conditions-precedent-and-time-bars-getting-around-them
conditions-precedent-and-time-bars-getting-around-them
SUMMARY
When a party fails to comply with a condition precedent, especially if such a provision includes a
time limit for the fulfilment of the obligation, it will often advance various arguments to avoid the
consequences of non-compliance. The case of of ISG Retail Ltd v FK Construction Ltd [2024] EWHC
878 (TCC) is an interesting example of the issues that may arise in this scenario. In this Insight, Shy
Jackson and Yorkie Fong take a closer look at this case.
It is always important to recognise any contractual conditions precedent. When a party fails to
comply with such conditions, especially if they include a time limit, it will often advance various
arguments to avoid the consequence of non-compliance. ISG Retail Ltd v FK Construction Ltd
[2024] EWHC 878 (TCC) is a recent example of the issues that come up when interpreting such
clauses and the difficulties that non-compliance will give rise to, especially when trying to rely on
waiver and estoppel arguments.
THE ADJUDICATION
ISG Retail Ltd, as the main contractor, engaged FK Construction Ltd as a sub-contractor for roofing
and cladding works on industrial units in Bristol in September 2021.
The sub-contract was a bespoke form of contract and clause 9(5) stated that FK was entitled to an
extension of time (EoT) if delays occurred due to specified events, “provided that the SubContractor
has given written notice to ISG of the circumstance or occurrence which is delaying him and details
of the effects or likely effects of such delay with a best estimate of the continuing extent of such
delay and its impact on practical completion of the Works and/or the relevant section within
fourteen days of such circumstance or occurrence first occurring”.
FK generally notified ISG of delays on site through Early Warning Notices (“EWNs”), issuing 106
EWNs from September 2021 to April 2022. FK formally applied for an EoT of 183 days in May 2022,
© 2025 Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP.
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which ISG substantially responded to.
In March 2023, ISG commenced an adjudication to determine the valuation of FK’s works as of
February 2023. One of the issues to be determined was whether clause 9(5) was a condition
precedent and if so whether FK complied with them. FK argued that it was not a condition precedent
but that if it was the EWNs they had issued fulfilled the contractual notice requirements, and further
that ISG had waived its entitlement to enforce the clause and/or was estopped from doing so on the
basis that ISG responded substantively to FK’s claim without raising the issue of non-compliant
notices and FK then went on to incur costs of a reply.
On 14 April 2023, the adjudicator, Mr Molloy, decided that clause 9(5) was a condition precedent but
that, on the facts, FK had complied with it, awarding them EoT and prolongation costs. Overall, he
decided that the work should be valued at £3,736,679.72.
COURT
ISG then issued Part 8 proceedings to obtain declarations including that the FK’s EWNs failed to
meet the requirements of clause 9(5) and that ISG had not waived and been estopped from
enforcing compliance, contending it was relatively straightforward to establish non-compliance.
FK argued that ISG was wrong in principle to bring Part 8 proceedings in relation to one aspect of
Mr Molloy’s decision when the entire dispute had not been brought for final determination. In
addition, on the question of compliance, FK argued that it was achieved not necessarily by way of
the EWNs but sometimes by correspondence and/or discussion on site, and that effect of the EWNs
had to be construed in light of the context and circumstances known to the recipient at the time. It
cited the following instances of ISG’s acts or series of acts or conduct which it argued amounted to
waiver or estoppel preventing ISG from relying on clause 9(5):
▪ ISG’s engagement in identifying and addressing delays with FK on site effectively constituted
a waiver of the obligation to provide notification of delay, or estopped ISG from demanding
such notices beyond what FK had already provided;
▪ ISG did not say in its response to FK’s formal EoT claim that its claim was precluded by a
failure to comply with clause 9(5); and
▪ ISG stated in its Payless Notice that the prolongation costs were “Not agreed; Full review to be
undertaken once works completed”.
The Court had to consider whether it could determine these issues under Part 8, which is intended
for claims where there are non-factual issues. The Court’s view was that the nature of clause 9(5)
was a matter of “pure construction” and could be determined under Part 8, but the fact that there
© 2025 Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP.
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were other issues related to this question but not fully pleaded out led to the Court’s refusal to
decide on the construction points.
Similarly, the question of breach was not suitable for Part 8 determination as it was likely to give
rise to substantial disputes of fact, considering there was clearly regular and routine engagement
on site between the parties as to the progress of the works.
In addition, the court took the view that with regard to the estoppel and waiver arguments, FK had
an arguable case which had a real prospect of success and were likely to involve substantial
disputes of fact.
Finally, the Court noted that there was no reason why one part of an adjudicator’s decision should
not be the subject of final determination under Part 8 if that issue was otherwise suitable (i.e.
unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact), particularly if the balance of the adjudicator’s
decision was uncontentious.
In Walter Lilly & Co Ltd v Mackay [2012] EWHC 1773 (TCC), it was held that under the 2011 form of
the JCT Standard Building Contract the use of the words “provided always” meant the need to make
an application as soon as it has become, or should reasonably have become, apparent that the
regular progress has been or is likely to be affected was a condition precedent.
The 2016 JCT edition uses different wording and the term “subject to”, but in the recent case of FES
Limited v HFD Construction Group Ltd [2024] CSOH 20 it was held that under the Scottish Standard
Building Contract 2016, which parallels the JCT 2016 standard form, giving notice is a condition
precedent to reimbursement of loss and expense.
The JCT clauses do not identify a specific period in which a notice is to made, unlike the bespoke
sub-contract entered into by ISG and FK which provided for a 14-day period, or the NEC provisions
which require a compensation event to be notified within 8 weeks. As was the case with FK, parties
will usually either seek to argue that certain communications constituted the requisite notice or that
a notice requirement had been waived. The latter argument was successful in the City Inn Ltd v
Shepherd Construction Ltd [2010] CSIH 68 decision where it was held that neither party, nor the
architect, had made any reference to the time bar clause during the course of the contract and the
silence by the architect at a meeting when the contractor’s claim for EoT was discussed resulted in
a waiver of the requirement to comply with the clause.
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Such arguments are not easy. Further, as Mr Justice Jackson (as he then was) stated in Multiplex
Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd [2007] EWHC 447 (TCC), time bar
provisions requiring a prompt notice “serve a valuable purpose” as they enable matters to be
investigated while they are still current and may provide the employer an opportunity to withdraw
instructions once the financial implications are clear.
In this case, the court took the view that there was “an arguable case of waiver and/or estoppel
which has a real prospect of success”. While this does not mean such arguments would succeed
once the full factual evidence is examined, it is a reminder that certain employer behaviours could
result in not being able to rely on the contractual provisions that govern entitlement. That is why it is
important to check the terms of the contract and ensure that any contractual rights are maintained
and that contractual processes are adhered to.
RELATED CAPABILITIES
Commercial Construction & Engineering
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MEET THE TEAM
Shy Jackson
London
[email protected]
+44 (0) 20 3400 4998
Yorkie Fong
London
[email protected]
+44 (0) 20 3400 2169
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