GROUP 1. Injunction. -2
GROUP 1. Injunction. -2
GROUP 1
PRESENTATION
TOPIC
EQUITABLE REMEDY OF INJUNCTION
GROUP MEMBERS
2: ADINDU HENRY
IKECHUKWU IMSU/2021/3702
4: AGUMADU CHINATU
IHEOMA IMSU/2021/3703
5: AHANONU WILLIAMS C
IMSU/2021/3704
9: ALOYSIUS SYLVIA
ADAUGO IMSU/2022/4737
TYPES/CLASSIFICATION OF INJUNCTION
1. INTERIM INJUNCTION
2. INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION
3. PERPETUAL INJUNCTION
4. A QUIA TIMET INJUNCTION
5. MAREVA INJUNCTION
6. ATON PILLER ORDER OF INJUNCTION
INTERIM INJUNCTION
4. Clean hands doctrine – The applicant must act in good faith and not
be guilty of any wrongdoing concerning the matter.
"It was wrong to have expressed the guiding principle for interim
and interlocutory injunctions as if they were the same or
interchangeable whereas, they are not."
(2) The applicant must show that there is a serious question to be tried
and that the applicant has a real possibility and not a probability of
success at the trial.
(3) The applicant must show that the balance of convenience is on his
side, that is, justice will result in granting the application than refusing it.
(5) The applicant must show that his conduct is not reprehensible,
for example, that he is not guilty of any wrong in relation to the case.
(7) The applicant must show that his application is not frivolous, vexatious
or baseless, but he must disclose an existing right or a serious question
to be tried between the parties.
(8) The applicant must also show that the balance of convenience is in
his favour.
Nowadays, the above position has been relaxed. Thus in Kotoye v CBN,
the Supreme Court, per Nnamani Agu JSC held:
"A long time ago, the plaintiff was required to show a strong prima-facie
case that he was entitled to relief (see Harma Pictures v Osborne (1967) 1
WLR 723). However, since the decision of the House of Lords in American
Cynamide & Co. v Ethicon (1975) AC 396 at 407-409, it has been held that
what the applicant needs to show is only a real possibility not a probability
of success at the trial, that there is a serious question to be tried. This is
now an accepted principle in this country...the order will still be made even
though the defendant has a technical defence..." Generally, what is
required of the applicant to establish now are:
(b) that there is a serious issue in the affidavit evidence before the judge
to be tried between the parties.
Along this line is the decision that, where a court has been misled in an
affidavit for obtaining an interim injunction, the trial judge on discovering the
true facts, is entitled to discharge the order. However, where the facts so
deposed to in the affidavit had been corrected in a further affidavit by the
applicant himself before the order discharging the interim order was made,
the trial judge should take into account the facts that the offending
statements had been corrected in determining whether or not to grant the
substantive application for interlocutory injunction.
Quia timet in Latin means `because he fears’ or `because of fear’ this type
of injunction is issued to prevent an infringement of the applicant’s right
which is threatened but has not happened.
According to Graigola Merthyr co ltd v Swansea Corpon; it was stated that
to obtain a quia timet injunction there must be an immediate threat to do so
HELD:
(2) The defendant cannot be restrained from using ordinary English words
which are simply descriptive of the articles he sells or the trade he carries
on. This does not apply, however, to a fancy name or to words that are
descriptive of the plaintiff rather than of his goods or his trade. Words such
as "Niger" or "Nigeria" are not descriptive of goods sold nor of trade carried
on and consequently the defendant can be restrained from using them.
(3) The fact that "Nigeria" is the official and geographical name of this
country does not imply that any person living or trading therein is entitled
to use it as part of his business name, if such use is otherwise unlawful.
The Mareva injunction derives its name from the landmark English case
*Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA* [1975] 2
Lloyd's Rep 509, where the English Court of Appeal recognized the need to
prevent a defendant from removing assets beyond the jurisdiction to
frustrate a court’s judgment.
*Key Features:*
To obtain a Mareva injunction, the applicant must satisfy the court on the
following essential grounds:
2. *Ex Parte Hearing*: The court may initially grant the injunction without
the defendant being present.
While Mareva injunctions are a crucial tool in litigation, they also pose
challenges, including:
*CONCLUSION*
The Mareva injunction is a vital legal remedy that protects claimants from
the risk of asset dissipation. However, its application requires careful
judicial scrutiny to balance the interests of both parties. Courts must ensure
that it is granted only when necessary, with adequate safeguards to
prevent abuse.
The Anton Piller Order
The Anton Piller order is an order of court, made ex-parte and requiring a
defendant or respondent to allow certain persons to enter his premises to
search for documents and movable articles as are specified in the court
order, and to permit such documents or articles to be taken away.
The first Anton Pillar order made in Nigeria was made by Anyaegbunam
C.J. in Ferodo Limited v. Unibros Stores1 in 1980 following the persuasive
authority of the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Anton Piller KG v.
Manufacturing Processes Ltd.2 (the case from which the order took its
name).
The next reported decision of a Nigerian court on the Anton Piller order
was the decision of Belgore J in Oluwanishola Development Co. v. Guines
Insurance Co. Ltd3. In refusing to grant an Anton Piller order as prayed in
that decision, Belgore J did not disapprove of the order, he however
disapproved of the variation to the order as prescribed in the Anton Piller
case sought to be introduced in the Nigerian context. He ruled that it did
not accord with the order prescribed in the Anton Piller case to order that
the party serving the order should include a senior official of the court as
well as policemen. He expressed the view that to involve officers of the
court in the execution of the order would be to involve the court in the
contest between the parties. He also ruled that to authorize policemen to
accompany the team would be to give the order the colouration of a search
warrant which it was not.
After the above mentioned decisions in the 1980s there were at least two
decisions of the Federal High Court in early 1990s in which the court
refused to grant Anton Piller orders on the ground that to do so would be to
breach the right to fair hearing enshrined in the Constitution. Subsequently
though, both judges who gave the decisions have changed their minds and
have been granting Anton Piller orders since then.
Recently however the question whether the grant of an Anton Piller order
would breach the constitutional right of fair hearing appears to have been
settled by the Court of Appeal in Akuma Ind. Ltd v. Ayman Ent. Ltd5. The
issue was raised in that appeal. In the decision of the court on that issue,
Pats-Acholonu JCA stated: "Indeed Anton Pillar order, although
seemingly appearing as a monstrosity, has become accepted within the
vortex of our legal doctrines and jurisprudence."
The Anton Piller Order is an order made in the exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction of the court to do justice as occasion demands. The ex-parte
nature of the order takes it out of reach of the normal rules of court
authorizing inspection and discovery. Those rules require notice of an
application in that regard to be given to the respondent.
Lord Denning in his judgment in the Anton Piller case (at page 60)
emphasized the fact that the order is not a search warrant which would
empower entry into the respondent’s premises without his consent. He
stated that the court had no authority to issue a search warrant in support
of a civil action. Hence the respondent under an Anton Piller order has to
give consent to the applicant to enter his premises otherwise the applicant
cannot.
Though the respondent can refuse to permit the applicant to enter his
premises, in view of the fact that the court has ordered him to give such
permission, he runs the risk of a committal for contempt of court if he
refuses.
In consideration of the drastic nature of the order, and given the fact that
the respondent will not be heard before the order is made, Lord Denning in
the Anton Piller case emphasized that the order should only be made:
1. There must be a strong prima facie case of a civil cause of action. The
approach prescribed in American Cynamid –v- Ethicon8 is not
appropriate.
The judicial view has been expressed10 that section 22 of the Copyright
Act constitutes the statutory authority for granting an Anton Piller order in
respect of Copyright infringement litigation. One respectfully wishes to
disagree with that view.
An Anton Piller order requires the permission of the respondent before
entry can be gained into his premises. The provision of section 22 of the
Copyright Act empowers the court to authorize entry without the need to
seek the permission of the respondent. The provision also empowers the
court to authorize the applicant to inspect all documents in the possession
of the respondent, without limiting such inspection to documents related to
the infringing activity of the respondent. The Anton Piller order does not
grant such unrestricted access to the respondent’s records.
Regardless of the issue raised, the court nevertheless retains the power in
the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to grant an Anton Piller order in
respect of a copyright infringement action. Therefore an applicant who
elects to ask for the remedy rather than an order under section 22 of the
Copyright Act should be entitled to a normal Anton Piller order with all the
safeguards erected by the courts to protect the interest of the absent
defendant.
_DISCHARGE OF INJUNCTION IN NIGERIA: A DETAILED ANALYSIS_
_JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS_
*Presenting Counterevidence*
- Providing *witnesses, contracts, or records* that contradict the
plaintiff’s claims.
*Negotiating a Settlement*
- Instead of litigation, the defendant may propose a
*compromise*(e.g., modifying business practices instead of stopping
them entirely).
A.G. Lagos State v. A.G. Federation [2014] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1425) 247 (S.C)
A.G. Rivers State v. A.G. Federation. [2012] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 335 (S.C)
Akuma Industries Ltd. v. Ayman Enterprises Ltd. (1999) CLR 12(u) (CA)
Anton Piller K G v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd. (1976) 1 All E.R 779 C.A
*B*
*C*
*E*
Ekwealor Ifekwu & Anor V. Chuba Mgbako & Ors (1989) LLJR-CA
*F*
*G*
Godfrey Anukam V Felix Anukam (2008) LLJR-SC
*H*
*J*
*K*
*M*
Martins Property Ltd. v. Albert Coury (1968) Unrep. Suit No. LD/690/1968
H.C of Lagos
*N*
Niger Chemist Ltd. v. Nigeria Chemists & Anor. (1961) JELR 87053 (HC)
*O*
Oluwanishola v. Development Co. v. Guinea Insurance Co. Ltd.
Oyeyemi v. Irewole Local Government. Ikire (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 270) pg.
462
*T*
Titilayo Plastic Industries Ltd & Ors. v. Chief Joshua Abesi Fagbola (2019)
12 NWLR. LCN/4884 SC)
*U*
Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Ogboru, [2011] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1257) 305