Ethernet and modern networking protocols like
TCP/IP became widespread, these protocols were adapted. The approach provided the
same basic electric power system capabilities as the serial link version while bringing
the advantages of modern networking technologies to the substation. But this
approach has fundamental flaw; the protocols being used were still designed to
minimize the bytes on the wire and do not take advantage of the dramatic increase in
bandwidth of modern networking technologies which provide a higher level of
functionality that can significantly reduce the implementation and operational costs of
substation automation.

IEC61850 is not a former serial link protocol recast onto TCP/IP-Ethernet. IEC61850
was designed from the ground up to operate over modern networking technologies
and delivers an unprecedented amount of functionality which is not available from
former communication protocols. The unique characteristics of IEC61850 have a
direct and positive impact on the cost to design, build, install, commission, and
operate power systems. To better understand the specific benefits, some of the key
features and capabilities of IEC61850 will be examined and then how these result in
significant benefits that cannot be achieved with the former approaches will be
explained.

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2.3.1 Key Features

The features and characteristics of IEC61850 that enable numerous advantages to all
involved in the power industry. Some of these characteristics are seemingly small but
are able to make tremendous impacts on substation automation systems. For instance,
the use of VLANs and priority flags for GOOSE and SV enable much more intelligent
use of Ethernet switches which cannot be achieved with other approaches. Therefore,
some of the key features that provide significant benefits to users are listed below [9].

Use of a Virtualized Model. The virtualized model of logical devices, logical

nodes, ACSI, and CDCs enables definition of the data, services, and behaviour
of devices to be defined in addition to the protocols that are used to define how
the data is transmitted over the network.

Use of Names for All Data. Every element of IEC61850 data is named using
descriptive strings to describe the data. Legacy protocols, on the other hand,
tend to identify data by storage location and use index numbers, register
numbers and the like to describe data.

All Object Names are Standardized and Defined in a Power System

Context. The names of the data in the IEC61850 device are not dictated by the
device vendor or configured by the user. All names are defined in the standard
and provided in a power system context that enables the engineer to
immediately identify the meaning of data without having to define mappings
that relate index numbers and register numbers to power system data like
voltage and current.

Devices are Self-Describing. Client applications that communicate with

IEC61850 devices are able to download the description of all the data
supported by the device from the device without any manual configuration of
data objects or names.

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High-Level Services. ACSI supports a wide variety of services that far

exceeds what is available in the typical legacy protocol. GOOSE, GSSE, SV,
and logs are just a few of the unique capabilities of IEC61850.

Standardized Configuration Language. SCL enables the configuration of a

device and its role in the power system to be precisely defined using XML
files.

2.3.2 Major Benefits

By understanding and taking full advantage of the key features of IEC61850

described above, significant benefits of IEC61850 can be realized [9].

Eliminate Procurement Ambiguity. Not only can SCL be used to configure

devices and power systems, SCL can also be used to precisely define user
requirement for substations and devices. Using SCL a user can specify exactly
and unambiguously what is expected to be provided in each device that is not
subject to misinterpretation by suppliers.

Lower Installation Cost. IEC61850 enables devices to quickly exchange data

and status using GOOSE and GSSE over the station LAN without having to
wire separate links for each relay. This significantly reduces wiring costs by
more fully utilizing the station LAN bandwidth for these signals and
construction costs by reducing the need for trenching, ducts, conduit, etc.

Lower Transducer Costs. Rather than requiring separate transducers for each
device needing a particular signal, a single merging unit supporting SV can
deliver these signals to many devices using a single transducer lowering
transducer, wiring, calibration, and maintenance costs.

Lower Commissioning Costs. The cost to configure and commission devices

is drastically reduced because IEC61850 devices do not require as much
manual configuration as legacy devices. Client applications no longer need to

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be manually configured for each point they need to access because they can
retrieve the points list directly from the device or import it via an SCL file.
Many applications require nothing more than setting up a network address in
order to establish communications. Most manual configuration is eliminated
drastically reducing errors and rework.

Lower Equipment Migration Costs. Because IEC61850 defines more of

the externally visible aspects of the devices besides just the encoding of data
on the wire, the cost for equipment migrations is minimized. Behavioural
differences from one brand of device to another is minimized and, in some
cases, completely eliminated. All devices share the same naming conventions
minimizing the reconfiguration of client applications when those devices are
changed.

Lower Extension Costs. Because IEC61850 devices do not have to be

configured to expose data, new extensions are easily added into the substation
without having to reconfigure devices to expose data that was previously not
accessed. Adding devices and applications into an existing IEC61850 system
can be done with only a minimal impact, if any, on any of the existing
equipment.

Lower Integration Costs. By utilizing the same networking technology

that is being widely used across the utility enterprise the cost to integrate
substation data into the enterprise is substantially reduced. Rather than
installing costly RTUs that have to be manually configured and maintained for
each point of data needed in control centre and engineering office application,
IEC61850 networks are capable of delivering data without separate
communications front-ends or reconfiguring devices.

Implement New Capabilities. The advanced services and unique features

of IEC61850 enable new capabilities that are simply not possible with most
legacy protocols. Wide area protection schemes that would normally be cost
prohibitive become much more feasible. Because devices are already
connected to the substation LAN, the incremental cost for accessing or sharing

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more device data becomes insignificant enabling new and innovative

applications that would be too costly to produce otherwise.

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T
HIS chapter evaluates the performance of conventional
protection system and IEC61850 based protection system using
standard protection test equipment.

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3.1 Introduction

The implementation of IEC61850 in the substation can be defined as partial, hybrid

and complete. Partial implementation is defined as the case that the IED supports only
station bus communications, while the analogue signals are based on conventional
hard wiring. Hybrid implementation is the case that the IED has process and station
bus interface, but the execution of the trip function is based on hard wires between the
relay outputs and the breaker trip coil. Complete implementation means that the IED
has communication based interface only. The difference between the complete
implementation and the hybrid case is that tripping is achieved by a GOOSE message
sent to the breaker control device that performs the actual breaker tripping [30], [31].

Before the design and evaluation of different process bus topologies, the basic
performance of the IEDs needs to be tested and demonstrated. The results of these
tests could be used as a benchmark for the future investigation.

In this chapter, the three different implementations of the IEC61850 based IEDs and
the conventional hardwired protection relays are tested by using the commercial test
set. For the relays with the IEC61850-9-2 SV interface, a simple star process bus
topology is adopted as shown in Figure 3-1.

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Figure 3-1 ALSTOM proposed process bus architecture

3.2 Commercial Test Set

Test sets used in such applications are required to have the functionality to perform
coordinated and precisely synchronised tasks as a part of a distributed, system wide
test facility.

The utilisation of system configuration information, the GOOSE mechanism, Sampled

Values and Client/Server SCADA Communication introduce several new issues for
testing the next generation of relays [32]. The most obvious change is the different
way of wiring to obtain the signals. The availability of machine readable, system wide
configuration information enables new, automated procedures for the configuration of
tests.

The system configuration language implemented by IEC61850 standard defines a file

format that describes the components of the substation and the protection and
automation system in a way that allows most of the engineering tasks to be performed
automatically.

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The commercial test universe hardware and software used the OMICRON CMC 256+
as shown in Figure 3-2, are very well adopted in protection relays testing. It utilise the
NetSim (Network Simulator) Software [32], which provides predefined Test Cases
and Network Configurations to perform the tests. Standard network configurations
with a simple parameter setup allow instant “click and run” simulations with signal
outputs via the test set. Figure 3-3 shows the utilisation of system configuration
information for testing a “stand-alone” relay.

Figure 3-2 OMICRON CMC 256+ test set

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Figure 3-3 Usage of configuration information for testing

By “wiring” protective relays and test sets through the substation network, the test
configuration is transformed into the networked world. Figure 3-4 shows a simplified,
“fully-networked” protection testing layout based on a complete implementation of
IEC61850.

Figure 3-4 “Fully Networked” protection testing

The test equipment can be connected to the GOOSE massages and the feedback from
and stimulus to the devices under test that was formerly exchanged via binary I/Os,
can be established by wiring the test equipment to the substation network. This test
equipment is able to simulate the merging units by generating Sampled Values and
publishing them on the network to be subscribed by the devices under test.

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This networked testing system is similar to the classical testing of protection

functions. The protection functions of the relays still work in the same way. For
example, testing a distance protection will be performed by using similar fault
scenarios and assessment criteria as before. Many aspects of the test configuration can
be efficiently supported by using the substation configuration information.

It is important that a test system preserves the working environment from classical
testing and allows the re-use of existing test procedures for use with IEC61850.

In addition, the substation devices provide a lot of additional information to be used

for SCADA purposes. With IEC61850, these data are all served in a standardised
way. By using a generic tool that works with relays, additional status data (e.g.
specific pick-up information) can be examined. This will provide extended depth of
testing.

System tests were and are already performed to a certain extent. Prominent examples
are the End-to-End tests for sophisticated line protection schemes. With the
availability of substation wide configuration data, the feasibility of tests involving
more devices is very much facilitated. Test with multiple points of test signal injection
and measurement of response will become easier to implement in IEC61850
installations.

This chapter will focus on the testing of feeder protection schemes, the Feeder Local
Panel (LB) and the Feeder Remote Panel (RB) is shown in Figure 3-5. The
OMICRON CMC256+ test set provides analogue signals to remote hardwired relays
and IEC61850 SVs signals to the local IEC61850 relays, as shown in Figure 3-6. The
upper Local (LT) and Remote (RT) relays in the panels are configured as a Feeder
Main-1 current differential scheme whilst the lower Local (LB) and Remote (RB)
relays are configured as Feeder Main-2 distance scheme.

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Figure 3-5 Feeder Local Panel (IEC61850) and Feeder Remote Panel (hardwired)

Figure 3-6 Test setup for feeder local and remote protection schemes

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3.3 Distance Relay Test

The protection performance of RB conventional relay and LB IEC61850 based

distance relay is demonstrated using the OMICRON CMC 256+ test set fitted with
both conventional, current and voltage amplifiers, and IEC61850, Ethernet, SV
outputs. The operating performance and characteristics of the RB hardwired relay are
verified by injection with CMC 256+ test set applying analogue signals to the IED.
The LB IEC61850 relay is injected with SVs also applied by the test set. Both relays
have the IEC61850-8-1 interface, hence can be configured to send GOOSE trip
message to the test set. The connections to the LT relay are shown in Figure 3-7.

Figure 3-7 LT IEC61850 based distance relay rear view

Therefore, four different scenarios can be derived, which are:

Scenario 1: Analogue input and Digital output – conventional hardwired;

Scenario 2: SV input and Digital output - hybrid implementation of IEC61850;

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Scenario 3: Analogue input and GOOSE output – partial implementation of

IEC61850;

Scenario 4: SV input and GOOSE output – complete implementation of

IEC61850.

In these scenarios, all the components (PC, OMICRON, RB and LB relay) are
connected to central Ethernet switch with the standard 100/1000TX electrical cables
with RJ45 connectors using a star process bus topology. The connection diagrams of
the four scenarios are shown below.

Figure 3-8 Connection diagram of scenario 1

In scenario 1, the CMC 256+ test set provides analogue signals to the conventional
relay using the current and voltage amplifiers. The relay is configured to send digital
trip signal to the test set. The CMC 256+ IEC61850 9-2LE interface card and a
supervisory PC are connected to a central Ethernet switch.

Figure 3-9 Connection diagram of scenario 2

In scenario 2, the CMC 256+ test set provides SVs to the IEC61850 relay using the
IEC61850 9-2LE interface card. The relay is configured to send digital trip signal to
the test set. The CMC 256+ IEC61850 9-2LE interface card and a supervisory PC are
connected to a central Ethernet switch.

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Figure 3-10 Connection diagram of scenario 3

In scenario 3, the CMC 256+ test set provides analogue signals to the conventional
relay. The relay is configured to send GOOSE trip message to the test set. The CMC
256+ IEC61850 9-2LE interface card, the relay IEC61850-8-1 interface card and a
supervisory PC are connected to a central Ethernet switch.

Figure 3-11 Connection diagram of scenario 4

In scenario 4, the CMC 256+ test set provides SVs to the IEC61850 relay. The relay is
configured to send GOOSE trip message to the test set. The CMC 256+ IEC61850 9-
2LE interface card, the relay IEC61850-9-2LE interface card, the relay IEC61850-8-1
interface card and a supervisory PC are connected to a central Ethernet switch.

The main parameters of the relays and are shown in Table 3-1.

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Table 3-1 Parameters of the distance protection relays for OMICRON test
Item Value
f nom 50.00 Hz
No. of phases 3
V primary 275.0 kV
V secondary 110.0 V
I primary 1.000 kA
I secondary 1.000 A
Z1 Ph. Reach 80 km
tZ1 Delay 0s
Z2 Ph. Reach 150 km
tZ2 Delay 200ms
Z3 Ph. Reach 250 km
tZ3 Delay 600ms
Line length 100.0 km
Line impedance 10
Line angle 70°
kZN residual comp 1
kZN residual angle 0°

Details of the faults used for the testing are shown in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2 Outline of distance relay test with OMICRON

Fault Type Phase A to ground
Pre-fault Time 2s
Test Point 40 km, 115 km, 200 km.

“Shot, check and search” test is repeated 100 times on the each test point. The shot
test locations are shown in Figure 3-12. Circle A, B, and C represents protection Zone
1, Zone 2, and Zone 3 respectively. The crosses are the fault locations which are all on
angle (70°). The trip times of the relays are recorded as shown in Table Appendix-1

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Figure 3-12 Short test for three different zones

The mean trip time (MTT) for each fault point is calculated as shown in the Table 3-3.

Table 3-3 The MTT for each test point

Fault Point Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
MTT MTT MTT MTT
40 km 18.635 ms 19.1 ms 16.163 ms 17.29 ms
115 km 217.171 ms 218.076 ms 214.317 ms 215.096 ms
200 km 616.927 ms 617.829 ms 614.252 ms 615.059 ms

It can be observed from Table 3-3 that scenario 3 (Analogue input and GOOSE output)
provides the shortest MTT of 16.163 ms, 214.317 ms and 614.252 ms respectively.
Scenario 2 (SV input and Digital output) provides the longest MTT of 19.1 ms,
218.076 ms and 617.829 ms respectively.

Comparing scenario 1 (Analogue input and Digital out) with scenario 3 and scenario 2
with scenario 4 (SV input and Digital out), the GOOSE trip signal is about 2.685 ms
faster than the digital trip signal on average, which indicates that the GOOSE message
digitization process of the relay is faster than the digital trip signal processing.

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Comparing scenario 1 with scenario 2 and scenario 3 with scenario 4, the analogue
input is about 0.831 ms faster than the SV input on average. which will be further
investigated in the next section.

In conclusion, the results indicate that the conventional and IEC61850 based distance
protection relay have a similar performance and respond with similar tripping times.

3.4 Current Differential Relay Test

3.4.1 Introduction

The test set is configured to generate SV data stream for the LT IEC61850 based
current different relay and an analogue signal for the RT conventional current
differential relay. Since the analogue signals and the SVs signals are synchronized,
phase offsets are due to the latency of the communication LAN and the digitizing
process of the receiving IED.

Standard 100/1000TX electrical cables with RJ45 connectors are used to connect the
LT and RT relay to the Ethernet communication networks. A fibre optic link is used
for the communication between the two relays.

In the test, both relays are synchronized by the GPS synchronization unit. The
synchronization technique will be described in the next section, and configured to
send GOOSE trip signals and digital trip signals to the CMC 256+ test set interfaces.
Therefore, the four scenarios can be tested in parallel. The connection diagram of the
test system is illustrated in Figure 3-13.

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Figure 3-13 Connection diagram of current differential scheme test system

3.4.2 Time Alignment of Current Vector

A. Time alignment of current vectors without GPS input (Traditional Technique)

This section relates to the relay when the GPS synchronisation is not used.

To calculate differential current between line ends it is necessary that the current
samples from each end are taken at the same moment in time. This can be achieved by
time synchronising the sampling, or alternatively, by the continuous calculation of the
propagation delay between line ends. The relay has adopted this second technique.

Consider a two-ended system as shown in Figure 3-14

Two identical relays, A and B are placed at the two ends of the line. Relay A samples
its current signals at time tA1, tA2 etc., and relay B at time tB1, tB2 etc. Note that the
sampling instants at the two ends will not, in general, be coincidental or of a fixed
relationship, due to slight drifts in sampling frequencies [33].

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Figure 3-14 Propagation delay measurement

Assume that at time tA1, relay A sends a data message to relay B. The message
contains a time tag, tA1, together with other timing and status information and the
current vector values calculated at tA1. The message arrives at end B after a channel
propagation delay time, tp1. Relay B registers the arrival time of the message as tB*.

Since relays A and B are identical, relay B also sends out data messages to end A.
Assume relay B sends out a data message at tB3. The message therefore contains the
time tag tB3. It also returns the last received time tag from relay A (i.e. tA1) and the
delay time, td, between the arrival time of the received message, tB*, and the
sampling time, tB3, i.e. td = (tB3 - tB*).

The message arrives at end A after a channel propagation delay time, tp2. Its arrival
time is registered by relay A as tA*. From the returned time tag, tA1, relay A can

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measure the total elapsed time as (tA* - tA1). This equals the sum of the propagation
delay times tp1, tp2 and the delay time td at end B.

Hence,

(tA * tA1) (td tp1 tp 2) (3-1)

The relay assumes that the transmit and receive channels follow the same path and so
have the same propagation delay time. This time can therefore be calculated as:

tp1 tp 2 1 (tA* tA1 td ) (3-2)

2

Note that the propagation delay time is measured for each received sample and this
can be used to monitor any change on the communication link.

As the propagation delay time has now been deduced, the sampling instant of the
received data from relay B (tB3*) can be calculated. As shown in Figure 2, the
sampling time tB3* is measured by relay A as:

tB 3* (tA* tp 2) (3-3)

In Figure 2-13, tB3* is between tA3 and tA4. To calculate the differential and bias
currents, the vector samples at each line end must correspond to the same point in
time. It is necessary therefore to time align the received tB3* data to tA3 and tA4.
This can be achieved by rotating the received current vector by an angle
corresponding to the time difference between tB3* and tA3. For example a time
difference of 1ms would require a vector rotation of 1/20 * 360° = 18° for a 50Hz
system.

As two data samples can be compared with each data message, the process needs to
be done only once every two samples, thus reducing the communication bandwidth
required. Note that the current vectors of the three phases need to be time aligned
separately.

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B. Time alignment of current vectors with GPS input

The relay make use of the timing information available from the GPS system to
overcome the limitation of the traditional technique, and thus allow application to
communications that can provide a permanent or semi-permanent split path routing.

A 1 pulse per second output from a GPS receiver is used to ensure that the re-
sampling of the currents at each relay occurs at the same instant in time. The
technique is thus not dependant on equal transmit and receive propagation delay times;
changes in one or both of the propagation delay times also do not cause problems.

The GPS technique is taken further, however, to overcome concerns about the
reliability of the GPS system. Consider a similar two ended system to that of Figure 3-
13 where the re-sampling instants (tAn, tBn) are synchronised using the GPS timing
information. Note that Figure 3-15 demonstrates a case where the communications
path propagation delay times are not the same.

Figure 3-15 Data transmission

Relay A can measure the total elapsed time = (tA* - tA1). This equals the sum of the
propagation delay times tp1 and tp2, the delay in sending out the initial message ta,
and the delay time tc+td at end B.

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Hence

tp1 tp 2 tA* tA1 ta tc td (3-4)

However, because of the GPS synchronisation of the re-sampling instants, tA3 is at

the same instant as tB3 (therefore tB3* = tA3). Using this knowledge, the receive path
delay can be calculated.

tp 2 tA* tA3 td (3-5)

Using the same process, the relay can also calculate tp1.

In the event of the GPS synchronising signal becoming unavailable, the

synchronisation of the re-sampling instants at the different ends will be lost and the
sampling will become asynchronous. However, time alignment of the current data can
still be performed, by measuring the total elapsed time (as per the traditional
measurement technique) and using the memorised value of tp2 prior to the GPS
outage. If the overall propagation delay sum of tp1 + tp2 has not changed significantly
since the GPS synchronising signal became unavailable, then the communication path
has not been switched and tp2 remains valid. This “fallback” strategy ensures
protection continuity even in the event of antenna vandalism, maintenance error,
extremely adverse atmospheric conditions etc – all of which could result in GPS
outage. Note that tp1 and tp2 do not need to be equal for the fallback strategy to
become operational [33].

3.4.3 Results and Discussion

If the manual adjustment of the delay compensation in the LT relay is disabled, then
under the healthy system conditions, the observed results from the front LCD of the
relays indicate that SV data stream is about 20° (1.11ms) lagging the hardwired
analogue signal, which can result in a different current of 292A~338A. It proves the
conclusion in the previous section that analogue input is faster than the SV input on
average.

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The OMICRON software SV scout is able to calculate the average time offset of the
communication LAN. The transmission of the SVs from the CMC 256+ test set to the
PC network card resulted in an average LAN latency of 80µs, which would mean a
phase shift of less than 1.5°, as shown in figure 3-16. Subtracting the LAN latency,
the time offset introduced by the IEC61850 9-2 digitization process of the protection
IED is approximately 1ms, which results that the analogue input is faster than the SV
input. As the operating time of a distance relay should be 20ms [33], considering
the worst case which is scenario 2 in section 3.3, the SV input delay is tolerable.

The angle difference and differential current can be reduced significantly (2°, 20A) by
applying manual compensation to LT relay.

Figure 3-16 Time offset for direct connection to the network card

The tripping characteristics of the current differential protection scheme are shown in
Figure 3-17.

The characteristic is determined by four protection settings:

Is1: The basic differential current setting which determines the minimum pick-up
level of the relay.

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k1: The lower percentage bias setting used when the bias current is below Is2 .This
provides stability for small CT mismatches, whilst ensuring good sensitivity to
resistive faults under heavy load conditions.

Is2: A bias current threshold setting, above which the higher percentage bias k2 is
used.

k2: The higher percentage bias setting used to improve relay stability under heavy
through fault current conditions.

The tripping criteria can be formulated as:

For Ibias Is 2 Idiff k1 Ibias Is1 (3-6)

For Ibias Is 2 Idiff k 2 Ibias (k 2 k1) Is 2 Is1 (3-7)

Figure 3-17 Current differential bias characteristic

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The main parameters of the relay and are shown in Table 3-4.

Table 3-4 Parameters of the relay

Item Value
f nom 50.00 Hz
No. of phases 3
V primary 275.0 kV
V secondary 110.0 V
I primary 1.000 kA
I secondary 1.000 A
Is1 200A
K1 30%
Is 2 2000A
K2 150%
Line length 100.0 km
Line impedance 10
Line angle 70°
kZN residual comp 1
kZN residual angle 0°

Details of the faults used for the testing are shown in Table 3-5.

Table 3-5 Outline of current differential relay test

Fault Type Phase A to ground
Pre-fault Time 2s
Test Point I diff=1000A, I bias=1500A

The test is repeated 100 times. The trip time of the relays is recorded as shown in
Table Appendix-2.

The MTT of the four scenarios is shown in Table 3-6 below.

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Table 3-6 MTT of the four scenarios

Scenario No. Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
MTT 26.241 ms 25.921 ms 23.426 ms 23.587 ms

Similar as the distance relay test, it can be observed from Table 3-6 that scenario 3
(Analogue input and GOOSE output) provides the shortest MTT of 23.426 ms.
Scenario 2 (SV input and Digital output) provides the longest MTT of 26.241 ms.
signal.

Comparing scenario 1 (Analogue input and Digital out) with scenario 3 and scenario 2
with scenario 4 (SV input and Digital out), the GOOSE trip signal is about 2.575ms
faster than the digital trip signal on the average.

Comparing scenario 1 with scenario 2 and scenario 3 with scenario 4, the latency of
the analogue input is almost the same as the SV input, because of the manual
compensation of the relays.

3.5 Conclusions

The results of the protection performance tests with the commercial test set indicate:

The average latency of the communication LAN is 80µs. Star topology is

adopted in the tests, hence the LAN latency may vary for different process bus
topologies.

The time offset introduced by IEC61850 9-2 digitization process of the

protection IED is approximately 1ms. It results that the analogue input is faster
than the SV input on average. As the operating time of a distance relay should
be 20ms, considering the worst case which is scenario 2 in section 3.3, the
SV input delay is tolerable.

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Equipment

The GOOSE trip signal is about 2.6 ms faster than the digital trip signal on
average, which indicates that the GOOSE message digitization process of the
protection IED is faster than the digital trip signal processing.

In conclusion, the conventional and IEC61850 based relay have a similar performance
and respond with similar tripping times. The results may be different if protection
IEDs from different manufacturers are adopted.

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T
HIS chapter describes three Ethernet switch based process bus
topologies and compares the different process bus topologies in the
light of the reliability and availability analysis.

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4.1 Process Bus Configurations for IEC61850

Based Substation

In this chapter, three basic Ethernet LAN topologies are introduced, which will be
applied in the following bay process bus design.

4.1.1 Cascaded Topology

A typical cascaded topology is illustrated in Figure 4-1. In this architecture, each

Ethernet switch is connected to the previous switch and/or next switch in cascade via
one of its ports. The maximum number of switches, which can be cascaded, depends
on the worst case delay (latency) which can be tolerated by the system.

Figure 4-1 Cascaded topology

This architecture is simple and less expensive than others, however, the latency is
generally higher.

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4.1.2 Star Topology

In the star topology as shown in Figure 4-2, each component is directly connected to a
common central node, a multiport Ethernet switch. The message transmission latency
for Ethernet switch based star topology has capability to comply with the requirement
of IEC61850. However, all IEDs in this architecture are connected to the single
central Ethernet switch which produces an inherent weak point in the scheme.

Figure 4-2 Star topology

4.1.3 Ring Topology

As show in Figure 4-3, the ring topology is very similar to cascaded topology except
that the chain of switches is closed from the last switch to the first switch to form the
ring. Standard Ethernet switches do not support “loops”, since messages could
circulate indefinitely in a loop and use all the available bandwidth. Therefore,
managed switches are required for this architecture [34].

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Managed switches take into consideration the potential for loops and implement a
Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol algorithm.

The Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is a network protocol that ensures a loop-free
topology for any bridged Ethernet local area network. The basic function of STP is to
prevent bridge loops and the broadcast radiation that results from them. Spanning tree
also allows a network design to include spare (redundant) links to provide automatic
backup paths if an active link fails, without the danger of bridge loops, or the need for
manual enabling/disabling of these backup links.

In 2001, the IEEE introduced Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) as IEEE 802.1w.
RSTP provides significantly faster spanning tree convergence after a topology change,
introducing new convergence behaviours and bridge port roles to do this. RSTP was
designed to be backwards-compatible with standard STP [34].

While STP can take 30 to 50 seconds to respond to a topology change, RSTP is

typically able to respond to changes within 3 × Hello times or within a few
milliseconds of a physical link failure. The so-called Hello time is an important and
configurable time interval that is used by RSTP for several purposes; its default value
is 2 seconds [35].

Standard IEEE 802.1D-2004 incorporates RSTP and obsoletes the original STP
standard [36]. This protocol allows switches to detect loops and internally block
messages from circulating in the loop. It also allows reconfiguration of the network
following a communication network fault.

The advantage of the ring topology is that it has the potential to provide better
availability because IEDs can still communicate even if any one of the ring
connections and/or Ethernet switches fail. However, this architecture is more costly
and complex when compared to the cascaded or star topology.

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Figure 4-3 Ring topology

4.1.4 Time Synchronization of Merging Units

The merging units described in IEC61850 9-1 are used to digitize multiple analogue
CT/VT output and multicast the sampled values to bay the level IEDs through the
process bus. This stream of sampled values must be synchronized so that the
protection function can use several streams from independent MUs. IEC61850
proposes the implementation of time synchronization on LAN using a Simple
Network Time Protocol, SNTP [16].

SNTP is a less complicated version of Network Time Protocol (NTP) which is a

networking protocol for clock synchronization between computer systems over
packet-switched, variable-latency data networks. NTP can usually maintain time to
within tens of milliseconds over the public Internet [37], and can achieve 1 ms
accuracy in local area networks under ideal conditions [38].

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When a better time synchronization is requied, the timing accuracy of 1 µs can be

achieved using IRIG-B synchronization signal in compliance with IEEE 1588.

The Precision Time Protocol (PTP) described in IEEE 1588 is a protocol used to
synchronize clocks throughout a computer network. On a local area network it
achieves clock accuracy in the sub-microsecond range, making it suitable for
measurement and control systems [37].

Therefore, an external time synchronization source is assumed to be connected to the

MUs for the reliability calculations in all the process bus topologies.

4.2 Reliability and Availability Analysis of Process

Bus Topologies

4.2.1 Device Reliability and Availability

The failure rate of electronic components is assumed to remain constant during

normal operating period, therefore exponential distribution is valid for the reliability
and availability analysis of IEC61850 based SAS devices [38] [39] [40] [41]. The
equations that estimate device reliability and availability are shown below.

t
R (t ) e (4-1)

1
MTTF R (t ) dt (4-2)
0

MTTF
A (4-3)
MTTF MTTR

where:

R is the reliability function

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t is the period under consideration (years)

A is the device availability

MTTF is mean time to failure (years), the mean value of exponential distribution. It
will be used to represent device reliability in this paper

MTTR is mean time to repair. It is the time taken to detect and repair each failure.

4.2.2 System MTTF and Availability using Reliability Block

Diagram

The Reliability Block Diagram, RBD, for each configuration shows the logical
connection of functioning components needed to fulfil a specific system function [42]
[43] [44] [45].

From the reliability point of view, components are connected in series if they all must
work for the successful functioning of the system and only one component needs to
fail for the system failure as shown in Figure 4-4.

Figure 4-4Series system with two components

The reliability function of the series system is

( 2 )t
Rs R1 (t ) R2 (t ) e 1
(4-4)

Therefore the MTTF of the series system is

1 MTTF1 MTTF2
MTTFs Rs (t ) dt (4-5)
0 1 2 MTTF1 MTTF2

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The availability of the series system is

As A1 A2 (4-6)

In contrast, if only one needs to be working for successful functioning of the system
or all must fail for system failure, components are connected in parallel from the
reliability assessment as shown in Figure 4-5.

Figure 4-5 Parallel system with two components

The reliability function of the parallel system is

R p (t ) R1 (t ) R2 (t ) R1 (t ) R2 (t )
(4-7)
1t 2t ( )t
e e e 1 2

Therefore the MTTF of the parallel system is

1 1 1
MTTPp R p (t ) dt
0 1 2 1 2
(4-8)
MTTF1 MTTF2
MTTF1 MTTF2
MTTF1 MTTF2

The availability of the parallel system is

As A1 A2 A1 A2 (4-9)

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4.2.3 Feeder Bay Study

The particular interest in this project has been the reliability and availability of a
typical transmission substation feeder bay. The mean time to failure and the
availability for a test system were calculated using above methodology.

The feeder bay is considered to use a dual main scheme with MAIN 1 and MAIN 2
protection IEDs. Each protection IED has separate MUs and circuit breaker control
IEDs.

The MTTF and availability values for the reliability calculations are tabulated in
Table 4-1 [47] [48] [49]. These MTTF and availability values for the components
have been derived from industry norms and provide a basis for the subsequent
calculations. They are not based on the analysis of any specific equipment.

Table 4-1 MTTF and availability considered for each component

SAS component MTTF Availability
(years)
Protection IED 16 0.999660016
Control IED 16 0.999660016
MU 16 0.999660016
Ethernet Switch 62.5 0.999912337
TS 16 0.999660016

The basic assumption is that failure modes are independent from each other.
Generally, the MTTF value of the communication links is considered to be high
enough to be ignored in the calculation [50] [51] [52]. A MTTR of 48 hours is used in
the availablity calculation [53] [54] [55]. The MTTF and availability values of the
principal components used in the reliability calculation of different process bus
topologies are shown in Table 4-1.

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4.2.4 MTTF and Availability for Cascaded Topology

In this architecture, each IED has a single Ethernet switch, and a time synchronization
unit is connected to the MU directly. The communication architecture of feeder bay is
shown in Figure 4-6.

Figure 4-6 Cascaded topology for feeder bay

In the protection scheme, there are MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 protections which are
independent. Both schemes provide a trip instruction to the breaker. Take MAIN 1
protection for example; the dedicated Protection IED-1, control IED-1, MU-1 and
three Ethernet switches are connected in series in reliability block diagram. Either
MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 are required to be healthy to maintain the feeder protection
function, therefore MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 are connected in parallel in the RBD for
MTTF and availability calculation as shown in Figure 4-7.

Figure 4-7 RBD of MTTF and availability calculation for cascaded topology

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Using the data in Table 3-1, the results of MTTF and availability calculation for the
cascade configuration are MTTFcascade is 5.034 years and the Acascade is 0.999997369.

4.2.5 MTTF and Availability for Star Topology

In the star topology, all the IEDs are connected to a central Ethernet switch. The two
schemes, Main 1 and Main 2 monitor the power system and provide trip instructions
to the circuit breaker. The communication architecture of feeder bay is shown in
Figure 4-8.

Figure 4-8 Star topology for feeder bay

For the analysis of cascaded topology, the reliability block diagram of star topology is
shown in Figure 4-9.

Figure 4-9 RBD of MTTF and availability calculation for star topology

The results of MTTF and availability calculation for the star configuration are
MTTFstar is 5.639 years and the Astar is 0.999997907.

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4.2.6 MTTF and Availability for Ring Topology

In the ring topology, each set of IEDs is connected to a single managed Ethernet
switch, and all the Ethernet switches in the scheme are connected in a loop, as shown
in Figure 4-10. Main 1 and Main 2 have separate loops, and both provide a tripping
instruction to the circuit breaker.

Figure 4-10 Ring topology for feeder bay

The reliability block diagram for ring communication network is similar to that for the
cascaded topology. The RBD for the ring scheme are shown in Figure 4-11.

Figure 4-11 RBD of MTTF and availability calculation for ring topology

The additional feature of the ring topology is that with the help of the RSTP within
the managed Ethernet switch, the communication network can be reconfigured in case
any communication cable which is used to connect the Ethernet switches in the
scheme fails. This means the faulted scheme will still be functional after the failure.

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Therefore, single failure of the communication cable will not influence the MTTF of
the protection system.

The results of MTTF and availability calculation for the first failure of the ring
configuration are MTTFring is 5.034 years and the Aring is 0.999997369.

For the protection application, it is questionable whether the scheme should remain
operational after a first failure event and therefore whether it should be taken out of
service whenever a failure occurs. Using a dual main configuration, should either
Main 1 or Main 2 suffer a failure, the other scheme will provide viable protection.

The MTTF and availability of different process bus topologies are summarized in
Table 4-2.

Table 4-2 MTTF and availability of different process bus topologies

Process bus topology MTTF Availability
(years)
Cascaded 5.034 0.999997369
Star 5.639 0.999997907
Ring ( first failure) 5.034 0.999997369

It can be observed from Table 4-2 star topology provides the highest MTTF of 5.639
years and the highest availability of 0.999997907. This architecture has the weakness
that the failure of the central Ethernet switch will lead the entire communication
system collapse. Cascaded topology provides the MTTF of 5.034 years and the
availability of 0.999997369. If the MTTF of the communication links is ignored in the
calculation, ring topology provides the same MTTF and availability as cascaded
topology. However, ring topology requires managed Ethernet switches with RSTP,
which makes this architecture more expensive and complicated comparatively.

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Process Bus Topologies

T
HIS chapter evaluates the performance of SV messages over
three Ethernet switch based process bus topologies by using
OPNET communication network simulation tool.

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5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the latency of the SV messages transmission over the three Ethernet
switch based process bus topologies, cascaded, star and ring topology, is evaluated in
terms of the communication volume, by using the OPNET Modeller which is a
network modelling and simulation tool [56].

OPNET Modeller is capable of accelerating the R&D process for analyzing and
designing communication networks, devices, protocols, and applications. It allows
users to analyze simulated networks to compare the impact of different technology
designs on end-to-end behaviour. The Modeller incorporates a broad suite of
protocols and technologies, and includes a development environment to enable
modelling of all network types and technologies including [57] [58]:

VoIP
TCP
OSPFv3
IPv6
Others

Key features of OPNET Modeller:

Fastest discrete event simulation engine among leading industry solutions

Hundreds of protocol and vendor device models with source code are
contained in the complete OPNET Model Library

Object-oriented modelling

Hierarchical modelling environment

Discrete Event, Hybrid, and optional Analytical simulation

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32-bit and 64-bit fully parallel simulation kernel

Grid computing support for distributed simulation

Optional System-in-the-Loop to interface simulations with live systems

Realistic Application Modelling and Analysis

Open interface for integrating external object files, libraries, and other
simulators

Integrated, GUI-based debugging and analysis

5.2 Building of IED Models

Three types of generic IEDs are modelled for this performance study, which are
circuit breaker Controller (CBC), merging unit (MU), and combined protection &
control (P&C) IED [59] [60] [61]. In the SAS, those IEDs provide the following
general functions. The MU processes and combines the signal from field CT and VT.
Then it transmits the digital voltage and current output to the process bus. The CBC,
which not only controls the breaker’s open/close but also monitors the state and
condition of the circuit breaker, receives the trip/close command from the P&C IEDs
and sends state change event to corresponding protection IEDs also through the
process bus. The P&C IED, a universal device, integrates the protection and control
functionalities for the bay unit in the substation [62] [63] [64]. The above unit models
are constructed on OPNET Modeller, and the modelling work are shown below.

5.2.1 Modelling of MU

The modelling of merging unit is based on IEC61850 9-1. The Ethernet broadcast
address is used as a default destination address although this model also supports
unicast and multicast. The user could configure the sample rate, start time, stop time,
packet size, address, and multicast group address if multicast is used as the

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transmission type. The communication stack for merging unit IED is very simple. It
contains an application layer, Ethernet layer, and physical layer. Figure 5-1 shows the
node model configuration of MU. The small squares in the model represent the
process models. OPNET Modeller has the Node Model Editor and Process Model
Editor which facilitate the model design.

Figure 5-1 MU model configuration [56]

The bursty_gen module represents higher layer users who submit data for
transmission. It uses an ON-OFF pattern for traffic generation.

The sink processor represents higher layers and simply accepts incoming packets that
have been processed through the mac (medium access control) process.

The hub_rx0 and hub_tx0 modules serve as the process bus link interface. These
modules are set to transmit and receive at a data rate of 100 Mbits/second.

The mac process handles both incoming and outgoing packets. Incoming packets are
decapsulated from their Ethernet frames and delivered to a higher level process.
Outgoing packets are encapsulated within Ethernet frames and when the deference
flag goes low, a frame is sent to the transmitter. This process also monitors for
collisions, and if one occurs, the transmission is appropriately terminated and
rescheduled for a later attempt.

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There is only one way of connecting this MU IED to P&C IEDs, which is through the
process bus[65] [66] [67]. In the simulation, MU is connected with P&C IEDs directly
using Ethernet switch, which will only use one communication port of the MU.

The application layer includes the bursty_gen which generates Ether-type protocol
data unit (PDU) as shown in Figure 5-2 at a configurable sampling rate. This PDU
contains an application protocol data unit (APDU) which may contain number of
ASDUs [66] [68] [69]. Each ASDU again contain four current values and four voltage
values as specified in the standard.

Figure 5-2 Raw data sample Ethernet frame

The Ethernet layer consists of the eth_mac_intf and mac modules. The Ethernet
protocols and algorithms are implemented in those modules. The Ether-type APDU
passed from the application layer are addressed, priority tagged according to IEEE
802.1Q [70] [71]. The priority tagging allows to separate time critical messages from
low time requirement busload. The raw data messages should be tagged with high
priority.

The physical layer allows connecting this IED to a process bus using 10 Mb/s,
100Mb/s, 1 Gb/s or 10 Gb/s link depending on the type of transmitters and receivers
this module uses.

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5.2.2 Modelling of CBC and P&C IED

The functionalities of P&C IED is to receive the SV messages from the MU, send
GOOSE trip messages to CBC, and calculate the end-to-end (ETE) delay. ETE delay
is the time between the creation of the message at the application layer of the sending
unit and the arrival of the message at the receiving unit’s application layer. The CBC
is to receive the GOOSE trip message, send multicast GOOSE state event to other
P&C IEDs. The size of the GOOSE is smaller than the SV message, and the number
of messages per second is lower. At 100 Mbps, GOOSE messages do not normally
play a crucial role in the overall network load. In the simulation, only the performance
of the transmission of SV messages is evaluated, therefore it has been assumed that
there are no GOOSE messages in the process bus.

5.3 Feeder Bay Study

The process bus performance of the MAIN protection for the three process bus
topologies as described in chapter 4 of a typical transmission substation feeder bay is
evaluated. The sampled value packet ETE delay is simulated by applying the cascaded,
star and ring process bus topology respectively.

In the cascaded topology model as shown in Figure 5-3, each component, MU, P&C
IED and CBC, is connected to its own Ethernet switch and these are connected in a
chain. The model is built on a 10m×10m zone as the numbers indicate in the diagram.
In this model, the P&C IED subscribes the SVs published by the MU, the CBC can be
configured to send GOOSE messages to the P&C IED, and generic Ethernet switch
models which support RSTP are used to represent the switches in this network.

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Figure 5-3 Cascaded topology model for feeder bay

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Figure 5-4 Star topology model for feeder bay

In the star topology model as shown in Figure 5-4, all the components, MU, P&C IED
and CBC, are connected to a central Ethernet switch.

In the ring topology model as shown in Figure 5-5, as with the cascade topology
model, each component, MU, P&C IED and CBC, is connected to a single Ethernet
switch, but the chain is then connected to form a ring.

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Figure 5-5 Ring topology model for feeder bay

The SV packet version used in this project is the IEC61850 9-2 LE [16]. An
IEC61850 9-2LE SV packet has only one ASDU in the APDU, which contain one set
of current values (phase A, phase B, phase C and neutral) and one set of voltage
values. Considering the 2 bytes gap each frame in APDU, the size of an IEC61850 9-
2LE SV packet is 138 bytes - 162 bytes in terms of Figure 5-2.

Assuming the svID frame is 10 bytes, the size of an IEC61850 9-2LE SV packet can
be calculated as 138 bytes per sampled value. The inter-frame gap is 96 bits, hence the
SV Ethernet frame width is therefore 1200 bits, which is 150 bytes. For a 50 Hz
power system, applying 80 samples per cycle, the sampling frequency is 4000 Hz.
The parameters for OPNET simulation are tabulated in Table 5-1.

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Table 5-1 Parameters for OPNET simulation

Parameters Default Values
Communication link Data rate 100 Mbps
Sampling frequency 4000 Hz
Message size 150 bytes
ESW packet service rate 0.5 Mega packets per second
Each Ethernet cable length 15 meters
Simulation Duration 10 minutes

After the simulation, the SV packet ETE delay of different process bus topologies are
summarized in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2 SV ETE delay of different process bus topologies

Feeder process bus topology Sampled value packet delay (ms)
Cascaded 0.048348
Star 0.031576
Ring 0.048375

It can be observed from Table 5-2 the star topology provides the shortest SV ETE
delay of 0.031576 ms. The cascaded topology provides the ETE delay of 0.048348 ms,
and the ring topology provides almost the same ETE delay of 0.048375 ms as
cascaded topology.

According to IEC61850, the acceptable maximum communication delay for the time-
critical messages, SVs and GOOSE, is 3 ms [16]. Therefore, the SV ETE delay of the
MAIN protection for a feeder bay using the three different process bus topologies is
tolerable.

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5.4 Process Bus Overload Simulation

In all of the above tests, the process bus was operated well within its specified
capabilities. The data traffic consisted of the samples values derived from one MU. In
a practical application, the process bus traffic would be expected to be greater as more
units, both merging units and P&C IEDs would be connected to it.

The SV Ethernet frame width is therefore 1200 bits. Using a 100 Mb/s process bus,
with a 50 Hz power system and a sampling rate of 4000 samples/s, theoretically the
max number of merging units that it can support is approximately 20. With any more
than this, the bus would be overloaded and data would be lost.

For the overload test, multiple MUs are connected to the process bus. These MUs are
programmed to generate data streams from an increasing number of sources thus
increasing the traffic on the process bus.

5.4.1 Star Topology Overload Test

The SV ETE delay is measured as the key indicator of its response to the increasing
traffic on the process bus. The configuration of the test system model is shown in
Figure 5-6.

Figure 5-6 Configuration of the star topology system model

In this model, P&C IED 1 is assigned to MU 1 and P&C IED 2 is assigned to MU 2.

Increasing the number of MU 2, thus the traffic on the process bus is increased. The
SV ETE delay of P&C IED 1 is measured, the results are tabulated in Table 5-3.

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Table 5-3 SV ETE delay of star topology

Number of MU IED Sampled value packet delay (ms)
1 0.031576
2 0.047165
3 0.047165
4 0.047165
5 0.047165
6 0.047165
7 0.062765
8 0.062765
9 0.078365
10 0.078365
11 0.078365
12 0.078365
13 0.078365
14 0.078365
15 0.093965
16 0.093965
17 0.093965

The results shows that, before the number of MUs reaches 18, the SV ETE delay
increases from 0.031576 ms to 0.093965 ms. When it reaches 18 (86.4 Mbps), which
is 86.4 % of the process bus data rate (100 Mbps), the SV ETE delay starts to increase
with time rapidly. As shown in Figure 5-7, the Ethernet delay increased over 0.5
seconds, after 8 seconds of the simulation. If more than 18 MUs are connected to the
network, the Ethernet delay may even longer. Therefore, according to the simulation,
the max number of MUs that the star process bus topology can tolerate is 17.

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Figure 5-7 SV ETE delay of 18 MUs on the star process bus

5.4.2 Cascaded Topology Overload Test

Similar as the star topology test, the configuration of the cascaded topology test
system model is shown in Figure 5-8.

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Figure 5-8 Configuration of the cascaded topology system model

The results of SV ETE delay of P&C IED 1 are tabulated in Table 5-4.

Table 5-4 SV ETE delay of cascaded topology

Number of MU IED Sampled value packet delay (ms)
1 0.048348
2 0.048348
3 0.048348
4 0.048348
5 0.048348
6 0.048348
7 0.048348
8 0.048348
9 0.048348
10 0.048348
11 0.048348
12 0.048348
13 0.048348
14 0.048348
15 0.048348
16 0.048348
17 0.048348

Before the number of MUs reaches 18, the SV ETE delay remains at 0.048348 ms.
When it reaches 18, the SV ETE delay starts to increase with time. As shown in

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Figure 5-9, the Ethernet delay increased over 0.4 seconds, after 8 seconds of the
simulation. Therefore, the max number of MUs that the cascaded process bus
topology can tolerate is 17.

Figure 5-9 SV ETE delay of 18 MUs on the cascaded process bus

5.4.3 Ring Topology Overload Test

The configuration of the test system model is shown in Figure 5-10. The results of SV
ETE delay are tabulated in Table 5-5.

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Figure 5-10 Configuration of the ring topology system model

Table 5-5 SV ETE delay of ring topology

Number of MU IED Sampled value packet delay (ms)
1 0.048375
2 0.048375
3 0.048375
4 0.048375
5 0.048375
6 0.048375
7 0.048375
8 0.048375
9 0.048375
10 0.048375
11 0.048375
12 0.048375
13 0.048375
14 0.048375
15 0.048375
16 0.048375
17 0.048375

Similar as the cascaded topology test, before the number of MUs reaches 18, the SV
ETE delay remains at 0.048375 ms. When it reaches 17, the SV ETE delay starts to
increase with time. As shown in Figure 5-11, the Ethernet delay increased over 0.25

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seconds, after 8 seconds of the simulation. Therefore, the max number of MUs that
the ring process bus topology can tolerate is 17.

Figure 5-11 SV ETE delay of 18 MUs in the ring process bus

5.5 Conclusions

The OPNET Modeller simulation based feed bay study shows that star topology
provides the shortest SV ETE delay of 0.031576 ms. Cascaded topology provides the
ETE delay of 0.048348 ms, and the ring topology provides almost the same ETE
delay of 0.048375 ms as cascaded topology. As the acceptable maximum
communication delay for the time-critical messages, SVs and GOOSE, is 3 ms, the
SV ETE delay of the MAIN protection for a feeder bay using the three different
process bus topologies is tolerable.

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The process bus overload test shows that before the traffic on the process bus
topologies, cascaded, star, and ring, reaches 85% of the communication link data rate
(100 Mbps), the star topology provides the SV ETE delay between 0.031576 ms and
0.093965 ms. The cascaded topology provides the ETE delay of 0.048348 ms, and the
ring topology provides almost the same ETE delay of 0.048375 ms as cascaded
topology. Therefore, before the process bus is saturated, the SV ETE delay of the
three different process bus topologies is also tolerable.

When the traffic on the process bus topologies reaches 85% of the communication
link data rate, the SV ETE delay starts to increase with time rapidly. That is because
the bandwidth utilization efficiency [69] of the OPNET Ethernet switch model is 85%,
the results may be different in the reality by using the real Ethernet switch, which will
be discussed in chapter 6.

Based on the OPNET studies, as the process bus overload simulation results show, the
max number of MUs that the three process bus topologies can tolerate is 17.

In conclusion, the SV ETE delay of cascaded, star, and ring process bus topology
within the number limit of the MUs will not influence the operation of the protection
communication system.

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T
HIS chapter evaluates the performance of different protection
schemes with cascaded, star and ring process bus topology using
RTDS Simulator.

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6.1 Introduction of RTDS Simulator

The Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) [72] is designed specifically to simulate
electrical power systems and to test physical equipment such as control and protection
devices. Numerous analogue and digital input and output channels, with optical
isolation and high accuracy, provide for flexible interconnections with the simulator.
The modular design enables simulation hardware to be customized for specific study
needs and yet give the flexibility for future expansion.

6.1.1 Conventional RTDS Testing System

Figure 6-1 demonstrates the application of RTDS in the conventional analogue signal
based system. The RTDS simulates the power system and generates the required
voltages and current signals to the amplifiers through a D/A converter [73] [74] [75].
The RTDS also exchanges the circuit breaker status, relay trip and re-closure signals
with the conventional protective relay under test via a binary I/O interface.

Figure 6-1 Analogue signal based RTDS test system

The amplifier receives low level signals from the RTDS and amplifies them to a level
compatible with the input module of the relays. The amplifier is composed of some

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analogue components which have the ability to carry high currents and voltages, Vnom,
Vpeak, Inom, Ipeak [76] [77] [78]. As a result, only a limited number of relays can be
connected to a RTDS system at one time through the amplifiers, this constrains the
capability of a RTDS system for relay testing.

6.1.2 Design of a New RTDS Testing System

A significant advantage of the IEC61850 system compared with the conventional

system is the replacement of analogue and binary signals with Ethernet messages.
Merging Units work as an access from the instrument transformers to the digital ports
of relays through Ethernet utilising a specific data format in accordance with
IEC61850 protocols. The simulation data generated by the RTDS can be injected to
the IEC61850 compatible relays by a data format conversion. This is achieved by
introducing a “Conversion Interface Module”. There is no need for the D/A interface
unit and the current and voltage amplifiers. Figure 6-2 is a schematic diagram of
RTDS close-loop testing design [79] [80].

Figure 6-2 Schematic diagram of RTDS close-loop testing design

This conversion interface module (CIM) has the ability to access the digital
simulation signals generated by the RTDS directly and converts these data to an
IEC61850 compatible format. These data can now be injected to the Protective IED
for testing purpose.

The connection between the RTDS system and the CIM can be configured as
analogue to accommodate the existing testing system as an integration phase.

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Otherwise, this connection can be configured as digitised which means there is a

direct connection between the RTDS system and the CIM. This is shown in Figure 6-3.

Figure 6-3 Connection diagram between RTDS system and CIM

6.1.3 Implementation of this new RTDS testing system

Equipped with the Giga-Transceiver Network Communication Card (GTNET) [81]

which is shown in Figure 6-4, RTDS can fully support the IEC61850 based system
testing. The GTNET can provide real time communication to and from the simulator
via Ethernet. Different firmware versions are used to accommodate IEC61850 GSE
binary messaging, IEC61850 9-2 sampled values, playback of large data files stored
on a PC hard disk and DNP communication, a SCADA protocol commonly used in
substations.

As shown in Figure 6-5, the simulated data (digital signals) generated by the RTDS
system are transferred to the GTNET_SV card, where the data is sampled, time-
stamped and converted to a IEC61850 compatible format and broadcasted to the
Ethernet. The subscribed device is able to access its required data from the Ethernet.
This effectively eliminates the D/A interface and the current and voltage amplifiers. It
is worth noting that, for protective relays that need more than one current or voltage
sampled values, every node involved requires a GTNET_SV card.

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Figure 6-4 The GTNET card

Figure 6-5 RTDS test system using GTNET cards

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The GTNET_GSE card is utilised to exchange breaker status and substation control
signals. It supports both GOOSE and GSSE messages but cannot support them
simultaneously. In the GOOSE mode, an IED configuration file (*.scd) is generated to
configure the GTNET card using the substation configuration language. The
configuration information can be inputted to the GTNET card directly in the GSSE
application [82] [83].

With the process bus, the relay has no physical current, voltage or contact inputs, so
there is no corresponding hardware to check. The hardware performing a somewhat
analogous function, the optical transceivers, PHY chip (it takes a frame of data and
turn it into a string of bits for transmission over the connecting medium – a process
called serialization.), etc., are continuously self-tested with signal level margin
detectors and with data security codes (i.e. CRC, Cyclic-Redundancy-Code), so there
is little if any value in further testing the relay’s process bus input/output hardware.
The firmware that implements the measuring elements and scheme logic is
continuously checked again by CRC, and the processors by watchdog timers.

This chapter will focus on the testing of feeder protection schemes and the
transformer protection scheme with different process bus topologies. The Feeder
Local Panel (LB) and the Remote Local Panel (RB) are shown in Figure 6-6 As with
the other commercial test equipment, the RTDS simulator provides analogue signals
to the remote hardwired relays and IEC61850 SVs signals to the local IEC61850
relays. It also provides SVs signals to the HV transformer relays. The upper Local
(LT) and upper Remote (RT) relays of the panels are configured as the Feeder Main-1
current differential scheme whilst lower Local (LB) and lower Remote (RB) relays
are configured as Feeder Main-2 distance scheme. The RTDS test system is shown in
Figure 6-7.

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Figure 6-6 Feeder Local Panel (IEC61850) and Feeder Remote Panel (hardwired)

Figure 6-7 RTDS test bed for the protection schemes

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6.2 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test

The performance of an EHV current differential protection scheme with different

process bus topologies is demonstrated using the RTDS simulator fitted with both
conventional, current and voltage amplifier, and IEC61850, Ethernet, SV outputs. The
modelled transmission system, shown in Figure 6-8, consisted of the protected 100km
line, with similar lines connected to both the local and remote ends and 1 GVA
sources connected to them. The local end is configured as the digital substation with
the LT IEC61850 protection and the remote end uses a RT conventional relay.

Figure 6-8 Modelled power transmission line for the current differential scheme test

The RTDS is configured to generate an IEC61850 9-2LE SV data stream using

“PhsMeas1” with 8 elements, 4 currents and 4 voltages. The digitised current and
voltage data streams are provided by the RTDS, separate merging units are not
required.

Standard 100/1000TX electrical cables with RJ45 connectors are used to connect the
IEC61850 relay to the Ethernet communication networks. A fibre optic link is used
for the communication between the two relays. Both relays are synchronized by the
GPS synchronization units. There are only GTNET_SV cards equipped on the RTDS,
so both relays are configured to send digital trip signal to the RTDS digital input
interface. The RTDS measured and reported the relays’ tripping times.

If the manual adjustment of the delay compensation in the LT relay is disable and
both relays are injected the voltage and current values of the local end, then under the
healthy system conditions, the observed results from the front LCD of the relays
indicate that SV data stream is about 17.5° (0.97ms) lagging the hardwired analogue

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signal. This can result in a different current of 539.9A~588.5A. The same conclusion
as with the other commercial test set can be drawn that the time offset introduced by
the IEC61850-9-2 digitization process is approximately 1ms. The angle difference and
differential current can be reduced significantly (3°, 47A) by applying manual
compensation to the LT relay.

The main parameters of the relay and transmission line are shown in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1 Parameters of relay and transmission line for current different scheme test
Item Value
f nom 50.00 Hz
No. of phases 3
V primary 400.0 kV
V secondary 110.0 V
I primary 1.000 kA
I secondary 1.000 A
Is1 500A
K1 30%
Is 2 5000A
K2 150%
Line length 100.0 km
Line impedance
Line angle 86°
kZN residual comp 0.67
kZN residual angle -5.000°

Details of the faults used are shown in Table 6-2.

Table 6-2 Outline of current differential scheme test

Fault Type Phase A to ground
Prefault Time 2s
Fault Point 15 km, 50 km, 85 km
Point On Wave 0º, 45º, 90º

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6.2.1 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test Using Cascaded

Topology

In this architecture, each component, the IEC61850 based relay, the RTDS IEC61850
9-2LE interface card and a supervisory PC is connected to its own Ethernet switch
and these are connected in a chain. The communication architecture of the protection
scheme is shown in Figure 6-9.

Figure 6-9 Configuration of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology

In the tests, faults are applied at each fault point with different points on wave, POW.
Each test is repeated ten times and the mean trip time, MTT, is calculated. The trip
times for both the IEC61850 based relay, IEC, and the conventional relay, CON, are
recorded as shown in the Table 6-3 below.

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Table 6-3a Trip times of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology
(15km)
Fault
Point: 15
km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
23.6 25.35 21.6 24.55 23.65 25.5 23.05 25.95
23.6 25.2 24.25 24.5 24 25.05 25.1 24.1
24.55 24.45 22.3 24.5 25.35 26.25 25.4 23.8
25.35 25.35 22.4 24.85 24.2 25.95 26.1 23.2
25.6 25.15 22.9 26.7 24.1 25.15 25.1 24
25.95 25.7 22.4 24.3 24.35 27.55 26.75 24.15
27.7 25.35 22.6 26.15 25.1 27.3 26.6 25.85
27.25 27.05 25.3 24.55 25.95 27.05 24.85 25.85
22.45 24.25 24.5 25.25 26.55 24.3 22.2 23.75
22.2 24.2 24.9 24.3 25.5 25 23.1 25.1

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Table 6-3b Trip times of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology
(50km)
Fault
Point: 50
km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
25.45 25.3 25.05 27.1 24.05 25.45 27.75 26.4
25.4 24.95 26.9 26.15 25.3 25.85 28.35 27.5
26.5 26.6 23.6 23.3 24.2 26.6 29.2 26.2
26.75 27.1 26.05 24.6 25.65 26.4 26.45 28.4
25.5 26.9 24.85 25.3 24.8 24.9 26.3 27.75
25.75 26.3 24 25.55 25.2 26.55 26.35 27.55
25.85 28.2 26.1 25.65 25.3 27.15 26.45 27
26.6 28.45 25.8 23.9 25.45 26.6 29.8 27.4
23.7 25.35 26.05 26.55 24.15 23.35 28.75 28.05
23.85 26.35 26.2 26 24.7 24.35 28.5 28.65

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Table 6-3c Trip times of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology
(85km)
Fault
Point: 85
km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
24.65 22.95 24.5 25.85 25.1 22.9 25.2 25.15
25.55 24.6 25.65 26.55 25.4 24.25 27.6 26.1
24.45 25 26.4 24.2 25.4 24.8 26.95 26.05
24.4 25.25 24.4 22.5 22.9 25.05 27.35 27.25
24.6 25.1 24.7 23.5 23.65 24.45 23.4 26.55
26.05 25.55 24.95 23.3 23.6 25.45 25.75 24.1
25 26.8 27.05 25.25 24.1 25.7 24.5 24.75
26.8 26.8 26.2 23.3 22.6 27 25.35 23.65
26.2 27 23.6 24.8 23.3 25.7 26.15 24.4
22.65 26.55 23.45 25.55 24.85 24.85 25 24.3
24.65 22.95 24.5 25.85 25.1 22.9 25.2 25.15

The MTT for the cascaded topology is shown in Table 6-4.

Table 6-4a MTT of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology (15km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 24.825 25.205 23.315 24.965 24.875 25.91 24.825 24.575

Table 6-4b MTT of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology (50km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 25.535 26.55 25.46 25.41 24.88 25.72 27.79 27.49

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Table 6-4c MTT of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology (85km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 25.035 25.56 25.09 24.48 24.09 25.015 25.725 25.23

6.2.2 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test Using Star

Topology

In the star topology, all the components are connected to a central Ethernet switch
giving the communication architecture shown in Figure 6-10.

Figure 6-10 Configuration of current differential scheme test using star topology

The trip times of both relays are shown in Table 6-5.

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Table 6-5a Trip times of current differential scheme test using star topology (15km)
Fault
Point: 15
km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
23.6 25.45 24.9 27.85 26.25 24.35 23 25.25
23.3 24.7 25.05 27.1 21.6 24.55 23.2 26.9
23.5 25.95 26.85 27.3 22.25 23.8 24 27.3
25.6 26 24.9 23.1 22.5 24.5 23.15 25.75
25.7 26.45 24.45 25.4 22.8 24.05 23.05 26.4
25.15 25.55 22.85 23.35 23.05 26.55 24.35 26.5
25.8 25.55 21.8 25.55 24.65 24.9 25 24.1
27.4 27.9 22.15 25.25 24.25 26.3 26.1 25.1
27.55 28.15 22.9 26.7 24.9 23 24.3 24.95
25.55 23.8 27.05 25.45 23.85 23.25 24.6 25.3

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Table 6-5b Trip times of current differential scheme test using star topology (50km)
Fault
Point: 50
km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
25.95 27.5 24.15 24.9 24.7 22.55 29.4 29
25.6 27.2 25 25.05 23.9 22.8 25.5 29.7
26.8 28.05 26.55 26.15 25.75 24.8 26.65 29.75
25.9 26.95 25.35 25.55 26.8 24.5 27 29.05
23 27.1 24.4 25.2 23.2 24.85 26.1 26.15
26.25 25.4 26.35 26.1 21.8 25.9 25.95 27.25
22.8 24.75 25.25 23.85 21.95 26 26.4 28.4
25 27.95 25.35 24.55 24.15 25.9 27.8 27.75
25.2 26.55 25.8 23.05 24.75 26.3 29.55 26.15
25.9 27.2 23.5 24.9 23.8 26.3 29.45 27.95

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Table 6-5c Trip times of current differential scheme test using star topology (85km)
Fault
Point: 85
km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
24 24.25 25.25 23.25 25.75 25.2 24.2 26.35
25.95 24.5 26.05 27.05 23.35 25.9 24.9 26.95
26.15 24.6 21.8 22.95 23.25 24.45 25.2 24.75
25.95 26 21.65 23.9 23.7 25.45 24.2 27.05
25.6 26.6 22.3 25.55 23.95 25.6 24.45 24.05
26.05 26.5 23.05 23.8 25.2 25.35 25.6 23.45
27.65 25.35 22.75 25.5 25.45 27.25 24.85 24.5
26.65 25.25 23.05 26.3 25.2 27.55 26.45 23.15
27.3 26.9 23.85 24.35 25.35 26.75 27.5 25.8
26.1 23.65 23.4 24.45 25.55 28.2 26.05 25.25
24 24.25 25.25 23.25 25.75 25.2 24.2 26.35

The MTT for the tests are shown in Table 6-6.

Table 6-6a MTT of current differential scheme test using star topology (15km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 25.315 25.95 24.29 25.705 23.61 24.525 24.075 25.755

Table 6-6b MTT of current differential scheme test using star topology (50km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 25.24 26.865 25.17 24.93 24.08 24.99 27.38 28.115

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Table 6-6c MTT of current differential scheme test using star topology (85km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 26.14 25.36 23.315 24.71 24.675 26.17 25.34 25.13

6.2.3 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test Using Ring

Topology

In the ring topology, as with the cascade architecture, each component is connected to
a single Ethernet switch, but the chain is then connected to form a ring using a
managed switch, as shown in Figure 6-11.

Figure 6-11 Configuration of current differential scheme test using ring topology

The test results for the ring topology are shown in Table 6-7 below.

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Table 6-7a Trip times of current differential scheme test using ring topology (15km)
Fault
Point: 15
km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
26.6 26.1 23.6 23.8 24.4 24.8 21.7 26.3
22.65 25.6 24.45 23.5 25.1 25.3 26.6 26.2
22.85 26.15 25.1 24.55 27.15 27.05 25.55 24.2
23.35 25.8 23.9 25.15 26.95 24.85 22.45 24.3
23.95 27.55 24.85 25.8 25.85 21.8 23.05 24.8
24.65 27.8 25.5 25.75 21.5 24.1 22.2 24.65
25.15 27.35 26.25 26.3 21.8 23.1 22.45 26.3
24.8 25.35 24.05 26.45 22.9 23.15 22.5 25.65
25.6 25.15 24.2 25.65 22.8 23.6 23.8 25.15
26.1 25.25 25.6 27.2 23.9 24.05 24.5 25.95

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Table 6-7b Trip times of current differential scheme test using ring topology (50km)
Fault
Point: 50
km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
25.65 25.1 22.95 23.35 25.8 25.95 25.6 22.9
24.95 25.65 25.05 24.5 26.1 26.5 26.35 23.15
26.3 26.4 25.25 24.05 24.4 26.15 27.25 24.1
23.25 27.25 26.3 25.45 24.7 27.7 26.5 24.05
23.15 25.65 25 25.45 23.4 22.6 27.05 24.2
24.35 22.8 23.5 25.25 23.85 21.95 23.1 23.75
25.15 23.9 25.15 24.3 23.1 22.9 24.55 26.75
25.05 24.55 25.3 27.25 23.1 24.65 25.7 27.45
24.75 24.1 25.45 25.95 22.45 23.9 24.6 26.2
25.25 25.2 22.35 23.1 23.7 23.5 25.35 25.45

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Table 6-7c Trip times of current differential scheme test using ring topology (85km)
Fault
Point: 85
km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
27.4 26 26.25 27.05 23.4 23.8 24.15 26.6
25.85 26.25 21.85 24.95 23.85 24.05 25.05 23.95
25.15 23.55 23.6 21.5 24.35 23.65 26.45 23.55
25.2 24.45 24.1 23.2 23 23.7 26.9 24.95
25.65 25.85 24.1 23.9 23.6 25.4 26.4 25.5
24.5 25.55 24.2 24.2 23.45 26.7 26.1 24.7
26.2 25.6 24.55 22.95 23.25 26.45 26.1 26.85
26.55 27.55 24.2 24.9 25.4 26.95 26.15 26.3
23.8 27.25 23.05 24.9 26.95 26 26.65 27.6
22.75 23.9 22.45 25.05 27.4 25.5 23.75 25.45
27.4 26 26.25 27.05 23.4 23.8 24.15 26.6

The MTT for the ring topology tests is shown in Table 6-8 below.

Table 6-8a MTT of current differential scheme test using ring topology (15km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 24.57 26.21 24.75 25.415 24.235 24.18 23.48 25.35

Table 6-8b MTT of current differential scheme test using ring topology (50km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 24.785 25.06 24.63 24.865 24.06 24.58 25.605 24.8

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Table 6-3c MTT of current differential scheme test using ring topology (85km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 25.305 25.595 23.835 24.26 24.465 25.22 25.77 25.545

Using a managed switch with its RSTP system enables the ring to be closed. This
enables the communications to be maintained in the event of a unit failure.

Although this self-healing ability of the ring topology provides additional

functionality, it can be argued that it is contrary to the philosophy of the Main A –
Main B protection described in the golden rules [2]. In this, should any part of either
the Main A or Main B protection scheme fail, that scheme should be taken out of
service leaving the other to provide the required level of protection. A ‘process bus
failure alarm’ would alert operators of the need for repair and any risk of spurious
operation would be avoided.

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6.3 Distance Protection Relay Test

The performance of the protection of RB conventional and LB IEC61850 based

distance protection relay was demonstrated using the RTDS simulator. The modelled
transmission system, shown in Figure 6-12, consisted of the protected 100km line,
with one similar line connected to the local end and two lines connected to the remote
end. 5 GVA sources connect to both ends. The local end is configured as the
substation with the both IEC61850 and conventional protection in order to compare
their performance. The relays used were ALSTOM Grid P545, the remote with the
conventional design and the local with the IEC61850 design.

Figure 6-12 Modelled power transmission line of P545 distance relay test

The test connection diagram is shown in Figure 6-13. The switch is the focus for the
9-2 SV channel from the RTDS, the SV connection to the relay and the connection to
the PC.

Figure 6-13 Connection diagram of distance relay test

The main parameters of the relay and transmission line are shown in Table 6-9.

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Table 6-9 Parameters of the relay and transmission line

Item Value
f nom 50.00 Hz
No. of phases 3
V primary 400.0 kV
V secondary 110.0 V
I primary 1.000 kA
I secondary 1.000 A
Z1 Ph. Reach 80 km
tZ1 Delay 0s
Z2 Ph. Reach 120 km
tZ2 Delay 200ms
Z3 Ph. Reach 250 km
tZ3 Delay 600ms
Z4 Ph. Reach -30km
(reverse)
tZ4 Delay 100ms
Line length 100.0 km
Line impedance
Line angle 86°
kZN residual comp 0.67
kZN residual angle -5.000°

Details of the faults used for the testing are shown in Table 6-10. 9 fault points are
chosen, which are next to the boundaries of the 4 protection zones.

Table 6-10 Outline of distance relay test

Fault Type Phase A to ground
Prefault Time 2s
Fault Point (measured -45 km, -15 km, 15 km, 50 km, 85 km, 110 km, 130
from substation) km, 230 km, 270 km
Point On Wave 0º, 45º, 90º, 135º

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In the test, each fault point with different POW is tested 10 times. The trip time of
both the IEC61850 based relay and conventional relay is recorded as shown in the
Table 6-11 and Table 6-12 below.

Table 6-11a Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (-45km)

Fault Point: -45 km -45 km -45 km -45 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no

Table 6-11b Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (-15km)

Fault Point: -15 km -15 km -15 km -15 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
116.6 121.1 125.2 118.1
117.8 123.1 124.6 123.1
115.8 120.6 125.3 123.3
116.3 123.5 122.2 124.1
116.1 122.6 123.9 120.9
116.5 122.2 123.6 122.4
116.6 121.3 120.7 122.6
117.9 115.5 124.1 122.8
116 121.1 124.5 124.6
115.1 115.4 122.8 122.4

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Table 6-11c Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (15km)

Fault Point: 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
17.2 15.45 17.75 18.2
16.8 15.75 24.6 18.85
17.05 15.45 23.1 22.85
16.15 16.5 21.05 21.6
17.25 17.2 17.8 17.85
16.9 18 16.85 18.15
17.65 21.95 17.4 18.75
16.9 20.55 22 17.55
17.65 19.1 21.9 16.4
18.15 18.95 18.2 17.95

Table 6-11d Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (50km)

Fault Point: 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
16.55 16.75 18.35 17.3
16.9 15.95 17.25 18.25
17.9 16.5 17.75 17.75
18.25 15.75 18.25 17.6
18.2 15.75 18.5 17.95
17.55 16 19.2 16.8
19.05 16.35 17.1 17.85
21 14.9 18.5 18.2
21.45 15.35 18.2 17.9
17.4 19.75 17.8 17.6

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Table 6-11e Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (85km)

Fault Point: 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
216.2 215 217 216.8
216.1 215 217.7 216.8
217.6 214.5 216.4 215.3
215 213.7 216.9 216.1
216 215.3 216.9 216.2
215 216.2 216.9 216
215.2 215.4 215.7 216.5
216.7 214.7 217 217.2
215.3 215.7 217 216.6
216 221.9 218.5 216.6

Table 6-11f Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (110km)

Fault Point: 110 km 110 km 110 km 110 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
227.3 227.7 246.5 229.2
229.7 221.7 252.2 235.2
226.3 226.7 252.5 233.4
227.7 226.9 245.2 227.8
226.9 228 242.5 233.3
226.1 227.8 235.9 233.9
228.6 228.3 242.9 228.2
229.1 226.7 239.8 229.5
225.7 227.7 235.7 233.9
228.8 228.1 239.6 234

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Table 6-11g Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (130km)

Fault Point: 130 km 130 km 130 km 130 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
616.3 616.8 616.8 617
616.7 618 617.3 616.8
616.6 617.3 616.8 618.3
616.1 615.5 617.7 616.6
615.7 615.2 615.3 615.1
616 614.9 616.5 616.2
616.3 614.9 617.3 615.4
615.9 613.5 615.4 618.1
616.5 613.9 617.8 618
615.4 614.6 619.2 617.1

Table 6-11h Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (230km)

Fault Point: 230 km 230 km 230 km 230 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
629.4 627.6 641.4 636.1
627.8 626.9 637.9 633.5
626.8 626.5 648.4 633.6
626.9 628.8 650.3 634.3
629.9 628.5 650.1 629.3
627.6 626.1 638.4 629.4
628.6 628.1 642 628.2
628.8 628.7 642.5 629.1
627.7 627.3 649.2 636.2
628 628.6 655.5 633.9

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Table 6-11i Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (270km)

Fault Point: 270 km 270 km 270 km 270 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no

Table 6-12a Trip times of conventional distance relay (-45km)

Fault Point: -45 km -45 km -45 km -45 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no

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Table 6-12b Trip times of conventional distance relay (-15km)

Fault Point: -15 km -15 km -15 km -15 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
114 117.9 118.1 116.1
114.8 116.6 117.8 118.3
114.1 115.8 118.9 116.2
115 116 116.7 115.7
115.4 115.5 117.7 117
114.3 116.1 117 117.1
115.4 116.1 118.1 116.1
115.8 115.6 119 116.8
114.7 117 118.1 118.3
114.5 117.8 117.1 116

Table 6-12c Trip times of conventional distance relay (15km)

Fault Point: 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
15.35 14 16 17
15.3 14.35 17.5 16.55
16.05 13.75 17.65 16.55
17.09 15.75 16.9 17.2
15.3 15.9 15.75 17.1
16.55 16.05 16.85 17.55
15.6 15.6 17.5 17.55
17.25 16.35 18.3 16.6
14.95 17.15 16.75 16.9
17.05 16.05 17.25 17.6

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Table 6-12d Trip times of conventional distance relay (50km)

Fault Point: 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
17.15 15.5 16.9 17.7
15.7 15.3 18.3 16.8
16.15 14.75 17.6 17.15
16.4 15.75 16.25 16.25
15.65 15.7 17.35 17.2
17.35 15.4 16.8 18.55
17.5 15.6 17.75 16.65
17.1 15.8 16.45 17.2
14.85 17.75 17.95 16.5
15.75 18.1 17 17.15

Table 6-12e Trip times of conventional distance relay (85km)

Fault Point: 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
215.1 213.5 217.2 215.9
214.6 215.1 215.9 215.6
214.8 213.6 215.7 214.4
216 214 215.3 215
215.3 214.9 215 216.4
213.9 214.5 214.9 214.4
214.8 215 214.5 214.6
214.7 214.1 215.4 216.5
214.6 215.6 215.7 215.2
215.4 220.4 215.4 216.3

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Table 6-12f Trip times of conventional distance relay (110km)

Fault Point: 110 km 110 km 110 km 110 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
226.5 223 237.7 226.3
226.8 224.8 238.2 232.7
228.1 228.7 236.1 233.3
228.5 230.6 238.6 227.5
227.4 226.8 236 226.6
228.6 231.6 235.3 225.8
227.7 231.3 238 226.3
228.2 229.9 237 227.1
226.8 228.4 237 227.4
227.1 227.7 236.6 227.3

Table 6-12g Trip times of conventional distance relay (130km)

Fault Point: 130 km 130 km 130 km 130 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
615.7 612.8 616.1 615.9
614 616.1 613.2 617.6
613.9 619.5 614.5 615.9
614 615 614 617.6
614.5 614.2 615.1 615.7
614.9 613 614.9 615.5
615.8 613.3 615.3 615.8
615.4 613.9 617.3 617.2
614.2 612.6 615.1 616.5
614.3 613.7 616 617.4

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Table 6-12h Trip times of conventional distance relay (230km)

Fault Point: 230 km 230 km 230 km 230 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
628.4 630.9 645.8 637.5
627.2 624.5 646.2 637
627.3 622.6 646.5 636
628.7 623.4 656.1 637
628.1 627.8 655.7 636.1
628 626.2 655 637.8
629.8 631.6 655.5 636.7
627.9 630.7 653.5 636.7
629.8 627.8 656.5 636
626.8 628.3 655.1 637.2

Table 6-12i Trip times of IEC61850 conventional relay (270km)

Fault Point: 270 km 270 km 270 km 270 km
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no
no no no no

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The MTT of the IEC61850 based and conventional relay is show in Table 6-13.

Table 6-13a MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (-45km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON
MTT no no no no no no no no

Table 6-13b MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (-15km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON
MTT 116.47 114.8 120.64 116.44 123.65 117.85 122.43 116.76

Table 6-13c MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (15km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON
MTT 17.17 16.049 17.89 15.495 20.065 17.045 18.815 17.06

Table 6-13d MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (50km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON
MTT 18.425 16.36 16.305 15.965 18.09 17.235 17.72 17.115

Table 6-13e MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (85km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON
MTT 215.91 214.92 215.74 215.07 217 215.5 216.41 215.43

Table 6-13f MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (110km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON
MTT 227.62 227.57 226.96 228.28 243.28 237.05 231.84 228.03

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Table 6-13g MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (130km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON
MTT 616.15 614.67 615.46 614.41 617.01 615.15 616.86 616.51

Table 6-13h MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (230km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON
MTT 628.15 628.2 627.71 627.38 645.57 652.59 632.36 636.8

Table 6-13i MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (270km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON
MTT no no no no no no no no

The results indicate that the two relays have a very similar performance and respond
with similar tripping times.

As the MTT of 110km and 230km shown, the trip may become slower when the fault
happens next to the boundary of the protection zone.

Because of the 17.5° (0.97ms) lagging of the SV signal to the hardwired analogue
signal, the response of the conventional relay is faster than the IEC61850 based relay.

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6.4 Distance Protection Scheme Test

The performance of an EHV distance protection scheme with different process bus
topologies was demonstrated using the RTDS simulator. The modelled transmission
system, shown in Figure 6-14, consisted of the protected 100km line, with similar
lines connected to both the local and remote end and 5 GVA sources connected to
them. The local end was configured as the digital substation with the IEC61850
protection. The conventional relay was located at the remote end.

Figure 6-14 Modelled power transmission line of distance protection scheme test

The relays were configured as a permissive under-reach protection scheme (PUR)

which is shown in Figure 6-15. The communication channel for a PUR scheme was
keyed by operation of the under-reaching zone 1 elements of the relay. If the remote
relay has detected a forward fault upon receipt of this signal, the relay will operate
with no additional delay using the PUR scheme. Faults in the lines end zone, 20% of
the protected line, are therefore cleared with no intentional time delay.

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Figure 6-15 Permissive under-reach protection scheme characteristic

Standard 100/1000TX electrical cables with RJ45 connector are used to connect the
local IEC61850 based relay to the Ethernet communication network. Fibre optic
communication was used to achieve the communication between the two relays. Both
relays were configured to send their digital trip signals to the RTDS digital input
interface. The RTDS measures and reports the relays’ tripping times.

The main parameters of the relay and transmission line are shown in Table 6-14.

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Table 6-14 Parameters of relay and transmission line for distance scheme test
Item Value
f nom 50.00 Hz
No. of phases 3
V primary 400.0 kV
V secondary 110.0 V
I primary 1.000 kA
I secondary 1.000 A
Z1 Ph. Reach 80 km
tZ1 Delay 0s
Z2 Ph. Reach 150 km
tZ2 Delay 200ms
Z3 Ph. Reach 250 km
tZ3 Delay 600ms
Z4 Ph. Reach (reverse) -50 km
tZ4 Delay 100ms
Line length 100.0 km
Line impedance
Line angle 86°
kZN residual comp 0.67
kZN residual angle -5.000°

Details of the faults used for the testing are shown in Table 6-15.

Table 6-15 Outline of distance protection scheme test

Fault Type Phase A to ground
Pre-fault Time 2s
Fault Point -25 km, 15 km, 50 km, 85 km, 115 km
(measured from digital substation)
Point On Wave 0º, 45º, 90º

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6.4.1 Distance Protection Scheme Test Using Cascaded Topology

The communication architecture of the protection scheme is shown in Figure 6-16.

Figure 6-16 Configuration of distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology

In the tests, faults are applied at each fault point with different points on wave, POW.
Each test is repeated ten times and the MTT is calculated. The trip times for both the
IEC61850 based relay, IEC, and the conventional relay, CON, are recorded as shown
in the Table 6-16 below.

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Table 6-16a Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture
(-25 km)
Fault
Point:
-25 km -25km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km
POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
225.7 116.8 222.1 118.2 238.6 122.4 227.9 123.9
225.7 115.8 223.5 119.8 226.4 124.1 226.5 118
227.9 116.5 225.2 121.6 235.1 124.1 227.4 121.7
226.6 116 223.4 121.7 235.8 124.7 227.4 121.8
225.5 115.9 224.2 120.4 235.3 124.2 227.1 122.6
226.1 116.7 221.7 116.6 235.3 122.3 228.8 122
225 117.8 221.7 116 237 122.1 231.7 122.8
226.4 115 222.6 118.8 236.8 124 228.6 121.2
226.6 115.5 222.5 118.9 235.1 120.6 229.1 121.4
227 116.7 222.7 115.7 236.4 124.4 227.8 122.9
The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for
the conventional relay.

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Table 6-16b Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture
(15 km)
Fault
Point:
15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
24 16.2 23.25 16.5 23.4 16.6 21.2 15.75
21.55 15.3 22.05 16.5 23.05 16.4 24.1 16.5
22.75 16 22.5 15.65 23.55 17.2 20.9 15.7
23.1 15.8 22.15 15.4 22.25 16.65 24.25 17.1
23.45 16.85 22.15 16.05 22.85 17 24.15 17.15
23.35 17.2 22.9 15.6 22.4 18.25 24.7 17.85
22.65 16.25 22.75 16.4 22.45 16.9 24.45 17.15
24.65 16.45 23.3 15.8 23.1 17.35 25.05 17.95
21.1 15.5 23.3 15.2 22.6 16.45 23.15 16.9
21.6 15.1 23.3 16.65 23.5 16.6 23.8 17.15
The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier
assisted times for the conventional relay.

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Table 6-16c Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture
(50 km)
Fault
Point:
50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
16 14.95 17.7 17.2 17.15 17.95 17.85 17.35
16.45 15.75 17.4 16.45 19.15 18.1 16.05 17.65
17 15.85 17.25 17.65 16 17.2 15.95 16.75
15.95 16.6 17.45 18 17 17.75 16.65 17.15
15.55 19.15 17 17.8 16.5 17.05 18 18.15
16.25 17.05 15.65 17.1 17.7 17.35 17.1 17.45
15.55 15.3 17.2 16.7 17.4 17.9 16.65 18.05
15.6 17.45 16.65 16.95 18.45 17.9 16.15 16.15
17.1 16.05 16.2 17.35 17.7 17.55 16.55 16.35
15.1 15.15 15.85 17.65 17.15 18.35 17.05 16.55
The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the
conventional relay.

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Table 6-16d Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture
(85 km)
Fault
Point:
85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
15.9 23.7 15.95 25.1 16.2 24.2 16.55 23.6
15.8 24.05 15.25 22.45 15.3 23.5 15.85 22.8
16 21.15 15.9 23.4 15.2 21.9 16.65 24.6
16 21.8 16.1 25.55 15.45 22.9 16.2 22.9
15.1 22.95 16.25 25.8 15.95 22.75 15.7 23.5
15.1 21.7 16.4 22.85 15.85 22.6 16.8 24.4
16.05 23.2 16.75 24.3 16.3 23.95 16.15 24.7
16.5 23.85 16.5 23.85 15.95 23.75 17 25.05
14.95 20.8 16.7 24.15 16.05 22.85 16.2 23.1
15.4 24.15 15.15 23.45 16.65 23.6 18.55 25.8
The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted
times for the IEC61850 relay.

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Table 6-16e Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture
(115 km)
Fault
Point:
115 km 115km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115km 115 km
POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
116.9 222.7 115.2 215.8 118.9 217.6 117.8 222.3
116 223.4 121 217.3 119.7 216.6 119.6 223.1
115.5 221.9 119.6 218 119.1 216.3 115.6 216.4
115.8 222.2 118 216.5 122.7 217 121.1 216.8
115.5 224.4 117.9 217.2 122.9 216.3 123 216.2
116.1 220.5 119.1 217 121.1 216.3 116.1 223
116.4 220.9 115.1 215.6 121.9 214.8 123.1 217.8
115.8 221.3 116 216.4 125 215.7 117.2 217.2
116.9 221.5 118.5 217.5 122.5 216.5 116.4 223.2
116.8 221.6 118.4 218.2 125.2 217.3 123.8 220.9
The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for
the conventional relay

The MTT of both relays using cascaded topology is shown in Table 6-17.

Table 6-17a MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (-25km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 226.25 116.27 222.96 118.77 235.18 123.29 228.23 121.83

The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for the
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the
conventional relay, which made the trips slower.

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Table 6-17b MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (15km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 22.82 16.065 22.765 15.975 22.915 16.94 23.575 16.92

The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier assisted
times for the conventional relay. Because of the communication delay between the
two relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the conventional relay were
about 7 ms slower than the IEC61850 relay.

Table 6-17c MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (50km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 16.055 16.33 16.835 17.285 17.42 17.71 16.8 17.16

The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the
conventional relay, therefore the trip times of the two relays were similar.

Table 6-17d MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (85km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 15.68 22.735 16.095 24.09 15.89 23.2 16.565 24.045

The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted
times for the IEC61850 relay. Because of the communication delay between the two
relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the IEC61850 relay were about 7
ms slower than the conventional relay.

Table 6-17e MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (115km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
MTT 116.17 222.04 117.88 216.95 121.9 216.44 119.37 219.69

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The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for the
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the IEC61850
relay, which made the trips slower at 0º POW.

6.4.2 Distance Protection Scheme Test Using Star Topology

The communication architecture is shown in Figure 6-17.

Figure 6-17 Configuration of distance protection scheme test using star topology

The trip times of both relays using star topology are shown in Table 6-18.

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Table 6-18a Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture
(-25 km)
Fault
Point:
-25 km -25km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km
POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
225.2 118.1 222.7 117.4 238.4 120.6 231.7 122.1
225.7 116.2 221.9 118.7 236.2 121.2 228.8 122.6
225.9 116.4 223.5 117.2 226.5 122.5 229 123.2
227.9 117.1 224 118 237 121.2 227.1 122.5
227.6 118.7 223.8 116.4 235.7 122.6 227.2 120.2
226.8 116.7 224.1 117.7 236.1 123.2 227.1 122
226.5 116.1 226 117.3 237.8 119.8 229 122.9
226.6 117.9 222 114.5 236.8 122.2 226 121.5
225.7 115.8 223.5 118 235.5 123.6 228.5 124.1
226.9 116.4 222.7 118.2 239.6 122 229.3 120.1
The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for
the conventional relay.

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Table 6-18b Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture
(15 km)
Fault
Point:
15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
23 16.75 21.1 15.65 22.85 16.4 25.35 17.85
23.25 17.85 21.55 16.2 22.35 15.25 23.15 16.85
23.6 15.8 21.5 16.5 22.45 16.45 22.35 16.15
22.4 15.7 21.3 15.15 22.2 16.1 23.55 16.7
22.2 15.25 21.75 15.8 23.1 16.2 22.75 17.55
21.95 15.05 22 16.65 23.3 16.1 23.4 17.7
22.75 15.7 21.85 16.45 24.15 15.55 25.75 18.1
20.6 15.45 22.4 16.3 23.75 16.4 25.25 15.95
23.4 16.45 21.95 16.15 22.55 16.2 24.35 16.45
23.4 16.25 22.1 15.85 23.5 16.45 24.4 16.25
The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier
assisted times for the conventional relay.

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Table 6-18c Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture
(50 km)
Fault
Point:
50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
17 15.9 17 17.15 17.65 16.1 16.6 17.75
16.45 15.7 16.7 18.05 17.2 16.95 16.9 16.45
16.5 15.95 17.2 16.9 16.3 19.65 18.3 17.25
15 16.4 17.05 18.15 16.85 18.1 17.45 17.7
15.85 16.55 16.7 16.85 16.7 17.05 17.15 17.9
16.5 16 16.5 17.75 16.5 16.7 16.45 17.15
16.55 16 16.75 18.15 18.2 20.5 16.55 18
14.9 17.6 16.95 16.05 17.85 18.1 17.2 17
16 16.8 17.05 17.6 18 17.4 17.45 18.35
16.85 14.95 17.05 16.3 16.65 16.6 16.5 16.6
The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the
conventional relay.

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Table 6-18d Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture
(85 km)
Fault
Point:
85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
15 24.4 16.1 26.8 16.6 24.05 15.3 23.25
16.05 23.85 16.85 25.65 15.95 23.15 15.2 21.95
14.6 21.95 17.4 24.6 17.25 23.7 17.6 24.35
15.45 22.75 15.35 22.3 17.25 22.95 15.8 24.8
15.4 24.65 16 22.65 17.1 23.7 16.5 25
15.1 20.65 16.85 22.5 17.5 25.05 15.5 22.4
17.2 23.9 15.75 23.1 17.55 23.3 16.6 24.8
16 21.85 16.5 22.65 16.55 23.45 16.8 25.25
16.45 25.15 15.75 23.25 16.5 24.4 17.3 26.15
15.5 23.05 16 23.75 18.75 26.55 15.8 22.9
The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted
times for the IEC61850 relay.

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Table 6-18e Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture
(115 km)
Fault
Point:
115 km 115km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115km 115 km
POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
118.5 222.2 115.9 217.3 122.8 217.4 118.9 217.1
117.2 224.2 116 215.5 119.6 216.6 117.4 217.3
116.3 223.2 116.1 218.5 117.3 216.2 124.1 223.7
115.8 224.1 115.2 215.8 120.8 215.9 123.7 216.74
115.3 224.9 116.4 214.9 125.4 217.5 121 222.9
116.1 224.1 115.3 216.9 123.5 215.7 119.5 216.4
115.1 226.1 115.6 219.9 125.9 216.3 116.9 214.6
116.1 223.8 116 216.7 119.1 216 118.3 216.2
117.2 224.2 115.7 216.4 118.6 215.4 119.3 215.4
116.7 223.4 1118.3 216.3 125.3 216.3 117.6 215.8
The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for
the conventional relay

Summary of the results using MTT of both relays with star topology is shown in
Table 6-19.

Table 6-19a MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (-25km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 226.48 116.94 223.42 117.34 235.96 121.89 228.37 122.12

The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for the
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the
conventional relay, which made the trips slower.

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Table 6-19b MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (15km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 22.655 16.025 21.75 16.07 23.02 16.11 24.03 16.955

The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier assisted
times for the conventional relay. Because of the communication delay between the
two relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the conventional relay were
about 7 ms slower than the IEC61850 relay.

Table 6-19c MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (50km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 16.16 16.185 16.895 17.295 17.19 17.715 17.055 17.415

The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the
conventional relay, therefore the trip times of the two relays were similar.

Table 6-19d MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (85km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 15.675 23.22 16.255 23.725 17.1 24.03 16.24 24.085

The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted
times for the IEC61850 relay. Because of the communication delay between the two
relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the IEC61850 relay were about 7
ms slower than the conventional relay.

Table 6-19e MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (115km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 116.43 224.02 216.05 216.82 121.83 216.33 119.67 217.61

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The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for the
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the IEC61850
relay, which made the trips slower at 0º POW.

6.4.3 Distance Protection Scheme Test Using Ring Topology

The communication architecture is shown in Figure 6-18.

Figure 6-18 Configuration of distance protection scheme test using ring topology

The trip times of both relays using star topology are shown in Table 6-20.

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Table 6-20a Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture
(-25 km)
Fault
Point:
-25 km -25km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km
POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
226 116.5 225 117.4 237.4 120.5 227.8 121.5
226.9 115.7 222.5 119.4 238 124.7 228.7 122.7
226.3 116.1 222.9 117.7 238.9 122.8 226.9 122.6
227.5 117.4 225.3 114.7 237.2 123.2 227.1 120.7
225.9 115.1 227.7 122.7 228.5 121.1 228 121.1
227.1 115.9 223.2 117.8 235.2 122.1 227 121
226.5 117.3 221.4 118.5 234.5 121.3 228.9 123.4
226 118.5 220.9 117.3 236.5 122.5 228.1 123.3
226.7 116.5 223.8 116.9 238.8 120.7 228.1 122.3
227.2 117 224.6 121 235.7 123.2 231.1 117
The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for
the conventional relay.

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Table 6-20b Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture
(15 km)
Fault
Point:
15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
22.25 16.4 22.55 15.9 24.25 16.8 24.8 17.95
21.9 15.8 19.85 15.6 24.25 16.95 26.15 17.25
21.55 14.9 23.25 16.2 24.45 17.55 22.75 16
21.25 16.75 23.45 15.3 24.2 17.25 22.55 16.15
21.55 15.25 24.55 16.2 23.1 16.45 21.7 16.45
22.5 16.5 20.2 15.75 24.8 18.45 23.75 16.3
22.25 16.3 24.85 16.65 23.9 16.4 23.7 17.9
22.15 16.7 24.65 16.25 24.7 17.25 23.4 16.85
22.8 15.85 24.05 16.95 24.25 17.15 22.8 17.9
23.2 16.45 23.35 14.6 22.75 15.85 22.85 16.75
The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier
assisted times for the conventional relay.

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Table 6-20c Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture
(50 km)
Fault
Point:
50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
17.8 16.45 16.8 17.4 17.85 17.1 17.3 18.65
15.75 17.25 15.95 16.6 18 17.3 16.9 17.55
15.75 15.4 17.7 17.15 17.1 17.35 17.65 16.75
15.95 15.3 17.3 15.65 17.25 17.85 16.65 19.1
15.6 16.15 16.65 16.25 17.6 18.2 16.05 17.95
16.05 16.4 16.6 16.9 17.95 18 16.65 17.55
15.65 16.85 17.1 17.2 16.7 18 16.85 17.15
15.6 16.2 17.25 18.3 17 16.6 16.3 16.7
17.35 16.75 17.15 16 16.1 16.75 16.95 17.05
16.4 16.1 16.5 17 16.95 17 18 17.6
The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the
conventional relay.

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Table 6-20d Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture
(85 km)
Fault
Point:
85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km

POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
15.55 22.35 17 24.65 16.4 25.8 17.05 21.4
16.25 25.45 16.5 25.85 15.8 21.7 15.1 22.35
16.4 24.85 16.25 24.05 17.2 25.25 15.25 22.85
15.8 25.2 16.05 24.25 17.15 24.9 16.4 22.55
15.75 21.7 15.95 23.65 16.9 24.9 16 22.15
15.1 22.3 16.55 24.6 17 25.8 15.7 22.75
15.25 21.6 16.2 23.25 17.4 25.35 15.25 23.4
16 22.25 16.45 23.05 17.35 23.5 16.55 24.1
15.95 21.25 15.6 22.2 18.3 25.15 16.4 23.4
15.6 23.45 16.05 24.55 15.85 24.4 15.95 23.75
The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted
times for the IEC61850 relay.

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Table 6-20e Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture
(115 km)
Fault
Point:
115 km 115km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115km 115 km
POW:
0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay
Type:
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC
Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip Trip
time time time time time time time time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
116 223.6 117.6 221.7 120.3 216.1 117.1 216.3
116.1 221.6 122.8 218.1 121.7 217 118.1 221.9
116.5 221.8 117.9 223.2 122.7 215 118.3 223.8
115.7 222.9 125.7 216.2 117.6 215.5 118.6 214.6
117.1 222.6 123.8 216 118.7 216.3 125.2 217.7
115.3 223.1 116.5 214.9 122.6 215.5 117.7 218.1
115.2 221.1 118.9 215.3 121.2 216 122.6 222.2
116.5 222.6 120.7 215.9 120.9 215.6 117.8 221.7
116.2 221.9 121.5 216.9 119.5 217.5 121.6 222.9
118.8 222.9 118.4 217.9 119.8 215.8 118.8 216
The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for
the conventional relay

The MTT of both relays using star topology is shown in Table 6-21.

Table 6-21a MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (-25km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 226.61 116.6 223.73 118.34 236.07 122.21 228.17 121.56

The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for the
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the
conventional relay, which made the trips slower.

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Table 6-21b MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (15km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 22.14 16.09 23.075 15.94 24.065 17.01 23.445 16.95

The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier assisted
times for the conventional relay. Because of the communication delay between the
two relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the conventional relay were
about 7 ms slower than the IEC61850 relay.

Table 6-21c MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (50km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 16.19 16.285 16.9 16.845 17.25 17.415 16.93 17.605

The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the
conventional relay, therefore the trip times of the two relays were similar.

Table 6-21d MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (85km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 15.765 23.04 16.26 24.01 16.935 24.675 15.965 22.87

The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted
times for the IEC61850 relay. Because of the communication delay between the two
relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the IEC61850 relay were about 7
ms slower than the conventional relay.

Table 6-21e MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (115km)
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC
MTT 116.34 222.41 120.38 217.61 120.5 216.03 119.58 219.52

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The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for the
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the IEC61850
relay, which made the trips slower at 0º POW.

6.5 Transformer Current Differential Protection

Relay Test

The performance of an EHV transformer current differential protection relay with

different process bus topologies was demonstrated using the RTDS simulator. The
modelled transmission system, shown in Figure 6-19, consisted of the protected
transformer, with a 100 km line connected to the local end and a 1 GVA source
connected to it. The low voltage end was configured as the digital substation with the
HV IEC61850 based transformer protection. Both the low voltage and high voltage
sides of the transformer used IEC61850 9-2 connection. Each side is for a different
GTNET card.

Figure 6-19 Modelled power transmission line for the transformer current differential
protection relay test

The tripping characteristics of the current differential protection relay are shown in
Figure 6-20.

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Figure 6-20 Current differential bias characteristic

Standard 100/1000TX electrical cables with RJ45 connectors were used to connect the
IEC61850 relay to the Ethernet communication networks. The relay is configured to
send digital trip signal to the RTDS digital input interface. The RTDS measures and
reports the relays’ tripping times.

The main parameters of the relay and transmission line are shown in Table 6-22.

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Table 6-22 Parameters of relay and transmission line for transformer relay test
Item Value
f nom 50.00 Hz
No. of phases 3
HV nominal 400 kV
HV connection Y-Wye
LV nominal 132 kV
LV connection Y-Wye
Leakage inductance 0.2 PU
Transformer rating 100 MVA
Is1 2.000 PU
K1 30%
Is 2 10.00 PU
K2 80%
Line length 100.0 km
Line impedance
Line angle 86°
kZN residual comp 0.67
kZN residual angle -5.000°

Details of the faults used are shown in Table 6-23.

Table 6-23 Outline of transformer current differential relay test

Fault Type Phase A to ground
Prefault Time 2s
Fault Point HV primary side
Point On Wave 0º, 45º, 90º, 135º

6.5.1 Transformer Current Differential Protection Relay Test

Using Cascaded Topology

The communication architecture of the transformer protection is shown in Figure 6-21.

The transformer relay subscribes both the HV and LV SVs with one IEC61850-9-2
LE network card.

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Figure 6-21 Configuration of transformer protection relay test using cascaded topology

In the tests, faults were applied at primary side of the transformer with different points
on wave, POW. Two SV data streams (high voltage side and low voltage side) were
provided by the RTDS. Each test was repeated ten times and the mean trip time,
MTT, was calculated. The trip times are recorded as shown in the Table 6-24 below.

Table 6-24 Trip times of transformer relay test using cascaded topology
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
13.1 13.45 12.95 16.6
14.35 13.25 12.25 16
12.5 13.1 12.05 15.85
12.5 13.1 11.85 15.8
14.25 12.7 11.9 16.5
14.4 13.4 11.6 15.9
14 12.5 13.2 16.4
14.65 13.1 13.7 15.35
14.9 12.45 11.25 15.3
14.1 12.65 13.5 15.45

The MTT for the cascaded topology is shown in Table 6-25.

Table 6-25 MTT of transformer relay test using cascaded topology

POW 0º 45º 90º 135º
MTT 13.875 12.97 12.425 15.915

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6.5.2 Transformer Current Differential Protection Relay Test

Using Star Topology

The communication architecture of the transformer protection is shown in Figure 6-22.

Figure 6-22 Configuration of transformer protection relay test using star topology

The trip times are recorded as shown in the Table 6-26 below.

Table 6-26 Trip times of transformer relay test using star topology
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
12.95 11.45 12.7 16.8
12.85 11.4 12.3 16.05
13.05 11.85 12.4 15.8
13 11.1 12.75 16.1
12.8 11.8 12.9 16.6
12.75 11.65 12.45 14.75
15.45 11.2 13.85 15.9
13.75 11.5 12.3 15.65
15.15 11 11.75 15.6
14.25 10.7 11.85 15.45

The MTT for the star topology is shown in Table 6-27.

Table 6-27 MTT of transformer relay test using star topology

POW 0º 45º 90º 135º
MTT 13.6 11.365 12.525 15.87

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6.5.3 Transformer Current Differential Protection Relay Test

Using Ring Topology

The communication architecture of the transformer protection is shown in Figure 6-23.

Figure 6-23 Configuration of transformer protection relay test using ring topology

The trip times are recorded as shown in the Table 6-28 below.

Table 6-28 Trip times of transformer relay test using ring topology
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms)
14 12.65 12.9 14.95
14.55 12.85 12.8 15.35
13.3 12.85 12.75 15.15
13 13.1 13.15 18.1
13.15 12.55 12.95 16.05
14.85 12.8 12.85 15.55
14.7 12.65 12.55 15.8
14.65 11.85 12.5 15.4
14.6 11.55 12.1 15.6
14.95 11.35 12.3 15.2

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The MTT for the ring topology is shown in Table 6-29.

Table 6-29 MTT of transformer relay test using star topology

POW 0º 45º 90º 135º
MTT 14.175 12.42 12.685 15.715

6.6 Process Bus Overload Test

6.6.1 Introduction

Following the process bus overload simulation in chapter 5, for the process bus
overload test, multiple Ethernet sources were connected to the process bus. These data
sources provide data streams which were similar to those generated by IEC61850
merging units.

Based on the OPNET studies, as the process bus overload simulation results show,
when the traffic on the process bus topologies reaches 85% of the communication link
data rate, the SV ETE delay starts to increase with time rapidly, and the max number
of MUs that the three process bus topologies can tolerate is 17.

The performance of LB distance protection relay is demonstrated using an “A” phase

to ground fault at the mid-point of the protected transmission line with a point-on-
wave of 0 degrees. The modelled transmission system is shown in Figure 6-24. The
main parameters of the relay and transmission line are shown in Table 6-1.

Figure 6-24 Modelled power transmission line for process bus overload test

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6.6.2 VLAN Priority of SV Ethernet packet

IEEE 802.1Q is the networking standard that supports Virtual LANs (VLANs) on an
Ethernet network. The standard defines a system of VLAN tagging for Ethernet
frames and the accompanying procedures to be used by bridges and switches in
handling such frames. The standard also contains provisions for a quality of service
prioritization scheme commonly known as IEEE 802.1p and defines the Generic
Attribute Registration Protocol.

In the Ethernet frame, there is a 3-bit field which is Priority Code Point (PCP). It
refers to the IEEE 802.1p priority and indicates the frame priority level. Values are
from 0 (best effort) to 7 (highest); 1 represents the lowest priority. These values can
be used to prioritize different classes of traffic (voice, video, data, etc).

The default VLAN priority of a SV Ethernet packet is 4. In this case, changing the
priority level of the SV packet generated by the RTDS to a higher level, the Ethernet
switch will differentiate it from other SV packets and guarantee it not to be influenced
by the process bus overload. Therefore, the VLAN priority level of SV streams were
all set to 4 in the test.

6.6.3 Process Bus Overload Test Using Star Topology

For this test, multiple Ethernet sources are connected to the star switch. The test
system configuration is as shown in Figure 6-25. These simulators are programmed to
generate data streams from an increasing number of sources thus increasing the traffic
on the process bus.

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Figure 6-25 Configuration of process bus overload test using star topology

Using Wireshark Network Analyzer, the sample value packets published by the
Ethernet Simulator are captured as shown in Figure 6-26. As the size of the Ether-type
PDU is 113 bytes, according to Figure 5-2, the size of this sample value packet is 143
bytes. The inter-frame gap is 96 bits, the SV Ethernet frame width is therefore 1240
bits.

The svID is the logical node name of the IED assigned to the MU. The range of this
frame is 10 to 34 bytes. As the length of the svID may be different, the size of the
PDU could change in different applications. In this case, the size of svID
“Areva_MUEthDRS1” is 15 bytes, which makes the size of the PDU 5 bytes bigger
than the one used in OPNET simulation.

Using a 100 Mb/s process bus, with a 50 Hz power system and a sampling rate of
4000 samples/s, the max number of merging units that it can support has been shown
to be 20, which means the process bus load will reach its full capacity (actually 99.2
Mb/s) when 20 SV data steams transmitted through the process bus. This is an ideal
estimation.

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Figure 6-26 Sampled value packet frames captured by Wireshark Network Simulator

The traffic on the process bus is increased and the effect on the IEC61850 relay’s
tripping times are monitored and recorded as shown in Table Appendix-3. The MTT
is shown in Table 6-30.

Table 6-30a MTT of process bus overload test using star topology (1 to 20 SVs)
1 SV 5 SV 10 SV 15 SV 19 SV 20 SV
MTT MTT MTT MTT MTT MTT
16.221 16.007 16.986 16.175 16.119 16.02

Table 6-30b MTT of process bus overload test using star topology (21 to 40 SVs)
21 SV 25 SV 30 SV 35 SV 40 SV
MTT MTT MTT MTT MTT
23.183 35.493 45.565 50.606 53.6

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The results show that the MTT of the IEC61850 based relay starts to increase when 21
SVs are injected into the process bus, which makes the traffic load reaches over its
full capacity and lead to the congestive collapse.

Congestion collapse is a condition which a packet switched computer network can

reach, when little or no useful communication is happening due to congestion.
Congestion collapse generally occurs at choke points in the network, where the total
incoming traffic to a node exceeds the outgoing bandwidth [84].

When a network is congestion collapse, it has settled (under overload) into a stable
state where traffic demand is high but little useful throughput is available. Throughput
is the average rate of successful message delivery over a communication channel [84].

Therefore, there are high levels of packet delay and loss, caused by routers discarding
packets due to the output queues are full, and general quality of service is extremely
poor under such condition. It can be observed from the Table 6-30 and Table 6-31 that
some of the trips are longer than the normal value (16 ms) due to congestion collapse
of the process bus LAN, and under such condition the trip times increase as the data
traffic load is increased.

The results for different traffic levels are shown in Figure 6-27.

Figure 6-27 MTT with respect to the loading of the star process bus traffic

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The results show that the MTT of the IEC61850 based relay starts to increase after the
process bus load reaches its full capacity, which is different from the results of OPNET
Modeler based process bus overload simulation. It means that the bandwidth utilization
efficiency of the real Ethernet switch is 100% rather than 85%. For these tests, there is
no evidence of any failure to trip.

6.6.4 Process Bus Overload Test Using Cascaded Topology

The test system configuration is as shown in Figure 6-28.

Figure 6-28 Configuration of process bus overload test using cascaded topology

The tripping times are monitored and recorded as shown in Table Appendix-4. The
MTT is shown in Table 6-31.

Table 6-31a MTT of process bus overload test using cascaded topology (1 to 20 SVs)
1 SV 5 SV 10 SV 15 SV 19 SV 20 SV
MTT MTT MTT MTT MTT MTT
16.705 16.135 16.176 16.443 16.399 16.191

Table 6-31b MTT of process bus overload test using cascaded topology (21 to 40 SVs)
21 SV 25 SV 30 SV 35 SV 40 SV
MTT MTT MTT MTT MTT
24.215 34.253 50.577 55.52 51.053

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The results for different traffic levels are shown in Figure 6-29.

Figure 6-29 MTT with respect to the loading of the cascaded process bus traffic

6.6.5 Process Bus Overload Test Using Cascaded Topology

The test system configuration is as shown in Figure 6-30.

Figure 6-30 Configuration of process bus overload test using ring topology

The tripping times are monitored and recorded as shown in Table Appendix-5. The
MTT is shown in Table 6-32.

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Table 6-32a MTT of process bus overload test using ring topology (1 to 20 SVs)
1 SV 5 SV 10 SV 15 SV 19 SV 20 SV
MTT MTT MTT MTT MTT MTT
15.975 16.489 16.254 16.654 16.937 16.549

Table 6-32b MTT of process bus overload test using ring topology (21 to 40 SVs)
21 SV 25 SV 30 SV 35 SV 40 SV
MTT MTT MTT MTT MTT
23.049 32.361 47.157 48.902 49.86

The results for different traffic levels are shown in Figure 6-31.

Figure 6-31 MTT with respect to the loading of the ring process bus traffic

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6.7 Conclusions

The performance of IEC61850 protection schemes using the three different process
bus topologies is investigated with an RTDS real time simulator modelling EHV
transmission systems. The protection schemes include feeder distance protection
scheme, feeder current differential protection scheme and transformer current
differential protection scheme.

The tests demonstrate that the IEC61850 based relays and the conventional relays had
a very similar performance and responded with similar tripping times. The time offset
introduced by the IEC61850-9-2 digitization process is approximately 1ms.
Differences of the tripping times for the three different process bus topologies are
small.

Tests to investigate the IEC61850 relay’s performance when the process bus traffic is
overloaded demonstrate a consistent performance until the process bus is congestion
collapse. The bandwidth utilization efficiency of the real Ethernet switch is 100% of
the communication link data rate (100Mb/s). Under the congestion collapse condition,
the protection becomes slower and the tripping times are increased.

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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Work

T
HIS chapter summarizes the thesis by outlining the major
contributions and findings from the research, and also presents
future works that can be done to improve the technology.

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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Work

7.1 Conclusion

The aims of IEC61850 are to reduce costs, respond to the increasing demands for
communications and to provide for standard protocols available from different
manufacturers. There are also aims to provide for future proofed equipment,
interoperability of equipment from different manufacturers and easing the
management of future power system substation equipment.

These aims can be met and if the road-maps provided by the computer and
communications systems are followed. There will also be a host of other opportunities
and advantages that can be realised. These include easier repair, refurbishment and
replacement of sub-station protection, control and metering equipment. They also
provide for greater use of general purpose IEDs, self-healing systems, and plug and
play type facilities.

IEC61850, the communications standard for the digital substation, has provided the
basis for future protection and control systems. The communications buses, which are
fundamental to the operation of these schemes have presented challenges to protection
scheme designers as to the type of system architecture which can be used.

In order to reducing the outages for replacement of the secondary equipments which
are typically eight weeks in duration to one – two weeks, National Grid Electricity
Transmission launched the Architecture of Substation Secondary System (AS3). This
aim will be achieved by implementation of a process bus.

Therefore, four primary aims and seven golden rules are proposed for the design of
the process bus architecture by the National Grid.

Primary aims of AS3 process bus architecture are:

A. Allow replacement of faulty IED with minimum outage requirements.

B. Allow secondary refurbishment of a bay with minimum outage requirement.

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C. Simplify isolation procedures between primary and secondary systems.

D. Reduce risks of mal-operation.

Seven golden rules for the design of the process bus Architecture are:

1. The design principles of the AS3 scheme must be standard for all bay types –
DBB feeder, DBB Bus Section, DBB Bus Coupler, MC Mesh Corner, MC
Transformer, MC Feeder.

2. The switching box should be located as close as possible to the Primary

equipment

3. No single activity on the MAIN 1 system shall affect the MAIN 2 system.

4. No single failure shall result in the loss of control of more than one bay.

5. Physical facilities shall be available to isolate a bay for testing (Protection &
Control).

6. The Protection and Control application/philosophy shall be functionally

identical to the existing bay solution currently provided by National Grid
suppliers.

7. All trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms (excluding
intertrip send).

Cooperating with WG4, Architecture & Reliability, a process bus architecture is

proposed, which has already been agreed by National Grid. This process bus
architecture as shown in Figure 7-1 contains two bay process buses (PB1 and PB2)
which are connected to the MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 protection respectively, which
makes them totally separated and independent.

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Figure 7-1 Substation communication system using the proposed standard process
bus architecture

The main advantages of this process bus architecture are described below in terms of
the four primary aims and seven golden rules of AS3 project.

12. Allow replacement of faulty IED with minimum outage requirements.

With the application of switching box, two independent bay process buses and
gateway switches, the, any single faulty IED can be replaced without an outage or
impacting any other IEDs.

13. Allow secondary refurbishment of a bay with minimum outage requirement.

The secondary system of a bay can be refurbished without an outage.

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14. Simplify isolation procedures between primary and secondary systems.

The primary system of a bay can be refurbished in an isolated way.

15. Reduce risks of mal-operation.

By using the independent MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 protection systems, each

protection IED is capable of tripping the circuit breaker. Therefore, the risk of
mal-operation is reduced.

16. The design principles of the AS3 scheme must be standard for all bay types –
DBB feeder, DBB Bus Section, DBB Bus Coupler, MC Mesh Corner, MC
Transformer, MC Feeder.

The process bus architecture is proposed as a standard for all bay types.

17. The switching box should be located as close as possible to the Primary
equipment.

The switching box is capable of being located next to the Primary equipment

18. No single activity on the MAIN 1 system shall affect the MAIN 2 system.

The MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 systems are totally separated and independent.
19. No single failure shall result in the loss of control of more than one bay.

All the BCUs are connected to the inter-bay measurement process bus and station
bus through gateway switches. Any single failure would influence one BCU at
most.

20. Physical facilities shall be available to isolate a bay for testing (Protection &
Control).

The application of switching box and gateway switches can fulfil this requirement.

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21. The Protection and Control application/philosophy shall be functionally

identical to the existing bay solution currently provided by National Grid
suppliers.

The new substation communication system will not influence the protection and
control schemes that the substations are using at the moment.

22. All trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms (excluding
intertrip send).

As described above, this proposed process bus architecture is capable of achieving the
four primary aims and obeying the seven golden rules, but leaves two questions still
unanswered.

What Ethernet LAN topology will be used in the bay process buses?

Whether all trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms
(excluding intertrip send) or not?

This work describes and evaluates three different process bus topologies which are
cascaded, star, and ring topology. The performance of IEC61850 protection scheme
using these topologies is investigated with different simulation tools. Conclusions are
drawn below.

I. Reliablity and availability analysis of process bus topologies

The three process bus architecures are evaluated from the reliability point of view
and the MTTF and availability of the feeder bay process bus topologies are
calculated. It is found that star topology provides the highest MTTF of 5.639 years
and the highest availability of 0.999997907. This architecture has the weakness
that the failure of the central Ethernet switch will lead the entire communication
system collapse. The cascaded topology provides the MTTF of 5.034 years and
the availability of 0.999997369. Considering the first failure, the ring topology
provides the same MTTF and availability as cascaded topology. However, ring

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topology requires managed Ethernet switches with RSTP, which makes this
architecture more expensive and complicated comparatively.

II. Modelling and simulation for performance evaluation of process bus topologies

The OPNET Modeller simulation based feeder bay study shows that the star
topology provides the shortest SV ETE delay of 0.031576 ms. The cascaded
topology provides the SV ETE delay of 0.048348 ms, and the ring topology
provides almost the same SV ETE delay of 0.048375 ms as cascaded topology.

According to IEC61850, the acceptable maximum communication delay for the

time-critical messages, SVs and GOOSE, is 3 ms. The size of the GOOSE
message is smaller than the SV message, and the frequency is lower, hence the SV
and GOOSE ETE delay of the MAIN protection for a feeder bay using the three
different process bus topologies are small and tolerable.

III. Protection performance study with commercial test set and RTDS simulator

The tests with both commercial test set and RTDS Simulator demonstrate that the
IEC61850 based relay and the conventional relay have a similar performance and
respond with similar tripping times. It can be concluded that the latency of the
process bus is small.

The time offset introduced by the IEC61850-9-2 digitization process of the

protection IED is approximately 1ms. It results that the analogue input is faster
than the SV input on average. As the operating time of a distance relay should be
20ms, considering the worst case which is scenario 2 in section 3.3, the SV
input delay is tolerable. The GOOSE trip signal is about 2.6 ms faster than the
digital trip signal on average, which indicates that the GOOSE message
digitization process of the protection IED is faster than the digital trip signal
processing.

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IV. Process bus overload test

The OPNET process bus simulation results shows that because the bandwidth
utilization efficiency of the OPNET Ethernet switch model is 85%, when the traffic
on the process bus topologies reaches 85% of the communication link data rate, the
SV ETE delay starts to increase with time rapidly. The max number of MUs that the
three process bus topologies can tolerate is 17.

The process bus overload tests to investigate the IEC61850 relay’s performance when
the process bus traffic is overloaded demonstrate a consistent performance until the
process bus is congestion collapse. The bandwidth utilization efficiency of the real
Ethernet switch is 100% of the communication link data rate (100Mb/s). Under the
congestion collapse condition, the protection becomes slower and the tripping times
are increased. The max number of MUs that the three process bus topologies can
tolerate is 20.

7.2 Future Work

The Ethernet standards comprise several wiring and signalling variants of the OSI
physical layer in use with Ethernet. The original 10BASE5 Ethernet used coaxial
cable as a shared medium. Later the coaxial cables were replaced by twisted pair and
fibre optic links in conjunction with hubs and switches. Data rates were periodically
increased from the original 10 megabits per second to 100 gigabits per second.

The new Gigabit Ethernet provides a great opportunity for the design of process bus
topologies. More complicated topologies can be evaluated, for example, the mesh
topologies.

Mesh topology is a type of computer network setup, where each of the computers and
devices in the network are interconnected to one another. This allows most of the
transmissions to be distributed, even if any one of the connection goes down. The
connection between the devices and different nodes (computers) is made through hops.
Some of the devices and nodes are connected through single hop and some are

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connected with more than one hop. In a full mesh topology, every node is connected
to every other node in the network. When data is traveling in a mesh network, the
network is automatically configured to take the shortest route to reach the destination.
In other words, the data is transferred through least number of hops.

Mesh topologies involve the concept of routes. Unlike the cascaded, star and ring
topology, messages sent on a mesh network can take any of several possible paths
from source to destination. (Recall that even in a ring, although two cable paths exist,
message can only travel in one direction.) The advantages of mesh topologies are:

There are dedicated links used in the topology, which guarantees, that each
connection is able to carry its data load, thereby eliminating traffic problems,
which are common, when links are shared by multiple devices.

It is a robust topology. When one link in the topology becomes unstable, it

does not cause the entire system to halt.

If the network is to be expanded, it can be done without causing any

disruption to current users of the network.

It is possible to transmit data, from one node to a number of other nodes

simultaneously.

Troubleshooting, in case of a problem, is easy as compared to other network

topologies.

This topology ensures data privacy and security, as every message travels
along a dedicated link.

With the upgrade of protection IED which can support the Gigabit Ethernet, the mesh
process bus topologies are worth being investigated in the future.

As concluded in the previous section, The time offset introduced by the IEC61850-9-
2 digitization process of the protection IED is approximately 1ms. The GOOSE trip

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signal is about 2.6 ms faster than the digital trip signal on average. The results may be
different if using protection IEDs from different manufacturers. Therefore, various
protection IEDs should be involved in the protection performance study in order to
improve the IEC61850-9-2 processing power and interoperability of the IEDs.

IEEE 1588 has already been considered to be the next step in the development of the
substation communication system synchronization. IEEE 1588 provides fault tolerant
synchronization for different clocks along the same network. There is very little
bandwidth consumption, processing power, and setup. IEEE 1588 accomplishes all of
this by using the PTP (precision time protocol). The time protocol synchronizes all
clocks within a network by adjusting clocks to the highest quality clock. IEEE 1588
defines value ranges for the standard set of clock characteristics. The Best Master
Clock (BMC) algorithm determines which clock is the highest quality clock within
the network. The BMC (grandmaster clock) then synchronizes all other clocks (slave
clocks) in the network. If the BMC is removed from the network or is determined by
the BMC algorithm to no longer be the highest quality clock, the algorithm then
redefines what the new BMC is and adjusts all other clocks accordingly. No
administrator input is needed for this readjustment because the algorithm provides a
fault tolerant. It is designed for applications that cannot bear the cost of a GPS
receiver at each node, or for which GPS signals are inaccessible. The new standard
needs to be investigated by applying on the synchronization of multiple MUs with
only one GPS receiver.

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The trip times of the four scenarios for the distance relay test using the commercial
test set are shown in Table Appendix-1. The four scenarios are:

Scenario 1: Analogue input and Digital output – conventional hardwired;

Scenario 2: SV input and Digital output - hybrid implementation of IEC61850;
Scenario 3: Analogue input and GOOSE output – partial implementation of
IEC61850;
Scenario 4: SV input and GOOSE output – complete implementation of
IEC61850.

Table Appendix-1 Trip time of the four scenarios for distance relay test
Fault Point Angle Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
trip time trip time trip time trip time
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
40 km 70.00 ° 17.4 16.7 13.7 17.5
40 km 70.00 ° 19.9 20.1 17.6 19.6
40 km 70.00 ° 19.6 20.1 15.9 20
40 km 70.00 ° 19.4 20 15.7 20.5
40 km 70.00 ° 18.2 17.9 15.4 14.3
40 km 70.00 ° 19.6 20.2 14.8 17
40 km 70.00 ° 20.3 19.5 17.5 16.3
40 km 70.00 ° 20 19.3 17.3 17.2
40 km 70.00 ° 18.1 19.5 17.4 16.6
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 19.4 17.1 16.2
40 km 70.00 ° 20 19.2 19.4 17.5
40 km 70.00 ° 18.1 19.5 15.7 18
40 km 70.00 ° 19.3 19.6 15.6 15.8
40 km 70.00 ° 18.9 20.3 13.8 17.3
40 km 70.00 ° 17.5 19 18 16.8
40 km 70.00 ° 20 19.6 16.2 20.2
40 km 70.00 ° 17.8 20.2 13 15.7

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40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 20.3 13.1 18.3

40 km 70.00 ° 18.3 19.8 18.8 20.3
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 19.1 15.8 19
40 km 70.00 ° 18.1 16.4 16.3 16.1
40 km 70.00 ° 17.8 20.2 19.6 20.3
40 km 70.00 ° 18.7 19 15.1 18.7
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 18.2 14.9 15.3
40 km 70.00 ° 19.3 19.3 15 14.2
40 km 70.00 ° 18.4 19.3 15.2 20.4
40 km 70.00 ° 19.1 18.5 15.5 16.8
40 km 70.00 ° 19.3 16.3 15 18
40 km 70.00 ° 17.3 19.9 18.4 14
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 16.8 13.9 16.2
40 km 70.00 ° 17.5 19.9 18.6 16
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 20.5 17 19.9
40 km 70.00 ° 17.7 19.1 15 16.2
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 18.7 17 15.3
40 km 70.00 ° 18.2 18.7 14.3 16.5
40 km 70.00 ° 17.4 19.1 15.8 19.5
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 17.6 17.5 19.8
40 km 70.00 ° 19.5 17.2 17.8 17.5
40 km 70.00 ° 20.5 16.2 13.5 16
40 km 70.00 ° 18.3 20.5 20 18.2
40 km 70.00 ° 19.1 18.1 15.5 16.8
40 km 70.00 ° 19.3 17.7 18.3 17.8
40 km 70.00 ° 19.4 19 14.6 15.9
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 19.6 15.6 15.9
40 km 70.00 ° 20.7 18.8 15.8 17
40 km 70.00 ° 16.5 18.6 15 15.9
40 km 70.00 ° 19.1 20.1 19 15.8
40 km 70.00 ° 22.5 19.9 14.7 20.5
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 18.7 17.1 19.1

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40 km 70.00 ° 16.9 19.1 16.6 16.6

40 km 70.00 ° 19 19.2 14.8 17
40 km 70.00 ° 16.3 19.3 14.9 15.8
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 19.3 15.4 17.3
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 19.4 17 16.8
40 km 70.00 ° 16.8 18.2 15.1 17.9
40 km 70.00 ° 19.8 19.4 17.7 15.8
40 km 70.00 ° 19.8 19.8 15.4 17.1
40 km 70.00 ° 18.3 20.4 14.6 14.5
40 km 70.00 ° 17.7 19 15.9 15.2
40 km 70.00 ° 17.6 17.8 15.4 13.6
40 km 70.00 ° 19.1 19.7 15.7 16.3
40 km 70.00 ° 16.7 17.9 15.5 20.1
40 km 70.00 ° 17.3 19.6 18.8 19.6
40 km 70.00 ° 19.3 19.3 15.2 16.8
40 km 70.00 ° 20.9 18.8 15.6 17.1
40 km 70.00 ° 20.3 18.8 17.3 15.5
40 km 70.00 ° 18.8 16.2 15.8 17.9
40 km 70.00 ° 19 19.7 17.7 20.2
40 km 70.00 ° 17.8 18.8 15.6 16.2
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 19 17.2 16.2
40 km 70.00 ° 20.4 20.3 16 18.8
40 km 70.00 ° 17.5 19.5 16.2 16.2
40 km 70.00 ° 17.5 19.1 15.9 15.9
40 km 70.00 ° 19.1 20.3 18.2 16.7
40 km 70.00 ° 17 19.6 15.8 20.1
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 20.1 15.3 17.1
40 km 70.00 ° 18.9 19 14.8 16.8
40 km 70.00 ° 16.4 19.1 18.8 15.9
40 km 70.00 ° 18.2 19.6 15.3 14.4
40 km 70.00 ° 17.2 19.6 16.4 15.5
40 km 70.00 ° 21.2 18 15.3 17.5

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40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 18 19.3 20.2

40 km 70.00 ° 21.3 19.7 14.6 17.3
40 km 70.00 ° 18.1 18.1 14.8 19.7
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 19 17 19.6
40 km 70.00 ° 18.9 19.2 18.5 16.8
40 km 70.00 ° 19.2 19.7 14.3 16.8
40 km 70.00 ° 17.3 19.8 16.4 17.8
40 km 70.00 ° 16.6 20.3 18.3 16.3
40 km 70.00 ° 18.2 18.9 15.7 16.8
40 km 70.00 ° 17.7 20.1 13 18.6
40 km 70.00 ° 17.4 18.9 16.3 18.6
40 km 70.00 ° 19.6 19.5 15.2 16.8
40 km 70.00 ° 16.6 19 17 17.7
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 19.5 15.2 16.2
40 km 70.00 ° 19.8 19.2 17.5 18.4
40 km 70.00 ° 19.9 17.6 15.6 15.9
40 km 70.00 ° 18 19.6 15.3 18
40 km 70.00 ° 19.7 19.9 16.1 17.5
40 km 70.00 ° 18.9 19.9 15.1 17.9
115 km 70.00 ° 217.7 218.4 214.1 215.3
115 km 70.00 ° 215.9 218.4 211.6 214.6
115 km 70.00 ° 217.2 218.3 216.4 218.8
115 km 70.00 ° 217.7 217.4 213.5 218.3
115 km 70.00 ° 216.6 218.9 216.3 215
115 km 70.00 ° 216.7 217.6 214.4 214.6
115 km 70.00 ° 216.9 218.3 215.5 215
115 km 70.00 ° 217.9 218.8 213.8 213.9
115 km 70.00 ° 216.5 218.4 215.7 213.1
115 km 70.00 ° 216.4 218 214.8 214.4
115 km 70.00 ° 215.1 216.6 215.3 214.4
115 km 70.00 ° 216.4 217.5 213 214.2
115 km 70.00 ° 216.8 217.4 218.4 215.8

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115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 216.8 215.5 216.5

115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 217.6 212.9 216.2
115 km 70.00 ° 216.5 218.6 212.4 214.5
115 km 70.00 ° 218.5 219.9 213.9 213.1
115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 219.2 214.8 214.5
115 km 70.00 ° 218.1 218.5 214 216
115 km 70.00 ° 215.5 217.9 211.8 217.4
115 km 70.00 ° 216 218.5 212.5 214.7
115 km 70.00 ° 217.7 216.6 214 214
115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 216.6 216.6 215.1
115 km 70.00 ° 218.2 218.5 213.3 213.1
115 km 70.00 ° 215.9 216.9 216 215.7
115 km 70.00 ° 218.5 219.4 215.6 216.5
115 km 70.00 ° 217.1 217.6 214 216.1
115 km 70.00 ° 215.9 219.4 213 215.7
115 km 70.00 ° 215.9 218.3 214.2 212.2
115 km 70.00 ° 217.2 218.3 213.8 214.4
115 km 70.00 ° 214.6 215.4 215.7 214.8
115 km 70.00 ° 216.9 217.1 214.2 215
115 km 70.00 ° 216.1 216.9 215.7 216.8
115 km 70.00 ° 216.4 219.6 213.8 213.9
115 km 70.00 ° 218.4 218.9 216.6 216.6
115 km 70.00 ° 218.3 218.7 215.1 214.5
115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 217 213.5 219
115 km 70.00 ° 217.6 220 213.1 213.4
115 km 70.00 ° 215.9 217.3 211.9 215.5
115 km 70.00 ° 217.1 217.4 213.1 215.3
115 km 70.00 ° 216.1 216.7 213.1 214.1
115 km 70.00 ° 218 218 214 214.5
115 km 70.00 ° 218.2 219.9 216.2 216.5
115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 220.2 215 217.9
115 km 70.00 ° 218.2 217.1 215.5 213.1

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115 km 70.00 ° 218.1 219.5 212.6 214.6

115 km 70.00 ° 218.7 219.9 212.2 216
115 km 70.00 ° 216.6 217.6 216.9 215.5
115 km 70.00 ° 217.8 217.3 214.7 213.4
115 km 70.00 ° 217 218.8 213.4 216.7
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 217.8 214.8 215.1
115 km 70.00 ° 218.8 217.5 212.4 215
115 km 70.00 ° 218.9 217.5 213.8 216.5
115 km 70.00 ° 217.8 218.2 213.2 216.1
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 216.7 214.1 215.5
115 km 70.00 ° 216.5 217.9 213.5 216.5
115 km 70.00 ° 216.4 216.9 215.4 215.9
115 km 70.00 ° 216.7 218.3 214.2 214.6
115 km 70.00 ° 216.2 216.9 216.3 213.8
115 km 70.00 ° 221.7 216.3 212.6 215.4
115 km 70.00 ° 218.2 216.7 213.8 215
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 215.9 214.7 214.3
115 km 70.00 ° 217.7 219.3 214 215
115 km 70.00 ° 216.7 219.3 214 214.7
115 km 70.00 ° 214.8 219.2 212.7 216.6
115 km 70.00 ° 216 219.4 214.1 217
115 km 70.00 ° 218.9 216.9 218.6 215
115 km 70.00 ° 215.8 219.9 213.3 215.6
115 km 70.00 ° 216.1 217.2 216.2 216.4
115 km 70.00 ° 214.9 218.9 215.2 214.6
115 km 70.00 ° 218.3 218.4 217.9 215.7
115 km 70.00 ° 216.5 220.2 214.3 215.2
115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 218.9 213.2 214.4
115 km 70.00 ° 217.1 217.8 215.5 212.9
115 km 70.00 ° 216.3 217 213.6 213.7
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 218.5 215.1 213.7
115 km 70.00 ° 217.4 218.4 213.8 214.7

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115 km 70.00 ° 214.9 218.5 214.4 213.5

115 km 70.00 ° 216 219 213.6 213.9
115 km 70.00 ° 216.4 216.8 214 214.5
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 218.4 214.7 213.5
115 km 70.00 ° 215 218.6 213.3 215.2
115 km 70.00 ° 218 218.4 215.4 214.2
115 km 70.00 ° 217 218.2 212.3 215.8
115 km 70.00 ° 215.7 216 217.8 214.3
115 km 70.00 ° 216 219 213 216.9
115 km 70.00 ° 217.1 217.3 215.2 212.3
115 km 70.00 ° 216.7 217.4 212.8 215.6
115 km 70.00 ° 217.7 218.1 214.9 216.2
115 km 70.00 ° 216.5 217.9 211.3 213
115 km 70.00 ° 219.5 218.2 214 214.7
115 km 70.00 ° 216.9 219.7 217.5 213.7
115 km 70.00 ° 219.7 219.1 212.5 214.7
115 km 70.00 ° 217.8 219.7 216.3 215.7
115 km 70.00 ° 217.1 218.1 214.6 213.4
115 km 70.00 ° 218.5 217.2 213.2 214.6
115 km 70.00 ° 218.3 216.9 212.6 216.7
115 km 70.00 ° 220.7 219.1 212.3 215.2
115 km 70.00 ° 218.1 217.6 214 218
115 km 70.00 ° 218.2 216.6 214.3 214.9
200 km 70.00 ° 615.6 617 614.4 617.4
200 km 70.00 ° 618.4 617.4 615.2 617.1
200 km 70.00 ° 618 618.2 615.5 615.3
200 km 70.00 ° 618.4 617.1 616.2 615.4
200 km 70.00 ° 615.9 618.6 612.9 614.6
200 km 70.00 ° 616.6 617 613.4 615.3
200 km 70.00 ° 617.1 616.9 614.5 615.7
200 km 70.00 ° 616.1 618.5 612.4 614.1
200 km 70.00 ° 616.7 617 613.6 614.4

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200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 616.6 612.6 612.8

200 km 70.00 ° 616.1 617.3 614.5 615
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 618.8 615.8 612
200 km 70.00 ° 616 615.6 611.5 614
200 km 70.00 ° 616 617.7 615.2 614.9
200 km 70.00 ° 616 617.7 613.8 613.2
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 617.6 613.3 615.2
200 km 70.00 ° 617 616.2 612.4 615.3
200 km 70.00 ° 616.9 618.6 614.3 618.4
200 km 70.00 ° 617.8 617.1 614.2 616.6
200 km 70.00 ° 616.9 615.1 614.6 614
200 km 70.00 ° 616.1 616.6 614.5 614.7
200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 617 615.2 618.2
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 617.4 613.8 616.7
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 616.9 613 614.5
200 km 70.00 ° 617 619.7 615.1 614
200 km 70.00 ° 618 619.4 611.9 613.9
200 km 70.00 ° 617.5 617 616.4 614.6
200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 617.6 613.5 615.4
200 km 70.00 ° 616.6 619.5 612.5 614.7
200 km 70.00 ° 617.8 617.5 613.8 614.9
200 km 70.00 ° 617.8 616.7 613.7 615
200 km 70.00 ° 618.6 617.5 612.6 614.4
200 km 70.00 ° 617.3 620.4 613 615.2
200 km 70.00 ° 616.2 618.6 615.9 616.8
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 617.4 614.1 619.9
200 km 70.00 ° 617 616 615 617.4
200 km 70.00 ° 616.9 619 614.6 616.7
200 km 70.00 ° 618.9 617 613.1 614.4
200 km 70.00 ° 617.4 617.7 614 614.7
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 616.9 612.7 615
200 km 70.00 ° 618 617 614.5 615.3

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200 km 70.00 ° 615.1 618.7 614.3 615.2

200 km 70.00 ° 616.7 617.3 614.6 615.7
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 619.7 617.1 615.1
200 km 70.00 ° 617.5 615.5 615 614.3
200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 617.6 614.1 613.7
200 km 70.00 ° 617.4 619.1 617.7 614
200 km 70.00 ° 617 617.2 614.7 614.5
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 617.6 614.1 619.4
200 km 70.00 ° 615.2 618.4 614.3 614.7
200 km 70.00 ° 614.6 617.7 616.1 617.1
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 618.4 613.5 614.5
200 km 70.00 ° 616.7 619.6 615.8 617.1
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 618.6 616.3 613.5
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 618.5 613.7 613
200 km 70.00 ° 616 618.4 613.5 614.6
200 km 70.00 ° 617.2 616.8 613.6 613.4
200 km 70.00 ° 617.3 618 613.2 613.4
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 617.8 614 615
200 km 70.00 ° 618.4 618.4 615.4 614.8
200 km 70.00 ° 616.9 618.8 614.4 613.4
200 km 70.00 ° 616.9 616.1 615.3 614.2
200 km 70.00 ° 615.5 618.2 617.8 615.9
200 km 70.00 ° 616.6 617.4 613.1 615.9
200 km 70.00 ° 618.2 617.8 615 614.9
200 km 70.00 ° 618.2 617.4 613.7 616.9
200 km 70.00 ° 615.8 618.4 613.9 615.2
200 km 70.00 ° 617.2 618.5 614 613.8
200 km 70.00 ° 616 616.5 612.8 616.2
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 618.5 615.5 615
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 617.1 612.9 613.8
200 km 70.00 ° 618.7 618.2 612.8 614.1
200 km 70.00 ° 617.4 617.6 615.2 614.4

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200 km 70.00 ° 616.1 617.7 613.5 615.3

200 km 70.00 ° 617.3 617 613 614.8
200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 617.4 612.7 613.9
200 km 70.00 ° 616.7 616.9 614.6 615.7
200 km 70.00 ° 615.9 619.2 613.3 614.8
200 km 70.00 ° 617.3 617.4 614.5 617
200 km 70.00 ° 617.8 618.2 613.6 614.9
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 620 611.4 617.3
200 km 70.00 ° 617.1 617.3 613.1 615.1
200 km 70.00 ° 617.5 616.1 613.7 614.3
200 km 70.00 ° 616.1 619.2 615.2 614.9
200 km 70.00 ° 618 619 614.2 614.7
200 km 70.00 ° 616.2 617.8 613.7 614.5
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 617.9 615.7 614.8
200 km 70.00 ° 616.2 619.1 612.5 613.8
200 km 70.00 ° 618.8 617.4 613.9 615.5
200 km 70.00 ° 618.2 617.8 614.5 614
200 km 70.00 ° 618.2 618.4 614.7 612.9
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 618.5 614.1 614.2
200 km 70.00 ° 617.2 617.1 616.5 613.5
200 km 70.00 ° 616.6 616.9 613.3 614.5
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 618.5 617.2 614.6
200 km 70.00 ° 617.2 618.7 613.3 614.3
200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 618 616.4 618.2
200 km 70.00 ° 617.6 619.2 616.1 613.7
200 km 70.00 ° 618.7 620 615.6 614
200 km 70.00 ° 617.4 618.8 614.3 616.9

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The trip times of the four scenarios for the current differential relay test using the
commercial test set are shown in Table Appendix-2.

Table Appendix-2 Trip time of the four scenarios for current differential relay test
Test No. Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
trip time (ms) trip time (ms) trip time (ms) trip time (ms)
1 27.4 26.7 23.9 23.8
2 29.2 25.7 25.5 23.3
3 27 27.2 24.2 28.4
4 25.7 26.7 22.5 23.2
5 23.4 25.9 19.8 26.6
6 25.2 25 22 21.9
7 25.5 26.3 22.4 22.8
8 24.4 23.7 21.2 21
9 28 24 25.4 21.5
10 27.4 25.3 24.3 22.3
11 25 25.8 21.9 26.6
12 28.1 25.7 24.1 23.4
13 27.5 27.4 27.7 24.6
14 27.8 25.8 26.8 27.5
15 26 23.3 22.6 21.3
16 26 26.8 23.5 23.4
17 28.4 27.7 25 24.6
18 24.7 24.7 21.7 21.7
19 25.8 29.4 22.6 27.4
20 25.6 26.5 22.2 23.4
21 24.6 27.3 21.4 26.4
22 26.8 27 24 24.1
23 25.1 27.6 22 29.3
24 27.3 31.3 24.8 30.5

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25 28 24.1 25.8 21.6

26 25.5 23 22.4 22.5
27 26.6 26.1 23.5 23.1
28 28.4 26.4 27.6 27.8
29 27.3 24.9 23.7 22.7
30 27.7 26.7 25 23.7
31 25.3 22.9 22.4 23
32 28.5 28.9 28.7 29
33 26.4 23.5 23.1 21.2
34 24.1 27.6 23.5 24.4
35 26.9 26.7 23.7 23.6
36 25.6 24 23 23
37 26.4 25.9 23.1 22.9
38 24.2 24.7 21.2 21.2
39 27.9 27.3 24.4 24.2
40 24.8 24.7 21.6 21.7
41 24.8 24.1 23.7 23.4
42 25.7 24.8 22.9 21.3
43 26.6 25.2 23.2 22.4
44 25.6 25.9 22.6 22.6
45 28 24.5 25.1 21.1
46 23.9 25.1 20.7 22.4
47 29.8 28.1 26.1 24.5
48 26 28.9 22.9 28.8
49 26.2 27.6 25.8 28.2
50 26.4 24.4 23.2 21.8
51 25.8 26.4 24.4 25.9
52 25.6 24 22.4 21.1
53 25.5 27.3 22.2 24.6
54 26.4 23.8 24.3 22
55 27.8 25.2 25.4 22.4
56 23.9 25.2 20.7 23.3

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57 27.3 25.9 23.8 22.4

58 25.3 27.9 22.1 24.2
59 25.9 25.5 25.1 21.9
60 26.4 25.5 23.4 22.8
61 23.2 26.4 20.1 23.5
62 25.4 27.5 23.1 23.9
63 26.9 23.4 23.8 20.3
64 24.4 27.4 21.1 24.6
65 27.8 25.9 26.7 22.9
66 24.9 27.9 21.7 24.7
67 27.3 25.7 23.6 22.3
68 27 24.6 23.7 21.7
69 25.7 27.8 22.5 24.2
70 27.4 25.3 26.3 22.4
71 27.3 24.8 23.9 22.7
72 27.5 26 26.5 23
73 24.3 26.3 21.3 23.4
74 25.4 24 23.9 20.8
75 26.7 26.1 23.4 22.9
76 26.8 26.4 23.9 23
77 24.1 26.9 20.7 24.4
78 28.8 24.6 25.3 24.8
79 24.6 27.4 21.1 24.4
80 26.8 26.5 23.7 22.8
81 26.4 27 23.4 25.9
82 25.9 26.9 22.6 23.6
83 23.8 23.3 20.5 20.2
84 28.1 26.2 26.8 22.6
85 24.3 25.1 21.3 21.8
86 27.8 22.5 24.5 19.5
87 28.1 26.5 25.1 27.6
88 28.6 26.9 25.4 23.6

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89 24.4 25.1 22.1 24.4

90 25.1 26.6 21.8 23
91 27.8 27.1 24.1 23.6
92 27.1 23.6 24.5 22.9
93 25.8 27.7 22.4 25.6
94 23.5 24.3 19.9 21.4
95 25.6 28 22.2 24.6
96 26.6 28.4 23.6 26.1
97 26.5 25.7 23.4 22.5
98 26.4 24.2 22.9 21.2
99 26.6 24.6 23.5 21.1
100 25 26 22.1 23.1

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Increasing the traffic on the star topology process bus by injecting SVs into the
process bus, the tripping times of the IEC61850 distance relay are shown in Table
Appendix-3.

Table Appendix-3a Trip times of process bus overload test using star topology
(1 to 20 SVs)
1 SV 5 SV 10 SV 15 SV 19 SV 20 SV
Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time
15.75 16.55 16.65 14.5 16.7 16.05
16.85 16.2 16.15 15 16.25 16
16.25 16.4 15.4 15.5 16 15.4
16.45 18.25 15.5 16.15 16.15 16.25
15.35 16.4 16.35 15.6 16.5 17.35
15.2 15.6 17.1 15.35 15.4 16.55
16.35 15.5 16.95 16.9 16.25 17.05
16.35 14.7 17.05 16.4 16.85 14.7
16.4 15.75 16.15 16.05 14.55 15.65
15.45 15.55 15.5 15.2 16.35 16.2
16.75 15.5 17.35 15.25 15.55 16.25
15.4 16.05 14.95 15.4 15.65 16.4
15.3 15.95 15.35 15.65 16.1 15.65
15.05 15.9 16.3 15.3 16.45 14.8
15.8 15.05 16.1 16.7 16.05 15.85
15.45 17.9 15.55 16.25 15.1 16.6
15.9 15.9 16.4 16.8 17.6 17.1
16.45 16.6 30.95 16.25 16.4 16.5
16.5 16.85 16.75 15.7 17.95 15.15
16.15 16.7 15.55 15.85 17.1 16.7
15.35 14.45 16.9 16.85 17 16.05
16.35 15.3 15.5 16.3 14.55 16.65

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16.35 16.25 16.8 15.7 15.95 16.25

16.3 16.3 15.7 15.75 17.1 15.6
16.55 16.65 29.95 15 15.75 15.05
14.9 16.05 15.95 15.35 16.05 15
15.3 15.2 14.75 16.2 15.6 16.35
15.1 15.7 15.6 29.45 16.05 16.4
15.6 15.45 16.4 15.25 15.45 16.6
16.2 15.5 17.4 15.95 17.55 15.45
15.95 16.8 17 15.55 16.85 16.4
16.45 16.15 15.35 15.35 16.25 15.45
15.6 16.3 16.45 15.85 14.85 15.4
15.55 15.7 15.7 16.35 15.8 16.3
16.3 16.75 15.95 16.55 15.65 16.4
16.65 15.3 29.75 15.1 17.7 18
16.65 14.8 16.95 15.3 14.6 17.05
16.1 15.35 15.35 15.65 15.5 14.6
15.65 14.8 15.1 16.15 16.25 17.1
17.1 15.5 15.05 17.6 16.15 15.75
16.1 16.15 15.95 17.1 14.85 16.35
15.65 16.1 16.65 15.95 15.55 15.5
30.15 16.2 16.9 15.8 15.7 15.7
14.65 15.95 16.65 15.5 16.25 15.75
16 17.3 15.95 16.3 15.85 14.55
15.9 15.8 15.4 17 17.4 15.95
15.8 16.7 16 16.25 16.15 16.1
16.3 16.2 17 16.55 16.4 16.1
16.05 16.2 16.15 16 16.05 15.9
15.3 16.15 17 15.25 16.15 15.05

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Table Appendix-3b Trip times of process bus overload test using star topology
(21 to 40 SVs)
21 SV 25 SV 30 SV 35 SV 40 SV
Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time
49.3 61.75 28.9 46.7 159.6
46.85 51.25 46.75 47.4 49.75
51.2 31.85 45.95 32.45 45.6
15.85 32.35 46.8 64.45 49.5
15.1 29.9 50.05 47.6 50
17.3 16.45 51.4 72 17.15
16 15.6 15.85 18.2 59.2
15.35 46.45 71.4 47 57.85
16.2 51.05 47.25 50.2 46.6
16.05 52.15 20 256.2 23.85
51.95 50.25 51 19.1 19.4
16.5 50.5 33.85 22.2 47.55
15.65 17.35 43.95 47.15 51.7
16.95 23.25 48.8 46.35 46.05
16.45 47.4 36.9 48.55 50.05
31.3 50 50.89 48.9 50.3
17.95 16.95 44.65 51.7 50.1
21.65 49.9 50.35 51.65 55.7
16.6 52.5 67.4 46 65.85
16.35 49.6 29.2 16.8 47.2
29.85 34.2 47.9 56.3 28.3
16.1 60.5 50.35 42.35 46.2
15.65 14.8 47.3 29.8 50.1
15.85 49.15 49.65 34.85 77.45
16.1 45.5 48.95 52.75 45.45
44.15 45 49.35 50.55 52.5
14.9 16.2 47.05 49.05 50.3
15.65 31.7 29.5 45.75 49.25
15.9 31.3 45.9 47.2 50.4

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15.7 46.4 66.55 51.25 46.75

15.7 14.7 26.8 48.15 188
15.95 22.85 45.3 69.7 54.8
16.2 49.45 65.8 51.25 135
16.35 16.1 45.35 51.1 45.85
15.95 47.85 49.6 19.15 51.55
16.3 16.35 45.7 48.6 39.95
29.55 15.15 50.75 49.15 56.55
15.65 16.55 52.25 51.8 46.25
18.7 28.2 49.45 16 36.25
47.1 15.6 16.85 50.3 46.05
37.05 39.95 48.5 63.45 17.15
48.5 48.95 66.4 49.25 45.6
16 29.6 33.8 49.25 49.7
17.1 28.15 44.85 71.4 46.35
16.5 16.6 51.4 51.15 29
16.9 46.1 48.3 65.55 48.6
17.25 29.6 23.4 48.65 49.9
16.8 23.1 51.3 51.15 55.1
45.6 48.85 51 34.55 49.1
39.6 49.7 47.6 50.25 49.55

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Increasing the traffic on the cascaded topology process bus by injecting SVs into the
process bus, the tripping times of the IEC61850 distance relay are shown in Table
Appendix-4.

Table Appendix-4a Trip times of process bus overload test using cascaded topology
(1 to 20 SVs)
1 SV 5 SV 10 SV 15 SV 19 SV 20 SV
Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time
16.25 17.2 15.8 17.8 17.25 16.6
16.35 16 15.3 16.45 16.2 15.3
16.75 15.85 15.25 16.9 16.3 16.15
15.35 15.75 16.1 16.35 16.15 16.05
16.15 16.9 16.45 16.15 16.6 16.4
15.45 16.55 15.75 15.85 16.7 17.2
15.1 16.8 15.45 15.85 15.35 15.6
17.05 15.4 17.75 15.6 14.95 16.4
16.4 14.95 15.7 15.45 15.75 16
16.25 14.75 16.4 15.6 15.75 15.25
16.2 16.2 17.15 17 16.2 16.7
15.1 16.15 16.45 16.55 16.2 16.25
15.75 15.55 16.25 16.1 16.65 16.35
15.7 17 15.85 16.55 17.1 16.95
16.8 15.05 15.75 15.5 16.9 16.35
15.9 16.1 16.4 16.6 15.7 18.2
16.05 16.6 16.65 16.3 16 16.5
15.75 17.4 15.85 17.35 16.85 16.5
17.4 17.15 15.7 16.3 16.5 16.6
15.45 16.95 16.5 17.1 16.85 16.45
16 15.8 16 16 14.75 15.75
16.3 15.4 17.2 15.35 14.95 14.95

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15 15.95 15.9 16.05 16.35 15.65

18.95 16.15 16.2 27.6 16.25 15.55
17.25 15.35 16 16.55 16.1 15.75
16.15 15.8 15.55 15.95 15.9 15.5
17.2 16.2 17.15 14.85 15.3 15.2
16 16.65 16.85 16.45 15.8 15.5
15.95 16 16.6 16.35 16.05 15.65
16.4 16.3 16.15 15.9 15.65 15.8
16.7 15.75 16.6 15.95 24.2 15.7
16.3 16.1 15.8 17.2 16.4 16.15
16.2 16.8 15.1 16.6 16.5 16.55
15.95 16.9 16.1 16.1 17 16.85
15.75 15.2 15.95 15.25 15.8 16.65
16.55 16.25 16.1 15.85 16.3 14.65
16.3 15.15 16.6 15.55 16.55 15.4
16.15 16.2 16.4 16.9 15.6 16.5
15.9 16 17.3 14.85 15.9 16.25
16.9 16.9 16.1 15.9 15.65 15.6
16.6 16.35 15.7 16.55 15.7 15.9
16.05 15.65 16.9 16.9 16.65 19.05
15.85 15.25 16.35 16.25 17.2 16.2
28.95 16.65 16.55 16.05 16.3 17.3
15.55 16.2 15.75 15.3 19.65 17.05
16.15 17 16.7 18.45 15.15 16.4
27.55 15.9 16.55 16.25 16.4 15.65
16.75 16.45 15.25 17.35 17 15.55
16.1 16.35 15.55 15.1 16.25 16.5
16.6 15.8 15.35 15.4 16.7 16.55

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Table Appendix-4b Trip times of process bus overload test using cascaded topology
(21 to 40 SVs)
21 SV 25 SV 30 SV 35 SV 40 SV
Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time
46.4 59.6 77.05 49.5 49.7
31.1 16.3 22.6 109.4 46.25
16.3 30.25 49.35 62.15 45.8
17.15 19.65 49.95 91.4 49.4
16.85 51.75 51.05 50.3 56.1
15.4 16.05 47.95 46.35 51.2
38.3 32.35 47.25 49.8 49.65
31.2 18.95 50.55 49.4 51.6
16.8 26.8 46.35 49.05 49.9
30.2 19.75 50.95 50.05 73.15
16.55 45.5 16.8 56.75 17.45
16.45 30.55 50.65 47.35 47.25
16.8 48.55 47.5 59.1 39.9
45.3 21.1 215.9 129.4 49.9
15.8 49.7 31.95 17.1 61.75
49.85 18.5 49 220.1 129.5
18.75 15.65 50 49.75 49.75
18.7 48.45 61.6 46.6 50.35
16.85 15.9 174.6 51.7 51.3
48.35 43.55 52.35 48.8 49.3
16.85 16.1 52.35 18.1 51.6
17.75 30.15 50.55 86.6 50.05
15.3 23.65 64.25 49.3 58.25
17.05 48.25 22.1 51.35 49.05
19.05 21.65 50.7 88.2 50.05
17.5 46.3 30.7 25.4 50.55
30.45 18.55 45.65 49.95 51.3
31.9 50.9 50.55 49.8 27.05
16.9 16.55 51.35 52.2 51.3

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 Appendix

31.15 47.3 26.45 45.9 50.35

48.4 49.35 31.65 27.3 50
38.7 46.55 45.3 48.65 48.4
16.25 47.45 49.95 47.05 52.1
17.5 47.5 52 18.9 48.3
17.1 20.65 60.5 49.4 46.65
18.5 39.2 50.9 52 51.25
15.35 50.2 50.75 136.3 51.6
16.6 18.3 49.8 31.8 78.4
30.5 49.3 47.1 51.2 52.6
32.95 59.5 50.6 21.4 50.2
30.4 17.05 50.15 50.15 35.3
16.65 49.4 50.8 46.8 48.6
30.1 51.1 29.55 49.8 51.95
31.95 18.05 32.65 18.25 49.6
16.55 49.65 16.95 53.1 49.45
15.95 16.25 46.65 29.85 52.1
17.05 51.25 47 48.55 50.25
17.45 18.3 19.05 46.75 48.9
30.55 16.25 42.85 46.75 30.95
15.25 49.05 16.6 51.15 47.3

Page 219
 Appendix

Increasing the traffic on the ring topology process bus by injecting SVs into the
process bus, the tripping times of the IEC61850 distance relay are shown in Table
Appendix-5.

Table Appendix-5a Trip times of process bus overload test using ring topology
(1 to 20 SVs)
1 SV 5 SV 10 SV 15 SV 19 SV 20 SV
Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time
16 15.4 16.65 15.85 16.1 15.9
14.9 15.5 14.85 18.3 15.65 16.7
16.8 16.8 16.4 18.35 15.65 16.65
16.2 16.1 15.6 15.45 17.2 15.15
16.95 16.55 16.35 16.4 16.25 14.95
17.3 17 17.15 16.35 15.8 15.35
16.5 16.3 18.5 17.4 16.45 16.65
16 14.55 16.45 24 16.65 16.6
15.45 15.4 15.4 17.05 16.1 17.7
15.35 16.05 16.75 15.75 16.5 15.9
15.15 15.6 15.35 16.05 19.45 15.55
14.9 15.85 15.2 16.25 15.45 16.55
15.4 16.6 14.6 16.55 30.45 16.05
16.4 17.15 15.5 16.65 15.75 16.3
15.8 16.4 16.4 17.1 16.6 16.8
16 16.15 15.75 14.5 16.5 14.9
15.9 15.9 16.2 15.75 17.45 15
15.4 16.2 15.9 16.25 15.75 15.05
15.9 16.45 15.8 15.3 16.2 15.3
15.75 16.95 16.2 15.4 16.3 16.7
15.55 28 16.2 15.5 17.15 16.05
16 16.8 16.3 15.6 16.65 30.95

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 Appendix

16.05 15.7 16.9 15.6 31.75 16.75

16.65 16.65 16.3 15.95 18.95 15.1
16.05 17.05 16.25 16.4 16.15 16.5
16.5 15.65 18.4 15.75 16.15 16.65
15.5 15.4 15.8 15.7 16.25 16.4
15.75 15.5 16.4 16.7 16 17.8
15.3 15.3 15.65 16.15 17.6 15.55
15.3 16.4 15.65 15.9 15.4 15.4
16 16.6 15.65 32.35 15.85 15
16.45 16.45 16.2 15.85 16.8 15.55
15.3 16.2 15.45 15.1 16.4 16
16.55 16.25 16 17.65 15.65 16.75
15.65 15.95 15.85 15.75 15.4 15.9
15.95 17.05 15.7 16.35 15.7 15.8
17.1 16.25 18.95 18 16.5 14.95
17.1 16.45 17.65 15.9 16.55 16.5
17.25 16.4 16.2 16.3 14.95 16.05
16.15 15.65 15.95 16.05 14.6 24.75
15.85 16.15 15.95 16.25 15.6 16.6
15.95 15.5 15.4 16.6 16.15 16.9
15.4 16.05 16.05 17 16.75 16.75
14.95 18.55 16.65 17.15 16.1 15.5
15 16.05 16.7 14.65 17.5 16.85
16.25 15.8 16.3 15.9 17.6 16
16.7 17.7 15.95 15.9 15.45 16.4
16.4 17.3 15.95 15.8 16.5 15.2
15.55 16.75 15.65 15.3 16.35 17.45
16.5 16 19.65 14.9 16.15 15.65

Page 221
 Appendix

Table Appendix-5b Trip times of process bus overload test using ring topology
(21 to 40 SVs)
21 SV 25 SV 30 SV 35 SV 40 SV
Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time Trip Time
15.1 53.05 30.25 48.8 47.5
50.25 46.8 51.75 51.2 48.55
16 16.2 51.35 44.85 29.4
16.6 16.55 44.85 50.95 70.95
16.5 47.25 50.15 34.35 50.35
14.8 50.05 50 46.45 52.5
17.1 51.5 46 51.55 83
15.25 18.8 49.7 49.9 75.45
17.65 45.6 45.9 19.2 47.4
32.15 38 47.25 29.6 50.5
16.7 51.6 19.85 57.4 50.7
17 46.55 38.65 49.75 54.4
16.85 16 32.5 49.65 20.9
47.6 15.4 49.8 49.55 23.7
15.5 50.05 50.15 51.25 49.7
16.1 18.4 61.2 37.65 51.7
23.6 33.05 49.9 49 46.5
17.5 50.25 47.9 26.35 51
15.5 17.15 50.9 48.8 58.35
48.25 50.4 55.25 49.15 63.95
16.35 17.05 47.3 52.7 46.3
16.8 49.9 15 50.35 49.95
15.85 27.05 19.05 49.75 48.55
46 16.75 44.9 30.8 58.4
17.2 39.8 27.1 30.2 47.85
15.5 16.9 77.95 48.9 48.3
19 30.4 51.35 44.9 68.6
16.5 30.6 46.7 50.4 47.2
15.7 49.65 30.75 40.15 50.65

Page 222
 Appendix

19.1 49.7 18.3 36.95 47.55

16.8 18.8 49.1 53.65 49.85
36.9 31.9 45.8 50.6 49.8
16.15 47.35 52.45 46.85 36.8
31.45 16.45 46.45 45.1 16.8
17.55 50.4 51.4 105.8 50.55
16.1 15.85 38.6 49.05 50.85
17.75 15.15 31.3 49.7 53.15
19.15 17.65 49.9 63 48.55
18.95 29.4 49.4 53.75 49.85
16.25 15.95 17.1 42.9 78.1
30.4 47.4 27.9 51.45 28.2
16.55 16.85 35.8 48.9 47.1
46.4 49.5 31.3 50.05 48.2
17.8 48.1 49.05 45.85 49.65
46.25 17.7 30.65 46.95 51
31.05 16.4 30.05 48.8 47.3
16.75 15.5 279 131.3 50.05
16.95 18.45 36.3 46.4 50.55
48.3 18.45 54.2 34.55 49.6
30.95 50.35 50.4 49.95 47.2

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