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INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

Perception

JADUNATH SINHA

•©7
* Fratv^
 First published in 1934
by Routledge, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd

Reprinted in 1999 , 2000 , 2001

by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 0 X 14 4 RN

Transferred to Digital Printing 2007

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

© 1934 Jadunath Sinha

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced

or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying
and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without
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of the works reprinted in the International Library of Psychology.
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These reprints are taken from original copies of each book. In many cases
the condition of these originals is not perfect. The publisher has gone to
great lengths to ensure the quality of these reprints, but wishes to point
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book
is available from the British Library

Indian Psychology
ISBN 0415 - 21113-1
Psychology and Religion: 6 Volumes
ISBN 0415 - 21133-6
The International Library of Psychology: 204 Volumes
ISBN 0415 - 19132-7
 CONTENTS
PAG £

P reface . . . . . . . xv

BOOK I

CH A PTER I

T he P h y s ic a l B a s is of P e r c e p t io n i

Introduction— The Nature of the Sense-organs— The

Buddhist— The Jaina— The Samkhya— The Origin of the
Sense-organs— The Principal and Subordinate Organs—
The Vrtti of the Sense-organs— Susruta and Caraka— The
Vedanta— The Nature of the Sense-organs— The NySya-
Vaisesika— The Mimamsaka— Are the Karmendriyas really
Sense-organs ?— Are there three Internal Organs ?— Is the
Manas a Sense-organ ?— The External Organs and Internal
Organ or Organs— Are the External Sense-organs Prapyakari
or Aprapyakari ?— The Buddhist— The Nyaya-Vaisesika—
The Samkhya— The Mimamsaka— The Vedantist— Axe the
External Sense-organs Physical (bhautika) or Psychical
(ahamkarika) ?— Is there only one Sense-organ ?— Is the
Tactual Organ the only Sense-organ ?

BOOK II

CH A PTER II

I ndeterm in a t e P e r c e p t io n and D e t e r m in a t e P e r c e p t io n 31

Introduction— Samkara— T h e Buddhist— T h e M lm am -

saka— T h e Samkhya— T h e Vaisesika— T h e N aiyayika—
The Neo-Naiyayika— The Neo-Samkarite— Ramanuja—
Madhva and Vallabha— The Sabdika— The Naiyayika
Criticism of the Sabdika View— Proof of the Existence of
Indeterminate Perception— Proof of the Existence of
Determinate Perception— The Nyaya-Vaisesika Analysis of
Definite and Determinate Perception— Does Determinate
Perception involve Inference ?
V
VI CO NTENTS

CH A PTER III

T he O b je c t s a n d C o n d it io n s o f P e r c e p t io n .

The Objects of Perception— Olfactory Perception—

Gustatory Perception— Auditory Perception— Visual Per­
ception— Tactual Perception— Internal Perception—
Common Sensibles— The Condition of Knowledge— The
General Conditions of External Perception— The Conditions
of the Visual Perception of Colour— The Conditions of
Tactual, Olfactory, and Gustatory Perception.

BO O K III

CH APTER IV

P e r c e p t io n and Sa n n ik a r s a . . . . . .

Introduction— The earlier Nyaya-Vaisesika— The later

Nyaya-Vaisesika— Samanya-Laksana-Sannikarsa— JnSna-
Laksana-Sannikarsa— Yogaja-Sannikarsa— The Mimam­
saka— The Samkarite— The other Schools of Vedanta.

CH A PTER V

A c q u ir e d P e r c e p t io n . . . . . . .

Introduction— The Jaina— The §amkara-Vedantist— The

Nyaya-Vaisesika.

CH A PTER VI

R e c o g n it io n . . . . . . . . .

The Nature of Recognition— The Buddhist— The Ny2ya-

Vais'esika— The Mimamsaka— The £amkara-Vedantist—
The Jaina— The Jaina Criticism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika
View— The Jaina Criticism of the Buddhist View.

BO O K IV

CH A PTER V II

T h e o r ie s of P e r c e p t io n . . . . . . .

The Buddhist Theory of Perception— The Jaina Theory of

Perception— The Naiyayika Theory of Perception— The
Neo-Naiyayika Theory of Perception— the Mimamsaka
Theory of Perception.
 CO NTENTS vii

CH A PTER V III

T h e o r ie s of P e r c e p t i o n (continued) . . . . 1 1 7

The Samkhya Theory of Perception— The Place and Function

of the Sense-organs— The Function of the External
Sense-organs— The Function of the Manas— The Function
of Ahamkara— The Function of Buddhi— The Unity of the
Functions of the Internal Organs— The Relation of the
External Sense-organs to the Internal Organ— The Purusa as
the Transcendental Principle in Perception— The Relation
of the Sense-organs to the Purusa— The Conditions of Per­
ception— The Vedanta Theory of Perception— The Identi­
fication of Pramana-caitanya with Prameya-caitanya— The
Identification of Pramatr-caitanya with Pramana-caitanya—
The Internal Perception— The Identity of Locus of the
Mental Mode and the Object— The Identity of the Time-
position of the Mental Mode and the Object— The Fitness
of the Object— The Different Kinds of Perception— The
Function of Antahkarana and the Sense-organs in Per­
ception— The Vedantist Doctrine of Vrtti— Objections to
the Vedantist Doctrine of Vrtti considered.

BOOK V

CH A PTER IX

P e r c e p t io n of S pace and M o vem ent . . . . 1 4 1

Introduction— The Mimamsaka— Direct Auditory Per­

ception of Direction— Direct Auditory Perception of
Distance and Position— The Mimamsaka Explanation of the
Extra-organic Localization of Sounds— The Buddhist
Explanation of the Extra-organic Localization of Sounds—
The Mimamsaka Criticism of the Buddhist View— Per­
ception of Movement— The Prabhakara— The Bhatta
Mimamsaka— The Vaisesika.

CH APTER X

P e r c e p t io n of T im e . . . . . . . 1 49

Introduction— Is Time an Object of Perception ?— No

Perception of Time as an Independent Entity— Perception
of the Present— The Sensible Present is Instantaneous (The
Buddhist View)— The Sensible Present has Duration (The
Naiyayika and the Vedantist View).
viii CONTENTS

CH A PTER X I

P e r c e p tio n o f t h e U n iv e r s a l (Jati) . . . * 1 6 3

Introduction— The Buddhist Doctrine of Nominalism—

The Buddhist Criticism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Realism—
The Buddhist Criticism of the Srotriya View— The Buddhist
Criticism of the Bhatta Realism— The Buddhist’s Refutation
of the Realist’s Objections— The Modified Nominalism of
the Jaina— The Jaina Criticism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika
Realism— The Jaina Refutation of the Mimamsaka
Objections— The Modified Nominalism of Ramanuja— The
Modified Conceptualism of Kanada— The Nyaya-VaiSesika
Realism— The Psychological Basis of Realism— Perception
of the Universal— The Nyaya-Vaisesika Criticism of
Buddhist Nominalism— The Prabhakara Realism— The
Bhatta Realism— The Bhatta Criticism of the Buddhist
Doctrine— The Bhatta Criticism of the Jaina Doctrine—
The Bhatta Criticism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Doctrine— The
Bhatta Criticism of Prabhakara’s Objections— The Bhatta
Doctrine of Identity-in-DifFerence— The Modified Realism
of Samkara.

CH APTER X II

P e r c e p t io n of C o g n it io n . . . . . 19 9

Introduction— The Bhatta Mimamsaka— The Nyaya-

Vaisesika Criticism of the Bhatta Doctrine— The Jaina
Criticism of the Bhatta Doctrine— The Ramanujist’s
Criticism of the Bhatta Doctrine— Another School of
Mimamsa— Criticism of the Doctrine— Prabhakara—
Criticism of Prabhakara’s Doctrine— The Nyaya-Vaisesika—
The Jaina Criticism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Doctrine— The
Samkhya-Patanjala— The Samkara-Vedantist— Ramanuja’s
Criticism of Samkara’s Doctrine.

CH A PTER X III

P e r c e p t io n of the Self . . . . . . 222

Introduction— The Carvaka— The Buddhist Idealist— The

Naiyayika— The Naiyayika’s Criticism of the Bhatta
Mimamsaka View— The Naiyayika’s Criticism of Samkara’s
View— The Vaisesika— The Samkhya— Patanjala—
The Bhatta Mimamsaka— The Bhatta’s Criticism of
the Naiyayika Doctrine— The Bhatta’s Criticism of Prabha­
kara’s Doctrine— The Bhatta’s Criticism of &amkara’s
 CO NTENTS ix
PAGE
Doctrine— The Prabhakara Mimamsaka— Prabhakara’s
Criticism of Samkara’s View— Prabhakara’s Criticism of
Kumarila’s View— The Jaina— The Upanisads— The
Samkara-Vedantist— The Self and Consciousness— Samkara
and Prabhakara— Jlva and Atman— Samkara’s View of
Atmapratyaksa— The later Samkarites’ View of Atmaprat­
yaksa— The Ramanuja-Vedantist— Comparison of the
Different Views.

BO O K VI

CH A PTER X IV

I n d e f in it e P e r c e p t io n s . . . . . . 263

Different Kinds of Indefinite Perceptions— Samsaya— Uha—

Samsaya and Uha— AnadhyavasSya—-SamSaya and Anadhya-
vasaya.

CH APTER X V

I l l u sio n s . ..................................................................................... 2 7 2

Introduction— Different Kinds of Illusions— AnubhuyamanS-

ropa viparyaya and smaryamanaropa viparyaya— Indriyaja
bhranti (Illusion) and ManasI bhranti (Hallucination)—
Different Causes of Illusions— Psychological Analysis of
an Illusion— Prabhakara’s Analysis— The Nyaya-Vaisesika
Analysis — The Samkara-Vedantist’s Analysis— Illusion
(viparyaya) and Doubtful Perception (SamIaya)— Different
Theories of Illusions— The Doctrine of Akhyati— The
Doctrine of Asatkhyati— The Doctrine of Atmakhyati— The
Doctrine of Alaukikakhyati— The Doctrine of Anirvacanlya-
khyati— The Doctrine of Satkhyati— The Doctrine of
Sadasatkhyati— The Doctrine of Prasiddharthakhyati— The
Doctrine of Vivekakhyati— The Doctrine of Anyathakhyati—
Different Theories of Illusion Compared.

CH APTER XVI

D ream s . . . . . . . . . 3 06

The Psychological Character of Dream-Consciousness— The

Presentative Theory of Dreams— The Representative Theory
of Dreams— Prabhakara’s Representative Theory of
Dreams— The Nyaya-Vaisesika Criticism of the Prabhakara
Theory— The Samkarite Criticism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika
X CO N TEN TS

Theory— Dreams, Illusions, and Indefinite Perceptions—

Dreams and Hallucinations— Classification of Dreams—
Caraka’s Classification— The Vaisesika Classification— The
Buddhist Classification— Different Kinds of Dreams—
Dreams due to Peripheral Stimulation (Dream-illusions)—
Dreams due to Subconscious Impressions (Dream-hallucina-
tions)— Dreams as the Fulfilment of Desires (Dream-
hallucinations)— Prophetic or Veridical Dreams— Telepathic
Dreams — Dreams-within-dreams — Physiological Basis of
Dreams— Theories of Dream.

CH A P TER X V II

A bnorm al P e r c e p t io n . . . . . . 324
The Treatment in the Samkhya— The Treatment in the
Ancient Medical Literature— Mechanism of the Visual
Organ— Abnormalities in Visual Perception— Timira (Loss
of Vision)— Abnormalities of Auditory Perception—
Abnormalities in Olfactory Perception— Abnormalities in
Gustatory Perception— Abnormalities in Tactual Per­
ception— Disorders in the Motor Organs— Mental Blindness
(manobadha)— Causes of Sense-disorders and Mental
Disorders.

BOOK V II

CH A PTER X V III

Su per- norm al P e r c e p t io n s . . . . . . 335

Introduction— The Mimamsaka Denial of Yogi-pratyaksa—
The Nyaya-Vaisesika View of Yogipratyaksa— Proof of the
Possibility of Yogipratyaksa— The Nature of Yogi­
pratyaksa— Yogic Perception and Ordinary Perception—
Yogic Perception and Divine Perception— Different Kinds
of Yogipratyaksa— Yuktapratyaksa and Viyuktapratyaksa—
Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa Yogipratyaksa— Samprajnata
Sam5dhi and Asamprajnata Samadhi— Other Kinds of Super­
normal Perception— Arsajnana (Intuition of Sages)— Siddha
Darsana (Occult Perception)— Pratibhajnana (Flash of
Intuition in Ordinary Life)— Yogic Perception of Dharma
(Duty or Moral Law)— The Samkhya— The Patanjala— The
£amkara-Vedantist— The Buddhist— The Jaina— The Jaina
Criticism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Doctrine of Yogic Intuition
—The Jaina Doctrine of Omniscience— The MlmSmsaka’s
Objections to the Jaina View of Omniscience— The Jaina
Refutation of the Mlmamsaka’s Objections.
 CO NTENTS xi

CH A PTER X IX

D iv in e P e r c e p t io n . . . . . . . 368
Patanjali’s Proof of Divine Omniscience— The Naiyayika
View of the Nature of Divine Knowledge— Divine Know­
ledge and Human Knowledge— Divine Omniscience and
Human Illusions.

CH A PTER X X

J iv a -S a k s ip r a t y a k s a and I s v a r a s a k s i- P ratyaksa . 373

The Samkara-Vedantist— The Jiva and the Jiva-sSksin—
Isvara and Isvara-sSksin.

Index 377
This page intentionally left blank
 ABBREVIATIONS
B.I. = Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta.
B.S. = Brahma Sutra of Badarayana.
BhP. = BhSsapariccheda of Visvanatha (Javaji’s edition, Bombay, 1916).
Ch.S.S. = Chawkhamba Sanskrit Series.
E.T . = English translation.
H.I.L. = History of Indian Logic, by S. C. Vidyabhusan (1921).
I.L.A. = Indian Logic and Atomism, by A. B. Keith (1921).
Kir. = Kiranavall of Udayana (Benares, 1885 and 1887).
NB. = Nyayabindu of Dharmaklrti (Benares, 1924).
NBT. = Nyayabindutlka of Dharmottara(Benares, 1924).
NBh. = Nyayabhasya of Yatsyayana (Jivananda’s edition, Calcutta,
I9 I9)-
N TD . = NySyatatparyadlpika of Jayasimhasuri (B.I., 1910).
NK. = Nyayakandall of Srldhara (V.S.S., Benares, 1895).
NM . = Nyayamanjari of Jayanta. (V.S.S., Benares, 1895).
NS. = Nyaya Sutra of Gautama (Jlvananda’sedition, Calcutta, 1919).
NV. = Nyayavartika of Udyotkara (B.I., 1887-1904).
NVTT. = Nyayavartikatatparyatlka of Vacaspati Misra (V.S.S., Benares,
1898).
PSPM. = The Prabhakara School of Piirva Mimdmsd by Dr. Ganganatha
Jha (19x1).
PBh. = Prasastapadabhasya (V.S.S., Benares, 1895).
PKM . = Prameyakamalamartanda of Prabhacandra (Javaji’s edition,
Bombay, 1912).
PM S. = Pariksamukhasutra of Manikyanandi (B.I., 1909).
P M Y . = Pariksamukhalaghuvrtti of Anantavirya (B.I., 1909).
PN T. = Pramananayatattvalokalankara of Devasuri.
PP. = Prakaranapancika of Salikanatha (Ch.S.S., 1903-1904).
R.B. = Ramanuja’s Bhasya on Brahma Sutra.
S.B. = Samkara’s Bhasya on Brahma Sutra.
SD. = Sastradlpika of Parthasarathi Misra (Benares, Samvat, 1964).
§DP. = Sastradlpikaprakasa of Sudarsanac2rya (Benares, Samvat, 1964).
S.L. — The Sddholal Lectures on Nyaya by Dr. Ganganatha Jha (in
Indian Thought).
SLS. = Siddhantale^asamgraha of Apyayadlksita (Jlvananda’s edition,
Calcutta, 1897).
SM . = Siddhanta-muktaval! of Vis'vanatha (Javaji’s edition, Bombay,
r9 l6)-
SP. = Saptapadarthi of Sivaditya (Y.S.S., Benares, 1893).
SS. = Samkhyapravacanasutra of Kapila (B.I., 1888).
SK. = Samkhyakarika of Isvarakrsna (Jivananada’s edition, Calcutta,
1911).
SSV. = Samkhyasutravrtti of Aniruddha (B.I., 1888).
SPB. = Samkhyapravacanabhasya (Benares, 1909).
xiii
xiv ABBREVIATIO NS
STK . = Samkhyatattvakaumud! of Vacaspati Misra (with YidvattosinI,
Bombay, Samvat, 1969).
£V. = &lokavartika of Kumarila (Benares, 1898-9).
TA. = Tarkamrta of Jagadisa (Jlvananda’s edition, Calcutta, 1921).
TBh. = Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra. (Kulkarni’s edition, Poona,
I924)-
TK. = TarkakaumudI of Laugaksi Bhaskara (Javaji’s edition, Bombay,
19H ).
T R. = TSrkikaraksa of Varadaraja (Benares, 1903).
T S. = Tarkasamgraha of Annanm Bhatta (Athalye’s edition, Bombay,
191 s).
U T S. = TattvSrthadhigamasutra of Umasvami.
YP. = Yedantaparibhasa of Dharmarajadhvarindra (Bombay, Samvat,
1968).
YPS. = Vivaranaprameyasamgraha of Madhavacarya Vidyaranya
(V.S.S., Benares, 1893).
Y.S. ' = Yaisesika Sutra (Gujrati Press, Samvat, 1969).
Y.S.S. = Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.
Y S U . = Upaskara of Samkara Misra (Gujrati Press, Samvat, 1969).
Y S V . = Vaisesikasutravivrti of Jayanarayana (Gujrati Press, Samvat,
1 9 6 9)-
YBh. = Yogabhasya of Vyasa (Benares, 19 11).
YS. = Yoga Sutra of Patanjali (Benares, 19 11).
 PREFACE
T he crowning achievement of the Hindus was metaphysical
speculation. But the philosophical literature of India is not only rich
in Metaphysics but also in Psychology, Logic, Ethics, ^Esthetics,
and Epistemology. There is no system o f Indian philosophy which
has not advanced a theory of knowledge, and which has not appealed
to the facts of our experience. Every school of philosophy has made
valuable contributions to Psychology, Logic, Ethics, and other mental
sciences. But these have never been treated as separate branches of
study in India.
T h e Hindu mind is essentially synthetic. It always analyses
a problem into its various aspects, and considers them in their synthetic
relation to one another. It never destroys the organic unity of
a subject and makes a compartmental study of its different aspects.
In the philosophical literature of India we find a synthetic treatment
o f a problem in all its multifarious aspects, psychological, logical,
ethical, and metaphysical. In the later stages of the development of
Indian thought, though we come across separate treatises and mono­
graphs on Logic and Epistemology, we find them mixed up with
Metaphysics. There is not a single work which is exclusively devoted
to the psychological analysis of mental processes.
But though there are no independent sciences of Psychology, Logic,
Ethics, Epistemology, etc., we can collect ample material from the
original works on different schools of Indian philosophy dealing with
these mental sciences, disengage them from their metaphysical setting,
and make a consistent study o f them. Indian Metaphysic has, for
some time past, evoked a great deal of interest among the Eastern
and Western orientalists. In recent times some comprehensive works
have been published on systems o f Indian philosophy, which,
incidentally, treat of Psychology, Logic, and Ethics. Some valuable
works on Indian Logic and Indian Ethics also have been published.
Mrs. Rhys Davids’ Buddhist Psychology is a monumental work on the
psychology of the Buddhists. But no attempt has yet been made to
give a comprehensive account of the psychology of the Hindus.
T h e present work is an attempt at a constructive survey of Indian
Psychology. T h e aim of this book is to give, in brief compass, an
outline of the most important topics of Indian Psychology. It will
be complete in two volumes. T h e first volume is wholly devoted to
the psychology of perception. T h e subject is vast and immense in
scope, and there is abundant wealth of material on this subject. M y
account of the psychology of perception is not at all complete and
comprehensive. M y task here is not an historical survey of all the
XV
xvi PREFACE
problems o f perception in their chronological order, but a systematic
exposition and interpretation of the most fundamental problems of
perception in their logical development of thought. I have tried to
throw light on different topics from the different standpoints o f Indian
thought.
There is no empirical psychology in India. Indian Psychology
is based on Metaphysics. T h e psychological account of some problems
o f perception, e.g. perception of the self, perception of the universal,
etc., is unintelligible without consideration of their metaphysical
foundations. So I found it extremely difficult to avoid metaphysical
considerations altogether in my treatment of these topics.
Indian Psychology is based on introspection and observation ;
it is not based upon experiments. Students of introspective psychology
will find ample food for reflection in Indian Psychology. T h e y will
find acute psychological analysis of some very subtle mental processes
which have not yet attracted the attention of the Western
psychologists.
I have indulged in comparisons of Indian Psychology with Western
Psychology here and there, which, I am sure, will be agreeable to
some and disagreeable to others. But such comparisons are
unavoidable to students of Indian and Western Psychology, though
they may be misleading.
T h e present work was planned and partly composed more than
a decade ago. Different parts of this work were submitted to the
Calcutta University for Premchand Roychand Studentship in 19 2 2 ,
19 2 3 , and 19 24 . T h e work was completed in 19 2 4 , and some portions
o f it were published in the Meerut College Magazine in 19 2 4 and
19 26 . But owing to unforeseen circumstances its publication has
been delayed so long. T h e work has since undergone considerable
alterations in course o f revision.
I acknowledge my deep debt of obligation to Sir Brajendra Nath
Seal, then George V Professor of Philosophy of Calcutta University,
who suggested the subject to me, indicated the main line o f research,
and helped me with important references.
In addition to the works referred to in the footnotes, I desire to
express my general debt to the works of Thibaut, Keith, Mrs. Rhys
Davids, Aung, S.C. Vidyabhushan, Ganganath Jha, and S. N .
Das Gupta.
M y best thanks are due to Professor Haridas Bhattacharya of the
Dacca University, who was good enough to go through a con­
siderable part of the M S. and helped me with many valuable
suggestions. I am also obliged to the publishers for their expediting
the publication of the work.
Ju ly, 2933•
 BOOK I
C h apter I

THE P H Y SIC A L B A S IS OF P E R C E P T IO N

§ i. Introduction

T h e ancient Hindus developed a conception of the nervous

system, which is mainly to be found in the medical works of Caraka
and Susruta, and in the works on Tantra. Caraka and Susruta
regarded the heart as the seat o f consciousness, but the Tantric
writers transferred the seat of consciousness to the brain. Caraka
had a clear conception o f the sensory nerves (manovaha nadi) and the
motor nerves (ajnavaha nadi). T h e Tantric writers constantly
referred to the centres o f different kinds of consciousness. T h e y
not only distinguished between the sensory nerves and the motor
nerves, but also recognized different kinds of sensory nerves : the
olfactory nerves (<gandhavaha nadi), the optic nerves (rupavaha nadi),
the auditory nerves (sabdavaha nadi), the gustatory nerves (rasavaha
nadi), and the tactile nerves (sparsavaha nadi).1
In the philosophical literature of the Hindus we find an elaborate
account of the sense-organs in the treatment of the problems of
perception. T h e different schools o f philosophers had different
views as to the nature, origin, and functions of the sense-organs.
Their views were based mostly on their systems o f philosophy,
though they advanced certain facts of experience in support of their
views. T h e Hindu accounts o f the sense-organs are widely different
from those of Western physiology, because they are based more on
metaphysical speculation than on scientific observation and experiment.
In the first Book we shall treat of the nature, origin, and functions
o f the sense-organs without comprehension of which there cannot
be an adequate conception of some important problems of the Indian
psychology of perception.

§ 2. The Nature of the Sense-organs, (i) The Buddhist

T h e Buddhists recognize six varieties of consciousness : visual,

auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and purely mental.
1 Dr. B. N. Seal, The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus,
pp. 218-225. See also H.I.P., ii, 344-357.
1 B
2 INDIAN P SY C H O LO G Y : PERCEPTIO N
Corresponding to these there are six bases (asraya) : the organs of
vision, audition, smelling, tasting, touch, and consciousness itself;
and there are six objects (visaya) : colours, sounds, smells, tastes,
tangibles, and ideas.1 T h e preceding moment of consciousness is
the basic element of the next moment of consciousness.2 Thus there
are six sense-organs including consciousness. Consciousness is the
faculty o f intellect which apprehends non-sensuous objects.3 It is
called the mind. It is immaterial and invisible.4
Leaving out the mind, there are five sense-organs. T h e y are
the end-organs (golaka). T h e y are the eye, the ear, the nose, the
tongue, and the skin. T h e y are made up of a kind of translucent
subtle matter. T h e five sense-organs are made up of five different
kinds of atoms.5 Thus the sense-organs are material but invisible.
T h e y are divided into two classes, viz. prapyakari and aprapyakari
sense-organs. T h e former apprehend their objects when they come
in direct contact with them. T h e latter apprehend their objects
without coming in contact with them. T h e organs of smell, taste,
and touch are prapyakari; they must be in immediate contact with
their objects. T h e organs o f vision and audition are aprapyakari \
they apprehend their objects at a distance.6 T h e Buddhists do not
hold with the Nyaya-Vaisesika that the sense-organs are different
from the peripheral organs, and the visual organ and the auditory
organ come in contact with their objects in order to apprehend them.7

§ 3. (ii) The Jaina

T h e Jaina recognizes five sense-organs.8 T h ey are o f two kinds :

objective senses {dravyendriya) and subjective senses (bhavendriya)?
T h e former are the physical sense-organs. T h e latter are their
psychical correlates. T h e y are the invisible faculties o f the soul.
A physical sense-organ (dravyendriya) consists of two parts, viz.
the organ itself and its protecting environment. T h e former is
called nirvrti. T h e latter is called upakarana.10 Each of these is
o f two kinds, internal and external. T h e internal organ is the soul
itself which is embodied in the sense-organ. T h e external organ is

1 Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception o f Buddhism, p. 58.

2 Ibid., p. 58. 3 Ibid., pp. 96-7.
4 Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, p. 102.
5 The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 1 2 - 1 3 .
6 The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 60.
7 V P S., p. 18 7 ; Advaitabrahmasiddhi, p. 74.
8 U .T .S ., ii, 15. 9 U .T .S ., ii, 16. 10 U .T .S ., ii, 17.