Draft resolution 1.

Committee : Disarmament and International Security Committee

Topic : Addressing the usage of autonomous weapons
Sponsor : The Republic of Korea and The Republic of Poland
Signatories : The People’s Republic of China, United States of
America, The State of Israel, The Republic of Ireland, Ukraine, The
Republic of Türkiye, The Republic of Estonia

The United Nations Disarmament and International Security Council,

Affirming that Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems (FAWS) should be understood as fully
autonomous weapons systems,
Affirming that the differentiating criteria Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems with Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems.
Keeping in mind the 2019 consensus of GGE on LAWS which produced the 11 guiding principle
of LAWS,
Understanding the role of human beings in the decision to deploy LAWS in all and any
circumstances,
Aware of the lack of laws and binding mechanisms that can be formed within this committee,
Emphasizing the importance of ensuring that AWS comply with international law, namely the
International Humanitarian Law (IHL),

HENCEFORTH;
1. Defines Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) as a weapon system that, once activated,
can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator, which
results in 5 characteristics in defining LAWS,
a. Autonomy; not needing human intervention and control during the process of
executing a task, such as, selecting, identifying, and engaging targets,
 b. Abort Procedure; implementing security and safety procedures to ensure that
these weapon systems can be aborted through human intervention,
c. Evolution; the capability of the weapon system to autonomously expand its
functions through interaction with the surroundings in a way exceeding human
expectations,
d. Lethality; having the sufficient means to be lethally engage a target,
e. Supervision; operating under the human supervision such as, but not limited to, an
on-site commander or operator, to ensure that the weapon system operates in
accordance to, and abides by, applicable laws, regulations, and policies,
2. Emphasizing that the main difference between FAWS and LAWS are the extent of human
involvement in operating the autonomous weapon system, wherein one requires a certain
level of human involvement, and one does not require any human involvement and has
the ability to eliminate any sort of human involvement,
3. Taking into account the characteristics of autonomous weapon systems:
a. Autonomy; not needing human intervention during the process of executing a
task,
b. Impossibility for termination; having no way to terminate the device once it has
been deployed,
c. Evolution; the capability of systems to autonomously expand its functions through
interaction with the surroundings in a way exceeding human expectations,

Chapter 1: Accountability & Responsibility

1. Recognising the Accountability for Deployment of Autonomous Weapons;
a. Military operators shall not be held responsible for carrying out orders from a
superior, unless it engages without authorization or disobeys orders from a
supervisor,
b. Military operators and/ or commanders who are charged for violating law when
engaging with a lethal autonomous weapons system must be tried in a military
court and by military law,
c. Must intervene and abort when systems fails,
2. Affirming the Accountability for the Sales of Weapons for Weapons Manufacturers;
 a. Implementing ‘the moral gambit’; a voluntary accountability and responsibility
approach the human agent takes on as part of their involvement in the
development of AWS, this measure will be implemented only for the private sales
of AWS, as they are not regulated by the military;
b. Acknowledges that LAWS function on human input, which sets the constraints,
descriptions, and boundaries of the targets and functions of LAWS; Proposes
transparency on the human operators assigned for controlling LAWS for the
below reasons,
c. Anonymity promotes reckless behavior and unfair decisions, therefore when
transparency is provided on who operates and controls LAWS, it encourages the
operators to make better decisions,
It is easier to hold the operator(s) accountable when the fault is related to the use and
purpose of LAWS as operators can be tracked on a case-by-case basis,
3. Acknowledging that there are concerns on racial and gender inequality within
autonomous weapon systems, thus it is important to take actions to limit this inequality;
a. Assign captains and leaders of human operator groups for supervision and
oversight of human operators, and these leaders will preferably be of diverse
cultural backgrounds,
b. Weekly or monthly evaluation for the performance of the operators of LAWS to
ensure that the operators are contributing to the meaningful human control of
LAWS,
4. Believing that in the process of the development and usage of autonomous weapons,
there are various roles to be taken account of, these roles include developers and
manufacturers, military commanders and operators, government and policy makers,
international law and treaties, algorithms and AI developers, chain of command, as well
as legal and ethical frameworks. Accounting only a single individual/group is unethical,
because there are multiple individuals who participated in the creation and use of
autonomous weapon systems,
5. Believing that the process of development and research should be accelerated, but in a
way that still complies with the basis of the IHL, as we will enforce development
regulations that comply with the IHL, we believe that researchers should not be held
 accountable, unless the researcher has been proven to conduct research in a way that
doesn't comply with the IHL. We believe that the research and development of AWS
could hold potential humanitarian benefits and even reduce civilian casualties as AWS
are more effective in operations, accurate, and will not be subject to human error which
may yield human casualties,
a. Recommends that these regulations should be implemented and enforced:
I. For deployment: The assessment of operators based on the IHL and the
complete human responsibility for decision making in every part of the
life cycle of LAWS,
6. Affirms the jus in bello and jus ad bellum principles in the deployment of LAWS, such
as, but not limited to:
a. The fulfillment of al jus in bello criteria prior to the deployment of LAWS which
includes, but not limited to:
i. Just cause,
ii. Right intention,
iii. Proper authority,
iv. Last resort,
v. The probability of success and,
vi. Proportionality,
b. The adherence to jus in bello during deployment of LAWS to ensure that the
discrimination principle is used to discriminate between civilians and combatants
with the smallest possible margin of error, with the principles of proportionality to
ensure that collateral damage can be minimized,
c. The use of the precautionary principle to confirm that enough risk assessment has
been taken in regards to the impact of the damage and potential collateral damage
before the deployment of LAWS,
d. The adherence of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter for use of force for
self-defense purposes.
 Chapter 2: Research & Development
1. Proposes a kill switch in the form of a microchip, deleting internal systems that with a
microchip is harder to hack into;
a. Strongly encourages research & development cooperation agreements on the
manufacturing of microchips, for the purposes of building safeguards on lethal
autonomous weapons systems, with leading semiconductor manufacturing
companies, such as, but not limited to;
i. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company,
ii. Samsung TechWin Co.,
iii. Intel,
iv. NVIDIA,
b. Invites the national governments of these companies’ home-countries to actively
participate in these research & development efforts, by contributing resources
such as, but not limited to;
i. Laws, Regulations & Policies,
ii. Government Funding,
iii. Providing the necessary facilities at secure locations, and if necessary and/
or requested by the company, security personnel,
iv. Employees of the government which can actively and positively contribute
to the research & development efforts as recommended, proposed, or
requested by the company,
2. Proposes the research and testing of different methods to effectively regulate AWS and
maintaining ethicality and emotion, whilst maintaining the effectiveness of autonomous
weapons;
a. Emotional categories; limiting AI systems to a predefined set of emotions to
eliminate the dangerous resentment that may arise,
b. Contextual awareness, designing AI systems with the consideration of emotional
responses,
c. Ethical guidelines, specifically the ‘ethical governor’, requires developers to
follow and implement all legal guidelines of AWS,
 3. Proposes the development of LAWS with advanced features;
a. A human-controlled killswitch to manually override the operation of LAWS in
case of an emergency e.g. misfire, wrongful targeting; this solution will be used
when the place of deployment is in a densely populated area; retrieval should be
done by army troops of the country which owns the LAWS,
b. Advanced security features such as a stronger firewall, will make the hacking and
hijacking of LAWS much more difficult, therefore we prevent these lethal
weapons from falling into the wrong hands and out of the government’s control,
c. A more sophisticated machine learning algorithm for the LAWS to better
distinguish the difference between civilians and threats,
I. Sensors to better differentiate between threats and civilians and also to
assess for collateral damage after engaging with a target,
II. Self-destruct feature when the surroundings are less populated.

Chapter 3: Meaningful human control

Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems
1. Affirming that the differentiating criteria Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems with
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems should be based on these criteria:
a. Lethality, or having the sufficient means to lethally engage on a target,
b. Abort Procedure; implementing security and safety procedures to ensure that
these weapon systems can be aborted through human intervention,
c. Supervision; operating under the human supervision such as, but not limited to,
an on-site commander or operator, to ensure that the weapon system operates in
accordance to, and abides by, applicable laws, regulations, and policies.
Monitoring of Autonomous Weapons Systems Deployment
1. Implementing meaningful human control on all 4 aspects of an AWS’s life;
a. Development, environmental assessments for which the AWS will be developed
for, certification process to certify an AWS and deem it legal done by the GGE on
LAWS,
b. Activation, before activation, a legal mandatory review should be conducted and
considers reliability and predictability of an AWS as part of its criteria,
 c. Deployment, probation and supervision period, especially for new weapons
d. Operation, human on the loop weapons can have a shutdown mechanism to
ensure that humans can always take control and override the actions of an AWS,
2. Proposes Supervision program; AI algorithms should be supervised before and after it is
deployed, where once deployed supervisors can only track the AIs emotional wave and
give certain “doses” to limit those emotions;
3. Declaring Testing programs; the priority of providing AIs with EQ must be tested
regularly where we put these algorithms in situations that can cause certain increase in
emotions like anger, sadness to project and limit their responses;
Offensive & Defensive Weapons
1. Fully alarmed by the need for distinction between both offensive and defensive, and that
is what we think should be the main focus at this point of time, thus hoping to
differentiate defensive and offensive AWS, following 2 aspects:
a. Purpose of weapon ,
b. Application of the weapon/intention of use,
c. Following this, the usage of a weapons and the role it plays in warfare can be
determined through trials conducted by the GGE on LAWS to investigate the
scope of defense by offensive weapons used for defensive purposes,
Training for Human Operators
1. Proposes a rigorous assessment of human personnel that is eligible to deploy and control
autonomous weapons;
a. Further deploring training programs for human operators related to
autonomous weapon systems, according to the ethical guidelines;
b. Maintaining a registry of human operators eligible to use and control
autonomous weapons systems;
c. Assessing the human operators' eligibility to use and control autonomous
weapons systems on a monthly basis;
d. Training ethics and rules of engagement on the usage of autonomous
weapons to operators of autonomous weapons;
Chapter 4: Human Resources
1. Reminding Operators and commanders who will have access to/ supervise the control
and deployment of these weapon systems must undergo a thorough and comprehensive
security background check by the appropriate investigative unit or agency to ensure
compliance, loyalty, and integrity when operating the system, through procedures such
as, but not limited to,
a. Interviews,
b. Polygraphs,
c. Psychological Test,
d. Financial Records,
e. Criminal Records,
f. Annual Debriefings,
2. Noting further the need to maintain a secure database of military and defense personnel
who are authorized to have knowledge, access, or use these weapons systems, which
should include, at a minimum,
a. Identity, Branch and Title of Operator,
b. Identity, Branch and Title of Supervisor,
c. Codename,
d. Assigned Military Command and Unit,
e. Clearance Level,
3. Acknowledging that military personnel must be trained, through training manuals;
a. Provide robust maintenance of these weapons systems, in terms of hardware,
secure server rooms, and any other physical infrastructure necessary to maintain
these weapons systems,
b. Analyze the situation on the ground, as seen through the camera embedded on the
weapon system, to determine if the analysis provided by the AI-system is accurate
or not,
c. Provide robust cyber maintenance of these weapons systems, through daily or
hourly code scanning, to ensure that only authorized codes are running and any
unauthorized flagged and found are swiftly removed,
 d. Operate these weapons systems through comprehensive training sessions, done as
much or often as deemed necessary, using a joint training manual produced and
established by the military and weapons manufacturer, to
i. Turn on and turn off the system,
ii. Immediately interfere and manually take control of the system if it
malfunctions in any way,
e. Report to appropriate military superiors and contact immediately, the personnel
from the weapons manufacturing company and military technicians, for
immediate systems fixing, if a malfunction and systems error occurs.

Chapter 4: Safety and security

1. Considering the deployment of the means of taking risks with AWS which can lead to
misuse of AWS, from the following aspects: risk of proliferation, misuse in roles by a
state and malfunction of an AWS;
a. Proliferation: cyber security measures, authenticity codes, as we have previously
mentioned in our speeches,
b. Misuse: trial-like assessments, considering environment spacial and time and
other factors conducted by the GGE on LAWS to investigate the scope of defense
by offensive weapons used for defensive purposes,
c. Malfunction of an AWS: adequate testing and mandatory reviews as mentioned
before.