REPORT F2024-05 • March 2025

Career Battalion Chief Dies from Explosion while Fighting Tractor

Trailer Fire – Georgia
Executive Summary
On September 4, 2024, a 35-year-old career
battalion chief (Battalion 1) died while
operating at a tractor trailer fire. He was the
command officer at the incident and was
killed while investigating the type of cargo
that was held within the refrigerated trailer
involved in the fire.

At approximately 0921 hours, the local

public safety answering point (PSAP)
received a call for a vehicle fire. While the
incident was being dispatched to the
responding units, the call type was updated
to a tractor trailer fire with black smoke and
multiple callers. Battalion 1 and Engine 11
were dispatched to the incident. Upon
hearing the update from the dispatch center, Photo 1: Fire conditions on arrival of Battalion 1.
Battalion 1 requested an additional engine (Photo courtesy of the fire department)
company and that station 1 be re-paged for a
tanker response. At approximately 0928 hours, Battalion 1 arrived on-scene and positioned past the involved
tractor trailer, blocking traffic. Battalion 1 established command and sized the incident up as a tractor trailer
fire with heavy fire involvement at the rear of the tractor, including tires and diesel fuel, with unknown
cargo and occupant status. Battalion 1 provided a further update to all responding units that there was off-
gassing at the rear of the tractor with an unknown source. He ordered Engine 11 to stop short, deploy an
attack line from the front bumper, and utilize foam. Engine 11 stopped approximately 100’ short of the
involved tractor trailer and deployed the 100’ 1 ¾-inch front bumper attack line. The Chief of the
department (Chief 1101), who arrived just before Engine 11, assisted with deployment of the attack line.
Engine 11’s officer extended the line with a 50’ section of attack line that was stored in the bumper well. At
approximately 0931 hours, Battalion 1 updated dispatch that they had water on the fire and walked away
from the engine crew. At approximately 0932 hours, while investigating at the rear of the trailer, Battalion 1
updated all units on-scene that the cargo was still unknown, but the rear of the trailer indicated it was
refrigerated. At approximately 0933 hours, Battalion 1 attempted to open the rear trailer doors. The trailer

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Career Battalion Chief Dies from Explosion while Fighting Tractor Trailer
Fire – Georgia

exploded and Chief 1101 called to Battalion 1 on the radio stating they were okay. Battalion 1 did not
acknowledge the message. At approximately 0934 hours, Chief 1101 updated dispatch that the trailer had
exploded, was fully involved in fire, and he was going to check on Battalion 1. At approximately 0935
hours, Chief 1101 updated dispatch that Battalion 1 was down and requested air medical. At approximately
0937 hours, Chief 1101 assumed command of the incident and confirmed Battalion 1 was deceased on-
scene.

Contributing Factors
• Standard operating procedures/guidelines (SOPs/SOGs)
• Incident command
• Risk/benefit analysis
• Staffing
• Hazard recognition, including control zone establishment with unknown hazard.

Key Recommendations
• Fire service organizations should develop and maintain SOPs/SOGs with industry best practices
• Incident Commanders (ICs) should establish an Incident Management System (IMS) at all incidents
• ICs should integrate risk assessment as a risk management practice into their fireground strategy
and tactic SOGs/SOPs
• Fire service organizations should follow the appropriate standards for organization and deployment
of fire suppression operations, emergency medical operations, and special operations
• ICs should establish control zones on incidents where immediately dangerous to life and health
(IDLH) environments exist
• Fire service training should provide insight and education towards commonly unrecognized
pressure vessels in the form of intermodal freight trailers and mixed cargo trailers.

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) initiated the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program to examine
deaths of fire fighters in the line of duty so that fire departments, fire fighters, fire service organizations, safety experts and researchers could learn from these
incidents. The primary goal of these investigations is for NIOSH to make recommendations to prevent similar occurrences. These NIOSH investigations
are intended to reduce or prevent future fire fighter deaths and are completely separate from the rulemaking, enforcement and inspection activities of any
other federal or state agency. Under its program, NIOSH investigators interview persons with knowledge of the incident and review available records to
develop a description of the conditions and circumstances leading to the deaths in order to provide a context for the agency’s recommendations. The NIOSH
summary of these conditions and circumstances in its reports is not intended as a legal statement of facts. This summary, as well as the conclusions and
recommendations made by NIOSH, should not be used for the purpose of litigation or the adjudication of any claim.

For further information, visit the program website at www.cdc.gov/niosh/firefighters/fffipp/ or call toll free 1-800-CDC-INFO
(1-800-232-4636). To access the report slides that summarize this incident and the recommendations, visit
www.cdc.gov/niosh/firefighters/programs/pdfs/face202405RS.pdf.

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 REPORT F2024-05 • March 2025

Career Battalion Chief Dies from Explosion while Fighting

Tractor Trailer Fire – Georgia
Introduction
On September 4, 2024, a 35-year-old battalion chief died while operating at a tractor trailer fire. On
September 5, 2024, the U.S. Fire Administration notified the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) of this incident. From September 25 through October 2, 2024, two NIOSH Fire
Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP) investigators conducted interviews
virtually with fire officers and firefighters who responded to the incident. Photos taken at the scene,
computer aided dispatch (CAD) notes, radio traffic audio, helmet camera, body camera, and drive
camera footage obtained from the fire department were reviewed. NIOSH investigators also reviewed
the training records of personnel involved in the incident and reviewed the department’s SOPs and
professional development model.

Due to the virtual investigation, on September 16, NIOSH’s FFFIPP contacted the Fire Safety
Research Institute (FSRI), part of the UL Research Institutes, to request assistance with fire analysis of
this incident. Facts and the timeline surrounding the incident were discussed with the NIOSH team
and gaps in the information were identified. Subsequently, on September 18, 2024, FSRI sent a team
member to meet with the Chief of the Department to examine the remains of the trailer at a storage site
in Georgia. The goal of the examination was to better understand the construction and fuel load of the
refrigerated trailer itself. A sample of rigid foam insulation from the trailer was provided for testing to
identify the foam type, and its potential as a fuel source for the smoke explosion.

Fire Department
Battalion 1 was a member of a combination fire department that has five stations with 31 full-time, 20
part-time, and 3 volunteer personnel that serve a population of approximately 25,000 within a 406
square mile area. The fire department is managed by a career fire chief employed by the county. The
combination fire department is responsible for providing service to the entire county and has automatic
aid agreements with the eight other volunteer departments located throughout the county.

The area served by the department contains a myriad of occupancies including resorts, an airport,
single and multiple family dwellings, light commercial, warehouses, and heavy industrial complexes.
The fire department is responsible for structural fire, aircraft rescue firefighting services, hazardous
material response, technical rescue, and emergency medical services (EMS).

All department members, except for the fire chief, work a 24-hours on duty, 48-hours off duty rotating
schedule. The minimum staffing for the department is 9 personnel including an on-duty battalion chief,

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Fire – Georgia

with full staffing of 11 personnel. The on-duty battalion chief oversees the staffing of five engine
companies, one hazardous materials unit, and one brush unit operating out of five separate fire stations.
Two personnel are assigned to each of the five stations. Fire and EMS are separate divisions within the
department.

Training and Experience

Battalion 1 had 17 years of firefighting experience with a background in both the career and volunteer
fire service. The minimum qualifications for the battalion chief position within the department include
national certification in Firefighter I and II, Apparatus Operator-Pumper, Fire Officer 1, 2, and 3, Fire
Instructor 1 and 2, Incident Safety Officer, and State Emergency Medical Technician Intermediate
(EMT-I) or Advanced (AEMT), or Paramedic.

Battalion 1 had various professional certifications including Firefighter I and II, Hazardous Materials
Awareness and Operations, Apparatus Operator - Pumper, Fire Officer 1, and Fire Instructor 1. He was
promoted to the rank of battalion chief with an agreement that all necessary qualifications would be
completed before the end of July 2026. This exemption was granted due to the department changing
their professional development program for minimum standards within each rank. The department
training records also indicated he had completed continuing education training in a variety of topics,
such as pipeline emergencies, strategies and tactics of fire control, and building construction.

Apparatus, Staffing, and Communications

The minimum daily staffing of the combination fire department is comprised of four engine companies
(minimum of two personnel each) and a battalion chief. The full, daily staffing of the combination fire
department is comprised of five engine companies (minimum of two personnel each) and a battalion
chief. The engine company personnel are responsible for staffing of and response with other apparatus
housed in their station based upon call type.

Emergency calls are received into a county PSAP which utilizes a Motorola P25 800-Megahertz
(MHz) encrypted tri-county simulcast trunking system and a CAD system. All dispatchers are state
certified and required to complete a minimum of 10 hours of continuing education annually. The PSAP
personnel in this incident averaged over 25 hours of continuing education and is currently in the
process of obtaining Emergency Medical Dispatching certification. Each dispatcher handles the call
and incident through completion, regardless of type of call. The various CAD event codes may prompt
the call taker to ask additional and specific questions to provide to dispatched companies. This PSAP
has a minimum staffing of two operators per shift with typical staffing of three or four operators per
shift. The county system averages 40,000 calls yearly including emergency and non-emergency
incidents for the sheriff, local, and state police departments, a combination fire department, eight
volunteer fire departments, and three EMS departments. The PSAP also receives calls for public
works, city workers, three animal control offices, city water, city gas, Department of Natural
Resources (DNR), and railroads. This incident was dispatched using the event code for a vehicle fire
and the CAD generated a specific, predetermined response plan to dispatch the appropriate units. See
Table 1 for the companies dispatched on the original call and Table 2 for the fire unit status and
staffing at the time of the explosion.

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Table 1: Initial Incident Dispatch

Resource Designation Staffing Level

Engine 11 2 Personnel

Battalion 1 1 Personnel

Table 2: Fire Unit Status and Staffing at Time of Explosion

Resource Designation Staffing Level Status

Engine 11 2 Personnel On Scene

Battalion 1 1 Personnel On Scene

Chief 1101 1 Personnel On Scene

Chief 8 1 Personnel On Scene

Engine 12 2 Personnel Enroute

Tanker 1 0 Personnel Dispatched, not enroute

Personal Protective Equipment

Upon arrival at the scene, Battalion 1 exited his command vehicle in his daily work uniform (i.e.,
uniform boots, long pants, sweatshirt, and ball cap). He was wearing a radio strap and holder that held
his portable radio and remote speaker microphone. As the incident progressed, Battalion 1 also donned
a high visibility safety vest as well as his leather structural firefighting helmet. The helmet met current
Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards.

Environmental Conditions
The weather on September 4, 2024, at 0853 hours was fair with no precipitation. The temperature was
69°F with winds out of the north northeast at 10 miles per hour. The humidity was 63% [Weather
Underground 2024]. It should be noted that in Diagram 2 and other images contained within this
report, the wind at the location of the fire was out of the east-southeast direction. This may be due to
obstructions or topography that are different from the recording weather station.

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Career Battalion Chief Dies from Explosion while Fighting Tractor Trailer
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Involved Vehicle
The vehicle involved in this incident was a tractor
trailer style commercial vehicle (see Diagram 1
and Photo 2). The trailer portion of the vehicle
consisted of a container chassis with a
refrigerated intermodal container secured to the
chassis with twistlocks on all four corners of the
container. The refrigerated intermodal container
had a portable generator, or genset, affixed to the
bulkhead of the container. The genset in this
incident ran on diesel fuel and included a self-
contained diesel fuel tank on the lower portion of
the genset device. Based on the information
provided by the UL Research Institutes team, a
visual inspection of the diesel tank did not present
any evidence of bulging or rupture. The container
was loaded with frozen chicken. Diagram 1: Type 111 road trailers.
(Courtesy of 2024 Emergency Response
The 2024 Emergency Response Guidebook
Guidebook)
(ERG) identifies this type of trailer as a type 111
intermodal freight container. These containers are for general freight that carry bulk or non-bulk
packages. They may transport hazardous materials/dangerous goods in small packages (e.g., bags,
boxes, drums) or intermediate bulk containers (IBCs), sometimes referred to as “totes”. These

Photo 2. Type 111 Intermodal Freight Container secured to trailer chassis with genset.
(Photo courtesy of UL FSRI)

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Fire – Georgia

containers typically have the doors for entering the compartment at the rear opposite the bulkhead
[PHMSA 2024]. A summary of FSRI’s trailer construction materials analysis findings can be found in
Appendix One.

Timeline
The following timeline is a summary of events that occurred as the incident evolved. Not all incident
events are included in this timeline. The times are approximate and were obtained by examining the
dispatch records, audio recordings, witness statements, and other available information. All times are
approximate and rounded to the closest minute. The timeline is not intended, nor should it be used, as a
formal record of events.

Time (hours) Fireground Operations, Response, and Details

0921 • PSAP case created and unit recommendations for vehicle fire response
initiated.
0923 • Battalion 1 and Engine 11 dispatched.
o PSAP updated responding units that they have received multiple
calls of a tractor trailer box truck with black smoke coming from it.
0924 • Battalion 1 and Engine 11 enroute.

0927 • Battalion 1 requests additional engine company and Station 1 be re-paged

for a Tanker.

0928 • Battalion 1 on-scene, established command.

o “Heavy fire involvement at the rear of the tractor, unknown
occupant status, unknown cargo”

0929 • Battalion 1 provides update to all responding units.

o “Some type of off-gassing at the rear of the tractor, unknown
source”

0930 • Battalion 1 orders Engine 11 to stop short and deploy the bumper line and
begin using foam.

0931 • Engine 11 has water on the fire.

0932 • Battalion 1 updates all units on-scene stating, “unknown what the cargo is,
it is a refrigerated trailer according to the rear.”

0933 • Trailer explodes.

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Time (hours) Fireground Operations, Response, and Details

• Chief 1101 calls command, “everyone is 10-4 over here.”
• Chief 1101 calls Battalion 1, “Are you okay?”

0934 • Chief 1101 updates dispatch, “large explosion, trailer now fully involved,
the entire trailer blew apart.”
• Chief 1101 going to check on Battalion 1.

0935 • Chief 1101 updates all units, “cannot find Battalion 1.”
• Chief 1101 updates, “Battalion 1 is down. Needs helicopter.”

0937 • Chief 1101 assumes command.

o Chief 1101 confirmed that Battalion 1 is deceased on scene.
o Chief 1101 updates still working on fire attack, contents of trailer
still unknown.

0938 • Chief 1101 confirmed contents of the trailer as frozen chicken.

0958 • Chief 1101 transfers command to Engine 13

o Still fighting fire, Personnel accountability report (PAR) okay, 6
personnel working.

1028 • Fire is knocked down. Hitting hot spots.

1528 • Command terminated.

• Scene turned over to Sheriff’s Office.
• Roadway still closed.

Investigation
On September 4, 2024, at approximately 0921 hours, the local PSAP received a call for a vehicle fire.
The case was generated in the CAD system and the call taker gathered information. While the incident
was being dispatched, the call type was updated to a tractor trailer fire with black smoke reported by
multiple callers.

The companies dispatched on the original call included Battalion 1 and Engine 11, see Table 1. Upon
hearing the update from the dispatch center, Chief 1101 called Battalion 1 by mobile phone to suggest
the upgrade of the assignment as well as to let Battalion 1 know he was enroute. Battalion 1 said he
would be able to see what they were dealing with momentarily and they hung up. Battalion 1 could see
a significant smoke column and requested an additional engine company and that Station 1 be re-paged
for a tanker response, see Table 2. Chief 8 self-dispatched to the scene to assist.

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At approximately 0928 hours,

Battalion 1 arrived on-scene and
positioned his vehicle past the
involved tractor trailer on the
North side, blocking the south
bound lanes to close the road in
that direction. Battalion 1
established command of the
incident and sized the incident
up as a tractor trailer fire with
heavy fire involvement at the
rear of the tractor including the
tires and diesel fuel tanks. The
fire from the rear of the tractor
provided direct flame exposure
to the underside of the front
portion of the trailer. The fire
extended up between the rear of
the tractor’s cab and the front of
the trailer. The cargo and
occupant status were unknown
upon his arrival and relayed to
the dispatch center. Battalion 1
provided an additional update to
all responding units that there
was off-gassing and fire
involvement at the rear of the
tractor from an unknown source.
He ordered Engine 11 to stop
short, South of the incident,
deploy an attack line from the
front bumper, and utilize foam.
Engine 11 stopped approximately
100’ short of the involved tractor Diagram 2: Approximate locations of all on scene
trailer and deployed the 100’ 1¾- apparatus and attack line at the time of explosion.
inch front bumper attack line. Chief (Diagram prepared by NIOSH)
1101, who arrived just before
Engine 11, assisted with deployment of the attack line. Engine 11’s officer extended the line with a 50’
section of attack line that was stored in the bumper well. At approximately 0931 hours, Battalion 1
updated dispatch that they had water on the fire and walked away from the engine crew.

At approximately 0932 hours, while investigating at the rear of the trailer, Battalion 1 updated all units
on-scene that the cargo was still unknown but the rear of the trailer indicated it was refrigerated. At
approximately 0933 hours, as Battalion 1 attempted to open the rear trailer doors, the trailer exploded

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Career Battalion Chief Dies from Explosion while Fighting Tractor Trailer
Fire – Georgia

and Chief 1101 called to Battalion 1 on the radio, stating

they were okay. Battalion 1 did not acknowledge the
message.

At approximately 0934 hours, Chief 1101 updated

dispatch that the trailer had exploded, was fully involved
in fire, and he was going to check on Battalion 1. At
approximately 0935 hours, Chief 1101 updated dispatch
that Battalion 1 was down and requested a medical
helicopter. At approximately 0937 hours, Chief 1101
assumed command of the incident and confirmed Battalion
1 was deceased on-scene. Chief 1101 updated that crews
were still working on fire attack, and contents of the trailer
were still unknown. At approximately 0938 hours Chief
1101 confirmed with the driver that the cargo was frozen
chicken.

Photo 3 and Photo 4. View of fire behavior on passenger side of vehicle (top photo) and view
from the fire attack team as Battalion 1 declared water on the fire (bottom photo).
(Photos courtesy of fire department)

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Career Battalion Chief Dies from Explosion while Fighting Tractor Trailer
Fire – Georgia

Photo 5. View of driver side of involved vehicle following extinguishment.

(Photo courtesy of fire department)

Photo 6. View of passenger side of involved vehicle following

extinguishment. (Photo courtesy of fire department)

At approximately 0958 hours, Chief 1101 transferred command to Engine 13, crews were still fighting
fire, PAR was okay, and they had six personnel working. At approximately 1028 hours, command
reported the fire was knocked down with crews still extinguishing hot spots. At approximately 1528
hours, command was terminated, the scene was turned over to the Sheriff’s Office, and the roadway
would remain closed.

Cause of Death
According to the State Bureau of Investigation, Department of Forensic Sciences report, an autopsy
was performed by the Office of the Medical Examiner. The manner of death was classified as an

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Fire – Georgia

accident. It was noted Battalion 1 was in close proximity to a vehicular fire and explosion. The cause
of death was listed as blunt force, blast, and thermal injuries of the head and torso.

Contributing Factors
Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more key contributing factors in a
larger sequence of events. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing
factors that likely led to this fatality:

• SOPs/SOGs
• Incident Command
• Risk/benefit analysis
• Staffing
• Hazard recognition, including control zone establishment with unknown hazard.

Recommendations
Recommendation #1: Fire Service Organizations should develop and maintain SOPs/SOGs with
industry best practices.

Discussion: SOPs/SOGs establish the basic framework for conducting emergency operations safely
and effectively. Some procedures are specifically directed toward safety; others support safe operations
by establishing a system of predictable and consistent operations. Coordination, consistency, and
standard approaches are all important and valuable components of safe emergency operations [USFA
2018].

In this incident, the IC was the first to arrive on the scene. The IC provided a scene size up report and
established command. He positioned his apparatus to provide a safe working area for incoming crews
and to establish a Traffic Incident Management Area (TIMA) [NFPA 1091 2024]. The IC then made
the effort to perform his 360-degree size up as dictated by the department SOGs. But, due to the smoke
drift, only about 270-degrees of the incident was viewed immediately upon his arrival. Once Battalion
1 exited his vehicle he completed his 360-degree size-up, provided his incoming units with updates
including something off-gassing at the rear of the tractor, the level of fire involvement, and their initial
set of orders on arrival. Following the initiation of fire attack by the first arriving engine and additional
personnel who arrived in non-suppression apparatus, the IC continued to operate within the hot zone of
the incident in an investigation mode. The purpose of the IC operating within the hot zone performing
investigation was to determine the cargo being transported by the motor carrier.

NFPA 1550 section 6.2.2, Standard for Emergency Responder Health and Safety, states that fire
departments should prepare and maintain written policies and SOPs that document the organization
structure, membership, roles and responsibilities, expected functions, emergency operations, and
training requirements. This includes:

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• the types of standard evolutions that are expected to be performed

• the evolutions that must be performed simultaneously or in sequence for different types of
situations
• the minimum number of members required to perform each function
• the number and types of apparatus and personnel that will be dispatched to different types of
incidents in accordance with NFPA 1710 or NFPA 1720.
The standard also states these SOPs should specify the procedures that will be employed to initiate and
manage operations at the scene of an emergency incident and post-incident control and mitigation of
emergency scene contaminants [NFPA 1550 2024].

The department in this incident provided copies of their SOGs for the NIOSH investigators to review.
The SOGs contain the requirements for personnel operating on vehicle fires, specifically commercial
vehicle fires. The SOG covering incidents where fire is showing requires personnel to be in full
protective clothing, including self-contained breathing apparatus. If the vehicle involved is a tractor
trailer, the SOG states that command should be in the investigation mode to determine if any
hazardous materials are involved. If there are hazardous materials, the type and amount of material
should be determined, and command should refer to the appropriate hazardous material SOG. If there
are no hazardous materials or if the vehicle involved is a bus, then a search for any victims should be
made.

Fire service organizations with similar SOGs could benefit from adding language about conducting
this type of investigation from outside of the hot zone, preferably uphill and upwind whenever
possible. Additionally, ensuring the incident response meets the requirements set forth by the
applicable NFPA 1710 or NFPA 1720 standard allows for additional personnel to respond and perform
necessary tasks, reducing task oversaturation by individual personnel.

The frequency at which SOGs should be reviewed and revised is also specified within NFPA 1550
section 6.2.4. The standards articulate that fire departments should evaluate current trends and research
to determine if policies and procedures are appropriate at least annually or following a near miss or
catastrophic event [NFPA 1550 2024]. The guidelines under which the department was operating on
this incident were effective as of August 2022 and were due for review in August 2023 based upon the
recognized best practice set forth in the standard. The department confirmed that they perform SOG
reviews and training on a rolling calendar basis and intend to continue doing so.

Fire service organizations could benefit from revisiting SOPs/SOGs in their system at least annually as
well as evaluating SOPs/SOGs for appropriate risk management strategies. As written, SOPs/SOGs
support safe operations and avoid unnecessary risk while allowing for deviation when necessary.

Recommendation #2: ICs should establish an IMS on all incidents.

Discussion: ICs are responsible for everything that occurs on the fireground. This includes being able
to decipher all the information that is presented to them upon their arrival at the incident, make sound
decisions, develop an Incident Action Plan (IAP), and employ an IMS on all incidents. Personnel

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cannot control the specific emergency they will face when they arrive to an incident. However, a well-
developed command system and training program provides a solid base for personnel to refer to while
operating [Pieper 2020].

NFPA 1550 Chapter 21 Command Safety states that the first arriving responder from an emergency
services organization has responsibility for the incident, should assume the role of IC for the incident,
and maintain the following responsibilities [NFPA 1550 2024]:

• Conduct an initial and ongoing situational assessment of the incident

• Establish an effective communications plan
• Develop incident objectives from the situational assessment and form applicable strategy and
tactics
• Develop an IAP for the management of the incident
• Review, evaluate, and revise the strategy and tactics based on the needs of the incident and
deploy resources as needed
• Provide for the continuity, transfer, or termination of command
• Maintain an effective supervisory span of control.
Industry best practices recommend that the IC establish an incident command post (ICP) and remain in
the immediate area for the duration of the incident. It is up to the department and IC to determine the
most appropriate command post for their incident. Some command post examples include the front
lawn or Alpha/address side of a structure, inside the cab of the apparatus with the best vantage point, or
the IC’s vehicle. NFPA 1550 standard 21.11 states how the IC should choose and set up their ICP in
the initial stages of an incident. Specifically, the standard states how to provide safety for the command
staff of an incident based on whether it is a single commander or a team. It would benefit the IC to
select an ICP that includes the following considerations [OSFC 2003, NFPA 1550 2024]:

• Sound – If the ICP is quiet, there is less of a chance for the IC to miss radio transmissions.
• Location – Although ICs want to be able to see as much as they can, it is important to provide a
buffer from staging crews and distractions. The ICP should be located in the cold zone of an
incident.
• Stationary – Moving ICs may find it more difficult to maintain focus as there are more
opportunities for them to be distracted.
• Better radio – Most apparatus and command vehicles have a more powerful radio than the
portable radio issued to personnel.
• Protection from the elements – A warm or cool and dry ICP will allow for the IC to concentrate
on the incident.

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• Place to write and record – It is imperative that an IC can write or record information related to
operations, whether it be crew assignments, which units are in staging, mayday information, or
even something as simple as a phone number.
• Better intel equipment – An IC wants to know anything and everything about the incident,
whether it is hazardous materials, occupancy data, target hazard information, etc.
There are times when conditions outside the ICs control prevent the first arriving officer from taking a
command role and they must engage in operations on the fireground. This could be an instance of less-
than-ideal staffing, an imminent rescue, or a situation that requires the IC to take an investigation style
stance. Investigation mode means the IC must determine what conditions are for the incoming crews.
This could include determining involvement of hazardous materials, fire conditions, occupancy status,
etc. Referring to the previous recommendation, fire department policies should acknowledge this
reality while also setting the expectation that ICs should be performing command functions and not
operational functions. Exceptions to this are infrequent and not the rule of day-to-day operations. If the
IC must perform in an investigative role, it is imperative that they transfer command to the next
arriving qualified officer or remove themselves from the command role as soon as possible [Pieper
2020].

The SOGs provided by the fire department in this incident for vehicle fires specifically direct the IC to
be in an investigation mode and not in a command position. This forces the IC to be engaged in some
level of operations inside the hot zone versus being in a controlled and safer environment with a good
vantage point of ongoing operations. The Incident Command SOG for the involved department also
does not specify the methodology the command officers should follow on arrival other than
establishing command, giving the size-up report, mode of operation, and delegating assignments.
Specifying the need for a relatively stationary command setup and the necessity of employing an
accountability system and IAP for the incident is important.

The Incident Command Structure (ICS) is a standardized approach to the command, control, and
coordination of on-scene incident management that provides a common hierarchy within which
personnel from multiple organizations can be effective. ICS specifies an organizational structure for
incident management that integrates and coordinates a combination of procedures, personnel,
equipment, facilities, and communications. Deploying the ICS on every incident can help hone and
maintain skills needed to coordinate efforts effectively, is applicable across disciplines, and enables
incident managers from different organizations to work together [FEMA 2017].

Recommendation #3: ICs should integrate risk assessment as a risk management practice into their
fireground strategy and tactic SOGs/SOPs.

Discussion: In this incident, the IC followed the department SOGs that were specifically developed for
a tractor trailer fire. He established command, provided a size-up, gave the initial company orders, and
requested additional resources. Then, based on the direction of the SOGs, the IC entered the hot zone
multiple times to investigate what the tractor trailer was hauling. He stated over the radio that the
trailer contained unknown content on more than one occasion. He stated the trailer was refrigerated.

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Applying different risk management techniques in coordination with following the SOGs may have
limited the number of personnel operating in the hot zone of the incident.

The concepts of operational risk management have always been important considerations for
emergency response organizations [USFA 2018]. Some risks are unavoidable and are accepted as part
of the duty of a firefighter or line officer. The nature of the activities of emergency responders exposes
them to a high level of inherent risk. Conditions or circumstances can exist in which the proper
response is to not take actions that could place the lives of responders in danger [USFA 2018]. Fire
service personnel can reduce the risk of injury or death while operating on the fireground if they are
able to identify the nature of the threat, determine the risk potential, and incorporate risk management
practices into the operational plan.

A high level of risk management is involved in directing emergency operations and in regulating the
responders’ exposure to emerging incident hazards. Emergency incident risk management expands the
standard approach to directing and conducting emergency operations by incorporating risk evaluation
and the assessment of optional approaches to the problems at hand. NFPA 1550 standard 18.3.2.1
states that the IC should integrate risk management practices in the regular functions of incident
command and at emergency operations the IC should evaluate the risk to members operating at the
scene [NFPA 1550 2024]. This means the IC should determine the life safety profile of the incident
and apply the most appropriate level of risk to first responders consistent with the following principles
shown in Chapter 10.4 of NFPA 1550 [2024]:

• Activities that present a significant risk to the safety of members should be limited to situations
where there is a potential to save endangered lives.
• Activities that are routinely employed to protect property should be recognized as inherent risks
to the safety of members, and actions should be taken to reduce or avoid these risks.
• No risk to the safety of members should be acceptable when there is no possibility to save lives
or property.
• In situations where the risk to fire department members is excessive, activities should be
limited to defensive operations.
There are times in which a tactical command style can be beneficial. Chief Curt Isakson explains that
the command style known as “tactical command” is out of a command vehicle, equipped with all
personal protective equipment, and involved in a more up close and personal size-up which assists in
not only managing the incident but also in getting personally involved in the mitigation of the incident.
He also expresses his perspective of the importance of choosing the command style or mode to fit the
incident and that there is not always a one size fits all approach. The command location and style must
fit the incident to provide the best outcome for life-safety of both civilians and firefighters, while still
placing property as a second priority [Isakson 2021].

In this incident, the contents of the trailer were unknown other than it was refrigerated. The bulk of the
fire was located between the rear of the tractor and the trailer bulkhead. Bystanders told the IC that the

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driver was out of the vehicle and had fled the scene. The department SOG for tactical priorities listed
the hierarchy of the incident as follows:

1. Life safety
2. Incident stabilization
3. Property conservation.
Knowing the driver of the tractor trailer departed the vehicle partially eliminates the life safety
concern. Without knowing if it was a driver team or a single driver, the priority cannot totally be
ignored without contacting the driver who fled the scene. Battalion 1 gave orders to the first arriving
engine company to stop short of the incident and to stretch an attack line for fire attack. This began the
process of addressing the priority of incident stabilization. Risk assessment, as part of an overall risk
management process, is ongoing throughout the entirety of an incident starting at the arrival of the first
emergency responder until the incident is deemed over and command is terminated. All actions and
tactics should have any new or changed information applied to them to ensure personnel safety and
operational effectiveness.

The role of the IC can be very overwhelming and difficult when the incident is complex and
multifaceted. The IC has overall authority for the management of the incident and for some it can be a
daunting task. The ICS provides a framework that allows it to be adapted and scaled based upon the
incident [NFPA 1550 2024].

Recommendation #4: Fire service organizations should follow the appropriate standards for
organization and deployment of fire suppression operations, emergency medical operations, and
special operations.

Discussion: The department involved in this incident became a combination fire department in 2019.
NFPA 1720 section 3.3.16.1 defines a combination fire department as one having emergency service
personnel comprising less than 85 percent majority of either volunteer or career membership. NFPA
1720 section 3.3.16.2 defines a volunteer fire department as a fire department having volunteer
emergency service personnel comprising 85 percent or greater of its department membership [NFPA
1720 2020]. Although it is not clear which standard they were following, the department in this
incident should have been utilizing the information in NFPA 1710 due to the percentage of volunteer
membership being approximately 5.6 percent of the total membership.

Chapter 5 of NFPA 1710 provides minimum standards for staffing of various fire suppression
companies. The department involved in this incident is responsible for primarily staffing engine
companies. Engine companies are fire companies whose primary functions are to pump and deliver
water as well as perform basic firefighting and search and rescue. Further, these companies should be
staffed with a minimum of four on-duty members. However, the standard recommends that these
companies be staffed with a minimum of five on-duty members in first-due response zones that
experience a high number of incidents, geographical restrictions, geographical isolation, or urban
areas, as identified by the authority having jurisdiction [NFPA 1710 2020].

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If the department were operating under the NFPA 1720 standard as a combination department, the
following information should be utilized with the implementation of more volunteer membership.
Based on the metrics provided by the department, the county could be considered a rural and remote
area. Specifically, there is less than 50 people per square mile and a travel distance from the second
due engine is greater than eight miles [USCB 2020]. The data preceding this shows that the staffing
should be six personnel within 14 minutes of dispatch at least 80% of the time. Table 3 displays the
staffing and time standards for volunteer and combination fire departments as specified in NFPA 1720.

Table 3: Staffing and Response Time (Adapted from NFPA 1720)

Demand Zone Demographics Minimum Staff to Response Time Meets Objective

Respond (Minutes) (%)

Urban area >1,000 people/mi2 15 9 90

(2.6 km2)

Suburban area 500 – 1,000 10 10 80

people/mi2
(2.6 km2)

Rural area <500 people/mi2 6 14 80

(2.6 km2)

Remote area Travel distance ≥ 4 Directly 90

8 mi (12.87 km) dependent on
travel distance

Special risks Determined by Determined by Determined by 90

AHJ AHJ based on risk AHJ

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Recommendation #5: ICs should establish

control zones on incidents where IDLH
environments exist.

Discussion: NFPA 1550, chapter 18.3.1.4,

states the IC should have the responsibilities
and duties of all unassigned incident
command system positions. In organizations
where personnel are not plentiful and arriving
early at incidents, this creates a situation in
which task oversaturation for the IC can
happen quickly. NFPA 1550 chapter 5 states
the Incident Safety Officer (ISO) role is a
position within the ICS at an incident or
planned event that is charged with ensuring
action is taken to mitigate any immediate life
safety threats. Within the scope of the ISO
position is the necessity to determine
hazardous incident conditions and advise the Diagram 3: Incident Scene Control Zones 1.
IC to establish or modify control zones at any (Courtesy of International Fire Service Training
given incident. These control zones must be Association)
communicated to on-scene personnel and
entry into the hazardous area must be controlled by the ISO as specified in chapter 5 of NFPA 1550.
These actions require the ISO to possess comprehensive knowledge of hazardous conditions,
operations, departmental SOPs/SOGs, control zones protocols, and the IMS. An ISO also needs to be
able to evaluate the effect of proximity for incident hazards so that risk to members will be limited to
emergency responders assigned tasks to mitigate the incident (i.e., in the hot zone) [NFPA 1550 2024].

In this incident, the IC applied various techniques that fell under responsibilities of an ISO. He ordered
Engine 11 to stop short of the affected vehicle, placing it outside of the hazard zone. He applied the
process outlined in the department SOGs and attempted to locate the driver as well as determine if the
cargo was considered a hazardous material. The IC also communicated all other hazards noticed during
his ongoing investigation of the incident including that there was something off-gassing at the rear of
the tractor and that the trailer was refrigerated.

The International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA), Essentials of Fire Fighting 8th Edition:
Firefighter 1, states that control zones can have a variety of labels depending on operations being
conducted within those zones. The most common terms used to describe these areas are hot, warm, and
cold zones.

The hot zone is the area closest to the hazard such as a fire or hazardous material. This is where trained
personnel work to mitigate the problem. Only personnel directly tasked in mitigating the problem are
allowed to enter this zone, which limits crowds and confusion at the most critical area of the scene.

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Photo 7 and Photo 8. Driver side of trailer just prior to explosion (left photo) and change of
smoke behavior and expansion of container as explosion is occurring (right photo).
(Photos courtesy of fire department)

These personnel wear protective clothing and equipment appropriate for the incident’s hazards [IFSTA
2024].

The warm zone is immediately outside the hot zone and serves as the transition area. Personnel in the
warm zone directly support personnel working in the hot zone by providing emergency lighting, fire
protection, or other support functions. These personnel wear full protective clothing and equipment
and are ready to enter the hot zone if needed [IFSTA 2024].

The cold zone surrounds the warm and hot zones. The cold zone may include the ICP and locations for
the rapid intervention crews, public information officer, rehabilitation area, and staging areas for
personnel and portable equipment. The outer boundary of the cold zone serves as the control line for
the general public (i.e., crowd-control line). Personnel working in the cold zone should wear protective
clothing and equipment appropriate for the tasks they must perform and the hazards they may
encounter [IFSTA 2024].

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Recommendation #6: Fire Service training should provide insight and education around commonly
unrecognized pressure vessels in the form of intermodal freight trailers and mixed cargo trailers.

Discussion: The 2024 edition of the ERG indicates there are several types of road trailers in use in the
United States and includes a road trailer identification chart for emergency responders. Several of these
trailers call out either design pressures or maximum allowable working pressures (MAWP). The road
trailer involved in this incident was a 111 intermodal freight container. The ERG lists distinctive
characteristics and uses for this type of trailer [PHMSA 2024] Including:

• For general freight that carry bulk or non-bulk packages

• May transport hazardous materials/dangerous goods in small packages (e.g., bags, boxes,
drums) or IBCs, sometimes referred to as “totes”
• Cargo door(s) in the rear.
What is not provided through the ERG is the MAWP for several types of trailers including the 111
intermodal freight container. The other trailer types identified with no noted MAWP include the 117
compressed gas/tube trailer, 134 dry bulk cargo trailer, and 137 vacuum tanker. The fire service is not
taught to recognize type 111 trailers as a pressure vessel. When impinged by fire, these trailers can
become pressurized. The same fire dynamics principles that apply to structure fires, apply here as well.
As the temperatures inside of a closed compartment increase, the pressure inside the compartment also
increases. Without a sufficient pressure relief vent(s), the pressure continues to build. The Type 111
trailers, when configured for refrigerated applications, have void spaces between the inner and outer
floor, walls, and roof that are filled with combustible foam plastic insulation. This means that even an
empty trailer has a significant fuel load.

Additionally on this unit, there was an integrated refrigeration unit that consisted of pressurized
cooling lines and a compressor system much like in a typical refrigerated trailer. The various
containers integrated into the refrigeration system could suffer a catastrophic failure as the refrigerant
becomes heated when exposed to fire. This could eventually lead to a boiling liquid expanding vapor
explosion (BLEVE). In this incident, the refrigeration overpressure appeared to ventilate and maintain
safer pressures. This incident is not believed to be the result of a BLEVE.

In the Principles of Heavy Vehicle Extrication by IFSTA [2023], personnel are taught the five-step
process for heavy vehicle extrication which includes the following steps:

1. Identify vehicle and cargo weight hazards (identify the load)

2. Stop the crush
3. Lower the smaller vehicle
4. Lift the load
5. Separate and extricate.
In this incident, the vehicle was upright on its wheels. The first applicable step of the process upon
arrival is identifying the load. Part of identifying the load is contacting the driver of the vehicle who

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should know what they are hauling. In this incident, Battalion 1 was unable to locate the driver of the
vehicle because they left the immediate area. The driver was located later into the incident by Chief
1101 and the cargo information was relayed after the explosion occurred. The trailer was not placarded
to indicate any hazardous materials and Battalion 1 approached the rear of the trailer to further
investigate. He eventually tried to open the rear cargo doors of the trailer at the same time the trailer
suffered a catastrophic failure. The IFSTA Principles of Heavy Vehicle Extrication states that if a
cargo area of a tractor trailer or box truck is involved in fire, consider calling for additional suppression
resources as these fires require extensive overhaul operations [IFSTA 2023].

The fire service at large is aware of the potential surrounding a catastrophic failure of tank trailers or
fuel tanks such as a BLEVE or a burn through that contributes to significant fire growth and potential.
However, the same care is not taught for type 111 trailer responses, which may support more
complacent responses. A smoke explosion, like this case, can happen in any fire in a compartment.
This could be a structure fire, or something different such as the trailer in this instance. The key
indicators as the compartment is filled with products of combustion and oxygen is consumed or limited
all it takes is the introduction of oxygen to the mixture to support a violent reaction. The IFSTA
Principles of Heavy Vehicle Extrication teaches the explosion hazards of undeployed air bags, energy-
absorbing bumper struts, support struts (such as in hoods, trunks, and hatchbacks), suspension struts,
shock absorbers, fuel containers, seatbelt pretensioners, and vehicle tires. The fire service should be
taught that even though explosion hazards are less prevalent than fire hazards, there is a risk associated
with explosion hazards at heavy vehicle incidents [IFSTA 2023].

The dangers of the unrecognized pressure vessel can be deadly, as seen in this incident. One pressure
vessel that is present on every vehicle fire are the tires of the vehicle. Fire service personnel are
educated of the potential dangers when these rupture but is not emphasized to the level it could be.
Commercial vehicle tires contain significantly more pressure than passenger car tires before they are
on fire. Tires rupturing without being impinged in fire have incredible force potential and fires amplify
the force potential. Another commonly overlooked or unrecognized pressure vessel are the various air
bags in commercial vehicles. These are in the suspension, the cab supports, and even the seats inside
the passenger compartments. Fire service personnel must be educated to identify these other less
known pressure vessels including the cargo compartments of the vehicle, especially when they are the
refrigerated style. Pressure can build in these containers unbeknownst to fire service personnel
operating in their vicinity with potentially deadly outcomes. A summary of FSRI’s fire analysis
findings can be found in Appendix Two.

References
FEMA [2017]. National incident management system. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

IFSTA [2023]. Principles of heavy vehicle extrication. Stillwater, OK: International Fire Service
Training Association.

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Isakson C [2021]. Command & control success: Command post location. Retrieved October 2024,
from Firehouse: https://www.firehouse.com/leadership/incident-command/article/21243635/command-
control-success-command-post-location

ISFSTA [2024]. Essentials of fire fighting. 8th ed. Stillwater, OK: International Fire Service Training
Association.

NFPA [2020]. NFPA 1710, Standard for the organization and deployment of fire suppression
operations, emergency medical operations, and special operations to the public by career fire
departments. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2020]. NFPA 1720, Standard for the organization and deployment of fire suppression
operations, emergency medical operations, and special operations to the public by volunteer fire
departments. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2024]. NFPA 1061, Standard for traffic incident management personnel professional
qualifications. 12. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

NFPA [2024]. NFPA 1550, Standard for emergency responder health and safety. Quincy, MA:
National Fire Protection Association.

OSFC [2023]. Officers command: 8 functions of command. Lewistown, PA: Pennsylvania Office of
the State Fire Commissioner.

PHMSA [2024]. Emergency Response Guide. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.

Pieper S [2020]. 4 essential elements for fire incident command policies and procedures. Lexipol.

USCB [2020]. QuickFacts Greene County, Georgia. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.

USFA [2018]. Risk management practices. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, U. S. Fire Administration. Retrieved October 2024, from

Weather Underground [2024]. Augusta, GA weather history. Weather Underground.

Investigator Information
This incident was investigated by Louis (Rick) Lago (former), Investigator, and Stephen J. Ringer,
Investigator, both with the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, Surveillance
and Field Investigations Branch, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH located in Morgantown, WV.
The report was written by Stephen J. Ringer. Dan Madrzykowski and Keith Stakes from the Fire
Safety Research Institute, part of the UL Research Institutes, provided an expert review of the

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expert review of the investigation report. The NFPA Emergency Response & Responder Safety
Division also provided a technical review. An expert technical review was provided by Thomas Cook,
CPSE credentialed Chief Fire Officer and Chief Training Officer.

Disclaimer
The information in this report is based upon dispatch records, audio recordings, video recordings,
witness statements, and other information that was made available to the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Information gathered from witnesses may be affected by
recall bias. The facts, contributing factors, and recommendations contained in this report are based on
the totality of the information gathered during the investigation process. This report was prepared after
the event occurred, includes information from appropriate subject matter experts, and is not intended to
place blame on those involved in the incident. Mention of any company or product does not constitute
endorsement by NIOSH, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In addition, citations to
websites external to NIOSH do not constitute NIOSH endorsement of the sponsoring organizations or
their programs or products. Furthermore, NIOSH is not responsible for the content of these websites.
All web addresses reference in this document were accessible as of the publication date.

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Appendix One
Trailer Construction Materials Findings
(Courtesy of UL FSRI)

At the time of the examination, the heavily damaged tractor trailer had been moved to a storage area
and was basically in 5 pieces (areas). The remains of refrigerated trailer (intermodal shipping
container), the trailer frame that the intermodal container sat on, remains of the tractor, the diesel
generator that powered the refrigeration system, and cargo that is in 3 roll off dumpsters.

The intermodal portion of the refrigerated trailer had been reduced to the floor, front wall, and some
sections of the sides, Figure 1. The floor, walls and roof of the refrigerated trailer had void spaces
between the exterior metal of the trailer and the interior metal lining of the trailer. By design, the void
spaces were filled with a blown in foam that sets up as a rigid foam plastic. This provides the
insulation for the refrigerated trailer. This foam could be a significant source of fuel. It was noted that
foam insulation had been consumed completely or showed significant mass loss in areas of the trailer
that had been exposed to the exterior fire sources.

Photo 9 and Photo 10. Photographs of the remains of the refrigerated trailer. Rear view on
the left and front view on the right. Most of the foam insulation had been burned out of the
front portion of the trailer.
(Photos courtesy of UL FSRI)

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Photo 11 and Photo 12. Some of the remaining foam insulation. Partially charred foam from a
wall panel (left photo) and partially charred foam in the floor section of the trailer (right
photo).
(Photos courtesy of UL FSRI)

Photo 13 and Photo 14. The foam sample from the trailer flooring section that was provided
for testing. Bottom of the sample (left photo) and top of the sample (right photo).
(Photos courtesy of UL FSRI)

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Foam Analysis

The foam samples used for testing were cut out of the foam from the truck, so that no char or residue
were part of the test samples.

A pyrolysis gas chromatography with mass spectrometry (Py/GC-MS) analysis of the foam was
conducted. This type of analysis is used to evaluate the chemical composition of pyrolyzates from a
wide range of organic materials, providing information to identify the test material. Organic materials
such as foam plastics that can be pyrolyzed can be analyzed by GC-MS. The mass spectrum is used to
identify the compounds in the sample and compare them against a library of known materials, to
identify the best match for the pyrolyzed sample.

Samples of the foam were prepared as a powder to ensure the sample was homogeneous for Py/GC-
MS and microscale combustion calorimetry experiments. The temperature range for the pyrolysis of
the sample was 300-900 °C with a temperature ramp of 5 °C/s. Pyrolyzates were directed into the GC-
MS column and identified by the MS. Peaks consistent with polyisocyanurate foam were observed in
the chromatogram.

The polyisocyanurate foam was also subjected to a series of tests to determine its potential heat release
rate capability. Powdered foam samples were tested with the microscale combustion calorimeter
(MCC) in general accordance with ASTM D 7309-21. The samples were heated from room
temperature to 700°C at a heating rate of 1°C/s. The peak specific heat release rate in the MCC was
observed at 371 °C and was measured as 293 W/g and the specific heat of combustion was 25.4 MJ/kg.

Foam samples, approximately 100 mm square and 25 mm thick, were tested in the cone calorimeter in
general accordance with ASTM E 1354-23. Cone samples were tested at radiant exposures of 25
kW/m2, 50 kW/m2, and 75 kW/m2. Two of the cone calorimeter results for the 75 kW/m2 are
presented here, the averaged peak heat release rate of 697 kW/m2 and the averaged heat of combustion
of 20.2 MJ/kg. The higher heat flux was chosen to represent the heat flux closest to flame impingent
from the outside of the truck. The measure protocols and the full dataset created can be viewed at
https://materials.fsri.org/materialdetail/polyisocyanurate-spray-foam

Compared to materials like wood, https://materials.fsri.org/materialdetail/wood-stud, under similar test

conditions, the foam insulation has an average peak heat release rate twice as high as wood, and an
average heat of combustion, 30% higher than wood.

The fire service take away, even if the refrigerated trailer were empty, it still has a large fuel load, with
the potential for significant fire or explosion hazard.

The material analysis of the foam shows that its pyrolyzates and combustion products could have been
a source of fuel for the smoke explosion that occurred within the trailer.

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Photo 15 and Photo 16. One of the foam samples prepared for testing in the cone calorimeter
(left photo) and amount of flame generated by the foam sample during a cone calorimeter test
(right photo).
(Photos courtesy of UL FSRI)

Summary

In addition to fuel sources such as tires and diesel fuel, the fire service needs to recognize other fuels
that are used in the construction of the tractors and trailers, including fiberglass and foam insulation.
Furthermore, based on the fire analysis of the incident there are several considerations for the fire
service regarding refrigerated trailer fires due to the insulating foam, the trailer contains a significant
amount of fuel (hazard), even if it is empty.

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Appendix Two
Fire Analysis Findings
(Courtesy of UL FSRI)

Still images taken from a video of the incident show notable changes to smoke and fire coming from
the trailer. The smoke and flames prior to suppression seem to cycle, build, stop, and start again, see
Photos 17 through 19. After initial knockdown, the smoke from the trailer again seems to cycle or
pulse until the explosion, Figure 8. After the explosion the ventilation limited/fuel rich environment is
the truck resulted in a vent point ignition, followed by an increased amount of fire, Figures 9 and 10.
The images captured throughout the incident captured pulsating fire behavior indicative of the onset of
a smoke explosion.

Photo 17 and Photo 18. The photograph on the left shows the fire at approximately 0928, the
fire has been burning for almost eight minutes. The images are approximately two seconds
apart. The photograph on the right shows a noticeable amount of dense black smoke from the
underside of the trailer. It seems to have enough pressure to flow against the direction of the
wind, then it stops.
(Photos courtesy of UL FSRI)

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Photo 19 and Photo 20. This set of images was recorded between 0929 and 0930. The interval
between the image on the left and the image on the right is about five seconds. These images
show flames jetting upwind from a localized point under the trailer. This may be an
indication of pressurized fire gases exiting an opening in the trailer.
(Photos courtesy of UL FSRI)

Photo 21 and Photo 22. Between 0930 and 0931, just prior to water on the fire, the image on
the left shows that the flame jetting had stopped and then started again 35 seconds later.
Seven seconds later the flame jet stopped again.
(Photos courtesy of UL FSRI)

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Photo 23, Photo 24, and Photo 25. These images are one second apart between 0932 and 0933.
Dense black smoke flow from under the trailer once again is pushing out. This was seconds
before the explosion.
(Photos courtesy of UL FSRI)

Photo 26 and Photo 27. These images provide a sense of the amount of energy released by the
explosion in terms of a blast, projectiles, and thermal radiation. The image on the right shows
the latched door that was blown off the trailer.
(Photos courtesy of UL FSRI)

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Photo 28 and Photo 29. After the explosion, the inside of the trailer was still a fuel rich
environment providing the conditions for a “vent point” ignition, as shown on the left. As
additional air was entrained into the smoke the area of flaming combustion increased. The
source of the fuel for the fire is mainly the trailer and not the cargo.
(Photos courtesy of UL FSRI)

Summary

The fire analysis showed it is important to recognize that ventilation limited fire conditions can occur
in compartments on wheels, such as this refrigerated trailer, just as they occur in compartments in fixed
structures. Fires burning inefficiently in a ventilation limited compartment can generate significant
amounts of gaseous fuel. When a portion of the compartment contains an explosive mixture of oxygen
and gaseous fuel, all that is needed to generate a smoke explosion is a source of heat.

Based on the fire analysis of the incident there are several considerations for the fire service regarding
potential fire behavior of refrigerated trailers:

1) Compartment fire dynamics apply to compartments that are part of a tractor trailer such as: the
closed refrigerator trailer, tanks, and tires.
2) Watch for pulsating fire behavior indicative of the potential for a smoke explosion and maintain
a safe distance.

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