Field Manual 3-0

Doctrine Addressing
Today’s Fight
Lt. Col. Sam Fishburne, U.S. Army
Maj. Joe Dumas, U.S. Army
Maj. Benjamin Stegmann, U.S. Army
Capt. Jim Burds, U.S. Army
It is even better to act quickly and err than to hesitate until Because this is a significant emphasis change for
the time of action is past. Army forces, the Combined Arms Center is using mobile
­—Carl von Clausewitz training teams to educate the force about the implications
of FM 3-0. To integrate this new doctrine, the Command
and General Staff College has placed renewed empha-

P ublished in October 2017, Field Manual (FM)

3-0, Operations, emphasizes the Army’s four
strategic roles as part of the joint force: shape
the security environment, prevent conflict, prevail in
large-scale combat operations, and consolidate gains
sis on division operations in the context of large-scale
ground combat against peer threats to ensure that our
field grade officers enter the force prepared for the most
demanding environments that their units will face.
FM 3-0 is the large-unit tactical doctrine that we use
to make temporary success permanent (see figure 1, to fight a peer or near-peer threat today. Mastering it
page 8).1 This is a significant departure from previous requires significant time and effort. But has this tran-
operational-level doctrine, which tended to focus on sition in focus been executed deliberately enough? Are
the tactical-level operations from the line of departure we too obsessed with more flashy future concepts and
to a limit of advance with little discussion of linkages be- modernization efforts that divert attention away from
tween strategic policy goals, operations, and the tactical doctrine, which already incorporates not only multi-do-
tasks units conduct to achieve a desired end state across main conceptual thinking but also the priorities of the
the conflict continuum. The new approach is necessary National Security Strategy?2 This article addresses the
to account for an operational environment that is very sense of urgency and cultural transition required to
different than those in Afghanistan and Iraq, an opera- incorporate FM 3-0 into the U.S. Army and to prepare
tional environment characterized by peer threats able to to meet peer adversaries capable of placing our nation
contest the joint force in all domains. at risk. Our culture is not yet aligned with our latest

Engineers assigned to the 588th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 3rd Ar-

mored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, employ an M58
Mine Clearing Line Charge 9 July 2015 during a breaching training
exercise at the Udairi Range Complex, Kuwait. (Photo by Spc. Gregory
T. Summers, U.S. Army)
 U.S. Army strategic roles
Win
Conduct large-scale
Shape Prevent Consolidate gains
ground combat

0 1 2 3 4 5
Shape Deter Seize the Dominate Stabilize Enable civil
initiative authority
Joint phases
(Figure from Field Manual 3-0, Operations)

Figure 1. Army Strategic Roles and Their Relationships to Joint Phases

doctrine, intended to address training and experience Russian integrated air defense systems (IADS) make
gaps resulting from fifteen years of prioritizing counter- sustained air superiority questionable, especially at the
insurgency and stability operations. beginning of operations when geographical proximity
FM 3-0 candidly states that the Army no longer en- to positioned Russian forces enables their deliberate
joys superiority across all the warfighting functions. Peer emplacement. With our current systems, we will only
threats, particularly Russia, China, North Korea, and be able to create temporary windows of superiority with
Iran, can contest both the Army and the joint force across great effort. The Russians employ IADS at every tactical
all domains.3 Depending upon the regional context, we level, from battalion to division, with a focus on finding
may be at a disadvantage in some warfighting functions and destroying U.S. fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. They
and may only have relative parity in others. While this ar- are also steadily working toward overmatch in the field
ticle does not address all of these challenges, it highlights of counterfire radar, fielding a variety of systems across
some areas where we may experience overmatch from a the depths of their formations and with varying levels of
threat in order to generate thought. Friendly intelligence, capability. This might enable the Russian fires complex
surveillance, and reconnaissance, when faced with the to “out attrite” our own counterfire capabilities, leaving
contemporary integrated air defense capabilities of our them with the only systems on the battlefield.6
adversaries, is one such area. Nowhere does Russian overmatch become more
apparent than in their unmanned aerial vehicles
Comparing U.S. and Russian Use of capabilities. Nicole Bier and Patrick Madden’s article
Fires in Relationship to Maneuver in the Red Diamond Threats Newsletter highlights this
When comparing our ability to find the enemy threat masterfully. The U.S. Army currently fields three
against a near-peer threat such as Russia (or an increas- unmanned aircraft systems: the Raven, the Shadow,
ingly capable China), significant friendly capability and the Gray Eagle. The Russians, however, are experi-
disadvantages immediately become apparent and must menting with over sixteen different unmanned aircraft
be offset. FM 3-0 defines reconnaissance as “a mission systems across their formations from the tactical bat-
undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other talion- to division-size elements. Some of the systems
detection methods, information about the activities fielded at the brigade level can operate between 200
and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure km and 500 km forward of their units. By contrast, the
data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or Gray Eagle typically operates at the U.S. division level
geographic characteristics of a particular area.”4 By this with an operational range at around 150 km.7 This
definition, we must look at every capability, across all threat is only magnified and compounded at the battal-
domains, to understand the existing disparities in our ion level, where every asset currently fielded to Russian
ability to collect information against current threats.5 battalions outranges the Raven.

8 January-February 2019 MILITARY REVIEW

 FM 3-0

This overwhelming disparity in information to fix them, all while subject to artillery overmatch in
collection at the tactical level has a direct impact on both range and number of systems.9
our ability to target the greatest threat on the modern
battlefield—artillery. Russian fire capabilities pro- Shaping the Information
vide an excellent case study in relative disadvantages Environment
that U.S. forces must overcome. Whereas the U.S. Even as we must prepare for lethal threats during
Army uses fires to enable maneuver, the Russian army large-scale ground combat, we must also prepare for
depends upon its maneuver forces to enable fires. nonlethal threats below the threshold of such conflicts.
Additionally, the U.S. Army typically views itself as an The majority of operations that U.S. Army forces con-
offensive force, which offers the implied task that we duct are in this range of actions. Information warfare is
understand how to deal with a prepared defense. FM a capability all our adversaries employ routinely during
3-0 states, “The enemy typically attempts to slow and competition. Specifically, China and Russia continu-
disrupt friendly forces with a combination of obsta- ously seek to shape the information environment in
cles, prepared positions, and favorable terrain so that ways favorable to their national interests in order to
they can be destroyed with massed fires. … Forward achieve their objectives without starting a war. Take,
positioned enemy forces are heavily focused on pro- for example, the simple Russian narrative that accom-
viding observed fires for long range systems …”8 With panied their Ukraine operations in 2014. “There are no
this in mind, the Russian force structure includes fire Russian forces in Ukraine” was a message that simulta-
capabilities at every echelon from the tactical battal- neously confused Western military and political leaders
ion to the corps equivalent level, providing a distinct and perplexed the news media, delaying any mean-
advantage over U.S. formations. Not only do they have ingful decisions at the strategic level.10 Russian infor-
more tubes and rockets, but the Russian systems also mation warfare sows confusion and creates ambiguity,
outrange U.S. systems using standard munitions. The and this is accomplished all while maintaining enviable
Russian 2S19M1 and G6 systems have a 34 km and operational security at the strategic level.
a 30 km range, respectively, using standard artillery Peer adversaries will not limit their information cam-
rounds, whereas the U.S. M109A6 has an approxi- paigns to the strategic level, however. FM 3-0 states that “in-
mately 24 km range with standard rounds. Basically, if formation is a weapon against enemy command and control
U.S. maneuver units seek to destroy Russian artillery (C2), and it is a means to affect enemy morale.”11 Again,
forces, they must move through an enormous kill zone nowhere is this better demonstrated than in Russia’s cam-
while defeating and bypassing maneuver forces seeking paign in the Crimea. During multiple sieges of Ukrainian

Lt. Col. Sam Fishburne, Maj. Joe Dumas, Maj. Benjamin Capt. Jim Burds,
U.S. Army, is a military U.S. Army, is an armored Stegmann, U.S. Army, U.S. Army, is a logistics
intelligence officer cavalryman serving in the is an information opera- officer serving at the
serving as chief of the Commander’s Initiatives tions officer serving at the Combined Arms Center
Commander’s Initiatives Group, Headquarters, Combined Arms Center in the Commander’s
Group, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. in the Commander’s Initiatives Group. His
Combined Arms Center. He has served combat Initiatives Group. His oper- operational experience
He has served in both deployments to Iraq and ational experience includes includes deployments to
Iraq and Afghanistan. Afghanistan. He holds a deployments to both Iraq and Haiti. He holds
He holds a BA in history BA in history from the Afghanistan and Iraq. He is a BS in public health
from the Virginia Military University of Wisconsin– pursuing a master’s degree from New Mexico State
Institute and an MA in Green Bay and an MA in in information strategy and University and is currently
diplomacy and military business and organization- political warfare from the working on his MS in adult
studies from Hawai’i al security management Naval Postgraduate School and continuing education
Pacific University. from Webster University. at Monterey, California. at Kansas State University.

MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2019 9

military installations, was only a portion of a
the Russian military greater threat.
reputedly targeted In 1973, Chief of
family members of Staff of the Army Gen.
Ukrainian soldiers Creighton Abrams
with threatening directed then Maj.
phone calls and text Gen. Donn Starry and
messages.12 This Brig. Gen. Bob Baer
reportedly forced to travel to Israel to
military members to capture lessons the
divert attention from Israel Defense Forces
installation defense learned from the Yom
to the evacuation Kippur War. Abrams
of their children, believed that Israel’s
though admirably, experience during
many of the spous- the Yom Kippur
es chose to remain War provided a lens
behind with their through which to view
soldiers. Other ex- the character of future
amples such as Tokyo battlefields the United
Rose and Axis Sally States might face. This
were propaganda conflict, executed by
campaigns in World Soviet client states,
War II that attempt- was a clear demon-
ed to demoralize U.S. stration of Soviet
troops on the battle- doctrine and techno-
field. All of these
13
logical advances, espe-
CSA—Corps support area DSA—Division support area
examples represent cially the employment
threats we must be —Corps —Division of antitank guided
mentally and morally (Figure from Field Manual 3-0, Operations) missiles and IADS.
prepared to face and Abrams realized the
counteract in the Figure 2. Consolidating Gains after need to doctrinally,
near future. And to Large-Scale Combat Operations culturally, and techno-
do so, we need to logically transform the
be able to fight such U.S. Army if it was to
narratives with effective messages of our own. effectively meet the dangers posed by the Soviet threat.
The U.S. Army embarked upon a nearly twenty-year
The Transition to AirLand Battle journey focused on winning during large-scale ground
The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target combat operations against the Warsaw Pact. Doctrine
of far more importance than the bodies of his troops. training and modernization required iterative processes
—Mao Tse-tung 14
and significant professional discourse and dialogue. Army
leaders at all echelons were heavily invested in improv-
Today’s Army senior leaders began their careers ing the Army on multiple fronts. Gen. William DePuy,
during the AirLand Battle era. They were influenced who was then the Training and Doctrine Command
by those who fought in the Vietnam War and learned (TRADOC) commanding general, was greatly influenced
hard lessons in combat. These leaders clearly under- by his own experiences in World War II and Vietnam,
stood that their wartime experience in Southeast Asia and felt that the inadequate doctrine, leadership, and

10 January-February 2019 MILITARY REVIEW

 FM 3-0

training needed to be corrected.15 “Active Defense” as an resulting from force structure changes (modularization)
original component of the 1976 FM 100-5, Operations, within the Army.
would be revised in a span of ten years, and based on pro- Changes to the global operating environment were
fessional exchange and dialogue, the 1986 edition of FM not addressed until the publication of the Army Operating
100-5 would result in the advent of “AirLand Battle.”16 Concept: Win in a Complex World (AOC) in October 2014.
In 1976, Starry, then V Corps commander and one The thirty-eighth Army chief of staff, Gen. Raymond
of the architects of FM 100-5, set out to test the doctrin- Odierno, highlights this in his foreword to the AOC:
ally defined construct, as he was not happy with what Conflicts in the future, like those in the past,
had been written (including his own contributions). As will ultimately be resolved on land. Hence
V Corps commander, he stimulated evaluation of the the concept recognizes that Army forces
doctrine by executing staff rides and terrain walks where will be essential components of joint oper-
his corps’ leadership and subordinate units were expected ations to create sustainable political out-
to defend against the Soviet threat. Starry’s actions were comes while defeating enemies and adver-
just the beginning of a professional discussion to improve saries who will challenge U.S. advantages in
doctrine. Later, as TRADOC commanding general, he all domains: land, air, maritime, space, and
directed Brig. Gen. Don Morelli and a small team to cyberspace. To do this, innovation is critical,
expose various audiences to the contents of FM 100-5 both for the operational and the institution-
in order to provide feedback on the operations doctrine, al Army, and the AOC is a beginning point
including those views of dissidence.17 for the innovation we need to ensure that
our Soldiers, leaders, and teams are prepared
Addressing the Global to win in a complex world.18
Operational Environment The AOC formally begins the process of addressing
History has a way of repeating itself. Lt. Gen. Michael the conflict continuum and range of military opera-
D. Lundy, Combined Arms Center commanding gener- tions that the Army should expect to support as part of
al, directed the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate the joint force. The AOC informs the realization that
to execute a similar mission across the Army amongst a Army doctrine needs to change. In 2016, the Army
variety of audiences to explain the most recent FM 3-0. chief of staff directed TRADOC to write a manual that
These efforts have not yet yielded the type of spirited provides the doctrinal basis for success against military
professional discourse about our capstone operations adversaries whose capabilities were on par with ours.19
doctrine of the 1970s and 1980s. The release of FM 3-0 represents a yearlong effort to
The previous FM 3-0 was rescinded in 2011 and is provide doctrine for large units that focus on large-
no longer seen as particularly necessary for Army forces scale ground combat operations against peer and near-
in the operational environment of the time. The Army, peer threats (see figure 2, page 10).
engrossed with operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, has
evolved from a threat-based to a capabilities-based force. Conclusion
Assumptions about future conflicts include a low likeli- You don’t have to make them see the light—just make
hood of large-scale ground combat and U.S. conventional them feel the heat.
force superiority against potential adversaries. Operations —U.S. President Ronald Reagan20
in the Middle East informed Army modernization efforts
for almost a decade, and the Army became optimized for Waiting for large-scale ground combat is not the
limited contingency operations as a result. Like previous time to test doctrinal theories, rather we should reflect
generations, we allow warfighting to consume our ability on lessons learned from previous generations of Army
to provide a holistic assessment of the Army’s contribu- leaders. Kasserine Pass and Anzio are notable historic
tions to the National Security Strategy and the joint force. examples of where the U.S. Army did not perform to its
Doctrine 2015 was heavily informed by recent operation- full potential because of doctrinal and training shortcom-
al experience but did not adequately address large-scale ings.21 Today’s strategic environment is just too dynamic
ground combat operations or the capability limitations not to be fully engaged in the language of our profession.

MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2019 11

There is no better time than the present for profession- divisions and 205 days to deploy the whole
als to read, analyze, and discuss the application of our force were deemed too long. The Army was
current doctrine. Knowing our doctrine, discussing and charged to look at the end-to-end deploy-
debating it, as well as providing each other with the best ment process, from infrastructure to strategic
practices in its application, is absolutely critical if we want mobility resources, with the goal of signifi-
to improve and refine how we fight. cantly cutting deployment lead time.23
As highlighted in the latest National Security Repetition and honest, continual assessment are
Strategy, “we convinced ourselves that all wars would essential to winning the force projection race required
be fought and won quickly from stand-off distances to achieve operational capability before our enemy.
and with minimal casualties.”22 The last seventeen Our deployment readiness and projection abilities
years of continued limited contingency operations create conditions where quick transitions to large-
have created a patch-chart approach to deployment scale combat operations are required. Generating this
readiness. Rotational units have endured periods of level of readiness and confidence is critical for future
sporadic tempo and intermittent lethality. Above all, success on the battlefield.
our forces have not been truly tested in all domains We, as Army professionals, must learn, speak, and
and have generally operated under air and land dom- exercise doctrine grounded in today’s fight. Doing this
inance. Theater Provided Equipment and the Left can only better serve the Army to answer the changing
behind Equipment programs have created an emotion- complexities of warfare. This will no doubt provide
al detachment between soldiers and their equipment. the direction for tomorrow’s concepts and the Army
Operational readiness assessments and the repetition beyond 2040. The rapid publication of FM 3-0 illus-
required to adequately conduct force projection and trates the present need for doctrine to serve as an engine
reception have atrophied, impacting our ability to con- of change for today’s Army to successfully operate.
duct operations to prevent conflict. Army Sustainment Doctrine will drive the cultural change across our
highlights how our expeditionary mindset going into formations, as we stress the need for agility akin to the
the First Gulf War led to our ability to mass forces and “fight tonight” mentality. Futures concepts and modern-
achieve success. Even with this achievement, the Army ization continue to drive innovation across doctrine, or-
sought ways for improvement: ganization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
Following Desert Shield and Desert Storm, personnel, and facilities, but we cannot become fixated
the Army began to look for ways to fill gaps on such. Concepts and modernization efforts are only
identified in its deployment performance. components of the Army “vehicle”; however, doctrine is
The roughly 150 days required to deploy five and always will be the driver.

Notes
Epigraph. Carl von Clausewitz, as quoted in Field Manual (FM) mentioned in the latest National Security Strategy as potential
3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing adversaries where large-scale ground combat operations are
Office, 2017), 1-17. possible.
6. Assessment based on independent research of the authors,
based on information from the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)
1. FM 3-0, Operations, vii. and assisted by the Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC)
2. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) and Intelligence Support
of America (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017). Activity (TRISA).
3. FM 3-0, Operations, ix. 7. Nichole Bier and Patrick Madden, “Unmanned Aerial
4. Ibid., 5-10. It is critical for Army leaders to understand that Vehicle Assessment: Russia,” Red Diamond Threats Newsletter 9,
they cannot rely on theater and national strategic means to find no. 1 ( January/February 2018): 8–13. Additional analysis beyond
the enemy. With the space domain contested by both the Russians the Red Diamond article is based on independent research of
and Chinese, we cannot be assured that satellites will provide the the authors based on information from the WEG and assisted by
required intelligence needed for tactical maneuver. FMSO and TRISA. Specific systems at the Russian brigade level
5. This analysis focuses on the current Russian threat, ac- are the S-100, the Tu-143, the Orlan-30, and the Orlan-50. At the
knowledging that China, Iran, and North Korea are all specifically Russian battalion level, they are experimenting with two variants of

12 January-February 2019 MILITARY REVIEW

the Eleron series, two variants of the Zala series, two variants of the
Orlan series, and the Granat system. All of these systems outrange
the U.S. Raven.
8. FM 3-0, Operations, 7-2.
9. Assessment based on independent research of the authors,

WE
based on information from the WEG and assisted by FMSO and TRI-
SA and the Fires Center of Excellence. There is a discussion to be had
regarding special fires munitions. Does the U.S. Army have enough

RECOMMEND
rocket-assisted projectile and Excalibur rounds to successfully sup-
press or destroy such an overwhelming number of artillery systems?
If not, then leaders must reserve these rounds for high-payoff targets
and use the cheaper more prolific standard rounds in the counterfire
fight and to support tactical maneuver.
10. Simon Shuster, “Ukraine Troops in Crimea Face Dilemma: To
Defect, Flee or Fight,” Time (website), 9 March 2014, accessed 25
September 2018, http://time.com/17356/ukraine-troops-in-crimea-
face-dilemma-to-defect-flee-or-fight/.
11. FM 3-0, Operations, 2-23.
12. William Booth, “Ukraine Soldiers Engage in Test of Wills
with Russian Troops,” Washington Post (website), 4 March 2014,
accessed 25 September 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/europe/ukraine-airmen-engage-in-test-of-wills-with-russian-
troops/2014/03/04/41990a30-a3ad-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_
story.html.
13. Richard Lucas, “Axis Sally: The Americans Behind That Alluring
Voice,” HistoryNet, 23 November 2009, accessed 25 September
2018, http://www.historynet.com/axis-sally.htm; Susan Anderson,
“Mildred Gillars, 87, of Nazi Radio, Axis Sally to an Allied Audience,”
New York Times (website), 2 July 1988, accessed 25 September 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/02/obituaries/midred-gillars-87-
of-nazi-radio-axis-sally-to-an-allied-audience.html.
14. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-18, Mao
Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 5 April 1989), 23.
15. George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry, eds., Camp Colt
to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington, KY:
University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 550.
16. FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1986 [obsolete]). The first version of AirLand Battle
was published in 1982; however, the updated 1986 document was
the culmination of multiple iterations of testing and revision.
17. Hofmann and Starry, Camp Colt to Desert Storm, 551–52.
18. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, foreword to The U.S. Army
The space domain is a vital component of the emerging
Operating Concept, Win in a Complex World 2020–2040 (Fort Eustis,
VA: TRADOC, 7 October 2014). concept of multi-domain operations because the
19. Mike Lundy and Rich Creed, “The Return of U.S. Army Field warfighter is reliant on the capabilities it provides
Manual 3-0, Operations,” Military Review 97, no. 6 (November–De- to be successful in executing operations. Today’s
cember 2017): 14. adversaries are aware of the U.S. military’s use of space-
20. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Senate Campaign Fundraiser enabled equipment and will try to disrupt those assets.
for Representative Ed Zschau in Los Angeles, California” (speech, Los This Center for Army Lessons Learned handbook,
Angeles Ballroom, Century Plaza Hotel, Los Angeles, 7 September Operating in a Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space
1986), accessed 5 October 2018, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/ Operational Environment: Lessons and Best Practices,
research/speeches/090786a.
is a collaboratively produced effort providing the
21. Lucian K. Truscott, Command Missions: A Personal Story
(1954; Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), 161–62, 286–380. warfighter with techniques and strategies to successfully
22. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United operate in a denied, degraded, and disrupted space
States of America, 27. operational environment. It provides information
23. Paul Hurley and Stacey Lee, “Embracing an Expeditionary derived from lessons learned and best practices on how
Deployment Mindset,” Army Sustainment, March/April 2018, 5–6, to effectively integrate space capabilities into mission
accessed 25 September 2018, http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/2018/ planning, training, and mitigation strategies. To view this
MARAPR18/PDF/200659.pdf. handbook, visit https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/
files/publications/18-28.pdf.
MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2019