EVIDENCE – a "means" of ascertaining the truth of a matter of fact [not in all types of proceedings but specifically in a "judicial proceeding.

"] (Sec. 1
of Rule 128 [Purpose of Evidence]).
– To be considered evidence, the same must be "sanctioned" or allowed by the Rules of Court. It is not evidence if it is excluded by law
or by the Rules even if it proves the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue. Thus, the following do not fall within the definition of
Sec. 1 of Rule 128:
a. a hearsay evidence,
b. a coerced extrajudicial confession of the accused and
c. an evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights
– Evidence is required because of the presumption that the court is not aware of the veracity of the facts involved in a case. It is therefore
incumbent upon the parties to prove a fact in issue thru the presentation of admissible evidence.
– the truth referred to in the definition is not necessarily the actual truth but one aptly referred to as the judicial or the legal truth [Truth
as the Purpose of Evidence]
EXAMPLE: For instance, while it may be the actual truth that it was Mr. X who shot Mr. Y, if the available evidence presented
and admitted in court points to Mr. Z as the culprit, then the judicial or legal truth is that it was Mr. Z, not Mr. X, who shot Mr. Y .
– Scope of the Rules of Evidence: guided by the principle of uniformity. As a general policy, the rules of evidence shall be the same in all
courts and in all trials and hearings (Sec. 2, Rule 128, Rules of Court).
When Evidence Not Required:
1. Where no factual issue exists in a case, there is no need to present evidence because where the case presents a question of law, such
question is resolved by the mere application of the relevant statutes or rules of this jurisdiction to which no evidence is required.
[In the Philippine judicial system, there is a mandatory judicial notice of the official acts of the legislature (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of
Court) and these acts cover statutes.]
2. When the pleadings in a civil case do not tender an issue of fact, a trial need not be conducted since there is no more reason to
present evidence. The case is then ripe for judicial determination through a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 34 of the Rules
of Court.
3. Evidence may be dispensed with by agreement of the parties. [Agreed statement of facts. — The parties to any action may agree, in
writing, upon the facts involved in the litigation, and submit the case for judgment on the facts agreed upon, without the introduction of
evidence. (Sec. 6, Rule 30, Rules of Court)]
4. Evidence is not also required on matters of judicial notice (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court) and on matters judicially admitted (Sec. 4,
Rule 129, Rules of Court).
Applicability of the Rules of Evidence – the Rules of Evidence applies only to judicial proceedings (Sec. 1, Rule 128, Rules of Court).
Rules of Evidence Not Applicable to the following:
1. Under Sec. 4 of Rule 1, Rules of Court:
a. Election Cases
b. Land Registration
c. Cadastral
d. Naturalization
e. Insolvency Proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for
2. administrative bodies (e.g. Civil Service Commission, NLRC, etc.)
NOTE: [T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of
procedure are not binding in labor cases [Clarion Printing House, Inc. u. National Labor Relations Commission (461 SCRA 272)].
“Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of
law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of
Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are
directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities
of law and procedure all in the interest of SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider
evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on
appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence." [Sasan, Sr. v. NLRC (G.R. No. 176240, October 17, 2008)]
It is not necessary for an affiant to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party on his
affidavit. Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law
[Bantolino v.
Coca Cola Bottlers, Inc., (403 SCRA 699)].
Even if not bound by the technical rules of procedure "the findings of facts of administrative bodies are however, respected as
long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant” (Avenido v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 177666, April 30, 2008).
Within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in
adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded
(Marcelo v. Bungubung, G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008).
best evidence rule – Original document must be produced (Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Application of the Rules on Electronic Evidence – applies to all civil actions and proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases
(Sec. 2, Rule 1 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence) [principle of uniformity – the rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials
and hearings (Sec. 2, Rule 128, Rules of Court) (except as otherwise provided by law or by these rules)]
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
the party having the burden of proof must prove his claim by a the guilt of the accused has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt
preponderance of evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court) (Sec. 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not Except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those
admissible in evidence against the offeror (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
Court) accused_may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt
(Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
GENERAL RULE: The concept of presumption of innocence DOES The accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence (Sec.
NOT APPLY (except in certain cases provided for by law). 14, Art. Ill, Constitution of the Philippines).
Example: A common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
negligent in case a passenger is injured in the course of his
transportation by the carrier (Art. 1756, Civil Code of the Philippines).

PROOF EVIDENCE
It is merely the probative effect of evidence and is the conviction or Evidence is the medium or means by which a fact is proved or
persuasion of the mind resulting from a consideration of the evidence disproved.
(29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, §2). ["Proof is not the evidence itself. There
is proof only because of evidence.]
Proof is the effect of evidence. without evidence there is no proof
Bare allegations unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
 proof (Domingo v. Robles, 453 SCRA 812).

Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus ("false in one thing, false in everything") – means that if the testimony of a witness on a material issue is willfully
false and given with an intention to deceive, the jury may disregard all the witness' testimony (Hargrave v. Stockloss, 127 N.J.L. 262, 21 A.2d
820, 823); not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence (People v. Batin, G.R. No. 177223, November 22,
2007).
– Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved
depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial (People v. Negosa, 456 Phil 861).
– Before this maxim can be applied, the witness must be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more material points. The
principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary to subsequent declarations in the testimony
(Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chiong, G.R. No. 155550, January 31, 2008).
– “The maxim falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus does not lay down a categorical test of credibility. While the witnesses may differ in
their recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily follow from their disagreements that all of them should be disbelieved as liars and
their testimonies completely discarded as worthless." [People v. Manalansan (189 SCRA 619)]
– It should not be applied to portions of the testimony corroborated by other evidence, particularly where the false portions could be
innocent mistakes. Moreover, the rule is not mandatory but merely sanctions a disregard of the testimony of a witness if the
circumstances so warrant. To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness on this ground, his testimony must have been false as
to a material point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify a material point." [People v. Pacapac
(248 SCRA 77)]

Alibi – as a defense, it is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive identification by truthful witnesses. It is evidence negative in nature
and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence (People
v. Larranaga, 463 SCRA 652).
– Positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and
categorical (People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 173308, June 25, 2008).
– In the face of positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness, such alibi crumbles like a sand fortress (People v. Vargas,
G.R. No. 122765, October 13, 2003; People v. Adam, 413 SCRA 293).
– For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must
likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission (People v. Coja, G.R. No. 179277, June 18, 2008).
– PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY: refers to the distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the place where he says he
was when the crime was committed [(People v. Nueva, G.R. No. 173248, November 3, 2008)]
– positive identification, made categorically and consistently, almost always prevails over alibi and denial (People v. Nueva, G.R. No.
173248, November 3, 2008)
– Alibi may serve as a basis for acquittal if it can really be shown by clear and convincing evidence that it was indeed physically
impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time (People v. Cacayan, G.R. No. 180499, July 9, 2008).
– For the defense of alibi to prosper, the following must be established :
(a) The presence of the accused in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and
(b) The physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People v. Larranaga, 463 SCRA 652).
[Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water (People v.
Castro, G.R. No. 172874, December 17, 2008).]
– While the defense of alibi is by nature a weak one, it assumes significance and strength where the evidence for the prosecution is also
intrinsically weak (People v. Canlas, 372 SCRA 401).
– Alibi is not always false and without merit (People v. Cacayan, G.R. No. 180499, July 9, 2008).
– It must be demonstrated that the person charged with the crime was not only somewhere else when the offense was committed, but was
so far away that it would have been physically impossible to have been at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. The reason is that no person can be in two places at the same time (People v. Baro, 383 SCRA 75; People v. Ubina, G.R.
No. 176349, July 10, 2007).
– Alibi is one of the weakest defenses due to its being capable of easy fabrication. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused as perpetrator of the crime. For an alibi to prevail, the defense must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it
was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the
accused was somewhere else. In the face of positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness, such alibi crumbles like a
sand fortress (People v. Vargas, G.R. No. 122765, October 13, 2003; People v. Adam, 413 SCRA 293).

Frame-up – Like alibi, frame-up is viewed with disfavor as it can easily be concocted and is commonly used as a defense in most prosecutions
arising from the violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed exists (People v.
Lee Hoi Ming, 412 SCRA 550; People v. Barita, 325 SCRA 22).
– For this to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials
have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner (People v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008).
– The rule requiring a claim of frame-up to be supported by clear and convincing evidence was never intended to shift to the accused the
burden of proof in a criminal case." The claim of frame-up assumes importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of the
prosecution evidence (Agustin v. People, G.R. No. 158788, April 30, 2008).

Self-defense – Like alibi, it is inherently weak because it can be easily fabricated (Rugas v. People, 419 SCRA 399).

Delay and Initial Reluctance in Reporting a Crime

 Delayed reporting by witnesses of what they know about a crime does not render their testimonies false or incredible, for the delay
may be explained by the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case. [inherent fear of
reprisal]
 The natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case, as well as to give information to the authorities is a matter of
judicial notice (People v. Navarro, 297 SCRA 331).
 Different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. A witness' delay in reporting what he knew about a crime does not render his
testimony false or incredible, for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case
(People v. Manalad, 387 SCRA 263).
 It is entirely possible for a rape victim to go through what psychologists describe as a " state of denial" which is a way of coping with the
overwhelming emotional stress of an extremely shocking event (People v. Maglente, G.R. No. 179712, June 27, 2008; People v. Mahinay,
G.R. No. 179190, January 20, 2009).
 It is also not uncommon that a rape victim will conceal for some time the assault against her person on account of fear of the threats
posed by her assailant (People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 177136, June 30, 2008) and must not be taken against the victim because the effect
of fear and intimidation instilled in the victim's mind cannot be measured against any given hard-and-fast rule such that it is viewed in
the context of the victim's perception and judgment not only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the time immediately
 thereafter (People v. Lantano, G.R. No. 176734, January 28, 2008). A rape victim is sometimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by
reason (People v. Montesa, G.R. No. 181899, November 27, 2008).
 Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case are sufficient explanations for a witness'
delay in reporting a crime to the authorities. Initial reluctance to volunteer information regarding a crime due to fear of reprisal is common
enough that it has been judicially declared as not affecting a witness' credibility. The reluctance of the witness to right away submit a
written statement to the police was natural and within the bounds of expected human behavior. Her action revealed a spontaneous and
natural reaction of a person who had yet to fully comprehend a shocking and traumatic event. Besides, the Court added, the workings of
the human mind are unpredictable. People react differently to emotional stress. There is simply no standard form of behavioral response
that can be expected from anyone when confronted with a strange, startling or frightful occurrence. [Ingal v. People (G.R. No. 173282,
March 4, 2008)]
 The rule is that delay by a witness in divulging what he or she knows about a crime is not by itself a setback to the evidentiary value of
such witness' testimony, where the delay is sufficiently justified by any acceptable explanation. Thus, a well-founded fear of reprisal or
the individual manner by which individuals react when confronted by a gruesome event as to place the viewer in a state of shock for
sometime, is a valid excuse for the temporary silence of witnesses. [People v. Sanidad (402 SCRA 381)]
 In a criminal action for rape for instance, a rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is this fear,
springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb
his victim into silence and submissiveness. Incestuous rape magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person normally expected
to give solace and protection to the victim. Furthermore, in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, proximity
magnifying the sense of helplessness and the degree of fear. In this case, the Court found that the delay was sufficiently explained by the
victim. The Court likewise found that when the victim was still a young child and already subjected to the revolting behavior of the
accused, the latter threatened her with physical harm should she divulge his misdeeds to anyone else. When she became pregnant, the
accused resorted to emotional blackmail by telling her that he would be imprisoned should she tell anyone about what he had been doing
to her. And when the wife of the accused wanted the latter to move out of their house because of his appalling conduct, the accused had
the audacity to confront the victim and her mother with the fact that he was the sole breadwinner of their family. It is therefore clear,
according to the Court, that the accused used every scheme he could think of to dissuade the family from going to the proper authorities.
But more than the appellant's actuations, the victim in her own words testified that she was discouraged by the public ridicule that she
expected to come her way. [People v. Ortoa (G.R. No. 176266, August 8, 2007)]
 Fear of reprisal or social humiliation are sufficient explanations. Moreover, Filipinas, especially those in the rural areas, are by nature shy
and coy, and rape stigmatizes the victim, not the perpetrator. XXX Delay is not a sign of fabrication. [People v. Satioquia (414 SCRA 60)]

Positive and Negative Defenses

 A positive testimony normally enjoys more weight than a negative testimony. In short, a testimony that a fact exists [positive testimony]
enjoys more weight than a testimony that asserts that the same fact does not exist [negative testimony ]. A denial evidence is merely a
negative evidence. – The reason for this rule is that the witness who testifies to a negative may have forgotten what actually occurred,
while it is impossible to remember what never existed (Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, February 6, 2007).
 A denial evidence is the weakest defense and can never overcome a positive testimony particularly when it comes from the mouth of a
credible witness (People v. Mendoza, 450 SCRA 328).
 Evidence that is negative is self-serving in nature and cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of witnesses who testify on
clear and positive evidence (People v. Larranaga, supra).
 Denial, like alibi is an inherently weak defense vis-a-vis positive identification (People v. Guambor, 420 SCRA 677; People v.
Guevarra, G.R. No. 182192, October 29, 2008; People v. Montesa, G.R. No. 181899, November 27, 2008).

2 FACTS: Factum Probans and Factum Probandum

Factum Probans Factum Probandum
the facts or material evidencing the fact or proposition to be the fact or proposition to be established
established
the probative or evidentiary fact tending to prove the fact in issue the fact to be proved; the fact which is in issue and to which the
evidence is directed.
Thus, if P claims to have been injured by the negligence of D who in a certain case may be affected by the judicial admissions of a party
denies having been negligent, the negligence of D and the causal EXAMPLE: if the defendant in a suit based on a culpa aquiliana theory
connection between such negligence, and the injuries of P taken as a admits his negligence in his answer to the complaint, there is no more
whole, constitute the factum probandum of the suit. The evidence need to prove negligence. Hence, negligence ceases to be a factum
offered by P, whether it be object, documentary or testimonial, probandum in the case.
constitute the materials to prove the liability of D. The totality of the the factum probandum in a civil case refers to the elements of a
evidence to prove the liability refers to the factum probans. cause of action from the point of view of the plaintiff and the elements
of the defense from the standpoint of the defendant
EXAMPLE:
In a suit for instance, for collection of a sum of money, in the absence
of any admission by the defendant, the factum probandum of the
plaintiff would be:
(i) the existence of the debt of the defendant;
(ii) the maturity of the debt;
(iii) the demand made by the plaintiff upon the defendant to
pay; and
(iv) the failure to pay despite the demand.
From the side of the defendant, the fact of payment of the obligation or
the prescription of the debt or the elements of any defense he may
interpose would constitute the factum probandum.

In every tort case filed under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove:
(a) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred (Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. v.
Tanjangco, G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008).

In a criminal case, the factum probandum includes all matters that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt in order to justify a
conviction.
(a) Thus, in a prosecution for robbery, the prosecution has the burden to prove the following matters beyond reasonable doubt: [ELEMENTS]
(i) that there be personal property belonging to another;
(ii) that there is unlawful taking of that property;
(iii) that the taking is with intent to gain; and
(iv) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things (Art. 293, Revised Penal Code; People v. Sandoval, 254 SCRA 436).
(b) To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosives , the factum probandum would be the two (2) essential elements
which must be indubitably established, viz:
(i) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the
testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and;
(ii) the negative fact that the accused had no license or permit to own or possess the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the
testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the
subject firearm or explosive.
Even if the firearm or explosive is presented in court, the failure of the prosecution to prove the absence of a permit to own or possess
the firearm or explosive is fatal to its cause. The essence of the crime penalized is primarily the lack of license or permit to carry or possess the
firearm, ammunition or explosive as possession by itself is not prohibited by law (People v. Cortez, 324 SCRA 335).
(c) In a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited or dangerous drugs , what determines if there was a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the
concurrence of all the elements of the offense. Conviction is proper if the following elements concur:
(i) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(ii) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor (People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347, October 17,2008).
What is material to the prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs is the proof that the sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti (People v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008).
In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused knowingly possessed
the prohibited articles in his person, or that animus possidendi (means the intent to posses a thing) is shown to be present together with his
possession or control of such article; animus possidendi is only prima facie — it is subject to contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that
the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so (People v. Penaflorida, Jr., ibid.).
Informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the
police (Ibid.).

Multiple Admissibility – refers to the instance when a proffered evidence is admissible for two or more purposes.
– An extrajudicial statement of a robbery suspect is not admissible against his co-accused under the res inter alios acta (provides that
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.) rule but may
be admissible against the declarant himself as an admission pursuant to Sec. 26 of Rule 130.
– It must be remembered that the purpose for which evidence is offered must be specified because such evidence may be admissible for
several purposes under the doctrine of multiple admissibility, or may be admissible for one purpose and not for another, otherwise the
adverse party cannot interpose the proper objection (Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda Construction and
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 126619, December 20, 2006).
– A private document may be offered and admitted in evidence both as documentary evidence and as object evidence depending on the
purpose for which the document is offered. If offered to prove its existence, condition or for any purpose other than the contents of a
document, the same is considered as an OBJECT EVIDENCE. When the private document is offered as proof of its contents, the
same is considered as a DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (Sec. 2, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

Res gestae (Latin for “things done” or “things transacted”)

To be part of the res gestae [an exception to the hearsay rule], the statement should have been made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior to or subsequent to such startling occurrence (Sec. 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
To be admissible as a dying declaration, the statement should have been made while the declarant was conscious of an impending death.

Bar 1991
Two (2) hours after Lt. Yap of the 2nd Air Division, PAF, at the Mactan Air Base in Lapu-Lapu City, was shot with a .45 caliber pistol, his
Division commander, Brig. Gen. A, visited him at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital in Cebu City where he was immediately brought before treatment of the
gunshot wound. Lt. Yap told A that it was Jose Comen who shot him. Forthwith, A, who is a law graduate, took the initiative of taking down in long
hand the statement of Lt. Yap. The latter narrated the events surrounding and categorically stated that it was Jose Comen who shot him. Lt. Yap
signed the statement in the presence of A and the attending nurse. Ten (10) days later, Lt. Yap died as a consequence of the gunshot wound. An
information for murder was filed against Jose Comen.
At the trial, the above statement of Lt. Yap marked as Exh. "X" was presented and identified by A who did not, however, testify that Lt. Yap
read it, or that it was read to him before he (Yap) signed it. A, nevertheless, testified that it was Jose Comen who shot him. The defense objected to
the testimony of A and to the admission of Exh. "X" on the ground that they are hearsay. The prosecution contended that both are exceptions to the
hearsay rule as they are part of res gestae. (a) Is the prosecution correct? (b) If the statement cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae, may it
be considered as a dying declaration?
Suggested answers:
(a) The prosecution is not correct. The statement of Lt. Yap is not part of the res gestae. To be part of the res gestae, the statement
should have been made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior to or subsequent to such startling occurrence
(Sec. 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court). The statement of Lt. Yap was made two (2) hours after he was allegedly shot, not neither while he was being
shot nor immediately prior to or immediately after being shot.
(b) The statement cannot be admitted as a dying declaration. To be admissible as a dying declaration, the statement should have
been made while the declarant was conscious of an impending death. The facts of the case do not clearly show that this essential element of a
dying declaration was met.

Bar 1984
When A was stabbed on the chest during a street brawl, he instinctively shouted for help. B, who was nearby, heard the shout and
immediately ran towards A who, upon inquiry by B, stated that C had stabbed him. If A should die on account of the stab wound, upon what rule or
rules of evidence could B's testimony be received? Explain.
Suggested answer:
The testimony could be admitted either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae. Assuming that A was under the consciousness of an
impending death when he stated that C had stabbed him, the declaration may be admitted as a dying declaration pursuant to Sec. 37 of Rule 130. If
the statement was made without such consciousness, it could be admissible as part of the res gestae under Sec. 42 of Rule 130, since the same
was made immediately after a startling event, i.e. the stabbing.

Conditional Admissibility – The proponent of the evidence may ask that the evidence be conditionally admitted in the meantime subject to the
condition that he is going to establish its relevancy and competency at a later time. If the connection is not shown as promised, the court may, upon
motion of the adverse party, strike out from the record the evidence that was previously conditionally admitted.

Curative Admissibility – The doctrine of curative admissibility allows a party to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to answer the opposing
party's previous introduction of inadmissible evidence if it would remove any unfair prejudice caused by the admission of the earlier inadmissible
evidence (Adams v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 865 S.W.2d 748, 751 [Mo. App. 1993]). The doctrine should not be invoked where evidence was
properly admitted. EXAMPLE:
In an action for damages arising from a car accident, the plaintiff, despite objection by the defendant, introduced evidence to show that on
several occasions the defendant in the past had injured pedestrians because of his negligence. The evidence was offered to prove the
defendant's propensity for negligence. Of course, under the rules, this kind of evidence is inadmissible because evidence that a person did a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or a similar thing (Sec. 34, Rule 130, Rules of Evidence). If we were to
follow the concept of curative admissibility, the court may be asked to give the party against whom the evidence was admitted the chance to
contradict or explain the alleged past acts he committed and to show evidence of past acts of diligence of the defendant to counteract the
prejudice which the improperly admitted evidence may have caused.

It is submitted that in our jurisdiction, the principle of curative admissibility should not be made to apply where the evidence was admitted without
objection because the failure to object constitutes a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence. In our jurisdiction, inadmissible evidence not
objected to becomes admissible. For instance, where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible (See SSS
Chemicals Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128538, February 28, 2001).

While a trial court generally has discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, it is opined that a trial court should be without discretion to
apply the doctrine of curative admissibility if it appears that the party seeking to invoke it intentionally or negligently failed to object to the
inadmissible evidence in order to gain admission later of his inadmissible evidence. If no limitations are placed on the doctrine of curative
admissibility, the doctrine will predictably be open to abuse and will encourage counsel not to object to inadmissible evidence to "open the door" for
him to introduce inadmissible evidence. The more logical rule should be one which will not allow a party to be heard through the offering of
inadmissible evidence if he declines or fails to timely object to the other party's inadmissible evidence.

Objections to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made and objections to questions propounded in the course of
the oral examination of the witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become apparent (Sec. 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

DIRECT EVIDENCE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (Indirect Evidence)

means evidence which if believed, proves the existence of a fact in that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference
issue without inference or presumption (State v. Mclure, Mo. App. 504 which the fact finder draws from the evidence established (People v.
S.W. 2d 664, 668 as cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. p.413- Matito, 423 SCRA 617).
414).
proves a fact without the need to make an inference from another fact the court uses a fact from which an assumption is drawn
EXAMPLE: EXAMPLE:
the testimony of the prosecution witness claiming that he personally The testimony of the victim that he dreads the mere presence of the
witnessed the attack by the accused on the victim without the latter's accused is direct evidence that the statement was made. However, it
provocation is also circumstantial evidence to show that this fear prevented the
victim from attacking the accused without provocation.
Direct evidence is not indispensable to prove a crime charged. It may not a weaker defense vis-a-vis direct evidence (People v. Matito, 423
be proved by circumstantial evidence (People v. Darilay, 421 SCRA SCRA 617). [In both types of evidence what is required is proof
45). beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Bernal, 388 SCRA 211).]

Conviction by Circumstantial Evidence

I. In criminal cases, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction provided the following requisites concur:
a. There is more than one circumstance;
b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction, beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 4, Rule 133, Rules
of Court; People v. Sevilleno, 425 SCRA 247; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 174479, June 17, 2008).
II. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, and they are to be taken together as proved. Being consistent
with each other, and, taken together, they must point unerringly to the direction of guilt and mere suspicions, probabilities, or
suppositions do not warrant a conviction (Underhill, Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., §18; People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 172326, January
19, 2009).
Bar 1998
A was accused of having raped X. Rule on the admissibility of the following pieces of evidence:
1. xx x
2. A pair of short pants allegedly left by A at the crime scene xxx .
Suggested answer:
The evidence may be admissible as a circumstantial evidence of his liability although not sufficient in itself
to support a conviction.
III. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence. Hence if the
totality of the circumstances eliminates beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of innocence, conviction is proper (Mallari v. People,
446 SCRA 74).
Circumstantial evidence may be a basis for conviction and such conviction can be upheld provided the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused to the exclusion of all
others as the guilty person. Direct evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw the conclusions and findings of
fact (People v. Bernal, 388 SCRA 211).
IV. Even carnal knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the victim was
unconscious and the accused was found guilty on the basis of circumstantial evidence (People v. Coja, G.R. No. 179277, June 18,
2008).
V. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence. Crimes are usually committed in
secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the
prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be impossible to prove (People v.
Sevilleno, 425 SCRA 247).
VI. The Supreme Court in People v. Corpuz, held that where the evidence admits of two interpretations one of which is consistent with
guilt and the other with innocence, the accused must be acquitted (People v. Corpuz, 412 SCRA 479).
EQUIPOISE RULE – The application of the rule is triggered by a situation where the court is faced with conflicting versions of the
prosecution and the defense and where the evidence, facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt. This situation cannot fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
– "The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption
of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused" (People v. Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348, November 26, 2008).

"At the outset, it may be well to emphasize that direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a
conviction. Indeed, rules on evidence and principles in jurisprudence have long recognized that the accused may be convicted through
circumstantial evidence. 38/571