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The document discusses the changing perception of U.S. leadership among NATO allies, highlighting an increase in approval ratings since 2020. It also addresses concerns regarding U.S. participation in the International Criminal Court (ICC), arguing that joining could harm relationships with allies like Israel and that the U.S. already holds nations accountable through sanctions. Additionally, it critiques the ICC's effectiveness and its perceived bias towards African nations, questioning whether U.S. involvement would enhance or undermine its mission.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
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ICC BF

The document discusses the changing perception of U.S. leadership among NATO allies, highlighting an increase in approval ratings since 2020. It also addresses concerns regarding U.S. participation in the International Criminal Court (ICC), arguing that joining could harm relationships with allies like Israel and that the U.S. already holds nations accountable through sanctions. Additionally, it critiques the ICC's effectiveness and its perceived bias towards African nations, questioning whether U.S. involvement would enhance or undermine its mission.

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1683872
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A2 Aff

https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_why_america_is_facing_off_against_the_international_crimin
al_cou/

https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2007/03/scholars-debate-us-policy-toward-international-criminal-
court

A2 Allied credibility
Non Uniq, US Credibility is increasing

Ray 25

Historically, the image of U.S. leadership across most NATO members is


stronger today than in 2020 -- the final year of Trump’s first presidency. In 20
of the 30 countries surveyed in both years, approval ratings in 2024 were
substantially higher (shifts of 10 percentage points or more) than in 2020.
Germany experienced the biggest shift, with approval increasing from 6% to
52%.

Notably, the image of U.S. leadership did not decline substantially in any
NATO country between 2020 and 2024. And, in several countries, including
Hungary, Greece, Slovenia, Romania and Montenegro, approval ratings
remained essentially unchanged.

Trump cannot leave NATO


McInnis 24
Would this matter? Some observers maintain that NATO will be a fact of life that
all future administrations will have to live with, in particular because of legislation
enacted in the National Defense Authorization Act that restricts a president’s
ability to unilaterally withdraw from alliances without congressional consent.
Lawfare’s own Scott Anderson has deftly detailed the provisions contained within
that legislation—and their limitations. But the formal exits from the alliance have
been barricaded; so far, so good.

Turn: Joining the ICC would hurt Israel, as said in our case, so therefore hurts
relationships with allies as the EU supports Israel.

Gegout 24

The EU has stood in solidarity with Israel since the start of the war with Hamas, and
has been consistent in saying the country has the right to defend itself. But the EU has
always said that this has to be done in line with international law, which Israel has
been accused of breaching.

If the US joins the ICC, who is prosecuting Israel, we will worsen ties with Allies
since they support Israel currently.

A2 US solves corruption:
Turn, US causes corruption:

Caleb Wheeler(Lecturer in Law at Cardiff University.), 12-08-2022, “Should the ICC


Allow the United States to

Become a State Party?” Opinio Juris,


https://opiniojuris.org/2022/08/12/should-the-icc-allow-the-united-states-to-become-a-st
ate-party/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNh

ZW0CMTEAAR3qnKZYVQclxCBA7VsAL6Rr_p36SDq-S4_4IpBpLG79SZnMREBoP6fA
BP0_aem_KNBuqeWfozIjEDO3lQx3VA,

accessed 7-1-23, //ZD

While it did not refer directly to the International Criminal Court, one of the bills’
co-sponsors, Representative Ilhan Omar stated in a Press Release that the Bill would
help support proceedings at the ICC. Conclusion The actions and statements of the last
five presidential administrations suggest that they do not fully understand what the ICC
actually does and that they are not particularly interested in finding out. They have only
been interested in engaging with the Court as a tool to be used against others rather
than as a real instrument designed to combat impunity. This was made clear in a recent
statement by Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US Ambassador to the United Nations.
When asked about trying Putin at the ICC, she responded that it remained available as
an option and that the United States has always been supportive of the Court taking
action ‘when action is required.’ Implicit in this statement is the idea that holding
Americans accountable is never required. The problem with this approach is that the
United States’ understanding of when action is required differs from that of the Court.
The ICC was founded on the principle of ending the impunity of individuals committing
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression regardless
of their official position or national affiliation. From the Court’s perspective, action is
required when it can help achieve that purpose. The United States takes a different
approach to deciding when action is required. It only believes in action against its
enemies or citizens of those countries that is does not really care about. When the
United States or its friends are threatened with prosecution, even in the face of
overwhelming evidence of criminality, it rejects that action as an impermissible
infringement on sovereignty. In the end, these two approaches are incompatible. That
leaves the Court with a choice. It can either change its mission to secure American
membership or stay the course and continue to pursue its goal ending impunity. The
first path would likely result in the ICC receiving greater political, intelligence and
financial support from the United States, making it easier for the Court to conduct
investigations and prosecutions. In exchange, it would almost certainly need to institute
a policy exempting American citizens from prosecution in at least some situations. This
could lead other states, particularly those that also regularly participate in peacekeeping
efforts, to seek similar protections for their own citizens. That would result in the
development of a two-tiered jurisdictional structure at the ICC under which individual
criminal responsibility would depend as much on the citizenship of the accused as the
circumstances surrounding their alleged criminality. Such a change would fundamentally
alter the Court’s mission by making full accountability for atrocious crimes an
unattainable goal. Until the United States is willing to drop its objections to how the ICC
exercises its jurisdiction, the Court is better off without the United States as state party
and should resist any attempts it might make to join.

A2 US soldier accountability

The US has prosecution within its government

Vindman 23

The greatest concern about cooperating with the ICC is that doing so would expose U.S. service members
and leaders to politically motivated prosecution by foreign bureaucrats. But the court operates on the
principle of complementarity, meaning that the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction when a state exercises its
own prerogatives to investigate and prosecute potential war crimes. The ICC steps in only when a state
fails to use its own national criminal justice apparatus to handle war crimes, as is currently the case in
Russia. In the United States, however, the robust military justice systems ensure that crimes are
investigated and prosecuted as a matter of maintaining order and discipline within the armed forces,
making ICC jurisdiction against U.S. military personnel unlikely, so long as the United States continues to
police its own behavior.

Because the United States is already compliant with core principles of international criminal law,
supporting and even joining the ICC would have very little practical effect on U.S. operations. Support for
the ICC would, however, eliminate the argument that the United States is hypocritical and send a clear
message that the United States plays by the same rules that it expects of all other international actors.

A2 Accountability:

The US Already holds countries accountable via sanctions, look at Russia for example

USDS 22

Executive Order 13685 was issued December 19, 2014. Utilizing these Executive
Orders, the United States has steadily increased the diplomatic and financial costs of
Russia’s aggressive actions towards Ukraine. We have designated a number of Russian
and Ukrainian entities, including 14 defense companies and individuals in Putin’s inner
circle, as well as imposed targeted sanctions limiting certain financing to six of Russia’s
largest banks and four energy companies. We have also suspended credit finance that
encourages exports to Russia and financing for economic development projects in
Russia, and are now prohibiting the provision, exportation, or re-exportation of goods,
services (not including financial services), or technology in support of exploration or
production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to
produce oil in the Russian Federation, or in maritime area claimed by the Russian
Federation and extending from its territory, and that involve five major Russian energy
companies.

The ICC is a failure, even with US resources could not hold countries accountable

Heritage foundation 22

Among other concerns, past U.S. Administrations concluded that the Rome
Statute created a seriously flawed institution that lacks prudent safeguards
against political manipulation, possesses sweeping authority without
accountability to the U.N. Security Council, and violates national sovereignty
by claiming jurisdiction over the nationals and military personnel of non-party
states in some circumstances. These concerns led President Bill Clinton to
urge President George W. Bush not to submit the treaty to the Senate for
advice and consent necessary for ratification.[1] After extensive efforts to
change the statute to address key U.S. concerns failed, President Bush felt it
necessary to "un-sign" the Rome Statute by formally notifying the U.N.
Secretary-General that the U.S. did not intend to ratify the treaty and was no
longer bound under international law to avoid actions that would run counter
to the intent and purpose of the treaty. Subsequently, the U.S. took a number
of steps to protect its military personnel, officials, and nationals from ICC
claims of jurisdiction.

ICC wouldn't prosecute non african countries anyway

Columbia Law 21

Since the inception of the ICC, critics have challenged its legitimacy as a
global, unbiased institution for two main reasons. First, the ICC has an
apparent focus on the African continent, which has spurred not only criticism
but also actual withdrawal from the Rome Statute. Second, there is a
perceived Western hegemony over ICC proceedings that arises from the UN
Security Council’s referrals. These criticisms will be explained in turn.

For the last two decades, the ICC has repeatedly come under fire for primarily
prosecuting Africans and turning a blind eye to atrocities that take place
outside of Africa. Of the thirteen situations currently under investigation, ten
are focused on African countries. [1] Leaders of these countries have
condemned this apparent bias for subjecting them to excessive persecution.
For example, Burundi, which withdrew from the Rome Statute in 2017,
accused the Court of being “a political instrument and weapon used by the
West to enslave other States.” [2] [3] Other African nations, including Gambia
and South Africa, have also expressed, and subsequently retracted,
intentions to leave the ICC. [4] The ICC’s distinctly narrow and arguably
prejudicial focus on Africa significantly undermines its legitimacy, particularly
given that the Court is supposed to embody the principles of internationality
and universality.

A2 China:

China's reasoning for not being in the ICC

Nomad Capitalist 24

Chief among China’s concerns about the ICC is its vulnerability to political
influence and interference, since any of its individual prosecutors can make
the decision to begin an investigation. China objects to the fact the court has
the power to judge whether a state is able or willing to prosecute its own
nationals. Finally, China believes that the court’s jurisdiction over what it can
prosecute weakens the United Nations Security Council.
ICC Funding/ support:

Because of the ASPA the US can't provide support the ICC

Jones 21 [Nicole Jones, J.D. Candidate at the University of Wisconsin Law School, 2021,
“SANCTIONING THE ICC: IS THIS THE RIGHT MOVE FOR THE UNITED STATES?”
Wisconsin International Law Journal,
https://wilj.law.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1270/2021/12/39.1_175-204_Jones.pdf]/Kank
ee

C. US CIRCUMVENTION OF THE ICC Since the creation of the ICC, the United States has made a number of attempts to stay out
of reach of the ICC’s jurisdiction. One of the first attempts was the enactment of the American Servicemember’s
Protection Act, hereinafter called ASPA.56 The ASPA was passed and signed into law on August 2, 2002. The ASPA
precludes US participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities unless one of the following conditions exists: US
soldiers are expressly exempt from ICC jurisdiction by U.N. resolution, the countries in which the troops are operating are outside
the jurisdiction of the ICC, the troops are in countries that have concluded bilateral agreements with the United States exempting
them under Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute, or the national interests of the United States justify participation.57 ASPA also

prohibits other forms of cooperation with the ICC by US courts, local governments, and US
agencies. It prohibits any federal, state, or local government from providing support to the ICC; 58
extraditing any person to the ICC; 59 using US funds to assist in the investigating, arresting,
detention, or prosecuting of any US citizen by the ICC; 60 and prohibiting any investigative
activity of the ICC in the United States and its territory.61 ASPA further prohibits the transfer of any
classified national security information and law enforcement information to the ICC.62 To put the
United States even further from the reach of the ICC, one of the ASPA exceptions listed above is that a country can sign a

bilateral agreement (BIA) in order to exempt all US troops from ICC jurisdiction.63 This is another attempt
at placing the United States in a place of immunity. In August 2002, with the enactment of the ASPA, the United
States began actively seeking these agreements with both parties and nonparties to the Rome Statute.64 The thought behind these
BIAs is attributable to Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute. Article 98(2) reads: The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which
the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.65 Essentially, this portion of the
Rome Statute
specifies that if a State has already entered into other treaty agreements with other States, the
ICC cannot proceed with a request for surrender if that State has already agreed to ask for
permission before surrendering a person. Before the adoption of the Rome Statute, many States had already entered
into other treaty agreements such as extradition treaties or Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).66 SOFAs are mostly concerned
with the legal issues that come with allowing foreign militaries to operate in a host country.67 The Rome Statute aimed to avoid
conflicts with already existing State agreements.68 The international agreements mentioned in Article 98(2) are what the United
States claims to include BIAs.69 There are criticisms of this interpretation and experts claim that “international agreements” was
meant to encompass existing agreements not future ones.70 Despite growing skepticism over their validity, the United States has
been successful in obtaining signed BIAs. Over ninety countries have signed BIAs since the United States
enacted the ASPA.71 Over forty of these countries are States Parties.72 There are three different types of
BIAs depending on the State’s wishes. The first type of BIA binds both parties to an agreement not to turn over

each other’s nationals to the ICC without the consent of the other party.73 The second type involvesthe
United States retaining the ability to turn over the other party’s nationals to the ICC, but it is not reciprocated for US nationals.74 The
last type is for states that have not ratified or signed the Rome Statute.75 These BIAs
contain a provision “requiring
those states not to cooperate with efforts of third states to surrender persons to the [ICC].”76 In
addition to the ASPA and corresponding BIAs, the United States has taken other measures to politically deter the ICC from
investigating crimes that implicate US nationals. On April 4, 2019, the Trump Administration revoked the visa of the
prosecutor initiating the prosecution of crimes committed in connection with the armed conflict in Afghanistan.77 Not one month
before, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that, “except to the extent otherwise required by the U.N. Headquarters

Agreement, the United States would impose visa restrictions on ‘those individuals directly responsible for

any ICC investigation of US personnel.’”78 Only one week after the prosecutor’s visa was revoked,
the request to investigate the situation in Afghanistan was denied.79 The actions taken by the Trump
Administration and its predecessors, are strong-arm attempts to politically influence the investigations that the

ICC approves in order to avoid possible prosecution of American citizens involved in States party to

the Rome Statute. There is no doubt that there are more attempts to come as the ICC undertakes the Afghanistan investigation.
Given the history of the relationship between the United States and the ICC, it is difficult to think of the future
ahead of the ICC as it investigates the atrocities committed in Afghanistan. Despite the constant pressure from the United
States against these investigations and the ICC itself, Prosecutor Bensouda and the ICC have decided to continue on their course to
find justice for the people involved in the atrocities committed in the armed conflict in Afghanistan. II. ICC INVESTIGATION INTO
AFGHANISTAN

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