Union Parliament

Office of Profits
Divya Prakash vs. Kultar Chand Rana (1974)- The respondent was the Chairman of the
Himachal Pradesh Board of School Education when he filed his nomination for the State
Legislative Assembly. Though the Board had fixed a pay scale for the post, his appointment
was clearly stated to be honorary. The Court held that while the position was under the
State Government, it did not amount to an "office of profit" since he was not entitled to
claim any remuneration. The test was whether he could legally enforce a claim to the salary,
which he could not. Hence, there was no disqualification..
Satrucharla Chandrasekhar Raju vs Vyricherla Pradeep Kumar-In this case, the appellant
was appointed as a teacher by the Project Officer of the Integrated Tribal Development
Agency (ITDA), a registered society with its own constitution. Although the government
provided funds and had indirect control over ITDA, it neither appointed nor removed the
teachers. The Supreme Court held that since the teacher worked directly under the Project
Officer and not the government, there was no conflict of interest or possibility of
government pressure. Hence, the teacher did not hold an "office of profit" under the
government and was not disqualified
Ramkrishna Hegde v. State of Karnataka 1993-The petitioner, an MLA in Karnataka, was
offered the post of Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission with Cabinet rank. Aware
that accepting an “office of profit” might disqualify him, he accepted the position only after
legal advice confirmed it wouldn’t violate the Karnataka Legislature (Prevention of
Disqualification) Act, 1956, as long as he received no salary. He only availed compensatory
allowances like travel and accommodation. The Court held that since the post didn’t offer
pecuniary gain or salary, it was not an “office of profit” and did not lead to disqualification.
Jaya Bacchan v. Union of India 2006- It is well settled that where the office carries with it
certain emoluments or the order of appointment states that the person appointed is entitled
to certain emoluments, then it will be an office of profit, even if the holder of the office
chooses not to receive/draw such emoluments. What is relevant is whether pecuniary gain is
"receivable" in regard to the office and not whether pecuniary gain is, in fact, received or
received negligibly.

Voluntarily given up Membership

Ravi S Naik vs Union of India, 1994- the Supreme Court had held that voluntarily giving up
membership does not necessarily mean that the legislator needs to formally resign, and that
this can be inferred from the member’s conduct as well.The court had said, “Even in the
absence of a formal resignation from membership, an inference can be drawn from the
conduct of a member that he has voluntarily given up his membership of the political party
to which he belongs”.In other words, if an MLA does not tender a formal resignation from
their party, but stands for election as an MP from another party, or takes up a position in
another party, that would also amount to voluntarily giving up their membership, and be
grounds for disqualification
Rajendra Singh Rana v Swami Prasad Maurya -In 2003, 13 BSP MLAs supported Mulayam
Singh Yadav in forming the U.P. government, leading to a disqualification petition by BSP
leader Swami Prasad Maurya. The Speaker rejected it, citing a party split. In 2006, the
Supreme Court ruled that the MLAs had voluntarily given up their party membership by
supporting another party and were thus disqualified under the anti-defection law. The Court
held that disqualification occurs at the moment of defection, and the Speaker can act only
on a petition, not suo moto.
P.V. Narasimha Rao v State-which had held that lawmakers enjoy immunity for their speech
and votes in the House as part of the parliamentary privileges under Article 105(2).
Sita Soren v Union of India 2024-
 Bribery is not protected by legislative immunity: The Court clarified that the
constitutional immunity under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) is intended to ensure the
independence of legislators in performing their duties, not to shield them from criminal acts
like bribery.
 The offence of bribery is complete upon acceptance: Under Section 7 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, the offence is constituted by the mere act of accepting or agreeing to
accept a bribe, regardless of whether the intended action (such as voting in a particular way)
is carried out.
 Functional connection is insufficient for immunity: The Court emphasized that even if
there is a functional connection between the bribe and a legislative act, such as voting, this
does not grant immunity from prosecution.

Anti Defection
The Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachilhu (1992) judgment is a landmark Supreme Court case on the
anti-defection law in India. The Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth
Schedule, which disqualifies legislators for defection, but struck down the provision that
made the Speaker’s decision final and beyond judicial review. It ruled that the Speaker’s
decisions under the Tenth Schedule are subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fide,
perversity, or violation of constitutional principles, ensuring that the Speaker acts fairly and
within the law. This judgment balanced the need to curb political defections with the
protection of democratic and constitutional values.

Union Executive
In U.N. Rao vs. Indira Gandhi (1971)- the Supreme Court held that the Prime Minister and
Council of Ministers can continue to function even after the Lok Sabha is dissolved, and this
does not violate the Constitution. Article 75(3), which requires the Council to enjoy the
confidence of the Lok Sabha, applies only when the House is in existence. When it is
dissolved, there is no question of majority support, but that does not mean the ministers
must resign. Article 74(1) is mandatory, requiring the President to act with the aid and
advice of the Council of Ministers. Hence, for continuity in governance, the Council remains
in office until a new government is formed.
 Article 74(1) of the Indian Constitution is mandatory, not optional. The word "shall"
means the President must act on the advice of the Prime Minister and Council of
Ministers. Allowing otherwise would go against the parliamentary system, making the
President unaccountable. The Constitution requires a Council of Ministers to ensure
democratic governance and responsibility to the Lok Sabha.

 In Kehar Singh v. Union of India, the Supreme Court clarified that the President’s power
to grant pardon under Article 72 (and similarly, the Governor under Article 161) is not a
sovereign prerogative, but a constitutional power. The President can examine the
merits of the case, including relevant evidence, while deciding on a mercy petition. This
means the President is not bound by the court’s judgment and can review the case
afresh, considering factors like injustice, harsh punishment, or humanitarian grounds.

In modern democracies like India, however, such powers are constitutional, meaning:

 They are granted and limited by the Constitution.

 They are not personal whims of the President or Governor.
 They must be exercised based on advice (of the Council of Ministers).

Shatrughan Chauhan v. UOI- The Court held that an undue, unexplained, and inordinate
delay in disposing of mercy petitions under Articles 72/161 can be a valid ground for
commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment, as such delay amounts to mental torture
and violates Article 21. However, this is subject to the condition that the delay was not
caused by the convict. The Court, while exercising its power under Article 32, will assess the
nature of the delay based on the facts of each case, and no fixed guidelines can be laid down.

D.C. Wadhwa vs. State of Bihar-

The general power of the Governor to re-promulgate the ordinance was examined by the
court as several ordinances had been re-promulgated over thirty times. The immediate
challenge was to the three ordinances that were kept alive for a period of 10-14 years.

court ruled that the mechanical re-promulgation of the ordinances for a period of one to
fourteen years without going to the legislation was a colourable exercise of power by the
executive and ruled that re-promulgation of ordinances was unconstitutional.

that there may be times when the parliament cannot deal with the promulgated ordinances
because of a shortage of time. Therefore the court gave two exceptions to this rule in which
re-promulgation can be allowed; firstly, if the legislature cannot take it up due to existing
legislative business; secondly, if the government feels that an emergent situation has emerged
and re-promulgation is necessary to deal with it.

Proclamation of Emergency ( 356)

State of Rajasthan Vs. Union of India- the satisfaction of the President regarding
Presidential proclamation is subjective and cannot be tested by reference to any objective test
it can not be a fit case for judicial determination. The court cannot go into the correctness or
adequacy of the facts and the circumstances on which the satisfaction of the Central
Government is based, but if the satisfaction is malafide or is based on wholly extraneous and
irrelevant grounds, the court would have jurisdiction to examine it.”

The satisfaction of the President has to be, in the scheme of the Constitution, based on the aid
and advice of the cabinet

Sunder Lal Patwa Vs. Union of India (1993)(MP)- After the demolition of the Babri
Masjid on December 6, 1992, President's Rule was imposed in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The imposition in M.P., H.P., and Rajasthan was
challenged in their respective High Courts. The M.P. High Court ruled that the presidential
proclamation can be challenged in court, and is subject to judicial review on grounds of
irrationality, illegality, impropriety, or malafide actions. The court noted that a sudden
outbreak of riots and failure to maintain public order does not justify President's Rule, which
should only be used in extreme situations where there is an imminent breakdown of
constitutional machinery.

S.R. Bommai Vs. Union of India- Presidential proclamation dissolving a state legislative
Assembly is subject to judicial review and justiciable on the ground: whether it was issued on
any material or not, whether the material was relevant or not, whether there was malafide
exercise of power, wholly based on extraneous and irrelevant ground.

● There should be material before the President indicating that Govt could not be carried
out in accordance to the Constitution.
● Burden lies on the government of India to prove that relevant material existed (to justify
the issue of proclamation)

Indefinite Delay

The State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu- On October 31, 2023, the Tamil Nadu
government challenged Governor R.N. Ravi's indefinite delay in responding to various Bills.
The Supreme Court ruled that under Article 200, Governors cannot keep Bills pending
indefinitely and must act "as soon as possible." They must either assent, withhold assent with
reasons, or reserve the Bill for the President. The Court reaffirmed that Governors cannot use
an "absolute veto" or "pocket veto" to block legislation. In this case, the Court declared that
the ten Bills were deemed to have received the Governor's assent on the date they were re-
presented, due to the Governor's unjustified delay

Contempt of Court

Re: Prashant Bhushan and Another-“The administration of justice is a vital part of the
state machinery, and any attempt to scandalize the judiciary or bring it into disrepute is an
attack on the very foundation of the rule of law. The right to free speech is not absolute and
must be balanced with the need to maintain the dignity and authority of the judiciary.

In Re: Hon’ble Shri Justice C.S. Karnan (2017) – In Simple Words

Justice C.S. Karnan was a sitting judge of the Calcutta High Court who was found guilty of
criminal contempt by the Supreme Court of India. This was a rare case where a sitting High
Court judge was punished by the Supreme Court.
He made serious and public accusations against several Supreme Court and High Court
judges, claiming they were corrupt and biased. For example, in a letter dated January 23,
2017, he named 20 judges and asked the CBI to investigate them.

Justice Karnan also made public statements against the judiciary, saying that the Supreme
Court’s actions against him were unconstitutional. He even passed his own orders against
Supreme Court judges, including sentencing them to jail and telling them not to leave the
country — actions which were beyond his authority.

Because of this behavior, the Supreme Court held him in contempt and punished him.

E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T.N. Nambiar (1970)-E.M.S. Namboodiripad, the former Chief

Minister of Kerala, was convicted of criminal contempt of court by the Supreme Court of
India. The conviction stemmed from remarks he made during a 1967 press conference, where
he criticized the judiciary.

Key Points:

1. Judiciary as an Instrument of Oppression: Namboodiripad stated that Marx and

Engels viewed the judiciary as an instrument of oppression, and he believed it
continued to function as such in the unchanged state setup
2. Judges Guided by Class Hatred: He alleged that judges were influenced by class
hatred, interests, and prejudices, favoring the wealthy over the poor

Original Jurisdiction

Earlier, in Karnataka Online Lottery Ban case, Sikkim and Meghalaya (States) challenged
Karnataka’s ban on online lotteries alongside private lottery company,. The Supreme
Court held that under article 131 only inter-state and federal disputes can be brought
noting that: If Sikkim and Meghalaya had sued Karnataka alone, Article 131 would apply.
But since they sued alongside private lottery operators, the case was not maintainable
under Article 131.

Legislative Relation ( 245-255)

State of Bombay vs. RMDC- SC held that extra territorial legislature can be upheld only
when there is the sufficient Nexus between the object sought to be achieved and the state
seeking to achieve them. The connection must be real and not illusionary the Bombay State
levied a tax on lotteries and prize competitions. The tax was extended to a newspaper printed
and published in Bangalore but it had wide circulation in Bombay. The respondent conducted
the prize competitions through this paper. The Court held that there existed a sufficient
territorial nexus to enable the Bombay State to tax the newspaper.

Wallace Bros. And Co. Ltd. vs. The Commissioner Of Income- A company which was
registered and incorporated in India and which also carried out its business in India through a
sleeping partner. The firm made a staggering profit in that accounting year. The income tax
authorities sought to levy a tax upon the company of the respondent. The income tax
authority was challenged by the respondent, it was held by the Privy Council that there
existed the doctrine of territorial nexus and held the tax valid. It is said that the major part of
that income was extracted from British India was the sufficient ground to establish a
territorial nexus.

R.D Joshi versus Ajit Mills Supreme Court held that entries in the list must be given wide
meaning in performing all ancillary and incidental powers. The court held that punitive
measures for enforcing social legislation are ancillary measures.

Prafulla Kumar vs. Bank of Commerce Khulna 1947 In this case, the validity of the Bengal
Money Lenders Act,1946 was challenged on the ground that it was ultra-vires the Bengal
Legislature in so far as it related to ＂ promissory notes ” which was a central subject. The
Privy Council held that the Act was, in pith and substance, a law in respect of “money
lending” and “money lenders” － a state subject and hence, was valid even though it
incidentally encroached on “promissory notes”.- a central subject

The court held that clear cut distinction is not possible between the legislation if Power of
Union and State legislatures because they are bound to overlap. In ascertaining the pith and
substance of the court must consider:-

a) The object of the

b) The scope of the act and

c) The effect as the whole

Colouarble Legislation

The case of State of Bihar vs. Kameshwar Singh (AIR 1952 SC 252)- In the case related to
the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the Act aimed to abolish the zamindari (landlord)
system by acquiring estates and paying landlords only half of the arrears of rent as
compensation. The issue was whether this amounted to valid compensation under Entry 42 of
List III (Concurrent List), which deals with the principles for determining compensation for
property acquired for public purposes. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not genuinely
lay down any principle for compensation and instead sought to deprive landlords of their
property without fair compensation. It was held to be colourable legislation and thus invalid
and unconstitutional.

Repugnancy

M Karunanidhi versus Union of India 1979- In this case, a constitutional bench of the
Apex court considered the question of repugnancy between a law made by the Parliament and
a law made by the State legislature. It was observed that the following conditions should be
satisfied for the application of the doctrine of repugnancy: 1. A direct inconsistency between
the Central Act and the State Act. 2. The inconsistency must be irreconcilable. 3. The
inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts should be of such nature as to bring the
two Acts into direct collision with each other and a situation should be reached where it is
impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other.

Animal Welfare Board of India -vs- A. Nagaraja and Others - This case deals with the
validity of the Tamil Nadu Regulation of Jallikattu (Amendment) Act, which allowed the
traditional bull-taming sport Jallikattu, and whether it conflicted with the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.

Key Issues:

1. Conflict under Article 254(1): In 2014, the Supreme Court struck down the 2009 Tamil
Nadu law, holding it repugnant to the central law (PCA Act, 1960), particularly Sections
3, 11(1)(a), and (m), which aim to prevent cruelty to animals.
2. Amendments & Presidential Assent: After this, Tamil Nadu and other states passed
amendment laws allowing Jallikattu and similar sports, claiming cultural and traditional
grounds, and these laws received Presidential assent.
3. Petitioners’ Argument: They contended that:
o Jallikattu does not fall under Entry 17 of List III (prevention of cruelty to
animals).
o The states had no legislative competence to pass such laws.
o Presidential assent under Article 254(2) cannot cure this constitutional
incompetency.
4. Supreme Court’s Ruling:
o The Court held that the Amendment Act is not colourable legislation.
o It falls within the domain of Entry 17 of List III, dealing with prevention of
cruelty to animals.
o The law's objective is to regulate and minimize cruelty, not to promote it.
o Once rules and safeguards under the amendment are properly implemented,
Jallikattu would not violate the PCA Act.
o Since Presidential assent was duly obtained, there is no inconsistency or
constitutional violation

Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka 1990- The case involved a conflict between
the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 (under Entry 42, List III) and the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (under Entry 35, List III). The Karnataka Act prohibited the grant
or renewal of permits for contract carriages, while the Motor Vehicles Act allowed it. The
Supreme Court held that both laws operated in different fields—acquisition of property vs.
regulation of transport—and thus, the doctrine of pith and substance did not apply. The test is
whether the laws deal with the same subject matter, not just whether they fall under the same
list entry. Hence, the Karnataka Act was held valid.

What constitutes Repungancy

Deep Chand versus state of UP 1959 - observed that repugnancy between two enactments
can be identified with the help of the following three tests:

• Whether there is a direct conflict between the two conflicting provisions;

• Whether the Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive enactment on the subject-matter
and to replace the law made by the State legislature; and

• Whether the law made by the Parliament and that made by the State legislature occupies
the same field.
Zhaverbhai vs. State of Bombay (1954), the convict challenged his conviction on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction, as he was punished under a law prescribing a higher
sentence than permitted. The State law (Bombay Act) allowed up to 7 years' imprisonment
for transporting food grains without a permit, while the Central Essential Supplies Act
allowed only 3 years, unless the quantity was double the limit. The Supreme Court held that
both laws occupied the same field and conflicted, invoking the doctrine of repugnancy. As
per Article 254 of the Constitution, the Central law prevailed, and the State law was declared
void to the extent of the conflict.

Rajiv Sarin v. State of Uttarakhand 2011- The Supreme Court held that there is no
repugnancy between the UP Amendment to the KUZALR Act, 1978 and the Indian Forest
Act, 1927. The KUZALR Act relates to agrarian reforms (Entry 18, List II & Entry 42, List
III), while the Forest Act deals with forest management (Entry 17A, List III). Since the two
laws have different purposes, any overlap is incidental. As both are not on the same subject,
Article 254 does not apply, and the UP law is valid.

Plenary Powers

In State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963)- the Supreme Court held that Parliament
has plenary legislative power unless the Constitution expressly restricts it. The case arose
when West Bengal challenged the Coal Bearing Areas Act, 1957, arguing that Parliament
could not acquire state-owned land. The Court rejected this, stating that India is not a true
federation and the States do not have absolute sovereignty. Under Entry 42 of List III,
Parliament is competent to legislate on acquisition of property, including State property.
Therefore, the Act was valid, and the power of the Union to acquire State property was
upheld.

Fateh Chand Himmat Lal v. State of Maharashtra (1977)- the Supreme Court interpreted
Entry 30 of List II, which deals with "money lending and money lenders; relief of agricultural
indebtedness," in a broad manner. The Court held that legislative power under this entry is
not confined to regulating agricultural loans alone, but also extends to providing various
forms of relief against indebtedness in general. This included ancillary powers necessary to
make such laws effective. The decision affirmed that States could enact comprehensive
measures on money lending, encompassing not only agricultural debts but also non-
agricultural loans, under their legislative competence.

Federalism Significance

Dr. K.C. Wheare – “Father of Modern Federal Theory”

In his classic work “Federal Government”, Dr. Wheare identified the following essential
features of a federal constitution:

1. Distribution of Powers:
o Powers are divided between the central (federal) and regional
(state/provincial) governments.
o Each level of government operates independently within its sphere.
2. Supremacy of the Constitution:
o The Constitution is the supreme law.
o It binds both levels of government and defines their powers.
 3. Written Constitution:
o A written document is essential to clearly outline the powers and functions of
each level of government.
o Prevents ambiguity and protects federal structure.
4. Rigidity of the Constitution:
o The Constitution cannot be easily amended; both federal and state
governments must agree to constitutional changes.
5. Independent Judiciary:
o A Supreme Court or Constitutional Court interprets the Constitution.
o It acts as a guardian of the Constitution and settles disputes between the
Centre and States.

📕 Prof. Ivo D. Duchacek – Features of Federalism

Prof. Duchacek elaborated further on federal principles. His key features include:

1. Dual Government:
o There must be at least two levels of government — federal and regional —
with constitutionally assigned powers.
2. Autonomy and Cooperation:
o Both levels enjoy autonomy, but they must cooperate on national goals
(especially in modern federalism).
3. Bicameral Legislature:
o A second chamber (often an Upper House like Rajya Sabha in India or the
US Senate) represents the federal units.
4. Participation of States in Constitutional Amendment:
o Amendments require the consent of the federal units, not just the central
legislature.
5. No Subordination:
o Neither level is subordinate; each is sovereign in its domain.

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)

Relevance to Federalism:

 This is one of the most significant cases affirming federalism as a basic feature of the
Constitution.
 The misuse of Article 356 (President’s Rule) to arbitrarily dismiss state governments was
curbed.
 The Supreme Court established judicial review over the President’s decision, thus
limiting central overreach.
 Mandating a floor test to prove majority in the State Assembly reaffirmed the autonomy
of elected state governments.
 Strengthens constitutional balance between Centre and States.
🔹 Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006)

Relevance to Federalism:

 This case addressed the representation of states in the Rajya Sabha, which is
crucial to the bicameral federal structure.
 Though it upheld the open ballot system and rejected the need for a domicile
requirement, it maintained that Rajya Sabha remains a representative body of the
States.
 The judgment clarified that procedural changes (like open ballots) do not dilute the
federal nature of the Upper House.
 Reaffirmed that flexibility in representation does not equal erosion of federal
principles.

🔹 Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018)

Relevance to Federalism:

 Dealt with the power tussle between the elected Delhi government and the LG.
 The Court ruled that the LG must act on the "aid and advice" of the Council of
Ministers, except in exceptional situations.
 Emphasized "collaborative federalism", even for Union Territories with special
status like Delhi.
 Ensured that the democratic mandate of elected governments is respected,
reinforcing functional federalism.

🔹 GST Council Case – Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022)

Relevance to Federalism:

 Addressed the nature of decisions made by the GST Council under Article 279A.
 The Court held that recommendations are advisory, not binding, thereby upholding
the fiscal autonomy of states.
 Reaffirmed that both Parliament and State legislatures have equal power in
taxation under GST.
 Strengthened the idea of “cooperative federalism”, where Centre and States
negotiate and coordinate, rather than one dominating the other.

Proclamation of Emergency

Minerva Mills v. Union of India- it was held that even though the proclamation under
article 352 is the prerogative of the president, there is no bar to judicial review of the
validity of the proclamation of emergency.
Effect of Emergency on Federal Structure

• Firstly, the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of any direction to
any State in the declared emergency area. (Art. 353(a))

• Secondly, Parliament’s lawmaking power will extend to the subjects enumerated even in
the State List. (art. 353(b))

• Further, the President is empowered to alter the distribution of revenues that are
normally to be assigned to the States under the financial provisions of the Constitution.
(art. 354(1))

• During the period, the tenure of Lok Sabha and State Assemblies can be extended by a
period of one year at a time and not extending in any case beyond a period of six months
after the proclamation ceased to exist. (Art. 83 (2) read with proviso and art. 172(1)
proviso, respectively).

Effects of sate emergency

Article 355 of the Constitution of India enjoins a responsibility on the Union Government
to protect States against external aggression and internal disturbance.

• In pursuance of this goal Article 356 provides that if the President is satisfied on receipt
of a report from the Governor or otherwise that a situation has arisen in which the
Government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution, he is empowered to issue a proclamation under Article 356.

(i) The president may assume to himself all or any of the functions of the government of
the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or
anybody or authority in the state other than the Legislature of the state; (Art 356(1)(a))

(ii) he may declare that the powers of the State legislature shall be exercisable by or
under the authority of Parliament; (Art 356(1)(b))

(iii) The President may dissolve the State Legislative Assembly or put it under
suspension. He may authorise the Parliament to make laws on behalf of the State
Legislature.

(iv) The President, however, cannot assume himself any of the powers vested in a High
Court.

(v) The President can make any other incidental or consequential provision necessary to
give effect to the object of proclamation

44th amendment-Article 19 suspended only if war or external aggression, 21 cannot

Judiciary safeguards to abuse of article 356

State of Rajasthan v. Union of India- issue of the power of judicial review came up.
Court held that the power of the President under Article 356 concerns his political
 judgment and the courts usually avoid entering the political thicket. • However, this
power does not enjoy blanket immunity from judicial review. But if the satisfaction is
mala fide or is based on wholly extraneous and irrelevant grounds, the Court would have
jurisdiction to examine it.

Minerva Mills v. UoI- The Supreme Court held that while it should not avoid judicial
review merely because political issues are involved, its role is limited to checking
whether constitutional requirements were followed in proclaiming emergency under
Article 356. It cannot assess the sufficiency of the facts, but the Proclamation is
subject to judicial review.

Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India-, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional
validity of the Union’s dissolution of the Bihar State legislative assembly and the
proclamation of President’s rule under Article356 of the Constitution. • It held that if the
Governor’s report, which forms the basis of invoking Article 356, is mala fide, arbitrary,
or irrelevant, the proclamation can be struck down

S.R. Bommai Vs UOI-

 Article 356 should be used sparingly to maintain the Centre-State balance, as

federalism is a basic structure.

 Centre’s intervention is justified only in cases of political instability or breakdown of

parliamentary government in a State.

 The Union must explore all alternatives and give a chance to form an alternative
ministry before acting.

 The President’s power under Article 356 is not absolute, but conditional, requiring
objective analysis.

 State Assembly cannot be dissolved before Parliament approves the proclamation; it

may only be suspended initially

 Judicial review is part of the basic structure, so courts can examine if conditions
justified invoking Article 356; once challenged, the burden shifts to the Union to prove it.

 Courts can demand records and material that formed the basis of the Council of
Ministers' advice to the President.

 Courts can strike down an unconstitutional proclamation under Article 356, and in
such cases, the State Assembly can be reinstated.

Elections

T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995)-

• Supreme Court held that the CEC is not superior to other Election Commissioners

• All members have equal voting powers in the Commission

• Established the principle of institutional equality within the Commission

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti (1995)- • Supreme Court held
that the power to conduct elections includes all steps necessary for conducting free and f air
elections

HIGH COURT

S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1982) [AIR 1982 SC 149] -First Judges Case

• Facts: Public interest litigation on Additional Judge non reappointments and transfers.

• Holding: “Consultation” under Article 217(1) is advisory, not concurrence. Executive

(President) has final say, even overriding unanimous judicial opinion.

• Observation: “The power of appointment resides solely and exclusively in the Central
Government” . Additional Judges (Article 224) aren’t on probation; non-reappointment
reflects tenure limits

• Critique: Diminished CJI’s role, equating it with Governor’s, risking political bias (Subhesh
Sharma case).

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (1993) [1993] 4 SCC

441 Second Judges Case

• Facts: Reassessed S.P. Gupta amid independence concerns.

• Holding: “Consultation” means “concurrence”; CJI’s opinion, via collegium (CJI + senior
judges), has primacy. Executive must appoint unless exceptional reasons exist. Judge strength
(Article 216) is justiciable for speedy justice (Article 21).

• Observation: “An integrated participatory consultative process” ensures merit . Overruled

S.P. Gupta on primacy .

• Impact: Established collegium system, aligning with Article 50 (judicial independence)

SubheshSharma v. Union of India (1991) [AIR 1991 SC 631]

• Holding: Criticized S.P. Gupta, emphasizing CJI’s “crucial importance” for an independent
judiciary.
• Observation: “An independent, non-political judiciary is crucial to sustain the democratic
political system” .
• Impact: Paved way for Advocates-on-Record
Ashish Handa v. Chief Justice of High Court of Punjab and Haryana [(1996) 3 SCC 145]
• This case involved the appointment of the President of the Haryana State Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission.
• Key Issue: Whether the executive could initiate the appointment process, or if it must
begin with the Chief Justice under Section 16.
• Court's Holding: • The process must be initiated by the Chief Justice, not the executive, to
preserve judicial independence and credibility. • The Chief Justice’s recommendation should
reflect a considered choice of a suitable candidate, not merely respond to executive
proposals. The Court held that the process must be initiated by the Chief Justice, not the
executive, and his recommendation should be followed, aligning with Article 217 principles.
• Jurisprudential development: Extended consultation principles to statutory appointments,
ensuring judicial primacy in such roles
Union of India v. Kali Dass Batish [(2006) 1 SCC 779]
This case involved the appointment of a member to the Central Administrative Tribunal
(CAT), requiring consultation with the CJI under Section 6 of the Administrative Tribunals Act,
1985.
• Key Issue: Whether the CJI’s concurrence could be presumed valid despite alleged
procedural lapses in case of tribunal appointment.
• Court's Holding: Applied Judges Case principles to tribunals, ensuring judicial input where
required.
o The Supreme Court held that regularization cannot be claimed as a right unless the
appointment was made in accordance with the relevant rules.
o It reiterated that backdoor appointments (i.e., without following proper selection
procedures) cannot be legitimized by judicial orders.
o Consultation with the CJI is not a formality; it must be effective, with all necessary
materials provided to ensure an informed decision.
o The court presumed the CJI acted with due diligence unless proven otherwise, given
the high constitutional office’s stature

N. Kannadasan vs. Ajoy Khose (2009)

The Supreme Court held that Shri N. Kannadasan’s appointment as Consumer

Commission President was invalid due to improper consultation with the Chief Justice of
the Madras High Court. The Court said consultation must be full and informed, similar to
judge appointments, to protect judicial independence.

SUPREME COURT

Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India (1992) – Brief Summary

The Supreme Court held that a motion to remove a judge does not lapse if the Lok Sabha is
dissolved. Under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, once an inquiry begins, it continues
independently of Parliament. The Court also clarified that while judicial review applies to
the removal process, courts cannot stop a judge from working during the inquiry. However,
the CJI may advise the judge to step aside temporarily.
In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Another (2020) – Brief Summary
The Supreme Court held that criticizing the judiciary in a way that damages its reputation is
a threat to the rule of law. While free speech is important, it must be balanced with respect
for the judiciary. Contempt of court is not to punish, but to protect the dignity and integrity
of the justice system.
State of bihar v UOI
Party under article 131 has to be a centre or state