Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90

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Journal of Environmental Psychology

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jep

Climate of silence: Pluralistic ignorance as a barrier to climate change

discussion
Nathaniel Geiger, Janet K. Swim*
Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Despite the importance of interpersonal public communication about climate change, most citizens
Received 21 August 2015 rarely discuss the topic. In two studies, we find that inaccurate perceptions of others' opinions (i.e.
Received in revised form pluralistic ignorance) contribute to self-silencing among those concerned about climate change. Study 1
29 April 2016
illustrates that those who are aware of others' concern about climate change report greater willingness to
Accepted 6 May 2016
discuss the issue than those with inaccurate perceptions of others' opinions. Study 2 demonstrates that
Available online 8 May 2016
correcting pluralistic ignorance increases concerned participants' willingness to discuss climate change.
In both studies, pluralistic ignorance leads to self-silencing because perceptions that others do not share
Keywords:
Climate change
one's opinion are associated with expecting to be perceived as less competent in a conversation about
Pluralistic ignorance climate change. In contrast to previous research on confronting prejudice, in the present research ex-
Discussion pectations about being disliked did not explain self-silencing. We discuss the implications for self-
Impression management silencing and promoting interpersonal communication about climate change.
Stereotype content model © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Feinberg, & Rosenthal, 2015), and similar

levels of silence are found among the British public (Capstick et al.,
The challenge of climate change requires major economic and 2015; Rowson, 2013).
social changes, both to transition to a low-carbon economy and to We suggest that the social dynamics surrounding climate
adapt to the changes that are already “locked in” by previous pat- change are barriers to discussion e a socially constructed silence
terns of carbon emissions (IPCC, 2014). A strong limiting factor to (Marshall, 2014; Norgaard, 2011, p 82). First, we propose that
the success of these changes is the public's willingness to accept, pluralistic ignorance e the tendency for a majority to misperceive
support, and actively engage in shaping economic, sociocultural, others' opinions on a topic, falsely believing that fewer people share
political, and structural changes that help to address climate their opinion than actually do (Prentice & Miller, 1993) e contrib-
change (Clayton et al., 2015; Jacobson & Delucchi, 2011). This public utes to the lack of discussion about climate change. Despite a solid
response is most likely to occur when social changes coincide with majority of the public being concerned about climate change, most
shared meaning and value structures held by a majority of citizens underestimate the degree to which others are concerned (Leviston,
(Dietz, 2013; Habermas, 1971, p 27). Thus, interpersonal commu- Walker, & Morwinski, 2013). Second, we propose that pluralistic
nication about topics is crucial to build public acceptance and ignorance leads people to avoid discussing climate change because
support for social change: scientifically grounded public discussion people anticipate being evaluated more negatively by those who
can increase public understanding of the problem, community disagree with them than those who agree with them in anticipated
engagement, and development of consensus for locally appropriate conversations about the topic. Research on core dimensions of so-
mitigation and adaptation solutions (Clayton et al., 2015; Swim, cial evaluation suggests that anticipated negative evaluations
Fraser, & Geiger, 2014). Currently, however, engagement in these would be in the form of anticipating being perceived to lack
conversations are uncommon: only a quarter of the American warmth, competence, or both (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999).
public report regularly discussing climate change (Leiserowitz,
2. Pluralistic ignorance and self-silencing

* Corresponding author. 511 Moore Building, University Park, PA 16802, USA. It is perhaps unsurprising that the public has demonstrated
E-mail address: [email protected] (J.K. Swim). pluralistic ignorance about climate change (Leviston et al., 2013).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2016.05.002
0272-4944/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
80 N. Geiger, J.K. Swim / Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90

Pluralistic ignorance has been demonstrated across many topics: climate change (Markowitz, 2012). Another point of view,
support for racial segregation in the 1970s (most white Americans expressed by a vocal minority who question the scientific
supported desegregation but believed that most others supported consensus, is that climate change is a conspiracy that is immorally
segregation; O'Gorman & Garry, 1976), norms of alcohol con- being promoted as scientific fact by those who wish to promote a
sumption (university students believed that norms of alcohol specific political agenda (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013).
consumption were excessive but perceived that most others sup- In sum, it appears that climate change has culturally acquired a
ported them; Prentice & Miller, 1993), opinions on foreign policy controversial, moral connotation in modern society, and thus we
(most Americans support multilateral foreign policy but perceive propose that the processes described in pluralistic ignorance and
that most other Americans support unilateral foreign policy; spiral of silence will also apply to climate change. Thus, we make
Todorov & Mandisodza, 2004) and comfort with “hooking up” the following prediction:
(students estimated that others felt more comfortable engaging in
Hypothesis 1. Participants will be less willing to talk about climate
uncommitted sexual activity than they did; Lambert, Kahn, &
change when they perceive that their opinions are in the minority (vs.
Apple, 2003). Pluralistic ignorance could in part be due to the
the majority).
lack of regular conversations about climate change (Leiserowitz
et al., 2015), which could lead to individuals having little insight
into others' internal beliefs. Interestingly, pluralistic ignorance on 3. Impression management and self-silencing
climate change has even been found among climate scientists who
underestimate concern among other scientific experts Self-silencing may be a form of impression management. In-
(Lewandowsky, Oreskes, Risbey, Newell, & Smithson, 2015). dividuals desire to be viewed in a positive light and sharing an
Pluralistic ignorance can have significant consequences for unpopular opinion could result in others perceiving them nega-
effectively addressing social issues. Pluralistic ignorance is associ- tively. Researchers have proposed that people self-silence because
ated with attitude change shifting toward the perceived norm of fear of isolation (Noelle-Neumann, 1993), rejection (Bergsieker,
(Leviston et al., 2013; Prentice & Miller, 1993); behavioral confor- Shelton, & Richeson, 2010), social retributions for violating cul-
mity to the perceived norm (Prentice & Miller, 1993; Schroeder & tural norms prescribing silence (Norgaard, 2011), embarrassment
Prentice, 1998), and relevant to the present study, reduced will- (Miller & McFarland, 1987), being dismissed as a “complainer”
ingness to share one's opinion on a topic (Miller & McFarland, 1987; (Kaiser & Miller, 2001; Swim & Hyers, 1999), and being seen as
Rios & Chen, 2014; Taylor, 1982). Conversely, correcting pluralistic ignorant (Salmon & Neuwirth, 1990).
ignorance by providing information about the true beliefs of others The varied explanations for self-silencing listed in the above
can reverse these effects (Schroeder & Prentice, 1998). paragraph can be organized along two core dimensions of im-
The spiral of silence theory specifically addresses the impact of pressions: fears about being a) disliked or b) losing respect. Inter-
pluralistic ignorance on public discourse (Noelle-Neumann, 1993; personal evaluation research suggests that up to 90% of initial
Taylor, 1982). This theory proposes that individuals scan their so- impressions of others can be organized along these two core di-
cial environment for information about others' opinions and that mensions, which directly reflect the core dimensions of social
people are less willing to share their opinion when informational cognition: warmth (those perceived as low in warmth are disliked)
cues lead them to believe that they hold a minority view (vs. ma- and competence (those perceived as low in competence are not
jority view), especially when the topic is perceived as controversial respected) (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske et al., 1999). These two
or morally charged (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Silencing is proposed dimensions have been consistently described across various
to be self-reinforcing: if many who hold a particular view believe literature (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Heider, 1958; Rosenberg,
that they are in the minority and remain silent, the silence leads Nelson, & Vivekanathan, 1968; Singh, Ho, Tan, & Bell, 2007) and
others who share this view to believe that their opinion is un- align with two basic impression management goals: the desire to
common and encourages them to also remain silent. Motivation to have an audience think favorably about oneself and the desire to
self-silence is also proposed to increase when individuals believe present one's ideal self to others (Bergsieker et al., 2010; Schlenker,
that their opinion is declining in public popularity (Taylor, 1982). 1975). Thus, warmth reflects being perceived as friendly and
The premises derived from pluralistic ignorance and spiral of cooperative, while competence corresponds with being respected
silence theory may explain why people are hesitant to discuss and achieving high social status (Fiske et al., 1999, 2002). Being
climate change. The principles outlined in spiral of silence theory perceived as either cold (i.e., confrontational and unlikeable) or
are purported to apply primarily to morally controversial or value- incompetent (i.e., not respected and low status) are distinct
laden topics, such as abortion, support for addressing racial grounds for anticipated social rejection, and thus people may alter
inequality, and political party preference in national elections (Moy, their behavior in attempts to manage others' impressions of them
Domke, & Stamm, 2001; Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Climate change on one or both of these dimensions (Holoien & Fiske, 2013).
might appear to differ from these more commonly studied topics
because climate change is a scientific topic supported by a solid 3.1. Avoiding being disliked
body of evidence and an overwhelming consensus of scientific
experts whom agree that human-caused climate change is occur- The desire to avoid being disliked has been well established as a
ring and presents a significant threat to global civilization (Cook motive for self-silencing when one is a target of discrimination and
et al., 2013, 2016; Oreskes, 2004). Yet, expression of opinions prejudice. (Sechrist, Swim, & Stangor, 2004; Shelton & Stewart,
about climate change has taken on a cultural significance distinct 2004; Stangor et al., 2003; Swim & Hyers, 1999). This desire leads
from scientific understanding of the topic due to its politicization. individuals to refrain from confronting discrimination despite their
About half of U.S. senators recently voted to publicly deny that wishes to do so (e.g., Swim, Eyssell, Murdoch, & Ferguson, 2010) or
“human activity significantly contributes to climate change” despite what they expect they would do (Shelton & Stewart, 2004;
(Goldenberg, 2015), despite scientific consensus and only approx- Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001), particularly in
imately 10% of Americans similarly dismissing the scientific evi- the presence of others expected to not share one's own point of
dence behind anthropogenic climate change (Leiserowitz et al., view (Swim & Hyers, 1999). Individuals faced with discrimination
2015). Further, many perceive the topic principally as a moral often perceive the possibility of confronting as impolite (Swim &
topic because of the potential negative impacts of unchecked Hyers, 1999) and those who do confront are devalued as difficult
 N. Geiger, J.K. Swim / Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90 81

to interact with and “complainers” (Kaiser & Miller, 2001). shows that most nonscientists have limited understanding of the
Consistent with the argument that individuals self-silence to avoid scientific mechanisms of climate change (Leiserowitz, Smith, &
being disliked, women were less likely to assertively respond to Marlon, 2010; Swim et al., 2014), and thus may be concerned
sexist comments during a job interview when the desire to be liked about appearing ignorant or incompetent when discussing this
was emphasized than when the desire to be respected was valued topic. Further, the expectation of appearing incompetent may be
more highly (Mallett & Melchiori, 2014). amplified when considering a discussion with an audience not
Fear of being disliked may also motivate suppression of opinions expected to share one's views, partly because a dissenting audience
about climate change. Individuals may be concerned about being may challenge the speaker or question their assumptions. Based
perceived as an “alarmist” or environmental activist if they were to upon the above analyses we make the following hypothesis:
express their concern about the topic, labels which carry poten-
Hypothesis 3. Individuals’ hesitation to discuss climate change in
tially negative connotations of being disliked by others. Similar to
situations when they perceive their opinions are in the minority (vs.
those who confront discrimination, those who are “alarmed” about
the majority) will be partly explained by expectations of appearing less
climate change are perceived as “whiny”, “nagging”, and “com-
competent in the conversation.
plainers” (Swim & Geiger, 2016b) and prototypic environmental
activists are commonly stereotyped as “eccentric”, “self-righteous,”
and “reactive” (Bashir, Lockwood, Chasteen, Nadolny, & Noyes,
2013), all traits associated with being seen as cold and disliked by 4. Present research
others. These negative impressions are associated with reduced
willingness to engage in climate change activism and to affiliate In two studies, we examine the effects of pluralistic ignorance
with environmental activists. Expectations about being disliked for on willingness to discuss climate change. We first conducted two
speaking one's opinions may be accentuated in particular contexts; pilot studies to verify that the pattern of pluralistic ignorance about
namely, when individuals anticipate that others do not share their climate change observed in Leviston et al. (2013) work would
views and thus believe that expressing their opinion would be replicate in our target population. Next, in Study 1 we examine
confrontational within a given context (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). whether participants who do not themselves doubt the scientific
Based upon the above, we make the following prediction. view on climate change and hold inaccurate perceptions of others'
opinions are less willing to discuss the topic than those who
Hypothesis 2. Individuals’ hesitation to discuss climate change in
endorse similar views about climate change but hold accurate
situations when they perceive their opinions are in the minority (vs.
perceptions of others' opinions. In Study 2, we experimentally
the majority) will be partly explained by expectations of appearing less
manipulate perceptions of others' opinions and examine the effects
warm in the conversation.
of correcting pluralistic ignorance on facilitating discussion relative
to emphasizing the false perceptions of others' opinions. Study 2
3.2. Avoiding losing respect participants include a full range of personal opinions about climate
change ranging from those who are very concerned about climate
Another motive for self-silencing is the concern that one would change to those who consider themselves nonbelievers. In both
lose others' respect following a conversation about a topic. studies, we examine whether expectations of being perceived as a)
Expressing an unpopular opinion could result in appearing igno- warm and/or b) competent explain the psychological process un-
rant to others (Salmon & Neuwirth, 1990), and people may remain derlying these effects.
silent out of fear of embarrassing themselves when they believe
that they are less knowledgeable about a topic than others (Miller &
McFarland, 1987). Yet, research suggests that confronting discrim- 5. Pilot studies
ination does not lead to the confronter being perceived as incom-
petent (i.e. losing respect; Stangor et al., 2003; Swim, Gervais, Pilot testing with undergraduate students in introductory psy-
Pearson, & Stangor, 2009), and women more interested in being chology courses (reflecting a range of students across the campus)
respected than liked were more likely to confront sexism during a were consistent with previous findings about pluralistic ignorance
job interview than other women (Mallett & Melchiori, 2014). This on climate change (Leviston et al., 2013). One pilot sample
could suggest that concerns about losing respect are less central completed a screening instrument that has been used to categorize
than concerns about being disliked when individuals consider the public into different levels of concern about climate change (i.e.,
whether to self-silence unpopular opinions. the Six Americas' questionnaire, Maibach, Leiserowitz, Roser-
However, in contrast to confronting discrimination, the degree Renouf, & Mertz, 2011) and self-categorized into different levels
to which an individual expects to be perceived as competent may of concern about climate change as assessed by the same screening
affect willingness to engage in discussions about climate change. instrument. Both methods indicated that a majority of students
Since climate change is a scientific topic, expectations of appearing were on concerned side of the opinion spectrum: survey instru-
competent may be more salient than expectations of appearing ment (N ¼ 365): 7% Alarmed, 40% Concerned, 40% Cautious, 3%
warm since understanding of scientific topics maps onto the Disengaged, 8% Doubtful, 3% Dismissive; self-categorization
competence dimension, but not the warmth dimension, of social (N ¼ 368): 8% Alarmed, 28% Concerned, 39% Cautious, 19% Disen-
cognition (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). This proposition is sup- gaged, 3% Doubtful, 3% Dismissive. This pattern is similar to this age
ported by work examining informal scientific educators' concerns group in the American public (Leiserowitz et al., 2015) and in
about incorporating climate change into their education curriculum subsequent tests in the same participant pool (Geiger & Swim,
(Swim & Fraser, 2013, 2014). The more concerned educators were 2014). Yet, despite this majority concern, in a second pilot test
about being able to competently communicate about climate (N ¼ 89), only 30% of respondents accurately perceived that a
change the more likely they were to avoid extensively communi- majority of other students were concerned about climate change.
cating with visitors about this topic. The most common misperceptions were that: 1) most un-
Given that even trained scientific educators express concern dergraduates were disengaged with the topic, 2) most un-
about being capable of communicating climate change, non- dergraduates were doubtful about climate change, or 3)
scientists may be even more likely to hold these concerns. Research undergraduates' opinions were polarized.
82 N. Geiger, J.K. Swim / Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90

6. Study 1 thinking about bringing up how climate change may be affecting

the current weather.
In Study 1, we examine whether pluralistic ignorance predicts
silence on climate change among undergraduate college students
Participants then indicated their expectations about how they
who do not doubt the existence of climate change. In this study, we
would be perceived if they initiated a discussion about climate
focus on the three most common misperceptions of other students'
change and their willingness to discuss climate change in this
opinions identified in the pilot study above. Specifically, Study 1
setting by answering the survey measures described below.
tests whether those who had accurately perceived that most un-
dergraduates were concerned about climate change in a pre-
6.1.3. Pre-screening measures
screening would later be more willing to engage in a discussion
about climate change than those who had endorsed one of three 6.1.3.1. Personal opinion about climate change. Respondents self-
other types of inaccurate perceptions of others' opinions in the pre- categorized into one of six groups arranged in a continuum from
screening. most to least concerned about climate change (Very Concerned,
Previous research on pluralistic ignorance (Goode, Balzarini, & Concerned, Cautious, Disengaged, Doubtful, and Nonbeliever). We
Smith, 2014; Larimer, 2010) and willingness to engage in discus- used the terms “Very Concerned” and “Nonbeliever” instead of the
sion (Oshagan, 1996; Salmon & Kline, 1985) suggests that percep- original “Six Americas” category labels “Alarmed” and “Dismissive”
tions of others' behaviors and opinions can influence conformity (Leiserowitz et al., 2015) because of the potential pejorative nature
only to the extent that the particular “others” referenced are of these labels. We provided descriptions of each group to partici-
perceived to be relevant to the individual in a given situation. pants based on prototypical descriptions given in the “Six Amer-
Specifically, people are likely to modify their behavior or discussion icas” report (Maibach, Leiserowitz, & Roser-Renouf, 2009, also see
based on the perceived opinions of those with whom they identify Geiger & Swim, 2014 for validity of self-categorization).
(Larimer, 2010; Neighbors et al., 2010) or the perceived opinions of Similar to pilot data, most students who had completed the pre-
those with whom they are speaking (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), while screening were more concerned than unconcerned (Very Con-
those with whom they do not identify or a more distant reference cerned 11%, Concerned 27%, Cautious 27%, Disengaged 26%,
group may be unlikely to induce conformity. To verify this propo- Doubtful 6%, Nonbeliever 3%.).
sition, we also assess perceptions of the American public's (a more
abstract and distant reference group) opinion in the pre-screening. 6.1.3.2. Perceptions of others' opinions (proposed predictor).
We anticipated that these perceptions would not be associated Respondents chose one of five graphs that they believed best rep-
with later willingness to discuss climate change. resented the distribution of: a) fellow university undergraduates'
and b) the American public's opinions about climate change (Fig. 1).
The categories of concern depicted in the graphs were derived from
6.1. Methods
the descriptions which respondents had previously read in order to
describe their own opinions (section 5.1.3.1). The five graphs were
6.1.1. Participants
designed to represent the following five options: 1) most are con-
Respondents were recruited based on their answers in pre-
cerned (concerned model that most accurately represents the uni-
screening as part of a battery of measures submitted by several
versity student population; Option C); 2) most doubt climate
psychology labs in the university department distributed during
change is occurring (doubtful model; Option D), 3) most are in the
the first two weeks of classes. A subset of the initial 1148 partici-
middle of the distribution (disengaged model; Option B), 4) a
pants from the pre-screening were recruited based upon their
bimodal distribution (polarized model; Option E) and 5) people are
opinions about climate change and their perception of other stu-
equally distributed across all six possibilities (rectangular model,
dents' opinions about climate change (measures are described in
Option A). Pilot testing indicated that respondents understood the
sections 5.1.3.1 and 5.1.3.2) We did not recruit those who indicated
meanings of the different graphs and suggested that Option A in-
that they were “Doubtful” or a “Nonbeliever” in order to study self-
dicates uncertainty or lack of an ability to decide.
silencing among those who hold the majority opinion. Perceptions
As noted above, we recruited participants to adequately repre-
of other students' opinions were used to select an adequate rep-
sent participants who endorsed each of the four distributions
resentation of the four categories of opinion perceptions which
assessed in the study. We did not recruit the respondents who
made up the primary predictor variable in the present study.
chose the rectangular distribution because few endorsed this dis-
Respondents were 305 undergraduate students (124 males, 180
tribution in pilot testing and our predictions were about compari-
females, and one student who did not indicate gender) enrolled in
son among respondents who chose the other four distributions. We
introductory psychology classes at Pennsylvania State University.
did not use responses on perceptions of the American public's
The average age was 20 (range 18e48), and most students (76%)
opinions to guide participant recruitment. This resulted in the in-
identified as White, with the largest three ethnic minority groups
clusion of a few participants who had selected the rectangular
being Asian (8%), Hispanic (6%), and Black (5%). Politically, more
distribution for perceptions of the American public's opinions
students were liberal (34%) than conservative (19%), with 36%
(n ¼ 7). These seven participants were removed from all analyses
describing themselves as moderate and 7% as libertarian.
which involved this variable.

6.1.2. Procedure
6.1.4. Survey measures
Approximately six weeks after completing pre-screening mea-
The survey measures were assessed six weeks after the pre-
sures, participants were directed to an online survey. Participants
screening measures detailed above.
were instructed to imagine the following scenario:
You are assigned a group class project in your Intro to English 6.1.4.1. Anticipated evaluations by others (proposed mediators).
class at Penn State. You are in a group with 4 other people, and Participants rated their expectations of being perceived as warm
you decide to meet together in the library to work on this (friendly, fun, good-natured, likeable, nice; a ¼ 0.89) and compe-
project. After a few productive hours of work, your group begins tent (competent, responsible, intelligent, level-headed, successful;
to get distracted. The topic of the weather comes up. You are a ¼ 0.76) (each on a 2 “Very Unlikely” to 2 “Very Likely” scale) if
 N. Geiger, J.K. Swim / Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90 83

Fig. 1. Opinion distribution answer choices in Study 1. Those who chose Option A were not recruited to participate in the study.

they were to talk about climate change. We also assessed expec- 6.2.2. Pluralistic ignorance and discussions
tations of appearing as a complainer, an alarmist, and an environ- Perceptions about undergraduates' opinions were associated
mentalist to analyze since expectations about being disliked (i.e., with willingness to discuss climate change, F(3, 301) ¼ 2.96,
perceived as cold) might be grounded in expectations about being p ¼ 0.03, h2 ¼ .03.1 Contrast tests compared those who accurately
categorized in one or more of these groups. Similar to expectations perceived that most undergraduates were concerned about climate
of being perceived as warm (as presented below), results show null change versus each of the other three possible inaccurate percep-
results for relationships between these variables and perceptions of tions. As hypothesized, those who inaccurately perceived that most
others' opinions. Thus, to simplify presentation of results, we do not undergraduates were doubtful about climate change were signifi-
present analyses related to these variables. cantly less willing to discuss climate change (M ¼ 0.85, S.d. ¼ 1.00)
than those who accurately perceived that most undergraduates
were concerned (M ¼ 0.23, S.d. ¼ 1.15), p ¼ 0.004, h2p ¼ 0.03. In
6.1.4.2. Willingness to discuss climate change (proposed outcome). contrast, those who inaccurately perceived that most un-
Following other research measuring willingness to discuss dergraduates were disengaged (M ¼ 0.40, S.d ¼ 1.11), or polarized
controversial topics (e.g. Noelle-Neumann, 1993; Scheufele, in their opinions (M ¼ 0.44, S.d ¼ 1.24), were not statistically less
Shanahan, & Lee, 2001), respondents answered the question, willing to discuss the topic than those with accurate opinions
“How likely would you be to discuss climate change in the above (ps > 0.25), although the difference was in the expected direction.
situation?” (2 “Very Unlikely” to 2 “Very Likely”). Responses were We conducted a separate ANOVA to examine whether percep-
normally distributed (skewness ¼ 0.23, kurtosis ¼ 1.00), sug- tions of the American public's opinions were related to willingness
gesting that ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques to discuss climate change. In contrast to the above findings with
would be appropriate for data analysis. perceptions of undergraduates' opinions, perceptions of the
American public's opinions were not related to willingness to talk
about climate change, F(3, 294) ¼ 0.37, p ¼ 0.77, h2 ¼ 0.004.
6.2. Results

6.2.1. Overview
6.2.3. Impression management
We used one-way ANOVAs to test whether perceptions of a)
Perceptions of other undergraduates' opinions were associated
other undergraduates' and b) the American public's opinions are
with expectations about appearing competent, F(3, 300) ¼ 4.31,
related to i) willingness to discuss climate change and ii) antici-
p ¼ 0.005, h2 ¼ 0.04, but not with expectations about appearing
pated evaluations by others. The independent variable corre-
sponded to the four opinion distributions the respondent chose for
the relevant target group. We next conducted mediation analyses 1
For this and all other analyses presented below, we examined whether results
to test whether anticipated evaluations mediated the relation be- were moderated by participants' personal opinion about climate change. We found
tween opinion perceptions and willingness to discuss climate no significant interaction effects in any analyses, ps > 0.17, perhaps partly due to the
change. restricted range of opinions among participants recruited to be in this sample.
84 N. Geiger, J.K. Swim / Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90

warm, F(3, 300) ¼ 1.65, p ¼ 0.18, h2 ¼ 0.02. Contrast tests again omitted the variable corresponding to perceptions of the American
compared those who accurately perceived that most un- public's opinions from these analyses because the prior analyses
dergraduates were concerned about climate change versus each of showed that this variable was unrelated to the other variables in
the other three possible inaccurate perceptions. As hypothesized, the mediation analysis.
participants who believed that most undergraduates were doubtful As shown in Fig. 2, those who believed most other students
about climate change expected to appear less competent (M ¼ 0.46, doubted climate change were less willing to discuss the topic than
S.d. ¼ 0.65) than undergraduates who held more accurate percep- those who believed most other students were concerned because
tions (M ¼ 0.81, S.d. ¼ 0.52), p ¼ 0.001, h2p ¼ 0.04. Undergraduates the former expected to be perceived as less competent in a dis-
who held the more accurate perception also perceived that others cussion than did the latter, indirect effect ¼ 0.09, SE ¼ 0.06, 95% CI
would perceive them as more competent than those who believed [0.01, 0.25], while expectations of appearing warm did not play a
others were disengaged (M ¼ 0.60, S.d ¼ 0.54), p ¼ 0.01, h2p ¼ 0.02, role in this process, indirect effect ¼ 0.01, SE ¼ 0.03, 95% CI [0.02,
but not more than undergraduates who believed others were 0.11].
mostly polarized, (M ¼ 0.69, S.d. ¼ 0.53), p ¼ 0.16.
We conducted separate ANOVAs to examine whether percep- 6.3. Discussion
tions of the American public's opinions were related to expecta-
tions of appearing warm or competent. In contrast to perceptions of Among students who do not doubt climate change, those who
other undergraduates' opinions, perceptions of the American endorse the misperception that most others doubt climate change
public's opinions were not related to expectations of appearing were less likely to engage in discussions about climate change than
competent, F(3, 294) ¼ 2.02, p ¼ 0.11, h2 ¼ 0.02, or expectations of those who held accurate perceptions of others' opinions. In
appearing warm, F(3, 294) ¼ 0.09, p ¼ 0.97, h2 ¼ .001. contrast, those who held other types of inaccurate perceptionsd-
that others are disengaged or polarizedewere not significantly less
6.2.4. Mediation analyses willing to discuss climate change than those who held the accurate
We used PROCESS with 5000 bootstraps to conduct a perception. The lack of statistical significance in differences be-
regression-based parallel mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013, Model tween these two groups and those who believed others were
4) testing whether the observed difference between those who concerned prevented us from making any conclusions about dif-
believed other students were concerned and those who believed ferences among these three groups. However, examining the mean
other students were doubtful was explained by perceptions of values for each of the four groups leads to the speculation that the
appearing warm or competent. We created the following dummy effect on perceptions of others' opinions on self-silencing is a
code based on participants' perceptions of other students to test matter of degree: the more an individual's perception diverges
this relationship: concerned ¼ 0, disinterested ¼ 0, polarized ¼ 0, from the reality that others share their concern about climate
doubtful ¼ 1 (entered as the independent variable) and included change, the more hesitant they may be to speak up. Future research
the following two other dummy coded variables as covariates in the could consider assessing perceptions of others' opinions as a
mediation model to control for other possibilities examined in the continuous variable to examine whether the relationship between
ANOVA: a) concerned ¼ 0, disinterested ¼ 1, polarized ¼ 0, perceptions of others' opinions and self-silencing best fits a linear
doubtful ¼ 0 and b) concerned ¼ 0, disinterested ¼ 0, pattern or if there is a certain tipping point upon which individuals
polarized ¼ 1, doubtful ¼ 0 (see Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, become more likely to self-silence.
2003). We entered a) perceptions of appearing warm and b) per- Results also show that the reason that those who believe that
ceptions of appearing competent as parallel mediators and will- most others doubt climate change are less willing to discuss the
ingness to discuss climate change as the dependent variable. We topic than those who accurately perceive others' opinions is

Fig. 2. Expectations of appearing competent and warm as mediators of the effects between the perceived opinions of others and willingness to discuss climate change in Study 1.
Higher values on Perceived Opinions of Others indicate more accurate perceptions of others' opinions. See text for a full description of how these variables were entered into the
model. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; þ p ¼ 0.056.
 N. Geiger, J.K. Swim / Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90 85

because the former expect to lose respect (appear less competent) In addition to these added dimensions, we also altered a key
in a discussion, and not because they expect to be disliked aspect of the design from Study 1 to increase the external validity of
(perceived as less warm). This suggests that many individuals are our study: in contrast to the hypothetical situation used in Study 1,
uncomfortable engaging in discussions about climate change with a participants learned that they would actually speak about climate
dissenting audience because they believe that they do not have the change in a classroom setting. This has been shown to enhance the
ability to do so, rather than being concerned about appearing so- validity of findings related to willingness to discuss a topic
cially deviant or hostile. (Scheufele et al., 2001).

7. Study 2 7.1. Methods

Study 2 tested whether experimentally manipulating percep- 7.1.1. Participants

tions of others' opinions would affect willingness to discuss climate Participants were 194 students recruited from Pennsylvania
change. Most published research on pluralistic ignorance is corre- State University introductory psychology classes, made up of 105
lational; to our knowledge, only one study has experimentally males, 88 females, and one who did not indicate gender. Most
manipulated perceptions of others' opinions (opinions about students (73%) identified as White, with the largest three ethnic
drinking behavior; Schroeder & Prentice, 1998). Similarly, although minority groups being Asian (10%), Black (6%), and Hispanic (6%).
research on the spiral of silence links perceptions of others' opin- Politically, more students reported being liberal (33%) than con-
ions to willingness to speak out on topics (Glynn & Huge, 2014; servative (22%), with 33% identifying as moderate and 9% as liber-
Noelle-Neumann, 1993), to our knowledge only one publication tarian. Most students (74%) reported that at least one of their
has experimentally manipulated perceptions of others' opinions to parents had a 4-year college degree or higher.
verify that these perceptions exert a direct causal influence on
willingness to discuss topics (Rios & Chen, 2014). Other research, 7.1.2. Procedure
however, points to the effects of manipulating perceptions of others Participants reported to a classroom along with 10e23 others.
opinions on behaviors; for example, relative to information indi- They completed a brief survey assessing their personal concern
cating that others are not prejudiced, information that indicates about climate change and then answered the same question using
others are prejudiced increases participants' discriminatory an electronic clicker allegedly so that they could “get a feel for what
behavior (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). Thus, in Study 2, we extend the classroom thinks as a whole.” The first independent variable in
this research by examining whether manipulating perceptions of the 2(others' current opinions) x 2(changes in others' opinions over
other's opinions about climate changeethereby reinforcing or time) was introduced, as follows. The experimenter displayed a
correcting pluralistic ignoranceeinfluences willingness to discuss graph that allegedly showed the class clicker responses. However,
climate change. In addition, we reassess expectations of appearing participants were actually randomly assigned to view one of two
warm and competent to test whether manipulating pluralistic previously created graphs that indicated that either: a) most others
ignorance affects willingness to discuss climate change via in the classroom were concerned about climate change, or b) most
increasing expectations of being liked or respected by others. others in the classroom were unconcerned about climate change.
We add two additional dimensions to the design of Study 2. To ensure that participants understood the graph's meaning, the
First, we expand our sample to include people with a full range of experimenter explained the graph to the participants. The second
beliefs about climate change, thereby including those who disagree independent variable was introduced through this description: the
with the scientific view on climate change as well as those who are experimenter described the results as either indicating that
concerned about climate change. We include the full range to test concern was a) increasing or b) decreasing from previous years. All
whether correcting inaccurate perceptions that few are concerned participants within a single timeslot were exposed to the same
about climate change reduces willingness to discuss the topic experimental condition.
among those who do not share the scientific view on climate After viewing the graph, participants were informed that they
change relative to exacerbating the incorrect perception that would separate into small groups and have a discussion about
overestimates the extent to which others' share their doubts climate change. Before doing so, they completed a second survey,
(Leviston et al., 2013). That is, we test whether the same informa- which assessed anticipated evaluations by others and willingness
tion provides inverse effects for those who doubt versus those who to participate in the discussion, as well as anticipatory affect
are concerned about climate change. Those who doubt climate measures which we analyzed for a different research project. After
change may also harbor concerns about expressing their opinions the survey, participants conducted a group discussion about
about the topic because people also report negative impressions of climate change and completed additional surveys which we
this group consistent with low warmth (Swim & Geiger, 2016b) e analyzed for the additional research project mentioned.
perceiving them as arrogant, aggressive, and dictatorial.
Second, we examined the effects of whether participants were 7.1.3. Measures
led to believe that concern about climate change was increasing or 7.1.3.1. Personal opinion about climate change. Participants self-
decreasing. Spiral of Silence theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1993) and categorized into one of the groups presented in Study 1, with the
previous research (Petri c & Pinter, 2002; Taylor, 1982) suggest that modification that the Cautious option was not presented because
perceptions of changing opinions affect willingness to discuss the electronic clicker we used as a prop only had five buttons.
topics such that individuals may be more willing to discuss topics
when they believe their opinion will become more popular in the 7.1.3.2. Anticipated evaluations by others. Using the same items as
future than when they think their opinion will become less popular Study 1, participants rated their expectations of being perceived as
in the future. Yet, to our knowledge, the causal relationship be- warm (a ¼ 0.83) and competent (a ¼ 0.75) in the upcoming dis-
tween these two variables has not been demonstrated in an cussion about climate change. As in Study 1, we also assessed ex-
experimental study. In Study 2, we test whether participants led to pectations of appearing as an environmentalist, an alarmist, and as
believe that their opinion about climate change is increasing report a complainer. Again, results show null results for relationships
greater willingness to discuss the topic than those led to believe between these variables and perceptions of others' opinions, so we
that their opinion about climate change is decreasing. do not present analyses related to these variables in the results to
86 N. Geiger, J.K. Swim / Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90

Table 1
Effects of others' alleged opinions, changes in others alleged opinions over time, and participants' own opinions on dependent measures (Study 2).

Independent Variables Willingness to discuss Expectations of appearing Expectations of appearing

climate change competent warm

B SE h2p B SE h2p B SE h2p

Step 1
Others concerned (vs. unconcerned) 0.20 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.01
Concern increasing (vs. decreasing) 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.00
Personal opinion (more concerned) 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.04** 0.08 0.05 0.01
Step 2
Others concerned  personal opinion 0.41 0.17 0.04* 0.23 0.09 0.04* 0.18 0.10 0.02
Concern increasing  personal opinion 0.11 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.01
Others concerned  concern increasing 0.30 0.27 0.01 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.21 0.17 0.01
Step 3
Others concerned  concern increasing  personal opinion 0.64 0.33 0.02 0.25 0.18 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.00

**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.

simplify the presentation. them as more competent in the discussion when they believed
others shared their opinions (vs. did not share their opinions)
7.1.3.3. Willingness to discuss climate change. Similar to Study 1, (Fig. 3). In contrast, being led to believe that concern was increasing
Study 2 participants answered the question: “Please indicate your (vs. decreasing) did not influence expectations of appearing
willingness to participate in the group discussion on climate competent and this effect was not moderated by participants'
change,” (2 “Very Hesitant” to 2 “Very Willing”). Again, this var- concern about the topic, ps > 0.10.
iable was normally distributed (skewness ¼ 0.34, The effect of others' alleged opinions about climate change on
kurtosis ¼ 0.23), suggesting that OLS regression techniques were expectations of appearing warm was marginally moderated by
appropriate for data analysis. participants' own concern about the topic, b ¼ .18, SE ¼ 0.10,
p ¼ 0.08.2 As before, students being led to believe that concern was
7.2. Results increasing (vs. decreasing) did not predict expectations of appear-
ing warm and this null relationship was not moderated by partic-
7.2.1. Overview ipants' concern about the topic, ps > 0.10.
We first tested the hypotheses that the effects of both experi-
mental manipulations would be moderated by personal opinions 7.2.4. Mediation analyses
about climate change. We conducted a three-step hierarchical We conducted a conditional mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013,
regression procedure (Cohen et al., 2003) to examine main effects model 8 with 5000 bootstraps) to explore whether the interaction
and interactions, entering a) students' willingness to discuss between others' alleged opinions and personal opinions on will-
climate change and b) anticipated evaluations by others were ingness to discuss climate change was mediated by expectations of
regressed on i) others' current alleged opinions, ii) whether par- appearing competent or warm. As shown in Fig. 4, expectations
ticipants were informed that concern was increasing or decreasing, about appearing competent, but not expectations of appearing
and iii) personal opinions about climate change in Step 1, all two- warm, mediated the relation between the interaction between
way interactions in Step 2, and the three-way interaction (for undergraduates' opinions and of others' alleged opinions and
exploratory purposes) in Step 3 (see Table 1). We next conducted a willingness to discuss climate change. Spotlight analyses revealed
conditional mediation analysis to examine whether the mediation that those who were concerned about climate change were more
findings in Study 1 would replicate for those upon both ends of the willing to discuss climate change when they were led to believe
opinion spectrum. that others were concerned (vs. not concerned) because they
believed they would be perceived as more competent when others
shared their views, indirect effect b ¼ 0.06, SE ¼ 0.05, 95% CI [0.004,
7.2.2. Pluralistic ignorance and discussions
0.156]. In contrast, those who were doubtful about climate change
The effect of others' alleged opinions about climate change on
were less willing to discuss climate change when they believed
willingness to discuss climate change was moderated by partici-
others were concerned (vs. not concerned) because they believed
pants' own concern about the topic, b ¼ 0.41, SE ¼ 0.16, p ¼ 0.01
they would be perceived as less competent when others disagreed
(Table 1). As predicted, undergraduates were more willing to
with their views, indirect effect b ¼ 0.15, SE ¼ 0.10, 95% CI
discuss the topic when they were led to believe others would share
[0.36, .02].
their opinion than when they were led to believe they would not
(see Fig. 3). The effect of the manipulation was of similar magnitude
7.3. Discussion
(but of opposite direction) for participants of opposing opinions.
In contrast, students who were led to believe that concern was
Results replicate and extend Study 1 findings that concerned
increasing (vs. decreasing) were no more willing to discuss climate
participants are less willing to discuss climate change when they
change and this effect was not moderated by participants' own
believe others do not share their concern (vs. share their concern).
concern about the topic, ps > 0.10.
Study 2 results extend this finding by revealing that this effect
applies to those upon both ends of the opinion spectrum. Similarly,
7.2.3. Impression management
The effect of others' alleged opinions about climate change on
expectations of appearing competent was moderated by partici- 2
As anticipated, this trend was driven by participants expecting that others
pants' own concern about the topic, b ¼ .23, SE ¼ 0.09, p ¼ 0.01. As would perceive them as warmer when they believed that others shared their
hypothesized, participants expected that others would perceive opinions (vs. did not share their opinions).
 N. Geiger, J.K. Swim / Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90 87

Fig. 3. Effect of perceived opinion climate on a) willingness to discuss climate change and b) expectations of being perceived as competent among participants with different
personal opinions about climate change. (Study 2). Values, simple difference tests and standard error bars depicted in the figure were assessed using simple slopes analyses.

Study 2 results replicate and extend Study 1 findings that con- with those who disagree (vs. agree) with them. Study 2 reveals that
cerned participants self-silence because they expect to be this effect occurs for those upon both ends of the opinion spectrum.
perceived as less competent in a conversation about climate change Study 2 further reveals that self-silencing among those concerned

Fig. 4. Expectations of appearing competent and warm as mediators of the effects between opinion congruence and willingness to discuss climate change in Study 2. Perceived
Opinions of Others  Personal Opinion reflects the degree to which one's opinion is congruent with perceptions of others' opinions, with higher values reflecting higher perceived
opinion congruence than lower values. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
88 N. Geiger, J.K. Swim / Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90

about climate change can be countered by providing accurate in- 8.1. Impression management and self-silencing
formation: those who hold the majority opinion are more willing to
share their opinion when pluralistic ignorance is corrected (vs. The present research indicates that impression management
exacerbated) by providing accurate information. In contrast, this concerns about losing respect (appearing less competent), but not
accurate information is likely to silence the minority if they pre- concerns about being disliked (appearing less warm), explain self-
viously believed that their view was more common than it actually silencing on the topic of climate change. These results differ from
was. previous research on confronting prejudice which revealed the
In contrast to our predictions, there were no effects related to silencing effect of concerns about being disliked (e.g., Shelton &
whether participants were led to believe concern was increasing Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance,
(vs. decreasing). These results suggest that perceptions that others' 2001). As we describe in the introduction, impression manage-
opinions are changing to become more (vs. less) like one's own ment concerns related to not being respected may play a role in
opinion do not appear to influence willingness to speak up. Instead, self-silencing on climate change due to the scientific nature of the
perceptions that others' current opinions differ from one's own topic.
reduce willingness to engage in discussion. These impression management concerns suggest that
improving individuals' confidence in their ability to talk about
8. General discussion climate change (i.e., self-efficacy) could also counteract the negative
effects of perceiving themselves to be in the minority by allowing
The present research demonstrates the effects of pluralistic individuals to overcome expectations of appearing incompetent.
ignorance in promoting public silence on the socially relevant This idea is supported by correlational research suggesting that
topic of climate change. Study 1 results reveal the costs of those with greater self-efficacy about their ability to discuss climate
pluralistic ignorance on discussion about climate change among change discuss the topic more frequently (Swim et al., 2014) and
those who do not doubt the science. Survey respondents who did experimental research showing that watching short videos about
not themselves doubt climate change were less willing to discuss climate change which increase individuals' self-efficacy about their
the topic when they inaccurately believed fellow students would ability to contribute to conversations bolster willingness to engage
not share their opinion than when they accurately perceived they in discussions about the topic (Geiger, Swim, & Fraser, 2016). In-
were in the majority. Study 2 results show that when accurate dividuals could potentially increase their confidence about dis-
portrayals of others' beliefs were presented, those who were cussing climate change through learning about the mechanisms by
concerned about climate change were more willing to discuss the which climate change is occurring (e.g., Ramney & Clark, 2016) or
topic relative to concerned individuals led to inaccurately believe receiving information that most scientists agree that human caused
that others would not share their views. Both studies show that climate change is occurring (e.g., Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016),
the reason individuals are more willing to discuss climate change possibilities which could be tested in future research. Confidence
when they perceive that others agree than when they perceive could also be obtained via observing others competently discuss
that others disagree is because they expected to be respected climate change. These role models could decrease concerns about
more (i.e., appear more competent) by the former audience. In appearing incompetent because they could illustrate how to talk
contrast, expectations of being liked (i.e., appearing warm) do not about climate change (Geiger et al., 2016). Observing high status
play a role facilitating discussion in either study. individuals discuss climate change could be another potential
Our findings have practical implications for those who seek to buffer to expectations of appearing incompetent. Incorporating
facilitate greater public engagement with climate change among more high-status characters who discuss climate change into the
the majority of the population that express concern about climate media (e.g., Cameron, Weintraub, & Schwarzenegger, 2014;
change. One way to promote discussion is to correct pluralistic Cornwell, Bajger, & Higgins, 2015) or promoting greater public
ignorance, informing them that a majority of others share their discussion among those holding positions of power (Corner, 2014)
concern. In contrast, correcting pluralistic ignorance is likely to could encourage others to follow their lead. Last, altered social
reduce discussion among those who are not concerned about norms could encourage conversations about climate change if the
climate change. Thus, while the correction of pluralistic ignorance norms promoted discussion about aspects of the topic that were
could increase participation by the silenced majority group it could more accessible to nonscientists, thus increasing individuals' self-
decrease participation by those holding minority opinions if the efficacy about contributing to these conversations.
minority opinion holders previously believed that they were in the
majority, which may not be desirable to those interested in hearing 8.2. Future directions
what individuals who reject the scientific consensus believe.
Consistent with previous research (Larimer, 2010; Oshagan, Future research might address alternate contexts in which ex-
1996), our results suggest that correcting pluralistic ignorance pectations of being disliked following an interaction would play a
may only be effective at facilitating discussion when the opinions of role in silencing. In the present research, Study 1 involved a hy-
the audience with whom one will discuss the topic are made pothetical situation and Study 2 involved a setting where partici-
salient, rather than the opinions of the general American public. pants did not anticipate repeated interactions with the audience in
This points to a practical weakness of accurately informing in- the future. Expectations of being disliked may play a greater role in
dividuals of others' opinions: given geographic and political po- self-silencing in situations where extended contact with others is
larization of climate change concern (Howe, Mildenbarger, Marlon expected. Contexts more similar to those found in the prejudice
& Leiserowitz, 2015), in some subgroups a majority of people are literature could also lead to increased salience of expectations of
unconcerned about climate change. Thus, informing members of being disliked. For instance, in some contexts speaking up about
these subgroups that a majority of others are concerned about climate change would require confronting another's environmen-
climate change may be unbelievable or may be disconfirmed if they tally harmful behavior. In this context, individuals may self-silence
talk about climate change within their subgroup. In these situa- out of concern of being appearing hostile and unfriendly (i.e., cold).
tions, it may be more effective to instead focus on decreasing ex- Individuals may also expect to be disliked or rejected from a group
pectations about losing respect from these audiences in a if speaking up required directly arguing with an in-group member
discussion, as we describe below. who denies the existence of anthropogenic climate change.
 N. Geiger, J.K. Swim / Journal of Environmental Psychology 47 (2016) 79e90 89

Future research might examine whether individual differences Foundation, Grant Number DUE-1239775 to NEAq. Portions of this
moderate effects. Those who are high self-monitors (Snyder, 1974), paper were presented at the German Environmental Association
for instance, may be more likely than others to self-silence due to a Conference in Magdeburg, Germany.
greater tendency to attend to audience opinions. Participant age We would like to thank Gamliel Sassoon and Kayla Warner for
might also moderate the findings: older participants may have their assistance in collecting data and Stephan Lewandowsky and
more practice negotiating difficult interactions or be less influenced two anonymous reviewers for their feedback on the paper.
by peer pressure than the university age students in the present
sample (Sears, 1986). The ubiquity of climate change silence among
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