Conduct cases

S v Smit (Failure of the defence of automatism)

Facts:
On the evening of July 6, 1962, the appellant was driving a light delivery vehicle from Rooipoort farm
to Barkly West via Kimberley.
The appellant was the only person in the front of the vehicle, with two passengers, Booi Petersen and
Welcome Jayiya, in the back.
After stopping briefly, the appellant continued to Kimberley and Barkly West.
Around 7:30 PM, the vehicle overturned on a curve within the municipal area of Barkly West,
resulting in Petersen's severe injuries and subsequent death.
The cause of death was a rib fracture, lung tear, and bleeding in the chest cavity.

Issue:
Whether the appellant's action of looking back when Petersen knocked on the rear window
constituted negligence, leading to the death of Booi Petersen, and whether the conviction and
sentence for culpable homicide were justified.

Rule of Law:
Criminal liability for culpable homicide requires proof of negligence.
A driver must exercise a high degree of skill and care, especially when faced with potential
distractions or emergencies.
An involuntary action, such as a reflex, does not necessarily constitute negligence unless it is
accompanied by blameworthy conduct.

Application:
The appellant claimed that he involuntarily looked back when Petersen knocked on the rear window,
causing him to lose control of the vehicle.
The court found that the appellant's action of looking back was not entirely involuntary and
constituted a lack of the necessary skill and care expected of a driver.
The court determined that the appellant's action was not merely an error of judgment but a negligent
act that directly caused Petersen's death.
The court also found that Petersen's action of knocking on the window was not negligent and did not
contribute to the accident.

Conclusion:
The court upheld the conviction for culpable homicide, finding that the appellant's negligence caused
Petersen's death.
The sentence, including the fine, imprisonment, and suspension of the driver's license, was deemed
appropriate and not excessively harsh.

S v Arnold ( defence of automatism, Emotional Distress)

Facts:
The accused was charged with the murder of his wife by shooting her.
At the time of the shooting, the accused was in a state of severe emotional distress.
The State failed to prove that the accused was acting consciously and not subconsciously during the
incident.

Issue:
Whether the accused could be held criminally liable for the murder of his wife given his state of
severe emotional distress.

Rule of Law:
Criminal liability requires:
1. A voluntary act (or omission).
2. Unlawfulness of the act.
3. A legal blameworthy condition of mind (mens rea).
4. Criminal capacity.
Factors such as youth, mental disorder, intoxication, and extreme emotional distress can lead to a
state of criminal incapacity.

Application:
The court found that the accused was in a state of severe emotional distress at the time of the
shooting.
The State did not prove that the accused was acting consciously.
Even if the accused had acted consciously, the evidence did not prove that he could appreciate the
wrongfulness of his act or act in accordance with such appreciation.

Conclusion:
The court held that the accused was not guilty of murder due to the lack of proof that he was acting
consciously and with the necessary mens rea.
The accused was discharged as the State failed to prove criminal liability beyond a reasonable doubt
S v Chretien (Extreme intoxication)

Facts:
After a party, Chretien, under the influence of alcohol, drove a Volkswagen minibus into a crowd of
people standing on a pavement.
One person died, and five others were injured.
Chretien claimed he thought the people would disperse when they saw the minibus approaching.
The trial court found Chretien not guilty of attempted murder and common assault due to a lack of
necessary intention.

Issue:
Whether Chretien could be held criminally liable for murder, attempted murder, or common assault
given his state of intoxication.

Rule of Law:
Criminal liability requires intention or criminal capacity.
Degrees of intoxication affect criminal capacity and intention:
• Slight intoxication: Person can control themselves and is accountable.
• Extreme intoxication: Person is incapacitated and not accountable.
• Intermediate degrees: Accountability depends on evidence and circumstances.

Application:
The court found that Chretien lacked the intention to commit murder or assault due to his intoxicated
state.
The Appellate Division identified varying degrees of intoxication and their impact on accountability.
The court agreed with the trial court that Chretien's level of intoxication rendered him incapable of
forming the necessary intent.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the State's appeal and upheld the finding that Chretien was not guilty of murder,
attempted murder, or common assault due to the lack of intention.
Subsequent legislation was enacted to address crimes committed while intoxicated, but common-law
principles from the Chretien judgment remain applicable in delict law.

R v Dhlamini ( Nightmare)
Facts:
The accused was charged with murder for stabbing the deceased three times.
The incident occurred on June 13, 1954, in a hut shared by the accused, the deceased, and other
natives.
The accused claimed he was half-awake from a nightmare and acted mechanically without intention,
volition, or motive.
The only Crown witness, Gideon, noted the accused's unusual behavior before the incident.

Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty of murder or culpable homicide given his claim of acting under the
influence of a nightmare.

Rule of Law:
A person cannot be held responsible for a crime committed while asleep or under the influence of a
nightmare, as there is no intention or volition.
Negligence could render a person liable if they are aware of their tendency to commit acts of violence
in their sleep and fail to take precautions.

Application:
The court found no motive or bad blood between the accused and the deceased.
The accused's behaviour and the lack of any reason for the crime supported his claim of acting under
a nightmare.
There was no evidence of negligence on the part of the accused.

Conclusion:
The accused was found not guilty of murder due to the lack of intention, volition, or motive.
The accused was also found not guilty of culpable homicide as there was no proof of negligence.

R v Mkize (Epileptic Attack)

Facts:
The accused, an epileptic, was charged with the murder of his sister, whom he stabbed with a knife.
The stabbing occurred while the accused was cutting meat, and the motive seemed inadequate.
The accused claimed amnesia for the period of the incident, supported by medical evidence
indicating an epileptic attack.
The court found that the accused was in an unconscious state during the stabbing, acting without
judgment, will, purpose, or reasoning.

Issue:
Whether the accused could be held criminally liable for murder given his state of unconsciousness
due to an epileptic attack.

Rule of law:
Criminal liability requires:
1. A voluntary act (or omission).
2. Unlawfulness of the act.
3. A legal blameworthy condition of mind (mens rea).
4. Criminal capacity.
Section 29(1) of the Mental Disorders Act 38 of 1916 applies when an accused escapes conviction
due to criminal incapacity from mental disorders or defects.

Application:
The court found that the accused's actions were involuntary due to his unconscious state during the
epileptic attack.
The accused lacked the necessary mens rea and criminal capacity at the time of the act.
The special verdict under Section 29 could not be applied as the accused was not responsible for his
actions due to unconsciousness.

Conclusion:
The court held that the accused was not guilty of murder as he did not act voluntarily and lacked the
necessary mens rea.
The proper verdict was "not guilty" due to the accused's unconscious state at the critical moment