CHAPTER EIG H T

Postwar Reconstruction

This chapter and the next consider the contribution that the conflict resolu­
tion field can make to postwar reconstruction and peacebuilding at the fragile
stage when war ends but peace is not yet secure.

W hen wars have ended, post-conflict peacebuilding is vital. The UN has often devoted too
little atten tio n and too few resources to this critical challenge. Successful peacebuilding
requires the deploym ent o f peacekeepers w ith the right m and ate and su fficient capacity
to deter would-be spoilers; funds for dem obilization and d isarm am ent b u ilt into peace­
keeping budgets; a new trust fund to fill critical gaps in reh abilitation and reintegration
o f com batants, as w ell as oth er early reconstruction tasks; and a focus on building State
institutions and capacity, especially in the ru le o f law sector. Doing this jo b successfully
should be a core fu n ctio n o f th e United Nations. (United Nations High-Level Panel, 2004)

Astrid Suhrke and Ingrid Samset (2007) estim ate from post-Cold W ar evidence
that there is a 25 per cent likelihood o f a ‘recurrence o f civil w ar’ following
negotiated agreem ents. Many argue th at this figure would be considerably
higher were it not for the efforts o f postwar peace operations (Fortna, 2008).
This chapter presents an account o f the rem arkable attem pt by the inter­
national com m unity in the post-Cold W ar era to underpin postwar peace
processes globally by the w holesale institution o f w hat is now usually known
as the ‘liberal peace’ - sometimes identified w ith a political UN ‘New York
consensus’ to set beside the ‘W ashington consensus’ in the econom ic sphere.
Liberal interventionism is made up o f a set o f assum ptions well summarized
by Roland Paris m ore than ten years ago:

The cen tral ten et o f this paradigm is the assum ption th at th e surest foundation for
peace . . . is m arket dem ocracy, th at is, a liberal dom estic polity and a m arket-oriented
e co n o m y . . . Peacebuilding is in effect an enorm ous experim en t th at involves transplant­
ing w estern m odels o f social, political, and econom ic organization into war-shattered
states in order to co n trol civil conflict; in oth er words, pacification through political and
econom ic liberalization. (1997: 56)

Since then these assum ptions have been tested out in the field w ith mixed
results, severely criticized, and to some extent adapted - but by no means
abandoned. They still represent the core thinking behind m ost postwar peace
operations at the beginning o f the second decade o f the twenty-first century -
although signs o f resistance from the growing influence o f China and Russia
may call this into question in future, as discussed in Chapters 11, 19 and 20.
This chapter offers an overall analysis o f this ongoing enterprise and o f cur­
rent controversy about it from a conflict resolution perspective. By the end of
 Postwar Reconstruction 199

the chapter a general conflict resolution response should becom e clear, and
this can then be carried through into chapter 9 to be developed further within
a broader peacebuilding framework.
In view o f current discussions it may be useful at the outset to distin­
guish between peacebuilding, nationbuilding and statebuilding, although these
concepts are not clearly and consistently differentiated in the literature.
Peacebuilding, as already defined earlier in this book, is the broadest o f these
terms and comes from the peace research and conflict resolution tradition. It
is most succinctly characterized as the project o f overcom ing structural and
cultural violence (conflict transform ation), in con jun ction with peacem ak­
ing between conflict parties (conflict settlem ent) and peacekeeping (conflict
containment). This will be further developed and deepened in chapter 9. The
term ‘nationbuilding’ has an interm ediate range o f reference, and was widely
used during the period o f decolonization to refer m ainly to the enterprise o f
forging national identity out o f the diverse populations that made up many
of the newer states so that citizenship would transcend subordinate loyalties.
Statebuilding - a central concept for this chapter - has the narrowest range
and refers to the attem pt to (re)build self-sustaining institutions o f govern­
ance capable o f delivering the essential public goods required to underpin
perceived legitim acy and what it is hoped will eventually becom e an enduring
peace:

One o f the m ost im portant m acro-level shifts in peacebuilding strategy occurred in the
late 1990s and early 2000s, w hen m ajo r peacebuilding agencies began em phasizing
the co nstru ctio n or stren gth enin g o f legitim ate governm ental institu tio ns in countries
em erging from civil war, or w hat we call “statebu ild ing" in this book. Statebuilding is
a particular approach to peacebuilding, prem ised on the recognition that achieving
security and developm ent in societies em erging from civil war partly depends on the
existen ce o f capable, autonom ous and legitim ate governm ental institutions. (Paris and
Sisk, 2 009: 1 -2)

This is contrasted with the earlier generation o f peace operations (what in

chapter 6 we called ‘second-generation’ peace operations), w hich ‘tended to
rely on quick fixes, such as rapid elections and bursts o f econom ic privatiza­
tion, while paying too little attention to constructing the institutional foun­
dations for functioning post-war governments and m arkets’. One influential
version o f this change o f strategy summed up the idea that constructing
effective and legitim ate governm ental institutions should som etim es precede
a prem ature introduction o f m arket democracy in the phrase ‘institutionalisa­
tion before liberalisation’ (Paris 2004). Paris and Sisk quote Lakhdar Brahimi
in support:

The concept o f statebu ild ing is becom ing m ore and m ore accepted w ith in the intern a­
tional com m un ity and is actually far m ore apt as a description o f exactly w hat it is that
we should be trying to do in postconflict countries - bu ild ing effective systems and insti­
tutions o f governm ent. Indeed, acceptan ce o f statebu ild ing as a generic term to describe
200 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

o u r activities w ill help to co ncen trate in tern atio n al support on those veiy activities.
(Brahim i, 2007)

From a conflict resolution perspective this is in itself a welcome develop­

m ent that in no way precludes a concom itant focus on wider aspects of
peacebuilding as clarified in chapter 9. After all, as seen in chapter 4, in the
1980s John Burton and Edward Azar precisely located the focal point o f their
efforts to address deep-rooted conflict and protracted social conflict on the
requirem ent to build effective and legitim ate institutions and practices of
governance that m eet basic hum an needs. W hat is not welcome, however, is
w hen the intervention is not driven prim arily by the interests o f the citizens of
those countries, but by the security interests o f the interveners - for example,
in pre-empting ‘safe havens’ for international crim e and terrorism as part of a
‘global war on terror’. W e do not deny that this may be a separate considera­
tion, but it cannot drive genuine peace operations. We will return to the ques­
tions o f vulnerable or fragile states and o f response to terror in chapter 11,
because these issues are more extensive than the specific challenge o f postwar
reconstruction looked at in this chapter.
Postwar statebuilding is considered from a conflict resolution perspective
in this chapter, and the wider dimensions o f postwar peacebuilding are dis­
cussed in chapter 9.

Postwar Peace Operations

Postwar reconstruction in the defeated Axis powers was carried out by the
occupation forces follow ing their outright victory at the end o f the Second
World War. Having disarmed their form er enem ies, the occupying forces
installed new governm ents with dem ocratic constitutions, supported physi­
cal and econom ic reconstruction, and gradually handed power to new indig­
enous governments. It is worth rem em bering this, because it represents
the original prototype for the whole idea o f liberal interventionism as a
foundation for future peace, and in particular was seen by planners in the
US Departm ent o f Defense as the model for their reconstruction o f Iraq after
2003. According to this logic, after 1945 Germany and Japan were transform ed
from fom enters o f war into bastions o f peace - and principles o f the liberal
peace were given the credit.
In the first edition o f this book, w ritten at the end o f the 1990s, the title of
this chapter was ‘post-settlem ent peacebuilding’ and the dataset was made up
o f UN missions in Namibia (UNTAG), Angola (UNAVEM), El Salvador (ONUSAL),
Cambodia (UNTAC) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ), all instituted between
1988 and 1992, together with the more com plex division o f labour in the
m anagem ent o f the intervention in post-1995 Bosnia. In the second edition,
in response to the evolution o f ‘third-generation’ m issions in the wake o f
disillusionm ent in Somalia, Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and Rwanda (see chapter 6),
and further com plicated by the post-2001 ‘global war on terror’, we changed
 Postwar Reconstruction 201

the chapter title to ‘postwar reconstru ction’ (despite w hat in some quarters
are seen as the more directive and less transform ational connotations o f this
term), and, equally controversially, widened the dataset to include interven­
tions in countries where there had not been overt civil war (for example,
Haiti) and countries where intervention had been forcible (for example,
Afghanistan, Iraq). The reason for doing this was to focus on the broad chal­
lenge o f postwar reconstruction in general, no m atter w hat the nature o f the
preceding war. W hat all these cases had in com m on was that they were m ajor
interventions (thus excluding operations with sm aller num bers o f military
personnel) and that they were ‘intervention-reconstruction-w ithdraw aT
(IRW) operations. In each instance the declared aim was to intervene, in most
cases in order to aid indigenous efforts to build an enduring postwar peace,
to assist (re)construction efforts, and then to withdraw. We follow the same line
of reasoning in this third edition o f the book. Nearly all the m issions listed in
table 8.1 are still post-civil war peacebuilding operations. The inclusion o f Iraq
does not suggest that the invasion had anything to do with conflict resolution,
nor does it say anything about w hether the war was justified (in our view it
was not). But lessons learnt from the rem arkable failure to understand or plan
properly for postwar reconstruction in Iraq, and from the subsequent belated
attempts at adjustm ent, are im portant com ponents in any comprehensive
survey o f the challenges o f postwar peacebuilding.'
Because our focus in this chapter is principally on external interventions,
we do not w ant to suggest th at external interveners are or should be the prime
actors involved in determ ining outcom es. The in ternal actors and dom estic
constituencies are alm ost always the more im portant. But it is a feature o f
m odem armed conflict that the devastation is so great and the civil popula­
tion’s need for support is so pressing that external support for reconstruction
is often badly needed (though this is not always the primary motive for outsid­
ers to intervene). W hether interventions turn out to be in the interests o f the
civil population or not is a m atter for investigation. In what follows we wish
to assess w hat types o f external intervention are helpful and what types are
unhelpful from a conflict resolution perspective, recognizing that, as conflict
persists in the postwar phase, so too m ust efforts at conflict resolution. We will
conclude th at the effectiveness o f postwar reconstruction and peacebuilding
in contributing to conflict resolution depends heavily on its legitim acy in the
eyes o f the dom estic population.

Intervention-R econstruction-W ithdraw al (IRW)

Operations, 1989-2009

The 1978 Settlem ent Proposal in Namibia, devised by the Contact Group o f
w estern states, m andated the United Nations Transition Assistance Group
(UNTAG) under Security Council Resolution 435 to assist a special representa­
tive appointed by the UN secretary-general ‘to ensure the early independence
202 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

o f Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control
o f the United Nations’ (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999b: 167-72). The
transition phase was to last a year. This unexceptional decolonization arrange­
m ent unexpectedly turned out to be the tem plate for international postwar
intervention and reconstruction program mes when it was revived ten years
later, in 1 9 88-9, in very different circum stances. The ending o f the Cold War
drew a line under what had been an alm ost autom atic backing o f rival sides
and regimes by the superpowers and opened up the possibility o f concerted
external action to end debilitating wars or overthrow repressive and danger­
ous regimes, and subsequently to help to create or rebuild dom estic political
capacity to the point where power could be safely handed back to a viable and
internationally acceptable indigenous authority in the host country.
This rem arkable era in world politics has unfolded in two m ain phases so
far (see chapter 6). First cam e the period between the Namibia Accords and
the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia (1995), in which it seemed to suit the major
powers to encourage the United Nations to assume a lead coordinating role
(this was the them e o f the first edition o f this book). This has been followed
by a period in which, in different perm utations, the norm has becom e one of
m u ltilateral coalitions under a lead nation or nations, supported by regional
alliances or organizations, international financial institutions, the G8 (not so
far the G20), and a num ber o f relief and development bodies, with the United
Nations and its agencies playing a variety o f more or less central or peripheral
roles. W hat has been characteristic o f both periods has been that the shape
o f intervention policy has been decided by the politically and m ilitarily more
powerful states. This is natural - strong states intervene in weak states, not
vice versa - w hich is why some com m entators are opposed to the entire enter­
prise, a point to be considered later.
In addition to changes over tim e, it is also worth noting differences in the
initial conditions and functions o f IRW peace operations, particularly as
articulated in mission m andates, because the context is often highly influ­
ential in setting the param eters for expected results - or should be. Initial
declared functions often overlap, are the result o f political comprom ise, and
may subsequently alter as the operation proceeds. Nevertheless, they play a
more significant role in determ ining the scope and outcom e o f peace opera­
tions than is often acknowledged.
Six different initial contextual functions for peace operations can usefully
be distinguished (see table 8.1).

• Interposition and monitoring operations are traditional ‘first-generation’ func­

tions, some o f which, such as UNDOF (Israel-Syria), survive from the Cold
War period. A more recent exam ple was UNMEE (2000-8), tasked with
m onitoring cessation o f hostilities in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. UNIFIL
(Lebanon) changed character after the 2006 Israel-H ezbollah war and is
now seen by some as a prototype for possible future interposition and
 Postwar Reconstruction 203

m onitoring missions in the region. These missions are not included in

table 8.1 because they do not encompass postwar reconstruction and are
not therefore IRW operations.
• Decolonization operations are m ounted to assist the transition to self-rule
after wars o f national liberation (Namibia, East Tim or (Timor Leste)). Here
the fact that the ‘colonial’ power (South Africa, Indonesia) has already
agreed w ithdrawal evidently makes the task o f the interveners easier.
• Democracy restoration operations are tasked to defend an already existing
democracy or restore an ousted dem ocratically elected leader (Haiti, Sierra
Leone). Although resistance from the usurper is likely to be strong, the
existence o f an already elected alternative again makes prospects better
so long as this is generally seen to have been legitim ate (‘free and fair
elections’).
• Peace support operations are interventions to help manage the transition
from war to peace after a ceasefire or some form o f already agreed peace
arrangem ent (Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Burundi). This is the
locus classicus for peace operations - indeed sometimes conflated with peace
operations in general. A prior peace agreem ent again greatly increases
chances o f success, but, since m aking peace between undefeated conflict
parties in civil wars does not end the conflict but merely transm utes it
into intense political rivalry, the post-agreement period is often the most
dangerous. The collapse o f agreem ents in Angola and Rwanda in the 1990s
subsequently engulfed the peace operations intended to support them
(UNAVEM II, UNAMIR). This is where lessons about postwar international
intervention did indeed need to be learnt - and to a considerable extent
they have been.
• Humanitarian intervention operations, unlike during the Cold W ar period,
when they were directed m ainly against over-powerful tyrants (for exam­
ple, Idi Am in’s Uganda), are now usually interventions in ongoing internal
conflicts or civil wars, initially driven principally by concern for the wel­
fare o f civilian populations (Bosnia 199 2 -5 , Somalia 199 2 -5 ) - although
tyrannous abuse is often still associated with them , as in Kosovo (1999)
and Darfur (2007). (There are also hum anitarian interventions that are not
peace operations, such as Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq after 1991.)
This contextual function should be clearly distinguished from peace sup­
port operations com m ented on above. Failure to make this distinction led
to the ‘wrong lessons’ being learnt from debacles in Bosnia (the massacre in
Srebrenica) and Somalia (the deaths o f eighteen US rangers). UN peace sup­
port operations in general were wrongly im plicated in the failure o f what
were not peace support operations. Conversely, when as a result no action
was subsequently taken by the m ost powerful m em bers o f the Security
Council in the first weeks o f the Rwanda genocide (1994), it was again UN
peace operations in general that were m istakenly discredited.
• Regime change operations are an explicit attem pt to topple an existing
Table 8.1 IRW operations 1989-2009
Independence (b) Democracy (c) Peace support (d) Humanitarian (e) Defence/regime change

1989 Namibia Nicaragua’

1990
1991 Angola El Salvador'
1992 Cambodia Mozambique (Bosnia (UNPROFOR))^ (Somalia
(UNITAF))^
1993 Rwanda
1994 Haiti Guatemala’
1995 Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR)
1996
1997
1998
1999 East Timor Sierra Leone^ Kosovo
2000

2001
2002 Afghanistan
2003 DRC (Zaire)’ Liberia Iraq
2004 Haiti Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire Sudan (Darfur)?
2005 Sudan (South)
2007 Sudan (Darfur)
1 The mandate of the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) in Nicaragua and Honduras was initially to verify an interstate non­
intervention agreement. It was subsequently expanded to take on something of an IRW role. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was
established in 1991 to verify human rights agreements. It was expanded after the January 1992 peace agreement to take on a full IRW role. The
UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) was deployed for human rights verification and trust-building from 1994, then its mandate was
expanded in 1997 to include verification of wider peace agreements. Initiated by the July 1999 Lusaka agreement, full-scale IRW operations did not
effectively begin in the Democratic Republic of the Congo until 2003.
2 Neither Bosnia 1992-5 nor Somalia 1992-5 is an IRW operation, although they are included in brackets here because they are often cited as
such. Attempts to broker peace during the UN Protertion Force (UNPROFOR) period in Bosnia proved abortive, while the UN Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM II) from May 1993 can be seen as a proto-IRW mission, but continued fighting precluded postwar reconstruction. The same applies to the
interventions of the Military Observer Group of ECOWAS (ECOMOG) in Liberia from 1990 to 1996, much discussed in the humanitarian intervention
literature, despite a UN presence after the abortive 1993 Cotonou agreement. The implementation of the 1996 Abuja II agreement through to the
election of Charles Taylor in July 1997 is similarly not included, because it is better seen as an extension of Taylor's bid for power. Liberia truly enters
IRW territory from 2003 after the negotiated abdication of Taylor under category (c).
3 Despite successful democratic elections in Sierra Leone in 1996, it was not until February 2000 that international efforts to restore elected
President Kabbah evolved into a full IRW mission with the expansion of the October 1999 UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The 1994 IRW
restoration of elected President Aristide in Haiti was initially seen as successful, with further elections following in 1995. The subsequent unravelling
of the IRW effort, particularly in the wake of disputed elections in 2000, eventually triggered a new IRW attempt in 2004.
206 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

governm ent seen to threaten international peace and security, and in par­
ticular the national interests o f the m ost powerful interveners (Afghanistan
2001, Iraq 2003). Here cam e another m ajor shift in contextual functions as
international peace operations were co-opted into the war against terror.
W eak or failed states were also seen as actual or potential havens for terror­
ism (United States, 2002), and US defence and foreign policy requirements
expanded to encom pass forcible dem ocratization and ‘nationbuilding’ as a
national security priority: ‘stability, security, transition and reconstruction
(SSTR) operations’ becam e a ‘core US m ilitary m ission’ (US Department of
Defense, 2005).

There is no suggestion th at these are w atertight distinctions. But it is helpful

to bear them in m ind when it comes to the question o f assessing the success
and effectiveness o f peace operations, as indicated below.
In short, it is highly significant from a conflict resolution perspective that
the perceived legitim acy o f interventions am ong host populations can be seen
to decrease concom itantly in general term s as we move progressively from
decolonization operations to regim e change operations, and th at this has a
m ajor effect on both the scale o f the challenge and the prospects for success.
This is surprisingly rarely taken into account in evaluations o f postwar peace
operations.
Finally, we can also now see th at none o f these cases approxim ates to the
post-1945 context o f total defeat and unconditional surrender after a classic
interstate war, as in Germany and Japan, despite initial US delusions to the
contrary. In 1945 the political conflicts were decided on the battlefield and
were em phatically over before reconstruction began. This is not the situation
in m ost o f the cases considered here. Despite com m on parlance, these are
precisely not ‘post-conflict’ contexts, as w ill be elaborated below. Nor is this
an accidental feature; rather, it is part o f the transform ation in the nature of
m ajor armed conflict in the latter part o f the tw entieth century. It is also the
difference between, say, the Northern Ireland peace process, involving the
accom m odation o f undefeated conflictants, and the peace process in South
Africa, where the outcom e o f the m ain conflict had already been decided by
the irrevocable defeat o f apartheid. This does m uch to explain why, despite
the m uch greater long-term difficulties facing the reconstruction process in
South Africa, it has been the Northern Ireland peace process th at has seemed
to encounter the greater in itial problems.

Filling the Postwar Planning Gap

Another im portant point about the 1 9 8 9 -2 0 0 9 postwar reconstruction experi­
ence from a conflict resolution perspective is the fact th at no single operating
model can fit the needs and com plexities o f each country’s situation. The
crucial negotiations are ultim ately those betw een dom estic parties, their
 Postwar Reconstruction 207

constituencies and the affected populations, but these are not always well
supported by conflict-sensitive external policies - as noted in the Somalia case
study in chapter 6. The United Nations has lacked adequate capacity in this
area, and nationally organized interventions tend to be strongly influenced
by the national priorities and short-term political interests o f the interven­
ing states. There are extensive institutional bases and planning structures
for relief and disaster work at one end o f the spectrum and for longer-term
international development at the other end o f the spectrum, both w ithin
national adm inistrations and w ithin international organizations, including
the United Nations. But when the international com m unity first plunged
into large-scale postwar intervention, reconstruction and withdrawal mis­
sions, there was at first nothing m uch in between, w hich is exactly where the
requirem ents for support for reconstruction and peacebuilding were located.
Previous European im perial colonial offices had been closed down, and the UN
Trusteeship Council had been effectively m othballed (the General Assembly
agreed to form alize this at the 2005 World Summit). In the UN secretary-
general’s words, this left 'a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional
m achinery’ with respect to ‘the challenge o f helping countries with the tran­
sition from war to lasting peace’ (Annan, 2005, § 114; see also Chesterman
2004a).
At the national level, one o f the m ain catalysts for filling this gap was the
catastrophic failure o f postwar reconstruction efforts in Iraq from 2003. Most
responses were ad hoc, such as the UK Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU)
set up to coordinate the efforts o f the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO), the Ministry o f Defence (MOD) and the D epartm ent for International
Development (DFID) (it was indicative that before the Iraq invasion this had
only been attem pted in the area o f conflict prevention - see chapter 5). In
2010 a 1,000-stro n g Civilian Stabilization Group o f experts (800 civilians,
200 civil servants), funded from the FCO, MOD and DIFID, was announced
to respond to the demands o f both conflict zones and natural disasters.
In the USA at first, the incom ing Bush adm inistration had torn up the
Clinton Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 on Interagency Planning for
Complex Contingencies, and there was a relu ctance to th in k that anything
could be learnt from previous UN experience in postwar reconstruction
- hence the startling inadequacy o f the original Office for Reconstruction
and H um anitarian Assistance (ORHA) in 2003 Iraq, run from the Pentagon
and alm ost im m ediately abandoned. Thereafter at first a Jo in t Interagency
Cooperation Group (JIACG) attem pted coordination, although the vast dis­
crepancy in planning capacity betw een the m ilitary planning resources of
the D epartm ent o f Defense (USDOD), w ith a total personnel o f nearly 1.3 m il­
lion, and those o f the Agency for International Development (USAID), w ith a
personnel o f 1,000, made this difficult. A new Office o f the Coordinator for
R econstruction and Stabilization was subsequently set up in August 2004
with a b rief to draw up ‘post-conflict’ plans for up to twenty-five countries
208 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

seen to be at risk and w ith a capacity to coordinate three reconstruction oper­

ations ‘at the same tim e’, each lasting ‘five to seven years’. This was linked to
control o f the World Bank, whose investm ent in ‘post-conflict’ countries rose
from 16 per cent o f its lending in 1998 to 20 to 25 per cent ten years later.
From a conflict resolution perspective, m any were alarm ed at the prospect
o f such grandiose national plans to reshape ‘the very social fabric’ o f target
countries, associated as they were w ith great-power interests, including huge
potential contracts for w estern (and in particular US) businesses (Naomi
Klein, The Guardian, 6 April 2005).
At the international level, strenuous efforts have also been made to fill the
‘peacebuilding gap’, reaching from efforts w ithin the UN Departm ent for
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to integrate field operations and to clarify
the role o f peacekeeping during the stabilization phase in peace operations via
the new capstone doctrine, as discussed in chapter 6, through to the setting up
o f a new UN Peace Building Commission (PBC), recom m ended in the UN report
on threats, challenges and change (United Nations Fligh-Level Panel, 2004) and
endorsed at the 2005 World Sum m it (United Nations General Assembly, 2005,
paragraph 97), to be discussed further in chapter 9.
At the tim e o f w riting the ju ry is still out on the effectiveness o f the PBC
(Ponzio, 2007). For Alex Bellamy and Paul W illiam s, for example, it is ‘too early
to make definitive judgem ents about the exten t to w hich the PBC . . . [has]
improved the UN’s capacity for assisting the transition to self-sustaining stable
peace’, but it is seen to have th e potential to increase support for existing long­
term missions w hich are at the m om ent ‘woefully under-resourced’, and to
bridge the gap between the security focus o f the UN Security Council and the
econom ic focus o f the World Bank (2010; 253-4). Roland Paris (2009) sees value
in country-specific m eetings sponsored by the PBC w hich include host country
representatives, because it may help to increase understanding o f and adapta­
tion to country-specific requirem ents: the com m ission is encouraged ’to con­
sult w ith civil society, non-governm ental organizations, including w om en’s
organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities as
appropriate’ (UN docum ent PBC/2/BDI/4, November 2007, § 21, cited in Paris,
2009: 72). This is a vital dim ension from a conflict resolution perspective, as
will be stressed further in chapter 9. But Paris is not sanguine about prospects
in general. The PBC is financed from existing budgets w ith no extra funding.
Institutional jealousies betw een the DPKO and PBC may bedevil the relation
between im m ediate postwar stabilization and longer-term peacebuilding.
And the PBC lacks authority w ithin the UN Secretariat beyond convening
m eetings and agreeing som ew hat am orphous ‘priorities’ th at are described
only as ‘norm ally’ having ‘im plications’ for participators. Above all, because it
proceeds by consensus, Paris fears th at difficult choices w ill be avoided, bland
‘low est-com m on-denom inator’ priorities will be listed, and actors will gener­
ally carry on doing w hat they were doing anyway. In short, the PBC is as yet
‘largely a discussion forum w ith no executive functions’;
 Postwar Reconstruction 209

The ch allen ge . . . is to strike a balance betw een preserving the flexibility o f the exist­
ing networked stru ctu re o f the in tern atio n al peacebuilding system on one hand, and
the req uirem ent for som e m easure o f hierarchy on the oth er . . . The Peacebuilding
Comm ission, as it is cu rren tly designed, does not strike th at balance. It errs on the side
o f preserving the self-directed qualities o f th e existing peacebuilding netw ork w ithout
introducing a capacity to m ake d ifficult choices betw een com peting approaches and
objectives. (Ibid.: 74-5)

This discussion will be taken up again in chapter 9.

The International Postwar Reconstruction Blueprint:

Dilemmas and Trade-Offs
At this point we offer what may at first appear an over-rigid schema that
combines reconstructive sectors (security, law and order, political, econom ic,
social/cultural) and tem poral phases (intervention, stabilization, norm aliza­
tion) in IRW operations in order to clarify the enorm ity o f the task under­
taken by the interveners and the difficult and constantly varied tensions and
trade-offs involved. It has recently becom e popular to interpret postwar peace
interventions in term s o f dilemmas o f peacebuilding (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008)
or o f statebuilding (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005; Paris and Sisk, 2009). This is
very helpful - although these are not strictly dilemm as because the choices
are rarely m utually exclusive, and in nearly every case the authors in question
end by recom m ending ‘a bit o f each ’, as Anna Jarstad does here for example;
Tn the long run, the central issue is not choosing between peace or democracy,
but rather w hat steps toward peace and democracy should be taken when, and
how are they best timed, sequenced and com bined’ (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; 35;
original emphasis).
It would be better to describe these as apparent contradictions, unavoid­
able tensions and uncom fortable trade-offs - often resulting in paradoxical
outcomes. Nevertheless, the suggestion that explicit ‘dilem m a analysis’ be
undertaken both before and during IRW statebuilding and peacebuilding
operations (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 310) is a good one. It introduces a sober
appreciation o f the scale o f the challenge from the outset, lowers unrealistic
expectations and induces hum ility. This ties in exactly w ith conflict resolution
analysis, w hich, as in the first edition o f this book (1 9 9 9 :1 8 8 -9 4 ), emphasizes
that, because o f the nature o f conflict at these levels, these are com plex and
contested relations. W hat is distinctive o f the conflict resolution approach is
the insight that m any o f these tensions are not so m uch dilem m as (two incom ­
patible alternatives, neither o f w hich is desirable) as com binations o f options
that are at the same tim e both m utually dependent (there cannot be one
w ithout the other) and m utually in tension (each has a tendency to underm ine
the other). This is characteristic o f difficult choices in intense conflict fields
in general. For example, it applies to the central elem ent in IRW operations
- the intervention itself - because only the strong intervene in the weak and
210 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

the requirem ent o f outside assistance is both needed bu t also in tension with
the aim o f building independent and sustainable indigenous capacity. And
it extends to the central relation between the shorter-term negative goal of
ending direct violence and preventing a relapse into war and the longer-term
positive goal o f building sustainable peace.
Postwar reconstruction is made up o f the ‘negative’ task o f ending con­
tinuing violence and preventing a relapse into war, and the ‘positive’ task of
constructing a self-sustaining peace. In the words o f the 2000 Brahim i Report:

Histoiy has tau ght th a t peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in com­
plex operations: w hile peacebuilders m ay no t be able to fu n ctio n w ith ou t the peacekeep­
ers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit w ith ou t th e peacebuilders’ work.

In Other words, the negative and positive tasks are m utually interdependent.
Yet they are at the same tim e in m utual tension. The logic inherent in the
negative goal is at odds w ith im portant elem ents in the positive goal, while
key assumptions behind the positive goal are often at cross-purposes with the
more pressing short-term priorities o f the negative goal. The task o f mopping
up a continuing war or preventing an early relapse back into war is likely to
demand uncom fortable trade-offs th at m ight jeopardize the longer-term goal
o f sustainable peace - for example, deals with unscrupulous power-brokers,
or the early incorporation o f largely unreconstructed local m ilitia to shore
up a critical security gap. Conversely, m easures adopted on the assumption
that it is m arket dem ocracy th at best sustains peaceful reconstruction long­
term may en route increase the risk o f reversion to war. On the governance
front, conflictual electoral processes may exacerbate political differences and
favour the ‘w rong’ politicians. On the econom ic front, the com petitive nature
o f free-market capitalism may engender turm oil while externally imposed
‘conditionalities’ may also be disruptive. On the social front, there are the
well-known tensions between stability and ju stice. Both democracy and the
m arket econom y are inherently conflictual processes which may offer a
greater measure o f political stability in the long run, but, as is often noted, are
likely to increase political instability during the transition phase, particularly
where there is little or no prior experience o f them .
In short, the task for those undertaking m ajor IRW operations, whether
w ith broader peacebuilding aims or w ith m ore focused statebuilding priori­
ties, is daunting. Indeed, returning to our m ain them e, the two concepts of
statebuilding and peacebuilding are themselves both in m utual tension in
the unruly conditions o f postwar recovery - as seen in the Som alia case study
in chapter 6. But they are also m utually dependent. W ithout effective govern­
m ental institutions deeper peacebuilding is not sustainable, while the fact
that governm ental institutions m ust at the same tim e be perceived as legiti­
m ate and accountable in order to be effective reintroduces considerations of
wider peacebuilding - and reconciliation.
Figure 8.1 and box 8.2 encapsulate the daunting nature o f the task for
 Postwar Reconstruction 211

Source; R am sbotham 2000, 2004; for nested paradigm s, see Dugan, 1996, p. 9 -2 0 ;
and Lederach, 1997, p. 7 3 -8 5

Figure 8,1 iRWoperotions; nested phases, nested tasks and withdrawals

postwar statebuilding and peacebuilding IRW operations that result from

these dynamics. In figure 8.1 the phases are not sequential, but 'nested’.
In other words, unlike the situation in pre-war prevention (see chapter 5),
in postwar peace support the key tasks must be initiated at the same time
(longer-term peacebuilding and middle-term statebuilding must from the
start accompany what it is hoped will thereby be shorter-term peacekeeping).
And box 8.2 is intended not to represent a rigid tem plate, but to sum up much
o f IRW practice over the past two decades that continues to this day. As Paris
and Sisk say in recom m ending ongoing ‘dilem m a analysis’;

The m ore typical approach to m ission planning involves identifying a num ber o f steps
to be com pleted at p articu lar m om ents by p articu lar actors, w ith th e m om ents defined
eith er according to a tim etable or on th e basis o f having achieved specific preconditions;
cu rren t instrum ents designed to aid decision-m aking tend to be based on this essential
premise. By contrast, dilem m a analysis begins from th e assum ption th at m any o f the
elem ents o f statebu ild ing w ill not fit easily together. Rather, they will often work at
cross-purposes. In fact, some o f these elem ents are likely to in teract in ways th at have
the potential to undercut, not advance, the goal o f establish ing legitim ate, effective state
institutions in w ar-torn countries. (2009; 310)
212 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

Box 8.1 Components of the UN Transition Authority in Cambodia

1 Military component: verify withdrawal of foreign forces; monitor ceasefire violations:
organize cantonment and disarming of factions: assist mine-clearance.
2 Civilian police component: supervise local civilian police; training.
3 Human rights component, secure signing of human rights conventions by Supreme National
Council: oversee human rights record of administration: initiate education and training
programmes.
4 Civil administration component supervise administration to ensure neutral environment for
election in five areas - foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security, information.
5 Electoral com ponent conduct demographic survey: register and educate voters; draft
electoral law; supervise and verify election process.
6 Repatriation component repatriate 360,000 refugees.
7 Rehabilitation component see to immediate food, health and housing needs: begin essential
restoration work on infrastructure; development work in villages with returnees.
In addition, there was an information division.

Source: United Nations, 1996: 447-84

We agree. But a phased sectoral approach has been widely evident since
the original list o f tasks for postwar peacebuilding was outlined by the UN
secretary-general in 1992:

d isarm ing the previously w arring parties and th e restoration o f order, the custody and
jrossible d estruction o f w eapons, rep atriating refugees, advisory and training support
for security personnel, m o n itorin g elections, advancing efforts to protect hum an rights,
reform ing or stren g th enin g governm ental institu tio ns and prom oting form al and infor­
m al processes o f political participation. (Boutros-Ghali. 1992: 32)

In 1997 these were seen to involve 'the creation or strengthening o f national

institutions, the m onitoring o f elections, the prom otion o f hum an rights, the
provision o f reintegration and rehabilitation programm es and the creation of
conditions for resumed developm ent’ (TVnnan, 1997). This was reflected in the
make-up o f associated UN missions. In the heroic days o f the early 1990s, for
example, w ith breathtaking com pression, UNTAC in Cambodia was expected
to achieve all these sectoral tasks in a country where conflict parties were as
yet unreconciled - the Khmer Rouge broke out o f the peacebuilding process
before the elections - in four phases between its planned initial interven­
tion in March 1992 and its final w ithdrawal in September 1993 (see box 8.1).
Although ’third-generation’ peace operations have since evolved in many
com plex ways beyond this original tem plate, a phased sectoral approach in
one form or another still represents ‘the m ore typical approach to mission
planning’, as Paris and Sisk say.
Reading across phases and sectors in box 8.2 enables us to com m ent on some
o f the key tasks to be undertaken. Under phase 1 (intervention) we focus on the
im m ediate trade-offs betw een the negative and positive priorities com m ented
on above and note th at this is where the security and law and order sectors
are at their m ost significant. Under phase 2 (stabilization), w hich has to begin
 Postwar Reconstruction 213

Box 8.2 Postwar reconstruction/withdrawal matrix

Phases in host country postwar reconstruction
Sector A Security
Phase 1 International forces needed to control armed factions;supen/ise DDR;
help reconstitute national army; begin de-mining.
Phase 2 National armed forces under home government control stronger than
challengers.
Phase 3 Demilitarized politics; societal security; transformed cultures of
violence.
Sector B Law and order
Phase 1 International control of courts, etc.; break grip of organized crime on
government; train civilian police; promote human rights/punish abuse.
Phase 2 Indigenous capacity to maintain basic order impartially under the law.
Phase 3 Non-politicized judiciary and police; respect for individual and minority
rights; reduction in organized crime.
Sector C Government
Phase 1 In most cases internationalsupenrision of new constitution, elections,
etc., subject to local conditions; prevent intimidation;...
Phase 2 Ability to collect sufficient taxes and formulate national budget; rea­
sonable representative governments; ...
Phase 3 Manage peaceful transfer of power via democratic elections; develop­
ment of civil society within genuine political community; integrate local
into national politics.
Sector D Economy
Phase 1 International provision of humanitarian relief; restore essential services;
limit exploitation of movable resources by spoilers.
Phase 2 Formal economy yields sufficient revenue for government to provide
essential services; capacity to re-employ many former combatants; per­
ceived prospects for future improvement (especially employment).
Phase 3 Development in long-term interest of citizens from all backgrounds.
Sector E Society
Phase 1 Overcome initial distrust/monitor media; international protection of
vulnerable populations; return of refugees under way.
Phase 2 Manage conflicting priorities of peace and justice; responsible media.
Phase 3 Depoliticize social divisions; heal psychological wounds; progress
towards gender equality; education towards long-term reconciliation.
International intervention transitions
Phase 1 Direct, culturally sensitive support for the peace process.
Phase 2 Phased transference to local/civilian control avoiding undue
interference/neglect.
Phase 3 Integration into cooperative and equitable regional/global structures.

at the same tim e, we offer a b rief analysis o f the interlocking requirem ents
for political stability and observe the critical significance o f the government
sector at this point. This is the core o f the statebuilding enterprise. Under
phase 3 (norm alization) we recognize the increased relative im portance o f the
econom ic and socio-cultural sectors w ithin the longer-term peacebuilding
enterprise and discuss what ‘n orm alization’ means. The difficult trade-offs
and dilem m as uncovered in this way show why m any conflict resolvers have
214 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

deep misgivings about many o f the assumptions behind interventions o f this

kind - and why in some cases they disagree am ong themselves.

P hase 1: Interven tion

Putting together the phase 1 tasks from across all five sectors o f the matrix in
box 8.2, we can see at a glance w hat a daunting prospect the initial phase of
the intervention is:

Control arm ed factions: supervise DDR; help restructure and integrate new national arm ed forces;
begin de-mining; reconstitute courts and prisons: break grip o f organized crime: train police;
prom ote hum an rights and punish abuse; in m any cases oversee new constitution, elections and
restructuring o f civil adm inistration subject to local conditions: prevent intim idation: provide
hum anitarian relief; restore essential services: lim it exploitation o f m ovable prim ary resources by
spoilers: overcome initial distrust between groups; m onitor and use m edia to support peace process;
protect vulnerable populations: supervise initial return o f refugees.

In this im m ediate post-intervention phase it can be seen th at security (peace­

keeping) and elite bargaining (peacemaking) predom inate in ensuring the
negative task o f preventing a relapse into war. At the same tim e a transition
has to be achieved from the outset from em ergency relief towards the phase 2
political stability requirem ents. Three features determ ine the core challenges
in phase 1.
First, there is the fu nd am en tal/act o f continuing conflict. Short o f total prior
m ilitary victory for one o f th e contending parties, the surviving undefeated
confiictants are still in ten t upon achieving their pre-existing political goals. In
the first edition o f this book we called this ‘Clausewitz in reverse’, because in
this sense the peace is best seen as a continuation o f the war ‘w ith the addition
o f other m eans’.^ This is an insight th at comes directly from the conflict resolu­
tion tradition. W here the war has been brought to an end by a peace process,
its essence lies precisely in th e effort to persuade undefeated conflict parties
that their persisting and no doubt undim inished political aims can best be
served by non-violent politics rather than by a perpetuation or a resumption
o f violence. W here the m ain power struggle has initially been decided by
m ilitary m eans (as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq) the same still applies,
inasm uch as surviving conflict parties continue to vie for postwar influence,
and additional actors and sub-actors em erge as the reconstruction process
unfurls to com plicate the situation further. W hat Grenier and Daudelin,
drawing on experience in El Salvador, have called the peacem aking or postwar
reconstruction ‘m arket place’ is focused around a series o f trade-offs in which
cessation o f violence is traded for other com m odities, such as political oppor­
tunity and econom ic advantage (Grenier and Daudelin, 1995: 350). In phase 1
o f the post-intervention process it is the interveners who usually play the key
role in ensuring th at there are incentives to discontinue violence by creating
w hat the UN secretary-general has term ed negative and positive inducements
(under the latter, distinguishing the two conflict resolution approaches of
 Postwar Reconstruction 215

‘civic actio n ’ and ‘peace initiatives’) (Annan, 1997). This pattern can be seen
across the range o f IRW cases, from international pressure to corral the South
African adm inistration and South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO)
leaders into the Namibian elections in November 1989, through to the com­
plex m anoeuvring in Afghanistan from the tim e o f the Bonn negotiations in
November 2001, and on to the effort to keep all legitim ate parties involved
in the post-November 2003 preparations for a phased transfer o f sovereignty
in Iraq. In the words o f the Brahimi Report (Brahimi, 2000) with reference to
the earlier period, ‘United Nations operations did not deploy into post-conflict
situations but tried to create them'. Even when armed conflict comes to an end,
political conflict continues, w hich is why we should strictly refer to ‘postwar’
reconstruction rather than employ the usual ‘post-conflict’ m isnom er. In
Afghanistan and Iraq, postwar reconstruction attem pts began while the war
was still continuing.
The second key feature is the fa ct o f the cost o f war, the fact that, in the course
o f the preceding war (or under the preceding regime), the instrum ents o f
governance in all five them atic dimensions are likely to have been much
debilitated if not destroyed (see chapter 3). It is difficult to convey the scale
o f devastation: from huge loss o f life (in the m illions in countries such as
Cambodia and Afghanistan); hundreds o f thousands o f refugees and inter­
nally displaced persons (IDPs) (a quarter o f the population in Mozambique);
ruined econom ies even in naturally rich countries (Angola’s budget deficit o f
23 per cent o f GDP; El Salvador’s per capita incom e at 38 per cent o f pre-war
figures); the destruction o f pre-existing political structures even in quite devel­
oped systems (in Kosovo w ith the collapse o f Serb institutions; in Iraq with the
instantaneous flight o f public employees at all levels); and the substitution for
all this o f predatory warlords, crim inalized econom ies and institutionalized
‘kleptocracies’ (Cranna, 1994). In the D em ocratic Republic o f Congo (DRC) in
the four and a h a lf years to autum n 2003, up to 3.5 m illion are estim ated to
have died as a result o f the violence (International Peace Committee), with
3.4 m illion internally displaced and 17 m illion w ithout food security out o f
a population o f 53 m illion (UN Office for the Coordination o f Humanitarian
Assistance) (Swing, 2003: 25). In the first phase, intervening m ilitary forces
are often the only large-scale organization with the capacity to respond, as
in Basra (Iraq) from April 2003, when British troops found themselves having
to run em ergency services and begin rebuilding the whole o f the local infra­
structure. Bernard Kouchner, head o f UNMIK in Kosovo, describes how the
UN was initially dependent on NATO for m uch o f its logistics and personnel
(Kouchner, 2001). This raises critical questions about civil-m ilitary rela­
tions at many levels, including the staged handover to host-country civilian
authorities that defines phase 2 (M. W illiam s, 1998). Faced with the task of
disarm ing m ilitias and beginning to reconstruct a national army, o f train­
ing police and rebuilding courts and prisons, o f producing electoral rolls
and overseeing the creation o f a new constitution followed by ‘free and fair
216 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

elections’, o f repatriating and resettling refugees and IDPs, o f restoring em er­

gency services and beginning to revive the econom y, o f introducing hum an
rights training and safeguards for threatened m inorities - all in the face of
severe tim e constraints - it is little wonder that Gareth Evans, Australian
foreign m inister and one o f the architects o f the 1991 Paris Peace Accords
in Cambodia, described the UNTAC m andate as ‘overly am bitious and in
some respects clearly not achievable’ (Evans, 1994: 27). It rem ains to be seen
w hat verdicts will be passed on the com parable efforts in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
The third key feature is the fa ct that there are enemies o f the reconstruction process
- especially where wars are ongoing and parties see the interveners as combatants. In
peace processes, the spoilers range from ideologically im placable enemies,
through disappointed political interests, to unscrupulous exploiters who
profited from the previous dispensation and are relu ctant to accept its demise
(Stedman, 1997; Kydd and W alter, 2002). Here there has been an evolution of
experience since 1989, when the m ilitary com ponent o f IRW operations was
still conceived as a variant on traditional peacekeeping, since the early cases
were seen as the im plem entation o f agreed settlem ents in w hich all the main
players concurred. Bitter experience in Angola, Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda
taught that provision had to be made for the Savimbis, Karadzics, Aideeds
and Interaham w e m ilitias. As a result, intervening forces have been asked
to com bine w hat had hitherto often been seen to be incom patible combat/
enforcem ent and peacekeeping/consent-creating roles. As we saw in chapter 6,
com bat troops are likely to find themselves in peacekeeping situations, while
peacekeepers have been compelled to evolve also into peace-enforcers; ‘neu­
trality’ has been reinterpreted as robust ‘im partial’ support for the peace or
reconstruction process. But one o f the m ain conflict resolution insights applies
here - in intense conflict zones no intervener will be seen as im partial. This has
been a steep learning curve exacerbated by problems o f coordinating best prac­
tice across w hat are often widely divergent national contingents, the lack of
experience o f such roles in some forces (including those o f the United States),
and the rapid turnover o f troops ju st when such experience has been gained.
Depending upon the type o f spoilers involved, it is now generally recognized
to be essential to make provision in advance for transform ing spoilers into
stakeholders in a peace process (as has happened, for example, in Northern
Ireland) or, failing that, by accom m odating those who are biddable without
serious damage to the reconstruction process (a difficult question o f ju d g e
ment); for reducing the scale and significance o f their support constituencies
(a demanding exercise in ‘w inning hearts and m inds’) (Avant, 2009); and for
defeating or m arginalizing those who rem ain irreconcilable (a challenge for
robust enforcem ent). This may be easier said than done. Spoilers have become
increasingly sophisticated at deliberately exploiting the tensions and contra­
dictions between the negative and positive tasks pinpointed above - for exam­
ple, squaring the discrepant priorities o f assuring the security o f interveners
 Postwar Reconstruction 2 17

and ‘w inning the hearts and m inds’ o f the host population, or attem pting to
reduce initial expectations while at the same tim e being seen to be ’making
a difference’. In Cambodia the Khmer Rouge succeeded in forcing the aban­
donment o f the cantonm ent and dem obilization plan in November 2002 but,
surprisingly, not the 23 May 2003 national elections. In Afghanistan and Iraq,
opponents o f the postwar outcom e targeted UN and international aid workers
with devastating effect, as well as those engaged in econom ic reconstruction
and the nascent reconstituted police, armed forces and adm inistration, using
violence to frustrate the objectives o f what they see as occupying forces.
In short, the m ain problem for conflict resolution in phase 1 is the fact that
these are unavoidably m ilitarized environm ents in w hich longer-term conflict
resolution goals may be sacrificed to shorter-term security and emergency
requirements. They also tend to be ‘top-down’ and ‘external-actor-driven’ proc­
esses, in contradiction to the conflict resolution principles o f ‘bottom -up’ and
‘local-em pow erm ent’ peacebuilding (see chapter 9).

P hase 2: S tability

Phase 2 is defined as the point at w hich enough progress has been made in
stabilizing the dom estic political situation to enable a safe handover o f power
to a host governm ent and to undertake the first stage o f international w ith­
drawal. Reading across the sectoral phase 2 stipulations from the m atrix in
box 8.2 we can sum m arize the requirem ents as:

National arm ed forces under home government control stronger than challengers: adequ ate indig­
enous capacity to m aintain basic order im partially under the law; sufficient governmental legiti­
macy, which m ay include dem ocratic credentials o f elected government with system seen to rem ain
open to those dissatisfied with the initial result; a reasonably stable relationship between centre
and regions: a form a l economy and taxation system yielding sufficient revenue fo r government to
provide essential services (with continuing international assistance): economic capacity to absorb
m any form er com batants and progress in encouraging general b elief in better future employment
prospects: adequ ate success in m an agin g conflicting priorities o f peace and justice, protecting minor­
ity rights and fosterin g a reasonably independent yet responsible m edia.

W hat are the core state functions that are required from a ‘statebuilding’ per­
spective if the aim is to help (re)construct governm ental institutions that are
legitim ate enough and capable enough to underpin the wider peacebuilding
process?

m ost d efinitions o f core functions include some or all o f th e follow ing: the provision
o f security, th e rule o f law (including a codified and prom ulgated body o f laws w ith a
reasonably effective police and ju s tic e system), basic services (including em ergency relief,
support for the poorest, and essential healthcare), and at least a rudim entary ability to
form ulate and im plem ent budget plans and to co llect revenue through taxation. None
o f these functions requires W estern-style dem ocracy o r ‘neo-liberal’ m arket ideologies.
A lthough dem ocratization and m arketization have been ro u tin e features o f peacebuild­
ing to date, they are analytically d istinct from the concept o f statebu ild ing used in this
volum e. (Paris and Sisk, 2 0 0 9 :1 5 )
218 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

Given the non-sequential and nested nature o f postwar reconstruction

phases, the attain m en t o f these dem anding phase 2 requirem ents is initially
a task for phase 1. Their consolidation, accom panied by further progress
towards phase 3 goals, is the proper task for phase 2. Here it is the ‘struc­
tu ral peacebuilding’ aspect o f postwar reconstruction th at predom inates in
general and the ‘governm ent’ sector around w hich the other sectors can be
seen to hinge in particular. This phase evidently poses particular problems
for conflict resolution because o f the severe com prom ises th at have to be
made on conflict resolution principles in the nam e o f stability. In order to
clarify this, we will outline the phase 2 stability requirem ents here w ithout
criticism and then sum m arize these difficult issues w hen we com e on to
consider phase 3.
The literature on the security sector tasks is large, covering as it does the pon­
derously term ed ‘disarm am ent, dem obilization, repatriation, resettlem ent
and reintegration’ (DDRRR) operations and the (re)construction o f national
armed forces under the control o f the governm ent (Collier, 1994; Cillers,
1995; Berdal, 1996; Ball, 1997; Kingma, 1997, 2001; Edelstein 2009). This can
be seen to include a wide range o f more specific issues, from control o f small
arms and light weapons (UNIDR, 1996) to the reintegration o f child soldiers
(Goodwin-Gill and Cohn, 1994; McCalin, 1995) and de-mining (US Departm ent
o f Defense, 1998). In 1 9 9 2 -3 in Angola some 350 UNAVEM II m ilitary observ­
ers were expected to supervise the process for m ore than 150,000 com batants
- and unsurprisingly failed (Anstee, 1996). Since then, the international com­
m unity has acquired a better understanding o f w hat is required in these more
challenging cases. For rebel forces or warlords to disarm is to give up their
trum p card, so there are huge incentives to cheat, and the interveners need
clear vision, steady w ill and skill in applying the right com bination o f pres­
sure, independent verification and positive political and econom ic induce­
ments. The key point is reached when reconstituted national forces are, first,
under secure host governm ent control and, second, decisively stronger than
rem aining undem obilized forces or private armies. Until this stage is reached,
the situation is too volatile to contem plate withdrawal by intervening m ili­
tary forces (short o f effective abandonm ent o f the whole project), although
current planning in Afghanistan appears to be prepared to risk this.
The law and order sector is equally well covered in the literature, w ith par­
ticular focus on the related topics o f civilian policing (Call and Barnett, 1999),
transitional ju stice (Kritz, 1995; Mani, 2002; Albin 2009) and hum an rights
(O’Flaherty and Gisvold, 1998). Once courts and prisons have been rebuilt and
the judiciary and police reconstituted and trained, the phase 2 requirem ent
is th at politically volatile elem ents should not be tem pted to gain significant
advantage through in citem en t to violence and th at crim inal elem ents should
not be able to operate w ith im punity. The ‘im partiality’ requirem ent is cru­
cial, since otherw ise the ju d icial and policing systems lose legitim acy, bu t this
cannot be expected to go unchallenged, because disappointed interests will
 Postwar Reconstruction 219

interpret the m aintenance o f order as suppression. As m ost o f the 19 8 9 -2 0 0 9

IRW cases suggest, law and order issues tend to get worse before they get
better. The crim e rate soars, as the peacetim e econom y is unable to absorb
large num bers o f unemployed ex-soldiers and their families as well as hun­
dreds o f thousands o f returning refugees, while a continuing w artim e black
economy, a ready availability o f weaponry, and the destabilizing effects o f
what has usually been an abrupt introduction o f free m arket conditionalities
further destabilize the situation. In El Salvador, for example, there were more
killings per year in 1998 than there had been during the war. The lesson is that
this must be expected and planned for. Negotiating acceptable conditions for
justice and policing may involve issues that go to the heart o f divided societies,
as in post-conflict Rwanda, South Africa and Northern Ireland.
It is w ith the phase 2 government sector requirem ents that the heart o f the
postwar reconstruction challenge is reached. The literature on constitutional
arrangem ents and elections is extensive and controversial (Kumar, 1998; Sisk
and Reynolds, 1998). Unfortunately, this also tends to be the most testing and
intransigent o f the challenges, because it concerns the fundam ental question
over which all m ajor political conflicts are in the end waged - who rules?
Agreements have to be made on constitutional frameworks and electoral proc­
esses w here dom estic political interests w ant to secure advantages for them ­
selves, and a process is needed to establish a structure that is in the interests o f
the population as a whole. The interveners have to tread warily, therefore, and
this is w here the international legitim acy provided in cases where the main
domestic players have already agreed to the process in outline, and where it
has been endorsed by regional organizations and the United Nations, is so ben­
eficial. Evidently there are num erous possible constitutional arrangem ents
that work in different circum stances, and there is no space to discuss the
perm utations here (Shain and Linz, 1995). But the phase 2 requirem ents are
clear: first, sufficient perceived (democratic) legitim acy for the governm ent o f
the day and, second, enough general confidence in the continuing openness
o f the system to encourage losers to continue th eir struggle non-violently
w ithin the constitution. This is absolutely critical to success in consolidating
phase 2 and moving on to phase 3, as we note in the next two paragraphs on
the econom y and the social sectors. In cases where there is little or no previ­
ous experience o f such practices, where there is a new state, or where central
governm ent has had little control over the provinces or has imposed itself
only by authoritarian or tyrannical means, these requirem ents becom e very
daunting indeed. For this reason, as seen above, some have questioned the
wisdom o f a ‘rush to elections’ in intense and volatile political environm ents
o f this kind. Further discussion would include questions about the legitim acy
o f international dem ocratic norm s in relation to the power and interest o f
those prom oting them and to the different cultures into w hich they are to be
transplanted, about the role that external actors can or should be expected to
play, and about the relative effectiveness o f top-down governm ent assistance
220 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

programmes or those that work more from the bottom up w ith civil society
and non-government groups (see chapter 9).
In the economy sector the phase 2 benchm arks are determ ined by three main
linked factors (Ball and Halevy, 1996; Kreimer et al„ 1998; Pugh, 2000; Ball,
2001). The first is that the official econom y should yield sufficient revenue for
the governm ent to be able to provide essential services (with continuing sup­
port from international donors where needed). This is a m ajor requirement
that is closely dependent upon success in the ‘governm ent’ sector because it
presupposes progress in tam ing or pegging back the unofficial economy, and
in many cases in overcoming the continuing reluctance o f regional authori­
ties to hand over revenues to the central government. The second requirem ent
is to have understood and made strenuous provision to begin dism antling the
entrenched war econom y (or authoritarian kleptocracy) that allows exploiters
to continue to resist reconstruction. We have seen th at is likely to include an
international regim e to control exploitation o f movable assets such as dia­
monds, drugs or oil. The third requirem ent is harder to m easure because it
involves the broad development o f the econom y as a whole. The phase 2 need
is, first, to absorb enough o f those previously employed in disbanded m ilitia as
will reduce disaffection to containable levels and, second, m ore generally, for
there to be a sense that, however difficult and indeed m iserable m aterial con­
ditions may be now, there is sufficient evidence o f likely future im provement
- particularly in em ploym ent prospects. Fortunately, the withdrawal o f most
or all o f the intervening armed forces at this stage does n ot preclude longer-
term engagem ent and com m itm ent from external development agencies.
Experience from 1989 to 2009 IRW teaches th at it is the m anagem ent of
future expectation th at is, if anything, even m ore im portant than the delivery
o f present gain. Several com m entators advise th at m arket conditionalities
should not be imposed too precipitately, as was, by com m on agreem ent, the
case to begin w ith in M ozambique. Paris is one w ho recom m ends a shift to
‘peace-oriented adjustm ent policies’ th at recognize the priority o f stim ulat­
ing econom ic growth even at the risk o f inflation, and th at target resources at
those hardest h it during the transition period (1997: 85-6). The central phase
2 aim in this sector is to persuade as many as possible th at things w ill improve
so long as they continue to participate in the reconstruction process.
Finally, in the social seaor, the phase 2 benchm arks are n ot so clear<ut,
beyond the aim o f containing intergroup antagonism below levels th at m ight
threaten the reconstruction process and preventing its exploitation by unscru­
pulous political interests (UNRISD, 1995). This m eans adequate reassurances
for threatened m inorities (Gurr, 2000), the settlem ent o f refugees (Stein et al„
1995; Black and Coser, 1999) and the m anagem ent o f conflicting priorities
o f peace and ju stice (Boraine et al„ 1997; Schuett, 1997; Skaar, 1999; Baker,
2001). Measurements o f social divisions are very difficult to make, but m ost of
the deeper recourses for overcom ing them , including the healing o f traum a
and reconciliation, can be expected to come to fruition only over the longer
 Postwar Reconstruction 221

term (see chapter 10). One key dim ension now widely recognized as vital is
what Luc Reychler calls ‘the education, inform ation and com m unication
system’ (to be elaborated in chapter 9):
Here we look at the degree o f schooling, th e level o f d iscrim in ation , th e relevance o f the
subjects and th e attitudes held, th e co n trol o f th e m edia, the professional level o f the
Journalist, the exten t to w hich th e m edia play a positive role in th e transform ation o f
the conflicts, and the co n trol o f destructive rum ours. (Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001; 13)

Turning to the sixth part o f the m atrix in box 8.2, ‘International interven­
tion transitions’, it should now be evident that the sectoral developments
listed above, taken together, m ake up the dem anding requirem ents for an
ordered stage 1 military withdrawal. This should not be seen as an ‘exit strat­
egy’ so m uch as a ‘safe handover strategy’ to indigenous civilian control.
Interveners who are not prepared to see it in these term s should not intervene
in the first place. As it is, the fam iliar tension between short-term ‘negative’
and long-term ‘positive’ goals now plays right through to the w ithdrawal proc­
ess itself. On the one hand, the message to the wider population o f the host
country (as also no doubt to dom estic constituencies in the intervening coun­
tries) is: ‘We are not perm anently occupying forces; we will be leaving veiy
soon and handing over to you.’ But at the same tim e the message to would-be
spoilers has to be; ‘It is no good w aiting for us to go so th at you can resume
your old ways; we are here for the duration and will pull out only when the
situation is secure. You had better realize this and jo in in the peace process
on the best term s available to you while there is still tim e.’ This is a central
dilemma, for example, for the Obama 2010 ‘surge’ in Afghanistan. It is clearly
easier to resolve the tension between these positions w hen the forces involved
have in ternational and dom estic legitimacy.
As to the length o f tim e th at the stage 1 m ilitary-civilian transition takes,
there are evidently no fixed rules. It depends upon the depth and com plexity
of the challenge in each case. In the heroic days o f the early 1990s, for exam ­
ple, swift transitions were envisaged; for exam ple, UNTAG in Namibia from
April 1989 to March 1990; ONUSAL in El Salvador from July 1991 to April
1995; UNTAC in Cambodia from March 1992 to Septem ber 1993, etc. In some
cases there was a handover to follow-on m issions (UNAVEM II to UNAVEM III
in Angola), in some there was a handover to a beefed-up intervention force
(UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia), and in some there was alm ost unconditional
w ithdrawal (UNOSOMII in Som alia and UNAMIR in Rwanda). In the post-1995
period there has been a greater readiness to stay longer in Bosnia and Kosovo,
since these were new political entities under effective in ternational trustee­
ship (and in Kosovo w ith the added continuing uncertainty about future
status). The operation in East Tim or (now Timor Leste) lasted from 1999 to
2002, but then required renewed support after 2006. W ith Afghanistan and
Iraq initial plans for swift withdrawal (the original planning fram ew ork for
the UK’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit in 2004 was for eighteen m onths)
soon unravelled and at the tim e o f w riting in 2010 are still unachieved.
222 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

P hase 3: N o rm a liza tion - a n d beyon d

A cross-sectoral conspectus from the m atrix in box 8.2 shows th at many of the
longer-term phase 3 requirem ents, often listed am ong the initial rhetorical
aims o f the intervention, constitute desiderata beyond the present capacity of
many postwar countries (though they are very relevant to the current stage in
Northern Ireland, for example);

Demilitarized politics; societal security; transformed cultures o f violence; non-politicized judiciary

and police; respect fo r individual and minority rights; reduction in organized crime; peaceful
transition o f pow er via dem ocratic elections; developm ent o f civil society within genuine political
community; equitable integration o f local and national politics; developm ent in the long-term inter­
est o f citizens from all backgrounds; depoliticization o f social divisions; the healing o f psychological
wounds; progress towards gen der equality; education towards long-term reconciliation; integration
into cooperative and equitable regional/global structures.

Here we reach a m ajor difference o f opinion am ong conflict resolution com­

m entators between those, on the one hand, who suggest that goals such as
local em pow erm ent, gender equality or long-term reconciliation are better
postponed in the interest either o f stability or o f conceptual and operational
clarity and those, on the other, who insist that they are w hat justify the
intervention in the first place and m ust therefore be forefronted from the
start. This issue cuts across the conflict resolution com m unity. For example,
Michael Lund argues in the first direction: ‘It is laudable to wish to improve
society by elim inating as many o f its deficiencies as possible . . . but such an
approach risks m aking peacebuilding into a grab bag o f unfulfilled human
w ants’ (2 0 0 3 :2 6 ; see also Cousens et al., 2000; 4). But others argue the opposite
way (Lederach, 1997; Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001).
In general from a conflict resolution perspective it can be seen that, whereas
in phases 1 and 2 it is peacekeeping, elite peacem aking and structural peace­
building that predom inate, in order to secure the more far-reaching and
deeply rooted declared sectoral goals o f phase 3 norm alization, it is social and
cultural peacebuilding that becomes more im portant. In other words, over
tim e ‘softw are’ becom es relatively more significant than ‘hardw are’. Until this
socio-cultural transform ation happens, therefore, m uch o f the form ality of,
say, an apparently independent jud iciary or an electoral democracy or declar­
atory instrum ents on m inority rights rem ains ju st that - a form ality, behind
w hich authoritarianism and partisan discrim ination will continue to prevail.
As to the next stage o f withdrawal o f intervention personnel associated
with phase 3 norm alization, this is also less clear-cut than stage 1 withdrawal.
It varies widely from case to case and merges into w hat m ight be termed
‘norm al’ international presence and intrusion in developing countries, where
it has been said, for example, that ‘UNDP never leaves’. The sixth section o f
the m atrix in box 8.2 describes the aim as ‘integration into cooperative and
equitable regional and global structures’. This em phasizes the im portance
o f regional stability in IRW operations, as noted in chapters 4 and 5. It also
 Postwar Reconstruction 223

evidently begs the big questions about global equity and the global distribu­
tion o f power th at forms an im portant sub-theme o f this book and will be
addressed m ore directly in Part II.

Current Controversies
So far in this chapter we have aimed to convey som ething o f the com prehen­
sive and extraordinarily am bitious nature o f postwar statebuilding and peace­
building operations as they have evolved over the past twenty years. But what
is the overall status o f the ‘liberal peace’ enterprise at the end o f this period?
A review o f the literatu re suggests that opinion is polarized, and com plicated
by the way the agenda has been swamped by the travails o f reconstruction
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The liberal peace has been hijacked by neo­
liberalism , and neo-liberalism in turn by neo-conservatism. The m ain declara-
toiy ju stificatio n for the Bush adm inistration’s m ilitary actions between 2000
and 2008, in addition to protecting US interests, was to ‘spread freedom ’. The
result has been a com plicated set o f reactions in w hich strange bedfellows
find themselves opposed to liberal interventionism , w hile those who w ant to
rescue the liberal peace offer differing, and som etim es conflicting, counsel.
Some object to liberal interventionism from a ‘conservative’ perspective.
Jeffrey Herbst (2003) advises against fixing ‘failed states’ when this artificially
keeps unviable political entities on a life-support system th at simply preserves
insecurity. It is better to let them fail. Jerem y W einstein (2005) sees interna­
tional intervention freezing unstable power struggles, when they should be
left to settle the issue via ‘autonom ous recovery’. Others, in contrast, reject lib­
eral interventionism from a ‘critical’ perspective. David Chandler (2006, 2008)
opposes interventionary statebuilding because, w ithin the general ‘political
econom y o f the liberal peace’, it is a thinly veiled form o f neo-colonial coercion
enforced by international institutions. M ichael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy
Turner endorse Mark Duffield’s argum ent (2007) th at w hat is needed is:

a fun dam ental change in the approach to th e analyses o f w ar econom ies and the politi­
cal econom y o f peace. The political econom y o f p o sK o n tlict peace and statebuild ing in a
liberal peace fram ew ork has involved a sim ulacrfum ] o f em pow erm ent w here peacebuild-
ers transfer responsibility to societies w ith ou t transferring power. Moreover, populations
have been subjected to calculated techniques o f d iscipline under liberal agendas requir­
ing individual self-reliance, a loss o f public goods and unequ al integ ration into the world
econom y. (Pugh et al., 2008a: 391)

Those who w ant to rescue liberal interventionism are also divided. Roland
Paris and Tim othy Sisk, although critical o f liberal interventionism as it has
been carried out in individual cases, argue strongly th at in general term s the
m ain lesson is not to abandon the liberal peace but to do it better: ‘although
m ost experts hold th at these operations have, on the whole, done considerably
m ore good than harm , serious doubts persist about th e ability o f international
agencies to create the conditions for sustainable peace’ (2 009:11).
224 Contemporary Conflict Resolution

Apart from the security danger that results from ‘spillovers, contagions,
instabilities, and vitiation o f in ternational norm s that occurs when authority
and order disappear’, to retreat from the postwar statebuilding project alto­
gether would from this perspective be the height o f irresponsibility and would
‘be tantam ount to abandoning tens o f m illions o f people to lawlessness, preda­
tion, disease and fear’. But here agreem ent ends, and there is a parting o f the
ways as the statebuilding project itself is variously interpreted. Jam es Fearon
and David Laitin, for example, look at the situation from a m ainly realist per­
spective and, in the case o f ‘weak states’, advocate a transfer o f power ‘not to
full sovereignty’, but rath er to a form o f ‘neo-trusteeship’, where the state in
question is ‘embedded in and m onitored by international in stitu tion s’ (2004:
42). Stephen Krasner (2004) goes further, recom m ending ‘shared sovereignty’
arrangem ents for ‘collapsed and failing states’, where external bodies assume
responsibility for aspects o f governance in the m ost vulnerable states on a
perm anent basis - they are no longer seen in international law as sovereign
states. This is m uch m ore radical than middle-ground discussions about ‘tran­
sitional adm inistration’, as in the cases o f East Tim or (Timor Leste) and Kosovo
(Chesterman 2004a; Caplan 2005). But these are com plex relations. Even when
the recom m endation is for a m ore nuanced, disaggregated or ‘lighter touch’
in statebuilding, the result may well be th at as a result there w ill be more
lengthy and extensive outside involvem ent overall - for example, when com­
pared w ith the ‘short sharp shock’ approach o f the early 1990s.

Conclusion

At this point we will postpone further current controversy about post­

war reconstruction in general, as well as testing questions about overall
evaluation, to the next chapter, where we will look at the more radical and
transform ative dim ension o f peacebuilding. Here we will conclude with a
summary o f issues raised in this chapter. Setting aside intense disagreement
about specific interventions, the argum ent has been that the success o f post­
settlem ent and postwar reconstruction efforts m ust be judged according to
conflict resolution and conflict transform ation principles. W e have stressed
the im portance o f dom estic opinion w ithin the host countries as the true
arbiter, however hard it may be to ascertain and however internally contro­
versial this may be, and have suggested th at the perceived legitim acy o f inter­
ventions appears to decrease as we move across the spectrum o f intervention
types in table 8.1. We have argued th at the shift from UN-led post-settlement
peacebuilding to m ixed or non-UN interventions, w here there is no settle­
m ent or the settlem ent is imposed, has compounded the problem s o f legiti­
macy. We have drawn attention to the reconstruction ‘planning gap’, which
dictates that IRW enterprises have to be international. W hatever the initial
war-fighting requirem ents may be in some cases, the overall postwar recon­
struction effort requires coordinated endeavours across national agencies.
 Postwar Reconstruaion 225

across civil-m ilitary operational divides, and across d om estic-m ultinational/

m ultilateral partnerships. W inning the peace makes even greater demands
than w inning the war. We have produced a m atrix o f the phased sectoral
tasks th at constitute the postwar reconstruction program m e according to the
principles o f com plem entarity and contingency (box 8.2) and noted how, from
a conflict resolution perspective, both phases and sectors are ‘nested’ (figure
8.1). The sectors interconnect, and the adm ittedly am bitious goals o f phase 3
must im bue the entire undertaking from the start. This places a huge onus on
effective cooperation befween dom estic parties and the interveners. In phase
1 (immediate post-intervention), when there is a situation o f ongoing conflict,
we have seen how the peacekeeping and elite peacem aking com ponents tend
to predominate. But, as elaborated in chapter 6, in a postwar reconstruction
context, m ilitary forces are there to support the peace process w ithin an over­
all conflict resolution scenario. In phase 2 (stabilization) we noted how there
is an unavoidable tension between the political stability requirem ents that
enable a safe w ithdrawal o f intervening armed forces and the longer-term nor­
m alization and transform ation norms that legitim ized the intervention in the
first place. It is the governm ent sector and the political and econom ic tasks o f
structural peacebuilding th at predom inate in this phase (statebuilding). The
key requirem ent o f the intervening m ilitary at this point is th at their w ith­
drawal should be seen as a function o f political stability in the host country
orientated towards the construction o f a sustainable peace. At all these stages
it is im portant to draw parties into negotiations, to hold open political space,
and continuously to develop and refram e the grounds for agreem ent. Finally,
it is in phase 3 (norm alization) and beyond that the full conflict resolution and
conflict transform ation goals can be attained. Cultural peacebuilding and the
social-psychological sector com e into their own here. We elaborate on this in
the n ext chapter.

Recommended reading
Cousens et al. (2000); Ghani and Lockhart (2008); Hampson (1996); Jarstad and Sisk
(2008); Lund (2003); Paris (2004); Paris and Sisk (2009); Reychler and Paffenholz
(2001); Stedman et al. (2002).