Kiggundu and Others V Attorney General 2025 UGHCACD 9 (14 April 2025)
Kiggundu and Others V Attorney General 2025 UGHCACD 9 (14 April 2025)
ANTI-CORRUPTION DTVISION
KIGGUNDU PAUL
KEMBERE MUHAMMED
VERSUS
RULING
1.0. lntroduction:
The applicants filed motions alleging violations of their fundamental human rights during the
investigations which led to their prosecution for corruption and other related offenses vide
Criminal Session Case 83/2022. I have chosen to deliver a joint ruling in Miscellaneous
Application No. 3612024 filed by the 1't applicant and No. 3812024 filed by the 2nd, 3'd and 4'h
applicants, which emanate from the same investigative process. The applicants are also seeking
the same reliefs based on the same grounds and related facts.
1. A Declaration that the actions of the respondent and their agents in beating the applicants
with cable wires, metals, kicking them with boots, burning them with hot metals, chaining
and tying them with ropes and dragging them on the floor, hitting their body parts with
batons, spraying them with unascertainable liquids, tying and suspending them from the
I IPaBe
/
air infringed on their non-derogable right to freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment guaranteed under Articles 24 and M ol the Constitution
2. A Declaration that the detention of the applicants for over 48 hours in places not
authorised in law, the denial of their access to medical treatment while in detention, denial
of access to their next of kin and lawyers violated their fundamental rights to liberty under
Article 23 of the Constitution
3. A Declaration that the trial of the applicants in Criminal Case No 083/2022 is a nullity for
blatant violations, infringement and abuse of the applicant's non-derogable rights and
freedoms.
4. That compensatory orders, punitive and general damages be awarded against the
respondent for the gross and blatant human rights violations and infringements
5. That the applicants be acquitted of all the criminal charges against them
6. That the court may grant any other reliefs in the interests of justice
2.0: Representation:
Advocates Edias Asiimwe and Mugisha Nuwagaba represented all the applicants, while
Kyeyune Arnold and Buzara Mathew from the chambers of the Attorney General represented
the respondents. Both parties made oral submissions which I have carefully considered in the
resolution of this matter, along with the affidavits, the relevant provisions of the law, the
authorities relied upon by the parties in light of the issues identified below.
1. Whether the applicants were subjected to torture, cruel and degrading treatment by
agents of the respondent
2. Whether the applicants' right to personal liberty was infringed or violated by the
respondent
3. What remedies are available to the applicants
Applications of this nature, though arising from and during a criminal trial, are civil nature. The
Evidence Act Cap 8 provides for the burden of proof.
2 !Page
Section I0I thereof provides that;
(l) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legol right or
"
(2) When o person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is soid that
the burden of proof lies on thot person."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the applicants who seek orders from this court based on specific
facts of torture and other human rights violations have the burden to prove that those facts exist.
Unsubstantiated allegations cannot suffice. The court must analyse the evidence presented
against the established legal principles and determine whether, on the balance of probabilities,
the allegations are proved.
This standard was expounded by Sekaana, J in Nankabirwa lrene versus Umeme Ltd, Civil
Division Civil Suit No 310 12016, with reference to re H (Minors) fl9961 AC 563 at 586 as
follows:
"A court is satkfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the
occurrence of the event wos more lkely thon not. When assessing the probabilities
the court will hove in mind as o factor, to whatever extent is oppropriate in the
particular case, that the more serious the ollegation the less likely it is that the event
occurred ond, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes
thot the ollegotion is estoblished on the balance of probobility. ....... this does not
meon that where o serious allegotion k in ksue the stondard of proof required is
higher. lt means only thot the inherent probability or improbabiliU of on event is
itself a motter to be token into occount when weighing the probabilities ond deciding
whether, on balance, the event occurred. The more improbable the event, the stronger
must be the evidence thot it did occur before, on the balonce of probobility, its
occurrence will be estoblkhed."
5.0: lssue 1:
Whether the appticants were subjected to torture. cruel and degrading treatment by agents
of the resoondent
Each of the applicants contends that they were subjected to torture while in police custody.
Torture is prohibited by several international treaties and conventions, including Article 5 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, ArticleT of the lnternationalconvention on
Civil and political Rights (ICCPR), Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
3lPage
(
(ACHPR) 1981 and the UN Convention against Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or Punishment 1984.
The frame work for the protection and promotion of Human rights in Uganda is Chapter Four of
the 1995 Constitution. These rights are not granted by the state; they are inherent to all individuals
by their human nature and are to be protected and upheld by all persons and agencies of
Government.
Under Article 44(al of this Constitution, the right and freedom from torture is non-derogable.
The Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, 2O12, was enacted to give effect to the above
constitutional provisions. Section 2 thereof defines torture as follows:
'(1) ln this Acf,, torlure meons any ad or omksion, by which severe poin or
suffering whether physical or mentol, k intentionolly inflicted on a person
by or ot the instigotion of or with the consent or acquiescence of any person
whether o public official or other person ading in an official or private
capacity for such purposes os-
Under Section 2 (a), severe pain or suffering means prolonged harm resulting from the
intentional infliction or threatened infliction of physical pain or suffering.
Acts that constitute torture are listed in Schedule 2 of the Act and include physical torture, mental
or psychological torture, and, lastly, pharmacological torture.
The applicants'Case:
The 1't applicant avers in paragraphs 4 to 9 of his affidavit that he was arrested on 30th August
2022 by plainclothes men and taken to the Directorate of Crime lntelligence, where his statement
was recorded. That very night, he was transferred to Special lnvestigative Unit in Kireka.
The facts constituting torture are contained in Paragraphs 10 and 14 of his affidavit. He avers as
follows:
(-
4lPage
( 41^" W
Paragraph 10:
"Thot of oround I l.OO pm, ofter recording my stotement, I was tronsported to Sttt in
o safe house where I spent two weeks while being subjected to torture with o wire
coble..."
Paragraph 14:
"Thot I wos illegally detoined in Kireko Safe House and Kololo Crime lntelligence
offices...while being tortu red "
It was submitted by counsel for the 1't applicant that the above was sufficient proof of physical
torture. Further, the conditions of his detention, including the denial of access to medical
attention, caused psychological torture. He prayed that this court finds in favour of the 1't
applicant on this issue.
The Respondent submitted that the allegation of torture had not been proved. He relied on lssa
Wozembe versus AG, Civil Suit No I 54/2016, Nsereko versus AG and 16 others Civil Division
Miscellaneous Cause No 386 /
2020, Paul Wanyoto Mugoya versus Sgt. Oumo and others,
ACD Mkcellaneous Application No 2612022 to emphasise the need for cogent evidence
supporting such allegations.
ln the respondent's affidavit in reply deponed by O/Sp Kusiima Harriet, the investigating officer
in Criminal Case No 83/2022, it is averred in paragraph 9 that the applicant was not subjected to
any form of torture during his detention, and that he was in good health throughout his detention.
The 2nd applicant, Kamoga Muzafaru's torture facts are contained in paragraphs 5, 9,10,11,12,14,
15,16,26 and 28 of his affidavit. ln summary, he alleges that he was first arrested from Kawempe
on 30th August 2022withthe 1st applicant and taken to Crime lntelligence Offices. He alleges that
he was hit on the head and fingers with a wooden log, causing him to bleed heavily as the officers
demanded for information on the whereabouts of some people. He avers that he was kicked with
combat boots while blind folded and severely beaten all over his body. They threatened to end
his life.
He further alleges that he was beaten using metallic wires until he lost consciousness, and
developed wounds on his legs, back, hands and head, chest and rib pain. He was in detention
until the 19th of September 2022, then rearrested on the 2nd of November 2022, and taken to a
torture chamber at the crime lntelligence offices in Kololo. He was undressed, badly and severely
beaten using electric cables and tortured for two weeks until he was released on police bond on
16th November 2022.
He concludes that he still suffers from intermittent headaches, hallucinations, general body aches
and intestinal bleeding.
5lPage
t
To support his allegations, he attached Annexure B, a medical form of the Outpatient Department
of Mulago Hospital dated 24th September 2022. He states that his wife drove him to the hospital
for treatment upon his release on bail by the Chief Magistrate at the Anti-Corruption Division.
He also attached Annexure D, a copy of a complaint written to the DPP about the torture while in
detention.
The 3'd applicant, Matovu John Tonny, avers in paragraph 4 of his affidavit that around January
2023 or thereabouts, he was arrested from Masaka and taken to Kawempe Police station, where
he was immediately threatened by unknown police officers, slapped and beaten with a wire. He
claims he was beaten on his ears severely until he bled. The bleeding from his ears continued
several days into his detention, resulting in a hearing impairment requiring urgent medical
attention and surgery. He also avers that he was beaten all over his body by the officers at the
station. These allegations are contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of his affidavit.
The 4th applicant, Kembere Muhammed's facts of torture are in paragraphs 4,6,7,8,12 and 14
wherein he alleges that he was arrested on 19th September 2022 and driven to the Crime
lntelligence Offices where he was dragged on the floor, kicked in the chest and beaten on his legs,
ankles and stomach with a wire. They wanted him to confess.
It was submitted by counsel for the applicants that there was sufficient evidence to justify a finding
that the applicants were tortured by police officers to extort information or confessions.
Counsel for the respondent opposed the application on grounds that there were glaring
inconsistencies and apparent fabrications in their affidavits. There was also an uncanny
resemblance in the same, suggesting deliberate untruths or "copy and paste" averments that
cannot be relied upon.
He relied on the affidavit in reply of D/SP Kusiima Harriet to the effect that the 2nd, 3'd and 4th
respondents were not tortured at all in the course of investigations.
He prayed that the court find the applicants had failed to prove the allegations of torture
Analysis of the Evidence:
ln the Paul Wanyoto Mugoya, Misc. Application No 26 and 3112021 case Gidudu, J observed
as follows:
"The burden of proof lies upon the opplicants to prove allegotions of torture. For o
court to opply the provisions of Sedion I I (2) of the Humon Rights Enforcement Act,
there should be credible. believoble. verifioble and proven evidence thot a person's
non-derogoble rights and freedoms have been infringed on. lt is o serious malter to
declare o triol a nullity ond ocquit on occused person. ln o woy, o court should be
sotisfied thot on the evidence odduced, fundomentol rights and freedoms that are
non-derogable have been violoted ond infringed.
6lPage
WM
Such evidence may constitute medical reports confirming injuries, illnesses, or other medical
conditions that may directly be linked to the alleged acts constituting torture. Where the applicant
is immediately upon release subjected to a medical examination or treatment, such evidence, if
credible, may be sufficient proof that the alleged acts of violation were committed. X-rays,
photographs, and the truthful testimonies of eyewitnesses who saw these injuries may be relied
on.
ln Poul Wanyoto Mugoya versus Sgt Oumo Joshua and AG, Civil Appeol No 91no2l , Egonda
Ntende, JA noted that it is rare to have direct evidence of torture because of the nature of the
crime. Most torture is committed in secret while the victim is in detention, making it difficult to
obtain medical reports.
For the foregoing reasons, torture need not be proved only by medical evidence. Nevertheless,
where medical evidence is available, it can lend credence to the allegations of torture. Where it is
unavailable, the court may look for other evidence to support the allegations. ln the Pau! Mugoya
versus Sgt Oumo case, there was an audio recording which showed that a group of people were
tortured. The transcript of that recording was tendered to the court and relied upon. A court
record of the applicant's first appearance where the physical or mental state of the inmate was
observed or raised by the applicant himself or by his lawyers and confirmed by the court may be
relevant. Records of prisons confirming the state in which the applicant was received in their
custody, and any medical attention given to the inmate, would all be relevant.
ln conclusion, there must be some evidence which supports the allegations. Further, anyone who
alleges torture must prove that severe pain or suffering, whether physical, mental or psychological,
was intentionally inflicted by or under the instigation of any person to obtain information or
confessions, or to intimidate or coerce him or her.
I have carefully gone through the pleadings of the applicants in this case and note that for the 1't
applicant (Kiggundu Paul), the 3'd applicant (Matovu John Tonny) and the 4th applicant (Kembere
Muhammed), there is no evidence whatsoever tendered to support their claims of torture. The
bare averments in their affidavits, having been rebutted by the respondent, cannot sustain their
case. ln Nsereko Muso versus AG ond l5 others, Miscellaneous Couse No O386/2020, it was
recognised that in cases of torture, all manner of allegations are made but remain controversial,
one man's word against another, in the absence of cogent, credible evidence. For this reason, I
find that they have failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed on them by law.
As regards the 2nd applicant, Kamoga Muzafaru Lukanika, he claims that when he was released on
bail on 23rd September 2022, his wife drove him to the hospital for treatment. He attached a
medical form dated 24th of September 2022, which is largely illegible. When counsel for the
applicant was asked to read it out in court, he failed. The x-ray sheets he mentioned in paragraph
28 of his affidavit were never attached'
Nevertheless, I note that the applicant was taken to court on 14th September 2022 and granted
bail, but was not able to raise the bail funds until 23'd September 2022 when he was finally
TlPage
released. That means he was on remand in prison for almost 9 days after his appearance in court.
This, in my view, negatively affects the value of any medical evidence taken on 23'd September,
nine (9) days later. I would have been inclined to place more evidential value on a report of his
treatment while on remand in prison, where he was taken immediately after the alleged torture.
Even evidence of people who saw him at the court on the day he was charged would have been
relevant. Annexure D, a letter of complaint to the DPP alleging torture, does not constitute
evidence of the same. ln that same letter, it is alleged that he was released on bail by the court on
23'd September 2022 due to his worsening health condition. lf this were the case, the order of the
court justifying release on health grounds should have been secured and furnished to this court
in support of the allegations. This was not done. Moreover, I find the assertion contradicted by
the applicant himself in paragraph 24 of his affidavit, wherein he states he was granted bail on the
14th but could not raise the funds, so he was further remanded till the 23'd'when he was released
upon payment of bond money and not on account of his worsening health condition.
Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the legal standard for acts to constitute torture. Under
Section 2 of the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act, torture is severe pain and suffering,
prolonged harm. A court must take into consideration the facts of each case, including the
duration of treatment, its mental and physical effects and the age, sex and vulnerability of the
victim. ln lssa Wazembe versus AG, Civil Suit No 154 / 2016, it was held that courts should
apply a strict test and that only the worst examples will suffice. ln that case, the applicant had
suffered grave injuries while in detention, and had developed gangrene leading to amputation.
The medical evidence supported his allegations.
ln the instant case, the medical report was so badly written that most of it was illegible. I am
unable to assess the severity of the alleged assaults, and cannot confirm that what the Dr. may
have seen on 24'h September 2022 was resulting from his detention by the police.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the 2nd applicant failed to prove torture on the balance of
probabilities.
5.0: Issue 2:
Whether the applicants' right to personal liberty was infringed or violated by the respondent
Article 23 of the Constitution protects the right to personal liberty. A person can only be
deprived of this right in any of the circumstances listed in Article 23 (1) (a-f). Clause (c) allows
for restriction of this right for the purpose of bringing that person before a court, upon reasonable
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a criminal offense under the laws
of Uganda
SlPage I
U (r4.-^
He or she must also be produced in court as soon as possible, in any case, not later than 48 hours
from the time of his or her arrest. See Article 23 (4) of the Constitution.
It was submitted that the 1't applicant was arrested on 30th August 2022 and detained at the
Special lnvestigations Unit in Kireka. This was averred in paragraph 4 of his affidavit in support of
the motion. As per paragraph 13, he was released on cash bail by the court on 14th September
2022.These total 15 days in custody.
I have carefully considered the evidence tendered in support. This includes the supplementary
affidavit of Richard Tuheirwe, where he confirms in paragraph 2 that the 1't applicant was arrested
on the 30th of August 2022. He is an Advocate of the High Court and a work colleague of the
applicant. He was present at the arrest and went with the applicant to the Crime lntelligence
Offices. His evidence was not controverted.
I have also considered the bail form issued to the applicant by the chief magistrate at the Anti-
Corruption Court on 14th September 2022 marked Annexure B. lt confirms that he was produced
on that day for plea and was granted bail. I have carefully considered the respondent's affidavit
in reply and noted that the assertions were not denied.
Ifind, in agreement with counsel for the applicants, that the 1't applicant adduced sufficient proof
that he was detained for over 48 hours, specifically for 13 days. This was a clear violation of his
constitutional right to be produced in court as soon as possible upon arrest.
He avers in paragraphs 5, 23, 26 and 27 of his affidavit that he was initially arrested on 30th August
2022together with Krggundu Paul, the 1't applicant. He was produced in court on 13th September
2022 and remanded. This translated into 14 days in custody. He was then rearrested on 2nd
November 2022 and released on police bond on 16th November 2022. Annexure C is his bond
form, which is dated 16th November 2022 and confirms his release on the second arrest. The
subsequent detention was for 15 days. Apart from Annexure C, there is no independent evidence
confirming the dates of arrest and release on the 1't arrest and the date of re-arrest. Although he
avers that he was arrested with the 1't applicant on 30.8.2022from Kibuye, the 1't applicant does
not mention that in his affidavit. Nevertheless, he is clear and consistent on the dates. He was
illegally detained twice.
While the respondent confirms the arrest and detention in their affidavit in reply, it does not
controvert these detention periods. I will revert to the effect of this after analysing the evidence
of the 3'd and 4th applicants.
glPage
U
ln paragraph 4 of the applicant's affidavit, he avers that he was arrested "around January 2023 or
thereabouts" by two men and driven to Kawempe Police station. ln paragraph 11, he states that
he was in detention for two weeks. A rather intriguing turn of the flow of events is in paragraph
13 when he states:
"That on the * of December 2022, I was eventually given occess to my phone and I
called my friend Mill who later contoded a person known os Eddy who secured my
releose on police bond.
"Thot one porticulor day when reporting back at the police, I wos informed thot my
file wos sonctioned and hence orroigned in court on 2nd February 2023."
From the foregoing, it is not possible that a person arrested in January 2022 is released on bond
in December of the previous year. Counsel for the respondent asked me to find that the
inconsistencies in the applicant's affidavit call for me to dismiss the assertions as incredible. I agree
with counsel for the respondent on this.
ln light of that and other averments I have cited, I find that the applicant himself has no clear date
of arrest and his release on bond, and I will not be drawn into conjecture or filling in of the
evidential gaps for the applicant. No bond form is attached from which the court can confirm his
release date. No evidence confirming the date of his arrest has been tendered.
He avers that he was arrested on 19th September 2022 and released on police bond on 8th
December 2022.This translates to about 2 months and 19 days in custody. ln paragraph 17, his
averments have an uncanny resemblance to those of the 3'd applicant's paragraph 13. He states
as follows:
'...Onih December 2O22, I was eventuolly gitnn occess to my phone and t colled my
friend called Mill, who loter contocted a person known os Eddy who secured my
release on bond on th December 2022.
ln light of the apparent "copy and paste" in the two affidavits, there is need for further evidence
for court to determine the veracity of the assertions.
He further states that on a date he cannot recall, his bond was cancelled, and he spent two days
before he was charged in court. Lastly, he claims he spent a total of 4 months in police detention,
yet this is contradicted by the fact that from the alleged date of arrest of 19th of Septemb er 2022
to production in court on 8th Decemb er 2022 is not more than three months.
It is trite law that the burden to deny facts sworn in an affidavit lies on the other party. lf such a
party does not deny or rebut them, then they are presumed to be accepted and the deponent
need not raise them again. lf they are disputed, then he has to defend them. Massa versus Achen
lolPageU
(1978) HCB 297 I do not, however, have to draw that inference where the affidavit evidence,
though uncontroverted, is incredible, contradictory and inconsistent, hence unreliable.
For that reason, having found the evidence of the 3'd and 4th applicants contradictory and
unreliable, I find they have not proved their assertions of violation of personal liberty rights by
detention for over 48 hours.
I will only use this principle to validate the claims of the 2nd applicant, who does not offer
contradictory or inconsistent dates in his evidence. The facts of the detention dates of the
applicant are within the special knowledge of the respondent. For that reason, the respondent's
failure to rebut the evidence can only lead to the conclusion that the 2nd applicant's assertion are
correct.
Article 23 (2) of the Constitution provides that a person arrested for a criminal offense ought to
be detained in a place authorised by law
All the applicants aver that they were arrested by police and detained at the Special lnvestigations
Unit at Kireka and Kawempe Police Station. They also were allegedly taken to the Directorate of
Crime lntelligence upon arrest and for statement recording. These are known detention facilities
under the Uganda Police Force. ln light of this, the applicants have failed to prove they were
detained in unauthorised places of detention.
Article 23 (5Xb) of the Constitution provides that where a person is restricted or detained, the
next of kin, lawyer, and personal Doctor shall be allowed reasonable access to that person.
All the applicants averred that this right was violated, but they adduced no evidence at all to
support their assertions. No lawyer, next of kin or family member filed an affidavit averring that
after the detention of any of the applicants, they tried to get access to them and failed. The
respondent denied infringing these rights and stated that their next of kin had access to them. ln
the absence of supporting evidence, this remains a matter of "one man's word against another's"
I find that they failed to discharge the burden to prove their facts as correct.
7.0 Conclusion
The 1't applicant, Kiggundu Paut, was detained in police custody for 13 days over and above the
Constitutional limit of 48 hours, thus violating his right to personal liberty guaranteed under
Article 23 (4) of the Constitution
11 IPage
erM
The 2nd applicant, Kamoga Muzafalu Lukanika was detained in police custody for 27 days over
and above the constitutional limit of 48 hours, thus violating his right to personal liberty
guaranteed under Article 23 (4) of the Constitution.
8.0. Remedies:
Article 23 (71 of the Constitution provides that a person unlawfully arrested, restricted or
detained by any person or authority shall be entitled to compensation from that person or
authority, whether it is a State or an agency of the State or other person or authority.
Section 9 of the Human Rights (Enforcement) Act Cap 12 provides for the orders that a court
may issue when it determines that a fundamental right or freedom has been violated or unlawfully
denied. These include compensation.
The framers of our Constitution intended to protect persons suspected of committing crimes from
long, unfair, unwarranted and unreasonable pre-trial detention by the police. Such long
detentions increase the risk of torture and suffering at the hands of the police, the making of
involuntary statements to buy freedom, and great anxiety and uncertainty for the accused. lt also
increases the risk of a suspect being forced to bribe his or her way to freedom.
Police should carefully evaluate their investigative and arrest protocols to ensure they are always
in compliance with the law. Suspects should be arrested only when there is reasonable cause, and
where the production in court within 48 hours is impossible, police bond should be considered.
Section 10 (1) of the Human Rights Enforcement Act provides that a public officer who, in
association with others, violates or participates in the violation of a person's rights or freedoms
shall be held personally liable for the violation, notwithstanding the State being vicariously liable
for his or her actions.
Furthermore, where a competent court orders compensation or any other form of restitution to a
victim of a rights violation a public officer who is found by the competent court to have personally
violated or participated in the violation shall pay a portion of the compensation.
Unfortunately, in most human rights violations here at the Anti-Corruption Court, the public
officers are never identified or joined in the actions. This creates a vicious cycle where the abuse
and violations continue with impunity, unabated. Personal accountability in my view, is one of the
most effective ways of countering this vice.
I haveconsidered the following cases, Lukungu Musa versus AG and others, ACD Misc. Application
No 35/2024; Kabwiso Abdul Rahman versus AG, ICD Misc. Application No 33/2023; Namuganza
Rahma versus Uganda, Misc. Application No 1/2023, where the court exercised its discretion to
caution the respondents. ln the instant case, I do not find a caution sufficient. I have also
considered Niwabiine Daudi versus Uganda, Misc. Cause NO 9212021, where Justice Baguma
in almost similar circumstances where the applicant only proved detention for three months but
failed to prove torture awarded general damages of 20m and punitive damages of 1m
12 I P a g e
ln the case of Nansubuga Hajara versus Uganda, ACD Misc. Application NO 3512O24, this
court awarded the applicant general damages of 10,000,000/- and punitive damages of Ushs
10,000,000 /= for detention for three weeks.
1. General Damages of Ushs 15,000,000/= (fifteen million) to the 1't applicant, Kiggundu Paul,
who was detained for 13, roughly two weeks days illegally.
2. General Damages of Ushs 25,000,000/- (twenty five million) to the 2nd applicant who was
detained for 27 days illegally.
3. Costs are awarded to the applicant.
4. The prayer for an order to nullify the trial of the applicants in Criminal Session Case No
83/2024 fails as the court has not found that any of their non-derogable rights have been
infringed.
Judge
14.4.2025
13 lPage