Writer Duffield explains that

Duffield, Andrew. When Do Rebels Become State-Builders?: A Comparative Case

Study of Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central Somalia. 2014. // lincros

State-building in Somaliland illustrates the relevance of both war- fare and political settlements. The Tillyan processes put Somaliland in a strong
position for state-building. However, the political settlement was called into question and tested throughout the first six years of state-building. The
state responded to these deviances with persua- sion, but also with force.47 This process follows the Tillyan logic of “War Makes States” by creating
demands on the state to organize and concentrate its control over violence. The fact that the Somaliland government has regularly
contributed circa fifty percent of its budget to security and that Somaliland remains a heavily armed
society despite all of the progress illustrate how questions of violence and warfare are never far from
state-building projects, even successful ones.48 More- over, it also shows the importance of a durable LAO, which in this case was negotiated
between local actors without significant international help. This increased the accountability and effectiveness of Somaliland's state-building because
it was pursued out of the interests of actors genuinely committed to the state-building project—an attribute we shall see separates Somaliland from its
former partner to the south.

Former Somalia U.S. ambassador Schwartz writes in 2021,

Schwartz, Stephen. “The African Union Should Resolve Somaliland’s Status -

Foreign Policy Research Institute.” Www.fpri.org, 8 Nov. 2021,

www.fpri.org/article/2021/11/the-african-union-should-resolve-somalilands-

status/. // lincros

Somaliland has held competitive elections—accompanied by peaceful changes of

government—and has a military, constitution, flag, and passport. Its deep-water port of Berbera is being developed by Dubai Ports World
and is rapidly gaining capacity. Somaliland lies just east of Djibouti and south of Yemen on the Gulf of Aden and abuts the strategically important Bab-
el-Mandab Strait. Meservey argues correctly that recognizing Somaliland’s independence would provide the U.S. military a much-needed alternative to

Djibouti and diminish the Chinese threat to U.S. facilities, personnel, and operations there. Such a move would also [recognition
would] provide the United States and others with a stable, functioning, peaceful
partner in a war-torn region and strengthen Somaliland’s democratic governance
and economy.

Meservey also identifies numerous potential downsides to U.S. recognition. He lists Chinese hostility towards Somaliland over the latter’s
relationship with Taiwan and likely refusal to seat it in the United Nations; Somalia’s ire at the U.S. having formally broken up the country;
consternation from other African states that the move would spur more secessionist movements; and the possibility that Somaliland might fail as has
South Sudan (and arguably Eritrea). Both he and I see this latter outcome as unlikely. Nor do we believe Somaliland’s unique situation would boost
the argument of any other African secessionist movement.
There is a course that would, if successful, achieve for the United States all the benefits of
recognizing Somaliland without any of these downsides: The United States should work with African
and non-African states to persuade the African Union to lead the process to resolve Somaliland’s
status. The African Union has the mandate and legitimacy to address the issue and to act authoritatively in the eyes of Africans and the
international community.

He continues that,

One could argue that with the civil war in Ethiopia putting that country at risk of dissolution, this is not the time for the African Union to entertain

Somaliland’s secession. However, the opposite is true. Growing instability in Ethiopia calls for greater stability in the region, which clarity in

the Somalia-Somaliland relationship would achieve [stability]. Whether the outcome be

independence, association, or a hybrid, Somaliland and Somalia [both] would emerge stronger. For example, if the parties
agreed to an association, Mogadishu would attain some degree of actual authority over Somaliland that it currently lacks. Alternatively, if Somaliland

achieved independence, it would then be able to assist Somalia with its security challenges in a way that it cannot or will not at present. Talks would

assist with two other regional issues, one actual and one potential. Negotiations to resolve Somaliland’s status and relationship to Somalia would need

to address the festering jurisdictional and security issues in Somaliland’s eastern region and its unsettled relationship with Puntland. Finally, should

Ethiopia dissolve into its component parts, the talks would provide a forum for Ethiopia’s ethnic Somali Ogaden region to negotiate its own

association with Somalia, Somaliland, or both.

Zackin, writing from the University of Pennsylvania elucidates,

Zackin, Emily. "The Role of International Recognition in State Sovereignty." University

of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 4, 2013, pp. 849-879,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=jil .

“In a somewhat circular fashion, recognition also changes the legal framework of the interactions between the parent state, the secessionist entity, and
other states. It enables the secessionist entity to seek the benefits of the international system, including military and economic aid. Recognition allows
the new state to seek admission into the United Nations16 and to secure aid from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.17 Support
from these institutions, achieved only after recognition, undoubtedly aids the continued existence and security of the new state, and secures its removal

from the control of the parent state. Finally, recognition as a new state frees other states in the
international community to send military assistance to secure the newfound
territorial integrity of the recognized state. Even if military assistance is not
actually sent, recognition makes it easier for the international community to
threaten such action, making it more likely that the parent state will not
resist the newly recognized state’s independence. Given the potential negative consequences of
recognition for the parent state, it can serve effectively as a sanction for the parent state’s bad behavior.”

Authors Kolubcista and Ferragamo from the Council on Foreign Relations

explain:

Authors Klobucista, Claire, and Mariel Ferragamo write “Somaliland: The Horn of

Africa’s Breakaway State.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 5

Jan. 2024, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-state. // LFG

A weak economy and limited opportunities for foreign trade and investment

have stifled the government’s capacity to provide services to its approximately

four million residents. Somaliland has a gross domestic product (GDP) of about $2 billion, most of which it receives in
remittances from Somalilanders working abroad. The area’s unemployment remains very high, particularly for youth, and officials worry about a

potential “brain drain” phenomenon, with educated people migrating in search of opportunities elsewhere. Its main exports are livestock and animal

products, which it ships to neighboring Djibouti and Ethiopia, as well as to Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman. Its GDP per capita, in the

hundreds of dollars, is one of the lowest in the world. If it were to gain independence, Somaliland would become the eighteenth-poorest country

[PDF] today. Somalia, meanwhile, is the world’s fifth-poorest. Meanwhile, the government is ineligible for loans

from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as long as

Somaliland is not an internationally recognized state or reconciled with Somalia. President Muse Bihi
Abdi, in an op-ed after his 2017 election victory, said that Somaliland’s exclusion from international markets “compounds the socioeconomic

pressures that Somaliland faces,” and analysts say that an anemic economy puts decades of

political progress at risk. Somaliland has nonetheless negotiated its own foreign investment deals despite opposition from the
federal government in Mogadishu.

Journalist James Jeffrey from the New Humanitarian furthers:

 Jeffrey, James. “Why Somaliland Now Needs International Recognition.” The

New Humanitarian, 19 July 2016,

www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2016/07/19/why-somaliland-now-needs-

international-recognition. //lincros

But, increasingly, Somalilanders acknowledge the country needs far more international investment to
survive. And there’s the rub: options remain limited while the country is treated by most of the world as a mischievous breakaway state. “About
70 percent of the population are younger than 30, and they have no future without recognition,” said Jama Musse Jama, a former mathematics professor
who gave up his life in Italy to return to Somaliland and run the Redsea Cultural Foundation, which offers cultural and artistic opportunities for

Hargeisa’s youth. “The world can’t close its eyes,” said Musse. “ It should deal with Somaliland.” It might also be able to better
tackle crises such as the drought that has hit the Horn of Africa, and which in the north of the Somalia region encompassing Somaliland
has left an estimated 4.6 million people – nearly 40 percent of the population – needing humanitarian assistance. I

Journalist Zackin terminalizes that

Zackin, Emily. "The Role of International Recognition in State Sovereignty." University

of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 4, 2013, pp. 849-879,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=jil .

“In a somewhat circular fashion, recognition also changes the legal framework of the
interactions between the parent state, the secessionist entity, and other states. It enables
the secessionist entity to seek the benefits [benefiting] of the international system, including military and economic
aid. Recognition allows the new state to seek admission into the United Nations16 and to secure aid from the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.17 Support from these institutions, achieved only after recognition, undoubtedly aids the continued existence and security of the
new state, and secures its removal from the control of the parent state. Finally, recognition as a new state frees other states in the international
community to send military assistance to secure the newfound territorial integrity of the recognized state. Even if military assistance is not actually
sent, recognition makes it easier for the international community to threaten such action, making it more likely that the parent state will not resist the
newly recognized state’s independence. Given the potential negative consequences of recognition for the parent state, it can serve effectively as a
sanction for the parent state’s bad behavior.”

The World Bank Concludes in 2023,

The World Bank. “Trade Has Been a Powerful Driver of Economic Development

and Poverty Reduction.” WORLD BANK GROUP, 12 Feb. 2023,

 www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/brief/trade-has-been-a-powerful-driver-of-

economic-development-and-poverty-reduction. // lincros

“From 1990 to 2017, developing countries increased their share of global exports
from 16 percent to 30 percent; in the same period, the global poverty rate fell
from 36 percent to 9 percent. Not all countries have benefited equally, but overall, trade has generated
unprecedented prosperity, helping to lift some 1 billion people out of poverty
in recent decades. Trade has multiple benefits. Trade leads to faster productivity growth, especially for sectors and countries engaged
in global value chains (GVCs). These links allow developing countries to specialize in making a single component, like a keyboard, rather than a
finished product, like a personal computer. GVCs give them access to foreign technology, know-how, and investment. Trade eases the diffusion of
technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and support adaptation – such as solar panels and wind turbines or drought-resistant seeds.
Consumers enjoy a greater variety of goods and services at lower cost, though some firms and workers in individual sectors may see their livelihoods at
risk through increased competitive pressures.”

Other independence claims prove secessionist groups aren’t emboldened.

Maservey, Joshua. “Missing Opportunities in Somaliland.” Heritage Foundation,

November 29, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/missing-
opportunities-somaliland. Accessed December 13, 2024.

A frequent concern expressed by those opposed to Somaliland’s independence is that

it would encourage other secessionist movements on the continent. That hypothesis
has already been tested. Eritrea gained independence in 1991, as did South Sudan in
2011. There was no subsequent explosion of independence claims in either case. In
fact, establishing a standard for independence based on the Somaliland model would
raise the bar for achieving recognition, since there is no other African secessionist
movement with nearly the same autonomy and success that Somaliland has. Its
borders are also today the same as they were upon independence in 1960, aligning them
with the African Union member states’ pledge that countries should abide within the
boundaries “existing on their achievement of national independence.”

Fraser, Suzan. “Ethiopia and Somalia agree to hold ‘technical talks’ over breakaway
Somaliland region.” Washington Post, December 11, 2024,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/11/turkey-somalia-ethiopia- joint-
declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html. Accessed December 13,
2024.
Turkey has been mediating between the two east African countries as tensions
between them have simmered since Ethiopia signed a memorandum of
understanding with Somaliland in January to lease land along its coastline to
establish a marine force base. In return, Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland’s
independence, which Somalia says infringes on its sovereignty and territory. A joint
declaration was reached after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met separately
with Somali President Hassan Sheik Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy
Ahmed on Wednesday. It says the sides agreed the talks, which would begin by
February 2025 and conclude within four months, would respect Somalia’s territorial
integrity while recognizing “potential benefits” of Ethiopia’s access to the sea. The
declaration also says the sides would work to “finalize mutually advantageous
commercial arrangements” to allow Ethiopia “to enjoy reliable, secure and
sustainable access to and from the sea,” under Somalia sovereignity.

DELINK: Somalia doesn’t have a tax system that distributes money well
The World Bank
“Somalia: Moving the Federalism Agenda Forward.” The World Bank, n.d.,
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/199431596779832046/pdf/Somalia-Moving-the-Federalism-Agenda-
Forward.pdf. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Each member state collects and retains its own taxes, along with various fees. The federal government also collects taxes and
fees, but only within the Benaadir Regional Administration (BRA). By 16 Information on revenues collected by Somaliland is included in the module on Domestic Resource Mobilization 0% 50%
100% Other revenue Domestic grants Foreign grants Other tax Tax on international trade Goods/services tax Income tax 50 100 150 200 250 300 Taxes Foreign grants Domestic grants Other
revenues 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 2016 2017 2018 Federal donor revenue State donor revenue 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 2016 2017 2018 Fed transfer to Mogadishu Fed transfer to states and
large, both federal and FMS taxes fall on the same bases. International trade taxes account for the vast majority of own-sources revenues at the federal level, as well as in Puntland and

For the remaining states which do not generate taxes from customs-related activities, own-
Jubaland (Figure 4).

source revenues are almost nonexistent (Figure 5). Indeed, tax revenues in Galmudug, Hirshabelle and
Southwest are all less than US$ 0.05 per capita.

The World Bank

“Somalia: Moving the Federalism Agenda Forward.” The World Bank, n.d.,
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/199431596779832046/pdf/Somalia-Moving-the-Federalism-Agenda-
Forward.pdf. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Apart from taxes, the federal government derives a substantial proportion of its revenues from foreign grants. These grants include funding from the European Development Fund, focused on
state building, food security and education, as well as the World Bank Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing project. In 2018, the federal government derived about one-third of its revenue
from such sources. Starting in 2018, direct donor assistance to individual states also reached a significant level (Figure 6). Although donor funding has increased rapidly over the past three
years, future levels are unpredictable. In addition, other non-tax revenues are important sources of revenues, such as port fees, tuna licensing fees and potentially revenues from the oil sector,
 The federal government, for its part, makes transfers to the Mogadishu local
in the form of royalty and profit oil. 23.

government and the member states.17 Approximately half of such transfers went to Mogadishu in 2017 and
2018. With few exceptions (Figure 7)18, the available evidence suggests that there is no rule or formula that determines the amount

allocated to each jurisdiction. Instead, the amount is determined through negotiations on a case-by-case basis.

TURN: Recognizing Somaliland allows for economic growth by joining international

institutions
Primorac91
Primorac, Marina. “How Does a Country Join the IMF?” IMF Library, January 1, 1991,
https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0028/002/article-A011-en.xml. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Who can apply for membership in the IMF? The prospective member must be a country in control of its own foreign affairs,
and it must be willing and able to meet the obligations of membership contained in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement—its charter. Under those obligations, a member must conduct its exchange
rate policy and related economic and financial policies in accordance with the Articles, and provide requested economic and financial information. Consistent with its purposes, the IMF helps a
member in finding a solution to the country’s balance of payments problems. A member must also pay a subscription—financial reserves that can be made available for use by the IMF’s
members.

World Bank Group

“The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” World Bank Group, n.d.,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history/the-world-bank-group-and-the-imf. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Founded at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the two institutions have complementary missions. The World Bank Group works with developing countries to reduce poverty and increase
shared prosperity, while the International Monetary Fund serves to stabilize the international monetary system and acts as a monitor of the world’s currencies. The World Bank Group provides
financing, policy advice, and technical assistance to governments, and also focuses on strengthening the private sector in developing countries. The IMF keeps track of the economy globally

and in member countries, lends to countries with balance of payments difficulties, and gives practical help to members. Countries must first join the IMF to be
eligible to join the World Bank Group; today, each institution has 189 member countries.

World Bank Group

“The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” World Bank Group, n.d.,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history/the-world-bank-group-and-the-imf. Accessed December 11, 2024.

World Bank Group is one of the world’s largest sources of funding and knowledge for developing countries. Its five institutions share a commitment to
The

reducing poverty, increasing shared prosperity, and promoting sustainable development. Together, IBRD and IDA form the World Bank, which provides financing, policy advice,
and technical assistance to governments of developing countries. IDA focuses on the world’s poorest countries, while IBRD assists middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries. IFC,

MIGA, and ICSID focus on strengthening the private sector in developing countries. Through these institutions, the World Bank Group provides financing, technical assistance,
political risk insurance, and settlement of disputes to private enterprises, including financial institutions. The International Monetary Fund
The IMF works to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable
economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world. The IMF's primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system—the system
of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries and their citizens to transact with each other. It does so by keeping track of the global economy and the economies of
member countries, lending to countries with balance of payments difficulties, and giving practical help to members.

TURN: Embezzlement makes Somalia’s system bad

Nation24
“Somalia’s audit unearths irregularities, embezzlement of funds.” Nation, July 2, 2024
https://nation.africa/africa/news/somalia-s-audit-unearths-irregularities-embezzlement-of-funds--4678222. Accessed
December 11, 2024.

Somalia's Office of the Auditor General has released results of forensic audits which highlight significant
financial irregularities and embezzlement with several key government agencies. In a move that provides a critical step
towards greater financial transparency and accountability, the audits were launched following a similar compliance exercise in 2020 for the fiscal year 2019, which identified suspicious
activities across multiple government sectors. The investigation spanned three years and rigorously examined the financial activities of various departments. The report leaves 22 offices on the
spotlight, including 15 from the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, 3 from the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank, and 4 officers from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Eleven
of these officers have since been convicted of criminal activities, receiving prison sentences ranging from 1 to 9 years. Additionally, several individuals have been barred from government
employment for five years.

Baczynska23
Baczynska, Gabriela, Michelle Nichols, Aaron Ross & Emma Farge. “Exclusive: EU temporarily holds back food aid in
Somalia after UN finds widespread theft.” Reuters, September 19, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-
temporarily-holds-back-food-aid-somalia-after-un-records-widespread-theft-2023-09-18/. Accessed December 11,
2024.

European Union executive has temporarily suspended funding for the

UNITED NATIONS/NAIROBI/GENEVA, Sept 18 (Reuters) - The

World Food Programme (WFP) in Somalia, two senior EU officials told Reuters on Monday, after a U.N. investigation found
widespread theft and misuse of aid meant to avert famine. The European Commission gave more than $7 million in aid to the WFP's
operations in Somalia last year, a fraction of the donations of more than $1 billion it received, U.N. data shows. EU member states gave much more money on a bilateral basis.

DELINK: This argument is colonialist AND Somaliland is economically viable

Schraeder 6
Schraeder 6, professor in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago

Peter J. Schraeder, 12‐16‐2006, “Why the United States Should Recognize Somaliland’s Independence,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why ‐united ‐states ‐should ‐recognize ‐somalilands ‐
independence

The critiques of the pro‐independence position are numerous, but don’t stand up to close examination. One strand of thought is that Somaliland is not
economically viable. This position is reminiscent of claims made by Europeans during the 1950s with respect to their African
colonies, with the aim of delaying independence throughout Africa. In any case, the argument is belied by

Somaliland’s creation of a highly self‐sufficient, well‐functioning economy even though it has no access
to the economic benefits that would come with statehood, such as access to loans from international
financial institutions.

TURN: Recognizing Somaliland would delegitimize other secessionist movements

Meservey21

Meservey 21, Former Research Fellow, Africa at the Heritage Foundation

Joshua Meservey, 10‐19‐2021, “The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland,” Heritage Foundation,
https://www.heritage.org/global‐politics/report/the‐us‐should‐recognize ‐somaliland

A common objection to recognizing Somaliland’s statehood is that it would set off a brushfire of secession in Africa. Yet Eritrean and South Sudanese independence did not. Somaliland is also
unique in Africa because it has successfully operated autonomously for 30 years, has a critical mass of the attributes of statehood, was once independent, and wishes to revert to that status

Recognition of its independence would delegitimize

within colonial‐era borders, the standard the African Union uses to determine statehood.1

other secessionist movements’ claims by establishing a difficult standard for achieving sovereignty.

TURN: It would raise the standard for recognizing secessionist movements

Meservey21

Meservey 21, Former Research Fellow, Africa at the Heritage Foundation

Joshua Meservey, 10‐19‐2021, “The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland,” Heritage Foundation,
https://www.heritage.org/global‐politics/report/the‐us‐should‐recognize ‐somaliland)

Consternation from African Countries. U.S. recognition would likely disturb some African states who fear that Somaliland’s example would encourage secessionist movements within their own
borders. However, the most recent examples of African countries receiving independence—Eritrea in 1991 and South Sudan in 2011—did not ignite a secessionist brushfire throughout Africa.
Somaliland’s claim (as the African Union’s own fact‐finding mission recognized in 2005) is also unique because there is no other territory in Africa that was once independent before voluntarily
 Today, Somaliland has its own
joining a union it now wants to leave—and which has successfully operated for 30 years as a de facto sovereign state.37 <<>>

currency, passport, foreign policy, and standing army, and maintains control of the land it claims—making it a genuinely
unique African secessionist movement. <<>> That means that recognizing Somaliland would raise the
standard for recognition of secessionist movements in Africa.

TURN: Somaliland’s unique history allows it to serve as a precedent for future

secessions, making secessions less likely
McCann22
McCann 22, Junior Foreign Policy Fellow at the Center for the National Interest

Scott McCann, 11‐19‐2022, “It’s Time for the U.S. to Recognize Somaliland’s Independence,” National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/it%E2%80%99s‐time ‐us ‐recognize ‐somaliland%E2%80%99s ‐independence ‐
205913)

As there was not a wave of secessions after South Sudan became independent, there is little reason to believe that recognizing Somaliland’s independence would now trigger such a wave in

Somaliland’s unique historical existence and

Africa. More significantly, Somaliland’s situation provides the appropriate rebuttal to these concerns.

behavior not only set it apart from spontaneous independence desires but also create a precedent. Somaliland has proven that a
functional, durable democracy can be built from the ground up with little to no international support. The region has maintained an autonomous democratic government for thirty years.
Although the lack of women in the current parliament suggests that the government is less than fully representative, there has been a peaceful transition of power between five different

thirty
presidents from all three constitutionally‐legal political parties. While demanding that independence movements conform to democratic governance is potentially problematic,

years of self‐governance and five peaceful transitions of power between opposition parties could be
identified as necessary milestones to achieve recognition, setting a precedent.

TURN: The status quo is unsustainable. Borders are the source of conflict, not the
solution.
Issa-Salwe23
Issa‐Salwe & Osman 23, East Africa University

Abdisalam M. Issa‐Salwe, Abdullahi Salah Osman, 2023, Why Has Somaliland Not Been Recognised as A Sovereign
State?. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 10(4), 8–12. https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.104.14257

Borders have frequently been a source

As a result, the Organization of African Unity operates under the premise that borders are intangible or utipossidetis.

of conflicts and disputes on the continent ever since the African States gained independence. Knowing this, the African Heads of
State and governments have also recalled the Committee of Eleven’s establishment during the Second Ordinary Session of the Council, which was tasked with researching additional ways to
strengthen African unity by acknowledging the imperative need to settle all disputes between African states amicably and strictly within an African framework. It was also recalled that all
member states agreed, under Article IV ofthe Charter of African Unity, to uphold all the principles outlined in Article III, Paragraph 3 of the Organization of African Unity Charter. After the
decision, the African states reaffirmed the strict observance of the principles outlined in Article III, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity by all Member States.
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, they declared that all member states pledge to respect the borders imposed on their attainment of national independence. Although it is claimed that this
policy avoided the border contestation that a border review policy might have brought about, several border conflicts have arisen since African states gained independence.
These have ranged in length from brief to extremely drawn‐out confrontations. Contrary to popular belief, the colonially imposed African state system has yet to be particularly challenged.
Instead, the boundary‐related inter‐state conflict has been the leading cause of competition on the continent.

CONCLUSION
The subject of the recognition of Somaliland as a separate state lies within the case of the policy and decision of African states, which followed when colonial powers started leaving Africa in
the late fifties and early sixties. In the early years before independence, African states had a history of ruling out Africa to be formed within the colonial inherited boundaries. This policy was
forwarded by the Pan‐ Africanism authors who believed that the colonial borders were drawn up in line with the interests of the colonial powers rather than the interest of the African people.

However, an unexpected problem emerged when the European colonial power started leaving the continent. The newly
formed African states within the colonially inherited boundaries accepted borders they inherited as they
were. Although the policy of territorial status quo emerged from African leaders’ legitimate fear of unleashing a Pandora’s Box of territorial claims and anarchy on the continent, the idea
that potential problems would vanish if the box were kept closed indefinitely has remained a fantasy. In addition to encouraging the regionalisation of intra ‐state conflict, Africa’s

colonial borders have shown a disturbing lack of homogeneity and functional polities in some states. Instead of
fostering peaceful relations, these borders have remained a significant source of inter ‐state conflict. The
decision to accept the colonially inherited boundaries was confirmed as a resolution of “the First Ordinary Session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government”, held in Cairo from
July 17 to 21, 1964, which recognised border disputes as a severe and ongoing source of dissent. Moreover, they knew that the colonially inherited borders divided the African States.
Nevertheless, the decision confirmed in the OAU’s annual conference held in 1964, stating the preservation of existing boundaries at the time of the accession to independence, was adopted
at the Cairo Summit in July 1964. As a result, the Organization of African Unity operates under the premise that borders are intangible or utipossidetis.

NO LINK: “Respect for borders” doesn’t apply to Somaliland’s unique history

McCann22
McCann 22, Junior Foreign Policy Fellow at the Center for the National Interest

Scott McCann, 11‐19‐2022, “It’s Time for the U.S. to Recognize Somaliland’s Independence,” National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/it%E2%80%99s‐time ‐us ‐recognize ‐somaliland%E2%80%99s ‐independence ‐
205913)

the AU uses the 1964 Organization of African Unity

There are two common reasons given by the African Union (AU) for refusing recognition. First,

agreement to “respect the borders on their achievement of independence” as justification for denying independence to
Somaliland. However, this argument doesn’t hold up, as Somaliland earned independence from Great Britain in 1960 along the

borders Somaliland recognizes today. Somaliland then chose to voluntarily unite with southern Somalia
upon the latter’s independence from Italy. Additionally, the borders of Egypt, Mali, and Senegal are all different than they were upon independence. More
recently, South Sudan gained independence in 2011. The AU’s other common objection is that recognizing Somaliland would lead to an increase in secession efforts across Africa. While the
complications associated with such a phenomenon could be significant, there is no evidence to suggest the concern is legitimate in the case of Somaliland.

SOMALILAND IS UNIQUE: It would return to previous borders, not undo current ones
Schraeder6
Schraeder 6, professor in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago

Peter J. Schraeder, 12‐16‐2006, “Why the United States Should Recognize Somaliland’s Independence,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why ‐united ‐states ‐should ‐recognize ‐somalilands ‐
independence

A second critique, typically offered by African policymakers, is that recognition of Somaliland will “open a pandora’s box” of secessionist claims throughout Africa. However, as in the case of

the Somaliland case does not call into question the African mantra of
Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993,

the “inviolability of frontiers” inherited at independence. The north‐south union followed the independence and recognition of both the British
and Italian Somali territories, and its dissolution therefore would constitute a unique case of returning to the boundaries

inherited from the colonial era.

Past independence movements prove it’s NOT unique

Daud12
Daud 12, obtained B.A. in Political Science/Global Studies from the University of Minnesota

Abdi Hussein Daud, September 2012, Strong Case for Somaliland Recognition,
http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Strong_case_for_Somaliland_Independence.pdf

Reasserting independence is not a new phenomenon. There were, and still are, countless countries that reassert their independence from their
respective union. Most, if not all, of the subsequent cases resemble Somaliland’s quest for recognition. On July

09, 2011 Republic of Sudan declared its independence from Sudan; East Timor with ‐drew from
Indonesia in 2002; on December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen states, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, etc; Macedonia and Bosnia seceded from Yugoslavia; on 1990s
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia disintegrated into Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Servia, Kosovo, Vojvodina; Eriterea seceded

from Ethiopia; Senegambia was dissolved into Senegal and Gambia; The Mali Federation dissolved into Mali and Senegal.
Therefore, Somaliland is not different from any of the aforesaid cases. It fulfills and satisfies similar
requirements that permitted the aforesaid states to secede. If this is the case, why then Somaliland is
not recognized yet?
Military base: If AU recognition leads to a Snowball Effect, Somaliland could become the
perfect base for the US military to fight the Houthis and al-Shabab, thus reestablishing free
trade in the region

Rubin 24–[“Have the Houthis Made This Somaliland’s Moment?” 2024. American Enterprise Institute - AEI. January 16.
https://www.aei.org/op-eds/have-the-houthis-made-this-somalilands-moment/.] Joel.

[Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East.
A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the
Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism,
to deployed US Navy and Marine units.]
Houthi attacks on shipping continue. While Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced a
multilateral effort to patrol the passage with warships, this is dangerous and unsustainable virtue
signaling. Perhaps President Joe Biden believes this akin to the Obama-era anti-piracy mission just 400
miles away, but that was in open water far from shore. The U.S. Navy was seldom under threat from land-
based missiles, drones, or the type of suicide speedboat that struck the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen a
quarter century ago.

A better analogy would be to the Reagan-era mission to protect reflagged tankers transiting under fire
from Iran in the Persian Gulf. In that operation, American ships faced constant air and sea threats. Even
that was easier. The Bab el-Mandeb is twice as narrow at the Strait of Hormuz; indeed, the Missouri
River is at places wider than the waterway now under threat. In the 1980s, Iran took advantage of that
narrowness to mine shipping channels; it is only a matter of time until the Houthis do likewise. Iranian
harassment of shipping ended only when the United States responded militarily.

Not only is the U.S. Navy vulnerable so close to shore, but sustainment is difficult. Ships spend as
much time in port for maintenance as they do at sea. This is why less than one-third of the U.S. Navy’s
aircraft carriers are now at sea. Replenishment at sea is also difficult near Yemen, as supply ships to
provide jet fuel, ammunition, and food would be even more vulnerable to Houthi attack. Congestion and
the Chinese presence in Djibouti limit that port’s utility.

Perhaps it is now Somaliland’s moment. The self-governing region consisting of the northern third
of Somalia is a perfect, elegant solution. Briefly independent in 1960, the U.S. recognized it. Its
subsequent marriage to Somalia failed, but it divorced before Somalia could drag it into state failure.

While Somalis turned to warlordism, piracy, and incubated terrorism, Somaliland turned to
business and technology.Businesses flocked to the region. Coca-Cola moved a bottling plant there.
Somaliland hosts two multibillion-dollar cellphone and mobile money companies whose control rooms
look like NASA mission control. Berbera, which once hosted a space shuttle emergency landing strip that
today is a modern airport, also boasts a deep-water port run by Dubai World. Both airfield and port meet
or exceed the standards of airfields used by U.S. forces in Iraq, Bahrain, Oman, or Niger.

Somaliland has long sought international recognition. It has governed itself longer than it was part
of Somalia. Generations have grown up as Somalilanders only, accustomed to democracy and free
markets. The country tilts westward, hosting European and east African diplomats. In 2020, it
became only the second African country to rebuff China and establish ties with Taiwan.

As commander of U.S. Africa Command, Gen. Stephen Townsend visited both Berbera and Somaliland’s
capital Hargeisa. So too has the intelligence community, which sees Somaliland as a stable base from
which to monitor Yemeni weapons smugglers and al Shabaab terrorists. Only the State Department
refuses, as Secretary Antony Blinken frets about angering Somali politicians who side with China
anyway.
Earlier this month, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed shook the region. In exchange for a lease that
will enable Ethiopia to build a port and operate its own navy, Ethiopia agreed to recognize
Somaliland’s independence. Many other countries have said they will not be the first to recognize
Somaliland, but they will not be third either. Expect a cascade of recognition.

The U.S. should recognize Somaliland within minutes of Ethiopia. If the Pentagon stations
helicopters and Bell Boeing V-22 Ospreys at Berbera, it can secure freedom of navigation more
quickly and at lower cost. Aircraft react faster and patrol more widely. An aircraft carrier might
carry 5,000 men; an Osprey can operate with four. In short, a Berbera-based air patrol would be a
permanent solution rather than one that runs an overstretched Navy into the ground.

It is time for the White House to set the State Department straight. Somaliland is the solution, not the
problem.

Meservey-21 [Joshua Meservey, 10-19-2021, "The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland," Heritage
Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-us-should-recognize-somaliland,
accessed: 12-13-2024] williamS

A common objection to recognizing Somaliland’s statehood is that it would set off a brushfire of
secession in Africa. Yet Eritrean and South Sudanese independence did not. Somaliland is also unique
in Africa because it has successfully operated autonomously for 30 years, has a critical mass of the
attributes of statehood, was once independent, and wishes to revert to that status within colonial-era
borders, the standard the African Union uses to determine statehood.1 Recognition of its independence
would delegitimize other secessionist movements’ claims by establishing a difficult standard for
achieving sovereignty. Independence would free Somaliland from the drag of association with southern Somalia. It would also deliver the justice of honoring the strongly and consistently held aspirations for independence of millions of
Somalilanders. History The region of Somalia today known as Somaliland achieved independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, following 73 years as a British protectorate. Five days later it formed the Somali Republic by joining with southern Somalia when the latter gained its own
independence from Italy. Initial Merger. Despite the voluntary merger, tensions existed between Somaliland and the rest of the country from the beginning. Of the Somalilanders who voted—the leading political party there boycotted the process—over 60 percent rejected a 1961
referendum ratifying the union and a provisional constitution for the Somali Republic.2 A failed coup in Somaliland by a secessionist faction followed later that year; while a brief calm settled on relations after a Somalilander became prime minister in 1967, it shattered two years later
when the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre came to power.3 Rebellion. Barre’s brutal rule eventually sparked a rebel movement in Somaliland and in other parts of the country. During the subsequent civil war, government-backed forces killed tens of thousands of Somalilanders and forced
half a million people to flee to Ethiopia. Hargeisa and other important northern cities were virtually destroyed.4 BACKGROUNDER | No. 3660 Octber 19, 2021 | 3 heritage.org Barre fell in 1991, but the violence throughout southern Somalia continued. The rapaciousness of the warlords
battling for control brought famine to the country, prompting an international intervention that led to the infamous Black Hawk Down battle, in which 19 U.S. servicemen were killed. The Islamist terrorist groups the Islamic Courts Union, and then its successor, al-Shabaab, eventually
seized swathes of southern Somalia. While an international military force has pushed al-Shabaab from many of its strongholds, it remains potent in the south. De Facto Independence. Somaliland charted a different course. Following a conference of traditional leaders, in May 1991 the
territory re-declared independence and began operating as an autonomous state. A series of other conferences followed in which the leadership created a system of government mixing traditional and Western-style elements that remains largely in place today. It held a de facto
independence referendum in May 2001—in which 97 percent of voters approved a constitution that again proclaimed the region’s independence.5 The territory has held seven popular votes since re-declaring independence, including three presidential elections that included in 2010 a
defeated incumbent leaving office peacefully.6 During the most recent legislative elections held in May—elections largely financed by Somaliland itself7 —the two opposition parties combined to win most of the seats and formed a coalition that gives them an absolute parliamentary
majority.8 Each of the popular votes has suffered deficiencies, but none serious enough to derail the territory’s democracy.9 Somaliland has not been entirely free of instability. The Somali National Movement that led the territory in its initial independence fight (and then against Barre)
fractured in the early 1990s, sparking a nine-month civil war. Clan and political violence, the causes of which often overlapped, periodically flared as well. Safety and Union. Nonetheless, Somaliland today is far safer than southern Somalia—and freer than most African countries.10 The
series of conferences that produced Somaliland’s governance model succeeded by the mid-1990s in ending much of the territory’s internal violence,11 and al-Shabaab, despite its strength in southern Somalia, has little presence in Somaliland. The most significant source of conflict
currently affecting the territory is a long-simmering border dispute with the neighboring Puntland region that occasionally sparks armed clashes. When there is a government in Mogadishu, it repudiates Somaliland’s independence, but lacks the authority to stop it. While Mogadishu
considers Somaliland a federal member state and allots it seats in the national BACKGROUNDER | No. 3660 Octber 19, 2021 | 4 heritage.org parliament, Hargeisa makes it illegal for any of its citizens to participate.12 Southern Somalia lacks now—and for the far foreseeable future—the
capacity to force Somaliland back into union. It is also implausible that Somaliland will ever voluntarily rejoin southern Somalia. For 30 years it has stayed committed to independence, and the scars from the atrocities southern forces inflicted on it remain. Recognition Benefits for the U.S.
Recognizing Somaliland would be a simple acknowledgement of the truth that the territory is an independent state in all but a technical sense—and would allow Washington to create a more effective reality-based policy for the region. The benefits to the U.S. would be significant, starting
with allowing Washington to diversify away from Djibouti, a country on which it is overly reliant and that is increasingly under Chinese influence. The region in which Djibouti and Somaliland lie is among Earth’s most strategically important. In recognition of that fact, the U.S. placed its
only permanent military base in Africa in Djibouti.13 Yet despite the U.S. presence, few other countries in the world are so under Chinese sway as Djibouti. Beijing recently built in Djibouti its only overseas military base, a hardened encampment whose quay can support a Chinese aircraft
carrier.14 Beijing’s lavish financing of Djiboutian infrastructure has made Djibouti at high risk of debt distress,15 and China is by far Djibouti’s largest trading partner.16 The Chinese government financed—and Chinese companies built—sensitive Djiboutian buildings such as the foreign
ministry headquarters and the People’s Palace.17 State-controlled China Merchants Port Holdings manages three of Djibouti Port’s terminals.18 It and four other Chinese companies are involved in various ways in the ownership, construction, and operation of what will be Africa’s largest
free trade zone, the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone.19 Beijing’s unparalleled influence in the country has already impeded American operations20—and positions China to shut down U.S. activity in the case of a confrontation between the two countries.21 The U.S. must compete
in Djibouti, but a strong American presence in an independent Somaliland would be a hedge against the U.S. position continuing to deteriorate in Djibouti. Somaliland has more than 500 miles of coast on the Gulf of Aden that abuts the Indian Ocean and is directly across the water from
conflict-torn Yemen, where Iranian-backed militias and an al-Qaeda affiliate operate.22 Its nearest point is about 70 miles from the heart of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—through which around 9 percent of the world’s maritime-borne petroleum and much of Europe–Asia sea trade
transits.23 BACKGROUNDER | No. 3660 Octber 19, 2021 | 5 heritage.org SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research. Note: Routes are approximate. BG3660 A heritage.org MAP 1 Somaliland’s Strategic Location Somaliland is about 70 miles from the heart of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a
chokepoint for Asia-Europe maritime trade and for global petroleum supplies. A strong American presence in an independent Somaliland would be a hedge against Beijing’s growing influence in Djibouti, which includes a hardened army base near the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway. In
Somaliland, a new road is under construction that will provide an alternate route between the Gulf of Aden and Ethiopia. Indian Ocean Somaliland Puntland SOMALIA Gulf of Aden YEMEN YEMEN SUDAN SOUTH SUDAN ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA ERITREA ERITREA Mogadishu Hargeisa Addis
Ababa Sana'a Juba Riyadh Nairobi Red Sea EGYPT IRAQ JORDAN ISRAEL UGANDA KENYA DJIBOUTI Cairo Khartoum Asmara 0° 45°E Kampala SAUDI ARABIA Somaliland Gulf of Aden Bab elMandeb Strait DJIBOUTI Hargeisa Wajaale Zeila Berbera Camp Lemonnier Chinese army support base
Port De Djibouti Suez Canal Bab el-Mandeb Strait Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway New Berbera-Wajaale Road (under construction) BACKGROUNDER | No. 3660 Octber 19, 2021 | 6 heritage.org This strait is also part of the quickest route for the
Mediterranean-based U.S. 6th Fleet and the Indian Ocean–based 5th Fleet to rendezvous during a conflict or other crisis. Somaliland is in the East Africa region that has the continent’s second-most populous country, Ethiopia, which, along with neighboring Kenya, was among Africa’s
most vibrant economies in pre-pandemic times. Djibouti and Mombasa in Kenya are the only two large, modern ports serving the region, which gives Somaliland’s Berbera port an opportunity to emerge as an economic hub.24 Beyond shoring up its position that Beijing is undercutting in
an important region, recognizing Somaliland would help the U.S. in other ways as well. Hargeisa and Taipei established close informal relations in 2020, and subsequently exchanged representatives. An independent Somaliland would give Taiwan another country willing to have such ties
with it, thereby boosting a territory that the U.S. also supports. By serving as a maritime gateway for East Africa not under Chinese influence, Somaliland could also complicate the continuity of the Belt and Road infrastructure that Beijing is building in the region.25 At a time when illiberal
governance is advancing in parts of Africa, American recognition of Somaliland would be a way to help a prominent experiment in democracy address its shortcomings, something Washington cannot currently do fully because of constraints imposed by Mogadishu. Problems with
Somaliland’s democracy have included deadly—though limited—post-election clashes and elite power struggles that have twice necessitated years-long extensions of the president’s term. Although the territory’s most recent vote was hailed as free and fair, it was 16 years overdue
because of wrangling among Somaliland’s political parties.26 The government also arrested five opposition candidates prior to the election.27 Despite those challenges, Somaliland is peaceful. It has largely quelled al-Shabaab, and its border dispute with Puntland, while concerning, is
localized and the occasional clashes are small-scale. The territory’s stability distinguishes it in a tumultuous region. A civil war rages in Ethiopia, Sudan is undertaking a hopeful but difficult and uncertain political transition, Eritrea is an authoritarian pariah, South Sudan could return to civil
war at any moment, and a contentious election looms in Kenya, which has had violent polls in the past. Amid all this instability, Washington should be seeking out areas of calm, with Somaliland being the obvious option. The danger there that U.S. efforts will be wiped away by war or
unrest is lower than in arguably any country in the region. Formalizing Somaliland independence might also focus the Mogadishu elites’ minds on the task of governing. Power struggles within southern BACKGROUNDER | No. 3660 Octber 19, 2021 | 7 heritage.org Somalia’s political class
have plunged the country into one crisis after another. The ongoing electoral process in the south is a dramatic regression from the previous (also deeply flawed) electoral process,28 in large part because of the elites’ inability to mediate their disputes. The specter of other federal states
seeking greater autonomy could jolt Mogadishu’s elites from their absorption with political battles. There is, as well, a strain within Somali nationalism that seeks to reunite the predominantly ethnic Somali regions of northeast Kenya, Djibouti, and eastern Ethiopia with Somalia. It is a
long-running source of tension in the region, and an independent Somaliland might undermine this destructive irredentism by making its realization even more unlikely than it already is. Finally, it would be an act of justice to recognize Somaliland. Millions of Somalilanders have
repeatedly affirmed that they wish to live in their own independent state, and their government has consistently demonstrated its independence.29 The fact that the world generally views Somaliland as indistinguishable from the far more unstable and undemocratic southern Somalia
denies Somaliland the benefits of the engagement it would attract on its own merits. U.S. recognition of Somaliland would partially rectify this injustice by sending a strong signal that the territory is distinct from the rest of Somalia, thereby encouraging investment and trade from the U.S.
and others. The Risks of Recognition Recognizing Somaliland would bring some objections and risks of which Washington should be aware. Competitor Countermoves. Beijing might try to isolate the new country. As previously noted, American recognition of Hargeisa would provide
indirect diplomatic support to Taiwan. The Chinese government could lean on countries with which it has significant influence, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates, to pressure Somaliland to dial down its relationship with Taiwan. Even if Beijing took this tack, however, it
should not change the U.S.’s calculation. A pressure campaign by the Chinese government would only drive Somaliland closer to Washington. The U.S. should also have a plan for economic and diplomatic exchange with Hargeisa before formal recognition, thereby helping the new country
weather possible pressure. The greater danger is that the Chinese government would try to degrade Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan and the U.S. by wooing its leadership with lavish aid packages or personal inducements, as it has done with many BACKGROUNDER | No. 3660
Octber 19, 2021 | 8 heritage.org other African governments.30 Somaliland resisted such blandishments previously31 because Hargeisa likely calculated that spurning Beijing would win American favor. This problem complicates all of the U.S.’s relationships with African countries, and
Washington would have to meet it the same way it must meet it elsewhere: by making the benefits of a strong partnership compelling enough that Hargeisa would wish to maintain it no matter what Beijing does. Being the first to recognize Somaliland would also give the U.S. a head start
on building enduring ties that would withstand a Chinese challenge. It could be difficult for Hargeisa to demur if Beijing offered to not use its veto at the U.N. Security Council to block U.N. recognition of Somaliland independence in exchange for Somaliland spurning Taiwan. Ultimately, it
would be up to Taipei to make the case to Hargeisa for why its diplomatic opening should continue, while the U.S.’s priority is its own interests in Somaliland. Russia could try to use Somaliland independence to validate its claims that regions in Europe—such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia
in Georgia and the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic in Ukraine—deserve independence. These regions, however, are not analogous to Somaliland because none of them have as many of the prerequisites of statehood as Somaliland has. They were
also illegally invaded and occupied by a foreign country—Russia—that continues to dominate them, whereas the Somaliland government is the final authority within its borders. A Rupture with Mogadishu. One virtually certain consequence of Washington recognizing Somaliland is that it
would damage relations with southern Somalia that would view it as dismembering the country. Yet Somaliland, in practice, is already separate from the rest of Somalia and has, for 30 years, repudiated Mogadishu’s sovereignty claims. Somaliland has taken the decision to carve itself off
from the rest of the country, and American recognition of its independence would simply be acknowledging that reality. While a break with Mogadishu would be unfortunate, it would not badly harm U.S. strategic interests because Washington derives little benefit from its current
relationship with the federal government. Its political elites’ power struggles obstruct the battle against al-Shabaab,32 and the rampant corruption siphons off American aid money and fuels further violent conflict.33 Despite massive military, diplomatic, and financial support, Mogadishu
has made scant progress rectifying the many thorny issues facing the country.34 As mentioned earlier, American recognition of Somaliland may BACKGROUNDER | No. 3660 Octber 19, 2021 | 9 heritage.org bring a unity and seriousness of purpose to the federal government facing the
prospect of other attempted defections by its federal member states. Somalia’s anger over American recognition could give China an advantage in the strategically situated country. However, Somalia badly needs American security assistance and humanitarian aid, which would dampen
an overreaction from Mogadishu and likely facilitate an eventual rapprochement. And while Beijing could replace any American aid Mogadishu rejects, it could not and would not provide the kinetic counterterrorism support that the U.S. does, and which is important to keeping al-
Shabaab at bay. Beijing has made some recent investments in Somalia and publicly proclaims its interest in strong diplomatic relations, but Somalia for the foreseeable future is unlikely to achieve enough stability to be the type of partner with which Beijing can build strong ties. There are
also other countries with far more influence in Somalia than China,35 which, even if they are friendly with Beijing, would limit the gains the Chinese government would make if the U.S. was evicted from Somalia. Another problematic country for the U.S., Turkey, might also benefit from a
Washington–Mogadishu rupture by replacing some of the withdrawn American counterterrorism assistance. Ankara already trains Somali forces and provides military materiel, and it has some experience and the willingness to engage in kinetic operations, such as in Libya. Yet while
Turkey is a challenge for the U.S., it is not a strategic competitor like China or even Russia. Ankara also already enjoys a strong position in Somalia and may be unwilling to undertake significant extra effort and expense for marginal gain. Consternation from African Countries. U.S.

However, the most recent examples of African

recognition would likely disturb some African states who fear that Somaliland’s example would encourage secessionist movements within their own borders.

countries receiving independence—Eritrea in 1991 and South Sudan in 2011—did not ignite a
secessionist brushfire throughout Africa. Somaliland’s claim (as the African Union’s own fact-finding mission recognized in
2005)36 is also unique because there is no other territory in Africa that was once independent before voluntarily joining a union it now wants
to leave—and which has successfully operated for 30 years as a de facto sovereign state.37 That means that recognizing Somaliland would raise
the standard for recognition of secessionist movements in Africa.

Ferragamo of the Council on Foreign Relations '24 [Mariel; Writer @ the Council on Foreign
Relations, BA from Colby College; 1-25-2024; Council on Foreign Relations; "Somaliland: The Horn of
Africa’s Breakaway State," https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-
state#chapter-title-0-5; accessed: 12-7-2024] squasha
The Somaliland government asserts that it meets most of the requirements of a sovereign democratic state:
it holds free and fair elections, has its own currency and security forces, and issues its own passports. It also says that its
independence claim is consistent with a longstanding norm of the African Union and its predecessor that
colonial-era borders should be maintained. Some analysts also note that Somalilanders are predominantly from the Isaaq clan, and thus
ethnically distinctive from other Somalis.
The territory has widely been seen as an “oasis” for stability in a turbulent region. “From the Somalilanders’ perspective, they have a
completely reasonable argument,” Bronwyn Bruton, democracy and governance expert, said in 2018. “Somaliland is trying to break off from
Somalia, which hasn’t been a functioning country in decades.” Democracy and civil liberties watchdog Freedom House rates Somaliland’s freedom index

at “partly free,” scoring a forty-four out of one hundred in 2023, while Somalia got only eight in the same year—an unequivocally “not free”
status, and the fourteenth-lowest worldwide However, Somaliland’s score has declined in recent years following crackdowns on opposition protestors when its
parliament postponed the 2022 presidential election.
What is its financial situation?