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Cia 3 2257355

The document discusses the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan, highlighting their historical conflict and the motivations behind their nuclear weapons programs. It details the evolution of their nuclear capabilities and the impact of these developments on regional tensions, particularly during events like the Kargil War. Additionally, it examines the role of the United States in managing the nuclear crisis in South Asia and the complexities of its foreign policy in the region.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
15 views5 pages

Cia 3 2257355

The document discusses the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan, highlighting their historical conflict and the motivations behind their nuclear weapons programs. It details the evolution of their nuclear capabilities and the impact of these developments on regional tensions, particularly during events like the Kargil War. Additionally, it examines the role of the United States in managing the nuclear crisis in South Asia and the complexities of its foreign policy in the region.

Uploaded by

Sheikh Snober
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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CIA 3: INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

TOPIC: - NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND CRISIS IN SOUTH ASIA

Name: Sheikh Snober Hafeez

Reg No: 2257355

Submitted to

Dr.Madhumati Deshpande

Master of Arts in International Studies


Department of International Studies, Political Science and History
School of Social Science
1) What were the reasons for both India and Pakistan to develop nuclear
weapons program? How did that impact the conflict between the two
countries?

The affiliation between India and Pakistan can be portrayed as one of the most prominent
national contentions in the world. Regardless of the common cultural, historical, geographical,
and economic relationship between the two nations, the India-Pakistan relationship has been
noticeable by dislikes and mistrusts from the partition of British India in 1947, consequential in
the formation the two states -India and Pakistan. Although the nature of the India-Pakistan
conflict has been historical, religious, and cultural, a new relationship element appeared in the
late 20th century: a nuclear feature.

Before India formally declared independence, the need to have WMDs for Pakistan and India, in
particular, became clear. Jawaharlal Nehru, the future prime minister of India, predicted in 1946
that every country would want to copy the new atomic technology created by the United States.
Nehru emphasized that if India is endangered, she will unavoidably try to defend herself by any
means at her disposal, even if she wished for Indian science to create an atomic force for
"positive ends." Although India's nuclear program was formally launched in 1944 while it was
still ruled by the British, even after gaining independence three years later, Dr. Homi Bhabha's
Institute of Fundamental Research could not propel India to make significant scientific progress
advancements.

The Indian government then revived the country's nuclear program in 1962 following a territorial
concession to China following a Himalayan border battle, claiming that nuclear weapons could
be essential for countering any future Chinese aggression (China had been developing nuclear
weaponry since the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954). On the other hand, India declined to sign
the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), alleging the duplicity of developed countries, which
failed to limit their nuclear arsenals after signing the treaty. India finally exploded its first
nuclear weapon in 1974, going by the codename "Smiling Buddha," after ten years of study and
positive initiatives. India detonated a credible nuclear weapon of mass destruction, making it the
sixth country in the world to do so and the first without a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council.
After the United States and the former Soviet Union, India and Pakistan's possession of nuclear
weapons established the second evident atomic competition in the world. To the shock of the
world as a whole, India and Pakistan renewed their conflict over the Kashmir insurgency in May
1999 and started the Kargil War. Although it ended a month peacefully after it began, this fight
is the sole instance of direct conflict between nuclear powers. On December 13, 2001, two
terrorist organizations from Pakistan launched a shooting attack on the Indian Parliament, which
was a considerably more dangerous affair.

While Indian officials emphasized that India would only use nuclear weapons in self-defense, the
Pakistani Prime Minister refused to give up Pakistan's right to wage nuclear war against India.
After a series of diplomatic meetings in October 2002, the impasse was resolved with vacating
borders and easing nuclear tensions. In terms of atomic tension incidents, only the Cuban Missile
Crisis has come close to matching this one.

Since then, there has been a gradual improvement in the peace between India and Pakistan, with
less hostility than in the past. However, the territorial struggle still exists and will probably
continue for longer than we might imagine. The two obstacles to disarmament are India and
Pakistan. No two nuclear states are more intertwined than the two under discussion. Pakistan has
asserted that it will not give up its weapons until the United States takes significant moves
toward personal disarmament. Pakistan has even gone so far as to claim that it will maintain its
nuclear capability for as long as India does.

India rejects the Western leaders' seeming hypocrisy in pleading with countries like China, India,
and North Korea to give up their weapons while doing nothing to do the same for their own
countries. But there is still hope for a world without nuclear weapons. Despite numerous policy
flops, India continues to advocate for nonproliferation in international bodies and supports the
development of an all-encompassing, non-discriminatory, and verifiable global disarmament
policy. Pakistan has taken aggressive steps to protect its nuclear weapons from local terrorists
and is waiting on the developed world to take nonproliferation-related action.

Before concentrating on a global disarmament campaign, India needs to reset its nuclear relations
with its constant foe. Pakistan must accept Indian progress in nonproliferation if not even start it.
Without India and Pakistan's critical participation, a world free from the fear of nuclear war
cannot be maintained. Even more encouraging, such a world may start to take shape under the
direction of Asia's main sub-continental competitors.

2) Discuss the role played by United States in managing the Nuclear South Asia crisis.

Although South Asia's nuclearization had long been predicted, it nonetheless came as a surprise.
It was commonly believed that India and Pakistan could not engage in hostilities since they
possessed nuclear weapons. Some claimed that the two countries' acquisition of atomic weapons
would eventually resolve their remaining conflicts. Despite their declared nuclear status, the two
nations did engage in a bit of war in 1999.

Over the past fifty years, the United States has altered its South Asia strategy several times,
weakly supporting with Pakistan or India against the Soviet Union and/or China. There are more
radical alternatives, but this pattern may persist. Should the global nonproliferation order
collapse, Washington might support India over Pakistan by offering the former technological,
military, and possibly nuclear support. The United States may decide it is time to fully support
India on the Kashmir issue and implement a containment policy against a more unstable and
radical Pakistan if Pakistan is regarded as a failing state and a contributor to the problem rather
than the solution in terms of terrorism. This would prompt American strategists to consider
various tactics for restraining or reforming Pakistan, and it would spark conversations between
Americans and Indians about still another option: partitioning Pakistan into its provinces.

The interests of the United States and the future of Asia depend on a stable and prosperous South
Asia. The United States regional policy has seen both accomplishments and squandered
opportunities. The remarkable improvement in U.S.-Indian ties since the 1990s is one of the
former. The latter is either the casualties of inadequate attention to the region's underlying
problems or the results of an excessive concentration on a single problem. To help South Asia
move toward a brighter future, the United States must have a clear grasp of how its policy has
changed over time. Then it will be able to take the required action to adjust to the current
situation and deal with the vast array of upcoming regional difficulties. Despite being the
immediate focus of most news and policy attention over the past few years, Afghanistan is not
Washington's primary interest in the region. Although the United States has made tremendous
headway since 1947 in developing strong bilateral relationships with nations throughout South
Asia, policy has frequently prioritized the short-term over the long-term. The stability and
growth of Afghanistan are still important to the United States. Achieving a durable and
successful policy toward Pakistan, strengthening the important bilateral relationship with India,
and creating a regional strategy that recognizes the connections between South Asia and other
regions of Asia are of even greater importance. The U.S. policy toward Asia as a whole must be
more thoroughly integrated to reflect the importance of the U.S.-China relationship to South Asia
policy as well.

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