A Troubling Trend

in Rate Design:
Proposed Rate Design Alternatives to
Harmful Fixed Charges
 AUTHORS
Southern Environmental Law Center
Caroline Golin, The Greenlink Group

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
SELC thanks the following individuals and organizations
for their contribution to this paper:

Jim Lazar, Senior Advisor, Regulatory Assistance Project

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy

Appalachian Voices

Energy Futures Group

For more information, contact:

Erin Malec
Director of Program Communications
Southern Environmental Law Center
[email protected]

December 2015
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many electric utilities have experienced reduced customer usage driven in part
by increased deployment of distributed energy resources (“DERs”). DERs include distributed genera-
tion, demand-response programs, and energy efficiency measures. They are frequently installed by
the customer at his or her own cost. The rise of DERs has prompted concern by some utilities that flat
or declining sales will generate insufficient revenue to cover the fixed costs of maintaining the grid.
In response, some utilities have proposed imposing higher fixed charges on their customers. Fixed
charges, also known as customer charges or access fees, are fees customers pay for electric service
that do not vary with usage. Because they are fixed, the charges cannot be avoided through mea-
sures such as energy efficiency or customer-sited renewable resources.
Utilities adopting higher fixed charges may view them as a quick fix—they provide short-term
revenue stability and are relatively simple to administer. The reality, though, is that high fixed charges
are bad for customers, and ultimately, the utility. High fixed charges harm many customers, especial-
ly those with lower incomes who live in smaller homes or apartments, and those with lower electric
demands. Further, high fixed charges fail to provide accurate price signals to customers, which are
essential for promoting customer investment in DERs and the system-wide benefits they can pro-
vide, such as reducing the need for new, high-cost centralized generation capacity. Lastly, high fixed
charges are frequently perceived by customers as an effort to punish them for buying less of the
utility’s product.
Fundamentally, high fixed charges reflect a failure by utilities to consider a range of smart rate de-
sign opportunities that better respond to the changing nature of the grid.
Electricity rate design refers to the pricing structure used by utilities to determine customer bills.
It is based on short and long-term utility costs that reflect past, and drive future investment choices.
Rate design determines the price signals consumers use to guide their consumption and investment
choices. Historically, for residential and small business customers, rates have generally been struc-
tured as volumetric energy rates—customers pay a single rate multiplied by the kilowatt-hours (“kWh”)
of energy used—with a modest monthly customer charge to cover billing and collection costs. For
higher-volume customers, such as large commercial or industrial customers, utilities have divided
rates into three parts: 1) a mandatory fee to cover billing and collection costs; 2) a volumetric per-kWh
energy price and 3) a demand charge, based on peak kilowatt (“kW”) demand. Under these rate-de-
sign structures, utilities’ ability to recover costs are directly tied to customer consumption, with fixed
charges only covering the costs that directly vary with each additional customer served.1
“Smart rate design” refers to an approach to rate design that more accurately aligns utility costs
with customer bills, and which better reflects the time- and location-specific costs of delivering elec-
tricity. Smart rate design allows utilities sufficient revenue without diluting the customer’s incentive to
deploy DERs.
Smart rate design options include time-of-use and other time-varying rates; well-designed min-
imum bills; and location-based and attribute pricing. Additionally, revenue decoupling—which sep-
arates utility revenue recovery from kWh sales—allows utilities to ensure revenue requirements,
independent of customer sales volume. Utilities utilizing smart meters will have greater opportunity to
adopt smart rate design.
As the electricity market continues to evolve as a result of DERs and smart-grid development,
utilities, particularly distribution utilities, are in a unique position to respond to the changing nature of
the grid with smart rate design mechanisms to ensure system cost recovery, serve customer interests,
and harness new technologies to decrease costs. However, utilities that choose not to utilize smart
rate design and instead implement high fixed charges create a barrier to these opportunities for them-
selves and for their customers.
 THE PROBLEM WITH HIGH FIXED CHARGES
Some utilities argue that because many of their electric services costs are fixed, customer fees
should also be fixed. They claim that recovering fixed infrastructure and operations costs through
volumetric pricing or per-kWh charges raises utility risk, which can in turn lead to increases in their
cost of capital, and ultimately, in the rates they charge customers. These utilities believe that fixed
charges are the best way to recover their costs and sustain their business model.
However, there are serious short- and long-term downsides to fixed charges. Fixed charges nega-
tively impact certain customer classes and income groups, discourage energy conservation, encour-
age unnecessary generation and distribution capacity investment, and discourage the development
of DERs. These impacts are discussed below.

High Fixed Charges Disproportionately Impact Low-use and Low-income Customers

When utilities impose high fixed charges, they increase the proportion of their revenue require-
ments recovered through such charges, and decrease the proportion recovered through a volumetric,
per-kWh energy rate. Thus, high fixed charges inherently penalize low-use customers, who are often
low-income customers, apartment residents, or small businesses, resulting in proportionally higher
electric bills for those customers. This is particularly harmful for low-income customers and those on
fixed incomes, such as the elderly, who are often already on tight budgets and for whom energy costs
consume a disproportionate share of household income.
Table 1 shows a comparison of the usage of low-income consumers to other consumers, for every
state.

Table 1
Average 2009 Household Electricity Usage by Status Above or Below 150% of Poverty
kWh Percentage Difference
between average
Household Income KWH low-income and
Energy Information Administration, Residential Energy Above 150% At or Below 150% non-low-income
Consumption Survey Reportable Domain Poverty Level Poverty Level All Households households
Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 7,468 4,709 6,961 -37.0%
Massachusetts 6,056 4,222 5,686 -30.3%
New York 5,969 4,544 5,355 -23.9%
New Jersey 7,497 4,969 7,231 -33.7%
Pennsylvania 9,690 8,402 9,306 -13.3%
Illinois 9,116 7,350 8,432 -19.7%
Indiana, Ohio 9,999 7,831 9,365 -21.7%
Michigan 8,190 7,073 7,764 -13.6%
Wisconsin 7,889 7,449 7,727 -5.6%
Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota 9,285 6,241 8,940 -32.8%
Kansas, Nebraska 9,402 8,808 9,302 -6.3%
Missouri 12,232 11,705 11,991 -4.3%
Virginia 13,859 10,997 13,231 -20.7%
Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, West Virginia 13,063 10,381 12,848 -20.5%
Georgia 13,816 12,727 13,499 -7.9%
North Carolina, South Carolina 14,343 12,105 13,651 -15.6%
Florida 13,760 11,905 13,212 -13.5%
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi 15,847 11,802 14,656 -25.5%
Tennessee 14,480 12,537 13,782 -13.4%
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma 13,646 12,628 13,421 -7.5%
Texas 13,799 10,602 12,878 -23.2%
Colorado 6,516 5,216 6,231 -20.0%
Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming 9,588 10,665 9,804 11.2%
Arizona 13,056 10,088 12,105 -22.7%
Nevada, New Mexico 9,434 7,637 9,164 -19.0%
California 5,939 4,739 5,628 -20.2%
Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington 10,799 10,597 10,754 -1.9%
Total 10,072 8,432 9,687 -16.3%
Source: 2009 EIA Residential Energy Consumption Survey data by “Reportable Domain,” July 2015, Tabulated by National Consumer Law Center, July 2015, John Howat – [email protected].

2
 While the empirical research is currently divided on how low-income customers would respond to
specific smart rate designs, it is clear that limiting customers’ ability to reduce monthly bills—which is
what fixed charges do—would have negative impacts on these vulnerable populations.2 Additionally,
fixed charges negatively impact both urban and rural residents who use natural gas for space and wa-
ter heat. Such customers receive proportionately higher electric bills as a result of high fixed charges,
because heating costs are not reflected in their electric bill.3 In other words, high fixed charges result
in a greater percentage increase in electric bills for those that heat with non-electric fuels.
Higher fixed charges are inequitable for apartment-dwelling urban residents in particular, because
they are the lower-cost group of residential customers to serve, simply because the number of
customers per transformer and per mile of distribution circuit is higher than for suburban or rural
single-family dwellings. If distribution costs are recovered through high fixed charges, higher-cost sub-
urban and rural single-family customers with higher usage see reduced bills­­—an inequitable result.4

High Fixed Charges Undermine Investments in Energy Efficiency

Energy efficiency and conservation reduce customer bills, and they also reduce overall system
costs. By reducing peak demands on the utility, energy efficiency and conservation help avoid expen-
sive new capacity upgrades, and by displacing
fossil generation, these customer initiatives also
reduce carbon emissions. With higher fixed
charges, customers have less incentive to re-
duce their electricity consumption because they
are charged a high fixed rate regardless of their
energy usage. Often, utilities that implement
high fixed charges will simultaneously decrease
their per-kWh energy charges with the result
that customers’ increased usage may not lead
to a significant increase in their bill. This encour-
ages wasteful consumption and hinders invest-
ment in energy efficiency.
For example, the Regulatory Assistance Project (“RAP”) recently found that, compared to a flat
volumetric rate, a high fixed charge rate design advocated by utilities in Ohio, Wisconsin, and Illinois
could result in a 7% increase in residential consumer usage. In contrast, an inclining block residential
rate with a low customer charge can achieve an 8% reduction in residential consumer usage.5
A study by the Kansas Corporation Commission reached similar conclusions. Researchers found
that increased fixed charges in Kansas would increase electricity use by 1.1 – 6.8%, varying by utility
and season.6 To put this in perspective, the projected increase would be greater than all of the en-
ergy savings from all energy efficiency programs in the state. The Commission found that such a
change in rate structure and consumption would offset the financial benefits of decades of energy
efficiency efforts and penalize customers who have already successfully invested in energy effi-
ciency under previous rate structures. Weakening the incentive to invest in energy efficiency could
also have negative impacts for the local economy and the environment, as investments in energy
efficiency are frequently accompanied by local efficiency jobs and pollution reduction.7 Rate design
that results in increased consumption would also greatly compound the challenges that utilities face
in meeting the emission reductions required by the federal Clean Power Plan, which aims to reduce
carbon emissions from power plants.

High Fixed Charges Can Encourage Utilities to Overbuild New Capacity Even as Electricity
Demand Declines
High fixed charges, paired with per-kWh energy rates that do not account for the timing of use,
also discourage peak demand reduction because they fail to provide accurate price signals about
the times when electricity is most expensive to produce. High fixed charges signal to customers that
increasing peak energy use does not increase costs and capacity requirements for the utility, when
in fact the opposite is true. Without proper price signals for customers, consumption may increase in

3
all periods, including peak periods. High peak demand, in turn, encourages utilities to overbuild new
capacity.
Historically, utilities have built capacity and structured rates based on their ability to ensure peak
demand is always met, even during rare high-demand moments. This approach has consistently
resulted in utilities overbuilding capacity, and in particular, baseload capacity. For example, while the
North American Reliability Council (“NERC”) standard for reserve capacity is around 15%, the U.S.
Energy Information Administration’s (“EIA”) Summer 2014 energy forecast put unused generation
capacity for the Carolinas at 24%, 26% for Tennessee, 37% for Georgia and Alabama, and 29% for
Florida.8 The costs of such excess capacity are an extra burden on ratepayers.
In recent years, electricity demand has slowed, and average usage has decreased, while peak
usage has increased or remained the same.9 The Southeast is no exception. Where previous esti-
mates expected energy demand in the Southeast to grow by 3-4% per year, recent projections by EIA
now estimate 1-2% growth. The expansion of DERs is contributing to the slowing of electricity demand
growth in both residential and commercial buildings.10 In some areas of the Southeast, residential de-
mand for delivered electricity is expected to decline.11
This decreased consumption results in increased unused generation and grid infrastructure. As a
result, utilities throughout the country and in the Southeast are being pressed to re-examine capacity
needs and reforecast expected load growth. For example, TVA recently shifted its forecasted annual
load growth from 3 or 4 percent a year to under 1 percent a year. While TVA previously expected to
build an additional coal or natural gas unit every year, or a nuclear reactor every two or three years, it
is now planning to retire plants and reduce its capacity expansion.12 With a reduced need to invest in
new capacity, TVA has the ability to offer lower long-term rates for its customers.
However, if the distribution utilities that serve customers in TVA’s territory begin to implement high
fixed charges which result in increased consumption, this could signal to TVA the need to maintain
or build more capacity and increase rates over the long term. For these reasons, high fixed charges
have the potential to unfairly penalize all customers by depriving them of price signals that could pre-
vent expensive capital investments and higher customer bills.

High Fixed Charges Discourage Customer Investment in DERs and Prevent the Benefits that
Flow to the Grid from that Investment
DERs reduce energy consumption and produce substantial average monthly energy bill savings.
Often, utilities claim that because customers with DERs significantly reduce their kWh consump-
tion, they avoid paying their share of the fixed costs of the grid. These utilities argue that high fixed
charges for DER customers are justified to prevent an unfair cost shift to non-DER customers. Utilities
most frequently make this argument
in regard to solar net metering poli-
cies (“NEM”) which compensate cus-
tomers who send power back to the
grid at rates equal to retail rates.
However, contrary to some utility
claims, solar is projected to actually
decrease system costs for utilities.
A new study by Rocky Mountain
Institute (“RMI”) projects that DER
customers with solar and battery
storage provide value to the grid by
reducing peak demand, deferring or
avoiding system upgrades, relieving
congestion, and providing ancillary
services.13 In addition, other studies
by utility regulators have found the
value of distributed solar to exceed

4
retail rates. For example, Nevada regulators found that the value rooftop solar adds to the grid is
18.5 cents/kWh,14 Mississippi 17 cents/kWh,15 Maine 33.7 cents/kWh,16 Minnesota 14.5 cents/kWh,17
and Vermont 25.7 cents/kWh.18 Implementing fixed charges will only result in a missed opportunity for
utilities to align the interests of customers using DERs with those of the grid as a whole.
Moreover, data from the residential solar market in Colorado shows that the typical residential customer
who installs solar tends to have greater initial usage than an average customer, with an average monthly
pre-solar bill of $126 compared to the average residential bill of $77 per month. After adding solar, the
typical solar customer’s bill drops to $50 per month.19 In effect, adding solar changes a larger-than-aver-
age customer into a smaller-than-average one, but both are well within the range of sizes typical of the
residential class.
In 2014, the Utah Public Service Commission reached a similar conclusion in rejecting a proposal from
Rocky Mountain Power to impose a net metering facilities charge. In Utah, the typical residential custom-
er uses 500-600 kWh per month, with net metered customers falling at the low end of this range at 518
kWh per month. The Utah commission concluded that “[t]hese facts undermine PacifiCorp’s reasoning
that net metered customers shift distribution costs to other residential customers in a fashion that war-
rants distinct rate treatment.”20

SMART RATE ALTERNATIVE TO FIXED CHARGES

There are a variety of rate design structures that utilities can utilize to ensure fixed cost recovery
without causing the negative effects of fixed charges. For years, electric industry experts have recog-
nized the importance of smart rate design founded on mechanisms that send correct price signals to
customers. A brief canvas of the literature reveals the following consistent principles of smart rate
design.21 Based on these principles, customer rates should:
• Be economically efficient, based on total system long-run marginal (not embedded) costs;
• Allow for customers to connect to the grid for no more than the cost of connection;
• Be comprehensible to the customer;
• Assure grid reliability;
• Recover system costs in proportion to how much electricity consumers use, and when they use it;
• Provide customers with the correct price signals about usage and consumption patterns;
• Fairly compensate customers who supply power to the grid at the power’s full value;
• Allow for competition within the market for both generation and ancillary services;
• Assure recovery of utility’s prudently incurred costs;
• Maintain fairness to all customer classes and subclasses;
• Maximize the value of new technologies as they become available; and
• When possible, be temporally and geographically dynamic.
Pursuing smarter rate design can reduce overall system costs while still allowing utilities to receive
necessary revenue, create incentives for customers to implement solutions that serve utilities’ interests,
promote the integration of DERs, and ensure net benefits to the grid. Some of these rate design tech-
niques include: time-of-use (“TOU”) and other time-varying rates; well-designed minimum billing; and
revenue decoupling. Advanced metering infrastructure—including smart meters—also allow utilities to
implement even more granular rate designs, such as location-based rates and attribute pricing.

Time-of-Use Pricing
Instead of establishing higher fixed charges, utilities can expand offerings for time-varying rates,
such as TOU or dynamic pricing structures. TOU pricing charges customers higher or lower rates based
on the timing of energy use and the corresponding demand on the grid. TOU rates are usually set once
or twice a year. Dynamic pricing—or Real-Time Pricing (“RTP”)—is a more granular TOU rate that ac-
counts for the hourly change in the cost of generation and more accurately reflects the short-run mar-
ginal value of power. While TOU rates are set annually or semi-annually, dynamic pricing may change
each hour depending on the real-time cost of generation.22

5
 TOU pricing is preferable to high fixed charges and flat volumetric rates because it sends more
accurate price signals to customers that better reflect the costs to the utility to produce and deliver
electricity. While fixed charges fail to capture marginal costs that can vary substantially over time and
ignore changing electricity system conditions, TOU and RTP better account for the dynamic cost of
energy generation, distribution, and service.23 The structure of a TOU program can vary significantly,
from simple on-peak and off-peak pricing, to seasonal TOU rates, to hourly-based RTP. For example,
Nevada Energy’s Residential on-peak TOU rate can reach 50 cents/kWh,24 while Chattanooga EPB’s
residential, off-peak TOU rates are as low as 6.5 cents/kWh.25 The efficiency and effectiveness of
TOU pricing depend on its ability to reflect real-time changes in electricity conditions.26
At their simplest, TOU rates communicate to customers that the cost to produce and deliver elec-
tricity is much higher during peak hours than off-peak hours. For example, TOU customers receive the
correct signal that turning up an air conditioner on a hot summer afternoon increases the cost and the
need for new capacity over the long run.27 In their more complex forms, such as RTP rates, time-vary-
ing rates provide a full picture of the hourly cost to produce and deliver electricity and give greater
control to consumers to shift their behavior based on their needs and investment decisions.28
In a recent order, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities stated that TOU rates are an
essential component of grid modernization.29 Concerned that under the current basic service struc-
ture rates do not reflect the time-varying nature of electricity supply costs, the Department is requiring
the incorporation of TOU rates for all customers.30 The Department’s recent order will require electric
distribution companies to offer two basic service TOU options: 1) A default product with TOU pricing
that includes a critical peak pricing (“CPP”) component,31 and 2) a flat rate with a peak time rebate
(“PTR”) option. Under CPP, utilities designate a number of “critical peak” days each year during which
the price of electricity increases significantly. Utilities inform customers ahead of time when critical
peak days will occur to allow customers to reduce consumption during CPP periods. Under PTR,
utilities apply similar critical peak periods, but instead of charging customers higher rates during those
periods, customers who reduce consumption during those periods will receive a rebate for the value
of the energy they saved.32
The Department anticipates that the on-peak rate will be higher, and the off-peak rate lower than a
flat-rate design. Thus, customers who respond to price signals by reducing on-peak energy consump-
tion will pay less than they would under a flat rate. TOU pricing can also be a powerful incentive for
the smarter integration of DERs, such as solar PV, that tend to produce the most power during sum-

6
mer months and during peak load hours, thereby reducing peak loads and resulting in both customer
and utility savings.
A recent two-year pilot program conducted by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District revealed
that customers prefer TOU rates to traditional rate structures. The pilot program tested three TOU op-
tions.33 In one scenario the utility charged an on-peak rate from 4:00 to 7:00 p.m. on weekdays; in an-
other scenario it charged a critical peak rate from 4:00 to 7:00 p.m. on up to 12 days per summer; and
in the third scenario it charged both an on-peak rate and critical peak rate. The utility found significant
differences in the cost of producing and delivering electricity throughout the day, and also discovered
that customers with TOU rates were more satisfied than customers on standard flat rates because
customers felt that the TOU rates were fair, provided more opportunity to manage energy costs, and
were easier to understand than flat rates.34
In 2013, Duke Energy Progress expanded TOU pricing to residential customers as part of a pilot
program in its North Carolina service territory. This rate design includes a seasonal, on-peak demand
charge, as well as an on-peak and off-peak energy charge. Rates also include a customer charge and
rider charges.35
TOU pricing can also be used to fairly compensate customers who supply power to the grid. Util-
ities that make TOU pricing available to net metered solar customers can more accurately compen-
sate such customers for the value of the power they supply to the grid based on when they provide
it. TOU pricing can be a powerful incentive for the smarter integration of DERs, such as solar PV, to
reduce peak loads and to increase loads when there is surplus solar, resulting in both customer and
utility savings. The Hawaii PUC recently issued an Order requiring that the mid-day hours be designat-
ed as “off-peak” hours.36 And the California ISO has proposed TOU pricing that designates peak solar
production times as a low-cost period for customers.37 Under these approaches, the “solar credit” val-
ues are tied to on-peak and off-peak demand, and they reduce the potential for lost revenue impacts
on the utilities. This TOU approach is an effective alternative to high mandatory fees.38
Additionally, Duke Energy Progress is allowing its residential customers to couple its net metering
program with its time variant rate options. These options include net metering under “time-of-use,”
“time-of-use demand,” and “time-of-use all-energy” schedules.39 While each option is structured slight-
ly differently, all provide net metered customers with varying levels of compensation based on wheth-
er they produce power during peak hours when solar power is more valuable, or during
off-peak hours when the value of solar may decrease.40
Finally, TOU pricing provides a favorable alternative to demand charges for
residential and small commercial customers—charges based on a customer’s
highest usage every month. Demand charges are unable to account for the
diverse usage patterns of residential and small commercial customers, often
do not coincide with peak system demand, and can result in significant and
inequitable cost-shifting. TOU pricing is a better approach because it more
accurately reflects the time-based costs of customer usage and avoids the
problems created by such demand charges.

Advanced Metering Infrastructure

Time-of-use rates generally require advanced metering infrastructure
(“AMI”) like smart meters. Smart meters allow utilities to receive data, control
equipment, and communicate more effectively between the customer and the grid.
For example, in 2013, Chattanooga Electric Power Board (“EPB”), a municipal utility served
by TVA, completed the installation of smart meters in all homes and businesses in its 600 square mile
service area. The meters allow for one billion data points to be collected annually, providing automat-
ed meter reading and billing, outage and voltage anomaly detection, automated connect and discon-
nect and theft detection. Such data help support the use of expanded TOU pricing in EPB’s service
area. EPB offers commercial customers a seasonal TOU rate without the need for high fixed charges.41
Similarly, Memphis Light, Gas and Water (“MLGW”) has recently begun several projects related to
smart grid technologies, including the installation of electric, gas and water smart meters at approx-

7
imately 60,000 homes. MLGW also offers a seasonal TOU rate for residential customers with smart
meters.42
As the utility industry continues to evolve toward a smarter grid, smart meters will be an essential
component of that evolution. Utilities without AMI will likely be unable to keep up with the innovations
and opportunities that the changing grid creates. For example, locational marginal pricing (“LMP”)
allows utilities to reflect the value of providing service at different locations, accounting for the pat-
terns of load, generation, and the physical limits of the transmission system. There are multiple forms
of LMP, with a range of granularity in pricing methods. LMP requires extensive knowledge of the dis-
tribution system, customer demand profiles, and the monetization of different energy services in both
space and time. LMP is usually applied in wholesale markets, but recently LMP has been proposed
with respect to distribution values.43
In addition, attribute pricing allows utilities to individually account for valuable attributes that may
be delivered by customers implementing DERs, or by the utility, such as energy, capacity, reliability,
flexibility, resilience, ancillary services and other related value streams. Attribute pricing allows utilities
to more accurately compensate or charge customers for the specific value of these services, and it
is particularly useful when integrating customer-owned DERs. Attribute pricing is typically paired with
TOU pricing which improves its delivery, helping customers make better decisions and giving them
appropriate compensation for the services they provide.44
AMI allows utilities to collect valuable data and apply that information towards smarter rate design
that benefits the utility and its customers. However, even utilities without AMI can choose smarter
alternatives to high fixed charges, such as well-designed minimum bills.

Minimum Bills
An increasingly-popular alternative to fixed charges is the adoption of a minimum bill. A well-de-
signed minimum bill guarantees the utility a minimum annual revenue level from each customer, even
if their usage is zero, but does not significantly alter the volumetric, per-kWh rate.45 Unlike a fixed
charge, a minimum bill does not come into effect unless the customer uses less than a certain amount
of power each month, essentially ensuring utilities that even if no power is consumed, the connection
is paid for and that every customer contributes at least a minimum amount toward the maintenance of
the grid.
The structure of a minimum bill is crucial to its effectiveness, because a poorly-structured min-
imum bill can result in similar negative effects as a high fixed charge. The key to minimum bills is
to set the minimum at a level that ensures the utility a consistent level of appropriate revenue, while
not penalizing the vast majority of customers, or inhibiting efficiency. Minimum bills are determined
by calculating the marginal cost to deliver the average daily minimum metered charges per customer.
If structured correctly, a minimum bill preserves the incentive to conserve energy by not drastically
decreasing the per-kWh energy charge or by shifting the bulk of a bill to a fixed charge, while still
providing adequate revenue for the utility.46 RAP recommends that utilities base minimum bills on the
future, marginal cost to deliver energy to each customer, and charge minimum bills annually rather
than monthly.47
Many utilities throughout the country are exploring the use of minimum bills in lieu of fixed charges.
A study by the Texas Ratepayers’ Organization to Save Energy documented that the number of Texas
retail electricity providers assessing minimum usage fees grew from 36% to 81% between 2011 and
2013.48 Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric have estab-
lished residential minimum bill policies. In addition, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District and the
Texas Public Utility Commission allow minimum or low usage charges to be assessed on customers
with low consumption. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power imposes a zero fixed charge,
a three-block inclining rate design, and a $10 minimum bill.
A recent study on the impacts of minimum bills has shown that given a choice between a $20
fixed customer charge with a lower per-kWh rate, and a $20 minimum bill charge with a slightly higher
per-kWh rate, customers would consume 15 times as much additional energy under the former as un-

8
der the latter.49 Additionally, Greentech Media recently examined the impact of minimum bills on solar
customers in comparison to fixed charges and found that a minimum bill would be more economic for
solar customers than a fixed charge, assuming the minimum bill is set at the same level as the fixed
charge.50 Greentech Media’s study compared the monthly and annual bills of a solar customer with a
6.3 kW rooftop solar system who was charged a $10 monthly minimum bill versus a $10 monthly fixed
charge. Under the $10 monthly minimum bill, the solar customer paid less than the customer with the
$10 fixed charge.

Revenue Decoupling
One reason utilities are seeking higher mandatory fees is to stabilize their revenue in the face of
stagnant or declining sales levels. Another approach to revenue stabilization is known as revenue
regulation, or “decoupling.” Decoupling is an adjustable rate mechanism that breaks the link between
the amount of energy sold and the revenue collected by the utility.51 Under decoupling, a utility’s rates
are adjusted every month or every year to account for variations from the sales prediction made when
rates were set. If sales decline, rates increase to recover the utility’s required revenue. If sales in-
crease, rates decline.
Through decoupling, utilities can achieve revenue stability without changing the rate design in a
manner that increases costs to low-income consumers, renters, and other low-use customers. Rates
can retain the traditional per-kW recovery of system costs that allocates these costs in proportion to
system usage. Customers do not lose the incentive to invest in energy efficiency measures, and the
utility becomes indifferent to sales volumes. The utility can concentrate on controlling the cost of ser-
vice and providing excellent service to consumers.
Decoupling has been used in most U.S. states for electric, gas, and water utilities in one form or
another. The map below shows the states in which one or more utilities have implemented some form
of revenue regulation mechanism.

Decoupling is usually utilized by investor-owned utilities regulated by a state utilities commission.

However, distribution utilities that set their own rates, such as electric cooperatives and municipal
utilities, may also implement decoupling as part of their rate design. The Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power implemented a decoupling mechanism in 2013. They did so in order to retain a pro-

9
gressive rate design with a zero customer charge and an inclining block rate design, while protecting
the revenue stability that ensures the utility’s strong bond rating. Since then, decoupling adjustments
have been no more than 2% per year.52
Decoupling can take several different forms, but all of the methods have a few common elements:
• Initially rates are set in a traditional rate proceeding;
• Rates are adjusted periodically to produce the target revenue, taking into account any increase
or decrease in sales volumes compared with the level assumed in the rate proceeding;
• The mechanism is defined in advance as to whether it will cover only distribution costs, or all
costs; different methods are appropriate for each approach;
• Some annual cap on how much rates can rise is usually imposed; if sales deviations exceed
these thresholds, increases are spread across more than one year;
• A true-up mechanism ensures that the utility recovers the allowed revenue; no more and no
less.

CONCLUSION
The electric industry is changing in ways that empower customers but that also may threaten
utilities’ ability to earn required revenue. Utility customers increasingly have at their disposal a vari-
ety of means for reducing their dependence on the grid. As they do this, utilities may be tempted to
respond with regressive rate mechanisms, such as high fixed charges. But fixed charges, and other
departures from volumetric pricing, are not a good solution. These measures fail to provide a core
component of smart rate design, which is to provide accurate pricing signals to customers. Fixed
charges hurt low-income customers and encourage economically inefficient outcomes.
Instead of instituting unfair and short-sighted pricing mechanisms, utilities should instead pursue
more dynamic, reflective pricing strategies such as time-of-use pricing, well-structured minimum bills,
and locational and attribute pricing. Additionally, utilities should consider revenue decoupling to
further ensure that necessary revenues are recovered while not deterring efficiency. These pricing
strategies respect the customer’s right to deploy DERs, while more accurately capturing the benefits
and costs to the grid of all resources. This is a better pathway for ensuring utility cost recovery as the
grid continues to evolve to meet customer needs and preferences.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Each utility and each state is different. In the Southeast,
markets are predominantly served by large, vertically integrated utilities. The Southeast also lacks
a single regional transmission organization (“RTO”) or independent system operator (“ISO”) that, in
other areas of the country, establishes the methods and economics of real-time transmission costs
and contracts for ancillary services. Thus the responsibility falls to the IOUs, electric cooperatives and
municipal utilities, and to regulators to create the framework for smarter rate design, to make eco-
nomically efficient decisions based on the cost of service, and to pursue the innovation necessary to
adapt to the changing electricity sector landscape. The pathway may look different in each state, but
the goal should be the same: smarter economics and stronger policy that treats customer choice as
a resource for the benefit of all ratepayers.

10
ENDNOTES
1
Revenue requirements refer to the annual revenues required by the utility to cover both its expenses and have the opportunity to earn a fair
rate of return. They also refer to the annual costs to provide safe and reliable service to the company’s customers that the company is allowed
to recover through rates.
2
Faruqui, A., Sergici, S, and Palmer, J., The Impact of Dynamic Pricing on Low Income Customers, Edison Institute, (2010), http://www.edison-
foundation.net/IEE/Documents/IEE_LowIncomeDynamicPricing_0910.pdf; Nancy Brockway, Rick Hornby, The Impact of Dynamic Pricing on
Low-Income Customers: An Analysis of the IEE Whitepaper, Synapse Energy, (2010), http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Syn-
apseReport.2010-11.MD-OPC.IEE-Low-Income-Customer-Report.10-042.pdf; Trevor R. Roycroft, Impact of Dynamic Pricing on Low Income Con-
sumers: Evaluation of the IEE Low Income Whitepaper (2010), available at http://www.roycroftconsulting.org/Roycroft_Dynamic_Pricing_Low_In-
come_11-29-10.pdf.
3
Jim Lazar, Electric Utility Residential Customer Charges and Minimum Bills: Alternative Approaches for Recovering Basic Distribution Costs,
Regulatory Assistance Project (2013)(hereinafter “Lazar, Minimum Bills”), http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/7361.
4
Id.
5
For the elasticity calculation showing the difference between rate designs, see Jim Lazar, Regulatory Assistance Project, Rate Design Where
Advanced Metering Infrastructure Has Not Been Fully Deployed Appendix A, Regulatory Assistance Project (2013), http://www.raponline.org/
document/download/id/6516.
6
Hansen, Daniel G. and Michael T. O’Sheasy, Residential Rate Study for the Kansas Corporation Commission Final Report (April 11, 2012), http://
www.kcc.state.ks.us/electric/residential_rate_study_final_20120411.pdf/AcroJS_DesignerJS.pdf#page=39.
7
Deitchman, B., Beyond Recovery- Policy Options for Energy Efficiency Financing, World Energy Engineering Congress (October 2014); Baer,
Paul, Marilyn A. Brown, and Gyungwon Kim, The Job Generation Impacts of Expanding Industrial Cogeneration, 110 Ecological Economics
141-153. (2015); Heidi Garrett-Peltier, Employment Estimates for Energy Efficiency Retrofits of Commercial Buildings, Political Economy Research
Institute (2011), http://www.peri.umass.edu/236/hash/294809398e497bee9c8abe6ac7df2bdc/publication/466/.
8
U.S. Energy Information Administration, NERC’s Summer Reliability Assessment Highlights Regional Electricity Capacity Margins (2014), https://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16791.
9
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electricity Data Browser, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/; Most analysts attribute this to
improved efficiency reducing overall usage, but increased deployment of air conditioning causes higher peak usage.
10
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2015: Projections to 2040 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/
pdf/0383(2015).pdf.
11
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2015: Energy Consumption by Sector and Source (2015), http://www.
eia.gov/beta/aeo/#/?id=2-AEO2015&region=1-6&cases=ref2015&start=2012&end=2040&f=A&linechart=2-AEO2015.3.~2-AEO2015.10.&-
map=&ctype=linechart.
12
Tennessee Valley Authority, 2015 Integrated Resource Plan Chapter 4, https://www.tva.gov/file_source/TVA/Site%20Content/Environment/
Environmental%20Stewardship/IRP/Documents/2015_irp.pdf.
13
Rocky Mountain Institute, The Economics of Grid Defection: When and Where Distributed Solar Generation Plus Storage Competes with
Traditional Utility Service (2014) (hereinafter “Rocky Mountain Institute, The Economics of Grid Defection”).
14
State of Nevada Public Utilities Commission, Nevada Net Energy Metering Impacts Evaluation (2014), http://puc.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/
pucnvgov/Content/About/Media_Outreach/Announcements/Announcements/E3%20PUCN%20NEM%20Report%202014.pdf?pdf=Net-Meter-
ing-Study.
15
Public Service Commission of Mississippi, Net Metering in Mississippi: Costs, Benefits, and Policy Considerations (2014), http://www.syn-
apse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Net%20Metering%20in%20Mississippi.pdf.
16
Maine Public Utilities Commission, Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study (2015), http://www.maine.gov/mpuc/electricity/elect_generation/
documents/MainePUCVOS-ExecutiveSummary.pdf.
17
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Minnesota’s Value of Solar: Can a Northern State’s New Solar Policy Defuse Distributed Generation Battles
(2014), http://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MN-Value-of-Solar-from-ILSR.pdf.
18
Vermont Public Service Department, Evaluation of Net Metering in Vermont Conducted Pursuant to Act 125 of 2012 (2013), http://www.leg.
state.vt.us/reports/2013ExternalReports/285580.pdf.
19
In 2014, the Colorado Public Utility Commission held workshops on net metering issues; this information was provided for one of these work-
shops, based on data from solar customers on the Public Service of Colorado system. See “On-Site Solar Industry Answer to Questions set forth
in Attachment A of Commission Decision No. C14-0776-I,” filed July 21, 2014 in Colorado PUC Docket No. 14M-0235E, at pp. 8-9.
20
Utah PSC, Order issued August 29, 2014 in Docket No. 13-035-184, at p. 62.
21
Deregulation of Electric Utilities, Georges Zaccour (Ed.) (2012); James C. Bonbright, Principles of Public Utility Rates 250-254 (1961); James C.
Bonbright, Fully Distributed Costs in Utility Rate Making, Amer. Econ. Rev. 305-312 (1961); Jim Lazar and Wilson Gonzalez, Smart Rate Design for
a Smart Future, Regulatory Assistance Project, (2015), http://raponline.org/document/download/id/7680.
22
See e.g. Devi Glick et al., Rate Design for the Distribution Edge: Electricity Pricing for a Distributed Energy Future, Rocky Mountain Institute
(2014).
23
Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Rulemaking 12-06-013, Proposed Decision p. 117 (April 21, 2015).
24
NVEnergy, Residential Time of Use for Southern Service Territory, https://www.nvenergy.com/home/paymentbilling/timeofuse.cfm.
25
Chattanooga Electric Power Board, EPB Retail Rate Summary, https://www.epb.net/downloads/power/business/rate-summary.pdf.
26
Severin Borenstein, Time-varying Retail Electricity Prices: Theory and Practice, in Electricity Deregulation: Choices and Challenges (S. L. P.
James M. Griffin (Ed.), 2005) (hereinafter “Borenstein, Electricity Deregulation”).
27
Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Rulemaking 12-06-013, Proposed Decision p. 117 (April 21, 2015).
28
Borenstein, Electricity Deregulation.
29
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, Investigation by the Department of Public Utilities Upon its Own Motion into Time Varying Rates
(June 12, 2014), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dpu/orders/d-p-u-14-04-b-order-6-12-14.pdf.
30
Id. The Department noted that in 2013, the average wholesale market price of electricity over the course of the year was $56 per MWh but
the peak wholesale price in the summer reached nearly $870 per MWh and in winter nearly $1,300 per MWh.
31
Under this TOU pricing structure, the retail electricity price will be higher during certain hours of the week when customers typically use more
electricity and wholesale energy prices rise (e.g., the “on-peak” hours of noon to 8:00 p.m. each weekday) than during the remaining hours of
the week when electricity usage and wholesale prices are typically lower (i.e., the “off-peak” hours).

11
32
Under PTR, customers will have an incentive to lower their electricity usage when it is most critical to do so, but even those who ignore the
incentive will be insulated against higher peak prices because they will pay one price for all electricity consumption.
33
The Sacramento Municipal Utility District, which serves approximately 540,000 customers in and around Sacramento, California, implement-
ed a two-year SmartPricing Options pilot program. See Jennifer M. Potter, et. al, Sacramento Municipal Utility District, SmartPricing Options Final
Evaluation (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/SMUD-CBS_Final_Evaluation_Submitted_DOE_9_9_2014.pdf.
34
Jennifer M. Potter, et. al, Sacramento Municipal Utility District, SmartPricing Options Final Evaluation (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.smartgrid.
gov/files/SMUD-CBS_Final_Evaluation_Submitted_DOE_9_9_2014.pdf.
35
Duke Energy Progress, Time-of-Use Rate R-TOU, http://www.duke-energy.com/tou-dep-residential/default.asp; Duke Energy has had TOU
rates for commercial customers in North Carolina since 1975, but the expansion to residential electric TOU rates is new.
36
Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 2014-0192, Decision and Order No. 33258 (Oct. 12, 2015).
37
California ISO, Matching Time-of-Use Rate Periods with Grid Conditions Maximized Use of Renewable Resources (2015), https://www.caiso.
com/Documents/MatchingTimeOfUsePeriodsWithGridConditions-FastFacts.pdf.
38
Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Docket No. 2014-0192, Decision and Order No. 33258 (Oct. 12, 2015).
39
Net metering customers under TOU and TOU-E pay a significantly higher price for electricity generated during on-peak hours, but the TOU
schedule charges a higher rate for on-peak energy than the TOU-E schedule. The TOU schedule also offers a shoulder rate (between on-peak
and off-peak), which provides more opportunity for a customer to avoid on-peak energy consumption, but provides fewer hours for a customer
to get paid the maximum on-peak rate for energy generated by their PV system. An advantage of both the TOU and TOU-E rate schedules
over the time-of-use demand (TOU-D) schedule is that there is no demand charge. Therefore, a homeowner gets the time-of-use advantage of
a higher rate for on-peak PV generation without the burden of a demand charge. The SunSense option pays a lower rate for electricity sold to
the grid during both on- and off-peak hours. The greatest advantages of the SunSense program are the reduced upfront cost and the five-year
monthly payment based on system size.
40
North Carolina Solar Center, A Residential Customer Guide to Going Solar: Duke Energy Progress Version (2014), http://nccleantech.ncsu.
edu/wp-content/uploads/Duke-Energy-Progress-Solar-Guide-FINAL-1.pdf.
41
Chattanooga Electric Power Board, EPB Retail Rate Summary, https://www.epb.net/downloads/power/business/rate-summary.pdf.
42
Memphis Light Gas & Water, Time-of-Use Residential Rate, http://www.mlgw.com/images/content/files/pdf_rates/RSTOUOct14.PDF.
43
Recently, the New York Department of Public Service proposed adopting multiple changes in rate design for their delivery rates, including
the adoption of LMP with the added marginal value of distribution. This is different from, DLMP, which is sometimes used to refer to a granular
calculation of time- and location-specific costs on the distribution system. LMP+D is a broader measure capturing the full value of DER, including
energy (LMP) and the full range of values provided by distribution level resources (D). See New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority, Large-Scale Renewable Energy Development in New York: Options and Assessments (2015), filed in N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n. Docket
No. 15-E-0302 (June 1, 2015).
44
Rocky Mountain Institute, The Economics of Grid Defection.
45
Jim Lazar, Regulatory Assistance Project, Electric Utility Residential Customer Charges and Minimum Bills: Alternative Approaches for Recov-
ering Basic Distribution Costs (2013)(hereinafter “Lazar, Minimum Bills”), http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/7361.
46
Jim Lazar, Rate Design Where Advanced Metering Infrastructure Has Not Been Fully Deployed 26, Regulatory Assistance Project (2013);
Lazar, Minimum Bills.
47
Lazar, Minimum Bills.
48
Carol Biedrzycki, Texas Ratepayers’ Organization to Save Energy, Texas Electric Consumers, Beware of REP Fees (2013), http://texasrose.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Fees-Summary-2013-Report-by-Texas-ROSE.pdf.
49
Lazar, Minimum Bills.
50
Josh Cornfeld & Shayle Kahn, Why a Minimum Bill May be a Solution to Net Metering Battles, Greentech Media (July 24, 2014), http://www.
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/why-the-massachusetts-net-metering-compromise-could-be-a-model-for-other-st.
51
Jim Lazar et al., Revenue Regulation and Decoupling: A Guide to Theory and Application 1, Regulatory Assistance Project (2011).
52
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Residential Adjustment Billing Factors, https://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/faces/ladwp/
aboutus/a-financesandreports/a-fr-electricrates/a-fr-er-energycostadjustmentfactor?_adf.ctrl-state=1b62srqg5m_4&OwnesLake&&_afr-
Loop=375353535571103; Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Commercial Adjustment Billing Factors, https://www.ladwp.com/
ladwp/faces/ladwp/aboutus/a-financesandreports/a-fr-electricrates/a-fr-er-energysubsidyadjustmentfactor?_adf.ctrl-state=1b62srqg5m_4&Ow-
nesLake&&_afrLoop=375589380925260.

12