National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?

Author(s): Wolfgang Sauer

Source: The American Historical Review , Dec., 1967, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Dec., 1967), pp. 404-
424
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1866167

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Oxford University Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review

This content downloaded from

f:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?
WOLFGANG SAUER*

IT is only two decades since National Socialism has left the scene, and yet
the literature dealing with it is already immense. The fifty-year rule, never
much respected by historians, has been quickly ignored in the face of so pro-
voking a subject. This was all the more easy since, in this case, no Cerberus
guarded the gates of the archives. Never before in the history of historiog-
raphy did the documentary record of events become accessible to historians
so quickly and comprehensively. One of the thought-provoking effects of
this state of affairs is that historians suddenly have begun to wonder whether
this surfeit of documents may not be, as one of them put it in a recent re-
view, "a source of confusion rather than clarification."'
One way to avoid confusion is to define clearly the concepts and theories
used in interpreting Nazism and to evaluate them in terms of the available
evidence. Such an enterprise may seem all the more urgent since well-
established concepts have become questionable in recent years. The follow-
ing discussion attempts to clarify the problem. It first surveys past efforts of
interpretation, then reviews present studies in this field, and, finally, develops
some suggestions for further interpretive analyses.

The study of Nazism has so far traversed three periods with the two turn-
ing points being the outbreak of the Second World War and the start of the
cold war.2 In the first period, prior to 1939, scholars tended to explain Na-
tional Socialism in terms of fascism. Adolf Hitler seemed merely a German
variant of Benito Mussolini, and both appeared, during the Great Depres-
sion and the popular front, to be but varieties of the agony of capitalism.
Many writers were strongly influenced by socialist thought and, what is
more, by socialist hopes. They sensed a profound revolutionary change in

Mr. Sauer, a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, wrote Part III of Karl
Dietrich Bracher et al., Die nationalsozialistisclse Maclitergreifung: Sttudien zur Errichtung des
totalitiren Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland (2d ed., Cologne, I962). This article is an en-
larged version of a paper presented to the Conference Group for Central European History at
the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, California, December
28, I965.

'Walter Laqueur, "Nazism and the Nazis: On the Difficulties of Discovering the Whole
Truth," Encounter, XXII (Apr. I964), 4I.
2 For an earlier bibliographical survey, see Andrew G. Whiteside, "The Nature and Origins
of National Socialism," Journal of Central European Aflairs, XVII (No. I, 1957-58), 48-73.

404

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism 405

their time and interpreted it in term

the classless society. From this point of view, the rise of fascism in many
parts of Europe appeared as a desperate last effort of monopoly capitalists to
reassert their control over the masses against the tide of socialism, using the
stick of terror and the carrot of pseudo socialism. Fascism, in this view, was
understood as a mere manipulation by big business. The outstanding ex-
ample of this approach was Franz L. Neumann's Behemoth with its empha-
sis on social and economic analysis.3
Historiography proper started with the Second World War. Under the
impact of the war situation and in view of a growing awareness among so-
cial scientists of the differences between Nazism and other forms of fascism,
authors tended to interpret the former as a Germanism, that is, some particu-
larly German form of social disease. Studies focused, consequently, on the
historical roots of Nazism and analyzed them especially in terms of intel-
lectual history. The tendency of scholars in this field to stress logical se-
quences in historical developments may have contributed to the well-known
deterministic interpretation of German history. A. J. P. Taylor's Course of
German History4 is characteristic of this determinism, though Taylor did not
emphasize intellectual history. German responses after 1945 varied from the
apologetic tone of Gerhard Ritter to the searching analysis of Friedrich
Meinecke and the universal view of Ludwig Dehio.5
In the third period, starting with the cold war, the prevalent interpreta-
tion was that of totalitarianism. Nazism now appeared as but one form of a
more general disease of modern society similar to Communism. Socialist
hopes had yielded to deep pessimism in light of such staggering and embar-
rassing experiences as World War II, the rule of Stalinism in Russia and in
Eastern Europe, and the rise of mass society, automation, and managerial
bureaucracy in the West. Instead of the end of capitalism, the end of civiliza-
tion seemed to loom ahead. Characteristic is the change in the attitude of
Neumann who referred, in the early 1950's, to Sigmund Freud's idea that
"conflicts deepen with the process of civilization, for . . . the increasing tech-
nical progress which in itself ought to make possible a greater measure of
instinct gratification, fails to do so."6 What was true of former Marxists was

3 Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (2d ed.,
New York, I944).
4 A. J. P. Taylor, The Course of German History (London, 1945; 2d ed., New York, 1962).
6 Gerhard Ritter, Europa und die deutsche Frage (Munich, 1948), Das deutsche Problem:
Grundfragen detitschen Staatslebens gestern und heute (new rev. ed., Munich, I962); Friedri
Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe (Wiesbaden, I946), tr. as The German Catastrophe (Bos-
ton, I963); Ludwig Dehio, Gleichgewicht und Hegemonie (Krefeld, I948), tr. as The Precari-
ous Balance (New York, I965).
6 Franz L. Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State (Glencoe, Ill., I957),
273.

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
406 Wolfgang Sauer
no less true of conservatives. To write
chim Friedrich, and Jacob L. Talmon,7 t
a kind of suicide of civilization, a dia
turned against itself. Their studies stres
lithic structure of totalitarian regime
relationships between ideology and terror
It should be noted, however, that this
sis among interpretations and not with
by another. Actually, the theories of f
ism coexisted to a degree from the outse
tion that has emerged since the war def
of classical tyranny. Held mainly by Bri
thesis advanced by Friedrich and othe
entirely new phenomenon, unpreced
stresses, instead, historical continuity. I
of Dehio who interpreted Nazism as t
pean struggles for hegemony. The case o
argued by Alan Bullock in his biograp
been held both by Hugh Trevor-Rope
ler's court to the late Roman monarchy,
that Hitler was but a traditional stat
been rejected, interestingly enough, a
for example, has maintained that a cont
to modern Communist totalitarianism
These historicist interpretations in ter
despotism have so far been what mig
they should be noted the more carefu
has generally begun to lose ground since
anti-Stalinist and coexistence policies, th
nese Communism, and a growing awa
society might eventually produce mass p
-all these developments militated aga
totalitarianism theory. In addition, sc

7 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarian

J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalita
Mass., 1956); Jacob L. Talmon, The Origins of
SThe shifts in emphasis can clearly be obser
Whiteside, "Nature and Origins of National Socia
9 Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (
Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (London, I947);
World War (London, 196I).
10 Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New
Haven, Conn., I957).

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism 407

trate the mountains of documentary material and had gained a closer view
of the historical realities of the Third Reich. These realities proved to be
quite different from the monolithic image of totalitarianism. If we compare,
for example, the view of Nazi rule as it emerges from Friedrich's studies to
that which appears in Robert Koehl's article on "Feudal Aspects of National
Socialism,"'1 we might wonder whether the two authors are talking about
the same subject.
An unfortunate effect of using the totalitarianism approach is the emer-
gence of a striking imbalance in covering the field of Nazi history. While
we have an abundance of studies on the Nazi terror system, on military and
war history, and on the history of the resistance, we know little or nothing
about the problems of Nazi domestic politics and social history after i934.
The feuds within and between the bureaucracy and the party, the organiza-
tion and social composition of the party and most of its affiliated organiza-
tions, the Nazi economic policy, particularly the Four-Year Plan, the effects
of this policy and of the war on German society, and the attitude of various
social groups, particularly of the workers, toward the Nazi government are
subjects of major importance that are neglected to a surprising degree by
studies of Nazism.'2 Even in the case of Nazi ideology, we know more about
its roots and about its propaganda system'3 than about its structure and its
functional role in the social system.

Such evidence seems clearly to suggest that a revision of the existing con-
ceptual framework is needed. To be sure, the totalitarianism theory cannot
be dismissed entirely. Modern dictatorships have undoubtedly developed
new characteristics, and totalitarianism is certainly one of them. It is, how-
ever, hardly as important as the totalitarianism theory has maintained. The
theory of Germanism has been abandoned already as a possible alternative;
William Shirer's attempt to revive it was a popular rather than a schclarly
success.'4 The question as to why Nazism rose just in Germany certainly re-
mains, but scholars seem generally to agree that the understanding of the
11 Robert Koehl, "Feudal Aspects of National Socialism," American Political Science Re-
view, LIV (Dec. I960), 92I-33.
12 For some recent studies indicating a change, see note I9, below. One of the negle
topics is the story of rescuers of Jews. Research in this field has recently been organized by
Rabbi Harold M. Schulweis in the Institute for the Righteous Acts, Oakland, California. For
an earlier attempt, see Kurt R. Grossmann, Die unbesungenen Helden: Menschen in Deutschlands
dunkelsten Tagen (Berlin, 1957).
13 The most recent contributions are Zbynek A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (Oxford, Eng.,
I964), and Ernest K. Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, 1925-1945 (East
Lansing, Mich., I965). Hajo Holborn, "Origins and Political Character of Nazi Ideology,"
Political Science Quarterly, LXXIX (Dec. I964), 542-54, gives valuable suggestions for a
comprehensive analysis. Specifically, the press is treated by Oron J. Hale, The Captive Press in
the Third Reich (Princeton, N. J., 1964).
14 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, I960).

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 408 Wolfgang Sauer

problem needs a wider horizon than

Recent writings even show a tende
the Nazi atrocities in a broader wa
three of the most passionate debates
Arendt's comment on Adolph Eich
Pope Pius XII, and over Taylor's ne
regarding the origins of the Second
from these debates mainly by the st
Hilberg's The Destruction of the
Bockenforde's critical article on G
even earlier with similar problems
historiographical problem that deserv
Taylor's thesis is professedly an att
cal opinion, which he believes will
War I. But the idea of revision arose
than from a consideration of what f
sults are not, however, ioo convincin
to be, therefore, but an attempt to
mon, if not unprecedented, in histor
a phenomenon that leaves him no wa
position. There is literally no voice w
matter, and it is probably not acci
situation most strongly.'7 Does not s
damental lack of understanding? A
write history? The term "underst
meaning; we can reject and still "
and psychological, capacities reach
dreamed of by Wilhelm Dilthey. We
if we face the facts directly, all expla
Thus, the attempt to write the hist
with an apparently unsolvable dilem
torical understanding and historic
Nazism. One of the merits of the tot
of this condition; from this point of
as a scholarly formulation of our lack
15 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem
I963); Rolf Hochhuth, Der Stellvertreter
I964); Taylor, Origins of the Second World War.
16 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago, 1961); Ernst-Wolfgang
Bockenf6rde, "Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahre I933," Hochland, LIII (No. 3, I96I),
2I5-39.

17 For a historiographical analysis of Taylor's work, see Ed

and History," Review of Politics, XXVI (Oct. I964), 531-46.

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism 409

Is there a better way to conceal our weakness? Among the established

concepts one remains: fascism. To be sure, the theory of fascism has also
suffered severely from both the politics of and the historical studies on Na-
zism. This concerned, however, the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of fas-
cism, and it may be worthwhile to ask if this interpretation is the only possi-
ble one. Attempts have indeed been made recently to repair the damaged
tool for use. Some outstanding examples are Seymour Lipset's Political Man,
which contains a comprehensive study of fascism on the basis of election
analyses; Iring Fetscher's article on Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus, in
which the author explicitly aims at a refutation of the Marxist concept of
fascism; Eugen Weber's works on the Action Franfaise and the European
Right; and Ernst Nolte's volume Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche of
which an English translation has meanwhile appeared. Mention must
also be made in this context of Arthur Schweitzer's Big Business in the
Third Reich in which the author attempts, unsuccessfully, I believe, to fuse
elements of Max Weber's and Marxist theories.'8 These works constitute, as a
whole and despite differences in approach and position, the first serious at-
tempt to develop a workable, non-Marxist concept of fascism. Their results
are less conclusive regarding the relationship between fascism and totali-
tarianism; this issue needs further clarification. A shift in emphasis toward
an interpretation in terms of fascism is, nevertheless, unmistakable. In this
context it is notable that works like William S. Allen's study of Nazi rule in
a northern German town, Schweitzer's study, and Alan S. Milward's bril-
liant book on The German Economy at War"9 show a disposition of his-
torians to turn to the neglected topics of Nazi history. In the case of
Schweitzer the turn is obviously related to the fascism approach; his book
continues the earlier analysis of Neumann. Allen and Milward, by contrast,
seem to have chosen their subjects. without major theoretical considera-
tions.20 But whatever the reasons for this turn, the tendency expressed in all
of these works seems to be the most characteristic development in recent
studies of Nazism.

18 Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York, I960), Chap. v; Iring Fetscher, "Faschis-
mus und Nationalsozialismus: Zur Kritik des sowietmarxistischen Faschismusbegriffs," Politische
Vierteliahrsschrift, III (Mar. I962), 42-63; Eugen Weber, Action Franfaise (Stanford, Calif.,
I962); The European Right: A Historical Profile, ed. Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Berkeley,
Calif., 1964); Eugen Weber, Varieties of Fascism (Princeton, N. J., I964); Ernst Nolte, Dce
Faschismus in seiner Epoche (Munich, I963), tr. as Three Faces of Fascism (New York, I966);
Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, Ind., 1964).
19 William S. Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town,
1930-1935 (Chicago, I965); Alan S. Milward, The German Economy at War (London, I965).
Since the completion of this article in May I966, further studies have been published confirming
this trend and covering many of the hitherto neglected subjects.
20 Allen tends, in fact, to use the totalitarianism concept, but his results disprove largely
his thesis that Nazi rule led to an "atomization" of society. (See, e.g., Allen, Nazi Seizure of
Power, 278.)

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 410 Wolfgang Sauer

Leaving aside the mainly empirical

may ask what image of fascism emer
naturally difficult in view of the diffe
there are two closely related points o
that fascism is not, as the Marxist inte
tion by monopoly capitalists: it is a
aim of its own, indicating a major crisi
Whether or not this crisis is temporary
now established beyond doubt that th
urban, were at least one of the major
ments.
There are also many divergences and discrepancies, however. Some con-
fusion exists regarding the distinction between fascist movements and
fascist regimes. Fetscher's analysis shows that fascist movements can ally, in
view of their basic opportunism, with a wide variety of other groups;
Schweitzer has exemplified this in the case of Nazism.2' Consequently, there
may be a marked difference between the original, relatively homogeneous
fascist movements prior to the seizure of power and what emerges as fascist
regimes after that event. This leads to the equally important problem of the
relationships between fascist movements and their allies. For example, Lip-
set's interesting definition of fascism as the extremism of the liberal Center,
in contrast to Right-wing extremism and Left-wing extremism (Commu-
nism), does not sufficiently explain why fascist regimes were frequently
built on alliances with conservatives while alliances with Communists never
materialized. Which social groups, then, were likely to become allies of
fascist movements, and what functional role did these alliances play in the
structure of the individual fascist regimes?
Other questions concern the social composition and the revolutionary
aims of the movements. On the first question, most authors limit their analy-
sis to the lower middle class and the problems of its definition. This is, in-
deed, an important issue since the concept of the lower middle class still
needs clarification, both in itself and in relation to the varieties of fascist
supporters. Historical evidence shows that support of fascism may not be
confined to the classical elements of the lower middle class (Mittelstand-
peasants, artisans, small businessmen, and so forth), but may extend to a
wide variety of groups in the large field between the workers on the one
hand and big business, the aristocracy, and the top levels of bureaucracy on

21 Schweitzer, Big Business, distinguishes two periods in the Nazi rule: "partial Fascism"
with alliances between fascism and other groups until 1936 and "full Fascism" after this date.
The thesis is basically correct (see page 4I9, below), though Schweitzer is too rigid on several
points. (Cf. Carl Landauer's criticism, journal of Economic History, XXV [i965], 293-95.)

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism 4II
the other. This evidence agrees, interesti
statement that it was among the workers
strata of the civil servants that the Jews
persecution in Germany.22
Important as such an analysis is, howeve
lects the military element as a major social c
The military is apparently still not a categor
authors quoted, only Fetscher recognizes i
even be said that a distinct interest group
mixture by what might be called the milit
First World War and the postwar struggle
into either the civilian society or the armed
they were a sizable minority. Having bec
years and more of struggles, they sought
mother army and to reform it according to
with society was, hence, not mainly econo
was not absent. The main conflict was that b
In a time when the League of Nations app
weariness and the rising pacifism of the m
fought, not only for their own survival, but
general.
The desperadoes were, thus, natural partici
but they did not merge entirely in the move
the social differentiation was reflected in
differentiations between the party and th
(SA), respectively. This indicates that the
emerged in varied form within the fascist m
of principles in the relationship between
ciety was a conflict of preferences in the
middle-class groups and the military desp
tools. The lower-middle-class members rega
a weapon to force their way into governm
hoped that the lower-middle-class member
without which they could not expect to rule.
After the seizure of power the smolderi
movements had to be resolved if the fascist
the conflict was terminated by Hitler wh
R6hm "revolt" which was, as I should like

22 Das Dritte Reich und die Juden, ed. Leon Poliakov

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 4I2 Wolfgang Sauer

Mau and others, predominantly a m

To be sure, the SA contained in its
middle-class Nazi supporters, but Er
tive in the leadership of the SA, Chie
after he assumed office in 1931.24 Ro
of the military desperadoes, and he d
have received some lower-middle-class
appear, consequently, as an embryon
ler's alliance with big business and
was aimed as much against the Nazi
would invariably have led to a conf
lower-middle-class forces. They were
party won against Rohm, but lost a
Himmler and Hjalmar Schacht). Hit
conflict within the movement from
Volksgemeinschaft, and rearmament
cupations both for all types of busi
added that basically the same situat
somewhat different, and, above all, le
Mussolini's imperialist adventure in
lent to Hitler's crushing of the Rohm
The control fascist regimes achiev
ments creates doubts concerning th
movements. There is virtual agreem
ments contained, contrary to the Mar
tial. This seems to conflict, however
movements. Rudolf Heberle's well-k
peasants, recently republished in its
vealed this point, and Lipset has no
sults. A look at the fascist regimes in

23 Hermann Mau, "Die 'zweite Revolution

Zeitgeschichte, I (Apr. 1953), i2i. Cf. my a
Dietrich Bracher et al., Die nationalsozialistisc
totalit/ren Herrschaftssystems in Deutschlan
article, I have tried to supplement the politic
dimension.
24 Cf. Bracher et al., Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung, 882-83.
25 See Gaetano Salvemini, Under the Axe of Fascism (New York, I936), 39I. Salvemini's
suggestion of a comparison between Mussolini's Abyssinian war and Hitler's Rohm purge has
so far not been taken up by historians.
26 Rudolf Heberle, Landbevolkerung und Nationalsozialismus: Eine soziologische Unter-
suchung der politischen Willensbildung in Schleswig-Holstein 1918 bis 1932 (Stuttgart, 1963),
tr. as From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany
(Baton Rouge, La., I945).

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism 4I3
whatever the revolutionary potential of t
results were meager.
How can this problem be resolved? May an answer be found by setting
fascism in a wider historical framework? This is the way Nolte approaches
his subject, but his answer is suggestive rather than conclusive. He advances
the thesis that fascism was a revolt against the universal process of seculariza-
tion, democratization, and international integration in the modern era.
When this process reached its critical stage in the period of the two world
wars, those elements in the culture that were doomed to perish revolted, ac-
cording to Nolte, with increasing radicalism and decreasing rationality, or,
in national terms, from the French Action Franfaise through Italian Fas-
cism to German National Socialism. On the last, most radical stage, fascism
turned, Nolte argues, into a resistance against what he calls the "transcen-
dence." He does not succeed, however, in clarifying this point sufficiently.
Nolte's thesis is not new in terms of facts. Its originality lies in assigning
a metaphysical dimension to the fascist revolt and definitely attaching this
revolt to a historical period. Fascism, Nolte suggests, is dead. This is, on the
one hand, a more optimistic variation of the totalitarianism analysis; on the
other hand, he tries to ascribe a historical meaning to fascism, which would
provide a starting point for historical understanding. Much of this remains
abstract and vague, however-mere Ideengeschichte. If the modernization
process was universal, was fascist revolt also universal? If so, why does
Nolte deal only with France, Italy, and Germany? If not, why did the fascist
revolt occur only in these (and some other) countries? And what was the
cause for differentiation? Why was this revolt most radical in Germany? Or,
to put the question in a sociological rather than a national form, which social
groups provided the mass basis of fascism, and why were just these groups
antimodernist in their orientation? Why did the antimodernist fascist re-
volt frequently foster industrialization? And, finally, what exactly does
'<transcendence" mean, and by which concrete means did the fascist re-
sistance against it manifest itself ?
Nolte's neglect of these questions can be attributed primarily to his
method, which he calls "phenomenological" and which he conceives as an
attempt to return to G. W. F. Hegel's integration of philosophy and his-
tory.27 This attempt is, however, problematical. Hegel's striking success in
synthesizing philosophy and history depended on his dialectical "logic";
Nolte's method is not dialectical. Nor does Nolte develop an alternative. He
has not succeeded, therefore, in invalidating Leopold von Ranke's argu-
ment against Hegel that philosophy in itself does not produce a method for
27 Nolte, Der Faschismus, 5i6-I7.

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
414 Wolfgang Sauer

the analysis and organization of emp

deed, not sufficient for Nolte; his phe
scrutiny, to be essentially Dilthey's
mented by some fragmentary social
satisfy immediate needs.
To be sure, Nolte makes this meth
mainly to an interpretation of the
Maurras, Mussolini, Hitler-and he a
with regard to psychological and id
approach is too narrow, however, to
is true of the fascist leaders is not nec
lowers. Their attitudes and motivati
analysis that includes economic fac
such a suggestion with as much cont
concept of industrialization.28 What do
dence" mean, however, if not that eco
societies a significance that transcends
this is true, how can we expect to gain
cieties without taking these factors
seems to conflict heavily with his conc
This must raise some doubts about th
as an antimodernist revolt. Indeed, he
through his biographical analyses, bu
ras's ideas. Nolte's decision, not too pla
tion Franfaise to a prominent positio
cism, has, actually, methodological rat
Franfaise is important to Nolte bec
intellectual bridge between the coun
thereby establishing a unified conce
apparently suggestive as an analytica
ter on the Action Franfaise is, thus
introduction.
The conclusion that Nolte arrived
irregular way does not necessarily imp
ply, however, that he has not prove
tion are actually different social pheno
tion of a part of what has been define
had its own independent anteceden
Jahn and the anti-Semites of the i8
28 Ibid., 54I.

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism 4I5
many).29 To be sure, counterrevolution showed a combination of revolu-
tionary and reactionary elements similar to fascism, but it was a revolution
from above while fascism is a revolution from below. The discussion of
Maurras by Nolte explains, therefore, the possibility of the fascist-conserva-
tive alliance, but it does not explain fascism. Nor does Nolte provide a satis-
fying answer to the question of the origins of fascism, especially in the
German case. Nolte's chapters on pre-i9I4 Germany and Austria are in fact
among the weakest in his book, though this is owing partly to Nolte's gen-
eral weakness in historical knowledge.
These criticisms do not, however, detract from the value of the book,
which is a major step forward in the study of fascism. If verified, Nolte's hy-
pothesis can offer, for example, an explanation for the fascist tendencies in
the military; its metaphysical implications might, in addition, open a way
to understand certain aspects in the relationship between the churches and
fascism. Nolte might indeed have achieved his aim of developing a compre-
hensive theory of fascism had it not been for his mistaken conception of the
relationship of philosophy and history and his refusal to consider the socio-
economic aspects of the problem.

The task is, then, to provide the non-Marxist theory of fascism with a
socioeconomic dimension; more precisely, the task is to bring the earlier at-
tempts of this kind up to date. Some contributors to the discussion in the
I930's have already laid important foundations for a socioeconomic theory of
fascism.30 We have only to adjust these foundations to today's advanced stage
of practical experience, historical research, and theoretical thought. With re-
gard to theory the most important recent contribution probably comes
from economic historians who have worked out, on the basis of the experi-
ences of both the Great Depression and the underdeveloped countries, a non-
Marxist concept of economic development that is highly suggestive to the
analysis of fascism.
The attempt to use this concept for the interpretation of fascism poses, of

29 The German anti-Semitic movement around I900 has attracted, understandably enough,
much attention in recent years. It is important to note, however, that it was only a part of a
broader trend that extended to France (the Dreyfus affair, Edouard Drumont) and Austria
(Karl Lueger and the Christian-Social party). As a whole, it has not yet been sufficiently in-
vestigated; Nolte (Der Faschismus) and Weber (Action Francaise) focus on France while
Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (New York,
I964), disregards France.
30 Harold D. Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitlerism," Political Quarterly (No. 4, I933),
373-84; David J. Saposs, "The Role of the Middle Class in Social Development: Fascism,
Populism, Communism, Socialism," in Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley Clair Mitchell,
Presented to Him by His Former Students on the Occasion of His 6oth Birthday (New York,
I935); Talcott Parsons, "Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Movement," (1941), re-
printed in Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, Ill., I954).

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 4I6 Wolfgang Sauer
course, certain problems. The Marxist trap
minor difficulty. Apart from the fact tha
conditions in social developments has m
miliar to social scientists, it must also b
using, here, an economic theory for a hist
one. In addition, the "theory of economic
strictly an economic theory. It is rather a
of industrialization on the basis of a socioe
already implies that the relationship betw
reversible one. In applying this theory t
merely shift the perspective without ab
A more important problem arises beca
eral conflicting formulations of that th
focus on continental European condition
sis of fascism. This reduces the number of
Alexander Gerschenkron and W. W. Ros
these two theories with regard to the so
find that they are complementary. Gersch
wardness" provides a model of historical d
"stage" theory, and the latter offers a mo
by Gerschenkron.
The critical problem is the developmen
riod of the industrialization process. Ger
wardness cannot be directly extended to
conditions, while Rostow's definition as
is still unsatisfactory.32 Rostow hits, cer
dustry, if it exceeds a certain limit of gro
He is also aware that private mass consu
sponse. Rostow's idea, however, that soc
tion have a choice between high mass c
expansion (or, between private mass cons
the state), does not entirely agree with the
tainly an element of choice in the situation

31 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardn

Mass., I962), CSp. 1-51, 353-64; W. W. Rostow, Th
Eng., I959); The Economics of Take-oil into Sust
the review by Henry Rosovsky, "The Take-off
Economic History, XXV (I965), 271-75.
32 Rosovsky, "The Take-off," 274-75, proposes to replace the concept of "stage" by that of
the "long swing." This might, however, deprive the concept of growth of its meaning and
would necessitate, therefore, a decision on whether the idea of growth should be abandoned
altogether or whether the idea of swing must be adjusted to that of growth. In the latter
case, the concept of stage might prove indispensable as a complement.

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism 417

also constraints working against a choi

quences of relative backwardness, or to differential national developments
and resulting international tensions and crises such as war. Rostow neglects
the impact of national economic growth on international relations and vice
versa; this seems to be, in fact, the major weakness of his theory. If we ana-
lyze twentieth-century history from this point of view, we do indeed find a
period of world crises (World War I, the Great Depression, World War
II) spreading between Rostow's stages of industrial maturity and high mass
consumption.
In terms of a theory of economic growth revised in this way, fascism can
be defined as a revolt of those who lost-directly or indirectly, temporarily or
permanently-by industrialization. Fascism is a revolt of the declasses. The
workers and industrialists do not fall under this definition; it applies mainly
to most of the lower middle class as defined above. They indeed suffered, or
feared they would suffer, from industrialization-peasants who opposed the
urbanizing aspects of industrialism; small businessmen and those engaged
in the traditional crafts and trades that opposed mechanization or concentra-
tion; white-collar workers (at least as long as they felt the loss of economic
independence); lower levels of the professions, especially the teaching pro-
fession, which opposed changing social values; and so forth. Also the mili-
tary joins here, with opposition against the industrialization of war, which
tended to destroy traditional modes of warfare and which by its increasing
destructiveness intensified pacifism and antimilitarism. On the other hand,
groups like the aristocracy, the large landlords, the higher bureaucrats, and so
on, who lost also by industrialization, generally did not turn to fascism. In
continuing the counterrevolutionary position, they defended hierarchical so-
ciety and abhorred, therefore, the egalitarian elements in fascism. In exact
distinction, then, fascist movements represented the reaction of the lower-
class losers, while the upper-class losers tended to react in a nonfascist way,
but were potential allies of fascist regimes.
Such an analysis seems to be a way of explaining the intriguing paradox
of a revolutionary mass movement whose goals were antirevolutionary in
the classical sense. As a movement of losers, it turned against technological
progress and economic growth; it tried to stop or even to reverse the trend
toward industrialization and to return to the earlier, "natural" ways of life.
In this respect the movement was reactionary, but, as a movement of the
lower classes, its means were necessarily revolutionary. In defining fascism as
a revolt of losers, we can also understand better both fascist atavism and
fascist opportunism. Since the process of industrialization as a whole is irre-
sistible, the existence of civilization is inextricably bound to it. Fascist revolt

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
4I8 Wolfgang Sauer

against industrialization must, ther

too. This was most evident in Ger
fledged neobarbarism, but it is al
though for various reasons neobar
derdeveloped. Such a definition of
civilization seems to describe in mor
sistance against the "transcendence."
The same condition led to fascis
losers, essentially from a position o
of their tendency toward violence,
even with their industrial enemy. T
fascist regimes often fostered indus
upon setting the clock back. The d
led eventually to a point at which
tions. Industrialization was sought in
since there was no alternative to ind
eventually destroy itself. This wa
an industrial machinery to murder
chine would have had to continue an
first the remnants of civilized socie
ization of mass murder was, thus, t
problems of industrial society.
The analysis of fascism in terms o
define more precisely the fallacy in
The fallacy lies in that Marxism b
mercial and late industrial capital
capitalism, between traditional fo
form of industrialism. The fact th
tieth century only on the lower lev
social locus of fascism. It is true,
nature; it is not true that it was ind
often were manipulated in varyin
dustrialists in manipulation was ra
that the share was indeed larger in
was in industrially advanced German
On the other hand, the differen
pears, in light of this analysis, m
analysis would admit. Neither V. I
the clock back; they not merely w
jump ahead. The Bolshevik revolut

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism 4I9
revolution not unlike those now under way
One of the striking differences between th
of the leaders. The social and political ord
dependent from the leadership; it is, so to
gimes, by contrast, are almost identical wit
has so far survived its leader. This is why
in terms of traditional tyranny has some b
would become evident, I believe, if schol
their interest in Hitler's secret utterances a
by also stressing his role as a public speaker
immediate, ecstatic communication betw
indeed, what might be called a momenta
utopia, at least so far as the "Nordic race" w
Finally, it is plain from an analysis in ter
degree of radicalization must somehow b
trialization. The more highly industrializ
reaction of the losers. Thus Germany stoo
and Spain and others were at the bottom. In
cient momentum to oust its allies. By the
Blomberg, Werner von Fritsch, and Kons
the Nazis assumed control over the econom
those exact three positions that their conser
had deemed it most important to maintain.8
was sustained between the movement and
relying on the monarchy and assisted by
ousted the Fascists. In Spain, a borderline
from the outset and never abandoned it.
with the many cases of pre-, proto-, and
Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.
The thesis of the parallel growth of ind
ization seems to conflict, however, with
dustrialized societies such as France and E

83This is one of the reasons why the lack of a colle

as technically possible, is one of the most serious o
Such a collection is indispensable not only for a bio
understand a man whose political career was built
speaker if we have no means to analyze him in this
the Nazi ideology. Only if we approach the Nazi id
we be able to solve the methodological dilemma of d
and with whether the Nazi ideology had substance o
effect we must follow the course of Hitler's thought
changes, and this can be done only by following him
34 The focus of present studies on the spectacular B
comprehensive character and the importance of the c

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 420 Wolfgang Sauer
never gained much momentum. The pro
a broader historical analysis involving th
tural traditions that industrialization en
is perhaps not accidental that the indus
smoothly in West European nations who
rise of modern civilization since the late M
contrast, was strongest in the Mediterra
where the premodern traditions of the
German and Turkish Empires persisted.
Protestantism and Catholicism may also
bers both Max Weber's thesis on the correl
ism and the recent controversy on the att
cism and Nazism. In other words, fascism
traditions were both strongest and most
where the rise of the latter caused a major
losses to the nonindustrial classes.
This definition is still incomplete, how
fascism emerged rather simultaneously thr
tries affected were on different levels of
question of the "epoch" of fascism, raise
general conditions of fascism as defined
Germany, for example, lower-middle-cla
tion had already emerged in the mid-ni
economic growth in varying degrees throu
turn into fascism prior to 19I4, though it
in Italy and Spain after the First World
of the military element for the analysis of
Only after total war had militarized Eu
large military interests were the condition
The First World War had tremendously

35Already Marx observed the antimodernist atti

partly misinterpreted it. The anti-Semitic movemen
of the growing radicalization of lower-middle-cla
Depression und Bismarckzeit [Berlin, I966]; for Fran
de la France de l'ouest sous la troisiame republique
I3I-32.)

36The Vaterlandspartei, organized in I9I7 by military and

Tirpitz; Wolfgang Kapp) in Germany to support imperialist wa
the first prefascist mass movement. The foundation of the N
pattern: Hitler acted originally as an agent of the Munich hea
addition, Anton Drexler, the founder of the first nucleus of
the Vaterlandspartei. Both the Reichswehr officers in Munich
what they felt was the major shortcoming of the Vaterland
workers. (Among recent accounts, see Guinther Franz-Willing
1962], 1.)

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism 421
technical terms, but it had diverted it fro
the war the victorious nations of the West
industrial society and to return to product
those industrially underdeveloped found it
same course. When they met with econom
whatever advance they had made toward
This breakdown occurred roughly alon
fined above. If we examine the geograph
in Europe between the two world wars,
in three areas: the Mediterranean coast; th
Southeastern Europe; and Germany. In
highly developed Mediterranean urban
reached back to antiquity faced destruction
as released or accelerated by World War
case of Italy or real as in the case of Spa
Anual in I92I, played an additional role.
civilization struggled with the problems
from Habsburg or tsarist dominations
both Western industrialism and Eastern Bo
dominantly Catholic. In the third area, a te
dustrial society clashed violently with th
remnants of preindustrial forms of socie
and economic crises. Catholicism played,
tory role. On the one hand, it seems to hav
such top Nazi leaders as Hitler, Himmle
origin, and the Vatican was quick to com
On the other hand, the vast majority of
tively immune to Nazi temptations. Signifi
split, though along somewhat different line
These differentiations suggest a divisio
the Mediterranean as the "original" one;
regimes in Central, Eastern, and Southe
full-fledged, variation; and German Nazi
The "epoch" of fascism starts, thus, with
War, but when does it end? Eugen Web
scholars who believe that there is no epoch
eral condition of modern society contin
racy.7 This is certainly indisputable as far
are concerned; it is quite another problem,
87 Weber, Varieties of Fascism, 3; Lipset, Political

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 422 Wolfgang Sauer

will emerge again. This emergence se

socioeconomic development in the hi
generally rules out the re-emergence
a disarrangement of society in wh
coincides with the rise of a sizable
no longer economic losers of indus
and Charles de Gaulle's victory ove
that military desperadoes alone will
rible experience of neobarbarism put
tation. If the success of fascism u
likely, there remain, theoretically,
breeding grounds of fascism. Yet i
industrialization will assume there
tries lack the specific traditions o
that conditioned the antimodernist r
ing against fascist regimes is, thus,
tral and South European conditions; i
dialectical movement of European

Some remarks on specific charact

gins may be added as a conclusion to
of the German case may be seen, in
was the only highly industrialized so
Some authors have tried to explain t
state played in German industrial
ingly shown that a relatively strong
istic of industrialization under con
must look, therefore, for other caus
in social rather than in political co
son with developments in France a
countries changed its social basis by
during the process of industrializat
social traditions proved so strong and
ence on, if not control over, the s
Rostow calls industrial maturity.39
sulted from this twisted process was

88 It would be different in case of large-sca

present social conditions.
89 I have tried to analyze this particular aspect in "Das Problem des deutschen National-
staates," rev. ed. in Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Cologne,
8I966), 407-36.

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 National Socialism 423
impact of the series of severe crises from Wo
sion.
One of the conditions that complicated Ge
seen in the fact that Wilhelm von Humbold
cational system favored, at the very momen
dustrialize, an aesthetic-aristocratic idea of
tion compatible with industrialism. The
divergence are reflected in German nineteen
and its complex relationship to the intellect
and George L. Mosse, among others, have re
butions to this subject.40 Mosse has taken up t
ogy and has convincingly shown how deeply
society already prior to I9I4. In focusing o
Mosse has, however, by-passed what appears
to the rise of the Vl6kisch ideology, Germany
est intellectual flowerings in its history durin
century. In many cases it reached the level
i8oo, and it certainly surpassed it in breadth.4
this parallelism occurred and why the Valk
umphed. As far as intellectual history is con
gradual decline toward Nazism; there was a cle
Stern's study is less ambitious and more pene
some support to Nolte's thesis of metaphysical
especially because they draw attention to the c
academic establishment. This seems to corre
indicate a deep and violent resentment on th
party against the "educated" classes,42 and bot
some reasons for the triumph of the- Vl6ki
Synthesized in this way, the results of the th
to one of the unduly neglected class divisions

40 Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A S

Ideology (Berkeley, Calif., I96I); George L. Mosse, The
Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1964).
41It is indeed surprising to what extent a split in o
veloped. The general facts are known: in the sciences-
heim, Ernst Troeltsch, Friedrich Meinecke, Max Plan
literature-Thomas and Heinrich Mann, Bertold Brecht
and others, plus Austrians such as Franz Werfel, Robe
Franz Kafka; in the dramatic arts-Max Reimann, Leop
visual arts-the Bauhaus; music, films, and dance must
1920's and early 1930's, a major center of European in
ception of this period of German intellectual history th
but nationalists and racists in Germany. A well-balanc
Republic is, thus, still painfully needed for the study o
42 Allen, Nazi Seizure of Power, 279-80.

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
424 Wolfgang Sauer
cated and the uneducated. In the classical c
fessor held and still holds one of the top
division was highly important in itself. It
in a political sense, when the aristocracy
teenth century the bourgeois ideal of Bild
the rise of the idea of the army as a "sc
even the Prussian army felt advised after
education with the bourgeoisie.43 The ci
the educational ideal earlier; now, the m
followed in an attempt to maintain their
optation of "suitable" bourgeois elements.
In view of these facts, the hypothesis se
tween the educated and uneducated may
century into the true dividing line betwee
jects. If this is true, subjects seeking eman
either forming a subculture or resorting
tion of the socialist labor movement; th
and it was the true revolutionary way.
tige with the masses did not rest exclusive
successes; it also appears to have been su
ceeded again and again in defeating and
old oligarchy. Hilder's frequent invectiv
are usually explained as motivated mer
ments. The motive may well have been
considerations must lead to the perplex
movement did involve some elements of a
deed, of Germany's age-old unfinished
new perspectives on the resistance move
the intriguing fact that the Nazi regim
monarchy in I9I8 and to the Fascist reg
overthrown by a mass upheaval from w
swered here, but it is crucial. The answer
standing of the nature of Nazism in ter
also our interpretation of Nazism as an ele

48 Reinhard H6hn, Die Armee als Erziehungssch

Harzburg, I963). Another aspect of these attempt
berg, "Die Pseudo-Demokratisierung der Ritterg
Problematik der Demokratie: Festgabe /fir Hans Her
(Berlin, i958), 459-86, reprinted in Moderne deuts

This content downloaded from

27.131.213.129 on Sat, 04 Mar 2023 10:39:15 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms