860007_ch9
860007_ch9
9.1.1 Introduction
Pipeline systems are automated to provide the capabilities of operating pipeline sys-
tems reliably, efficiently and thus economically. Pipeline operation involves moni-
toring and controlling of a pipeline system, and monitoring is required for checking
the pipeline states and controlling facilities such as pump and valve stations. Modern
pipeline system operation is centralized because a centralized operation of the pipe-
line systems benefits the stakeholders including the pipeline company, producer of the
product, and the shipper of the product. A centralized system provides the capability
to monitor and control the complete pipeline system in a safe and efficient manner. It
allows the stakeholders to meet the changing demands for the product being shipped
expediently and to move the product from source to market safely and quickly in the
most economical way possible. A SCADA system provides the pipeline companies
with centralized monitoring and controlling capabilities [1].
SCADA is an acronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition; supervisory
because human operators always issue control commands, not providing a closed-loop
control function. A SCADA system is a computer-based data acquisition system de-
signed to gather operating data from an array of geographically remote field loca-
tions, and to transmit this data via communication links to one or more control center
location(s) for monitoring, controlling, and reporting.
A SCADA system is designed to assist pipeline operators in the operation of the
pipeline system using real-time and historical information. Pipeline operators typically
regulate pipeline pressure and flow, start and stop pumps at stations, and monitor the
status of pumps and valves through the SCADA system. Local equipment control sys-
tems monitor and control the detailed process for the pump and its associated driver.
They may then issue commands of a supervisory nature to the remote locations in
response to the incoming data. Additionally, software programs implemented within
the SCADA host can provide for specific responses to changes in field conditions, by
reporting such changes or automatically sending commands to remote field locations.
Pipeline system control is accomplished by setting a controlling variable at the
desired level and the control system responds to reach the set point. Depending on the
controlling functions, the controlling variable can be pressure, flow, and sometimes
temperature. The controllers monitor and change the controlling variables through the
SCADA system, which transmits the control signals to remote stations such as pump,
551
Hardware/Physical
Supervisory
Master Remote
(Host)
and Terminal
Data Acquisition
Software/Protocol
lifting, delivery or valve station. Figure 9-1 illustrates the relationship between the
master and remote terminal through the computer and communication system.
Traditional SCADA users include the pipeline system dispatchers or controllers, oper-
ation engineers, system engineers, maintenance and measurement staff. System dispatchers
use the SCADA for safe and efficient pipeline system operation while meeting transporta-
tion requirements. Operations engineers analyze pipeline operational problems to increase
operation reliability, efficiency, and throughput as well as troubleshooting, while system
engineers configure and maintain the SCADA system including instruments and remote
terminals. Maintenance staff analyzes equipment performance based on historical data, and
measurement staff validates volume measurements.
Current business environment requires fast access to operational information. As
a result, other groups use the SCADA data to improve the pipeline business. These
groups include accounting personnel who account liquid volumes and issue invoices,
liquid marketers who use estimated batch data to schedule and market liquids move-
ments, and management who make management decisions regarding normal and ab-
normal conditions including emergency situations.
In order to accommodate a rapidly changing business condition or environment,
corporate-wide information access has become critical to the efficient operation and
management of a pipeline system. Not only is it important to provide accurate informa-
tion to operation and management staff, but timely access to this information is of vital
importance to the successful operation of the pipeline company’s business. Companies
that are able to acquire, process, and analyze information more efficiently than their
competitors have a distinct market advantage. Such expansion of the scope, function-
ality, and capabilities is made possible by continuing improvements in computer and
telecommunication technologies.
A properly designed, installed, and operating SCADA system is a keystone in the
operation and management of a pipeline in today’s competitive deregulated pipeline
market. The SCADA system has become the hub for corporate information systems.
Refer to Figure 9-2 for an overview of an integrated corporate and SCADA system.
Looking at the information requirements of a pipeline company and considering both
operational and business aspects, the key requirements can be broadly grouped into the
following categories [2]:
Corporate
Database
Interface
SCADA Real-tim e
Database
integration. Process integration means that SCADA systems are becoming a key part of
business processes. This provides for both proactive business processes as well as the
ability to provide better information and thus better service for customers.
Most modern SCADA systems can provide the functionality to meet these re-
quirements. However, the combination of the SCADA system together with its control
center should be configured to fulfill them.
There are three basic tiers in a SCADA system as shown in Figure 9-2, namely,
field device, control room, and corporate. The field to SCADA connection is some form
of a telecommunications network, and the connection between SCADA host and the
corporate or enterprise environment is made with a communication network. A backup
control center located at an offsite may be connected to the main control system.
In US, PHMSA incorporates American Petroleum Institute (API) recommended
practices 1165, 1167 and 1168, which are the recommended practices for Pipeline
SCADA Displays, Pipeline SCADA Alarm Management, and Pipeline Control Room
Management, respectively. Each document describes the following:
·· API RP 1165 — Pipeline SCADA Displays [3] focuses on the design and im-
plementation of displays used for the monitoring and control of information
on SCADA.
·· API RP 1167 — Pipeline SCADA Alarm Management [4] provides guidance
on industry practices that include alarm definition and determination, alarm
philosophy, alarm functionality and design, alarm handling, alarm documenta-
tion, alarm audit and performance monitoring, roles and responsibilities, man-
agement of change, etc.
·· API RP 1168 — Pipeline Control Room Management [5] addresses pipeline
control room personnel roles, guidelines for shift turnover, pipeline control
room fatigue management, and pipeline control room management of change.
The operational nerve center of today’s pipelines is the pipeline control center. It
is from this central location that a geographically diverse pipeline is monitored and
operated. It is also the center for gathering information in real time that is used for real-
time operation, for making business decisions and for operational planning. Figure 9-3
Figure 9-3. C
ontrol Console (Cerda J., 2008, “Oil Pipeline Logistics” Instituto de Desarrollo
Tecnológico para la Industrial, August 11–21, Mar del Plata, Argentina, http://cepac.
cheme.cmu.edu/pasi2008/slides/cerda/library/slides/jcerda-pasi-2008-1page.pdf )
shows a modern control console that the pipeline operator uses for minutes by minutes
system operations. Usually, several large screens are made available to monitor the
entire pipeline system.
Since the control center provides real-time information, it may also include an
emergency situation-room adjacent to the control room. This room may be dedicated
to addressing dispatching issues and particularly to resolving emergency or upset con-
ditions. Several stakeholders, including technical support and management, may be
assembled to address emergencies.
A backup control center may be required in order to operate the pipeline sys-
tem continuously in the event that the main control center is severely disrupted. This
backup is normally in a physically separate location from the main control room. The
backup center is equipped with the same equipment and devices as the main control
center. One option is that the backup system receives the real-time data directly from
the field devices each cycle, so that it is the exact replica of the primary system. The
other option is that the entire backup system is refreshed with the required data re-
ceived from the primary system at a regular interval.
The division of control between a central location and the local pump station var-
ies widely. A large complex pipeline system may be divided into multiple control sec-
tions defined in terms of size of the pipeline network, complexity of the network, or
number of shippers. This division allows the operators, assigned to each section, to
efficiently monitor and safely control the pipeline system.
A control center houses most of the equipment used by the operators on a daily
basis. The equipment required includes the SCADA system computers and terminals,
printers, communication devices, and network equipment used to implement Local
Area Networks (LAN) and/or Wide Area Networks (WAN). In addition, pipeline sys-
tem maps and schematics may be displayed, and operator manuals and other informa-
tion required for performing dispatching functions can be made available.
A SCADA system consists of three main components; host or master, commu-
nication system, and remote terminals. A SCADA host or “master” is a collection of
computer equipment and software located at the control center and used to centrally
monitor and control the activity of the SCADA network, receive and store data from
field devices and send commands to the field. A SCADA system gathers the data from a
variety of field instrumentation, typically connected to remote terminals. See Figure 9-4
for a modern SCADA architecture of both the main control center and backup control
center.
The architecture of SCADA systems can vary from a relatively simple configura-
tion of a computer and modems to a complicated network of equipment. In whatever
form it takes, however, SCADA architecture will incorporate the following key hard-
ware and software capabilities:
·· Ability to interface with field devices and facilities for control and/or monitor-
ing, usually through remote terminals.
·· Provision of a communication network capable of two-way communication be-
tween the remote terminals and the control center. This network might also pro-
vide communication between the control center and a backup control center.
·· Ability to process all incoming data and enable outgoing commands through a
collection of equipment and software called the SCADA host.
The network is normally an internal private network. However, there are now
SCADA systems that utilize secure connections to the Internet that replaces the private
network. Web-based SCADA systems are ideal for remote unattended applications, as-
suming that an RTU or flow computer is available. In other words, they are suitable to
pipeline systems or remote locations where centralized computing or control require-
ments are not intense and the primary function is remote data gathering. A web-based
SCADA system offers several benefits. The main advantages are as follows:
·· A DCS normally does not have remotely (i.e., off-site) located components
and is always connected to its data source. Redundancy is usually handled by
parallel equipment.
·· SCADA needs to have secure data and control over a potentially unreliable
and slow communication medium, and needs to maintain a database of ‘last
known good values’ for prompt operator display. It frequently needs to do event
processing and data quality validation. Redundancy is usually handled in a
distributed manner.
·· A DCS does not poll data but rather needs to be able to process a high number
of transactions at a high speed in order to implement multiple real-time closed
loop control.
·· The majority of operations, such as start/stop commands and alarm detection
of a SCADA system are digital. They also gather/poll analogue readings but
do not implement closed loop control; humans determine if set points need to
be adjusted. A DCS is process control oriented and therefore is designed to be
able to implement many control loops as well as standard operator initiated
start/stop commands.
·· When the DCS operator wants to see information, he usually makes a request
directly to the field I/O and gets a response. Field events can directly interrupt
the system and the operator is advised automatically of their occurrence.
The remote terminals are located where the process values are monitored and
interfaced with the host SCADA. They can be a remote terminal unit (RTU), program-
mable logic controller (PLC), or flow computer. The remote terminals collect data from
the process devices, transmit data to the host SCADA, receive supervisory commands
from the host SCADA, and issue these commands to the process devices. Supervisory
commands may include pump/compressor station or unit start and stop commands,
valve opening and closing commands, and set point settings.
An RTU acquires process values independent of the host by scanning hardware
and software points, and communicates with the host, field I/O points, and other com-
puter systems. It can detect and report alarm conditions, which include I/O error, bad
measurement, high/low limit violations, rate-of-change alarm, and other deviations
from set-points. An RTU provides limited control functions at field devices. The func-
tions range from simple on-off or open-close control to logical control sequences such
as ESD. It supports diagnostic checks with diagnostic software running in the remote
watching for a number of possible problems. Some RTUs provide electronic flow
measurement capability, by performing calculations of AGA, API and other standards,
storing the measurement data, and allowing instant access of the measurement data.
A PLC provides extensive control, communication and operator interface capa-
bilities. PLCs are used as remote terminals on a SCADA system, the heart of station
control for field equipment (pumps, drivers, lube oil systems), communicating with
the host. At a pump station, it can perform all the monitoring and control functions of
pump unit and driver, station valve, station suction and discharge, station electrical
and auxiliary equipment. It may have its own memory for the data to be transferred, or
logic control for the gathering of data and error-checking with the host. PLCs can also
be networked to provide a complete control system for a complex station.
It has to be noted that DCSs are not only economic for large installations but can
be a solution choice for larger pump stations. They would certainly be considered for
installations where there is a station and an associated processing facility or a refinery
that would utilize a DCS for its control. The traditional boundaries between various
control system solution options have become blurred due to the flexibility of today’s
control equipment. For small systems, the control system will generally be imple-
mented using a PLC. As the facility gets larger and more complex, several options are
now available of choosing between installing a control system using networked PLCs
or a DCS system, requiring a careful consideration to ensure the operating require-
ments are met while at the same time the design dovetails with corporate business
information gathering and processing.
LAN A
LAN B
CROSSBAR
SWITCH
In addition, various utilities and development software are important for system
development, configuration, and maintenance.
The SCADA will manage the polling of data, processing of that data and the pass-
ing of it to the real-time database. It will make data available to the presentation layer
consisting of the HMI Manager and interfaces to other applications, as well as process
control and data requests.
·· Metallic line is a hardwired physical connection between the SCADA host and
the remote location. This is a good practical choice in SCADA applications
where the distances between the SCADA host and the remote locations are not
significant and there may be a limited choice of other media. An equivalent is
usually leasing “lines” from a telephone company. The connection will utilize
the internal network of the telephone company and may be any combination
of wire, fibre optic cable, and radio. Another alternative is to utilize mobile
telephone networks which provide good coverage in populated areas.
·· Application of radio transmission on a pipeline SCADA usually takes two
forms. The simple case is where a radio link is used as the last communication
link between the SCADA and a remote site. The main communication back-
bone of the SCADA system is some other media other than simple radio. A long
distance pipeline that may be geographically located in remote areas as well as
near occupied areas may well incorporate a mix of radio links and fixed links
(leased lines, fibre optic, etc.)
·· A fibre optic cable uses coherent laser light sent along a “cable.” The cables
are not lossless and repeater equipment is required at spacing of up to 100 km.
The growth of the need for data transfer capability for the internet and private
networks has spurred advances in fibre optic equipment. Because a fibre optic
cable uses light and not electricity to transmit data it has the benefit of being
unaffected by electromagnetic interference. On new pipeline projects, some
pipeline companies have installed fibre optic cable in the same right of way
as the pipeline. This can be a cost effective way of providing a transmission
medium to implement the SCADA WAN.
·· A satellite can provide a cost effective communication solution for pipelines
under certain conditions. This solution is usually considered when the RTU is
in a very remote location where the ability to utilize other media is not practical
or very expensive. The capital cost is typically more than alternative techniques
but when operating costs are factored in, this option can be a cost effective
solution. However, poor weather conditions can adversely affect the reliability
of communications.
Polling is the term used to describe the process of the SCADA host communicat-
ing with a number of RTUs connected on a network and exchanging data with each
RTU. The arrangement between the SCADA host and the remote RTU is sometimes
referred to as ‘master-slave’ implying that the SCADA host is in charge of each com-
munication session with an RTU. The types of polling schemes are as follows:
·· Polled Only or multi-drop scheme: The SCADA host will sequentially initiate
communication with each RTU in sequence on a fixed schedule. There will be
a fixed number of attempts to establish communication with an RTU before
reporting that communications with the RTU are faulty. One can imagine that
for a system with a large number of points to be updated at the SCADA host,
this may take some time and therefore there will be some time lag between the
sample time for the first data point and the last.
·· Freeze scheme: One variation of multi-drop scheme is the ability of the master to
issue a freeze command to all RTUs. The RTUs then store their data samples and
the master begins polling and retrieves the data. This results in a database update
at the master where all data was taken more or less at the same time. One way of
mitigating this is to have all the RTUs take and store data samples at the same time.
The major disadvantage of the above two schemes is that the status and value of all
data base points are transmitted every polling cycle, which can be costly.
·· Polled Report by Exception (RBE): In this scheme, a local history of each data
point is saved and the RTU will only send back those points that have changed
since the last poll. In the case of an analogue value, these will have a dead
band that the value must exceed before a new value is sent back to the SCADA
host. This reduces the amount of data traffic on the network. The user must be
careful in choosing dead bands for analogue values for example to ensure that
information is not lost.
·· Unsolicited RBE: In this case, the host does not poll on a regular basis, but each
RTU “pushes” data back to the host when it has updated data to send. This can
reduce data traffic even more than the polled RBE. However, it has the disad-
vantage of the host not knowing if data points have not changed or failed. A
variation can be to have a system that incorporates a guaranteed polling time.
For example, all RTUs may be scanned at least once every 15 minutes.
·· Pump station — values and quality of suction, casing and discharge pressures.
Sometimes, temperature value and its quality are made available, especially
if a heater or chiller is installed. Status of various valves is also required. For
variable speed pumps, unit speeds are made available for the operator to review
the performance of the unit. Data to allow monitoring of unit operating point is
also useful for determining operating efficiency.
·· Meter station — values and quality of flow, pressure, and temperature. In addi-
tion, a densitometer reading may be available for liquid pipelines, particularly
batch pipelines. The status of various valves is also required.
·· Control or pressure reducing valve station — values and quality of pressure or
flow.
·· Pipeline — values and quality of pressures along the pipeline. Sometimes,
values and quality of temperature are available. These may be retrieved from
automated block valve sites to take advantage of the need for an RTU for valve
control. The incremental cost of pressure and temperature measurements in this
situation is minimal.
Alarm messages are generated to signal the potential or real interruption of normal
operation at any monitored location on the pipeline.
There are four basic data types in a SCADA system, namely, “discrete,” “ana-
logue,” “internal,” and “parameter”:
·· The term “discrete” reflects the fact that these points can only be in one of two
(or more) predefined states. Discrete points are generally binary in nature, i.e.,
they only have distinct states. This can represent open/closed, on/off, normal/
alarm, etc. They are referred to as digital, status or binary points. Some systems
will implement three or four state points, such as a valve status, to indicate that
the valve is “open,” “in transit,” or “closed,” or a pump is running, in start-up,
in shutdown or off.
·· “Analogue” or “Analog” refers to points that have a numeric value rather than
two or more discrete states. Analogue inputs are field data points with a value
that represents a process variable at any given remote location such as pipeline
pressure, oil temperature or pressure set point on a control valve. Analogue
output points can also be sent as commands from the SCADA host, such as set
points for controllers.
·· A third type of data point is determined internally by the SCADA host as op-
posed to being sent by an RTU. The internal data type is also called derived
data. This can range from a simple calculation to change the engineering units
of a field value to more complicated calculations such as the corrected volume
measurement in a tank based on tank level, temperature, and product density of
a flow calculation that uses API corrections.
·· Parameters or factors are generally used to calculate derived values. Exam-
ples include orifice plate sizes, AGA calculation parameters, and performance
curves.
and digital data, alarms, events and operator actions. The SCADA system must be able
to retrieve archived data without interrupting ongoing process operations.
To facilitate analyzing system upsets and events, the SCADA system can have
a feature known as “playback.” This functions much like a rewind on a VCR and al-
lows a user to replay historical data through an off-line operator terminal in order to
more easily analyze and determine the root cause of an upset. It can also be used to
do “post-mortems” with operators to provide feedback on actions that were taken and
to determine if remedial action taken was done correctly and in a timely fashion. The
SCADA data base manager needs to store and time tag all operator actions (alarm ac-
knowledgment, commands, etc.) as well as all incoming and outgoing data to get the
most benefit from this feature.
9.1.6 Alarms
For safe pipeline operation, potential alarm situations should be addressed by annunci-
ating alarm messages. High-priority alarms may require audible alarming. Alarm condi-
tions are expected during the course of pipeline system operation. The alarm processing
function can help to identify potential alarm conditions before actual alarm conditions
occur. Examples of potential alarms include high-pressure violation, high-temperature
violation at a compressor discharge, leak detection, etc.
The alarm processing function should be able to limit the number of alarms to
those that are important. If the number of alarms is too large, the operator’s attention is
consumed reviewing and acknowledging alarms instead of monitoring and controlling
the pipeline system. An overabundance of alarms also desensitizes the operators and
can result in them ignoring critical alarm conditions.
In general, alarms are prioritized according to their critical nature in order to give
the operator an indication of which alarms need to be attended to first. Emergency
alarms require the operators to take immediate action to correct the condition, while
communication alarms may require them to contact support staff immediately. Warn-
ing alarms are not usually critical, requiring preventive measure without immediate
action. The severity of alarms should be configured to be one of multiple levels of
severity (for example, high, medium, or low) for all alarm generating points. Alarms
are usually color coded, requiring a different color for each level of alarm. In addition,
an audible signal should be generated for high-level alarms.
Analogue alarms are generated when a current value for an analogue point reaches a
limit pre-defined in the data base attribute for that point. Figure 9-6 is a typical alarm sum-
mary display, which in this case shows the conditions both “in alarm” and “not in alarm”
as well as both the “unacknowledged” and “acknowledged” statuses. The first two alarm
messages are in an alarm condition because the tank is in “Low-Low” level.
Alarm levels will typically include the following:
·· High-High (or Alarm) means that the point has reached its maximum allowable
value. This will generally mean that it is close to or has reached a point where
local automatic protection systems may be initiating action.
·· High (or High Warning) means that the point has reached a warning level. If
remedial action is not taken, the point may reach High-High. The trending sys-
tem will allow an operator to display such a point to see how long it has taken
the point to get to the warning level.
·· Low-Low (or Alarm) similar to High-High but for a lower limit
·· Low (or Low Warning) similar to High but for a lower limit
·· Rate of Change: The slope of a trend line has exceeded a pre-defined limit. This
means the process value is changing more rapidly than would be expected.
Discrete alarms are generated upon a change of state of the data base point. These
can represent:
All such alarms will be reported and logged, as will any change of status of a point.
This will provide not only a record of all abnormal events but will also show when
equipment was acted upon by an operator.
A basic alarm management scheme consists of detecting the alarm and reporting
the alarm to the operator. An alarm management system will also log and provide an audit
trail of each alarm. This will include the time that the alarm was reported, when it was ac-
knowledged by the operator and when the alarming point returned to normal. This informa-
tion along with the database log will provide key information for post-event analysis.
In any system upset, there will be an initiating event followed by secondary indica-
tions or alarms. For example, a control valve may fail causing pressure to rise, which may
then cause pressure relief valves to operate and flow rates to exceed expected values. Some
SCADA systems may incorporate some form of artificial intelligence to process alarms
automatically to advise the operator of what the potential root cause may be.
The SCADA database will have the ability to assign various levels of alarm sever-
ity to individual points to provide an easy means of reporting high-priority alarms to
an operator. In an emergency condition, it is important to not overload an operator and
allow concentration on priority items.
The alarm message includes the date and time of the alarm, the point that caused
the alarm, the severity of the alarm denoted by color and an audible signal, and the state
of the point. The message is displayed in the alarm window and in the tabular summary
of alarms. The alarm window lists all unacknowledged alarms, which should be made
available on the screen at all times. Alarms are always logged in an event summary,
including not only all the information in the alarm message but also the time when the
alarm was acknowledged and by whom.
The operators should be able to easily monitor alarm messages and quickly re-
spond to the messages. Therefore, messages should be made readily available to the
operator. The current alarm summary is mainly used for monitoring and acknowledg-
ing the messages, while the alarm history summary is mainly used for reviewing the
alarm status and pipeline system operation.
·· Telemetered data, including analogue, digital, and derived values and quality
·· Parameter data, such as orifice plate size
·· Schematic information, including station yard piping, facility locations on the
pipeline system, and other pertinent information
The displays need to be designed to meet the needs of individual operators, be-
cause they are the prime users of SCADA displays. Displays need to:
·· provide a fixed area on the screen for alarm and emergency annunciation
·· refresh the displays dynamically and within a short time (at most a few sec-
onds) after a command is issued
·· allow the operators to be able to navigate the displays easily and quickly
·· maintain a consistent “look and feel” and use intuitive design industry-accepted
display design methodologies and standards.
All SCADA vendors will have a comprehensive HMI system, which will include
tools for creating and modifying displays and reports. In fact, the capabilities of most
systems can be bewildering and intimidating. Since a typical SCADA host will have
a large real-time database, the challenge is to design an HMI that presents relevant
information to the operator in an easy to understand set of displays.
It is suggested that a fixed area be reserved on the screen for alarm and event mes-
sages, system performance monitoring, and annunciation of emergency scan. In other
words, this information remains on the screen always until it has been acknowledged.
It is important to develop some guiding principles for each system before the displays
are created. These guidelines should include some variation of the following:
this display may show the link to pump/compressor, meter, or valve station con-
trol panels through which the operator can send a control command.
2. Screen navigation should follow the current expected features found in most
window-type navigation software to reduce operator-learning time and to make
the system as intuitive as possible.
3. Ensure a consistent “look and feel” of displays to minimize training and the
chance of operator error. These will include the use of color and a consistent
and logical approach to the use of buttons, menus and toolbars. A judicious
choice of colors is important as certain types of color blindness can result in
some colors appearing the same to some people.
4. Keep screens as uncluttered as possible while still supplying the required in-
formation. The possibility of confusion should be minimized and care taken to
reduce the possibility of information being lost or “buried” on the screen.
The following displays are considered to be key display requirements for effective
operation of the pipeline system:
The displays are either in tabular or graphical format. In some cases, it may be
useful to have both tabular and graphical formats for displaying data. The selection of
format depends on how the data is used. For example, it is more useful to display pres-
sure drop along the pipeline in graphical format. Most modern SCADA systems use
several display mechanisms, which include textual and graphical images augmented
with real-time information. Color and shape can be used to relate discrete information
in an intuitive manner, plot and trend display types can be used to display graphs of
analog data in an x/y format or a horizontal or vertical bar graph.
There are other display types such as pushbutton for selecting a button to perform
a specific function, meter/gauge for showing a meter/gauge device with values, and
region for marking a location on a display. Some SCADA display systems support
display format control. The format control functions include popup and pan/zoom.
For example, the functions such as set-point control and communication control can
be supported by pop-ups. A large display area can be easily navigated by means of a
panning/zooming feature of the display system.
Figure 9-7 is a display of a pipeline system. It shows the operating statuses and
parameters of the entire pipeline system; pump stations and the operating pump units,
current station pressures and flow rate, density, and list of alarm messages at the bottom
of the display. From this display, a desired pump station or alarm message is selected
to review the detailed data for the station.
Figure 9-8 shows a typical pump station diagram. To monitor or control a pump
station, it can be directly selected from the display of the pipeline system. Then, the
operator can monitor the measured variables and controlled parameters of the selected
station as well as its station operation statuses including pump unit and valve statuses.
From the pump station display, the pump units and valves can be controlled and the
control point can be set. Normally, the suction or discharge pressure is controlled from
this screen.
Figure 9-9 displays a meter station in a tank farm, installed with a meter prover.
The operator can view the current meter station statuses and meter data including flow
meter and valve positions as well as control the meter station from this display. The
operator can acknowledge any alarm messages related to the meter station operation.
These alarms are listed in the alarm summary at the bottom of the screen. In addition,
the flow meter can be proved by means of a meter prover.
Figure 9-10 displays the elevation profile, and pressure profile with MAOP. The
pressures can be presented in terms of head so that all three units are the same. This
allows the operator to visually detect trouble spots such as slack flow conditions along
the pipeline.
Data trending capability is one of the most important functions of any SCADA
system because it helps the dispatchers and operations staff to identify potential prob-
lems before they arise and to diagnose alarm conditions. Data trending is used to dis-
play any analogue values which are stored in the historical database over time at a
specific location or locations. Data trending displays are in graphical format due to the
large amount of data. Figure 9-11 shows a typical trend plot of flow rate, pressure, tem-
perature, and API gravity at any specific point of a pipeline. Any data can be trended,
and the trended data can be analyzed to detect any anomaly at the point.
All SCADA systems have some type of reporting capability. This will typically
consist of both standard reports generated automatically by the system and user-defined
reports. These reports are generated from the SCADA databases containing real-time,
historical and calculated data. The standard reports are of a predefined structure, while
the user-defined reports meet the user’s specific needs. Examples of standard reports
include operating summary reports and billing reports, and those of user-defined re-
ports include such things as command/alarm log sorted by station.
The types of reports usually found on a pipeline SCADA system would include
some of the following:
·· Operating reports
·· Shift or daily operating summary reports
·· Product movement report
·· Alarm summary report
·· System availability, communication and reliability report
·· Emergency scan report, containing operating data during emergency conditions
The number, content, and style of reports will vary widely depending on the pipe-
line type, the business requirements, and the regulatory environment. It is important
that the SCADA system provides an easy to use, flexible reporting package that does
not require programming changes to create and implement reports.
9.1.8 Security
A SCADA system will provide for user password access and the ability to configure
specific levels of access for each user. For example, there may be users who may ac-
cess the SCADA system but are allowed only the ability to read some pre-configured
reports. For example, only those who are directly responsible for the database are al-
lowed to make changes to the database and this is done with password protection.
SCADA systems have long been thought to operate in a secure environment
because of their closed networks, which are not exposed to external entities. In ad-
dition, the communication protocols employed were primarily proprietary and not
commonly published. Recent advances, such as Web-based reporting and remote
operator access, have driven the requirement to interface with the Internet. This
opens up physical access over the public network and subjects SCADA systems
to the same potential malicious threats as those that corporate networks face on a
regular basis.
Typically, compliance with industry standards and technologies is regarded as
a good thing. However, in the case of newer SCADA systems, recent adoption of
commonly used operating systems and standards makes for a more vulnerable target.
Newer SCADA systems have begun to use operating systems such as Windows that
are commonplace in corporate networks. While this move offers benefits, it also makes
SCADA systems susceptible to numerous attacks related to these operating systems.
RTU to host protocols are now utilizing industry standard protocols, which may com-
promise their security.
Due to cyber terrorism, the security associated with the SCADA network needs to
be designed and assessed by the same policies utilized in other areas of the company.
If there are no such clear network security policies in place, then they need to be estab-
lished before taking specific actions on the SCADA network. For detailed information
on SCADA security, refer to API Standard 1164 — Pipeline SCADA Security [6]. This
standard provides guidance to the operators of pipeline systems for managing SCADA
system integrity and security.
9.2.1 Introduction
This section discusses various aspects of pipeline leak detection without an emphasis
on any particular techniques. Anyone, who is interested in the detailed discussion of
the leak detection techniques and their implementation considerations, are referred
to other volumes [1]. This section introduces the selection criteria of a leak detection
system and various leak detection techniques.
Pipeline leak detection is only one aspect of a pipeline leak management pro-
gram; it encompasses leak prevention, detection and mitigation procedures. In order
to minimize the consequences of a leak, pipeline companies require a comprehensive
leak management program. A leak detection system by itself does not improve on a
pipeline’s integrity nor reduce potential failures of a pipeline system. However, such a
program will not only help prevent and monitor the degradation of a pipeline that may
eventually lead to failure, but will also minimize the consequences of pipeline leaks
if they occur.
Pipeline companies minimize leaks through a leak prevention program. The main
causes of leaks are: outside or third party damage such as excavation equipment hitting
the pipeline, geophysical forces such as floods and landslides, improper control of the
pipeline system, and pipe corrosion. Figure 9-12 shows leak statistics in US, Canada
and Europe.
Even though the statistics are about ten years old, they can be relevant to ad-
dress key issues on leaks. Incidents resulting from damage by a third party are signifi-
cantly higher in Europe than those in Canada, mainly because the population density
in Europe is much higher. Proper control of third-party damage is achieved through:
marking of the right of way; education of employees, contractors, and the public; and
effective use of systems such as “One-Call.” Geophysical forces cannot be controlled
but can be monitored and their effects can be mitigated. Pipeline integrity management
is a significant subject by itself and discussed in separate volumes [7].
Leak mitigation is the attempt to reduce the consequences of a leak when it occurs.
If a leak can be detected quickly and isolated quickly, the spillage can be minimized.
This requires that the leak alarm and its associated information are reliable and accu-
rate. Having effective procedures in place and the proper resources and tools to enact
them are critical in addressing the leak mitigation issues efficiently. The leak confirma-
tion and isolation issues should be part of leak detection. The scope of leak detection
does not normally include spillage management issues such as cleanup procedures and
manpower mobilization.
Historical data indicates that leaks were predominantly detected by local opera-
tion staff and third parties. Successful detection by means of a single leak detection
system was random. This was because no single leak detection system could detect
leaks quickly and accurately or provide reliable leak detection continuously and cost-
effectively. Therefore, more systematic approaches to leak detection are required, such
as a combination of line patrol, sensing devices and/or SCADA-based systems with
automated leak detection capability.
Since SCADA systems have become an integral part of pipeline operations, a
particular consideration has to be given to leak detection methods that can be easily
implemented on the SCADA system. API Publication 1130 [8] addresses various Com-
putational Pipeline Monitoring (CPM) methodologies, integrated with a host SCADA
system. In association with the CPM, API Publication 1149 [9] and API Publication
1155 [10] are briefly discussed with respect to how they are used for specifying and
evaluating leak detection performance.
Pipeline Leaks
This chapter uses the definition of leaks as defined in “Petroleum Pipeline Leak De-
tection Study [11].” There are two types of leaks: an incipient leak and an actual leak.
“Incipient leaks” are defined as those that are just about to occur. Certain incipient
leaks can be discovered by inspecting the pipeline and dealt with before they become
actual leaks. Here, an actual leak is called a pipeline leak when fluid is leaking out of
a pipeline system.
All pipeline leaks are associated with certain external and internal phenomena.
External phenomena include the following:
All leak detection systems take advantage of the presence of one or more leak
phenomena.
The Canadian standards applicable to oil and gas pipelines are specified in Z662,
“Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems.” Section 10.2.6 of Z662 specifies leak detection for
liquid hydrocarbon pipeline systems. The specifications in Section 10.2.6 for liquid
pipeline systems states:
“Operating companies shall make periodic line balance measurements for sys-
tem integrity. Operating companies shall periodically review their leak detection
methods to confirm their adequacy and effectiveness. Installed devices or oper-
ating practices, or both, shall be capable of early detection of leaks. Measuring
equipment shall be calibrated regularly to facilitate proper measurement.”
A leak would be initially detected and located by the leak detection system and
then confirmed by some means such as visual inspection. After, or even before the
leak is confirmed (depending on the company’s leak response procedures), the leak
must be isolated by closing block valves adjacent to the leak. After the leak is iso-
lated, a significant volume of product can be lost depending on the leak location
and terrain of the leaked pipeline section. The spillage during the detection phase
is often relatively small compared to potential total spillage. Therefore, the impor-
tance of rapid detection time as a valuable feature of a detection system cannot be
over-emphasized.
It is important to define a set of selection criteria for use in assessing the perfor
mance and selection of various leak detection systems. Typical performance criteria
are listed in Table 9-1 [12, 13]:
An effective leak detection system helps pipeline operators mitigate the risks and
consequences of any leak. It can shorten leak detection time, increase reliability (not
miss actual leaks and at the same time not produce false alarms), and reduce leak con-
firmation and isolation time with accurate leak location estimates. Simply put, overall
cost of a leak can be reduced using an effective leak detection system. However, there
are costs to implement and operate a leak detection system.
Therefore, the decision-making process of implementing and operating a leak de-
tection system can be made by balancing the risk and consequences of possible leaks
against the cost of a leak detection system and mitigation program. The following
p rocess may help in analyzing potential risks of leaks in terms of cost and the cost sav-
ings resulting from the implementation of a leak detection system:
·· Estimate likely probabilities of various leaks and thus the potential number of
leaks.
·· Estimate the direct and indirect costs of leaks over a period of time without
a leak detection system by using historical data for the consequences of the
leaks.
·· Assess attainable leak detection performances of various leak detection sys-
tems by applying the above criteria.
·· Determine the costs of implementing and operating these leak detection sys-
tems over the same period of time used in the cost calculation above.
·· Estimate potential cost savings from the use of a leak detection system.
a dvantage is that it can detect not only incipient failure but also existing small pin
hole size leaks. However, non-critical cracks may not be found and crack growth can
accelerate due to pressurizing at the time of testing.
Hydrostatic testing was also used on operating pipelines to assess their structural
integrity. It is another method of identifying SCC problems. When an operating pipe-
line is tested at a pressure above normal operating pressure using the fluid normally
transported in the pipeline, it is called a dynamic pressure test. The purpose of this test
was not to accommodate the increase in operating pressure level, but to confirm the
pressure capability of the pipeline system. However, a pressure test can be destructive
if a line break occurs during the test. As a result, pressure testing of operating pipelines
with hydrocarbon liquids is not allowed by code and is not practiced anymore. Proce-
dures for hydrostatic testing and ILI are outlined in API Standard 1160 — Managing
System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines.
9.2.2.2 Sensor Methods
Sensing Devices can be used to continuously sense particular characteristics of leaks
such as sudden pressure drop, noise, electrical impedance, or other signals caused by a
leak or interference around a pipe. Some sensing devices can detect not only leaks but
also third party interference around the pipeline system. Traditionally, these techniques
have been relatively unreliable and impractical. There are a few emerging technologies
in sensing devices such as fiber optics that are showing increasing promise. Certain
techniques such as specialized fiber optic cables can be expensive for existing pipe-
lines, as the pipeline has to be retrofitted with the cable or sensing devices.
Acoustic Sensing Device — The figure above shows the schematics of this tech-
nique. The principle of this technique relies on the fact that when a fluid passes through
a hole under high pressure, the resulting turbulence creates acoustic pressure waves
that travel through the fluid and pipe. Acoustic sensors are placed on the pipe, regularly
spaced along the pipeline, to detect these acoustic waves. An acoustic leak detection
system continuously monitors the pipeline for the sound characteristic of a leak. The
signals, after the background noise including operation characteristics are filtered, are
compared to the appropriate thresholds to confirm or reject a leak. The acoustic leak
detection system can also determine the leak location by correlating the sensor spacing,
velocity of sound, and propagation time difference.
The advantages, if it is installed properly, include the detectability of small leaks
in a short time, accurate leak location and continuous operation. However, it tends to
generate frequent false alarms particularly for small leaks in the presence of large back-
ground noise in the pipeline and can be expensive for a long transmission line, because
of the need for many acoustic sensors (Figure 9-13).
Optical Fiber Sensor System — This is an emerging technology that uses an
optical fiber sensor to detect leaks and/or impending pipe damage [14]. It requires the
installation of an optical fiber cable along the entire length of the pipeline. It operates
by detecting optical properties, temperature change, and/or micro bends of the pipe.
The latter capability allows the detection of activities outside the pipeline which can
be picked up by micro-strain sensors.
The advantages of this system, if it is installed properly, include the capability of
detecting and locating outside third party damage and fluid theft as well as continuous
operation. However, the installation cost on an existing pipeline can be high. Even
though several successful trials were reported [15], its performance has not yet been
fully proven for long pipelines.
Vapor Monitoring System — A vapor monitoring leak detection system [16]
detects leaks by placing a sensor tube next to the pipeline. In the event of a leak, the
hydrocarbon vapors will diffuse into the sensor tube. Its operation is shown in the figure
below (Figure 9-14).
Communications Link
The system consists of a suction pump, gas detector and a plastic cable or tube that
is installed adjacent to the pipeline. When a leak occurs, some hydrocarbon molecules
diffuse into the tube as a result of the hydrocarbon concentration difference between
the inside and outside of the tube around the leaking section. In due course, the affected
area of the tube will have a higher hydrocarbon concentration than the rest of the tube.
When the pump pulls the air, the affected air is also pulled toward the detection unit,
which analyzes the hydrocarbon concentration. Because the air is pulled at a constant
speed, the system can determine the leak location. Leak size can be estimated from the
concentration of hydrocarbons.
Monitored pipe
Permeable
sensor tube
Clean dry air
Pump Sensor Electrolysis
cell
Gas Test peak
concentration Leak signal (hydrogen)
Arrival time
of leak signal
Arrival time
of test peak
This method of leak detection and location can detect a very small leak and locate it
accurately. It can be used for both onshore and offshore pipelines as well as multiphase leak
detection. In addition, this methodology can be used to detect many different substances. A
system based on this technology has been used in an Arctic pipeline (Northstar Develop-
ment). However, this method may be too slow to react to large leaks, and the installation
and operation costs can be very high. This system should be used in conjunction with other
leak detection systems in environmentally sensitive areas.
9.2.2.3 Computational Pipeline Monitoring (CPM) Methods
The CPM methods are based on mathematical or statistical computations of certain
quantities using commonly available measured values such as flows and pressures ob-
tained through the host SCADA system. Each scan, a CPM system receives an updated
set of SCADA data and sends a set of the modelled results back to SCADA through the
SCADA interface software. In general, the cost is relatively reasonable but the sensitiv-
ity is lower than other methods.
Any pipeline monitoring system that continuously checks for leaks can be con-
sidered a real-time leak detection system. All CPM methodologies are classified as
real-time leak monitoring systems. Real-time leak detection as discussed in this section
includes only the methods based on leak detection software operating in conjunction
with a host SCADA system.
Any CPM system consists of the following components:
·· Field instrumentation and RTU which sends the field data to the host SCADA
·· SCADA system, which collects the field data, sends them to the real-time leak
detection system, and annunciates event and alarm messages. The SCADA sys-
tem requirements for leak detection are discussed in ref. [1].
·· Hardware and software interfaces which integrate the functions of the host
SCADA and real-time leak detection system
·· Real-time leak detection computer and software
The key advantage of the CPM methods is that they seldom need additional in-
struments and equipment to those that already exist for normal pipeline operations. As
a result, the implementation and operating costs are typically lower than the costs for
inspection and sensor methods.
API Publication 1130 defines the following eight CPM methodologies:
The first five methodologies are based on mass balance principle and will be dis-
cussed in that context. The mass balance principle applied to a pipeline means that the
difference between the amount of fluid that enters and leaves the pipe over a given time
must be the same as the change in fluid inside the pipe over the same period of time.
This principle is expressed mathematically as follows:
where
Vin = corrected volume entering the pipeline over a fixed time interval
Vout = corrected volume leaving the pipeline over the same time interval
DLP = change in line pack over the same time interval
Imb = imbalance
“The fundamental difference that a RTTM provides over the CMB method is that
it compares the model directly against measured data, i.e., primarily pressure and
flow) rather than use the calculated values as inputs to volume balance. Extensive
configuration of physical pipeline parameters (length, diameter, thickness, pipe
composition, route topology, internal roughness, pumps, valves, equipment location,
etc.), commodity characteristics (accurate bulk modulus value, viscosity, etc.), and
local station logic (e.g., pressure/flow controllers) are required to design a pipeline
specific RTTM. The application software generates a real-time transient hydraulic
model by this configuration with field inputs from meters, pressures, temperatures,
densities at strategic receipt and delivery locations, referred to as software boundary
conditions. Fluid dynamic characteristic values will be modelled throughout the
pipeline, even during system transients. The RTTM software compares the mea
sured data for a segment of pipeline with its corresponding modelled conditions.”
·· Normal operations can produce rapid changes in pressure and flow rate that do
not necessarily indicate a leak.
·· Pipeline pressure increases can mask a leak.
This method may be useful for detecting unusual events or ruptures. For leak
detection purposes, it is normally used in conjunction with other leak detection
methods.
Acoustic/Negative Pressure Wave Technique — This technique works similarly
to the acoustic sensing technique, except that pressure sensors are used instead of
acoustic sensors. API Publication 1130 defines this method as follows:
This technique provides accurate leak location and rapid detection of relatively
large leaks, assuming that the leaks occur rapidly, the sensor spacing is close and oper-
ating pressure is high. However, it tends to generate frequent false alarms.
Statistical Technique — This technique is not a leak detection technique in itself,
but a decision tool based on the data generated by some of the above methods. Two
statistical techniques specifically applied to leak detection are described below. Even
though it is time-consuming to determine all possible “no leak” conditions for all pos-
sible operating scenarios, several successful implementations have been reported.
Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) Technique — A statistical leak de-
tection method applied to this problem is a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT)
technique to determine an alarm status. It provides a means of making a leak alarm de-
cision by analyzing time series data statistically. For pipeline leak detection, the SPRT
is applied to the time series data of the volume imbalances or flow differences.
To achieve reliable and sensitive leak detection performance, test values such as
imbalance data, should be reliable and the statistical parameters properly set during
a tuning process. A sufficient amount of normal operational data must be analyzed
in order to obtain the correct statistical tuning parameters. The tuning parameters in-
clude the number of time series data points, probabilities that determine the thresh-
olds, leak sizes to be detected with minimum standard deviation, and mean value
correction.
The SPRT offers good fault detection capability including pipeline leak detection.
The sequential probability ratio test expression includes the standard deviation and
mean value terms that indicate variability of the incoming data and inherent measure-
ment bias. Therefore, the equation automatically takes into account the pipeline opera-
tions in terms of changes in test values and bias correction. This technique responds
to changes quickly, and if properly tuned, it can provide sensitive and reliable leak
detection capability.
However, successful operation of the SPRT technique requires that the smooth
time series data to be tested be reliable. Since it relies on other calculation methods for
its test values such as volume imbalance, the selection of a proper imbalance calcula-
tion method is an important factor in achieving good leak detection performance. In
general, the SPRT tends to use a lot of test data for proper trending analysis, and thus
it may respond too slowly to respond to pipeline ruptures that require immediate leak
detection and confirmation.
Bayesian Inference Technique — Another statistical approach to leak detection
uses a Bayesian inference technique in order to make a leak/no leak alarm decision.
In other words, assuming known prior probabilities of no leak for a set of no leak pat-
terns, the Bayesian inference technique applies the Bayes’ rule to determine the prob-
ability of a no leak alarm condition. The same Bayes’ rule is applied to a leak condition
to determine the probability of a leak occurring. This technique has been success-
fully implemented in a simple pipeline, because prior probabilities can be determined.
However, it is not simple to apply it to complex pipelines with several pump stations
because it is much more complex to determine prior probabilities.
The pipeline operator identifies and analyzes pipeline operation problems via the
user interface. The user interface should be easy to use and provide appropriate in-
formation in order to make correct decisions. It is critical to have accurate and timely
information in an easy-to-interpret format. The decision may include leak confirmation
and location, so that the operator can shut down the pipeline in accordance with the
pipeline’s operating and alarm conditions. A proper response must be made quickly
when an emergency such as a leak occurs. In addition, the user interface should be
consistent with the SCADA system, because the operator gets the information through
the SCADA. Alarm messages are the most critical information that the operators must
pay attention to, and a pipeline map is required to efficiently execute emergency re-
sponse procedures. The map gives detailed information about the names and contact
numbers of responsible parties, pipeline route and terrain, population close to the pipe-
line route, responsible officials including police, critical environmental concerns, etc.
An example display of leak alarm messages is shown in Figure 9-16. It shows the
leak alarm status, estimated leak location and size, and other information that helps the
operator to quickly identify the potential problem.
Alarm messages are critical information that the operations staff must pay atten-
tion to. It is strongly recommended to display alarm messages including leak detection
alarms on the SCADA alarm display screens. The following features and qualities
should be part of the alarm displays:
Trending measured and calculated values of the SCADA and CPM system help
determine what caused an alarm. Trending may be in graphical and tabular forms:
Graphical presentation makes it easier to identify anomalies. The tabular form is use-
ful for analyzing data in detail. API 1130 suggests that a trend cover a long enough du-
ration to see values before a CPM alarm occurred and continue right through to when
the alarm ends, or the current time. The following values need to be trended:
·· A system map, profile, and detailed physical description of each pipeline segment
·· A summary of the characteristics of each product transported
·· A tabulation of the measurement devices used in the leak detection procedure
for each pipeline segment and a description of how the data is gathered
·· A list of special considerations or step-by-step procedures to be used in evaluat-
ing leak detection results
·· Details of the expected performance of the leak detection system under normal
and line upset conditions
·· The effects of system degradation on the leak detection results
API 1130 recommends on-going testing — establishing the policy of periodic test-
ing, test frequency, and test methods. Testing methods may include removal of fluid
from the pipeline, if permitted. The main purposes of the testing are to check if the
installed system is effectively operating and to test whether operators follow the com-
pany’s emergency response procedure. Effective emergency response is one of the key
tasks for mitigating the consequences of the leak when a leak is detected. Emergency
response procedures must not only be clearly written but understood and practiced by
pipeline operating staff.
API 1130 recommends keeping design records, software changes and test records, and
specifies the record retention length. Records of tests should include the following:
It also recommends that records detailing the initial or retest results should be
retained until the next test.
To maximize performance of the implemented CPM system, operating companies
need to establish a procedure and schedule for maintaining all instruments, communication
tools, and hardware and software that affect the leak detection system. Refer to API 1130
which describes several aspects of a system maintenance and support program.
9.2.5 Summary
A leak detection system is a tool for mitigating the consequences associated with a leak
by fast but reliable detection and accurate location. The operator should be well trained
in using the leak detection system so that any emergency due to a leak can be effec-
tively managed. If a leak detection system is effective, it can be good insurance for
reducing risks. An appropriate leak detection system should help pipeline companies
operate their pipeline systems safely by reducing the consequences related to a leak.
A SCADA system is an integral part of daily pipeline operations. The CPM and
sensing methods of leak detection take advantage of real-time capability and the
effectiveness of the SCADA system as a monitoring and controlling tool. As the his-
torical data indicates, the current CPM technologies are far from satisfactory in their
performance. They need further improvement in their reliability and leak detection
sensitivity. Also, a single CPM system may not satisfy all the criteria of an effective
leak detection system. Combining a few CPM and sensing methodologies, however,
may be able to satisfy not only most regulatory requirements but also effectiveness
criteria.
commercially available DRA since 1979, after its effectiveness in increasing through-
put was proven. Nowadays, many North American pipeline companies use DRA to
increase throughput well beyond their design capacities. In addition to oil transmission
pipelines, DRA has been applied to district heating and cooling systems.
Different types of DRA are used in these systems. Most DRA products consist
of a long chain and high molecular weight polymer which is injected into the petro-
leum liquid in small amount (in the range of 10 to 30 ppm of the petroleum liquid)
for reducing the frictional pressure drop. It is injected into the petroleum liquid
flow stream to raise line throughput or lower line pressure to maintain the line
within operating parameters while increasing flow for a given power input. There-
fore, it can save power costs and also relieve the pipeline company of capacity
restriction.
Main classes of additives and chemicals used for transport are summarized in
Table 9-2 [18].
Table 9-2. Main classes of additives and chemicals
Additive Remark
Drag reducer For both liquid and gas transport
Corrosion inhibitors Both chemical inhibitors and biocides
Paraffin inhibitors Prevent paraffin depositions
Pour point depressants Lower pour point of waxy crudes
Gas hydrate inhibitors For gas and multi-phase transport to prevent hydrate
deposits
Surfactants For multi-phase transport of heavy crudes
Odorizing additives For safety
In most petroleum pipelines, the liquid flows through the pipeline in a turbulent
flow regime. In this flow regime, the molecules move in a random motion. As shown in
Figure 9-17 [19], a turbulent flow regime has three flow zones; laminar sub layer, buffer
region, and turbulent core. Working with the molecules in the second and third zones,
a DRA can reduce the energy waste caused by the random motion. In other words,
drag reduction takes place through an interaction between DRA and the turbulence of
flowing fluid.
The DRA is effective only for reducing friction and thus friction pressure loss.
Since the total pressure drop is caused by both friction and elevation gain, it is benefi-
cial only in the sections where the frictional pressure loss is significant but not useful
where the primary pressure drop is caused by elevation gain.
Figure 9-18 [20] shows that lowering these internal fluid pressure losses increases
the bulk throughput of the pipeline for a given pumping energy, hence operating costs
are reduced.
Figure 9-18. Effect of chemical drag reducers on pipeline pressure and flow
·· The DRA facility construction time is shorter and the cost is significantly lower
compared to the time and cost for the construction of pump stations.
·· Solubility: The DRA must be soluble within the fluid being pumped.
·· Shear stability: The DRA must be stable enough not to break down in turbulent
pipe line flow.
·· Downstream effects: The DRA should have no downstream effects on refinery
equipment when used in crude pipe lines and, on product systems, no effects
on engine performance.
A DRA can be degraded due to shearing while flowing through the pipeline and
f acilities such as pump and valve stations. The degradation through pipes is roughly
proportional to travelling distance. The degradation of DRA through the facilities may
be caused by the operating pumps as well as the station piping and fittings. The deg-
radation due to the station piping and fittings may be small if the station is bypassed,
but it can be larger if the DRA flows through the pump station. The degradation due
to the pumps may be different for each pump, and the degradation for each pump in
series is larger than that for a single operating unit. Field data indicates that the DRA
passing through a running pump degrades roughly by one third of its value. Therefore,
the DRA degrades roughly by two thirds if a pump station is operated with two pumps
in series.
Several properties of the fluid being pumped can also affect DRA performance as
follows:
·· Turbulence: The pipeline must be operated at turbulent flow conditions for the
DRA to be effective. Most DRAs are not effective for heavy crude transporta-
tion flowing in laminar flow conditions [23].
·· Viscosity: Decreasing the viscosity of the fluid increases the effectiveness of
the DRA.
·· Temperature: Increase in the temperature of the fluid decreases the fluid viscos-
ity and increases the solubility of the DRA, thus improving performance.
·· Wax or water contents: It is indicated that high wax or water contents in the
fluid reduces the effectiveness of the DRA.
Figure 9-19. Example of field test facilities (courtesy of ConocoPhillips Specialty Products,
www.liquidpower.com)
Startup of DRA Injection: The DRA injection system is usually automated and
controlled remotely by an operator from the control center. Refer to Figure 9-20, which
illustrates a DRA injection system at a pump station. In anticipation that the remote
control system may not work, the facility needs to provide local manual control capa-
bility. Described below is a normal DRA injection starting procedure:
·· Select stations where DRA is to be injected, while checking to ensure that in-
compatible product (such as jet fuel) will not be affected by wrongly injecting
a DRA into the passing batches.
·· Determine the DRA flow rate set point based on the target flow rate in order to
obtain an optimum drag reduction. The required DRA flow rate is calculated
automatically if the line flow rate is known. Normally, DRA injection initially
begins at a high flow rate, and then lowers to the required flow rate.
·· Select and start the DRA pump if there are several DRA pump units.
·· Check if the DRA flow rate agrees with the DRA flow rate set point.
DRA injection operation is shown in Figure 9-21. The DRA flow rate is control-
led to reach the DRA set point. The pump station is equipped with two variable speed
pumps (two VFD drivers) in series, and the DRA injection system is installed down-
stream of the station. A booster pump is installed to boost the suction pressure of the
mainline pump.
In order to make sure that any jet fuel batch is not contaminated with DRA, the
following steps for the startup and shut-down of DRA injection are taken:
·· DRA injection should not start about one hour after a jet fuel batch has passed
the DRA injection station.
·· DRA injection should be shut-down about an hour before the jet fuel batch ar-
rives at the injection station.
·· Where a batch tracking application is employed, DRA lockout can be triggered
by the approach of a jet fuel batch to the DRA injection station with a status
returned to SCADA that can be used to lockout the DRA pump.
Shut-down of DRA Injection: When a pipeline operates near the pressure op-
erating limit, shut-down of DRA injection could cause line operating pressure to be
exceeded if the flow rate remains constant. Described below is a normal DRA injection
shut-down procedure:
The above figure shows a DRA injection and shut-down control through the
SCADA screen of the pump station, where the DRA injection takes place.
9.3.3.3 DRA Concentration Tracking
The DRA concentration is measured in parts-per-million in the flowing product. The
DRA concentration is tracked as it moves down the pipeline, and the concentration in
the subsequent section includes the degradation due to moving along the pipeline and
passing through running pumps. The inclusion of the DRA will create a new ‘batch’
blended with the DRA when the DRA is being injected.
Both sheared and non-sheared DRA concentrations need to be tracked to prop-
erly operate DRA injection. A DRA injection rate is used with measured or calculated
product flow rate to calculate the DRA concentration. When a DRA passes through a
pump, it is sheared and no longer active. The DRA tracking function tracks the sheared
and active DRA concentrations and checks the concentration against the maximum
DRA concentration allowable in the product. For example, DRA is not allowed in jet
fuel and thus its concentration should be checked against zero concentration level. A
graphic view of the DRA contents within a pipeline can show active, sheared and total
concentration of DRA in the product as well as the positions relative to DRA injectors
or pump stations.
9.3.3.4 DRA Limitations on Operation and Design
If the throughput is restricted by the pipeline capacity, it is generally cost-effective
to install DRA facilities at pump stations. However, if the desired flow rate is higher
than the pump capacity, the pumping capacity must be increased to accommodate the
increased throughput requirements.
Figure 9-22 illustrates the pump operating point change due to capacity increase.
Since the throughput increases in the presence of a DRA, the existing pumps may not
be able to accommodate the flow rate increase without modifying the pump charac-
teristics. Note that the pump does not operate at the best efficiency point (BEP) when
DRA is injected into the fluid.
DRA can be used in the transportation of crude oil and refined petroleum products
(except jet fuel) in order to increase pipeline throughput. The DRA can accumulate
on turbine blades and may damage the turbine. Therefore, it cannot be used for jet
fuel transportation, not because of its effectiveness but because of its potential safety
concern. The original DRA did not work with heavy crude, but ConocoPhillips has
recently developed a DRA [23] that has proven effective for heavy crude.
Since much higher flow rate can be achieved with DRA, the flow velocity can be
fast. It has to be noted that the higher velocity can also increase the surge pressure.
Therefore, a check must be made to see if the existing pipeline can meet the new tran-
sient pressure requirements.
As the DRA is injected into the pipeline section, the throughput increase takes
place slowly because the increased rate is linearly dependent on the flow velocity.
The desired throughput can be achieved only after all the liquid in the pipeline section
contains the required DRA concentration. For example, it would take about 10 hours
to reach the intended throughput in a 100 km section if the flow velocity is in the order
of 10 km an hour.
As discussed in the previous section, DRA is sheared as it moves through pipes
and particularly pumps. In other words, it has to be injected at every operating pump
station. Therefore, it can be very costly for a long pipeline with short pump station
spacing.
·· Type of DRA,
·· Supplier,
·· Pressure,
·· Temperature,
·· Pipeline product flow rate,
·· Distance travelled.
The DRA injection rate needs to be determined to achieve the desired pressure or
flow rate. DRA manufacturers provide their own DRA correlations. When studying a
DRA operation, one of the following correlations can be used: AESOP [24], Burger
[25], Conoco or Simplified Conoco correlations [26]. They relate the effective friction
factor with the DRA concentration. The AESOP correlation has been recently devel-
oped by a joint consortium of academic and industrial bodies under European Union
funding.
Aesop: This is a correlation that requires data which is specific to the fluid in a
line.
f = fm ´ (1 – F)
where
f = effective friction factor
F = drag reduction factor
fm = model-calculated Moody friction factor
æ ACe ö
F = Bç
è 1 + ACe ÷ø
(
1 + C ×10 -5 NRe )
Ce = e -ld ppm
æ æ ppm ö ö
0.5
ç v * çè C ÷ø ÷
F = k1 * ln ç s ÷ +k
ç d 0.2 ÷ 2
ç ÷
è ø
where
k1 and k2 = Burger equation constants
v = local fluid velocity, ft/sec
ppm = DRA concentration, parts per million
Cs = fluid viscosity, centistokes
d = pipe diameter, ft
ppm
F=
(a * ppm + b)
where a and b are product-specific constants and ppm is DRA concentration in parts
per million. For full details of the Conoco CDR Correlation contact Conoco Speciality
Products, Inc. This DRA correlation is only active for velocities in excess of 0.6m/s
and Reynolds Number in excess of 7500.
Figure 9-23. D
RA concentrations and their effects (courtesy of Energy Solutions International
Inc.)
ppm
F=
( A * ppm + B)
where A and B are product-specific constants. The equation above is used directly with
the product-specific constants entered by the user.
Figure 9-23 shows a set of typical DRA effect curves for the Conoco, Burger, and
AESOP correlations. These curves can only be regarded as typical as the drag reduc-
tion effects depend on the pipeline dimensions, fluid properties and velocity as well as
the DRA properties themselves. Note that the DRA takes effect even when the DRA
concentration level is very low, less than 10 ppm, and that drag is not reduced signifi-
cantly even when the concentration keeps increasing beyond 30 ppm.
Crude oil and petroleum products, including light hydrocarbons, are likely to deliver
their products to/from tankage. These products are often stored in tanks in various
locations such as producing areas, refineries, petrochemical plants, and/or distribution
centers. Petroleum liquids are stored underground or in aboveground storage tanks.
Storage allows for flexible pipeline transportation and efficient transportation manage-
ment through the existing pipeline system and minimizes supply/delivery disruptions.
The stored liquids need to be measured and accounted for accurately in order to keep
track of all volume movements including custody transfer when required. Refer to
Chapter 8 for the detailed tank and tank farm design.
Oil and petroleum product pipelines lift their products from and deliver to tank
farms. A tank farm refers to a collection of tanks located at a refinery, shipping terminal
or pipeline terminal. A tank farm at a refining operation is used to store feedstock and
various products produced by the refinery and to hold them until they are scheduled for
injection into a pipeline for transportation. Similarly, tank farms at shipping terminals
hold products until a shipping route is scheduled. The shipping route may be via tanker
ship, truck, railcar, or another pipeline. Tank farm operation covers tank control, vol-
ume measurement and inventory.
A schematic for a typical tank farm is shown in Figure 9-24. On the left hand side,
distillate and gasoline tanks are separately connected to each set of valves, which in
turn are connected to a booster pump. The distillate or gasoline is lifted through the
dedicated booster pump into the mainline pumps. The lifted fluid passes through the
flow meter and in this case the meter prover before it reaches the mainline pumps.
Any alarm or warning messages related to tank or tank farm operation are listed at
the bottom of the SCADA screen, to which the operator can respond remotely. The
operator responses may include simply acknowledging the message or taking correc-
tive action.
·· Open the valve on the tank or header from which the batch is to be supplied.
·· Open the suction valves on the selected booster pumps.
Once the conditions to start are satisfied, the start sequence is initiated by opening
the bypass valve on the selected booster pump(s). After the flow through the bypass
line has stabilized, the valve in the discharge line is opened to direct the flow to the
main line pump suction through the meter designated for the batch.
·· The flow rate for the batch is metered and accumulated volumes are recorded.
·· Pumping of the leading batch would have been just completed prior to the in-
troduction of the new batch.
·· Close the booster pump discharge header valve to stop lifting the leading
batch.
·· Stop the booster pumps that were being used for pumping the leading batch.
Close the booster pump suction valves and tank valves.
·· Set the flow accumulator to zero at the start of the new batch.
because the flow rate upstream of the injection point has to be reduced if the down-
stream flow is maintained. The pressures in the upstream section have to be adjusted to
maintain the selected injection rate. It may be necessary to take off some pump units
and/or stations right after the partial injection starts. For a full stream injection, the
mainline valve just upstream of the injection point is closed and all pump stations are
shut down in the sections upstream of the injection point.
Figure 9-25 illustrates a side stream injection into the mainline at a pump station.
A booster pump takes a batch or fluid from a tank and pumps the fluid into the mainline
pump. The flow rate is measured before it is injected into the pump.
operation tankage is usually located in the middle of a pipeline, not at the lifting or delivery
terminal unless the terminal is connected to another pipeline system. The batch volume has
to be determined by providing flow accumulators on the flow meters.
In the above tank farm diagram, the incoming fluid can bypass the tank farm or
be stored in a tank. For example, a batch received from the mainline is stored in Tank
2 and the other batch in Tank 1 is injected into the mainline on the downstream side of
the tank farm.
9.4.1.6 Sump System
A sump system collects drainage from various sources such as pumps and pig traps,
and pumps them to other facilities when a sump tank is full. The system may include
a tank that collects any slop or off-spec liquids such as used lubricating oil of a pump.
Sump tanks are installed at pump stations and receiving/delivery points. When a sump
tank is getting full, the liquid in the tank is transported to a refinery or if acceptable can
be blended with other liquids being transported at the location.
to move the product. This ability helps avoid an error of lifting a product from or de-
livering to a wrong tank. This is important, as an error such as the injection of crude oil
into a refined product tank would be costly.
The tank control requires the tank information and several control variables. The
tank information for a tank farm includes product name, tank type (net or gross), tank
volume correction factor, maximum and minimum tank volumes, maximum and mini-
mum working level, and others. The tank volumes are normally measured in tank level,
which is converted into tank volume (see Chapter 7). The tank control variables are as
follows:
·· Flow rate: Flow rate into and out of a tank is calculated by dividing the net/
gross volume change by the elapsed time.
·· Volume-to-fill: The net/gross volume in the tank is subtracted from the maxi-
mum safe tank volume to calculate the volume-to-fill.
·· Volume-to-pump: The tank bottom volume is subtracted from the net/gross
volume to calculate the volume of liquid that can be pumped from the tank.
·· Time-to-fill/empty: The time to fill or empty the tank is calculated from the
current flow rate into or out of the tank, and the volume-to-fill or volume-to-
pump.
The above figure displays the information on the tank status, product in the
tank, tank volume and level, and other tank control data. The tank level should be
between the maximum and minimum levels, and the level gauge is used to control the
flow moved into or out of a tank. Tank level conversion to tank volume is discussed
below.
·· The tank data includes the tank ID, inventory date and time, shipper, product
name and gravity, temperature, tank gauge level, and roof loading value.
·· The host collects the tank data from each tank and stores them in the tank in-
ventory database.
The tank inventory volume is determined from the measured gauge level through
a multi-step process (API 2550 procedure):
·· The tank level gauge is converted to a gross volume using a volume conversion
table, which may be built by means of either increment or strapping table.
·· An increment table defines incremental volumes per number of level incre-
ments, while a strapping table defines levels with corresponding tank volume.
Linear interpolation is performed if the level is between two defined increments
or strapping table entries.
·· The volume of a tank with a floating roof has to be corrected by applying a cor-
rection factor to compensate for the effect of the floating roof weight.
·· Assuming that sediment and water (S&W) are on the bottom of the tank for
strapping purposes, a free water level is subtracted from the measured tank
level to obtain a true gross volume of product.
·· Gross volumes are converted to a net volume using the temperature and density
of the liquid in the tank.
·· First, the current API gravity is measured and corrected to base condition of
15°C.
·· Second, the temperature correction factor is calculated using the API equation
or API tables.
·· The temperature correction factor is multiplied by the gross volume to obtain
a net volume.
In general, the energy and payroll costs are the two highest in pipeline system opera-
tion, depending on the locations of pipelines. As the energy cost increases, the energy
cost control is even more important and pipeline companies should address the cost
issue. The purpose of the energy cost control is to minimize the energy cost and thus
pipeline system operating costs. Assuming that pumps are driven by electrical drivers,
power is mostly consumed by pumps and thus this section discusses the power cost
control in pump station operation.
Power cost can be reduced by controlling power demand at each pump station
run by electrical drivers. Power demand can be controlled by scheduling products or
batches properly and by minimizing the usage of power or energy. A proper schedule
includes such factors as product or batch lifting and delivery schedule, throughputs,
pumping order, etc.
The power cost can be minimized in four different ways; controlling power demand
based on the power contracts, monitoring and collecting pump unit operating statistics, op-
erating pump station and units at or near the best efficient point, and selecting an optimum
set of pump stations and their control pressure in the entire pipeline system.
These statistics are made available to the operator through the SCADA system.
They are determined at regular intervals and displayed on the SCADA screen along
with the efficiency at all pump stations. As a minimum, the following data may be
required for each pump unit:
Station efficiency for each station is calculated by dividing the calculated output
power by the measured input power. The output power can be obtained by multiplying
the flow rate with the differential pressure, which is the difference between the case
pressure and suction pressure.
When a pump unit start is initiated, the operator has to check if starting the unit
will violate the following constraints:
·· Exceed the on-peak or off-peak maximum station power specified in the con-
tract. This check is intended to reduce power cost.
·· Exceed the maximum number of times the unit is allowed to be started and the
minimum time required between starts. This check is intended to protect the
unit from overuse.
use these plots to operate pumps close to the BEP of the pumps. In addition, the ef-
ficiency can be trended to identify improper throttling operations or degradation of
pump unit efficiency. Such information can be used to determine the operator training
and equipment maintenance requirements and to re-rate the pump curves.
Figure 9-28 illustrates current operating point and historical trajectory of operat-
ing points superimposed on performance curves of a variable speed pump. It shows
how efficiently this pump is and has been operating for varying flow rates. Based on
this operating data, more efficient pump operating strategies can be developed. A simi-
lar trajectory can be plotted for fixed speed pumps to exhibit how efficiently throttling
actions have been taken.
·· Pump unit line-up and operating point, considering that a station may consist of
different pump units and that the units can be combined in various modes. The
operating points, overlaid on the pump performance curve, can be displayed on
the host SCADA screen.
·· Calculation of the overall pumping costs. When drag reducing agent (DRA)
is injected for a liquid pipeline operation, the cost without DRA is compared
against the cost with DRA.
In addition, some optimization systems may provide the following information for
analysis to help improve pipeline operation efficiency performed by operation staff:
The model employs the following data in addition to the pipeline configuration
and facility data:
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