201

Paweł Ukielski PhD

Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland
Warsaw Rising Museum, Warsaw, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0001-8664-7718

ARTICLES
POLITICS OF HISTORY
IN SLOVAKIA
(1989–2018)
Abstract
The aim of this article is to describe and analyse the politics of history in Slovakia
after the Velvet Revolution and gaining independence. Although the Slovak
authorities do not have a compact vision of the politics of history, in many aspects
and fields it is conducted both by central institutions and other players in public
life. This study delivers a synthetic analysis of the Slovak debate on identity,
changes in symbolics, lustration, “de-communisation” and education. It defines
points of fundamental dispute and disagreement on history in Slovak society.
The overview presented in the paper shows the complex nature of the politics
of history in Slovakia.

Keywords: Slovakia, politics of history, remembrance, Slovak national identity,

de-communisation

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 202

Introduction

T he contemporary Slovak state emerged on January 1,

1993 after the split of the Czechoslovak federation.
For the last quarter-century it has created its own policies,
including the so-called “politics of history” or “politics
ARTICLES

of memory”. However, it is possible (and even necessary

in my opinion) to move back to 1989, and also include in
the analysis of the Slovak politics of history the period
between the fall of communism and the division of the
state. On the one hand some common, Czechoslovak
solutions of dealing with the past came into power in
the independent Slovakia, on the other hand, historical
controversies had great influence in the process of division
of Czechoslovakia.
Slovak authorities do not lead complex politics of history,
what is more, the term itself is rarely used in the public
discourse. It is not included in any basic document of
the government or president, nor is there any specialized
department in the state authorities (in any ministry,
parliament or presidential office) that would be responsible
for that area. Two institutions in Slovakia deal with politics
of history (mostly in the internal dimension) – Matica
slovenská (MS) and the Institute of National Remembrance
(Ústav pamäti národa, ÚPN). Although both were created
in completely different situations and historical moments
(MS in 19th century, as a response to “Magyarisation”,
ÚPN in the 21st century to deal with the communist past),
they operate on the basis of recent laws, adopted in the
independent Slovakia: the Law on Matica slovenská of 1997
(Law on Matica Slovenska 1997) and the Law on Nation’s
Memory of 2002 (Law on ÚPN 2002). There are however
also other important institutions that deal with similar
topics, and are involved in the discussion on Slovak national
identity and history. Just to mention a few: The Institute
of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (Historický
ústav Slovenskej Akadémie Vied), The Institute of Military
History (Vojenský historický ústav, VHÚ) and the Museum
of the Slovak National Uprising (Múzeum Slovenského
národného povstania).

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 203

Shaping National Identity

The Slovak case is different to that in other Central

European nations from the Visegrád Group as they have
no medieval or early modern tradition of an independent
kingdom or statehood. This situates Slovaks in a different

ARTICLES
moment of a nation’s development. Shaping national identity
after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and establishing
an independent Slovak state is a dynamic process, in which
history and remembrance plays vital role. Slovaks are
confronted however with the fact that their history,

“taking into consideration only what is confirmed by historical

research evidence, is exceptionally poor. In contrast with
histories of their neighbours (with exception of Ukrainians),
Slovaks never had their »golden age«, great and decisive
moments, dramatic reversals of historical action, great
heroes—kings, princes or even legions of internationally
recognized medieval scientists.” (Zenderowski 2007, p. 140).

Some of the political elites in Slovakia, hand in hand with

some historians, try to overcome this limitation by building
a kind of bridge between modern Slovakia and Slovaks on
the one hand and Great Moravia (the Slavic tribal monarchy
in Pannonia, existing in 9th c. AD) on the other. Of course,
such an approach did not appear in the 21st century, though it
had been present during 19th century romanticism and in the
Czechoslovak times. Subjects of king Svätopluk I from the 9th
century are often called “old Slovaks” (starí Slováci), “proto-
Slovaks” (Protoslováci) or “Sloviens” (Sloviení), however
there are also historians who claim that any distinction
is not needed, and they should be called simply “Slovaks”
(Zenderowski 2007, p. 417).
The best example of this approach can be seen in
Bratislava Castle, where in June 2010 (just a week before the
parliamentary elections) a monument of King Svätopluk
I (b. about 844, d. 894) was unveiled. Its height is 7.80
meters, which means it is 60 cm taller than Saint Venceslas’
monument in Prague. Its unveiling was a strong political
message that Great Moravia was the first Slovak state and

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 204

Svätopluk I was a king of the Slovaks. In his speech Prime

Minister Róbert Fico stressed: “Svätopluk was here long
before St. Stephen and St. Venceslas.” (Svatopluk 2010). Some
additional controversies were raised by the author of the
monument – Ján Kulich, who created it, was an influential
“Normaliser” in Czechoslovak culture decades earlier
(”Normalisation”, during 1969–1989 was the Neo-Stalinist
ARTICLES

period in the Czechoslovak history after the suppression

of the Prague Spring in 1968. In cultural terms it meant
a return to communist orthodoxy and censorship as well as
the prohibition of publication for many artists).
Such a perspective gives Slovaks top position in
comparison with their neighbours—they become an older
nation than the Czechs, Hungarians and Poles, Milan
Ďurica claims that it is the oldest nation in the whole of
Central Europe. Still, however, for next thousand years
there was no Slovak state, and Slovaks were living within
the Hungarian kingdom. In the second half of the 19th and
beginning of the 20th century it meant being subordinated
to the restrictive national policy of “Magyarisation”, which
was led by Budapest against the waking national identity of
Slovaks. It was the main reason, why Slovaks did not want
to continue their coexistence with Hungarians and were
looking for alternatives during the World War I. One of
them was to unify with tsarist Russia under Romanov rule,
as was promoted by one wing of Slovak nationalists under
Svetozár Hurban Vajanský, who claimed that “if he could not
be a Slovak, he would rather drown in the Russian sea than
in Czech swamp” (Chmel 2002, pp. 11–12). However, after
the October Revolution in Russia, it became impossible, and
it was one of factors which allowed the idea of a common
state with Czechs to prevail.
As a result of the dissolution of Austro-Hungarian
Empire, in October 1918 the Czechoslovak state emerged.
Its founding idea was “Czechoslovakism”—the existence of
one, Czechoslovak nation (Ukielski 2007, pp. 26–27). It was
crucial from the point of view of interests of both parties—
it legitimised the idea in the winning powers’ eyes, as the
newly emerging countries were supposed to be established on
a national basis. It also helped Czechs to separate themselves
from Germans, and Slovaks from Hungarians, and made

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

King Svätopluk’s Monument,
placed in front of Bratislava
Castle (Ján Kulich, 2010).
Bratislava, Slovakia. 2019.
© Franciszek Dąbrowski
 206

“Czechoslovaks” to be over 2/3 of the population; whereas

Czechs alone would establish only about half, and Slovaks
would be less numerous than Germans (Ukielski 2007,
pp. 31–32). However, soon it became a problem in bilateral
relations, as Czechs began to treat the rule as obvious and
fundamental, while Slovaks saw it as a tactical trick and began
to demand autonomy.
ARTICLES

The above analysis shows three traits of vital importance

for understanding today’s politics of history in Slovakia.
First, and the most important, is opposition to Hungary
or Hungarian identity, which is the strongest distinctive
feature for contemporary Slovakia, much stronger than
opposition to Czech identity. It is caused by brutal
Magyarisation and strong revisionism in Hungary during
the interwar period. Not without meaning is also the fact
that sentiments towards the Greater Hungary are still
present among Hungarians.
The second feature, as stated above, is weaker, although
also present. This is the opposition to Czechs and idea
of “Czechoslovakism” (or, also, the problem with foreign
perception of Slovakia as a part of former Czechoslovakia—
the question of the nation’s visibility was one of the most
important problems in Czech-Slovak relations during the
existence of the common state). Conflicts with Czechs never
reached comparable level of emotions, Prague did not lead
a conscious policy of Czechisation and the division of state
was carried out in very peaceful way (the often-named
“velvet divorce”).
The third component of Slovakia’s remembrance today is
a deeply rooted Russophilia combined with sympathy with,
or at least understanding of, Panslavic ideas. The 19th century
ideas of the Slovak national movement considered liberation
by Russian “Slavic brothers” and the 20th century experience
did not weaken these ideas very much. Slovakia was not
invaded by the Soviet Union as a hostile country during
the World War II (even though Carpathian Ruthenia was in
1944 incorporated by the Soviet Union) and the liberation
by the Red Army is still perceived very positively. Therefore
it is still celebrated very much and Soviet monuments with
communist symbols are present in Slovak towns (Burakowski,
Gubrynowicz and Ukielski 2009, p. 236).

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 207

The last trait is also combined also with the Slovak attitude
to communist times, which is ambivalent. Slovaks notice some
positive aspects in the period of the regime, such as rapid
industrialisation and economic development (they almost
reached the level of the Czech Republic) as well as better
national recognition (final overthrow of “czechoslovakism”
and federalisation of the so-far unitary state during Prague

ARTICLES
Spring). The suppression of the Prague Spring and the
following “normalisation” was also a lesser trauma for
Slovaks than for Czechs and persecutions in Slovakia
were much milder than in the Czech Republic (Rýchlik
1998, p. 281). In opinion polls conducted in 2003–2005 in
Slovakia, respondents said that the period of “normalization”
had been the best time for the country in terms of the
economy, living conditions, education, and culture, which
indicates a clear success for the Husák version of “goulash
socialism” (Pekník 2006, pp. 43–44).
Although formally promotion of totalitarian symbols is
prohibited in Slovakia, communist symbols, such as hammer
and sickle on Soviet monuments are preserved by the state.
The most symbolic was the case of Luboš Lorenz, an artist
from Košice, who was detained by police for removing
hammer and sickle signs from the monument devoted to
Soviet soldiers who liberated the city. He spent several days
in custody and after few months he received a suspended
sentence of two months in prison for the defamation of
a cultural heritage monument (Výtvarník Ľuboš Lorenz
2018).
In this context is easy to notice that the fall of communism
and the year 1989 does not play a vital role in Slovak politics
of memory and history. Martin M. Šimečka remarked in
2001 that politicians unwillingly comment on the events
from 17 November, usually uttering a cliché such as “it was
an important day in our history”. In his opinion it was not
a coincidence that ten years after those events a politician
appeared who when asked what he was doing that day gave
an unusual answer: “Perhaps it sounds terrible, but I do not
remember, I had other things to do then” (Šimečka 2007,
pp. 263–272). Those were the words of Robert Fico, one of
the most popular and influential politicians in Slovakia,
Prime Minister of the state for many years.

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 208

Slovak State (1939–1945)

vs. Slovak National Uprising

T he most vital and fundamental conflict from the Slovak

identity point of view is between two traditions—
the Slovak state from years 1939–1945 and the Slovak
ARTICLES

National Uprising (1944). The Slovak state emerged in

March 1939 as a result of the break-up of Czechoslovakia
and German invasion on Czech territory combined with
Hitler’s ultimatum. The state became a close ally of Nazi
Germany, however it was the first Slovak modern statehood
(leaving aside attempts to explain mediaeval Great Moravia
as such). On the other hand the Slovak National Uprising
was instigated against the Slovak state and in favour of the
reestablishment of a common Czechoslovak state (although
not on basis of Czechoslovakism anymore).
Supporters of the Slovak state tradition stress the meaning
of the first Slovak statehood, which is often presented as
a realisation of the eternal Slovak dream of emancipation
and independence and a kind of founding ground for the
contemporary Slovak state (after 1993). Most of them do not
try to claim that the regime was democratic or gave people full
freedoms, however they stress that it became an oasis of peace
in the wartime (the adherents of this thesis do not refer to Jews
and Roma). Also the argument that only few democratic states
existed in that time is raised (Zenderowski 2007, pp. 444–447).
Critics stress the fascist nature of the Slovak State and
its participation in the Holocaust, persecution of the Roma
and Sinti as well as its participation in the World War II and
collaboration with Germany. They claim it was necessary to
react (and such a reaction was the Slovak National Uprising)
to save the face of the nation. They believe that no argument
can be raised to defend that Slovak state in any aspect, as it was
wrong from its very basis (Zenderowski 2007, pp. 449–453).
Of course, there is also a big variety of opinions “somewhere
in between”, claiming that it should be no taboo and both
positives and negatives have to be analysed and presented.
They evoke both the above-mentioned negatives and positives
of Slovak statehood during the World War II (Zenderowski
2007, pp. 447–449).

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 209

The Slovak National Uprising is the other side of the coin.

Those who support the tradition of the Uprising, underline
its whole-national character, influence on relations with the
Czechs (positive, as its aim was to restore the Czechoslovak
state) and on the position of Slovaks in democratic world (as it
helped Slovakia not to be perceived as an ally of Third Reich).
Critics of the Uprising claim its anti-national character and

ARTICLES
fratricidal nature. An important issue is also the interpretation
against whom (or what) it had been organised—was it against
Germans/Germany or Slovak statehood, with many other
interpretations (against fascism or the Ludak regime—the
one party rule in the Slovak state 1939–1945). The debate
is also biased by decades of communist propaganda, which
have influenced the interpretation of the Slovak National
Uprising (Zenderowski 2007, pp. 469–485). Although in the
Stalinist times it had been condemned, as an effect of Slovak
“national deviation”, after the thaw began in the 1960’s it was
rehabilitated, and the role of the communists and Soviets
was stressed. The Museum of the Slovak National Uprising
was established then.
Although both traditions are contradictory and
from a logical point of view are impossible to combine,
somehow they exist in Slovak politics. Politicians from
national parties, who rather support the Slovak state
tradition, participate in celebrations of the Slovak National
Uprising anniversaries and pay tribute to the insurgents.
The modern Slovak state has however formally chosen one
of those traditions by establishing a national holiday on
the anniversary of the beginning of the Uprising, whilst
the anniversary of the proclamation of independence in
1939 did not receive that honour (Bajda and Ukielski 2008,
p. 228).

Changes in National Holidays

The fall of communism demanded deep changes in the

symbolic sphere, which included state holidays. In
communist Czechoslovakia, the 9 May was a state holiday
(Czech: státní svátek, Slovak: štátny sviatok): Liberation
Day. Other public holidays (Czech: dny pracovního klidu,

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 210

Slovak: dni pracovného pokoja) on which people did not

work were as follows: New Year’s Day, Easter Monday, 1 May
(Labour Day), 28 October (the Day of the Establishment
of Czechoslovakia), and the two days of Christmas. Other
important days (Czech: významné dny, Slovak: významné
dni) were the 25 February (the anniversary of the communist
coup d’état in Czechoslovakia in 1948), 29 August (the Slovak
ARTICLES

National Uprising) and 7 November (the Great October

Revolution).The national commemoration days (Czech:
památné dny, Slovak: pamätné dni) were the 5 and 6 July
(the Day of Saints Cyril and Methodius—two Byzantine
Christian Missionaries in Great Moravia—and Jan Hus Day,
commemorating his burning at the stake in 1415), see (Law
on Public Holidays 1951). The last two categories of holidays
were working days.
In 1975, the act was amended: the 28 October lost the
status of a non-working day and was moved to the category
of ‘important days’ (where it remained until 1988, when it
was designated as the second state holiday).
After the Velvet Revolution, many significant changes
were made to the hierarchy of state holidays and public
holidays. Independence Day (28 October) and Liberation
Day remained state holidays (although in 1991 the date of
Liberation Day was moved from the 9 to 8 May). In 1990,
the 5 July (the Day of Saints Cyril and Methodius) and 6 July
(the Jan Hus Day) also became state holidays.
The anniversary of the Great October Revolution and the
Czechoslovak communist coup d’état in 1948 were removed
from the list of important days.
Shortly after gaining independence, Slovakia also took
care of statutory regulations regarding the list of state
holidays, public holidays, and commemoration days.
The Gate of Freedom In October 1993, a relevant act was passed which replaced
Memorial (Brána Slobody), all of the former regulations adopted during the federation
Devín (Peter Meszároš, 2005).
The Memorial is placed era (Law on Public Holidays 1993). Pursuant to the new
at the banks of Morava act, the following days became state holidays: 1 January,
(German: March) and the Day of the Establishment of the Slovak Republic;
Danube rivers, at the former
5 July, the Day of Saints Cyril and Methodius; 29 August,
Czechoslovak-Austrian
border. 2019. the Anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising; and
© Franciszek Dąbrowski 1 September, the Day of the Constitution of the Slovak

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 212

Republic. A later amendment adopted in 2001 added to the

list a day commemorating the anniversary of the Velvet
Revolution (17 November), which became the Day of the
Struggle for Freedom and Democracy. The public holidays
are as follows: 6 January, Epiphany; Good Friday; Easter
Monday; 1 May, Labour Day; 15 September, the Day of Our
Lady of the Seven Sorrows, the Patron Saint of Slovakia;
ARTICLES

1 November, All Saints’ Day; and also Christmas Eve and

the two days of Christmas. In 1996, 8 May was also added
to this list, as the Day of the Victory over Fascism. The
Slovak list of commemoration days, that are working days,
became very long according to new regulations. The list
includes the following commemoration days: 25 March
(the anniversary of the Candle Demonstration in 1988)
as the Day of the Struggle for Human Rights; 13 April
(the anniversary of the dissolving of male monasteries
in Czechoslovakia in 1950) as the Day of the Unfairly
Persecuted; 4 May, the Anniversary of the Death of
Milan Rastislav Štefaník (1919); 7 June, the Anniversary
of the Memorandum of the Slovak Nation (1861); 5 July,
the Day of Slovaks Living Abroad; 17 July, the Anniversary
of the Declaration of the Independence of the Slovak
Republic (1992); 4 August, the Day of Matica Slovenská
(established in 1863); 9 September, the Day of the Victims
of Holocaust and of Racial Violence (the anniversary of
the introduction in the World War II Slovakia of what is
referred to as the Jewish Code in 1941); 19 September,
the Day of the Establishment of the Slovak National
Council (1848); 6 October, the Day of Dukla Pass Victims
(on the anniversary of the battle of Dukla pass in the
Carpathians in 1944); 27 October, Černová Tragedy
Day (the symbol of Slovak oppression in the Habsburg
times, 1907); 28 October, the Day of the Establishment of
The Gate of Freedom
an independent Czechoslovak State (1918); 29 October,
Memorial (Brána Slobody),
Devín (Peter Meszároš, 2005). the Birthday of Ľudovít Štúr (1815); 30 October, the
The Memorial is placed Anniversary of the Declaration of the Slovak Nation (1918);
at the banks of Morava 31 October, Reformation Day (on the anniversary of the day
(German: March) and when Martin Luther nailed his Ninety-five Theses on the
Danube rivers, at the former
Czechoslovak-Austrian
door of the All Saints’ Church in Wittenberg in 1517), and
border. 2019. 30 December, the Day of the Declaration of Slovakia as an
© Franciszek Dąbrowski Independent Ecclesiastic Province in 1977.

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 214

Lustration/de-Communisation

Like in other post-communist states, one of the fundamental

problems that a free Czechoslovakia had to face was the
issue of the activity of the secret service, the StB. This body
was formally dissolved on February 1, 1990 and the activity
ARTICLES

of the secret political police became one of the main topics

in the political life of the country. That was mostly due
to the work of the commission investigating the role of
the StB in a number of events, which took place during the
demonstration of 17 November.
Lustration in Czechoslovakia started relatively quickly.
Before the first free election planned for 1990, the government
adopted a special resolution that set out the rules for the
lustration of the candidates for the parliament. Pursuant to
this regulation, the archives of the ministry of the interior
could issue lustration certificates to party authorities, but
only with the consent of individual candidates. All political
groups running in the election, except for the communists,
exercised the right to obtain such certificates. It is hard to
estimate the outcome of those procedures, but it is generally
considered that in many cases they were effective as an
element that deterred former security service collaborators,
a tool that helped parties make some adjustments to their
planned electoral lists (Łabuszewska 2005, p. 7).
On October 4, 1991, the Federal Assembly adopted
lustration and de-communisation laws, signed by President
Havel three days later. They covered three categories of
people: functionaries and collaborators of the StB; persons
who had studied in the KGB academy in Moscow and similar
Soviet institutions, and party activists at the level of county
committee and above. Those who were “positively verified”
did not have a right to apply for executive positions in the state
administration, the army, the counterintelligence services, the
police; in the chancelleries of the president, the government,
and the parliament; in the Supreme Court, the Constitutional
Tribunal, the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, public
media, and in organisations, enterprises and companies in
which the state has a majority stake (Law on Lustration 1991).
Initially, the law was to be binding until the end of 1996, but

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 215

in 2000, after two amendments, its effectiveness was extended

in the Czech Republic for an indefinite period.
After the dissolution of the federation, Slovak settlements
with communism took a different course to Czech ones. When
the lustration laws inherited from the federation expired in
1996, Slovakia did not extend their effectiveness and never
adopted any similar solutions. Being a former StB collaborator

ARTICLES
does not have any legal consequences and does not limit access
to any offices in the state administration (unlike in the Czech
Republic). Even concealing that fact does not involve any
negative consequences (unlike in Poland). One of the most
glaring examples of the Slovak attitude towards the issue of
punishing functionaries of the communist regime is the case
of Alojz Lorenc, the deputy minister of the interior responsible
for the security services in the late 1980s. In 1992, he was
sentenced to four years in prison by a court in Prague, but
he did not serve his sentence, as after the division of the
federation, being a citizen of Slovakia, he refused to do so. In
Slovakia, the case was dismissed in 1998; then in 2002, Lorenc
received a three-year sentence, suspended for five years. Until
December 2010, he was an advisor in the Penta fund (the
owners of which are graduates of MGIMO in Moscow).
After several years of legal vacuum regarding the opening
of the former Communist secret services archives (which
made them de facto completely inaccessible), finally some legal
solutions were adopted that ensured an extensive disclosure
of the archives. This demand is supposed to be guarded by the
Institute of National Remembrance (Ústav pamäti národa—
the ÚPN), established by the act of August 19, 2002 and active
since 2003. The act also regulates the issue of making available
the files of security services from 1939–1989. Pursuant to
its provisions, every citizen has the right to address to the
Institute an inquiry as to whether the StB had any files on
him; in the case of an affirmative answer, he/she should have
an opportunity to inspect those files. This act also imposed
Ján Langoš Monument,
an obligation on all institutions with access to security service Námestie SNP
materials to make those available to the ÚPN free of charge. (Ján Hoffstädter, 2007).
The founder and first director of the Institute was Ján Langoš, The monument is placed
in front of the first seat
an democratic opposition activist for many years, a former
of Ústav Pamäti Národa.
Czechoslovak interior minister (1990–1992), and the co- Bratislava, Slovakia. 2019.
author of the lustration procedure in Czechoslovakia. © Franciszek Dąbrowski

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 216

Pursuant to the act on the ÚPN, he published on the

internet a list of persons who were in the Slovak register of the
StB. This register was divided into three categories: people who
were checked upon, people who were enemies of the system,
and collaborators (in total 81,000 names). Simultaneously, the
website of the Institute published the list of StB employees.
These materials were the subject of much controversy and
ARTICLES

many conflicts, and led to lawsuits filed against the Institute.

The most heated debates have surrounded the names
connected with the Church.
Christian circles had provided the strongest support for
the opposition movements in Slovakia and therefore the
communist services had tried to infiltrate them in the deepest
manner. The list of names published on the internet contained
such people as Archbishop of Trnava Ján Sokol and General
Bishop of the Evangelic Church Julius Filo (Łabuszewska
2005, pp. 12–14). Both of them flatly rejected the accusations.
In a special statement, Abp. Sokol wrote, “I declare once again
and confirm that I never intentionally collaborated with the
StB, and I never consciously passed any information to StB that
would harm the Catholic Church or any of my compatriots.”
(Mons. Sokol’s Statement 2007). However, in May 2009 new
ambiguities appeared concerning Sokol: according to the
information acquired by the ÚPN, in 1998 he had allegedly
given half a billion Slovak crowns to former StB agent Štefan
Náhlik (Niewiadomski 2009).
In the years 2002–2006, when the right-wing coalition was
in power, there was a political consensus regarding the ÚPN;
however the situation of this institution got much worse after
the 2006 election, when the leftist-nationalist coalition was
established. The change of government coincided with the death
of the charismatic and popular Langoš that further weakened
the ÚPN. As a result of the decisions taken by the coalition, the
SNS was supposed to propose a candidate to succeed Langoš
and after much hesitation (some potential candidates refused
to accept the post), it put forward the candidacy of a young
historian, Ivan Petranský, who was officially appointed to this
post by parliament on February 1, 2007. It soon turned out that
director Petranský was too “independent” and the Institute
was attacked by the coalition, particularly the SNS, which in
April 2008 submitted a motion for the dissolving of the ÚPN

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 217

(which was connected with the fact that the Institute published
the name of Jan Slota, the leader of the SNS, in a criminal
context). This wave of harassment of the ÚPN by the coalition
was also evident when in January 2007 the Ministry of Justice
terminated the lease agreement for the building occupied by
the Institute and it had to move to another location. Although
the Institute survived, the atmosphere around the ÚPN created

ARTICLES
by the governing parties was very tense. On the other hand,
liberal circles accused the Institute managed by Petranský
of excessively extolling the Slovak Republic in the years
1939–1945. (One of the most prominent case was historian
Martin Lacko, author of numerous books and articles, who had
not only a positive attitude towards the 1939–1945 regime, but
also engaged himself in the far-right party of Marian Kotleba.
In 2016 Lacko was fired from the ÚPN by director Ondrej
Krajňák, which caused waves of protests from nationally
oriented circles in Slovakia), and rehabilitating the Ludák
regime and Father Josef Tiso (Vagovič 2013; Szatmary 2013).
The appointment of the new head of the ÚPN in 2012 and
2013 was connected with more trouble. In the end, Ondrej
Krajňák became the new director (Eliášová 2013) and he
had to face a huge challenge right at the beginning of his
term: a court dispute with Andrej Babiš, a powerful Czech
oligarch and politician. An examination of the archives kept
in the Institute revealed that he had co-operated with the StB,
and Babiš reacted by filing a lawsuit against the Institute. In
June 2014, the court in Bratislava ruled that he was right,
because his name had been placed in the security files with
no legal grounds; ÚPN filed an appeal (Eliášová 2013; Babiš
vyhrál 2014). It has been successful, so in October 2017
the Constitutional Court issued a verdict, that former StB
officers are a priori untrustworthy while testifying about their
collaborators. This verdict caused return of the case to the
Regional Court in Bratislava, where Babiš’s lawsuit against
his StB registration has been dismissed (Court rejects 2018).
In 2017, the Slovak parliament adopted an amendment to
the law on the nation’s remembrance, which changed the way
of governing the ÚPN (Law on ÚPN 2002). On 1 November
Krajňák resigned from the post, claiming that he was deprived
of his powers. The decision came just few days after the success
of ÚPN’s appeal in Babiš’s case.

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 218

Education

History is not very much present in the educational program

of Slovak schools. After the reform of the educational system
in 2008 in Slovakia, the number of history lessons in primary
schools (5–9 class) has been reduced by 50% and in vocational
ARTICLES

schools by 75%. After the reform only one lesson of history

a week is taught in classes 5–8, and two lessons in the last,
ninth class of primary school (which was changed to three in
2017) (Education Framework Appendix 2017).
The basic document that describes general aims of
education and key competences of student after the course
is the State Educational Program. The guidelines and goals
of history as a subject of education in primary schools are
defined in the annex ISCED 2 (ISCED 2 2011), while the
same for secondary schools is contained in the annex ISCED
3a (ISCED 3A 2010). As defined in the introductory part of
both documents:

“the main function of history is the cultivation of a historical

conscience by the student as a complex personality and
preservation of continuity of historical remembrance that is
understood as transfer of historical experience either from
a city, region, Slovak, European or world perspective. Part
of this transfer is above all the consecutive learning about
such historical events, facts, phenomena and processes in
area and time that influenced Slovak society in a fundamental
way and to reflect on this picture of our presence. Stress is
put on the history of 19th and 20th centuries, where the roots
of most of contemporary phenomena and problems can be
found.” (ISCED 3A 2010).

The history of Slovakia and Slovaks is largely separated from

world history, however it is taught in parallel—for example
after the topic “Birth of the modern era and nationalism”
students have the topic: “Modern Slovak nation” and after
“World War I” they learn about “Slovaks and the creation
of Czechoslovakia”. The Slovak Republic is taught in a bloc
of topics and students are supposed to discuss authoritarian
rule, the Holocaust or different attitudes towards the Slovak

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 219

National Uprising. There is almost no space for regional

or local history in the program, and no separate points are
devoted to minorities (ISCED 3A 2010).
To sum up, although the politics of history or politics of
remembrance/memory officially is not present in activities
of Slovak authorities, it is often led de facto by politicians, parties
or other players on public scene. History plays important role

ARTICLES
in the self-definition of identity by Slovaks and debates on
specially sensitive issues are often emotional and turbulent.

References

Babiš vyhrál 2014: “Babiš vyhrál »agentský soud«. Ústav

paměti národa se odvolá”. 2014. Echo24.cz. June 26, 2014.
Accessed July 30, 2018.
https://echo24.cz/a/iibsi/babis-vyhral-agentsky-soud-
ustav-pameti-naroda-se-odvola.

Bajda and Ukielski 2008: Bajda, Piotr, Ukielski, Paweł. 2008.

“Słowaków portret własny. Rzecz o słowackim dyskursie
tożsamościowym”. Studia Polityczne 21: 225–234.

Burakowski, Gubrynowicz and Ukielski 2009: Burakowski,

Adam, Gubrynowicz, Aleksander, and Ukielski, Paweł.
2009. 1989 – Jesień Narodów. Warsaw: Collegium Civitas,
Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Wydawnictwo
TRIO.

Chmel 2002: Kwestia słowacka w XX wieku. 2002. Ed. Chmel,

Rudolf. Gliwice: Kaligram-GREG-“Gazeta Wyborcza”.

Court rejects 2018: “Court rejects Babiš’s lawsuit against his

StB registration”. 2018. Prague Monitor Daily. February 24,
2018. Accessed July 30, 2018.
http://praguemonitor.com/2018/02/14/slovak-court-
rejects-babi%C5%A1s-lawsuit-against-his-stb-registration.

Education Framework Appendix 2017: Dodatok č. 1

ktorým sa mení Rámcový učebný plán pre nižšie stred­

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 220

né vzdelávanie – 2. stupeň základnej školy, schválený

Ministerstvom školstva, vedy, výskum a športu Slovenskej
republiky dňa 20. mája 2011 pod číslom 2011-7881/18675:2-
921 ako súčasť štátneho vzdelávacieho programu pre nižšie
stredné vzdelávanie s vyučovacím jazykom slovenským
s platnosťou od 1. septembra 2011. 2017. Bratislava:
Ministerstvo školstva, vedy, výskumu a športu Slovenskej
ARTICLES

republiky. Accessed August 9, 2018.

http://www.minedu.sk/data/files/7460_dodatok-c-1_
dejepis.pdf.

Eliášová 2013: Eliášová, Andrea. 2013. “Ústav paměti národa

v Bratislavě má nového ředitele”. Český Rozhlas. April 28,
2013. Accessed July 30, 2018.
http://www.rozhlas.cz/nabozenstvi/zpravy/_zprava/1202400.

ISCED 2 2011: “Štátny vzdelávací program. Dejepis

(Vzdelávacia oblasť: Človek a spoločnosť). Príloha
ISCED 2”. 2011. Bratislava: Štátny Pedagogický Ústav.
Accessed August 9, 2018.
http://www.statpedu.sk/files/articles/dokumenty/statny-
vzdelavaci-program/dejepis_isced2.pdf.

ISCED 3A 2010: “Štátny vzdelávací program. Dejepis

(Vzdelávacia oblasť: Človek a spoločnosť). Príloha ISCED
3A”. 2010. Bratislava: Štátny Pedagogický Ústav. Accessed
August 9, 2018.
http://www.statpedu.sk/files/articles/dokumenty/statny-
vzdelavaci-program/dejepis_isced3a.pdf.

Łabuszewska 2005: Problem lustracji w Europie Środkowej

i krajach bałtyckich. 2005. Ed. Łabuszewska, Anna. Warsaw:
Centre for Eastern Studies.

Law on Lustration 1991: Zákon ze dne 4. října 1991,

kterým se stanoví některé další předpoklady pro výkon
některých funkcí ve státních orgánech a organizacích
České a Slovenské Federativní Republiky, České republiky
a Slovenské republiky, č. 451/1991. 1991. Accessed July
30, 2018.
http://www.psp.cz/docs/laws/fs/451.html.

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 221

Law on Matica Slovenska 1997: Zákon č. 68/1997 z 13.

februára 1997 o Matici slovenskej (v znení č. 183/2000
Z. z., 474/2005 Z. z.). Accessed September 5, 2019.
http://matica.sk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/zakonms.pdf.

Law on Public Holidays 1951: Zákon ze dne 2. listopadu

1951 o státním svátku, o dnech pracovního klidu

ARTICLES
a o památných a významných dnech, Sb. 93/1951. 1951.
Accessed July 16, 2018.
https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1951-93.

Law on Public Holidays 1993: Zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej

republiky z 20. októbra 1993 o štátnych sviatkoch, dňoch
pracovného pokoja a pamätných dňoch č. 241/1993 Z. z.
1993. Accessed July 16, 2018.
http://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/1993-241.

Law on ÚPN 2002: Zákon z 19. augusta 2002 o sprístupnení

dokumentov o činnosti bezpečnostných zložiek štátu
1939–1989 a o založení Ústavu pamäti národa a o doplnení
niektorých zákonov (zákon o pamäti národa). Accessed
September 5, 2019.
https://www.upn.gov.sk/data/zakony/553-2002.pdf.

Mons. Sokol’s Statement 2007: “Stanovisko Mons. Jána Sokola

k zverejňovaným dokumentom”. Press Agency of the Slovak
Bishops’ Conference. February 27, 2007. Accessed July 30,
2018.
https://www.tkkbs.sk/view.php?cisloclanku=20070227029.

Niewiadomski 2009: Niewiadomski, Andrzej. 2009. “Czy

arcybiskup przekazał miliony agentowi bezpieki”.
Rzeczpospolita. May 29, 2009.

Pekník 2006: Verejná mienka a politika. Historické vedomie

slovenskej spoločnosti. 2006. Ed. Pekník, Miroslav. Bratislava:
VEDA, vydavateľstvo SAV, Ústav politických vied SAV.

Rychlík 1998: Rychlík, Jan. 1998. Češi a Slováci ve 20. Století.

Vol. 2. Česko-slovenské vztahy 1945–1992. Bratislava:
Academic Electronic Press.

Institute of National Remembrance 2/2020

 222

Šimečka 2007: Šimečka, Martin Milan. 2007. Poučenie

z reálneho socializmu. Tak sme si tu žyli a jako budeme
žit’? In Slovenská otázka dnes. Výber textov z časopisu
OS 1997–2006. Ed. Szigeti, Laszló. Bratislava: Kalligram:
263–272.

Svatopluk 2010: “Svatopluk byl král Slováků, hřímal Fico

ARTICLES

při odhalení sochy v Bratislavě”. iDnes.cz. June 7, 2010.

Accessed July 13, 2018.
https://zpravy.idnes.cz/svatopluk-byl-kral-slovaku-hrimal-
fico-pri-odhaleni-sochy-v-bratislave-1mx-/zahranicni.
aspx?c=A100607_103003_zahranicni_aha.

Szatmary 2013: Szatmary, Michael. 2013. “Franek: Ústav

pamäti národa chce rehabilitovať ľudácky režim”. Delet
Slovensko-Zidovske Noviny. December 1, 2011. Accessed
September 26, 2018.
http://www.delet.sk/zivot-a-judaizmus/holocaust/franek-
ustav-pam-ati-naroda-chce-rehabilitovat-ludacky-rezim.

Ukielski 2007: Ukielski, Paweł. 2007. Aksamitny rozwód.

Rola elit politycznych w procesie podziału Czechosłowacji.
Warsaw: Instytut Jagielloński.

Vagovič 2013: Vagovič, Marek. 2013. “Od Langoša kam?”.

týždeň. January 6, 2013. Accessed September 26, 2018.
https://www.tyzden.sk/casopis/12633/od-langosa-kam/.

Výtvarník Ľuboš Lorenz 2018: “Výtvarník Ľuboš Lorenz

spoznal trest za odstránenie komunistických symbolov
z pamätníka”. HN Slovensko. April 3, 2018. Accessed
July 16, 2018.
https://slovensko.hnonline.sk/1721635-vytvarnik-lubos-
lorenz-spoznal-trest-za-odstranenie-komunistickych-
symbolov-z-pamatnika.

Zenderowski 2007: Zenderowski, Radosław. 2007. Nad

Tatrami błyska się… Słowacka tożsamość narodowa
w dyskursie politycznym w Republice Słowackiej (1989–
2004). Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kardynała
Stefana Wyszyńskiego.