2nd Year B.B.A., LL.

B – Semester-III (2022-23)
2nd- Internal Assessment

Law of Crimes – 1 (Indian Penal Code)

HYPOTHETICAL/ PROBLEM BASED QUESTION

NAME: Jaideep Singh

DIVISION: C
PRN: 21010126249
COURSE: BBA LL.B. (H)
BATCH: 2021-2026, 2nd Year

HYPOTHETICAL/ PROBLEM BASED QUESTION

 PROBLEM 1

INTRODUCTION

The offence of murder is defined under Section 300 of IPC, which further specifies that
culpable homicide is murder in the following situations:
1. The act is committed with an intent to cause death
2. The act is performed with the intent to cause serious bodily harm; with the knowledge
that it may cause death.
3. When someone knows that what they are doing is risky and likely to result in death or
serious injury but nonetheless does it, that person has committed murder.

Therefore, in accordance with the aforesaid section, it can be said that in any case where there
is certainty that the act will result in death, the person who commits such an act is considered
to have committed murder under this provision.

APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS

In this instance, Raju and Kaju shared the same responsibilities as security guards at the
officer's home. They frequently argued, as was the case. But on the occasion of Diwali, their
argument became so heated that they both pulled out revolvers and started shooting at one
another. However, after C intervened, both parties put down their weapons, but as soon as
Kaju noticed Raju had put down his revolver, he shot and killed him.
The parties' objectives are plain from the case's facts and are amply demonstrated by their
behaviour. On the one hand, Raju lowered his gun in this situation, while Kaju was merely
waiting for Raju to do so before shooting him. As a result, given their shared past and history,
it is possible to conclude that there was malicious intent between the two of them, which
contributed to the altercation between the two and ultimately resulted in Raju's death.

HYPOTHETICAL/ PROBLEM BASED QUESTION

For instance, in the case of Radhey Shyam and Anr. v. State of U.P. 1, the appellant got
extremely angry when he got to know that his calf had come to the deceased’s place and he
suddenly started abusing the deceased. When he was refrained from doing so, the appellant
fired at the deceased. However, the deceased was unarmed at that time. Thus, the court
observed that the appellant had an intention to kill the deceased, and hence was held liable for
murder.

Since Raju lowered his handgun, it might be concluded that he was unarmed in the current
situation in light of the aforementioned case. It is therefore impossible to demonstrate that he
had any desire to kill.

Furthermore, when discussing the right to private defense, it should be noted that Kaju was
exonerated of the crime through an appeal based on the defence of "self-defense." In contrast,
Section 100 of the IPC states that "when the right to private defence of the body includes the
ability to kill" is when it is illegal. It includes situations like:

 Where there is apprehension of death;

 Where there is apprehension of grievous hurt;
 Rape;
 Sating Unnatural Lust;
 Kidnapping/Abduction;
 Wrongful Confinement;
 Acid Attack;

However, none of the aforementioned scenarios apply to the current issue. In actuality, both
sides engaged in the confrontation that ultimately resulted in one of them dying. As a result,
both parties can be considered at fault. Because it must be proven that there was a "imminent
threat to life or serious bodily damage" in order to invoke this section, which is apparently
impossible to do in the current situation, Kaju cannot claim the right to murder someone in
self-defense provided by Section 100 of the IPC. Raju already lowered his rifle, indicating
that there was no immediate threat. Thus, the right to kill Raju in self-defense cannot be
exercised.

1
Radhey Shyam and Anr. v. State of U.P, Criminal Appeal No. 1598 Of 2002.

HYPOTHETICAL/ PROBLEM BASED QUESTION

In fact, in accordance with Section 106, IPC, Kaju’s Right to Private Defence was
terminated the moment Raju lowered his revolver.

INNOVATIVE APPROACH:

Kaju could probably take the defence of “Sudden and Grave Provocation” provided under
Exception 1 of Section 300 wherein, if a person loses his control in response to a sudden or
serious provocation and kills the other person who provoked him or another person as a result
of an error or accident, they are guilty of culpable homicide that does not constitute murder.

For instance, the court determined in K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra2, that under
certain conditions, gestures and words can incite someone to act in a way that would qualify
for the exception. It additionally ruled that the victim's history of prior acts must be taken into
consideration when determining whether the subsequent act was sufficient to cause a sudden
and substantial provocation.
Accordingly, it can be concluded that Raju's actions and statements during the altercation
enraged Kaju, and as a result of this sudden and serious provocation, Kaju shot Raju on the
spot. This conclusion can be supported by the history of the two parties. Kaju can therefore
use this exception to his advantage.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the aforesaid facts and provisions, The State may file an appeal against
the High Court's order in light of the aforementioned facts and legal provisions. Since the
right to private defence is a tool provided to citizens to protect themselves and others, the
argument made by Kaju should not be taken into consideration and must be rejected. But
frequently, as in the Kaju case, it appears that this clause has been utilised as a shield against
criminal culpability. It is obvious that Kaju is abusing the law in this case. The right to
murder is granted by Section 100 of the IPC in certain circumstances. This power used must
not only be necessary to fend off the attack but must also be proportionate to the harm done.

2
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, 1962 AIR 605.
HYPOTHETICAL/ PROBLEM BASED QUESTION
Kaju will be held accountable for the crime of murder in the aforementioned circumstance
because he intended to do so. Additionally, it is obvious that Raju shot him after lowering his
rifle. His right to self-defense cannot therefore be used. Additionally, they frequently engaged
in tense disagreements. Kaju cannot even claim that there was an unexpected provocation
because they were both used to being in this circumstance. Additionally, it might be argued
that since they were fighting, Kaju may have had mens rea for killing Raju in his head.
So, the decision of the High Court can be contested on the aforementioned justifications.

PROBLEM 2

HYPOTHETICAL/ PROBLEM BASED QUESTION

 INTRODUCTION

The case at hand (hereinafter case) is primarily concerned with murder and private defence
extending to murder inter alia. As per Section 1003 of IPC, which lays down the conditions
for the instances of private defence4 (r/w Section 965 of IPC) extending to murder, which
in turn is defined under Section 3006 of IPC as an act of intentionally causing death in
accordance with the descriptions appended therein.

APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS

The case's facts are identical to those in State of U.P. v. Ram Swarup, 7 in which it was
determined that "the aggressor must have taken every attempt to prevent the act of violence
and therefore retreating from the scenario already stage-managed by him in any feasible
means."

As aptly laid down in Balbir Singh,8 there are four prerequisites that need to be fulfilled in
order to justify the killing of a person under the garb of self-defence:

 Firstly, the accused must not have initiated the fight. It is well-established in a catena
of judgements9 that the initial aggressor is not entitled to invoke the defence of private
defence.
 Secondly, a forthcoming danger to life or corporeal injury, palpable or apparent,
sufficient to generate a genuine belief of an extant necessity must be present.
 Thirdly, In accordance with the "retreat to the wall" doctrine, which states that an
individual attacked within his own precincts or elsewhere where he has a legal right to be

3
Indian Penal Code, 1860, §100, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
4
Amjad Khan v. The State, 1952 AIR 165.
5
Indian Penal Code, 1860, §96, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
6
Indian Penal Code, 1860, §300, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
7
State of U.P. v. Ram Swarup, (1974) 4 SCC 764.
8
Balbir Singh Balwant Singh v. The State, AIR 1959 P H 332.
9
State of Rajasthan v. Mehram, (2020) 5 SCC 143; Mannu v. State of U.P., AIR 1979 SC 1230; Kishan v. The
State Of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 244; State of U.P. v. Ram Swarup, (1974) 4 SCC 764.
HYPOTHETICAL/ PROBLEM BASED QUESTION
 is not required to retreat and only exempts the unerring party, there cannot be any other
safe and reasonable means of escape other than retreat.
 Fourthly, a genuine necessity for killing a person must be present.

According to the ruling in Mehram,10 the circumstances of the case show that the accused
party—the accused, his father, and his brothers—was the aggressor because they planned to
inflict revenge on the deceased, who was unarmed and unoffending”.11 Due to this, the
accused, together with his father and two brothers, all of whom were carrying deadly
weapons—a rifle, a knife, and lathis—arrived at the market with the express purpose of
attacking the deceased.12
In addition, the above circumstances and the involvement of more than two people can be
used to infer the existence of common intention under Section 34 of the IPC because, despite
the claim that there were casualties as a result of "unforeseen arguments," the necessary
consensus to harm the deceased can be formed on the spot and on the spur of the moment and
intended by all the accused. 13

Although the father of the accused had a legitimate fear of suffering physical harm from the
criminal force the deceased's servants used against him, such as blows from their lathis,
necessitating the need for self-defense, as stated in Darshan Singh,14 the use of force in self-
defense must be reasonable, proportionate to the harm to be avoided or anticipated, and
within its legal purpose. However, in this instance, the accused shot the victim dead from a
close distance after being caught off guard, suggesting an excessively disproportionate use of
force. Moreover, the force was directed towards the deceased, rather than the servants,
who were the real assailants in the case, contravening the requisites of Section 100.

Additionally, the "retreat to the wall" doctrine was in the deceased's favour because he was
on his property after winning it through tender, and it was against the accused because they
were the aggressors and had other practical and secure ways to leave the situation without
killing the deceased,15 This negated the necessity to kill the deceased.
10
State of Rajasthan v. Mehram, (2020) 5 SCC 143.
11
H.P. Nandharagh, Study on Right to Private Defence, International Journal of Law Management and
Humanities, 4(2), 2333-2337 (2021).
12
Jaipal v. State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 1271.
13
Ramaswami Ayyangar and Ors v. State Of Tamil Nadu, 1976 AIR 2027.
14
Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 2 SCC 333.
15
Yogendra Moraji v. State, AIR 1980 SC 660.
HYPOTHETICAL/ PROBLEM BASED QUESTION
Thus, in violation of Section 300 of the IPC, the accused killed the deceased without acting in
good faith or in the exercise of his right to self-defense. Instead, the circumstances were set
up to allow the accused to carry out an act of aggression or retaliation that was later
attempted to be justified under the pretext of self-defense.

CONCLUSION

According to the aforementioned analysis, the accused cannot assert a right to a private
defence under Section 10016 and will be held accountable for the murder and assault of the
deceased under Section 302 r/w Sections 352 and 34 of the IPC, subject to the mitigating
factor of "unforeseen argument" that ensued. This is because the accused was the aggressor
himself and the commission of the act of aggression resulted in the death of the victim whom
he initially attacked.
As direct evidence of common intention or partaking in the commission of the offense
need not be proved in all cases, 17 the father of the accused and his brothers are liable to be
punished for the commission of criminal assault as per Section 35218 r/w Section 34 of IPC.
Furthermore, the servants of the deceased are liable for the use of criminal force for
attacking the father of the accused with lathis as per Section 35019 of IPC.

16
State Of U.P v. Ram Kishore, 1983 AIR 867.
17
Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 8 SCC 428.
18
Indian Penal Code, 1860, §352, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
19
Indian Penal Code, 1860, §350, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
HYPOTHETICAL/ PROBLEM BASED QUESTION