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 Write
It Up

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 Write
It Up
Practical Strategies for
Writing and Publishing
Journal Articles

Paul J. Silvia, PhD

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION • Washington, DC

TitlepagesBlurbs.indd 2 7/23/14 12:18 PM

 Copyright © 2015 by the American Psychological Association. All rights reserved.
Except as permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this
publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, including,
but not limited to, the process of scanning and digitization, or stored in a database or
retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Published by
APA LifeTools
American Psychological Association
750 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20002
www.apa.org

To order
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E-mail: [email protected]

In the U.K., Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, copies may be ordered from
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Typeset in Minion and Goudy by Circle Graphics, Inc., Columbia, MD

Printer: Edwards Brothers, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI

Cover Designer: Naylor Design, Washington, DC

The opinions and statements published are the responsibility of the authors, and
such opinions and statements do not necessarily represent the policies of the
American Psychological Association.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Silvia, Paul J., 1976-
Write it up : practical strategies for writing and publishing journal articles /
Paul Silvia, PhD. — First edition.
    pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-1-4338-1814-1
ISBN-10: 1-4338-1814-0
1. Authorship. 2. Academic writing. 3. Psychology—Authorship. 4. Social
sciences—Authorship. I. Title.
PN146.S553 2015
808.02—dc23
2014014381

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A CIP record is available from the British Library.

Printed in the United States of America

First Edition
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14470-000

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 Contents

preface vii
introduction 3

I. PLANNING AND PREPPING 13

1. How and When to Pick a Journal 15

2. Tone and Style 31

3. Writing With Others:

Tips for Coauthored Papers 63

II. WRITING THE ARTICLE 83

4. Writing the Introduction 85

5. Writing the Method 107

6. Writing the Results 123

7. Writing the Discussion 137

8. Arcana and Miscellany:

From Titles to Footnotes 157

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 III. PUBLISHING YOUR WRITING 175

9. Dealing With Journals: Submitting,

Resubmitting, and Reviewing 177
10. One of Many: Building a Body of Work 205

references 223
index 237
about the author 247

vi

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 Preface

Beginners have a lot of good resources for learning how

to write articles: The latest Publication Manual of the
American Psychological Association (APA, 2010) and
related books (e.g., Nicol & Pexman, 2010a, 2010b) are
touchstones, and many other books give good advice for
people who are getting started (e.g., Sternberg, 2000).
These resources are valuable for teaching beginners
the basics of what a scientific paper in APA Style
should look like, what the different sections are for,
and what common flaws should be avoided.
But book smarts only go so far. Street smarts—the
knowledge and strategies gained from hard-earned
experience—are also needed to navigate the mean
streets of academic writing and publishing. How do pro-
lific writers write? How do people who have published
dozens upon dozens of articles pick journals, outline
Introductions, and decide what to discuss in Discus-
sions? How do they deal with reviewers’ comments and
craft resubmission letters? How do they decide which
projects are worth their time?

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 Write It Up develops a practical approach to writing
and publishing journal articles, one rooted in my own
experience and the good advice others have shared with
me. If you work in an IMRAD field—your papers have
an Introduction, Method, Results, and Discussion in
APA Style—in the social, behavioral, educational, and
health sciences, this book will show you how to plan,
write, and submit good manuscripts. Along the way,
we’ll also consider some issues that rarely come up, such
as how to write effectively with coauthors, to cultivate a
strong sense of style, and to create a broader program of
research. My approach emphasizes writing not for mere
publication, but for impact, and for making a difference
in the scholarly conversation. Our work will matter
more if we are reflective and discerning, if we focus on
our stronger ideas and try to communicate them well.
This book is a companion volume to How to Write
a Lot—an older and hopefully wiser companion, one
with more gray in the beard and more tales from the
trenches of academic writing. How to Write a Lot
focused on motivational aspects of academic writing:
how to make a writing schedule and stick to it, how to
avoid binge writing, and how to write during the work-
week instead of on the weekends and holidays. Write It
Up focuses on the nuts and bolts of writing and publish-
ing empirical articles. I’ve wanted to write a book about
how to write good journal articles for at least a decade,
but it took publishing a few dozen articles before I felt
that I knew what I was doing and a few dozen more
before I thought I could put my tacit ideas into words.

viii

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 The great team at APA Books, as before, was a
pleasure to work with. I want to give particular thanks
to Linda Malnasi McCarter, both for her advice and
her partnership in culinary crimes; to Susan Herman,
for her developmental guidance; and to the reviewers
of an earlier draft, for hitting a lot of nails on the head.
So many people have given me good advice about writ-
ing over the years, more than I can thank, but Janet
Boseovski, Nathan DeWall, Mike Kane, Tom Kwapil,
Dayna Touron, and Ethan Zell, whether they knew
it or not, were particularly helpful while I was writ-
ing this book. In hindsight, I can see that I was lucky
to get excellent advice and mentoring in writing dur-
ing graduate school at the University of Kansas—my
thanks particularly to Dan Batson, Monica Biernat,
Nyla Branscombe, the late Jack Brehm, Chris Cran-
dall, Allen Omoto, the late Rick Snyder, and Larry
Wrightsman. I’m still coming to understand much
of what I learned there. The graduate students in my
academic writing seminar and research group—Roger
Beaty, Naomi Chatley, Kirill Fayn, Candice Lassiter,
Emily Nusbaum, and Bridget Smeekens—helped to
refine the ideas and to mock the many jokes that didn’t
work. To be sure, I don’t imagine that anyone thanked
here agrees with all, most, or any of the ideas in this
book, for which I alone take the blame.

ix

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 Write
It Up

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 Introduction

I had so much more free time in grad school. Of the

many quirky hobbies I developed to keep me off the
mean streets of Lawrence, Kansas, the oddest was found-
ing Broken Boulder Press, a registered nonprofit that
published experimental poetry and fiction. Many peo-
ple say they like poetry, which usually means they had
a Birkenstock-shod friend recite a few lines from Kahlil
Gibran at their wedding. But our press published weird
and wondrous stuff, from found poetry to algorithmic
writing to visual poems. And we always got the same
response from our less adventurous friends: Why do
people write that stuff? Does anyone read it? Where
did you get that awesome saddle stapler?
I closed the press many years ago, but I get the same
questions about my scholarly writing from the blunter
of my friends: Who reads that stuff? Why do you write
for such a small audience? These are questions that
all writers have to face, whether they’re dabbling in
experimental language art or experimental social psy-
chology, so we’ll face them in this chapter. Time is short,
writing is hard, and papers are long. Why do we do this?
What’s the purpose behind all this effort? What writing

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 projects are worth our time? What is worth publishing,
and what is worth burying?

Why We Write
Why do we publish work at all? The answer to that
question is easy: The written word will outlast us
(Greenblatt, 2011), and our ideas must be fixed and
archived for present and future scholars to evaluate
them. But why should we publish work? What are good
and bad reasons for dipping our toes into the fetid
waters of peer-reviewed journals? Whenever we con-
sider the panoply of human motives, we feel both
ennobled and depressed, and examining motives for
publishing papers is no exception. Exhibit 1 lists rea-
sons for publishing that I have heard firsthand over the
years. Take a moment to read them, and add some of
your own if they aren’t there.
All the reasons for writing sort into a few clus-
ters. The first cluster has the noble reasons, the rea-
sons we learn as undergraduates: to share knowledge,
to advance our science, to foster positive changes in
the world. These are good reasons, and we should resist
applying either our aged cynicism or youthful irony to
them. Science is indeed a candle in the dark (Sagan,
1995), and sometimes it feels like the sun burned out.
The second cluster has the practical reasons, the
honest and pragmatic motives that respond to the reali-
ties of scientific institutions: to get a job; to keep a job; to
promote your students; and to build your credibility with

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 exhibit 1. Reasons for Writing, Grand and Scurrilous,
That I’ve Heard Firsthand
77 To share knowledge with peers
77 To pass the quantity cutoff for promotion and tenure
77 To show my colleagues that I’m right about something
77 To further our science
77 To make myself a cooler person
77 To denounce a foolish idea in the literature
77 To build credibility when applying for grants
77 To get a job
77 To help the grad students get jobs
77 To get a better annual merit raise, which is pegged to quantity
rather than quality
77 To advance social justice or influence public policy
77 To build a professional relationship with a new colleague
77 To avoid looking like a failure
77 To show a track record of successful collaboration before apply-
ing for a collaborative grant
77 To learn a new method or research area
77 To outdo the people I went to grad school with, who did better
then and got better jobs
77 To educate the public at large
77 To show I still can do it
77 To have fun
77 To impress my grad school adviser
77 It’s an interesting challenge
77 No reason—it’s just what I do
77 It beats working for a living

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 funding agencies, community groups, and the public
at large. Humans respond to incentives in the envi-
ronment. The environments of most social scientists
encourage publishing more and discourage fresh paint
and windows.
The third cluster has the intrinsically motivated
reasons. Many people find writing articles fun. Most
of us will look askance at that one—I usually hear it
from people who also say, “All your body really needs is
water!” and “Put down that coffee and hop on a bike!”
as well as other exclamatory curiosities—but it’s a good
reason. If not fun, writing articles can be challenging,
a kind of mental weightlifting. In this cluster is the
writing-to-learn method (Zinsser, 1988)—a favorite
of mine—in which people decide to write a book or
article as a way of teaching themselves a new area and
discovering what they think about it.
The vain and sordid and unseemly reasons, our
final cluster, usually lurk in the dark recesses of the
scientific mind. Over the years, people have shared
with me, in moments of honesty and impaired sobri-
ety, some cringe-worthy reasons. Some people publish
papers to compete with their peers; to see if they still
have the stuff; to impress their advisers; to prove to
themselves that they aren’t one-hit wonders; and to
feel like a better, cooler person. It sounds sad to pub-
lish journal articles to feel validated as a person—some
people need a dog or hobby—but it happens. Analyses
of the downfall of the notorious Diederik Stapel, who
published fraudulent data for decades in social psychol-

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 ogy, point to ambition mixed with an unhealthy desire
for celebrity and attention (Bhattacharjee, 2013).

Write for Impact,

Not for Mere Publication
What can we take away from this airing of academic
writing’s coffee-stained laundry? My opinion is that
people may write for whatever reasons they want so
long as they recognize that their readers don’t care
why they wrote something up. Authors are entitled to
their reasons, but they aren’t entitled to an audience.
Readers want something good, something interesting,
something worth their time and trouble. Papers writ-
ten out of vanity or desperation won’t win you a read-
er’s respect or repeat business. Think of all the weak
papers you’ve read. Did you ever think, “I’ll overlook
the rushed writing, tired ideas, and lack of implica-
tions for anything. That guy needed a job, so I totally
understand about this woeful ‘least publishable unit’
paper. So, what else of his can I read and cite?”
This takes us to our book’s guiding idea: Write for
impact, not for mere publication. Early in our careers,
when we’re twee naïfs trying to find our way in the
confusing world of science, most of us just want to get
published—publishing anything, anywhere, with any-
one would be better than remaining a vita virgin. But
once we get a few papers published and the infections
from the more sordid journals have cleared up, most of
us learn that publishing papers isn’t in itself especially

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 satisfying. Some researchers do continue to crank out
work simply to carve another notch into their publi-
cation bedpost, but as one’s career develops, this pro-
miscuous approach seems dissolute and sad, and most
people seek something more meaningful.
The notch-carving approach is a poor use of our
limited time on the planet. Writing is hard and pain-
ful. It can take years to design, execute, and write up
a research project, and it is heartbreaking when the
article vanishes into a black hole, never to be read
or cited. A startling percentage of articles are never
cited—up to 90% in some fields (e.g., Hamilton, 1990,
1991; Schwartz, 1997)—a point that should give us
pause. If no one reads, thinks about, assigns, or cites
your work, was it worth your time and trouble? Would
you still develop the project, put in the time, and write
it up if you knew that no one would read it? I’ve had
more than a few papers get sucked into science’s black
hole—some turned the hole a few shades darker—and
I cringe when I think about the blood, sweat, and duct
tape that went into those studies.
In its darkest, prototypical form, writing for mere
publication is asking “Could we get this study pub-
lished somewhere?” instead of “Is this a good idea?”
People who follow this strategy aim for quantity over
quality, so the manuscripts they submit look rough in
all the usual places: missing and outdated references;
a sense of being written for no one in particular rather
than a defined audience; being far too long or short;
sloppy editing and proofreading; a copy-and-paste

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 approach to writing; and too few elements, like tables
and figures, that take time and effort to create. These
slapdash drafts get kicked from journal to journal,
eventually finding a home in an obscure or permissive
outlet. Over the years, people who write for mere pub-
lication accumulate a lot of weak papers on disparate,
far-flung topics. Many of the papers feel awkwardly
motivated—big flaws get a hand-waving dismissal in
the Discussion, and the research design and measures
don’t dovetail with the paper’s goals and hypotheses—
so readers with expertise in the field suspect that the
data come from a half-failed project that the authors
nevertheless wanted to get published anyway. Over
the years, these researchers pride themselves on a long
list of publications, but discerning readers wonder why
those researchers crank out so much fluff.
Unlike writing for mere publication, writing for
impact seeks to influence peers, to change minds about
something that the field cares about. Science is a grand
conversation that anyone with a good idea can enter.
Whether the conversation group you want to enter
looks like a jazz-age cocktail party or a band of rumpled
codgers who meet for breakfast to grouse about the dis-
sipated youth, all are welcome to step up and say their
piece. Vita virgin or not, if you publish a compelling
paper, the major researchers in your field will read
it, cite it, argue about it, and have their beleaguered
grad students read it. Science has many seats at many
tables, and we can earn a chair by publishing work that
influences the conversation. But not everyone gets an

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 invitation to sit at science’s version of the grown-ups’
table, far from the youngsters with their paper plates
and plastic sporks.
Writing for impact is trying to change the conver-
sation: pointing out something new and interesting,
changing how people think about a familiar problem,
refining the field’s vocabulary, adding new concepts
and tools. The impact of an article is made visible in
many ways. People cite your work in their papers; catch
you at a conference and mention they read it (i.e., they
saw it and intend to read it someday); ask you to peer
review manuscripts and grant proposals on the topic,
thus proving that no good works go unpunished; invite
you to be part of conference sessions and edited books
related to your area, thus proving that the rich do
get richer; and, at the end of it all, conduct research
inspired by yours.
So this is what we want: a chance to change minds
and to sit at the grown-ups’ table. How do we do this?
What do people who write for impact do? This book’s
goal is to show you how to write a good article. That
doesn’t mean your paper will tilt the axis of the world
of science—unlike pop music, science lacks a formula
for cranking out hits, so you will need to come up with
ideas that are relevant and compelling yourself. But
we’ll learn how to get the most out of your ideas. Many
nice papers end up underplaced and underappreciated,
usually because of common mistakes or a lack of craft.
Our central theme—write for impact—has two
hangers-on, two ideas that we’ll see throughout this

10

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 book. The first is to plan and reflect: Writing good
papers requires planning, sweating the small stuff, and
overthinking everything. Science is exciting, and it’s
easy for our impulsive side to want to get some data
together and get it out there before thinking things
through. A little planning prevents a lot of rejections.
The second is to be open. In the long run, no one fools
anyone in this business. This book appears during a
time of unsettling but productive discussions about
questionable research practices, replicability, false posi-
tives, p-hacking, and outright fraud. To have an impact
over the long run, the work we publish has to be can-
did, credible, and open. Some people don’t get this. For
example, an inane but common hope—and a hallmark
of writing for mere publication—is for reviewers who
won’t notice some flaw that the author tried to mute.
Hoping a few people won’t see a blemish so that every-
one can see it, in immutable black and white, is delu-
sional and self-defeating.

Looking Ahead
This book develops our guiding goal—to write for
impact and thus gain a seat at the table with sharp knives
and candles. In Part I, we focus on broader problems
to ponder before we start writing. Chapter 1 considers
how to pick the right journal for your paper. Many
good papers get rejected because they were pointed at
the wrong audience. Chapter 2 considers the thorny
problem of style. Good writing will make your papers

11

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 more appealing to your reviewers and readers, so how
can we write well? Finally, Chapter 3 delves into col-
laborative writing. Because most of our work is in teams,
we need tools for writing collaborative papers quickly
and effectively.
Part II journeys into the heart of IMRAD darkness:
the Introduction, Method, Results, and Discussion.
Each of these four sections gets a chapter of its own
(Chapters 4–7). By stepping back and thinking about
each section’s rhetorical purpose, we can find some
strategies for crafting papers that are interesting, open,
and easy to understand. Part II ends with an obsessive
treatise on the little things—titles, references, foot-
notes, and abstracts (Chapter 8). These runty elements
don’t get the respect they deserve, but impact comes
from taking every part of a paper seriously.
In Part III, we look at the aftermath of your paper.
Chapter 9 discusses how to deal with journals. Some
good papers get rejected because people mishandle
the process of submitting, revising, and resubmitting
to journals. And in Chapter 10, our final chapter, we
step back and consider the bigger picture of impact.
Now that your own paper is done, how do you build an
influential program of research over the long run?
So let’s get to it. In Chapter 1, we’ll dig into evalu-
ating and picking journals. But before we do, give me a
second to get a clean paper plate and spork.

12

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 I
PLANNING AND PREPPING

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13750-02_Ch01-2ndPgs.indd 14 7/21/14 5:22 PM
 1
How and When to Pick a Journal

The scholarly life is full of vexing choices: Which

NPR affiliate should I listen to this morning? Which
farmer’s market should I buy organic okra from?
Which soy-based highlighter should I use to write
comments of devastating snark on the wretched pile
of papers that need grading? For the scholarly writer,
the most vexing choice is where to submit your manu-
script, the organic fruit of your fair-trade labor. There
are a lot of journals, and more appear every year—
one suspects a spooky reproductive process at work,
an eros of biblos in the library stacks after the staff turn
off the lights—so it’s hard for a researcher to decide
which one to try first.
In this chapter, we peer into the world of journals:
how to judge them, how to pick a few to be target
journals for our papers, and when to pick some. With
some forethought, we can boost the likely impact of our
papers, reduce the odds of rejection, and spend less
time revising and resubmitting.

15

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 Understanding Journal Quality:
Great, Good, and Grim
Picking the right journal for your manuscript is like
changing diapers—it takes more experience than you
would think to do it well. Each field’s opinions of its
journals are a kind of tacit cultural knowledge. This
knowledge gets spread informally: Advisers give the
dirt on journals to their students; researchers gossip
about their journal trials and triumphs at conferences;
and occasionally an aggrieved writer sends an embar-
rassing but revealing rant about a journal and its cruel,
uncaring editor to a Listserv. Being outside the gossip
stream, outsiders and newcomers find it hard to know
which journals are good and to discern the subtle
emphases that distinguish them.
Picking journals is central to our theme of impact.
We want our published work to influence the scientific
conversation about our problem, not merely to appear
in print, and some journals reach wider audiences than
others. Even in our database-driven world of down-
loaded PDF articles, people keep an eye on some jour-
nals and ignore others. If anything, the proliferation
of journals has made the best ones more prominent—
when there’s too much information, people will tune
much of it out.
So, obviously, we would prefer our work to be in
the good journals, not the not-good ones. And differ-
ent journals attract different audiences, some of which
would be more likely to read and cite our article. It thus

16

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 helps to rank journals, to separate the wheat from the
soy, as a first step. One group of ways to rank journals
is quantitative. Several scores—impact factors, H in-
dexes, eigenfactors, and article influence scores—are
derived from analyses of citation counts. They vary on
many dimensions—some exclude self-citations, adjust
for citation differences between fields, or account for
citation outliers—but they mostly come down to how
often people cite a journal’s articles in their own arti­
cles. Exhibit 1.1 sketches how the most common met-
rics work. Journals that publish highly cited papers end
up with higher scores on all the quantitative citation
metrics, so the differences between the metrics is less
important than the differences between journals on a
particular metric. Impact factors, H indexes, and many
other scores are reported in the Web of Science family
of databases; eigenfactors and article influence scores
are reported at www.eigenfactor.org. If you haven’t
already, it’s worth poking around these databases to see
if the numbers mesh with your intuitive rankings of
your field’s journals.
Ranking journals on the basis of citation metrics
sounds superficial, like Andy Warhol’s notion that art-
ists should weigh their press reviews instead of reading
them, but citations are a reasonable marker of impact.
Some journals routinely publish work that gets a lot of
attention, and those journals are high on all the quan-
titative metrics of influence. And some journals rou-
tinely pitch articles into a black hole of scholarship,
from which no light or knowledge or influence shall

17

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 exhibit 1.1. Multifarious Metrics of Impact
77 The most widely used metric is the impact factor, which is the
average number of citations in a year to the articles a journal
published in the prior 2 or 5 years. A 2-year impact factor of
1.50 in 2014, for example, means that in 2014 each article
published in 2012 and 2013 was cited on average 1.5 times.
Two-year impact factors are volatile—a single big hit can cause
a spike—so the 5-year impact factors are much better. By
aggregating over a longer time window, they are less affected
by the occasional superstar article or popular special issue. All
impact factors, however, are biased by domain size: Bigger areas
(those with many researchers publishing many papers) have
more total citations than smaller areas, so the journals in large
fields (e.g., neuroscience) tend to have higher impact factors
than journals in small fields (e.g., personality psychology).
Because the impact factor has dominated citation metrics for
so long, it is a big target for editors, publishers, and researchers
looking for hacks. For better or worse, a journal’s impact factor
can be inflated by nudging authors to cite recent articles and
by avoiding topics that traditionally get few citations, such as
replication studies.
77 The H index is the value at which the number of papers equals
the minimum number of citations to those papers. A journal
with an H of 205, for example, has published 205 papers with
at least 205 citations each. That journal would be seen as much
more influential than one with an H of 35, which has pub-
lished only 35 papers with at least 35 citations each. H scores
are probably more popular for scaling the influence of research-
ers: Someone with an H of 30 has published 30 articles with
at least 30 citations each, whereas someone with an H of 4
has published four articles with at least four citations. H scores
have some nice features—publishing a bunch of uncited papers
won’t increase H, nor will having only a couple megahits—but

(continued)

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Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 VIII
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NEXT WAR [4]
This essay is of some interest, as it was written two years
before the war, and was one of the first attempts to make the
public realise the importance of Bernhardi’s notorious book.
The author follows it by an unpublished essay called
“Afterthoughts,” in which he examines how far his reading of
the future has been justified by the event.

I am a member of the Anglo-German Society for the improvement of

the relations between the two countries, and I have never seriously
believed in the German menace. Frequently I have found myself
alone in a company of educated Englishmen in my opinion that it
was non-existent—or at worst greatly exaggerated. This conclusion
was formed upon two grounds. The first was, that I knew it to be
impossible that we could attack Germany save in the face of
monstrous provocation. By the conditions of our government, even if
those in high places desired to do such a thing, it was utterly
impracticable, for a foreign war could not be successfully carried on
by Great Britain unless the overwhelming majority of the people
approved of it. Our foreign, like our home, politics are governed by
the vote of the proletariat. It would be impossible to wage an
aggressive war against any Power if the public were not convinced of
its justice and necessity. For this reason we could not attack
Germany. On the other hand, it seemed to be equally unthinkable
that Germany should attack us. One fails to see what she could
possibly hope to gain by such a proceeding. She had enemies
already upon her eastern and western frontiers, and it was surely
unlikely that she would go out of her way to pick a quarrel with the
powerful British Empire. If she made war and lost it, her commerce
would be set back and her rising colonial empire destroyed. If she
won it, it was difficult to see where she could hope for the spoils. We
could not give her greater facilities for trade than she has already.
We could not give her habitable white colonies, for she would find it
impossible to take possession of them in the face of the opposition
of the inhabitants. An indemnity she could never force from us.
Some coaling stations and possibly some tropical colonies, of which
latter she already possesses abundance, were the most that she
could hope for. Would such a prize as that be worth the risk
attending such a war? To me it seemed that there could be only one
answer to such a question.
It still seems to me that this reasoning is sound. I still think that it
would be an insane action for Germany deliberately to plan an attack
upon Great Britain. But unfortunately an attack delivered from
mistaken motives is as damaging as any other attack, and the
mischief is done before the insanity of it is realised. If I now believe
such an attack to be possible, and it may be imminent, it is because
I have been studying Germany and the Next War, by General von
Bernhardi.
A book written by such a man cannot be set aside as the mere
ravings of a Pan-Germanic Anglophobe. So far as appears, he is not
a Pan-German at all. There is no allusion to that Germania irredente
which is the dream of that party. He is a man of note, and the first
living authority in Germany upon some matters of military science.
Does he carry the same weight when he writes of international
politics and the actual use of those mighty forces which he has
helped to form? We will hope not. But when a man speaks with the
highest authority upon one subject, his voice cannot be entirely
disregarded upon a kindred one. Besides, he continually labours, and
with success, to make the reader understand that he is the direct
modern disciple of that main German line of thought which traces
from Frederick through Bismarck to the present day. He moves in
circles which actually control the actions of their country in a manner
to which we have no equivalent. For all these reasons, his views
cannot be lightly set aside, and should be most carefully studied by
Britons. We know that we have no wish for war, and desire only to
be left alone. Unfortunately, it takes two to make peace, even as it
takes two to make a quarrel. There is a very clear statement here
that the quarrel is imminent, and that we must think of the means,
military, naval, and financial, by which we may meet it. Since von
Bernhardi’s book may not be accessible to every reader of this
article, I will begin by giving some idea of the situation as it appears
to him, and of the course of action which he foreshadows and
recommends.
He begins his argument by the uncompromising statement that war
is a good thing in itself. All advance is founded upon struggle. Each
nation has a right, and indeed a duty, to use violence where its
interests are concerned and there is a tolerable hope of success. As
to the obvious objection that such a doctrine bears no possible
relation to Christianity, he is not prepared to admit the validity of the
Christian ethics in international practice. In an ingenious passage he
even attempts to bring the sanction of Christianity to support his
bellicose views. He says:—

“Again, from the Christian standpoint, we arrive at the same

conclusion. Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of
love. ‘Love God above all things, and thy neighbour as
thyself.’ This law can claim no significance for the relations of
one country to another, since its application to politics would
lead to a conflict of duties. The love which a man showed to
another country as such would imply a want of love for his
own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably
lead men astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and
in its nature cannot be political. Its object is to promote
morality of the individual, in order to strengthen him to work
unselfishly in the interests of the community. It tells us to love
 our individual enemies, but does not remove the conception
of enmity.”

Having thus established the general thesis that a nation should not
hesitate to declare war where a material advantage may be the
reward, he sets out very clearly what are some of the causes for war
which Germany can see before her. The following passages throw a
light upon them:—

“Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers.

From a given moment they require a continual expansion of
their frontiers, they require new territory for the
accommodation of their surplus population. Since almost
every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a
rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors—that is to say,
by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity.”

Again:—

“Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has been

admitted. It may be that a growing people cannot win
colonies from uncivilised races, and yet the State wishes to
retain the surplus population which the mother country can
no longer feed. Then the only course left is to acquire the
necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct of self-
preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of
foreign soil. It is not the possessor, but the victor, who then
has the right.”

And he concludes:—

“Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an

aspiring people, which has not yet reached its political and
national zenith, and is bent on expanding its power in order
to play its part honourably in the civilised world.”

And adds:—
 “It must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an
arbitration court can never replace in its effects and
consequences a warlike decision, even as regards the State in
whose favour it is pronounced.”

To many of us it would seem a legitimate extension of the author’s

argument if we said that it would have a virile and bracing effect
upon our characters if, when we had a grievance against our
neighbour, we refrained from taking it into the law courts, but
contented ourselves with breaking his head with a club. However, we
are concerned here not so much with the validity of the German
general’s arguments as with their practical application so far as they
affect ourselves.
Brushing aside the peace advocates, the writer continues: “To such
views, the off-spring of a false humanity, the clear and definite
answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not
only the right but the moral and political duty of the statesman to
bring about a war. The acts of the State cannot be judged by the
standard of individual morality.” He quotes Treitschke: “The Christian
duty of sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State,
for there is nothing higher than it in the world’s history—
consequently it cannot sacrifice itself to something higher.” One
would have hoped that a noble ideal and a moral purpose were
something higher, but it would be vain to claim that any country,
ourselves included, have ever yet lived fully up to the doctrine. And
yet some conscious striving, however imperfect, is surely better than
such a deliberate negation.
Having laid down these general propositions of the value of war, and
of the non-existence of international moral obligations, General von
Bernhardi then proceeds to consider very fully the general position
of Germany and the practical application of those doctrines. Within
the limits of this essay I can only give a general survey of the
situation as seen by him. War is necessary for Germany. It should be
waged as soon as is feasible, as certain factors in the situation tell in
favour of her enemies. The chief of these factors are the
reconstruction of the Russian fleet, which will be accomplished
within a few years, and the preparation of a French native colonial
force, which would be available for European hostilities. This also,
though already undertaken, will take some years to perfect.
Therefore, the immediate future is Germany’s best opportunity.
In this war Germany places small confidence in Italy as an ally, since
her interests are largely divergent, but she assumes complete
solidarity with Austria. Austria and Germany have to reckon with
France and Russia. Russia is slow in her movements, and Germany,
with her rapid mobilisation, should be able to throw herself upon
France without fear of her rear. Should she win a brilliant victory at
the outset, Russia might refuse to compromise herself at all,
especially if the quarrel could be so arranged that it would seem as if
France had been the aggressor. Before the slow Slavonic mind had
quite understood the situation and set her unwieldy strength in
motion, her ally might be struck down, and she face to face with the
two Germanic Powers, which would be more than a match for her.
Of the German army, which is to be the instrument of this world-
drama, General von Bernhardi expresses the highest opinion: “The
spirit which animates the troops, the ardour of attack, the heroism,
the loyalty which prevail among them, justify the highest
expectations. I am certain that if they are soon to be summoned to
arms their exploits will astonish the world, provided only that they
are led with skill and determination.” How their “ardour of attack”
has been tested it is difficult to see, but the world will probably
agree that the German army is a most formidable force. When he
goes on, however, to express the opinion that they would certainly
overcome the French, the two armies being approximately of the
same strength, it is not so easy to follow his argument. It is possible
that even so high an authority as General von Bernhardi has not
entirely appreciated how Germany has been the teacher of the world
in military matters and how thoroughly her pupils have responded to
that teaching. That attention to detail, perfection of arrangement for
mobilisation, and careful preparation which have won German
victories in the past may now be turned against her, and she may
find that others can equal her in her own virtues.
Poor France, once conquered, is to be very harshly treated. Here is
the passage which describes her fate:—

“In one way or another we must square our account with

France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy.
This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German
policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be
removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by
force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she
can never again come across our path.”

It is not said how Germany could permanently extinguish France,

and it is difficult to think it out. An indemnity, however large, would
eventually be paid and France recover herself. Germany has found
the half-German border provinces which she annexed so indigestible
that she could hardly incorporate Champagne or any other purely
French district. Italy might absorb some of Savoy and the French
Riviera. If the country were artificially separated the various parts
would fly together again at the first opportunity. Altogether, the
permanent sterilisation of France would be no easy matter to effect.
It would probably be attempted by imposing the condition that in
the future no army, save for police duties, would be allowed her. The
history of Prussia itself, however, shows that even so stringent a
prohibition as this can be evaded by a conquered but indomitable
people.
Let us now turn to General von Bernhardi’s views upon ourselves;
and, first of all, it is of interest to many of us to know what are those
historical episodes which have caused him and many of his fellow-
countrymen to take bitter exception to our national record. From our
point of view we have repeatedly helped Germany in the past, and
have asked for and received no other reward than the consciousness
of having co-operated in some common cause. So it was in
Marlborough’s days. So in the days of Frederick. So also in those of
Napoleon. To all these ties, which had seemed to us to be of
importance, there is not a single allusion in this volume. On the
other hand, there are very bitter references to some other historical
events which must seem to us strangely inadequate as a cause for
international hatred.
We may, indeed, congratulate ourselves as a nation, if no stronger
indictment can be made against us than is contained in the book of
the German general. The first episode upon which he animadverts is
the ancient German grievance of the abandonment of Frederick the
Great by England in the year 1761. One would have thought that
there was some statute of limitations in such matters, but apparently
there is none in the German mind. Let us grant that the premature
cessation of a campaign is an injustice to one’s associates, and let us
admit also that a British Government under its party system can
never be an absolutely stable ally. Having said so much, one may
point out that there were several mitigating circumstances in this
affair. We had fought for five years, granting considerable subsidies
to Frederick during that time, and dispatching British armies into the
heart of Germany. The strain was very great, in a quarrel which did
not vitally affect ourselves. The British nation had taken the view,
not wholly unreasonably, that the war was being waged in the
interests of Hanover, and upon a German rather than a British
quarrel. When we stood out France did the same, so that the
balance of power between the combatants was not greatly affected.
Also, it may be pointed out as a curious historical fact that this
treatment which he so much resented was exactly that which
Frederick had himself accorded to his allies some years before at the
close of the Silesian campaign. On that occasion he made an
isolated peace with Maria Theresa, and left his associates, France
and Bavaria, to meet the full force of the Austrian attack.
Finally the whole episode has to be judged by the words of a
modern writer: “Conditions may arise which are more powerful than
the most honourable intentions. The country’s own interests—
considered, of course, in the highest ethical sense—must then turn
the scale.” These sentences are not from the work of a British
apologist, but from this very book of von Bernhardi’s which scolds
England for her supposed adherence to such principles. He also
quotes, with approval, Treitschke’s words: “Frederick the Great was
all his life long charged with treachery because no treaty or alliance
could ever induce him to renounce the right of free self-
determination.”
Setting aside this ancient grievance of the Seven Years’ War, it is of
interest to endeavour to find out whether there are any other solid
grounds in the past for Germany’s reprobation. Two more historical
incidents are held up as examples of our perfidy. The first is the
bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, when the British took forcible
possession in time of peace of the Danish fleet. It must be admitted
that the step was an extreme one, and only to be justified upon the
plea of absolute necessity for vital national reasons. The British
Government of the day believed that Napoleon was about to possess
himself of the Danish fleet and would use it against themselves.
Fouché has admitted in his Memoirs that the right was indeed given
by a secret clause in the Treaty of Tilsit. It was a desperate time,
when the strongest measures were continually being used against
us, and it may be urged that similar measures were necessary in
self-defence. Having once embarked upon the enterprise, and our
demand being refused, there was no alternative but a bombardment
of the city with its attendant loss of civilian life. It is not an exploit of
which we need be proud, and at the best can only be described as a
most painful and unfortunate necessity; but I should be surprised if
the Danes, on looking back to it, judge it more harshly than some
more recent experiences which they have had at the hands of
General von Bernhardi's own fellow-countrymen. That he is himself
prepared to launch upon a similar enterprise in a much larger and
more questionable shape is shown by his declaration that if Holland
will not take sides against England in the next war it should be
overrun by the German troops.
General von Bernhardi's next historical charge is the bombardment
of Alexandria in 1882, which he describes as having been affected
upon hypocritical pretences in a season of peace. To those who have
a recollection of that event and can recall the anti-European
movement of Arabi and the massacre which preceded the
bombardment, the charge will appear grotesque. But it is with a
patchwork quilt of this sort that this German publicist endeavours to
cover the unreasoning, but none the less formidable, jealousy and
prejudice which inflame him against this country. The foolish fiction
that the British Government declared war against the Boers in order
to gain possession of their gold mines is again brought forward,
though one would have imagined that even the gutter-Press who
exploited it twelve years ago had abandoned it by now. If General
von Bernhardi can explain how the British Government is the richer
for these mines, or whether a single foreign shareholder has been
dispossessed of his stock in them, he will be the first who has ever
given a solid fact in favour of this ridiculous charge. In a previous
paragraph of his book he declares that it was President Kruger who
made the war and that he was praiseworthy for so doing. Both
statements cannot be true. If it was President Kruger who made the
war, then it was not forced on by Great Britain in order to possess
herself of the goldfields.
So much for the specific allegations against Great Britain. One can
hardly regard them as being so serious as to wipe out the various
claims, racial, religious, and historical, which unite the two countries.
However, we are only concerned with General von Bernhardi's
conclusions, since he declares that his country is prepared to act
upon them. There remain two general grounds upon which he
considers that Germany should make war upon the British Empire.
The first is to act as the champion of the human race in winning
what he calls the freedom of the seas. The second is to further
German expansion as a world-Power, which is cramped by our
opposition.
The first of these reasons is difficult to appreciate. British maritime
power has been used to ensure, not to destroy, the freedom of the
seas. What smallest Power has ever been hindered in her legitimate
business? It is only the pirate, the slaver, and the gun-runner who
can justly utter such a reproach. If the mere fact of having
predominant latent strength upon the water is an encroachment
upon the freedom of the sea, then some nation must always be
guilty of it. After our mild supremacy we may well say to Germany,
as Charles said to James: "No one will assassinate me in order to put
you on the throne.” Her mandate is unendorsed by those whom she
claims to represent.
But the second indictment is more formidable. We lie athwart
Germany’s world ambitions, even as, geographically, we lie across
her outlets. But when closely looked at, what is it of which we
deprive her, and is its attainment really a matter of such vital
importance? Do we hamper her trade? On the contrary, we exhibit a
generosity which meets with no acknowledgment, and which many
of us have long held to be altogether excessive. Her manufactured
goods are welcomed in without a tax, while ours are held out from
Germany by a 20 per cent. tariff. In India, Egypt, and every colony
which does not directly control its own financial policy, German
goods come in upon the same footing as our own. No successful war
can improve her position in this respect. There is, however, the
question of colonial expansion. General von Bernhardi foresees that
Germany is increasing her population at such a pace that emigration
will be needed soon in order to relieve it. It is a perfectly natural
national ambition that this emigration should be to some place
where the settlers need not lose their flag or nationality. But if Great
Britain were out of the way, where would they find such a place? Not
in Canada, Australia, South Africa, or New Zealand. These States
could not be conquered if the Motherland had ceased to exist.
General von Bernhardi talks of the high lands of Africa, but already
Germany possesses high lands in Africa, and their colonisation has
not been a success. Can any one name one single place upon the
earth’s surface suitable for white habitation from which Germany is
excluded by the existence of Great Britain? It is true that the huge
continent of South America is only sparsely inhabited, its whole
population being about equal to that of Prussia. But that is an affair
in which the United States, and not we, are primarily interested, and
one which it is not our interest either to oppose or to support.
But, however inadequate all these reasons for war may seem to a
Briton, one has still to remember that we have to reckon with the
conclusions exactly as if they were drawn from the most logical
premises. These conclusions appear in such sentences as follows:—

“What we now wish to attain must be fought for and won

against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers.”

“Since the struggle is necessary and inevitable, we must fight

it out, cost what it may.”

“A pacific agreement with England is a will-o’-the-wisp, which

no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We
must always keep the possibility of war with England before
our eyes and arrange our political and military plans
accordingly. We need not concern ourselves with any pacific
protestations of English politicians, publicists, and Utopians,
which cannot alter the real basis of affairs.”

“The situation in the world generally shows there can only be

a short respite before we once more face the question
whether we will draw the sword for our position in the world,
or renounce such position once for all. We must not in any
case wait until our opponents have completed their arming
and decide that the hour of attack has come.”

“Even English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us

to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the
necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we
have some prospect of success.”
This last sentence must come home to some of us who have worked
in the past for a better feeling between the two countries. And this is
the man who dares to accuse us of national perfidy.
These extracts are but a few from a long series which show beyond
all manner of doubt that Germany, so far as General von Bernhardi is
an exponent of her intentions, will undoubtedly attack us suddenly
should she see an opportunity. The first intimation of such attack
would, as he indicates, be a torpedo descent upon our Fleet, and a
wireless message to German liners which would bring up their
concealed guns, and turn each of them into a fast cruiser ready to
prey upon our commerce. That is the situation as he depicts it. It
may be that he mistakes it. But for what it is worth, that is his
opinion and advice.
He sketches out the general lines of a war between England and
Germany. If France is involved, she is to be annihilated, as already
described. But suppose the two rivals are left face to face. Holland
and Denmark are to be bound over to the German side under pain of
conquest. The German Fleet is to be held back under the protection
of the land forts. Meanwhile, torpedoes, submarines, and airships
are to be used for the gradual whittling down of the blockading
squadrons. When they have been sufficiently weakened the Fleet is
to sally out and the day has arrived. As to the chances of success,
he is of opinion that in material and personnel the two fleets may be
taken as being equal—when once the numbers have been equalised.
In quality of guns, he considers that the Germans have the
advantage. Of gunnery he does not speak, but he believes that in
torpedo work his countrymen are ahead of any others. In airships,
which for reconnaissance, if not for actual fighting power, will be of
supreme importance, he considers also that his country will have a
considerable advantage.
Such, in condensed form, is the general thesis and forecast of this
famous German officer. If it be true, there are evil days coming both
for his country and for ours. One may find some consolation in the
discovery that wherever he attempts to fathom our feelings he
makes the most lamentable blunders. He lays it down as an axiom,
for example, that if we were hard-pressed the Colonies would take
the opportunity of abandoning us. We know, on the other hand, that
it is just such a situation which would bring about the federation of
the Empire. He is under the delusion also that there is deep
commercial and political jealousy of the United States in this country,
and that this might very well culminate in war. We are aware that
there is no such feeling, and that next to holding the trident
ourselves we should wish to see it in the hands of our American
cousins. One thing he says, however, which is supremely true, which
all of us would endorse, and which every German should ponder: it
is that the idea of a war between Germany and ourselves never
entered into the thoughts of any one in this country until the year
1902. Why this particular year? Had the feeling risen from
commercial jealousy upon the part of Great Britain, it must have
shown itself far earlier than that—as early as the “Made in Germany”
enactment. It appeared in 1902 because that was the close of the
Boer War, and because the bitter hostility shown by the Germans in
that war opened our eyes to the fact that they would do us a
mischief if they could. When the German Navy Act of 1900 gave
promise that they would soon have the means of doing so, the first
thoughts of danger arose, and German policy drove us more and
more into the ranks of their opponents. Here, then, General von
Bernhardi is right; but in nearly every other reference to our feelings
and views he is wrong; so that it is to be hoped that in those
matters in which we are unable to check him, such as the course of
German thought and of German action in the future, he is equally
mistaken. But I repeat that he is a man of standing and reputation,
and that we should be mad if we did not take most serious notice of
the opinions which he has laid down.
I have headed this article “Great Britain and the Next War,” since it
looks at the arguments and problems which General von Bernhardi
has raised in his Germany and the Next War from the British point of
view. May it prove that the title is an absurdity and the war an
imaginative hypothesis. But I should wish, before I close, to devote
a few pages to my view upon the defensive measures of our country.
I am well aware that I speak with no expert authority, which makes
it the more embarrassing that my opinions do not coincide with
those of any one whom I have encountered in this controversy. Still,
it is better to be a voice, however small, than an echo.
It would simplify the argument if we began by eliminating certain
factors which, in my opinion, simply darken counsel, as they are
continually brought into the front of the question to the exclusion of
the real issues which lie behind them. One of them is the supposed
possibility of an invasion—either on a large scale or in the form of a
raid. The former has been pronounced by our highest naval
authorities of the time as being impossible, and I do not think any
one can read the Wilson Memorandum without being convinced by
its condensed logic. Von Bernhardi, in his chapter upon the possible
methods of injuring Great Britain, though he treats the whole
subject with the greatest frankness, dismisses the idea either of raid
or invasion in a few short sentences. The raid seems to me the less
tenable hypothesis of the two. An invasion would, at least, play for a
final stake, though at a deadly risk. A raid would be a certain loss of
a body of troops, which would necessarily be the flower of the army;
it could hope to bring about no possible permanent effect upon the
war, and it would upset the balance of military power between
Germany and her neighbours. If Germany were an island, like
ourselves, she might risk such a venture. Sandwiched in between
two armed nations as strong as herself, I do not believe that there is
the slightest possibility of it.
But if, as Von Bernhardi says, such plans are visionary, what is the
exact object of a Territorial Army, and, even more, what would be
the object of a National Service Army upon compulsory lines for
home defence? Is it not a waste of money and energy which might
be more profitably employed in some other form? Every one has
such an affection and esteem for Lord Roberts—especially if one has
the honour of his personal acquaintance—that one shrinks from
expressing a view which might be unwelcome to him. [5] And yet he
would be the first to admit that it is one’s duty to add one’s opinion
to the debate, if that opinion has been conscientiously formed, and if
one honestly believes that it recommends the best course of action
for one’s country. So far as his argument for universal service is
based upon national health and physique, I think he is on ground
which no one could attack. But I cannot bring myself to believe that
a case has been made out for the substitution of an enforced soldier
in the place of the volunteer who has always done so splendidly in
the past. Great as is Lord Roberts’s experience, he is talking here of
a thing which is outside it, for he has never seen an enforced British
soldier, and has, therefore, no data by which he can tell how such a
man would compare with the present article. There were enforced
British sailors once, and I have seen figures quoted to show that of
29,000 who were impressed 27,000 escaped from the Fleet by
desertion. It is not such men as these who win our battles.
The argument for enforced service is based upon the plea that the
Territorial Army is below strength in numbers and deficient in quality.
But if invasion is excluded from our calculations this is of less
importance. The force becomes a nursery for the Army, which has
other reserves to draw upon before it reaches it. Experience has
shown that under warlike excitement in a virile nation like ours, the
ranks soon fill up, and as the force becomes embodied from the
outbreak of hostilities, it would rapidly improve in quality. It is idle to
assert that because Bulgaria can, in a day, flood her troops into
Turkey, therefore we should always stand to arms. The Turko-
Bulgarian frontier is a line of posts—the Anglo-German is a hundred
leagues of salt water.
But am I such an optimist as to say that there is no danger in a
German war? On the contrary, I consider that there is a vast danger,
that it is one which we ignore, and against which we could at a small
cost effect a complete insurance. Let me try to define both the
danger and the remedy. In order to do this we must consider the
two different forms which such a war might take. It might be a
single duel, or it might be with France as our ally. If Germany
attacked Great Britain alone, it may safely be prophesied that the
war would be long, tedious, and possibly inconclusive, but our rôle
would be a comparatively passive one. If she attacked France,
however, that rôle would be much more active, since we could not
let France go down, and to give her effective help we must land an
expeditionary force upon the Continent. This force has to be
supplied with munitions of war and kept up to strength, and so the
whole problem becomes a more complex one.
The element of danger, which is serious in either form of war, but
more serious in the latter, is the existence of new forms of naval
warfare which have never been tested in the hands of competent
men, and which may completely revolutionise the conditions. These
new factors are the submarine and the airship. The latter, save as a
means of acquiring information, does not seem to be formidable—or
not sufficiently formidable to alter the whole conditions of a
campaign. But it is different with the submarines. No blockade, so
far as I can see, can hold these vessels in harbour, and no skill or
bravery can counteract their attack when once they are within
striking distance. One could imagine a state of things when it might
be found impossible for the greater ships on either side to keep the
seas on account of these poisonous craft. No one can say that such
a contingency is impossible. Let us see, then, how it would affect us
if it should come to pass.
In the first place, it would not affect us at all as regards invasion or
raids. If the German submarines can dominate our own large ships,
our submarines can do the same for theirs. We should still hold the
seas with our small craft. Therefore, if Great Britain alone be at war
with Germany, such a naval revolution would merely affect our
commerce and food supply. What exact effect a swarm of
submarines, lying off the mouth of the Channel and the Irish Sea,
would produce upon the victualling of these islands is a problem
which is beyond my conjecture. Other ships besides the British
would be likely to be destroyed, and international complications
would probably follow. I cannot imagine that such a fleet would
entirely, or even to a very large extent, cut off our supplies. But it is
certain that they would have the effect of considerably raising the
price of whatever did reach us. Therefore we should suffer privation,
though not necessarily such privation as would compel us to make
terms. From the beginning of the war, every home source would
naturally be encouraged, and it is possible that before our external
supplies were seriously decreased, our internal ones might be well
on the way to make up the deficiency. Both of the two great
protagonists—Lord Haldane and Lord Roberts—have declared that if
we lost the command of the seas we should have to make peace.
Their reference, however, was to complete naval defeat, and not to
such a condition of stalemate as seems to be the more possible
alternative. As to complete naval defeat, our estimates, and the
grand loyalty of the Overseas Dominions, seem to be amply
adequate to guard against that. It is useless to try to alarm us by
counting in the whole force of the Triple Alliance as our possible
foes, for if they came into the war, the forces of our own allies would
also be available. We need only think of Germany.
A predominance of the submarine would, then, merely involve a
period of hard times in this country, if we were fighting Germany
single-handed. But if we were in alliance with France, it becomes an
infinitely more important matter. I presume that I need not argue
the point that it is our vital interest that France be not dismembered
and sterilised. Such a tragedy would turn the western half of Europe
into a gigantic Germany with a few insignificant States crouching
about her feet. The period of her world dominance would then
indeed have arrived. Therefore, if France be wantonly attacked, we
must strain every nerve to prevent her going down, and among the
measures to that end will be the sending of a British expeditionary
force to cover the left or Belgian wing of the French defences. Such
a force would be conveyed across the Channel in perhaps a hundred
troopships, and would entail a constant service of transports
afterwards to carry its requirements.
Here lies, as it seems to me, the possible material for a great
national disaster. Such a fleet of transports cannot be rushed
suddenly across. Its preparation and port of departure are known. A
single submarine amid such a fleet would be like a fox in a poultry
yard destroying victim after victim. The possibilities are appalling, for
it might be not one submarine, but a squadron. The terrified
transports would scatter over the ocean to find safety in any port.
Their convoy could do little to help them. It would be a debacle—an
inversion of the Spanish Armada.
If the crossing were direct from the eastern ports to Antwerp, the
danger would become greater. [6] It is less if it should be from
Portsmouth to Havre. But this is a transit of seven hours, and the
railways from Havre to the Belgian frontier would be insufficient for
such a force. No doubt the Straits of Dover would be strongly
patrolled by our own torpedo craft, and the crossing would, so far as
possible, be made at night, when submarines have their minimum of
efficiency; but, none the less, it seems to me that the risk would be
a very real and pressing one. What possible patrol could make sure
of heading off a squadron of submarines? I should imagine it to be
as difficult as to bar the Straits to a school of whales.
But supposing such a wholesale tragedy were avoided, and that in
spite of the predominance of submarines the army got safely to
France or to Belgium, how are we to ensure the safe passage of the
long stream of ships which, for many months, would be employed in
carrying the needful supplies? We could not do it. The army might
very well find itself utterly isolated, with its line of communications
completely broken down, at a time when the demand upon the
resources of all Continental countries was so great that there was no
surplus for our use. Such a state of affairs seems to me to be a
perfectly possible one, and to form, with the chance of a disaster to
the transports, the greatest danger to which we should be exposed
in a German war. But these dangers and the food question, which
has already been treated, can all be absolutely provided against in a
manner which is not only effective, but which will be of equal value
in peace and in war. The Channel Tunnel is essential to Great
Britain’s safety.
I will not dwell here upon the commercial or financial advantages of
such a tunnel. Where the trade of two great nations concentrates
upon one narrow tube, it is obvious that whatever corporation
controls that tube has a valuable investment, if the costs of
construction have not been prohibitive. These costs have been
placed as low as five million pounds by Mr. Rose Smith, who
represents a practical company engaged in such work. If it were
twice, thrice, or four times that sum it should be an undertaking
which should promise great profits, and for that reason should be
constructed by the nation, or nations, for their common national
advantage. It is too vital a thing for any private company to control.
But consider its bearing upon a German war. All the dangers which I
have depicted are eliminated. We tap (via Marseilles and the tunnel)
the whole food supply of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Our
expeditionary force makes its transit, and has its supplies
independent of weather or naval chances. Should anything so
unlikely as a raid occur, and the forces in this country seem unable
to cope with it, a Franco-British reinforcement can be rushed
through from the Continent. The Germans have made great works
like the Kiel Canal in anticipation of war. Our answer must be the
Channel Tunnel, linking us closer to our ally.
Though this scheme was discarded (under very different naval and
political conditions) some twenty years ago, no time has, as a matter
of fact, been lost by the delay; as I am informed that machinery for
boring purposes has so enormously improved that what would have
taken thirty years to accomplish can now be done in three. If this
estimate be correct, there may still be time to effect this essential
insurance before the war with which General von Bernhardi
threatens us breaks upon us.
Let us, before leaving the subject, glance briefly at the objections
which have formerly been urged against the tunnel. Such as they
are, they are as valid now as ever, although the advantages have
increased to such an extent as to throw the whole weight of the
argument upon the side of those who favour its construction. The
main (indeed, the only) objection was the fear that the tunnel would
fall into wrong hands and be used for purposes of invasion. By this
was meant not a direct invasion through the tunnel itself—to invade
a nation of forty-five million people through a hole in the ground
twenty-five miles long would stagger the boldest mind—but that the
tunnel might be seized at each end by some foreign nation, which
would then use it for aggressive military purposes.
At the time of the discussion our relations with France were by no
means so friendly as they are now, and it was naturally to France
only that we alluded, since they would already hold one end of the
tunnel. We need not now discuss any other nation, since any other
would have to seize both ends by surprise, and afterwards retain
them, which is surely inconceivable. We are now bound in close ties
of friendship and mutual interest to France. We have no right to
assume that we shall always remain on as close a footing, but as our
common peril seems likely to be a permanent one, it is improbable
that there will be any speedy or sudden change in our relations. At
the same time, in a matter so vital as our hold upon the Dover end
of the tunnel, we could not be too stringent in our precautions. The
tunnel should open out at a point where guns command it, the
mouth of it should be within the lines of an entrenched camp, and a
considerable garrison should be kept permanently within call. The
latter condition already exists in Dover, but the numbers might well
be increased. As an additional precaution, a passage should be
driven alongside the tunnel, from which it could, if necessary, be
destroyed. This passage should have an independent opening within
the circle of a separate fort, so that the capture of the end of the
tunnel would not prevent its destruction. With such precautions as
these, the most nervous person might feel that our insular position
had not really been interfered with. The strong fortress of the Middle
Ages had a passage under the moat as part of the defence. This is
our passage.
Could an enemy in any way destroy it in time of war?
It would, as I conceive, be sunk to a depth of not less than two
hundred feet below the bed of the ocean. This ceiling would be
composed of chalk and clay. No explosive from above could drive it
in. If it were designed on a large scale—and, personally, I think it
should be a four-line tunnel, even if the cost were doubled thereby—
no internal explosion, such as might be brought about by secreting
explosive packets upon the trains, would be likely to do more than
temporarily obstruct it. If the very worst happened, and it were
actually destroyed, we should be no worse off than we are now. As
to the expense, if we are driven into a war of this magnitude, a few
millions one way or the other will not be worth considering.
Incidentally, it may be noted that General von Bernhardi has a poor
opinion of our troops. This need not trouble us. We are what we are,
and words will not alter it. From very early days our soldiers have
left their mark upon Continental warfare, and we have no reason to
think that we have declined from the manhood of our forefathers.
He further calls them “mercenaries,” which is a misuse of terms. A
mercenary is a man who is paid to fight in a quarrel which is not his
own. As every British soldier must by law be a British citizen, the
term is absurd. What he really means is that they are not conscripts
in the sense of being forced to fight, but they are sufficiently well
paid to enable the army as a profession to attract a sufficient
number of our young men to the colours.
Our military and naval preparations are, as it seems to me, adequate
for the threatened crisis. With the Channel Tunnel added our
position should be secure. But there are other preparations which
should be made for such a contest, should it unhappily be forced
upon us. One is financial. Again, as so often before in the history of
British wars, it may prove that the last guinea wins. Everything
possible should be done to strengthen British credit. This crisis
cannot last indefinitely. The cloud will dissolve or burst. Therefore,
for a time we should husband our resources for the supreme need.
At such a time all national expenditure upon objects which only
mature in the future becomes unjustifiable. Such a tax as the
undeveloped land tax, which may bring in a gain some day, but at
present costs ten times what it produces, is the type of expenditure
I mean. I say nothing of its justice or injustice, but only of its
inopportuneness at a moment when we sorely need our present
resources.
Another preparation lies in our national understanding of the
possibility of such a danger and the determination to face the facts.
Both Unionists and Liberals have shown their appreciation of the
situation, and so have two of the most famous Socialist leaders. No
audible acquiescence has come from the ranks of the Labour Party. I
would venture to say one word here to my Irish fellow-countrymen
of all political persuasions. If they imagine that they can stand
politically or economically while Britain falls, they are woefully
mistaken. The British Fleet is their one shield. If it be broken, Ireland
will go down. They may well throw themselves heartily into the
common defence, for no sword can transfix England without the
point reaching Ireland behind her.
Let me say in conclusion, most emphatically, that I do not myself
accept any of those axioms of General von Bernhardi which are the
foundation-stones of his argument. I do not think that war is in itself
a good thing, though a dishonourable peace may be a worse one. I
do not believe that an Anglo-German war is necessary. I am
convinced that we should never, of our own accord, attack Germany,
nor would we assist France if she made an unprovoked attack upon
that Power. I do not think that as the result of such a war, Germany
could in any way extend her flag so as to cover a larger white
population. Every one of his propositions I dispute. But that is all
beside the question. We have not to do with his argument, but with
its results. Those results are that he, a man whose opinion is of
weight, and a member of the ruling class in Germany, tells us frankly
that Germany will attack us the moment she sees a favourable
opportunity. I repeat that we should be mad if we did not take very
serious notice of the warning.
 IX
AFTERTHOUGHTS
So it was so after all. I write after perusing what was written two
years ago. I lean back in my chair and I think of the past. “So it
really was so after all,” represents the thought which comes to my
mind.
It seems hardly fair to call it a conspiracy. When a certain action is
formulated quite clearly in many books, when it is advocated by
newspapers, preached by professors, and discussed at every
restaurant, it ceases to be a conspiracy. We may take Bernhardi’s
book as a text, but it is only because here between two covers we
find the whole essence of the matter in an authoritative form. It has
been said a thousand times elsewhere. And now we know for all
time that these countless scolding and minatory voices were not
mere angry units, but that they were in. truth the collective voice of
the nation. All that Bernhardi said, all that after long disbelief he
made some of us vaguely realise, has now actually happened. So far
as Germany is concerned it has been fulfilled to the letter.
Fortunately so far as other nations have been concerned it has been
very different. He knew his own, but he utterly misjudged all else,
and in that misjudgment he and his spy-trusting Government have
dug a pit for themselves in which they long may flounder.
Make war deliberately whenever you think that you may get profit
from it. Find an excuse, but let it be an excuse which will give you a
strong position before the world and help your alliances. Take
advantage of your neighbour’s temporary weakness in order to
attack him. Pretend to be friendly in order to screen warlike
preparations. Do not let contracts or treaties stand in the way of
your vital interests. All of these monstrous propositions are to be
found in this vade mecum of the German politician and soldier, and
each of them has been put in actual practice within a very few years
of the appearance of the book. Take each of them in turn.
Take first the point that they made war deliberately, and took
advantage of the imagined weakness of their neighbours in order to
attack them. When was it that they backed up, if they did not
actually dictate, the impossible ultimatum addressed as much to
Russia as to Servia? When was it that they were so determined upon
war that they made peace impossible at the moment when Austria
was showing signs of reconsidering her position? Why so keen at
that particular moment? Was it not that for the instant each of her
three antagonists seemed to be at a disadvantage? Russia was
supposed not to have recovered yet from her Japanese
misadventure. France was torn by politics, and had admitted in the
Senate that some important branches of her armies were
unprepared. Britain seemed to be on the verge of civil war. It was
just such a combination as was predicated by Bernhardi. And his
country responded to it exactly as he had said, choosing the point of
quarrel against the Slav race so as to conciliate the more advanced
or liberal nations of the world.
Then again they pretended to be friendly in order to cover hostile
preparations. To the very last moment the German Minister in
Brussels was assuring the Government of King Albert that nothing
but the best intentions animated those whom he represented, and
that Belgian neutrality was safe. The written contract was
deliberately dishonoured on the false and absurd plea that if they did
not dishonour it some one else would. Thus, of the five propositions
which had seemed most monstrous and inhuman in Bernhardi’s book
in 1912, every single one had been put into actual practice by his
country in 1914. Those of us who advised at the time that the book
should be taken seriously have surely been amply justified.
It is a singular thing that Bernhardi not only indicated in a general
way what Germany was contemplating, but in his other book upon
modern warfare he gives a very complete sketch of the strategic
conception which has been followed by the Germans. He shows
there how their armies might come through Belgium, how their
eastern forces might mark time while the western, which were to
consist of the picked troops, would travel by forced marches until
they reached the neighbourhood of the coast, or at least the west of
Paris, after which the whole line should swing round into France.
The chance that by these movements the German right would come
into the region of the British expeditionary force is dismissed lightly,
since he entirely underestimated the power of such a force, while as
to the Belgian army it is hardly admitted as a factor at all. A
comparison of the opinions of this great military authority with the
actual facts as we have recently known them, must weaken one’s
faith in the value of expert judgment. He is, for example, strongly of
opinion that battles will not as a rule last for more than one day. He
has also so high an opinion of the supreme fighting value of the
German soldiers, that he declares that they will always fight in the
open rather than behind entrenchments. It makes strange reading
for us who have seen them disappear from sight into the ground for
a month at a time.
In what I have said in the previous article of the naval and military
position, I find nothing to withdraw, and little to modify. I write with
the Germans at Ostend, and yet the possibility of either a raid or an
invasion seems to me as remote as it did two years ago. I do not of
course refer to an aerial raid, which I look upon as extremely
probable, but to a landing in these islands. The submarine which has
been used so skilfully against us is an all-powerful defensive weapon
in our hands. As to the submarine, I think that I may claim to have
foreseen the situation which has actually come upon us. “No
blockade,” I remarked, “can hold these vessels in harbour, and no
skill or bravery can counteract their attack when once they are
within striking distance. One could imagine a state of things when it
might be found impossible for the greater ships on either side to
keep the seas on account of these poisonous craft. No one can say
that such a contingency is impossible.” It is largely true at the
present moment as regards the North Sea. But the submarine will
not shake Great Britain as mistress of the seas. On the contrary, with
her geographical position, it will, if her internal economic policy be
wise, put her in a stronger position than ever.
The whole question of the Channel Tunnel and its strategic effect,
which is treated of in the last essay, becomes entirely academic,
since even if it had been put in hand when the German menace
became clearer it could not yet have been completed. The idea of an
invasion through it has always seemed and still seems to me to be
absurd, but we should have been brought face to face at the present
moment with the possibility of the enemy getting hold of the farther
end and destroying it, so as to wreck a great national enterprise.
This is a danger which I admit that I had not foreseen. At the same
time, when a tunnel is constructed, the end of it will no doubt be
fortified in such a fashion that it could be held indefinitely against
any power save France, which would have so large a stake in it
herself that she could not destroy it. The whole operation of sending
reinforcements and supplies to the scene of war at the present
instant would be enormously simplified if a tunnel were in existence.
There remains the fiercely debated question of compulsory national
service. Even now, with the enemy at the gate, it seems to me to be
as open as ever. Would we, under our constitution and with our
methods of thought, have had such a magnificent response to Lord
Kitchener’s appeal, or would we have had such splendid political
unanimity in carrying the war to a conclusion, if a large section of
the people had started by feeling sore over an Act which caused
themselves or their sons to serve whether they wished or not?
Personally I do not believe that we should. I believe that the new
volunteer armies now under training are of really wonderful material
and fired with the very best spirit, and that they will be worth more
than a larger force raised by methods which are alien to our
customs. I said in my previous essay, “Experience has shown that
under warlike excitement in a virile nation like ours the ranks soon
fill up, and as the force becomes embodied from the outbreak of
hostilities it would rapidly improve in quality.” Already those
Territorials who were so ignorantly and ungenerously criticised in
times of peace are, after nearly three months of camp-life,
hardening into soldiers who may safely be trusted in the field.
Behind them the greater part of a million men are formed who will
also become soldiers in a record time if a desperate earnestness can
make them so. It is a glorious spectacle which makes a man thankful
that he has been spared to see it. One is more hopeful of our
Britain, and more proud of her, now that the German guns can be
heard from her eastern shore, than ever in the long monotony of her
undisturbed prosperity. Our grandchildren will thrill as they read of
the days that we endure.

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London and Aylesbury.
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