H I N D U LAW*

D. C. /am**
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW through judicial decisions continued in
its characteristic manner—slow but steady. Many provisions of the
statutory Hindu law have come up before the Courts more than once
and the law is now becoming certain, settled and crystallized.

L ADOPTION

In Arumugha Uddayar v. Vallimal,1 the Madras High Court held

that under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 when an
adoption is made by a widow, the adopted boy does not become
adopted son of deceased husband conferring upon him right of in­
heritance to the estate of the deceased husband. To arrive at this
conclusion the Court examined at length the relation between the
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and the Hindu Succes­
sion Act, 1956; and the comulative effect of section 8, 11 and 14
of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.
The Court observed that the purpose of both these enactments
was to establish complete equality between male and female with re­
gard to property rights. As regards section 14 of the Hindu Adop­
tions and Maintenance Act the Court observed that a perusal of
provisions of section 14 shows that it deliberately omits a provision
for the affiliation to the deceased husband of a child adopted by his
widow. The affiliation referred to therein is only to the husband
whom she may marry after adoption. The Court also emphasized the
fact that all the "deeming" provisions relating to affiliation in section
14 are only in relation to living persons and not to persons who were
dead at the time of adoption.
It is submitted that this sweeping generalization will not be
correct in all cases; say for example in a case where there are three
brothers A, B, and C constituting a joint Hindu family. A dies un­
divided, A's widow adopts a son D. A few years after this adoption,
B and C partition the joint famil property. D as adopted son of A

♦Excluding the Hindu Matrimonial Law.

**LL.M., Ph.D., Reader, Faculty of Law, Jodhpur University, Jodhpur
(Rajasthan).
1. A . I . R . 1969 Mad. 72 at 75-76.

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 418 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INDIAN LAW 1969

is entitled to claim a share on partition in his own right. The reason

is that till the partition takes place no property can be said to be
vested in any of the coparceners- The Madras decision, therefore, it
is submitted, is not correct. Further, this decision is per incuriam
since it does notice the Supreme Court's decision in Sawan Ram v.
Mst. Kalawantir where it was held that adoption by a
widow will be not only to herself but also to her hus­
band; and that the adopted son is to be deemed to be a member
of family of deceased husband of widow. The Court was of the view
that under the Shastric law, if a child was adopted by a widow he
was treated as a natural born child and, consequently, he could divest
other members of the family of rights vested in them prior to his
adoption. It was only in this respect that the rights of the adopted
child were restricted by section 12(c) of the Act. It is to be noted
that this restriction was placed on the rights of a child adopted by
either a rr>ale Hindu or a female Hindu and not merely in a case of
adoption by a female Hindu (this aspect of the matter the Madras
High Court has failed to notice). The Supreme Court there held:
This restriction on the rights of the adopted child, cannot, therefoe,
in our opinion lead to any inference that a child adopted by a widow
will not be deemed to be the adopted son of her deceased husband.8

An adopted son cannot challenge the transfer of property by

way of gift or otherwise, made by the father before his adoption, was
laid down by the Mysore High Court in Ram Chandra v. Ansuyabai*
It was held that doctrine of 'relation back' only establishes
a line of succession and the dispositions made by the
father could not be disturbed by an adoptee who was never in
existence as such when dispositions were made. An adopted son is
entitled to claim only the properties of his adoptive father or the
interest of his adoptive father in the properties as on the date of his
death.5 Sections 12 and 13 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance
Act contain the above principle. They also enable a sole surviving
coparcener to dispose of properties by will, and the subsequently
adopted son by his widow has to take the estate subject to the dis-
dispositions made by the will. But, it has to be noted that in case
the adoption is made before the dispositions take effect, i.e. before
the death of the testator, then the adopted son's right comes into

2. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1761.

3. Id. at 1765.
4. A.I.R. 1969 Mys. 64.
5. See Id. at 69-72.

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 HINDU LAW 419

existence immediately on his adoption, and he being in existence, the

disposition made by the father out of the coparcenary property can
be successfully challenged by him.0
II. COPARCENARY

A woman can very well act as the manager (karta) of a joint

Hindu family. The position of the female manager is the same as
that of a male manager. There is no inheritance incompetency in an
adult female member to be karta of the joint Hindu family under
particular circumstances. This was held in Ram Kawal Upadhyay
v. Dudhanuth Pandey.7 The Orissa decision in Budhi Jena v, Dhobai
Natk was thus followed. However, the observation of the Court
that:
Of course, there are some limitations in the case of the female
manager, e.g. in case of legal necessity, the action of the female
manager will bind the other members of the family.0

is misleading. Does it mean that in case of male manager it will not

bind the other members of the family? With due respect, it is sub­
mitted that reference to widow's power of management is ill-conceiv­
ed. What was stated in Hanomanpersaud v. Mst. Babooeell) was
that the power of the widow to manage the estate is similar to that
of a manager of an aninfant estate. Further, widow like a manager
must be allowed a reasonable latitude in the exercise of her powers. 11
All this explains powers of a widow as a limited heir and has no
relevance to power of a female to -act as a manager of a joint Hindu
family.
An important question has been decided by the Supreme Court
in Kapuchand v. Tax Recovery Officer12 The question was whether
a manager (karta) of joint Hindu family is criminally liable for tax
arrears of the family property? The Court held that;
In case of failure to satisfy tax due by Hindu undivided family en­
forcement of certificate under Section 222, Income Tax Act, 1961, the
Manager (Karta) is not liable to be arrested and detained in prison.1^

6. See id. at 72.

7. A . I . R . 1969 Patna 317.
8. A . I . R . 1969 Orissa 7.
9. Supra note 7 at 319.
10. (1856)6 Mod. Ind. App. 393 (P.C).
11. Ibid.
12 A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 682.
13. See Id. at 683.

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Examining the scheme of the Income Tax Act, and the

rules, the Court observed that the assessee alone may be treated in
default, and against him only the notice for payment of the tax arrears
may be issued and proceedings for recovery of tax may be taken:
Under the Act, a Hindu undivided family is a distinct taxable entity,
apart from the individual members who constitute it. The manager
by virtute of his status is competent to represent the Hindu undivided
family, but on that account he cannot for the purpose of section 222
be deemeed to be the assessee when the assessment is made
against the Hindu undivided family and certificate for recovery is
issued against the family.14

If it is intended that some one in the joint family should be held

responsible as an assessee proper amendment should be made in the
Act.
An interesting question came up for determination before the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Narayanlal v. Controller, Estate
Duty,15 it was whether insurance amount received by a member of
the joint family, premium of which were paid out of the joint family
fund should be treated as his individual property or not?
It was held that:
It is one of the basic principles of Hindu law that amounts earned
with joint famiiy property are moneys belonging to the joint family.
Where, therefore, insurance policies are taken on members of joint
family and premiums are paid from out of the joint family fund;
ordinarily the insurance amounts when due would belong to the joint
family. The test is whether the joint family suffered a deteriment
and what was the intention at the time of effecting the insurance,
namely whether the income which would have accrued on the
maturity or otherwise of such policy would go to the benefit of the
individual or the joint family.16
The Court thus followed the Supreme Court's decision in Smt.
Parbati Kuer v. Sarangdhar Sinha17 and on examining the fates of
the case under review the Court held that "the polices were intended
to be for the benefit of the deceased."18

14. Id. at 684.

15. A . I . R . 1969 A . P . 188.
16. Id. at 189.
17. A . I . R . 1960 S.C. 403.
18. Id. at 191. The Court observed the following:
The joint family itself did not treat the insurance affected upon the
deceased as one enuring for the benefit of the joint family the

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 HINDU LAW 421

In State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram19 the Supreme Court

has held that having regard to the juristic nature of the Hindu joint
family according to the Mitakshara School, a Hindu joint family can
not be treated as an individual. The Court held that:
A coparacenaiy under the Mitakshra School is a creature of law and
cannot arise by act of parties except in so far that on adoption the
adopted son becomes a coparcener with his adoptive father as regards
ancestral properties of the latter.20

The Court defined the incidents of coparacenership under the

Mitakshara law as follows:
The lineal male descendants of a person upto third generation, ac­
quire on birth ownershp in the ancestral property on such person;
secondly, that such descendants can at any time work out their rights
by asking for partition; thirdly, extending over the entire property,
conjointly with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such coownership
the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly
that no alienation of the property is possible unless it be for neces­
sity, without the concurrence of he coparceners; and sixthly, that the
interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors.21

III. PARTITION

In Muthyalareddy v. Venkatareddy22 a full bench of the Andhra

Pradesh High Court examined whether an unregistered partition deed
can be looked into for establishing severance in status. It was held
that though it cannot be looked into for terms of partition, it ran,
however be looked into for the purpose of establishing severance in
status. It is now a well settled principle of Hindu law
that for a severance is status; all that is required is a communi­
cation to the other members of the joint family, of an unequivocal
intention to separate. This communication of intention could be
done orally or by a notice in writing to the other coparceners or by
amounts were received by the widow and were credited to her sepa­
rate account in the joint family books; these moneys were not
merged with the funds of the Hindu undivided family nor had the
families derived any benefit from these policies; there was no proof
that though the premium amounts came from out of the joint family
funds and whether they were paid on behalf of the joint family or were
advanced to the deceased who paid the premiums from out of those
funds, to keep the policy alive for the benefit of the immediate
members of his family.
19. A.I.R. 1969 S.C.133(
20. Id. at 1333.
21. Ibid.
22. A.I.R. 1969 S.C.242

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422 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INDIAN LAW 1969

other suitable means. If the intention is expresed by reducing the

same to writing such a document though unregistered, is admissible,
and can be looked into for establishing severance in status. This
decision does not lay down any new principles. It applied the rule
laid down in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv,2'* Naini Bai v, Gita Bai,24 Rukma
Bai v. Laxmi Narayan2:* and Raghavamma v. Chenchamma.2G
The well established rule about severance of status was restated
by the ^Supreme Court in Mudigowda v. Ram Chandra27 It was
observed:
It is now well established that an agreement between all the cop. rc-
eners is not essential to the disruption of the joint family status, but
a definite and unambiguous indication of intention by one member
to separate himself from the family and to enjoy his share in seve aiity
will amount in law to a division of status. It is immaterial in such
a case whether the other members assent or not Once the decision
is unequivocally expressed and clearly intimated to his co-sharers,
the right of the coparceners to obtain and possess the share to which
he is admittedly entitled is unimpeachable.2®
"Clearly intimated to his co-sharers" may however create prac­
tical difficulties. These were created by the decision in Raghavamma
v. Chenchamma also. It can easily be seen that there may be a case
where some of the co-sharers (coparceners) have been intimated but
some of them have not received the intimation. Should it be taken
that he is divided with respect to those who have received intimation
and joint with regard to those who did not receive intimation? The
statement of the law by the Supreme Court in these decisions has not
been satisfactory. Girja Bai v. Sadashiv is still the decision stating,
the correct law in the best way.
IV. DEBTS

The question that came up for determination before the Allahabad

High Court in Phool Chand v. Lalit Kishore2l} was whether a decree
against the karta can be executed against the entire joint family pro­
perty and if so under what circumstances. It was held that the answer
depended on the following:
If there is nothing in the judgment or the decree to indicate that the
23. A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 104.
24. ^.I.R. 1958 S.C. 335.
25. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 335.
26. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 136.
27. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1076.
28. Id. at 1080.
29. A.I.R. 1969 All. 155.

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 HINDU LAW 423

claim of the creditor had proceeded on the footing that the debt had
been incurred by the Karta of the family on behalf of the family
and for legal necessity, then in such a case the decree obtained
by the creditor can only be executed as against the interest of the
judgment debtor in the family properties and not against the entire
joint family properties in which the other members of the family
have interest.... if there is sufficient indication in the judgment
and the decree that the claim was not against the joint family pro­
perties leaving it to the members of the family to challenge the action
of the creditor decree holder.30

It is respectfully submitted that this observation is at variance

with the section 47 and order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is
not the frame of the suit or the form of the decree which is conclu­
sive in the matter. The essential point is whether in fact the debt
which is the basis of the decree had been raised by the judgment
debtor with the scope of his authority as the manager and for the
purpose of the family. This question of fact can be determined
finally only after the junior members had had proper opportunity of
being heard, either in the execution proceedings or in a separate suit
specially brought for the purpose.

V. SUCCESSION

Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act is an enigma of statutory

Hindu law. There are some anomalies and inconsistencies in it. It
came up for elucidation in Rama Ananda Patil v. Appa Bhima
Redekar?1 It was held that:
A son by the first husband of a female Hindu is entitled to succeed
to the property on her death inherited by her from her second
husband, (in preference to the nephews and grand nephews of her
second husband) under section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act of
1956.32
The reason was stated thus:
The scheme of sub-section (1) of Section 15 at once shows that
30. Id. at 158. Contra the full bench decision of the Lahore High
Court in Jai Kishen v. Ram Chand, A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 1, wherein it was
held: >
The mere circumstances that it had not been disclosed in the course
of proceedings in the original suit against the managing member,
that the debt had been raised for family necessity or that the decree
does not show on the face of it that the judgment—debtor had been
said in his capacity as a Manager is not fatal to the right of the
decree-holder to proceed against the entire family property.
31. A . I . R . 1969 Bom. 205.
32. Id. at 206.

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424 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INDIAN LAW 1969

the property of Hindu females dying instestate is to devolve on her

own heirs. The list of such heirs is enumerated in section 15(1)
clauses (a) to (e) who can be said to be nearer and dearer to the
current notions and conceptions about the closeness of the relation­
ship. Sub-Section (2) provides for exceptions only with regard to
one source of acquisition viz. the inheritance, and then again the
exception is confined to the property inherited by her either from
her (1) father or mother or (2) from her husband or from her
father-in-law. But in engrafting these two exceptions the legislature
has taken care to emphasise that these exception will operate in the
event of the female Hindu not leaving her direct heir viz. her son
or daughter or child or her pre-deceased son or daughter. By making
the exception to operate only in the contingency of female Hindu not
leaving any son or daughter or children or a predeceased son or
daughter, the legislature has only acted consistently with its main
object of conferring absolute title on female Hindus to the proper­
ties absolute title on female Hindus to the properties inherited by
t h e m . . . . [t]here is no warrant to assume that the legislature intended
to deprive the sons and daughters or their children from inheritance
of the property left by a female dying intestate merely because they
were born to her from some other husband than the one from whom,
the property in dspute was inherited by the female Hindu.83

Some anomalies and inequities in section 15 of the Hindu

Succession Act may be stated here. The effect of the rule laid down
in section 15 is that the property of a female dying intestate shall
devolve as summarized below:
(1) The general order of succession laid down in entries (a)
to (e) in sub-section (1) applies to all property of a female
dying intestate howsoever acquired except in case of pro­
perty inherited by her from her father, mother, husband or
father-in-law.
(2) In case of a female dying intestate leaving ia son or a
daughter or a child of a predeceased son or of a predeceased
daughter, all her property, howsoever acquired develoves
on such heirs regardless of the source of acquisition of pro­
perty and such heir take the property simultaneously;
and if the husband is also alive, they all take along with
him. In such a case sub-section (2) of section 15 does not
at all come into operation.
(3) In the case of a female dying intestate without issue but

33. Id. at 209.

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 HINDU LAW 425

leaving her husband, the husband will take all her pro­
perty except—
(a) Property inherited by her from her father or mother
which will revert to the heirs of the father in existence
at the time or her death. (This provision if followed
literally leads to absurdities discussed below).
(b) In case the female intestate had remarried after the
death of her first husband the property inherited by her
from him or his father (as widow of a predeceased son)
will revert to the heirs of the first husband in existence
at the time of her death.
(4) In case of a female dying intestate without any child, the
property inherited by her from her father or mother will
revert to the heirs of his father at the time of her death
and not in accordance with the general order of succesion
laid down in sub-section (1) (As stated above this provi­
sion leads to anomalous positions, discussed below).
(5) In the case of a female dying instestate without any issue
property inherited by her from her husband or father-in-law
will go to the heir of the husband and not in accordance
with the general order of sucession laid down in sub-section
(1). (This provision alsontains a possible anomaly).
(i) Anomaly created by section 15, subsection (2), clause (a):
This clause engrafts an important exception on the provisions
relating to the general order of succession to the property of a female
dying intestate laid down in sub-section (1). This exception provides
for a special order of succession in case of property inherited by her
from her father or mother but its operation is confined to the case of
her dying intestate without leaving a son, daughter or their children.
The clause enacts that in any such case the property so inherited is
to devolve "not upon the other heirs but upon the heirs of the
father." An anomalous position arises with regard to the property which
might have been inherited by the female from her mother and the
female were to die leaving her father among the heirs. On an interpre­
tation of clause (a) of this sub-section, the property so inherited by
the female must devolve on the heirs of the father and not upon the
father even though he be alive.
(ii) Anomaly created by section 15, sub-section (2) clause (b):
This clause engrafts another exception on the provisions relating
to the general order of succession. This exception provides that if

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she had inherited property from her father-in-law and she does not
leave behind a son, daughter or their children, the property will
develove on heirs of her husband even though the husband may be
alive.
It is expected that the courts will point out these anomalies in
future cases and effective steps will be taken by the legislators for
suitably amending the provisions of section 15 of the Hindu Succes­
sion Act.
In the Andhra Pradesh case, V. S. Reddi v. Tulasammd64 a woman
obtained a money decree for maintenance with a charge on property.
While she put the decree for execution a compromise was effected.
Under the compromise she was given life estate in certain immovable
property in lieu of maintenance. The compromise was recorded in
court and full satisfaction of the maintenance decree was recorded.
The question was whether the woman held property under sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2), of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.
It was held that the woman held the property only under sub-section
(2). She got substituted title to property under a compromise
which was not outside the court. It may be pointed out that it was
also possible to hold that she got the property under an instrument,
compromise being an instrument. She did not get title to the pro­
perty de hors the order of the court.

VI. MAINTENANCE

If a daughter-in-law, having obtained her share pursuant to the

Hindu Succession Act of 1956 seeks to obtain maintenance by virtue
of the provisions contained in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance
Act, 1956 she will not succeed. But position will be different if a
Hindu, in discharge of un obligation under Hindu law to maintain
members of the family, executed a maintenance-deed in favour of
his widowed daughter-in-law giving her life-interest in some items
out of the joint family property. He dies after the commencement of
Hindu Succession Act, 1956. By virtue of the proviso to section 6
read with section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, the deceased father-
in-law's undivided interest in the joint family property will devolve by
succession and the daughter-in-law will be entitled to a share. There
is no necessity for the daughter-in-law to surrender the items which
were given to her for maintenance, and make these items available

34. A.I.R. 1969 A.P. 300.

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 HINDU LAW 427

for partition. This was the rule laid down in Chinnuppa v. Valli-
ammalsn It was observed:
there is no provision either express or implied which will have the
effect of terminating or putting an end to an interest created in an
immovable property in favour of a person like the respondent herein
[daughter-in-law] in charge of an obligation resting on the father-in-
law . . . . I am unable to find any principle or authority for holding
that [such life] interest automatically comes to an end as soon
as she [the daughter-in-law] files a suit for partition or for recover-
ing her share of property under the provisions of the Hindu Succes-
sion Act, 1956. FTlhere can be no analogy between the rights which
the three widows had under Hindu Women's Right to Property Act,
1937 and the right which the various heirs get unde- the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.36

An important aspect of the application of the Hindu Adoptions

and Maintenance Act came up for decision in C. Ambayamma v.
U. Ganapathi?1 The question was whether for application of the
Act, the death of the husband should have taken place after the
commencement of the Act. It was answered in the negative. Follow­
ing the Supreme Court's decision in Gopal Rao v. Sitararruf8 it was
observed:
A decree or agreeement fixing maintenance will not bar a widow
from claiming increased maintenance if the circumstances justify
such alteration in view of the plain provision of Section 25 (of the
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956). It is immaterial
whether the decree or agreement was before or after the Act; nor
is there any thing in the Section to justify the conclusion that the
initial right of maintenance to a widow must have accrued to her
only after the commencement of the Act i.e. the death of the
husband should have taken place after the commenment of the Act.39

VII. MlNIORITY AND GUARDIANSHIP

Popat Namdeo v. Jogu Pandu40 the Bombay High Court laid

down certain principles which govern a contract by guardian on be­
half of minor. It was held that "a contract to purchase immovable
property by a competent guardian acting within his authority on behalf

35. A.I.R. 1969 Mad. 187.

36. Id. at 189-90.
37. A.I.R. 1969 A.P. 213.
38. A.I.R. 1965 S . C 1970.
39. Supra note 37 at 214.
40. A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 140.

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 428 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INDIAN LAW 1969

of a minor is specially enforceable by or against the minor."41 In

this regard amongst others the following principles were stated:
(1) A minor has no legal competency to enter into a contract or
authorise another to do so on his behalf. A guardian, therefore
steps in to supplement the minor's defective capacity;
(2) Capacity is the creation of law, whereas authority is derived from
nature of the act of paities;
(3) The limit and extent of the guardian's capacity are conditioned
by Hindu Law. They can only function within the doctiine of
legal necessity or benefit. The validity of the transaction is
judged with reference to the scope of his power to enter into
a cont act on behalf of the minor,
(4 ) Even the personal liability arising out of the guardian's contract
is a liability of the minor's estate only;
(5) Since the guardian under the Hindu law has the legal com­
petency to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor for neces­
sity oir for the benefit of the estate, the contract is valid from
the time of its inception and since either party can enforce the
contract, the test of mutuality is satisfied.4-

An interesting question as to whether a writ of habeas corpus

could be issued to restore a minor child to his guardian when wrong­
fully deprived of it, came up for consideration in Bhagwati Bai v.
Yadav Krishna. It was held that, for restoration of custody of a
minor from a person who according to the personal law is not his
legal or natural guardian, the ordinary remedy lies under the Hindu
Minority & Guardianship Act or the Guardian and Wards Act, as
the ease may be, and it is only in exceptional cases that the rights of
the parties to the custody of the minor will be determined on a
petition for habeas corpus.
It was further clarified that it cannot however be said that an
application under section 491 Criminal Procedure Code by a guardian
for custody of the minor cannot lie just because there is the ordinary
remedy provided by the law. The paramount consideration in every
such case is the welfare of the minor. The best interest of the child
is the primary consideration, the right of the guardian is secondary
and it will not be enforced by issuance of the writ when it is in con­
flict with the former consideration. The underlying principle is that
the guardian's claim to the custody of the child is not a right in the
nature of property but, indeed, it is a right in the nature of trust for

41. Id. at 150.

42. Id. at 149.
43. A.I.R. 1969 M . P . 23.

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the benefit of the minor. Where there is imminent danger to the

health or safety or morals of the minor, the interim order by way of
habeas corpus for production of the minor becomes necessary.
VIII. ENDOWMENT
In Venkata Krishna v. Sub-Collector, Ongole44 the Supreme
Court has held that:
Under Hindu law a tank can be an object of chanty and when a
dedication is made in favour of a tank, the same is considered as a
charitable institution.45

The question whether such an institution can also be considered

as a juristic person was however left open.
In C. Sethurayar v. Arumanayakam46 the Supreme Court did not
decide the question whether the expression "property" includes a
'trusteeship' right. It only held:
Assuming wihout deciding that the expression "property" used in Act
II of 1929 [Hindu Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929] does not in­
clude a trusteeship right still it is a well established proposition of
law that succession to trustee-ship is governed by the ordinary rules
of inheritance under Hindu Law.17

In Shanii Sarup v. R. S. Sabha,4H it was held that gift to Radha

Swami Payal, although an impersonal deity was valid. It was
observed:
That once it was understood that the true purpose of gift of proper­
ties to the idol was not to confer any benefit on God but to acquire
spiritual benefit by providing oppo;tunities and facilities for those who
desire to worship, there could be no difficulty in understanding the
true nature of the gift to Radha Swami Dayal. The gift did not and
c©uld not confer any benefit on Radha Swami Dayal, the personal
deity of the Radha Swami Satsangis. Being an impersonal deity and
not being one of the Gods of the Hindu pantheon: Radha Swami
Dayal could not be said to be a juristic person. However, when a
Satsangi made a gift of money to Radha Swami Dayal for the cons­
truction of a house inside Dayal Bagh Colony, Agra, there could be
no doubt that there was no uncertainty either in his mind or in the
mind of others that, although the gift was to Radha Swami Dayal,

44. A . I . R . 1969 S.C. 563.

45. Id. at 565.
46. A . I . R . 1969 S.C. 569.
47. Id. at 572.
48. A . I . R . 1969 All. 248.

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430 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INDIAN LAW 1969

the Satsangi knew that gifted property would go to the Sabha as

Radha Swami Dayal himself could not hold the property.49

The purpose of the endowment was definite both religious and

charitable. The sabha was a body registered and as a juristic per­
son could hold the property which had been gifted to Radha Swami
Dayal for the benefit of the satsangis of Dayal Bagh group, the real
beneficiaries. There vvas nothing illegal in such a dedication.
Intention of the donor was to make a gift to Radha Swami
Dayal for the benefit of the satsangis of the Dayal Bagh group. By
executing the memorandum, the donor bad clearly and unambiguous­
ly divested himself of entire interest in the money donated. All re­
quisite conditions being satisfied, there was no reason why the
dedication should not be held to be valid even though it might be
said that Radha Swami Dayal was not u juristic person and, therefore
incapable of accepting the gift. The provisions of section 122, Trans­
fer of Property Act, where acceptance is also necessary in the case
of a gift, will not apply to endowments of public nature.
The question whether the income earned by shebait of an idol>
is 'earned income' of idol, came up for determination in
/. T. Commr. v. Uma Maheshwar.50
[T]he personality of the idol might, therefore, be said to be merged in
that of the shebait. Hence, for all legal purposes, the shebait and
the idol are one; any income earned by the shebait not on his own
personal behalf but while functioning as the shebait of the deity must
be deemed to be the income earned by the idol. The separation of
[
the personality of the shebait from that of the idol for the purpose
of applying, the provisions of the [Income Tax] Act will not be in
consonance with the Hindu l a w . . . . the shebait carried on the busi-
ness on behalf of the idol, and earned the income which is sought to
be taxed. It will therefore come within the definition of *earned
income' of the idol as described in Section 2(6AA)(b) [of the Income
Tax Act, 1922].5i

Whether Hindu deity falls within the meaning of the term 'indi­
vidual' under section 2(31) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and can
be treated as unit of assessment was answered in the affirmative by
the Supreme Court in Jagendra Nath v. /. T. Commr*2 The Court
held:

49. Id. at 265-66.

50. A.I.R. J969 Patna 95.
51. Id. at 96-97.
52. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1089.

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 HINDU LAW 431

Neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law.

But so far as the deity stands as the representative and symbol of
the particular purpose which is indicated by the donor, it can
figure as a legal person. The true legal view is that in that capacity
alone the dedicated property vests in it. There is no principle why
a deity as such a legal person should not be taxed if such a legal
person is allowed in law to own property even though in the ideal
sense and to sue for the property, to realise rent and to defend such
property in a court of law again in the ideal sense... . The Hindu idol
is a juristic entity capable of holding property and of being taxed
through its shebaits who are entrusted with the possession and manage­
ment of its property.... we see no reason why the meaning of the
word Individual' in section 3 of the Act should be restricted to
human beings and not to juristic entities.... Hindu deity, therefore,
falls within the meaning of the word "individual" under section 3 of
the Act and can be treated as a unit of assessment, under that
section.53

This decision of the Supreme Court brings forth the logical con­
sequences of a Hindu deity being a juristic person.
IX. CONCLUSION

There were no sensational cases during the year under survey

relating to Hindu law. But the decided cases have definitely brought
forth once again the fact that the 1955 and 1956 enactments on
adoption, maintenance and succession are not good exam­
ples of legal draftsmanship. Further, codifying part of Hindu law
and leaving the rest uncodified has confused and complicated the
law as is illustrated by the decision in Arumugha Udayar v. Vallia-
ammaP4 which runs counter to an earlier Supreme Court decision. In
case the government do not dare to attempt a uniform civil code, it
must at least codify the entire Hindu taw.

53. Id. at 1093.

54. Supra note 1.

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