University of Delhi

Sri Venkateshwara College

ASSIGNMENT

Q: What were the main features of the Iqta System? Discuss its role vis a vis the ulema in state
administration of Delhi Sultanate.

Submitted By: Angel Choudhary

Course: B.A (H) History

Year: II

Roll No.-0623038
 I
As taxation came to appropriate a sizeable part of the peasant's surplus in countries of the
Islamic world, a mechanism had simultaneously to be devised to collect this from the
peasantry and distribute it among the members of the ruling class. The crucial element in this
mechanism was the iqta, through which were combined the two functions of collection and
distribution but without immediately endangering the unity of the political structure. The iqta
was a territorial assignment and its holder was designated muqti. Muqtis who hold iqta had
no claim on the subjects other than that of collecting from them in a proper manner the due
mil [tax, land tax] that has been assigned to them. When the revenue has been realised from
them, those subjects/peasants remained secure from them in respect of their persons, wealth,
wives and children, cultivated lands and goods.1 The Muqtis did not not have any [further]
claims on them. If any muqti did anything other than this, the kings could take away his
power and resume his iqta and visit their wrath on him, so that others might be warned
thereby. They should in truth realise that the country and peasantry all belonged to the Sultan,
with the muqti placed at their head. Nizamul Mulk here emphasized an important element in
the iqta, viz. the muqti’ s right to collect and appropriate taxes, especially land revenue, due
to the king, during the latter's pleasure. The iqta, however, also implied, in return, certain
obligations on the part of the muqti to the sultan, the major one being to maintain troops and
furnish them at call to the sultan. The revenues appropriated from the iqta were thus meant to
provide him with resources wherewith to fulfil this obligation. The muqti was thus tax
collector, and army paymaster (also commander), rolled into one. The area that the sultan did
not give in iqtas was called Khalisa; here the sultan's officials collected taxes directly for the
royal treasury. When the Ghorians conquered northern India, the conquests were initially
divided up among commanders who maintained themselves and their troops by plunder and
collection of tribute. Yet, so familiar was the practice of iqta assignments to the conquerors
that the commanders were designated muqtis, and their territorial jurisdictions were called
iqtas. Gradual process seems to have begun that ultimately converted what were autonomous
principalities into real iqta's. First of all, the sultans from Iltutmish onwards enforced the
practice of transferring muqtis from one iqta to another. The muqtis were clearly required to
furnish military assistance at the summons of the sultan; but in the earlier period at least. The
muqti also seems to have been free to sub-assign small iqtas to anyone he chose, from within
his own larger iqta; he also probably normally paid his troops by this means. The sultans
sought to enlarge their own Khalisa. Apparently, Delhi itself together with its surrounding
district, including parts of the Doab, was in the sultan's khalisa. A later tradition related that
Iltutmish paid cavalry soldiers of his own 'central' army (qalb), 2,000 or 3,000 in number, by
assigning them villages, which came to be called iqtas (paralleling similar sub-assignments
by muqtis. The expenditure on the troops the muqtis were expected to maintain. Sultan
Balban's appointment of a khwaja (accountant) along with the muqti'1 suggests perhaps that
the sultan's government was now trying to discover what was actually collected and spent
within the iqta.2

1
Irfan, Habib: THE CAMBRIDG ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA; Edited by Irfan Habib and Tapan Raychaudhuri
Volume, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2: c. \151-c. 1970, Ch3, Pg 68
2
Irfan, Habib: THE CAMBRIDG ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA; Edited by Irfan Habib and Tapan Raychaudhuri
Volume, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2: c. \151-c. 1970, Ch 3, Pg70
Major changes occurred during the reign of Allauddin Khalji (1296-1316) like imposing the
full land tax on the peasantry of the older territories. This immense enlargement in resources
of the ruling class was accompanied by a number of important measures affecting iqta
organization. As more distant areas became subject to the empire and were assigned in iqta,
areas nearer the capital were annexed to the Khalisa. It now covered the whole of the middle
Doab and parts of modern Rohilkhand. The system of paying the sultan's own cavalry troops
by assignment of villages as iqtas was abolished. The entire revenue of the khalisa was
brought into the treasury, and the soldiers were paid in cash. This system continued without
change until the end of the reign of Muhammad Tughluq (1351). Alauddin Khalji maintained
the practice of assigning iqtas to his commanders. What was new was the extent of the
intervention of the sultan's bureaucracy in the administration of the iqta.3 Alauddin Khalji
decreed the new system of assessment and collection of agrarian taxes in a large region, the
bulk of which, as Barani himself shows, was under muqtis measures taken by Ghiyasuddln
Tughluq (1320-5). The tax income (kharaj) from each iqta was estimated at a particular figure
by the Finance Department. The department remained on constant look-out for an
opportunity to enhance this estimate. Out of the estimated income of the iqta certain amount
was allowed for the pay (mawajib) of the troops (hasham) placed under the muqti' or wait.
The area expected to yield this amount was apparently set apart by the Diwan. The remainder
was treated as the muqtis own personal iqta, i.e. for his own salary and the expense of his
personal establishment of officials. He had to pay into the treasury all realization above the
amount allowed for the pay of the army and for his own income. The muqti's were naturally
tempted to conceal their true receipts, and so understate the excess payable by them to the
sultan. At the same time in order to maximize their collections, the muqti's were anxious to
control the embezzlement by officials of their iqtas. Thus, while the sultan's government was
intent on preventing concealment and defalcation by the muqtis, the latter harboured similar
suspicions against their own subordinates. Harsh measures, including imprisonment and
physical torture, were taken as part of audit at both levels. Barani says that' Alauddin Khalji's
minister Sharaf Qai had the papers of the village accountants (patwaris) audited in order to
check fraud; revenue officials were kept by him for long years in chains and subjected to
torture for small misappropriations of audit. Ghiyasuddin Tughluq had no radical changes to
introduce in this system, except to propound moderation. The Finance Department was not to
increase the estimate of income by over one-tenth or one eleventh annually, since the burden
of any such enhancement could be passed on by the muqti' to the peasantry. No harshness
was to be shown to muqti's who took anything from one-tenth to one-twentieth of the kharaj
in excess of their sanctioned income. No muqti' was, however, to be allowed to take anything
from the portion of the iqta reserved for the payment of the troops. Similarly, the muqti's were
warned no to ill-treat any of their officials for small amounts, taken over and above their
salaries.4

Under Muhammad Tughluq, there was a further extension of the control of the sultan's
government. The two functions of collecting taxes and maintaining the troops now began to
be separated. It is possible that the separation arose primarily out of a desire to obtain larger
3
Irfan, Habib: THE CAMBRIDG ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA; Edited by Irfan Habib and Tapan Raychaudhuri
Volume, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2: c. \151-c. 1970, Ch3, Pg 71
4
Irfan, Habib: THE CAMBRIDG ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA; Edited by Irfan Habib and Tapan Raychaudhuri
Volume, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2: c. \151-c. 1970, Ch3, Pg 72
income. Ibn Battuta, in his account of the hazar of Amroha, tells us how in fact such dual
administration operated. The hazar of Amroha, he says, had a wait al-khardj, Arabic form for
'the wait of the kharaj (revenue)'. He elsewhere calls him simply 'wall', the usual synonym of
muqti'. The wall ('Aziz Khammar) had 1,500 villages under his charge, yielding an
(estimated) revenue of 6 million (tankas), whereof the wait took just one-twentieth for his
own pay, and the rest was paid into the treasury. It was out of this amount that 'Aziz
Khammar was called upon to send large quantities of grain to Delhi. Side by side there was
an amir (military commander) of the same territory: he was in command of the troops, an
advantage he drove home during a quarrel with 'Aziz, when he besieged the latter in his
house with his troops. Presumably, the amir's troops used to claim money for their pay from
the wait, for the wali complained that a slave of the amir had seized some money from his
treasury. Masdlik al-Absdr, a description of the iqta system as it functioned under
Muhammad Tughluq. It says that all army commanders, from khans heading 10,000 cavalry
troops to isfahlar (sipahsalars), placed over less than a hundred, were assigned iqtas in lieu of
their salaries. The estimated income of the iqta, against which the salary was adjusted, was
always less than the actual. The significant point is that the troops are said to have been
always paid in cash by the treasury and that the iqtas were given only in lieu of the
commanders' personal salaries. This would mean in effect that the apportionment of the iqta
reserved for the soldiery under the Khaljis and Ghiyasuddin Tughluq was now taken out of
the commander's hands altogether; only the part sufficient to yield his own salary was left to
him as his iqta. It is possible that Muhammad Tughluq's difficulties with his army officers -
called amirdn-i sada (' centurians') - had their roots in, among other things, the arrangements
whereby the commanders were deprived of the gains of iqta management. Barani himself
ascribes conflict with the amirdn-i sada in the Deogir (Daulatabad) region to the new
arrangements for revenue collection there. Firuz Tughluq's accession took place amidst a
severe political crisis; and he began his reign by promising concessions to the nobility.5

He decreed that there should be a new estimate of the revenues (mahsiil) of the sultanate; and
within four years this was prepared, the total amounting to 67,500,000 or 68,500,000 tankas.
The figure was designated jama' (a term used for the first time); and no change was made in it
for the remainder of the reign of the sultan. The fixity of the jama' meant that the muqti's
would not be troubled on account of enhancements in the payments due from them to the
treasury. The auditing of their accounts at the court now became a comfortable and even
pleasant business for the muqtis. Firuz also increased the personal pay of his great nobles:
whereas the highest personal pay of nobles under Muhammad Tughluq was 200,000 tankas.
Firuz gave to his khans and maliks, for their personal income alone, the pay of 400,000,
600,000 or 800,000 tankas, reaching in the case of his vizier 1,300,000 tankas. In lieu of this
they obtained separate iqtas and parganas'. It is to be assumed from 'Afif s language that
technically the portion of the iqta assigned for the personal pay of the muqti' remained
separate from that assigned for his troops; but in the absence of any mechanism of control the
separation seems to have become increasingly nominal. In general, Firuz Tughluq's policy
was to assign away lands in iqtas;

5
Irfan, Habib: THE CAMBRIDG ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA; Edited by Irfan Habib and Tapan Raychaudhuri
Volume, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2: c. \151-c. 1970, Ch3, Pg 75
'By an inspiration from God, he distributed the revenues (mahsiil) of the empire among the
people even (all) the parganas and iqtas were distributed. ' One should infer from this that
the khalisa was greatly reduced. Within such of it as remained he re-established the system of
paying soldiers by assigning them the revenues of villages as wajh (a new term) in lieu of
their salaries (mawajib). Soldiers who were not assigned wajh, were paid their salaries in cash
from the treasury, or byway of drafts on the iqtas of the nobles, to be adjusted against the
payments of 'excess' due from them to the treasury. Afif says that in such cases the soldiers
received only half of their claim from the iqtas; and it was common for them to sell their
drafts to speculators for a third of the pay; the buyers of the paper then went to the iqtas
where they apparently received only half of the amount due. The reign of Firuz Tughluq was
also remarkable for the regard paid to the hereditary principle. No restoration of central
control of earlier times was possible under the successors of Firuz Mubarak Shah in 1422
gave the iqta of Lahore to a noble with 2,000 cavalries placed under him. Here, then, the iqta
still carried some obligation to maintain troops. Cases of transfer of iqtas also occurred.
But these appear to have been exceptions. Under the Lodhis (1451-15 26), the system
remained essentially similar, but a reorganization occurred. The term iqta now disappears
from view, replaced simply by sarkars and parganas. These were territorial divisions, each
sarkar comprising a number of parganas. The term sarkar seems to have originated from its
use to represent a noble's 'establishment'. A group of parganas placed under the sarkar of a
noble (and thus in older terminology, his iqta) would be called, first, his sarkar, and, then
simply, a sarkar. Each sarkar was assigned a jama', or estimated revenue, whose purpose
could only be to lay down, to some extent, the military and other obligations of the noble
holding the sarkar-assignment. Sikandar was reputed to have refused to claim the balance if
an assignee's income increased beyond the officially sanctioned. The principal assignees used
to sub-assign portions of their territories, or parganas, to their subordinates who, again, paid
their soldiers by the same means. In spite of the weaknesses of central control in the Lodi
regime, the essential elements of the old iqtas would appear to have been retained and to have
been bequeathed to the Mughals who constructed on their basis their elaborate system
jagirdars.
 II
In the early 13th century, the Ulamas had considerable social influence in north India ulamas
were a group of individuals who were learnt in religious sciences besides the ulama there
existed Ahl I Kalam called the people of the pen that included secretaries, accountants etc.
The terms ulama and ahl i kalam they did not define a social or occupational group , rather
individuals who possessed qualities of piety and learning that differentiated them from the
rest of the Muslim community even though they were provided with the status of ulama but
still they were not separated from military activity, for example Iltutmish wazir nizam ul
Mulk Junedi was involved in financial and secretarial duties besides leading the royal
offices ,the learned people of the ulema themselves advised their followers that they need to
be constantly armed and being able to defend themselves. The ulema and Ahl I kalam won
the public acclaim because they had knowledge of religious sciences and law, they had
mastery of epistolary traditions and they had training in accountancy. The knowledge that one
needed in order to become an ulema consisted that of Quran, hadiths, the exegetical literature
and rules of legal deduction that were a part of the learning the ulema they were ranked after
the profit. The following excerpt comes from Fakhr I Muddabbir:6
“Religiosity Indeed the world flourished because of the version of their learning unpretty and
the injunctions of the Sharia and the worship entrusted to them”.
The education of the ulama was a difficult exercise that was achieved with many years of
discipleship with a lot of mentors where they mastered one text at a time and they travelled
from one centre of learning to another. Most of the Ahl I Kalam did not have that vigorous
training in religious sciences rather their education was more exclusive in-house affair where
they would be taught by the people in their house that usually meant that they belonged to the
families of that particular religious science, this was especially true if a particular subject that
they were specialising in was not available for teaching in a local mosque or madrasa. In the
early 13th century north India it was very difficult to identify and alim well read in religiosity
and pity as there were no madrasa infrastructures that was available at that time ,as a result
the alim had to gain reputation as a lone man via his work belonging to a family that was
already known for their knowledge of religious sciences ,by his ability to read the text and
make the other people understand what he had mastered over the years or his ability to guide
the Muslims on the matters concerning faith and this process of social esteem was gained
through adab or model conduct particularly a learning of law and theology not shared by the
rest of the Muslim community . Often the scenario was different for the ulema of the big and
larger centres as compared to the smaller centres as the ones belonging to the latter category
received less distinguished schooling but the ulema of these small communities had better
associations with the local communities where the individual that was recognised as alim
fulfilling diverse functions of the teacher, religious expert, adjudicator concerning rituals of
Muslims. Many of these rituals’ specialists in the urban centres the chosen by the local
community and the Delhi Sultan acknowledged their appointment. According to these
individuals, the ulema was relatively independent and hence a lot of attention from a
historical perspective have been given to their relationship with the ruling elite as besides
being religious specialists they were also involved in Commerce and Industry. Prominent
example is that of juzjani from Tabaqat- i-Nasiri who was involved in silk trade. The ulama
6
Sunil, Kumar: The ‘Ulama’ and the Emergence of Delhi as the Sanctuary and Axis of Islam in North India,
Pg212
was inclined towards the slave trade as well, it involved numerous profits and Nizamuddin
Auliya narrated the story of a Sufi from Bihar who after increasing his initial capital with
trade was advised to trade in slaves since they fetched even higher profit.
Since the involvement of the ulama in the trade is very casually discussed in the texts of the
13th and 14th century it goes against the historical formula of Khalik Nizami that the ulema
allied with the Delhi Sultanate because they pinned for wealth and worldly prestige and did
not hesitate in compromising their conscience even if it’s served their purpose. Since the
ulama was relatively independent and they could engage in trade and other professions
without much scrutiny from the king, therefore their association with the Delhi sultanate must
have been much more than their aim to gain more wealth as they could sufficiently afford to
do that on their own. The analysis also presumes that the Delhi Sultan was happy to recruit
the nobles who wanted his service the most but that was not at all the case with Iltutmish who
was very careful with the dispension of privileges and honours to individuals. When he did
give his favour, it was very much to the individuals that he wanted to use in consolidating his
authority thus Ulama recruitment was part of a deliberate policy of enrolling strategically
important personnel. Iltutmish favouring and patronising the ulama and Ahil-i- kalam was
notable because previously most of them had taken patronage with his competitors in ghazni.
It was only after the final defeat and death of Qubacha that this balance of power has shifted
in favour of Delhi that a larger migration of ulama and ahl-i-kalam is noticeable into the
Delhi sultanate. In his patronage to the ulama Iltutmish favoured the Sunni scripture tradition
but he also supported scholars who belong to both the Hanafi and the Shafie schools of
theology and legal interpretation. This attraction of Iltutmish opened gates of the Shafi and
the Hanafi ulama to migrate in the contextual background of the Mongol invasions in the land
of Afghanistan, Khwarazm and eastern Iran because the instability in these lands was marked
in quite a contrast to the stability of Delhi Sultanate that was emerging in northern India at
the time thus providing a relatively safe haven for the ulama in north India. 7
Scholars like nizam al din the stressed upon the need of altruistic and piece individuals be
given positions of guides and teachers because that would be for the ultimate benefit of the
Muslim community because services as a Qazi, imam etc entail undertaking important social
responsibilities. Self-serving worldly ulama should not receive appointments from the Delhi
sultanate, instead these posts of public significance should be reserved for the individuals of
unquestioned piety. Even in providing the positions in ulama, there existed an element of
hierarchy among the posts of mudarris, Qazi and Shaikh-al-Islam; which were in an order of
ascendence. Different posts occupied by different ulama meant differences in salaries,
responsibilities, the extent of influence and patronage that was available to these individuals.
The location of the incumbent’s service became the most important in in determining the
significance of the position. Juzjani’s movement to Delhi from Gwalior, for example, marked
a definite improvement in his career in spite of the fact that whether the ulama was appointed
by the Delhi Sultan, his ministers or the local urban community his responsibilities for similar
as depicted in the Sharia or their decisions concerning legitimate conduct of Muslims. The
respective ulama differed only in terms of the extent of the influence that they possessed.
Thus, it can be said that the Alim of a Qasba or a shehar theoretically performed the same
tasks in a local community as the Qazi of Delhi but a smaller body of people recognised his
authority and he lacked the moral force to enforce his unpopular decisions, for example the
7
Sunil, Kumar: The ‘Ulama’ and the Emergence of Delhi as the Sanctuary and Axis of Islam in North India,pg213
Qazi of Ajudhan wanted to declare illegitimate Baba Farid’s practice of performing sama in
the local mosque but he was unable to take any action against the popular Sufi Saint and thus
had to seek the support of the Ulama of Multan but since the Chishti Saints started as a Sufi
Saint was very popular, the ulama of Multan declined his request against Baba Farid that was
in contrast to the actions of the ulama of Delhi who was far more forthright in their intent to
curb any practices that they felt were contrary to the Sharia . 8It can be said that the ability of
the ulama of Delhi to take a more aggressive action against the conduct was because they
believed was to be against the Sharia came in part for their confidence in their own eminence
but at the same time, they had the full support of Sultan that also influenced their decision
making in a very positive manner. The Delhi Sultan in turn shared the Ulama’s concern
regarding the imposition of Sharia in his domain.
As an integral part of Iltutmish’s programme of political paramount was to project himself in
the self-image where the Sultan appeared in the dual role of a conqueror and the protector of
the holy law. This self-image was publicly proclaimed by his constructions and could hardly
be missed by the local Muslims as he constructed mosques. idgah that the local Muslim
community would constantly use for their visual worship celebrating festivals and communal
service. The extant inscriptional record of the Sultan in his monuments in Delhi, Ajmer etc
bears out the seriousness of the extent to which Iltutmish was willing to go to his image as the
protector of the Sharia and the guide of the Muslim community in north India. In his
epigraphs, they took for granted the indivisibility of the Muslim community and focused on
the believer’s personal and social conduct as evidence of his submission to his confession.
The hadith inscribed on the surface of the mihrab seen in the Delhi’s JAMA Masjid brought
out the prophet’s emphasis upon the performance of congregational prayers and its benefits,
similarly on the second floor of the minar in Delhi’s JAMA Masjid sura 62 :9 -10 from Quran
preached the importance of performing the obligatory rituals of prayer in the midst of one’s
daily activity. Most likely that the gist of the content of these Quranic and other religious
statements in the mosque were conveyed in the congregation in the ceremony of the inam the
khati the muntazir etc.
Incidentally, goals of both the ulama and the Delhi Sultan placed an equal emphasis upon the
primacy of the injunctions of the Sharia in the lives of the Muslim community. Textual
evidence does lack the way in which Iltutmish would have liked the ulama to enforce
conformity of belief and action according to the sharia but numerous stray references indicate
that he was an individual whose specific function poster guide the conduct of Muslims in his
area of jurisdiction, interact with the Pious and scrutinise their texts and teachings. He was
not necessarily an appointee of the Sultan, a lot of times like in the case of suhura wardi saint
Baha al-din Zakariya, Pious and influential individuals were sometimes given the
responsibility by the local Muslim community. The variations in his duties and functions
were influenced by the individual Sheikh al Islam’s own inclinations, his competence as a
scholar, his prestige and the degree of support he obtained from the local community and the
immediate political authority so it can be said that the function of shaikh al Islam in the reign
of Iltutmish does not seem to have been different from that of its Ghurid predecessor. Variety
of reports and accounts have recorded the activities of Sheikh al Islam of Delhi Sultan’s reign

8
Sunil, Kumar: The ‘Ulama’ and the Emergence of Delhi as the Sanctuary and Axis of Islam in North India, Pg
216
and interestingly enough they all emphasise upon his role as a guide and adjudicator of the
conduct of Muslims.
Which is not clear whether the examples of supervision of the conduct of Sheikh al Islam
versus restricted to Delhi or reflected the wider effort to discipline and punish the regions
under Iltutmish’s reign there were reports of conflict between the ulama and the Sufi peers
over the validity of the mystical practices like sama, racqz and namaz. This evidence seems to
suggest that the Sufi is in particular felt the brunt of the prosecution of Iltutmish.
Although Iltutmish was the supreme perpetuator of the Sharia laws in Delhi but still he
escaped criticism in the Sufi literature because he was never directly involved in the regulator
functions of the Qazi or the shaikh Al Islam, once a Sharia minded individual with the
appropriate degree of learning or social support had been chosen, he functioned according to
his own consciousness. The Sultan only intervened to curb excesses it does meant that the
Sultan had to be very careful while choosing the Qazi or Shaikh al Islam and maintaining a
distance from them would allow him to escape the brunt that they may face on a variety of
unpopular decisions thus simultaneously gaining the legitimacy of the ulama as well as not
getting criticism from the common public as the Sultan was never made responsible for the
decisions of the jurists or the sensors. Iltutmish had a relatively difficult position in
regulating the conduct of his subjects because beyond a certain point he could not intervene
in the regulation process , his authority was circumcised because he could not function as a
legislator or interpreter of the Sharia but also by choice he had constructed a political system
that derived its stability by maintaining the distance from the subject Muslim population and
also besides the fact that the ulama and the Sharia minded Sufis commanded the respect of
the subject there were also one group of people who could legitimately guide incorrect the
actions and beliefs of ordinary Muslims, thus Iltutmish wanted to tap on the authoritative
status within the masses and through them span the divide between the rulers and the ruled
rather than subvert or manipulate them, he lent the pious his support but this support was not
indiscriminate, Iltutmish in fact did not encourage the charismatic Sufis who had the potential
to command large followings and later emerged as a threat , in contrast the ulama did not
make any disciples , commended respect as individuals learned in religious sciences and
guided Muslims in their endeavour to follow the teachings contained in the Qur’anic
revolution.
Ideally ulama was the specific group that could help Iltutmish in his goal of promoting social
and political stability within his newly conquered domains by creating a sense of a
homogeneous Muslim community bound by the dictates of Sharia, thus the search for
political and social stability in the north Indian units turned Iltutmish and the Sharia minded
ulama into a sort of a collaboration.9 Support to Iltutmish was forthcoming because of the
Holocaust Genghis Khan had inflicted upon the Islamic civilization as well as the fury of the
Mongolian visions coincided with the establishment of the Delhi sultanate, the pious saw the
Delhi Sultan as the final hope for the protection of their community and from the mid-13 th
century onwards only the domains of the Delhi Sultan were left as the only source of
sanctuary for ulama in north India, thus we can say that the goals of both the ulama and
Iltutmish coincided concerning Delhi’s role in north India. For Iltutmish the goal was to of
north India could be integrated into a larger comprehensive community which could be
9
Sunil ,Kumar: The ‘Ulama’ and the Emergence of Delhi as the Sanctuary and Axis of Islam in North India, Pg
220
guided by the Sharia. There were a lot of achievements of the Sharia minded individuals
during the reign of Iltutmish they had a lot of success in introducing norms that put supervise
the conduct of Muslims they could take credit for ensuring that no Sufi in Iltutmish is rain
succeeded in establishing a charismatic position in Delhi South except Nizamuddin Auliya in
the early 14th century. In the middle of the 13th century Iltutmish was able to consolidate his
position in the urban centres of north India and a a major amount of credit goes to the ulama
as their association with the Delhi South in it enabled him to consolidate his new domains. 10

10
Sunil, Kumar: The ‘Ulama’ and the Emergence of Delhi as the Sanctuary and Axis of Islam in North India, Pg
228
 Conclusion
The Iqta system played a central role in the administration and military organization of the
Delhi Sultanate. It was more than just a way to collect revenue it was a practical solution that
tied together the financial needs of the state with its military responsibilities. By assigning
territorial units to nobles (muqtis), the Sultanate ensured that these officials would collect
taxes and, in return, maintain troops for the Sultans service. Over time, especially under
rulers like Alauddin Khalji and Muhammad Tughluq, the system became more regulated and
bureaucratic, with greater attempts by the central government to monitor and control the
income and activities of the muqtis. These changes reflected the Sultanates ongoing efforts to
centralize power and prevent regional fragmentation, even though complete control was often
difficult to maintain.

Alongside the iqta system, the ulema (religious scholars) also played a key role in the
political and social structure of the Delhi Sultanate. Far from being passive religious figures,
the ulema were actively involved in administration, law, and even commerce. Their deep
knowledge of Islamic theology and law made them important allies for the Sultans,
particularly during the reign of Iltutmish, who strategically used their influence to strengthen
his authority and promote stability in his newly conquered territories. The ulema were also
respected by the broader Muslim community, which allowed them to act as intermediaries
between the state and the people. Their support helped the Sultanate promote the Sharia as a
unifying code of conduct, thereby reinforcing both religious and political legitimacy.

In essence, both the iqta system and the involvement of the ulema were crucial in shaping the
nature of governance in the Delhi Sultanate. The iqta system allowed the Sultanate to sustain
its army and expand its control, while the ulema helped create a shared religious identity that
supported the political goals of the state. Together, they contributed to the consolidation of
the Sultanate's power and the development of a more structured and stable Islamic rule in
North India during the 13th to 15th centuries.
 Bibliography

1.Habib, Irfan: THE CAMBRIDG ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA; Edited by Irfan