JDP 6-00

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 6-00

COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS

Joint Doctrine Publication 6-00 (JDP 6-00) (3rd Edition) dated January 2008
is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

Director General Development, Concepts and Doctrine

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

1. This information is Crown copyright and the intellectual property

rights for this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of
Defence (MOD). No material or information contained in this
publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments except as
authorised by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate.

2. This information may be subject to privately owned rights.

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AUTHORISATION
The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) is responsible for
publishing Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs) within a hierarchy of similar
publications. Readers wishing to quote JDPs as reference material in other work
should confirm with the DCDC Doctrine Editor whether the particular
publication and amendment state remains authoritative. Comments on factual
accuracy or proposals for amendment are welcomed by the Doctrine Editor at:

The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

Ministry of Defence
Shrivenham
SWINDON, Wiltshire, SN6 8RF

Telephone number: 01793 314216/7

Facsimile number: 01793 314232
Facsimile number: 01793 314232
Military Network: 96161 4232
E-mail: [email protected]

DISTRIBUTION
Distribution of JDPs is managed by the Forms and Publications Section, DSDA
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for issue of this publication, or amendments to its distribution, should be referred to
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(AJPs)), can also be demanded from the DSDA Operations Centre.

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All publications (including drafts) are available to view and download at:
www.dcdc.dii.r.mil.uk. This publication is available on the internet at:
www.mod.uk/dcdc.

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous,
clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives
advantage to a country’s Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of
conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of NATO. The
development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by
NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national
thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in Joint Doctrine Publications

(JDPs). 1 From time to time, Interim Joint Doctrine Publications (IJDPs) are
published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of
anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising from
operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed in Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). JDNs
do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position, but are raised in short order by the
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) to establish and disseminate
current best practice. They also provide the basis for further development and
experimentation, and a doctrinal basis for operations and exercises.

Details of the Joint Doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of
JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 Joint Doctrine Development Handbook.

1
Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

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RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
Amendment Number Date of Insertion Initials
Change 1 December 2011 DCDC

Change 1 to JDP 6-00 CIS Support to Joint Operations was promulgated in December
2011 and comprised a complete rewrite of Chapters 3 and 4. Change 1 provides
updated or new doctrine on:

a. The nature and character of information flow on Joint operations.

b. The information services planning process.

c. The requirement for the commander to articulate his information needs.

d. The information exchange requirement process to translate the

commander’s information needs (ends) through the development of an
appropriate architecture of core services and applications (ways) that can then
be delivered by information and communication services (means).

e. The information services support to the conduct of operations during the

deploy, operate and recover phases.

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PREFACE
1. Purpose. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 6-00 Communications and
Information Systems Support to Joint Operations provides guidance for the planning
and execution of Communications and Information Systems (CIS) support to Joint
operations. This edition is intended primarily for personnel employed within the
Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) including the Permanent Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ), a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), Joint Force CIS
(JFCIS) staff, Front Line Commands (FLCs), the Directorate General Information
Systems and Services (DG ISS) and the wider CIS community. In any operation, it is
essential that staff understand the Commander’s information needs and support them
with CIS; all staff branches have an important role in CIS planning, and all officers
engaged in Joint operations should be familiar with this publication.

2. Context. This 3rd Edition of JDP 6-00 builds upon previous editions, and
includes updated processes and procedures developed for the ongoing evolution of
CIS. Although this document is based on the deployment of a JTFHQ, it is equally
valid under other operational constructs and different scales of operations. The
generic principles contained within this document should be adapted for specific
operations.

3. Structure. JDP 6-00 has 4 Chapters: Chapter 1 introduces the fundamental

elements and principles governing CIS support; Chapter 2 outlines the roles and
responsibilities of those organisations that contribute to CIS planning and capability;
Chapter 3 describes the information services planning process; and Chapter 4
describes the processes and activities that provide information services support to the
conduct of operations.

4. Linkages. To satisfy an urgent need for CIS doctrine, JDP 6-00 was drafted ahead
of the 4th Edition of JDP 0-01 British Defence Doctrine and the revised editions of
JDPs 01 Campaigning, 3-00 Campaign Execution and 5-00 Campaign Planning,
which together will provide the updated overarching context.

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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

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COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

Page No
Title Page i
Authorisation and Distribution ii
Joint Doctrine Publications iii
Record of Amendments iv
Preface v
Contents vii

Chapter 1 Introduction
Annex 1A – Information Management

Chapter 2 Roles and Responsibilities

High Level Context 2-1

Operational Level of Command 2-3
Multinational Operations 2-6
Annex 2A – Organisations that Deliver
Operational Communications and Information
Systems
Annex 2B – Generic Terms of Reference for
Commander Joint Force Communications and
Information Systems
Annex 2C – Multinational and Multi-agency
Operations

Chapter 3 Information Services Planning

Information Flow on Joint Operations 3-1

Lifecycle 3-3
Fundamentals 3-4
Prepare Phase 3-6
Considerations 3-10
Annex 3A – Information Services Estimate
Annex 3B – Information Exchange
Requirement
Annex 3C – Communications and Information
Services Directive

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Annex 3D – Security and Information

Governance
Annex 3E – Battlespace Spectrum Management

Chapter 4 Information Services Support to the Conduct of

Operations

Deploy Phase 4-1

Operate Phase 4-3
Recover Phase 4-9

Lexicon

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
101. Successful Communications and Information Systems (CIS) support to
operations combines the fundamentals of the Information Exchange Requirement
(IER), CIS capability and Information Management (IM) to achieve operational
advantage. After describing these fundamentals in detail, this Chapter introduces
enduring CIS principles of prioritisation, agility, capacity, interoperability and security
that are applied to operational CIS planning and execution. It then outlines the
operational context for CIS support.

Fundamentals
102. Communications and Information Systems. CIS are ‘the assembly of
equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel, organised so as to
accomplish specific information, conveyance and processing functions’. 1 In the
modern battlespace, effective IM and subsequent information superiority is only
achieved with properly deployed and managed CIS. CIS are an essential part of
military operations and provide commanders at all levels with the means to exercise
Command and Control (C2) and disseminate vital information. CIS are also an
essential prerequisite for Network Enabled Capability (NEC), 2 which allows increased
situational awareness, supports better decision making and greater operational agility
for an Effects-based Approach (EBA). 3 The role of J6 staff is to ensure that CIS
delivers robust and flexible solutions to meet this requirement.

103. Information Exchange Requirement. The IER translates an operational

information requirement into the detail required by CIS staff to provide capability
throughout all phases of an operation. It stimulates development of the CIS solution
and forms the basis for developing a CIS network design.

104. Information Management. IM underpins the successful prosecution of

military operations. It is ‘the integrated management processes and services that
provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise
freedom of action’. 4 It enables effective information exploitation and the achievement
of situational awareness by commanders and staffs. IM is as much about managing
people, and their methods of working, as it is about the provision of CIS. Detailed
aspects of IM are at Annex 1A.

1
AAP-6 ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’. Note that CIS represents a capability; the term Information and
Communication Services (ICS) describes the services available.
2
Strategic Defence Review New Chapter (July 2004) defined NEC as ‘encompassing the elements required to deliver
controlled and precise military effect rapidly and reliably’.
3
UK EBA embodies a way of thinking and specific processes that together enable the effective use of military capability,
usually as part of a Comprehensive Approach (CA), to achieve favourable outcomes. (See JDP 01 (2nd Edition) ‘Joint
Operations’ – programmed for promulgation early 2008).
4
New term developed for this publication and future UK doctrine – see Annex 1A2.

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105. Battlespace Spectrum Management. The use of and reliance upon the
Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS), by both military and commercial users, has
increased significantly in recent years and shows no signs of abating. Effective use of
the Electromagnetic Environment (EME) 5 is a prerequisite for successful operations,
and the ability to manoeuvre within it is enabled by Battlespace Spectrum
Management (BSM). 6

106. Operational Advantage. The relationship between the 3 fundamentals of CIS

– the IER derived from the Operational and CIS Estimate, the CIS capability itself,
and associated IM – together with the enabling BSM, is shown at Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 – Fundamentals and Operational Advantage

5
Electromagnetic Environment is ‘the totality of electromagnetic phenomena existing at a given location’. (JDP 0-01.1)
Also see CDS 01/06 ‘UK Joint EW Policy’.
6
Battlespace Spectrum Management (BSM) is defined as ‘the planning, coordination and management of the
electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering and administrative procedures’. (ACP 190(B))
The BSM function and process is covered in Chapter 3.

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Principles of CIS
107. Throughout all stages of operational CIS planning and execution, a number of
enduring principles are applied to ensure that the most effective and efficient CIS
solution emerges to accommodate the Commander’s Intent. These principles are:

a. Prioritisation. Commanders and their staffs should be aware that the

CIS required are roughly proportional to the scale of the operation. However,
other factors also need to be considered. There is an irreducible minimum
level of CIS capability required to support either a Joint Task Force
Headquarters (JTFHQ) or National Contingent Commander’s Headquarters
(NCCHQ) and their subordinate Component Headquarters (HQ), irrespective
of the scale of combat forces deployed. This is an important consideration
when the UK is involved in multiple, concurrent operations even of moderate
scale. In all operations, there is a need to set rigorous priorities for the
allocation of limited CIS resources, including bandwidth, based upon the
Commander’s Intent and information needs set out in the IER.

b. Agility. Agility 7 provides the ability to respond quickly and

appropriately to change; as with other critical combat assets, flexibility and
resilience are of particular importance for CIS:

(1) Flexibility. Flexibility ensures that deployed CIS can respond to

changes in scales of effort, operational tempo and posture. Changes in
posture, such as from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement, may result in
minor changes to force structure, but could result in a considerably
different CIS requirement. Flexibility is achieved through the
production and rehearsal of contingency plans, the standardisation of
equipment, the use of commercial systems and infrastructure, mobile
and transportable CIS equipment, freedom of manoeuvre within the
EME and reserve capability.

(2) Resilience. Availability, permanence and training all contribute

to resilience. Due to its critical enabling role, the availability of CIS is a
high priority. However, available and durable CIS is not necessarily
resilient without properly trained personnel to run and manage it.
Permanence is a significant element of resilience and is achieved by
redundancy. This includes the distribution and replication of CIS and its
associated data, and protection against physical, electronic and
environmental attack.

c. Capacity. Although CIS capacity is invariably finite, advances in

technology have increased significantly the volume and rate of data delivery.
7
Agility has 5 attributes: responsiveness, resilience, flexibility, acuity and adaptability’.

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To avoid slowing decision-making processes, care should be taken to ensure

that sufficient CIS capacity is available to support IM and Information
Exploitation (IX) requirements. Sufficient capacity should be made available
to meet predicted demand, but occasions may arise where CIS limitations
precipitate the adoption of different IM or IX strategies. Where possible,
technologies and procedures are used to maximise capacity, for example
through the use of dynamic bandwidth management, Internet Protocol (IP)
switching and efficient IM. Early use may also be made of commercial CIS to
increase capacity.

d. Interoperability. Interoperability 8 of systems is required to allow the

passage of information between different elements of a deployed Joint Task
Force (JTF) or, on multinational operations, between allies. However, optimal
IM and IX are only achieved through operating with common systems. Where
common systems are not available, such as is in coalition operations,
interoperability between systems offers the next best option to support Joint or
multinational operations. The requirement is essential, to allow commanders
to exercise command and to enable all elements of the (Combined) JTF to
coordinate activities. A core CIS requirement of a Comprehensive Approach
(CA) 9 is for integrated IM techniques, infrastructure and connectivity, to
enable advanced working practices, including communication networks for
collaboration between Other Government Departments (OGDs), Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International Organisations (IOs).

e. Security. Operations Security 10 (OPSEC) can be compromised unless

consideration is given to the security of information held on, and transmitted
by, CIS. The quality and reliability of CIS have a direct impact on security. 11
If commanders, staff and CIS users perceive or experience poor
communications, they frequently revert to unprotected devices such as civilian
mobile telephones. On Joint and multinational operations, there is a
requirement to work in multiple information domains (RESTRICTED,
SECRET and TOP SECRET). These levels may be supplemented by others
defined by release criteria, such as UK/US, NATO, or ‘Coalition’. Such
hierarchies enable concurrent handling of sensitive, protected intelligence, UK
Eyes-Only information, information shared on a bilateral or multilateral basis
and unprotected information.

8
Interoperability of systems is defined as ‘the ability of systems to provide services and information to (or accept
services and information from) other systems’. (AAP-31)
9
A Comprehensive Approach is ‘an approach that responds effectively to complex, contemporary crises by the
orchestration, coordination or de-confliction of military, OGD, and (where possible) IO and NGO activity’. (See JDP 01
(2nd Edition) for detail – programmed for promulgation early 2008).
10
OPSEC is ‘the process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means,
to deny an adversary knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces’. (AAP-6)
11
Security is dealt with in detail in Chapter 3.

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108. Security principles are interrelated and should be considered together, noting
that some appear to act in opposition; for example, the need for security versus the
need for interoperability. The overriding premise throughout is to understand and
meet the commander’s requirements.

Operational Level
109. JDP 6-00 ‘Communications and Information Systems Support to Joint
Operations’ primarily addresses the provision of CIS at the Operational level; 12 that is,
providing CIS capability spanning strategic to tactical assets and at all scales of
operation to enable C2 between the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), the
JTFHQ 13 and Component HQs. 14 A simplified diagram showing the principal HQ
engaged at this level of command is at Figure 1.2. Operating with other nations and
IOs may generate a more complex C2 structure than that shown at Figure 1.2; the
detail is considered in later chapters.

12
The Operational level is ‘that at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to
accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations’. (JDP 0-01.1)
13
A JTFHQ is ‘a purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the operational level by a
Joint Task Force Commander’. (JDP 0-01.1)
14
Components are ‘force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the operational
level commander.’ (JDP 0-01.1)

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Figure 1.2 – Operational Level of Command

110. Within a JTFHQ, the J6 Division is normally led by Commander Joint Force
CIS (Comd JFCIS) (OF-4 to OF-6 dependent on scale). J6 is responsible for enabling
the IER across the JTF, and for planning and controlling Joint Operations Area (JOA)
CIS architectures, including integration at the Strategic and Tactical levels. Comd
JFCIS directs the Joint Network Centre (Jt NETCEN) to manage, coordinate and
control the delivery of CIS capability across the JOA.

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ANNEX 1A – INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

CONTEXT AND DEFINITIONS

1A1. Information. Data, information, knowledge and intelligence are inter-related
manifestations of fact or perceived fact that have varying degrees of utility for
commanders and their staff. Data is the basic building block of information,
comprising facts and statistics that can be manipulated by individuals or machines.
Information is the meaning that an individual associates with data when it is presented
in context. Information combined with experience, interpretation and reflection,
generates knowledge and thereby enables effective use of the information, for example
in decision-making. One individual’s knowledge becomes another’s information, and
thus information and knowledge are managed through the same Information
Management (IM) processes. 1 In parallel, intelligence is an ability to acquire and
apply knowledge. Military intelligence normally refers to processed, analysed and
assessed information and knowledge about adversaries or potential areas of operation. 2
Management of intelligence is the same for that of any other information.

1A2. Definitions. IM and its associated terms 3 are defined as:

a. Information Management. Integrated management processes and

services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and
format, to maximise freedom of action.

b. Information Exploitation. The use of information to gain advantage

and improve situational awareness to enable effective planning, decision-
making, and coordination of those activities required to realise effects.

c. Information Administration. The structuring and handling of

information to enable it to be stored, archived, located and retrieved efficiently,
whilst ensuring its integrity.

d. Information Assurance. The confidence that the information within the

Defence Community is maintained reliably, accurately, securely and is
available when required. 4

1A3. IM encompasses the Joint enabling activity that underpins effective

information exploitation and common situational understanding by commanders and
1
The term knowledge management is in common use in parts of industry and academia and with some international
partners. It is not used in this JDP.
2
Intelligence is ‘the product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or
potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations’. (AAP-6 ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and
Definitions’)
3
New terms developed for this publication and for future UK doctrine.
4
JSP 440 ‘Defence Manual of Security’.

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staffs. Figure 1A.1 demonstrates the IM bridge between the infrastructure, upon
which the bulk of information resides, and its exploitation. Exploitation leads to
situational understanding that, when combined with experience and culture, results in
intuitive or reasoned risk assessment and decision-making. IM comprises:

a. Determining information needs.

b. Managing information flow.

c. Administering information.

Figure 1A.1 – Place of IM in Decision-making

Information Needs and Planning

1A4. Information Management Planning. An IM Plan is derived from the
Operational Estimate, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Information
Exploitation (IX) Directive, and associated Force IM planning conferences. It sets out
the direction, priorities and resource allocation for IM within the HQ and its
subordinate commands, taking account of the Commander’s Intent and
Communications and Information Systems (CIS) constraints. This relationship is
shown in Figure 1A.2. Once IM is reflected comprehensively in HQs’ Standing
Operating Procedures/Instructions (SOPs/SOIs), an IM Plan should focus simply on
any variations to established procedures. IM planning specifically:

a. Determines the information needs and outputs of the organisation, leading

to a Joint Operations Area (JOA) Information Flow Analysis (IFA). This in
turn enables production of the Joint Information Exchange Requirement (IER)
and identifies changes to Reports, Returns and Responses (R3). 5 Many

5
R3 provide information to meet Campaign Rhythm decision-making requirements. They are directed by the chain of
command and may be automated or achieved through the maintenance of common databases or publishing to the web.

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information needs are standard and are captured in SOPs/SOIs, but others are
operation-dependent and specifically identified.

b. Provides input to the CIS estimate and to national/international system

interface requirements, whilst taking account of CIS constraints.

c. Determines changes to Information Administration, particularly for

coalition operations, and takes account of planned Campaign Rhythm .

Figure 1A.2 – Plans and Estimates

1A5. Information Needs Analysis. Information needs vary according to task,
mission, own and coalition force composition, opposition and neutral forces and JOA.
Framing these needs requires input from all elements of an organisation and, whilst
adaptive, the initial analysis should be comprehensive if information providers and the
information infrastructure are to deliver effectively. Whether for the Operational
Estimate, during the planning process, or by individuals and teams engaged in
particular tasks, framing information needs requires identification of:

a. The content, format and timeliness of outputs to deliver the effect, from
formal directives through R3 to the Joint Operations Picture (JOP).
Maintaining output currency is a prime consideration, in which case
modularity or use of databases is preferable to single long documents.

b. The membership of teams to deliver these outputs. Increasingly, these

are cross-organisational, rather than J1-J9 focused, in order to bring the
requisite expertise to bear.

c. Information needs to service required outputs.

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d. Acquisition sources and lead times. Compiling reference and

environmental information for a particular operation can take significant time
and could impose a constraint unless providers are identified and tasked early.

1A6. Agility. Unresponsive operational plans, information clutter and lack of

actionable information all impede the decision-making cycle. To be flexible and
adaptable, staffs at all levels should continually think ahead to ensure that potentially
critical information is available to their own organisation and, as importantly, to
superior, subordinate or peer organisations. With fluent retrieval techniques, sharing
information allows rapid access and is fundamental to the achievement of agility.

1A7. Coalition. Information flow within a coalition is constrained by immature

system interfaces, language difficulties and security concerns. A coalition generally
operates a tiered structure of network domains, interfacing through gateways that
ideally allow information to be transferred automatically between partners. On
enduring operations, a coalition network may be established for exactly this purpose.
Sharing information is, however, limited by national security or release constraints.
National Senior Information Officers (SIOs) 6 should engage early with coalition
partners to determine how and what information flows across coalition interfaces.
Where the UK provides the operational lead, the senior deployed UK SIO takes
responsibility for multinational Joint Force information flow.

1A8. Comprehensive Approach. Within a Comprehensive Approach (CA), IM

relies on an understanding of the complex, multi-dimensional information
requirements of each department and the needs of the inter-departmental structure.
Whilst there is an enabling technological aspect to IM, the fundamental issue is the
orchestration of collaborative ways of working between departments. In the context of
Government-wide crisis management, the MOD should be prepared to harmonise its
IM requirements, principally those of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation
(DCMO), with those of other Government Departments (OGDs) and agencies as
detailed in paragraph 203.

6
The Senior Information Officer (SIO) owns the information within the organisation, sets policy and culture and is
accountable for the quality, and provenance of the information produced. The SIO leads the organisation’s staff work
and is likely to be the Chief of Staff (COS) or equivalent.

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CHAPTER 2 – ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

201. Chapter 2 outlines the roles and responsibilities of those organisations that
contribute to the planning and provision of Joint Communications and Information
Systems (CIS). The process of planning and conducting a campaign is explained in
detail elsewhere. 1 This Chapter covers those organisations that provide high-level
context and direction, and then focuses on the roles responsibilities of the CIS
community at the Operational level, including the Front Line Commands (FLCs), to
deliver CIS operational capability. A diagram outlining how these organisations
interact is at Annex 2A. The Chapter also highlights the additional complexities and
terminology of multinational operations. The roles and responsibilities outlined below
introduce elements of the Joint CIS planning process, examined in detail in Chapter 3.

SECTION I – HIGH LEVEL CONTEXT

Defence Crisis Management Organisation
202. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) is formed from
existing Ministry of Defence (MOD) departments and the Permanent Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ). It is the MOD’s agent for the overall management and
resolution of crises, including the higher level direction of operations. It is responsible
for the dissemination of strategic direction through PJHQ to the Joint Task Force
Commander (JTFC) and Component Commander(s) (CC).

203. Whilst the DCMO does not have dedicated CIS staff, it receives advice on J6
issues from Director Command and Battlespace Management/J6 (D CBM/J6). Within
a Comprehensive Approach (CA), the DCMO is responsible for integrating
Information Management (IM) techniques, infrastructure and connectivity with Other
Government Departments (OGDs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and
International Organisations (IOs).

Directorate of Command and Battlespace Management/J6

204. D CBM/J6 is the MOD’s Joint Customer for J6 strategic systems and Joint CIS
capabilities. A principal role of D CBM/J6 is to provide military strategic CIS
guidance, and advice on relevant CIS freedoms and constraints, leading up to and
during the formulation of any Joint CIS plan. The primary planning output from D
CBM/J6 is the CIS Annex to Chief of Defence Staff’s (CDS’) Directive. This Annex
nominates the supported and supporting commands, confirms the contribution of
Directorate General Information Systems and Services (DG ISS) as a supporting

1
JDP 01 ‘Joint Operations’ explains the principles that underpin the planning and conduct of campaigns and operations
by the UK’s Armed Forces. JDP 5-00 ‘Joint Operations Planning’ flows directly from JDP 01, and together with JDP 3-
00 ‘Joint Operations Execution’, form the UK authority on the conduct of deployed Joint operations.

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agency, and provides high-level CIS direction to the Joint Commander (Jt Comd). It is
produced with input from DG ISS and in consultation with PJHQ.

205. From an early stage of crisis management and preparation for operations, D
CBM/J6 liaises with PJHQ J6 and DG ISS, and coordinates activity with Director
Special Forces (DSF) J6 staff. D CBM/J6 allocates military satellite terminal
equipment and satellite channels and sets high-level service restoration priorities. If
there is insufficient military bandwidth available, D CBM/J6, through DG ISS,
arranges support from other nations via a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or
uses other methods to secure services from another country or commercial provider.

206. D CBM/J6 also acts as the focal point for Computer Network Defence (CND)
and works with the Joint Security Coordination Centre (JSyCC) to ensure that any
Computer Network Attack (CNA) on CIS inside or outside the Joint Operations Area
(JOA) does not disrupt the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) supporting the
operation. Additional responsibilities include the provision of secure voice equipment
for Defence Attaches, and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Posts at a time
of crisis.

Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Equipment Capability)

207. The MOD’s Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Equipment Capability)
(DCDS(EC))’s support to CIS is provided by Capability Manager (Information
Superiority) (CM(IS)). Within CM(IS), the Directorate of Equipment Capability
Command Control and Information Infrastructure (DEC CCII), and its associated
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) within Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), are
responsible for staffing Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR). UORs address gaps
in operational CIS capability, and may include accelerating ongoing projects or
implementing commercial solutions.

Directorate General Information Systems and Services

208. DG ISS provides Information and Communication Services (ICS) to meet

Defence needs and a single point of contact for strategic planning. The organisation
was formed to subsume all the former single-Service elements, providing strategic
communications. DG ISS is involved at an early stage of crisis management.
Consultation with PJHQ J6, for example, may enable reconfiguration of strategic
communications assets in response to evolving plans.

209. DG ISS and FLCs satisfy Information Exchange Requirements (IER) for PJHQ
in order to meet the Commander’s Intent, and DG ISS provides end-to-end service
assurance for Defence CIS. DG ISS is engaged in operational planning with PJHQ J6,
Joint Force CIS (JFCIS) staff, DSF and FLCs from the earliest opportunity; the

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organisation is a major contributor to the CIS Estimate 2 through all phases of an

operation. DG ISS achieves this by coordinating the efforts of its IPTs and Defence
CIS Service Delivery partners, and by working with PJHQ, Commander JFCIS (Comd
JFCIS) and FLCs to design the optimum ICS solution. The resultant ‘network of
networks’ is managed through DG ISS’ Global Operations and Security Control Centre
(GOSCC). As the primary Defence CIS service provider, DG ISS is the Design
Authority for the operational CIS solution. 3

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF COMMAND4

Joint Commander and Permanent Joint Headquarters

210. Joint Commander. The Jt Comd, appointed by CDS, is usually the Chief of
Joint Operations (CJO) and he commands assigned UK forces on most deployed
operations. He also provides military advice to CDS and is responsible for liaison
with the MOD, allies, coalition partners and OGDs.

211. Permanent Joint Headquarters J6 Division. The J6 Division is integral to

the PJHQ and supports the Jt Comd in planning, directing and sustaining CIS
capability. It is involved in all stages of the crisis management process and at all
stages of operations. It is thus the pivotal J6 organisation and is critical to mounting
and conducting Joint CIS operations.

Front Line Commands

212. The 3 single-Service Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs), Commander- in-Chief
Fleet (CINCFLEET), Commander-in-Chief Land Command (CINCLAND) and
Commander in Chief Air Command (CINCAIR), provide trained Force Elements (FE)
for Joint and multinational operations. Each FLC has a CIS Branch to undertake
operational planning in support of the Jt Comd. Although operational command and
control of assigned FE is exercised through the Joint chain of command, individual
FLCs retain full command of their respective FE. FLCs are also responsible for the
provision of CCs and their Headquarters (HQs) including CIS, infrastructure, life
support and protection.

Director Special Forces

213. DSF commands all UK Special Forces (UKSF) and provides advice to CJO
and the JTFC. He nominates a Special Forces (SF) CC and the DSF J6 Branch

2
PJHQ or Commander JFCIS lead the Joint CIS Estimate, see Chapter 3.
3
The role of Design Authority is defined by JSP 440 ‘Defence Manual of Security’ as ‘A Single Point or Committee that
has the knowledge and the authority to ensure that technical decisions relating to the end-to-end Service delivery
architecture are informed and coherent with wider plans and future projections.’
4
This Section should be read in conjunction with JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition) ‘Joint Operations Execution’, programmed for
promulgation early 2008.

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coordinates the CIS support required. The deployed SF J6 staff, signal unit, or
detachment commanders coordinate Joint Force CIS with Joint Task Force
Headquarters (JTFHQ) J6.

Joint Task Force Commander and National Contingent Commander

214. CDS appoints a JTFC for Joint national or multinational operations, based
upon the recommendation of the Jt Comd. In multinational operations not under a UK
lead, the UK National Contingent Commander (NCC) normally sits alongside the
Lead Nation’s appointed JTFC. Comd JFCIS is the senior J6 staff officer to the UK
JTFC or NCC. In a national operation, all of the JTFHQ’s CIS capability is provided
through Comd JFCIS, but in a multinational context the CIS requirement is influenced
by the UK’s role in the operation.

Joint Task Force Headquarters

215. Joint Force Headquarters. The Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) is an
integral element of PJHQ, under the command of a 1* Chief of Joint Force Operations
(CJFO); it provides an experienced and cohesive staff to project military forces rapidly
and over long distances. JFHQ is held at the highest readiness and, where speed is
paramount, is the JTFHQ of choice. It provides the basis of other potential JTFHQs 5
held at lower readiness states. All of these HQs have the J6 capability to support
enduring operations worldwide.

216. Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team. A core JFHQ capability is

the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT). 6 Each OLRT comprises a
small team of personnel with organic CIS capability, held at the highest readiness.
Several OLRTs can be deployed simultaneously to give expert advice on contingency
planning and operational issues, including force composition, logistics, command,
control, and communications.

217. Commander Joint Force Communications and Information Systems. The

delivery and management of Joint CIS across the JOA is a complex task, usually
requiring a Comd JFCIS, reflected in the CIS Annex to CDS’ Directive. From this, the
Jt Comd issues a CIS Annex to his own Directive, written by PJHQ J6, detailing Comd
JFCIS’ responsibility to direct the CIS/Information and Communications Services
(ICS) in the JOA and to provide operational CIS advice to the JTFC and staff. The
CIS Annex also specifies the Operational level freedoms and constraints for Comd
JFCIS. Typically, Comd JFCIS is delegated Operational Control (OPCON) of all CIS
assets in the JOA, less SF, and draws core staff from JFHQ J6. It is augmented by
other J6 staff from PJHQ, FLCs, DG ISS and other organisations, to match the scale
and nature of the operation. Comd JFCIS’ responsibilities are outlined in the generic
5
There are 5 principal JTFHQ models. (See JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition) – programmed for promulgation in early 2008).
6
For detailed information on ORLTs. (See JDP 5-00 (2nd Edition) – programmed for promulgation in early 2008).

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Terms of Reference at Annex 2B. When CDS’ Directive does not stipulate the need
for a dedicated Comd JFCIS, in a small-scale operation for example, then a post
should be nominated within JFHQ J6 or the J6 Division at PJHQ to fulfil the role. In
the case of concurrent operations, when more than one Comd JFCIS is required, they
are likely to be provided from 1 and 11 Signal Brigade (Sig Bde).

218. Joint Network Centre. An integral element of the JFCIS staff is the Joint
Network Centre (Jt NETCEN), which has responsibility for the management,
coordination, control and delivery of CIS across the JOA. The Jt NETCEN’s role is to
provide technical advice, undertake service, network and asset management, identify
risks to the required CIS capability, liaise with OGDs and implement Comd JFCIS’
direction. In a Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) deployment, a cadre of staff from
11 Signal Sig Bde form the core of the Jt NETCEN, augmented by personnel held at
graduated readiness in FLCs and DG ISS. In operations without a significant JRRF
contribution, the Jt NETCEN function is provided by the lead FLC. DG ISS acts in
support of the GOSCC to manage the operational network. Dependent on the CIS
design and the scale and nature of the operation, further augmentation may be required
from the Defence Computer Incident Response Team (DCIRT) and the Joint Data Link
Management Organisation (JDLMO).

Components
219. The UK’s JTF uses 5 Tactical-level Components whose individual size and
shape are determined by the operation. 7 These are the Joint Force Maritime, Land,
Air, Special Forces and Logistic Components (JFMC, JFLC, JFAC, JFSFC and
JFLogC).

220. Maritime Component. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

(JFMCC) and his staff are likely to be found from the Maritime Battlestaff
(MARBATSTAFF). 8 The JFMC HQ is located either afloat or ashore depending on
the operation. The deployment or transition of the Maritime Component Commander
(MCC) ashore requires significant planning and CIS capability that may have to be
provided from outside CINCFLEET’s resources, through liaison between PJHQ,
Comd JFCIS and HQ FLEET.

221. Land Component. The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)
and his staff may come from any Field Army formation. The JFLC HQ may be
augmented with strategic communication bearers and information systems to allow
integration into a Joint Force, but there is no standing JFLC J6 staff branch.

7
For more detail see JDP 3-00 (3rd Edition) – programmed for promulgation in early 2008.
8
These are: at the 2* level, COMUKAMPHIBFOR and COMUKMARFOR and, at the 1* level, COMUKTG,
COMATG and Commander 3 Commando Brigade. The commander of a smaller Task Group (TG) may also be
appointed the MCC, if appropriate.

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Consequently, the planning, execution and integration of Land CIS capability relies
heavily on liaison between PJHQ, Comd JFCIS staff and HQ LAND.

222. Air Component. The standing Joint Force Air Component Headquarters
(JFACHQ) provides the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and core
staff. Like the JFHQ, it is fully resourced and supported with CIS capability, elements
of which are held at very high readiness.

223. Special Forces Component. Given the complexity and sensitivity of SF

operations, the command of the SF Component is exercised in different ways, with the
Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC) reporting to MOD,
PJHQ or the JTFHQ. The JSFC HQ may collocate with the JTFHQ. SF J6 staff,
signal unit or detachment commanders coordinate SF CIS issues with the JFCIS.

224. Logistic Component. The standing Joint Force Logistic Component

Commander (JFLogCC) serves under CJFO with a small permanent cadre of staff
including a J6 officer. The JFLogCC’s responsibility for Reception, Staging, Onward
Movement and Integration (RSOI) places a high priority on the early identification of
the JFLogC IER.

225. Component and Unit Network Centres. Individual components and

specialist formations may have their own NETCENs. Where appropriate, these
NETCENs are linked through the Jt NETCEN to the GOSCC and use common
processes and procedures to provide coherent end-to-end CIS service delivery. A core
capability in all network operations is the full integration of Paradigm Services, DG
ISS’ civilian Private Finance Initiative (PFI) partner in providing an array of ICS for
Defence, including SKYNET Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and the
‘Welcome’ welfare package for deployed personnel. Similarly, current and future
Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) is being delivered in partnership between DG
ISS’ DII IPT and the ATLAS consortium.

SECTION III – MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

226. The CIS requirements of a UK force in multinational operations, whether
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Union (EU) or within an ad-
hoc coalition, are influenced by the UK’s role and status within that operation. The
most likely roles for the UK, including general and specific CIS considerations, are
described in Annex 2C.

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ANNEX 2A – ORGANISATIONS THAT DELIVER

OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
SYSTEMS

Note: All of the organisations shown, from the Strategic to Tactical level, either liaise or
work directly with civilian partner companies to deliver operational Communications and
Information Systems (CIS) capability. Paradigm Services is the Directorate General
Information Systems and Services’ (DG ISS) Private Finance Initiative (PFI) partner in
delivering an array of Information and Communications Services (ICS) for Defence,
including SKYNET Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and the ‘Welcome’ welfare
package for deployed personnel. Similarly, current and future Defence Information
Infrastructure (DII) is being delivered in partnership between the DG ISS and the
ATLAS consortium.

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ANNEX 2B – GENERIC TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR

COMMANDER JOINT FORCE COMMUNICATIONS AND
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
2B1. Commander Joint Force Communications and Information Systems (Comd
JFCIS) is an officer experienced in Joint CIS matters, normally from the permanent
CIS staff of the Front Line Commands (FLCs), Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)
or Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). He is delegated Operational Control (OPCON)
of all CIS capability in the Joint Operations Area (JOA), less Special Forces (SF), and
directs all CIS on behalf of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC).

2B2. Comd JFCIS is appointed by the Joint Commander (Jt Comd), as detailed in
the CIS Annex of the Jt Comd’s Directive to the JTFC. The rank of the Comd JFCIS
is determined by the scale of the operation, the quantity and complexity of the CIS
support required, and by any representational considerations arising in multinational
operations.

2B3. Comd JFCIS is responsible for:

a. Providing CIS advice to the JTFC.

b. Exercising OPCON of all JTFC-assigned CIS capability within the JOA,

less SF, commensurate with the JTFC’s Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM).

c. In conjunction with J3 staffs, developing, ratifying and maintaining the

Joint Information Exchange Requirement (IER) for the operation.

d. Conducting the CIS Estimate.

e. Leading the CIS capability audit for the operation, facilitating the agreed
design of the CIS solution, and staffing Urgent Statements of User
Requirement (USUR) to PJHQ so that existing capability can be generated or
Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) can be staffed.

f. Overseeing and producing the CIS Implementation Plan, Operations

Orders, configuration (authority for design and control), freedoms and
constraints1 and information/CIS risks in the Joint CIS Instruction (JCISI) to
all JOA CIS elements.

g. Informing PJHQ J6 of all CIS issues and risks that may have impact at
the operational level, including the Alerting, Warning and Reporting of

1
Freedoms and constraints are derived from the Operational Estimate, and other sources such as doctrine and SOPs.
Where constraints are not specified, Comd JFCIS allows components the freedom to configure and operate CIS assets
provided they are not part of a wider network or Joint Force Command and Control integration.

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incidents, including those from the Joint Network Centre (Jt NETCEN), as the
sub-Warning and Reporting Point (WARP).

h. Liaison with Host Nation (HN), multinational, Other Government

Department (OGD), Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) and International
Organisation (IO) representatives for JOA CIS requirements.

i. Adhering to the Joint Operational Standards (JOS) for the JFCIS.

j. Directing the Jt NETCEN.

k. Ensuring the effective integration of civilian service providers in JFCIS

and Jt NETCEN to achieve the required level of operational CIS capability.

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ANNEX 2C – MULTINATIONAL AND MULTI-AGENCY

OPERATIONS
2C1. There are many considerations peculiar to multinational and multi-agency
operations, including the nuances of Other Government Departments (OGDs) and
Host-nation Support (HNS), which are considered during the planning process.
Moreover, the UK may play different roles which impact upon Communication and
Information Systems (CIS) planning.

2C2. General Considerations. General considerations for multinational operations

include interoperability, Information Management (IM) and liaison:

a. Interoperability. Interoperability in a multinational or multi-agency

environment adds considerable extra complexity. 1 This complexity is reflected
at each level of command and should be considered under 3 main categories:
technical, security and procedural.

b. Information Management. Effective IM is critical to maintaining

operational tempo in a multinational or multi-agency environment. An
Information Manager is appointed to ensure that appropriate IM processes are
established and adhered to. UK protectively marked information is released in
accordance with UK security procedures. 2

c. Liaison. The potential frictions of working in a multinational or multi-

agency environment are mitigated by the use of Liaison Officers (LO). While
too many LOs could potentially slow Headquarters’ (HQ) tempo, multinational
or multi-agency environments usually benefit from employing LOs. In support
of a Comprehensive Approach (CA), LOs from OGDs and Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) are particularly useful in overcoming procedural and
cultural barriers.

2C3. Specific Circumstances.

a. Lead Nation. As Lead Nation, the UK is responsible for CIS planning

and provision of CIS to the multinational Joint Task Force HQ (JTFHQ). This
includes embedding UK LOs with partner nations to coordinate planning in the
Joint Operations Area (JOA). Other nations are expected to provide their own
CIS in accordance with the overall CIS plan. Early liaison between CIS staff
is essential to ensure coherence, including the incorporation of other nations’
LOs into a national HQ.

1
PJHQ J5 should provide detailed guidance on the status of any UK force.
2
JSP 440 ‘Defence Manual of Security’.

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b. Framework Nation. As Framework Nation, the UK is expected to

provide the majority of the CIS infrastructure to enable other nations to
integrate within the overall force structure. There may also be a requirement
for LOs with organic CIS, should interoperability issues arise in a
multinational or multi-agency environment.

c. Contributing Nation. Where the UK’s role is that of a Contributing

Nation, there is a requirement to appoint a UK National Contingent
Commander (NCC), who is located in, or represented at, the multinational HQ.
As a Contributing Nation, the UK seeks to establish a NCC HQ alongside the
multinational JTFHQ. It is also possible that the UK could provide embedded
staff within the JTFHQ. Any requirement to provide national CIS for
embedded staff is the responsibility of the NCC J6 staff. Integration and
interoperability of multinational CIS remains a challenge, and this can result in
the provision of numerous national systems to enable personnel to operate
effectively in the multinational environment.

d. Joint Task Force Headquarters and Combined Component

Headquarters. The Lead Nation for a multinational operation is expected to
provide the JTFHQ and much of the multinational component HQs. 3 On
high-readiness operations, such HQs are usually established using national CIS
assets. LOs are expected to operate within these HQs, and the deployed HQ
then migrates to a fully integrated HQ with embedded staffs from other
nations.

e. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Operations. UK forces engaged

in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operations are incorporated
into NATO Command and Control (C2) structures and use a combination of
NATO and national CIS. The UK often contributes personnel to a NATO CIS
cell.

f. European Union Operations. In European Union (EU) operations, an

Operational HQ (the equivalent of PJHQ), and a Forward HQ (the equivalent
of JTFHQ), are nominated.

g. Ad Hoc Coalitions. Ad hoc coalitions are increasingly common. 4 They

are invariably based on ad hoc C2 structures, and interoperability challenges
may be exacerbated by the lack of protocols or common operating procedures.
A centralised coordination function is required in most ad hoc operations to
facilitate the interconnection and interoperability of CIS.

3
The Component HQs for combined maritime, land, air, logistics and Special Forces (SF) operations.
4
For example, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) in Africa with France and Belgium, Op LANGER in East
Timor with Australia.

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2C4. Host-Nation Support. On many operations, deployed CIS is enhanced by

local CIS, thereby adding diversity and robustness to the CIS solution. Factors to be
considered for HNS CIS support include:

a. Availability. The ability of Host Nation (HN) civil and allied military
communications to support military operations, including peacekeeping
operations, depends upon the local situation. The lack of HN commercial
services usually requires the deployment of an alternative CIS solution to cater
for the majority of Information Exchange Requirements (IERs).
Communications support is often central to broader HNS, and this should be
coordinated centrally through J4 for inclusion in any Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) or other agreements between the UK and the HN. It
will be necessary to obtain the appropriate clearances for spectrum use from
the HN as detailed in Annex 3B.

b. Permanence. HNS may not endure throughout the operation,

particularly if the political situation changes. This requires further negotiation
with the HN government, through UK diplomatic representatives, to secure
HNS CIS for the full duration of the operation.

c. Location. The availability of HN civil and military CIS varies

considerably. Where some HN CIS capability exists, consideration should be
given to using the HN’s commercial international telecommunications
services, provided that appropriate security safeguards are established. It is
vital that Joint Task Force (JTF) capability does not rely wholly on facilities
that are susceptible to poor maintenance, equipment failure, financial
constraints or sabotage.

d. Diplomatic Communications. In the early stages of an operation, the

local Diplomatic Post may provide the primary communications link with the
UK, particularly for a reconnaissance team. Most Diplomatic Posts have a
range of communications facilities that can be augmented during a crisis
through coordination with Directorate of Command and Battlespace
Management J6 (D CBM/J6).

e. Civil Air Management. Civil air management communications may

not be available. Local and coalition circumstances may influence the use of
military air management vice civilian communications systems.

f. Liaison. To facilitate a CA, communications links may be required

from the JTF to local government and administrative authorities. Should HN
or commercial services be unsuitable for the task, UK military CIS capability
may be needed.

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CHAPTER 3 – INFORMATION SERVICES PLANNING

SECTION I – INFORMATION FLOW ON JOINT OPERATIONS

301. There has always been a requirement to transfer information across the battle
space. Operational advantage can be gained by managing information better, in
relative terms, than your adversary to gain understanding and influence; this is known
as information superiority.1 Conceptually the flow of information has 3 component
parts. First; the commander directs what information he needs so that it can be
collected from all sources, fused, interpreted and fed to him/his staff. Second; the
commander and his staff use the information to gain a degree of understanding and
situational awareness of the battle space; this understanding, which is influenced by
the commander’s experience and intuition, enable him to make a decision on what
actions to take next. Finally; the commander’s decision on a course of action is
disseminated to the organisation so that they can enact his direction.

302. The Character of Information Flow. Advances in technology have not

changed the nature of the information requirements but have changed its character.
Modern technology has revolutionised the information flow in the battle-space
providing the commander with significant new capabilities that can deliver operational
advantage. Information can now be transferred almost instantaneously, over greater
range and volume, in a range of formats to commanders located anywhere in the
world. This explosion in the availability of information and ability to manipulate does
not in itself enhance either understanding or decision-making but it is critical enabler.
Conversely the volume of information, the requirement to integrate numerous
information sources and speed of reaction can result in information overload that can
lead to decision paralysis. It can also lead to dependency on specific technology,
applications or bearers to deliver mission critical information; this leads to reliance on
potential single points of failure.

303. Exploitation and Management of Information. Information superiority is

enabled by the successful management and exploitation of information. The
management and exploitation of information are interdependent and delivered by a
combination of the bearer systems that transfer data, the applications 2 that convert data
into information, and the automated and staff functions to understand the information
and then exploit it. Information management is a set of integrated management
processes and services that enable and support the capability of collectors, producers
and users to store, locate, retrieve and transform information, allowing it to become
the right information in the right form and of adequate quality. Information
1
Defined as possessing a greater degree of information about the Battlespace, being able to exploit that information
more rapidly and preventing the adversary from obtaining or exploiting information which would give combat
advantage. JDP 0-01.1, UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (7th Edition).

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exploitation is a function for all the staff branches because it gets the most value out of
the information we have. The key is the common sharing, usage and re-usage of
information to support the provision of staff situational awareness and understanding,
planning, decision-making and the co-ordination of desired effects.

304. Risk Management. Managing the risk of single points of failure requires that
the planning process considers the primary, alternative, contingent and emergency
modes of working. This will require the allocation of sufficient resources to each
mode and that training in using these reversionary modes is conducted by both
specialist J6 and the wider staff. The risk must also be considered when assessing the
balance between information-rich static headquarters and the more limited
connectivity available to agile manoeuvring or mobile headquarters. The Joint Task
Force Commander (JTFC) owns these risks and mitigates them by balancing the
resilience of the information flow across the battlespace against the availability of
resources; requiring him to prioritise mission critical services. To manage the risk
requires a clear appreciation of the commander’s information needs and how they both
enhance his understanding and support his decision-making process. This
appreciation must inform and guide the development of staff processes and provision
of applications. Only through a combination of process and technology can effective
information management be achieved that delivers the right information, on time, in
the right place and in the correct format in order to exploit it.

305. Information Services Planning Process. The information services planning

process develops the JTFC’s information needs to the detail required for execution by
specialist J6 staff. This requires the identification of:

a. What information the commander needs?

b. What timeframe (real-time, near real-time or higher latency)?

c. How is it presented, to what level of depth or detail, how accurate does it

need it to be?

d. Who does it need to be shared with (multinational, host nation, other

government departments etc)?

306. While many of the commander’s information needs can be explicitly drawn
out of his statement of information needs and the operational estimate, others may be
implied or not immediately identifiable. The information services planning process
must test the completeness of the requirement by running a set of standard mission
threads against the proposed concept of operations, using the intended command and
control structure; identifying the totality of information flows required across the
battlespace. The combination of specified, implied and derived information needs

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provide the foundation for developing the required information and communications
services architecture and eventual network design.

307. The rest of this Chapter describes the information services planning process
and explains how it contributes to the overall operational planning process. 3 It
emphasises the key deliverables and highlights the fundamental elements that are
required to fully enable, exploit and support information services on operations

SECTION II – LIFECYCLE
308. Planning and execution of information services are broken down into 4 phases
of prepare (discussed in this Chapter), deploy, operate and recover (discussed in
Chapter 4). These sub-headings derived from the High-Level Operational Concept are
broadly aligned with the information services lifecycle known as the Joint Information
Communications Services Operating Framework 4 (JICSOF). In outline these phases
are:

a. Prepare. During this phase, the PJHQ J6 staff, normally augmented by

Commander Joint Force CIS (Comd JFCIS), SO1 J6 within the Joint Task
Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), Director Information services and Service
(DISS) and Front Line Commands (FLCs) develop an information services
plan that can deliver the commanders information needs. Several courses of
action are developed and refined in line with the emerging direction from the
JTFC. The final solution is selected by Comd JFCIS; endorsed by PJHQ J6;
and DISS, 5 as the network authority, with the FLCs delivers the plan. The
prepare phase concludes after a successful testing and commissioning of the
selected information services plan articulated as the CIS Directive. 6

b. Deploy. Upon deployment Comd JFCIS will deliver the initial

operating capability identified in the CIS Directive. This will define and
prioritise the delivery of services to the key staff. Component J6 staff will
advise Comd JFCIS of their initial operating capability states and identify any

3
See JDP 5-00, Campaign Planning, (Edition 2).
4
The JICSOF is derived from Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) version 3. ITIL version 3 was
developed by the UK Office of Government Commerce and industry and is the most widely accepted approach to
information services management. The lifecycle consists of Strategy, Design, Transition, Operation and Continual
Service Improvement. The information services lifecycle can be mapped against the sub-headings used in this Chapter.
The strategy and design phases of the JICSOF aligned with the key elements of prepare. The operation phase in the
JICSOF is aligned with sustain. JICSOF transition appears twice; first, as the final part of the prepare continuing
through to deploy, and secondly, as part of recover. This is because both provisioning and retiring an information service
are both transitional activities. For an expeditionary operation the lifecycles align but during the sustain phase of an
enduring campaign the information services lifecycle will be continuously followed as new or updated services are
provisioned or old services are retired.
5
DISS is the Network Authority for all defence information architectures. It does this through its role as the Network
Capability Authority (NCA), Network Technical Authority (NTA) and Network Operating Authority (NOA) – See
paragraph 404 for more details.
6
The CIS Directive forms the J6 element of the JTFC Mission Directive.

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issues that may affect delivery within the timelines prescribed in the CIS
Directive. Once full operating capability has been achieved for all the Joint
staff and components then Comd JFCIS will declare this to the commander and
PJHQ.

c. Operate. The provision of information services will constantly adapt

during an operation as the commander’s information needs, technology and
other factors change. This can lead to enhancements, reductions and other
developments of the architecture and network design. The operation of
information services is the business of DISS, as the Network Operating
Authority, and the Joint Network Centre (Jt NETCEN). These 2 organisations
have joint responsibility for maintaining the network, conducting service
management and delivering service assurance. JFCIS staff focus on delivering
new requirements and maintaining the information exchange requirement.

d. Recovery. Termination of the operation or transfer of services to

another Nation will result in the recovery phase being initiated. Maintenance
of relevant information services until the last person departs will be a
significant challenge; however, data management and retention of historical
data will be equally time consuming unless considered early within this phase.
Upon return to the UK, the FLCs are responsible for the regeneration process.

SECTION III – FUNDAMENTALS

309. To deliver the JTFC’s information needs J6 staff must develop a detailed
understanding of all C4ISR, 7 logistic and medical applications and core services, how
information flows to enable the services, and the network design and capabilities over
which the information is collected, transmitted, stored, retrieved and protected. This
understanding of how the layers are interconnected, especially in the ISR 8 domain,
enables the successful planning and execution of information services in the
contemporary operating environment.

310. The information services planning process is shown at Figure 3.1. It should
start as early as possible; recognising that in the early stages of planning, key political
decisions may not have been made. The commander must clearly articulate his
information needs to achieve an effective and appropriate plan. Information services
planners will also require a full understanding of the information needs of staff
branches, components, subordinate levels of command, and other supported actors 9

7
C4ISR: C4 Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance or Command, Control, Communications and Computation
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. C4 ISR is the more common usage.
8
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
9
Within a integrated approach military information services may require to support, or interact with, other government
departments, host nation and multinational partners. In addition the Special Forces (SF) component will be supported.

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involved in the operation. This ensures that any limitations in delivering the required
information services can be used to inform the commander’s operational estimate.

Strategy
Information Problem
Needs Analysis
Transition
Comd’s
Build Network
Intent
Iterative

Prepare

Prepare
Feedback
Process IER 3 Stage Test and
Process Commission All
Services Prior to
Deployment
IS Plan
Operational Estimate

Design
Comd Jt
Development of NetCen/Ready
IS Estimate

Solutions to Deploy

Comd’s Intent Deploy

Detailed Planning Build Network in

and Design Theatre

Deploy
Provision
Services (T&C
Transition Continues)
Delivery and
Assurance Jt NetCen/
Information GOSCC
Services Agree In-Service
Approved
Directive

Operations

Operate Operate

Transition

Controlled Close
Down of Services
Recovery

Controlled Draw
Down of Network

Recover

Figure 3.1 – Information Services Planning Process

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311. The information services estimate informs the information exchange

requirement 10 and is primed by the commander’s statement of his information needs 11
and will be further developed by the staff. 12 The information exchange requirement 3-
stage process, described in detail in Annex 3B, translates the commander’s
information needs (Ends) through the development of an appropriate architecture of
core services and applications known as the information services requirement
(Ways). 13 The information services requirement is then delivered by the
communications service requirement (means). 14 The culmination of the planning
process is the production of the CIS Directive which is the J6 annex within the JTFC
Directive. Although this process may appear linear it is in fact iterative and subject to
regular review. As understanding of the problem develops throughout the estimate the
plan is further refined. Critically there is an explicit requirement to feedback the art of
the possible to the JTFC, noting that information services can both enable and
constrain.

312. The CIS Directive articulates the types and quantity of equipment that will be
needed to deliver the required information services. The designed solution, when fully
resourced, will meet the commander’s information needs. These include, for example
ISR dissemination and the reach of logistics services across extended lines of
communication both within theatre, inter-theatre and back to the UK, while throughout
continuing to enable effective C2. The final element of the prepare phase will be the
testing and commissioning of the PJHQ J6 endorsed information services solution
prior to deployment.

SECTION IV – PREPARE PHASE

313. Information services planning is an iterative process conducted continually
throughout the operation. It is both harmonised with and integral to the J5 process to
ensure that it reflects the status and progress of the overall planning effort.
Consideration must be given to possible changes in scale of effort, posture, tempo, or
main effort as the operation progresses. Potential resource and capacity limitations are
also assessed and information services requirements prioritised in order to meet the
commander’s intent.

10
The information exchange requirement addresses the JTFC’s C4ISR requirements for the Joint Task Force, the
interaction of components and agencies as well as tasks required to enact the Campaign plan.
11
Output of Step 2a of the Operational Estimate.
12
Output of Step 2b of the Operational Estimate.
13
The information services requirement identifies the applications and core services (namely applications, e-mail, voice,
and so on) to meet the Users’ information needs.
14
The communication services requirement identifies the network systems (for example trunk (FALCON), satellite
(REACHER)) and infrastructure systems (for example DII (Future Deployed) and JPA) that deliver the applications and
core services identified in the information services requirement.

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Strategic Level Information Services Planning

314. The wider context for information services planning as part of Defence Crisis
Management is described in JDP 01 Campaigning and JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning.

315. CDS Directive. Chief Information Officer-J6 Operations (CIO/J6-Ops), PJHQ

J6 and DISS (as the Network Authority) contribute throughout the planning cycle to
develop the information services element of the Chief of Defence Staff’s (CDS)
Directive. The information services element of the Directive, known as the CIS
Annex, normally states the requirement for a Comd JFCIS although this role may be
assigned to the senior J6 15 representative within the deployed lead headquarters if the
scale of the task does not warrant a separate command appointment. 16 The CIS Annex
gives broad direction on planning freedoms and constraints and the C2 relationships
for strategic and high value CIS assets.

316. Mission Directive. The Joint Commander issues a Mission Directive to the
JTFC, expanding upon the military strategic direction in CDS’ Directive. The Joint
Commander is responsible for: giving further direction and advising the JTFC as
necessary; deploying, sustaining and recovering the force; and for monitoring and
reporting the progress of the campaign to CDS. The Joint Commander’s Mission
Directive normally includes a CIS Directive as an annex to the main document. 17
PJHQ J6 staff usually form the core elements of the JFCIS staff early in the
operational planning cycle to provide continuity throughout the operation.

Operational Level Information Services Planning

317. Information Services Estimate. The JTFC uses the Joint Commander’s
Mission Directive to prime his operational estimate, supported by the senior J6
representative 18 for the J6 elements. The information services estimate, shown at
Annex 3A, is harmonised with the operational estimate and subject to regular review
and feedback from the Joint Command Group. This allows the information services
estimate to track the commander’s guidance and direction to ensure that the solution
supports the JTFC’s plan. To ensure coherence, the deductions, tasks, commanders
critical information requirements and requests for information identified by the
commander during mission analysis, or by other staff branches during the operational
estimate process, are considered by J6 in the information services estimate. In turn,

15
For the purposes of this publication Comd JFCIS will be used to refer to the senior J6 representative deployed.
16
Normally, the SO1 J6 post within the standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) will routinely fulfil the role of
Comd JFCIS for Disaster Relief Operations (DRO), Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) or during the early
stages of a larger operation. Alternatively, the SO2 G6 within a Spearhead Lead Element (SLE) force elements may
assume the role if the JTFHQ is not mobilised.
17
Small scale tasks often do not require a separate information services Annex; therefore IS will be covered under a
separate entry within the main body of the Mission Directive.
18
If a Comd JFCIS is not deployed because the scale of the operation does not require one or the nominated Comd JFCIS
is not available within the planning timelines; either SO1 J6 within the JTFHQ will subsume this role (if the JTFHQ is to
be deployed) or ACOS J6 at PJHQ will retain the responsibility.

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key deductions, tasks and risks developed in the information services estimate must
feed the development of Courses of Action (CoA)s and the subsequent campaign plan
to ensure that they properly reflect the information exchange requirement and specific
information services considerations and limitations. This iterative process is the basis
for the detailed design, delivery and assurance of the information services plan. The
end product is promulgated in the J6 CIS Directive. The directive states how
information services will be deployed and managed within the JOA.

318. Capability deficiencies, identified during the information services estimate, are
addressed by CIO/J6-Ops, PJHQ or FLCs through the reallocation of assets or,
alternatively, through the UOR process. 19

Information Exchange Requirement

319. PJHQ J6, or Comd JFCIS, lead and co-ordinate the information exchange
requirement process of transforming the commander’s information needs into a co-
ordinated and prioritised information services requirement by location, service,
latency, quality of service, availability and level of assurance. DISS, the network
authority, leads the design for the CIS solution, and is supported by the Jt NETCEN,
or lead CIS support element. 20 In turn, PJHQ J6/Comd JFCIS approve the solution.
The information exchange requirement process is collaborative, iterative and dynamic.
It includes specialist contributions from the FLCs and DISS. At the earliest
opportunity, DISS convenes and co-ordinates an internal planning team to support the
operational planning process. The planning team ensures timely and coordinated
engagement across DISS to prioritise and allocate resources for the operation.

320. The first and most important stage of the information exchange requirement
process is the analysis of the commander’s information needs to establish the
requirements of all organisations that are supported by information services during the
operation. The second stage, scaling analysis, derives the number of users for
individual information services. The third stage is the production of the information
service requirement and communications service requirement. The information
services requirement identifies the capability to access and manipulate the
information. When combined with the scaling requirements this starts to identify
discrete capabilities. The communications service requirement provides a broad
operational architecture and details how the network elements will be delivered to
meet the commander’s information needs. The information exchange requirement
process is at Annex 3B and is the baseline from which the solution is designed,
developed and delivered. The chosen solution balances the requirement for service
19
In accordance with Defence urgent operational requirement procedures.
20
If a Jt NETCEN is not deployed because the scale of the operation does not require one; either the Officer
Commanding (OC) of the Signal Squadron deployed in support of the JTFHQ (if they are deployed), or OC of the
Spearhead Lead Element (SLE) Signal Detachment or the Global Operations Security and Communications Centre
(GOSCC) will subsume the responsibility. For the purposes of this publication, Jt NETCEN will be used to cover all
these eventualities.

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assurance and availability against acceptable cost, timescales for delivery and other
risks.

Design, Delivery and Assurance

321. As the Network Authority, DISS leads the detailed design, delivery and service
assurance of the information services solution. DISS is supported by the Jt NETCEN
and other external stakeholders, such as: FLCs, Level 3 and 4 Support Organisations
and other military and commercial service providers. The objective of this process is
to deliver PJHQ with detailed planning guidance on the timeline and costs of service
delivery options to develop potential solutions. These potential solutions, which also
identify initial operating capability and full operating capability targets to support the
commander’s plan, are prioritised and endorsed by PJHQ J6/Comd JFCIS. Gap
analysis, conducted by DISS and front line commands against the overall requirement,
may identify capability shortfalls which are submitted as candidate urgent operational
requirements in accordance with extant procedures. As the planning progresses,
DISS’s focus shifts towards the fulfilment and delivery of the end-to-end services to
meet the information exchange requirement. DISS provides end-to-end assurance of
service delivery for systems under the organisation’s responsibility, including the
coherence of delivery between service providers.

Implementation
322. Comd JFCIS sets out the tasks and timelines required to implement the
information services solution. This includes dates for the achievement of initial
operating capability and full operating capability for particular information services
resources and detailing the priority services that will initially be required upon
deployment. Comd JFCIS continuously reviews the progress of design, its
implementation and any risks identified.

323. The CIS Directive, issued by Comd JFCIS, details the selected information
services solution, the information exchange requirement, information services
requirement, communication services requirement, freedoms and constraints and the
associated Reports, Requests and Returns required from J6 formations across the JOA.
It will also give the desired order of arrival. The CIS Directive is subject to
configuration control and is regularly updated to ensure the information services
solution continues to satisfy the operational requirement. The framework for the CIS
Directive format is at Annex 3C and forms the J6 Annex to the JTFC Mission
Directive.

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SECTION V – CONSIDERATIONS
324. There are important planning considerations that complement the principles of
CIS. 21 These considerations cover operational, technical and personnel factors.
Additionally they inform the information services estimate.

325. Command and Control. C2 relationships between all deploying force

elements should be defined early in the planning process, particularly in multinational
or multi-agency operations, to fully capture the information needs of all participants.
A UK force deploying on operations will often form part of a broader coalition and
may be under the command of, or be in command of, other nations’ forces. The status
of the UK force as a contributory, lead or framework nation has significant impact on
the scale and nature of national and coalition information services required.
Therefore, the UK status within the coalition needs to be clearly articulated. 22
Planning should also consider any transition of capability provision to another nation
as part of a roulement or redeployment.

326. Security. Two factors to consider are the ability of an opponent to disrupt
friendly information services and the prevention of inadvertent disclosure of
information. Operations Security (OPSEC) protects essential elements of friendly
information against disclosure to an opponent. OPSEC is tailored to specific threats
on individual operations and seeks to strike an appropriate balance between need to
know and duty to share information. 23 Information Assurance (IA) considers
protecting information and information services by ensuring their availability,
integrity, authentication and confidentiality, and includes measures to ensure physical
security. Information security covers technical security measures to protect
information while in electronic form, and includes computer security, communications
security and radiation security. 24 Details of specific considerations for the planning
process are at Annex D.

327. Warning Time. Warning time influences the depth and scope of information
services planning as well as force elements held at readiness. Short warning tends to
limit the ability of industry to deliver urgent operational requirements or other
capabilities. Contributions from FLCs may be limited to that held at extremely high
readiness or very high readiness. Conversely, long lead times allow the development
of in-depth solutions, with enhanced resilience, encompassing the broader application
of commercial information services solutions.

328. Concurrency. Enduring or concurrent operations may limit the availability of

information services, requiring economy of effort and prioritisation between

21
See Chapter 1
22
Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) J5 should provide detailed guidance on the status of any UK force.
23
JDP 3-80.1, OPSEC, Deception and PSYOPS.
24
Authoritative CIS Security Policy is detailed in Joint Service Publication (JSP) 440, Defence Manual of Security.

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commitments. This may require strategic direction to either release additional

resources or accept a constraint on the freedom of manoeuvre of the relevant
commanders.

329. Environmental Considerations. Extremes of temperature, weather, terrain

and adverse electromagnetic conditions have a detrimental effect on the availability,
mobility, resilience and sustainability of information services equipment. The
information services plan will consider the requirement for environmental protection
and will balance the operational imperative against the demands of providing logistic
support to equipment in remote locations. It will also consider any environmental
limitations of the proposed equipments. 25

330. Force Protection. A less permissive operational environment will constrain

the freedom of movement of assets within the theatre. Force protection considerations
therefore may impact the provision of information services plan. The use of remote
sites to extend the range of terrestrial systems 26 represent a major challenge and will
often require dedicated force protection, logistic and level 2 and 3 support.

331. Host-Nation Support. Information services planning must take account of the
availability of host nation support across the JOA, as well as an understanding of the
interfaces required with the host government and its agencies. 27 Analysis includes
consideration of technical capabilities, the co-ordination of the Electromagnetic
Spectrum (EMS) between participating nations, arrangements for network (including
satellite communications) usage, and the potential use of other information services
provided by other government departments, international organisations and non-
governmental organisations. 28

332. Integrated Approach. It is important that commanders at all levels are able to
share information with non-military organisations. The information requirements of
other government departments, non-governmental organisations and international
organisations need to be captured as they are potential users of military information
services. The subsequent information services plan should facilitate a layered or
sectioned network to achieve interoperability within national and other government
departments. Although constrained by security considerations, this approach is
necessary to establish information flows across cultural divides, security gateways and
other barriers.

25
Equipment Programme (EP) funded equipment will be capable of working within adverse conditions.
26
If these cannot be provided or guaranteed, the resulting network will be less resilient and robust, which subsequently
leads to an increase in the number of personnel required to maintain the delivery of the CIS or the requirement for beyond
line of sight technology to be used at an increased cost to the operation.
27
PJHQ J4 should be consulted at an early stage and throughout planning when considering host nation support issues.
28
See Annex 2C for host nation support CIS matters; however, it should be noted that interoperability with outside
organisations is currently limited.

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333. Sustaining Information Services. To sustain information services an end-to-

end approach should be used to quickly identify and rectify any failures.
Considerations for Comd JFCIS during the prepare phase are:

a. Level 3 Support Organisations. Various military organisations, such

th
as 15 Signal Regiment, 90 Signals Unit and the Fleet Information Services
Support Unit (FISSU), can provide level 3 support to deployed information
services. The size and composition of this deployed support will be identified
in the estimate process having considered the following factors:

(1) The scale of the deployment.

(2) The diversity of systems and networks deployed.

(3) The information services environment (austere or rich). 29

(4) The availability targets required by the JTFC for information

services.

(5) The size of the JOA.

(6) Anticipated movement constraints in the JOA.

b. Surge Personnel. Surge personnel may be required to install

information services during the deployment phase of the operation and provide
specific additional support, such as upgrades, throughout the operation.
Factors to be considered during the estimate include:

(1) Any constraints on manning levels in the JOA.

(2) The time required to generate and deploy a surge capability.

(3) Force protection and Contractor Support to Operations (CSO)

management issues.

(4) Whether existing information services resources in the JOA, such

as manpower from another component, could meet the requirement.

(5) Disposition of forward and rear-based personnel to support CIS

capabilities linking the UK and the JOA.

29
An austere information services environment (for example, limited in resilience and robustness due to force protection
issues) will require a larger support envelope than a rich information services environment where sufficient resilience and
robustness exists such that some loss of services can be tolerated.

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c. Logistic Support. Comd JFCIS should consider logistic support to

information services as part of his planning process; and ensure that it is co-
ordinated with the Logistic Component staffs.

d. Environmental Support. Some Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS)

products may not be designed for use in extreme environments and may be
prone to degradation or failure due to temperature extremes, vibration, water
and foreign particles ingress. COTS equipment may, therefore, require
additional power as well as climatic, physical and electronic protection, which
will be delivered and managed by the Theatre J4. If COTS equipment is
needed a full understanding of the service management plan identifying how,
and by whom, equipment will be supported is required.

e. Contractor Support to Operations. Contractor support to operations

covers all forms of contractor support and encompasses: Contractors Deployed
on Operations (CONDO); contractor logistic support, where in-service
equipment is maintained under contract with the equipment provider; and the
use of contractors through the PJHQ Contractor Logistic contract, where a
range of services are provided from a long term commercial contract. 30 The
increase of long-term partnerships with industry through Private Finance
Initiative (PFI) to deliver military CIS capability has seen civilian staff become
fully integrated into all layers of information services provision. It is
necessary to be clear in advance on the status of contractors, including their
status under military law, the impact of any Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU) with a host nation (regarding their employment) and whether they are
subject to a Status of Forces Agreement. Operational circumstances may
preclude the use of contractor support to operations 31 and contractors may
choose not to deploy their personnel into high threat or austere environments.
In the CIS context, this risk is mitigated by the use of the long-term PFI
partnerships that help to develop military-commercial relationships, and early
engagement of contractors in the planning cycle. Nevertheless, should the
local situation deteriorate to the point that contractor support to operations no
longer wish to remain in the JOA, contingencies should be developed to
address their potential withdrawal of service delivery. This is a significant
planning constraint and one that requires capturing and investigating early to
ensure the risk is articulated to the JTFC and mitigation sought.

334. Interoperability. Interoperability provides connectivity across applications,

core services, infrastructure and networks to enable multinational and multi-agency
partners, components and force elements to share information. A degree of
30
As operations reach ‘steady-state’, early consideration should be given to recovering critical, high-readiness military
assets and replacing them with CSO assets where appropriate. PJHQ J6 is responsible for managing commercial solution
implementation.
31
MOD use of CSO is articulated in JSP 567 Contractors on Deployed Operations.

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interoperability with partners will have been included in the initial equipment
programme requirement although this may not provide a complete solution for a
specific operation. Therefore Comd JFCIS, PJHQ J6 or DISS must consider the
interoperability standards required during the planning process. Specifically the
planning process must consider: applications and databases and their associated data
standards; agreed technical protocols, configuration control, gateway management,
service management procedures, security and national caveats and common standard
operating procedures. Often a less capable solution that is interoperable with partners
is preferable to a more capable UK only solution. If a technical solution is not
available then information management and staff processes will need to be developed
to mitigate the risk.

335. Battlespace Spectrum Management. Battlespace Spectrum Management is

essential to enable optimal use of the EMS; this includes consideration of
deconfliction, protection, exploitation and denial. There are many competing demands
on the EMS and considerable risk of electronic fratricide, 32 which could lead to loss
of situational awareness or severely impact the commander’s ability to conduct the
operation by a denial of service. The Battlespace Spectrum Management process is
detailed at Annex 3E.

336. Personnel. Greater connectivity and the multinational and multi-agency

nature of the contemporary operations have increased the risk of information
overload. 33 It is essential to ensure that information management is driven by the staff
with a full understanding of the operational requirements for information exploitation
whatever their discipline. Staff selected to fulfil critical information services roles
should have the knowledge and experience to advise on the capabilities and limitations
of the CIS, information management, and information exploitation and information
superiority. Early identification of personnel to fill these roles presents the best
opportunity for induction, refresher, or technical update training. The need for
additional training increases significantly where a high percentage of the information
services plan is new or theatre specific.

32
Potential interference in the EMS that could impact radar, telemetry, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and radio
frequency capabilities.
33
Annex 1A provides a detailed insight into how Information Management (IM) is used to determine the information
needs and outputs of an operation.

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ANNEX 3A – INFORMATION SERVICES ESTIMATE
OP NAME

File Reference: Date:

References:

A. JDP 5-00 Joint Operations Planning.

B. JDP 6-00 Delivering Information Services to Enable Joint Operations.
C. Operational Estimate and Directives.

Time Zone Used Throughout Estimate:

MISSION ANALYSIS
MISSION: (from Jt Comd’s Directive)
(When known, JTFC Planning Guidance, outline Concept of Operations and Main Effort can be included here.)

(The text included in the Considerations/Deductions and Tasks/Constraints is included for guidance purposes only)

Factor Deduction Output

1. Intention of Superior Commander. It is important that the information services
Estimate examines the output of the Operational
a. Joint Commander (Jt Comd) intention Estimate.
is to….

b. Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)

intention is to….
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Factor Deduction Output

c. Deductions, tasks and constraints from

Operational Estimate.
2. Tasks. Tasks will be specified in the commander’s Remember:
statement of his information needs.
a. Specified. 1. Force Command and Control (C2) – Joint
Specified and implied tasks will be derived from Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), C2
b. Implied. the Jt Comd Directive as part of the Operational Structure, coalition partners, allies.
Estimate. 2. Joint (and Coalition) activities.
3. Co-ordination and interoperability with allies.
Consider also known tasks from Joint Planning 4. The principles of CIS planning.
Guide (JPG)/Joint Contingency Plan (JCP) and
doctrine (JDP) or Standard Operating Procedure All tasks must be considered and information
(SOP). services issues identified.

Test the completeness of the requirements set by Information services issues not for JTFHQ
running a set of standard mission threads against must be briefed to components.
the CONOPS, using the intended C2 structure,
ORBAT and scheme of manoeuvre to identify the JTFC Main Effort must be reflected in
totality of information flows required across the information services Main Effort.
battlespace (and back into the business space where
applicable).
3. Constraints. Detail on constraints will be derived as part of the
Operational Estimate. Consider also constraints
already identified in JPG/JCP and doctrine (JDP)
or SOP.
a. Time. Disseminate information services planning
timeline.
(1) Time available for planning. Long lead times may be required if there is a Include Op Timeline and deductions in
requirement to generate commercial information Warning Order to Permanent Joint

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Factor Deduction Output
services. Headquarters (PJHQ) & Commands CIS
Staff.

(2) Operation timelines. Consider implications for PJHQ, Commands & Constraints relating to:
Units. Remember 1/3, 2/3 Rule (1/3 time to
conduct your planning – 2/3 time to conduct their - JTFHQ & Force deployment.
planning). - Operation Phases & Activities.
- Recovery or Relief.
b. Space.

(1) JOA (size and location).

(2) Jt force elements locations. How does the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and the
lines of communication (loc) of the deployed force
constrain or influence the information services
CONOPS?
Consider JTFHQ/National Contingent
Commander (NCC), Component HQs, Joint
Force Elements (JFEs), National Support
Element (NSE), Forward Mounting Base
(FMB), Airport of Disembarkation (APOD),
Seaport of Disembarkation (SPOD), Deployment
Operation Base (DOB), etc.
c. INFORMATION SERVICES Are there requirements for data separation,
Resources. closed user groups, compartmented information,
etc.?

Will some users require additional resources to

meet these requirements?

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Factor Deduction Output
(1) UK information services. How does concurrent deployment, UK
infrastructure and information services equipment
availability constrain this operation?

What is the appropriate degree of resilience

required to meet the Comd’s intent?

(2) Allied information services. What part do allies play?

How may this constrain the information services

Course of
Action (CoA)?

What are the responsibilities for communication

between higher and lower headquarters?

(3) Host Nation (HN) information What is Global System for Mobile communications
services. (GSM) coverage?

(4) Other agencies.

d. ROE. How do the Rules of Engagement (ROE) affect the

use of the spectrum in the JOA?

e. CANNEL Alert State. What additional steps will be required to reach the
desired Information Security posture?

4. Has the Operational Environment Changed? (Since the Jt Comd’s Directive was received or the estimate completed.)

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Factor Deduction Output

5. Commander’s Direction.

a. JTFC Planning Guidance. What planning guidance must be passed to PJHQ Complete Warning Order to PJHQ and
J6 & Components at this stage? Front Line Commands (FLCs).
b. CCIR/RFI. Are there information services related Ensure information services related CCIRs
Commander’s Critical and RFI are addressed.
Information Requirements (CCIR)/ Requests for
information (RFI)?
What CCIR/RFI will impact on the information
services CoA
and how? What are the J6 RFI?

c. Clarification. What issues requiring clarification will impact

upon the information services CoA? How?

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EVALUATION OF FACTORS

Factor Deduction Output

6. Environment.

How will terrain features affect wireless

a. Terrain.
(Local Area Network) LAN and other radio
transmissions?
b. Weather. How will prevalent and expected weather
conditions affect wireless LAN and other radio
transmissions?

What environmental protection will equipment

need (for example, air conditioning, radomes, dust
protection)?
c. National Culture. What aspects of National culture within the
JOA impact on use of information services with
allies and the host nation? Consider language
requirements.
d. National information services Refer to host nation Joint Tactical Procedure (JTP)
within JOA. for initial data on host nation information services
ifrastructure.

e. Spectrum Utilistion. Determine the current usage of the spectrum in the Generate RFI – What is the usage of the
JOA.. spectrum in the JOA?
7. Adversary Forces. How do adversaries’ CoAs affect the information Task J2 to provide a specific electronic
services plan? threat assessment.

What is the threat to maritime, land–based

and air information services from adversary
physical attacks?

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Factor Deduction Output

Does threat preclude use of contractor support to

operations (CSO)?
a. Physical Threat.

b. Electronic Threat. What ability does the enemy have to intercept,

monitor or interfere with friendly transmissions?
c. Cyber Threat. What ability does the enemy have to conduct a
cyber attack on deployed networks and systems?
d. CBRN.

8. Friendly Forces. Confirm Force C2.

a. UK Joint Force. (JTFHQ, Mar, Land, Consideration must be given to inter-component Remember:
Air, Special Forces (SF), Logistics co-ordination staff. 1. Force C2 ((Combined (C)) JTFHQ, C2
(Log). Structure, coalition partners, allies).
2. Joint (and Coalition) activities.
3. Co-ordination & interoperability with
Allies.
b. Coalition. (Lead Nation, information
services
Framework Nation, UK NCC, UK NSE,
UK MAR/LAND/AIR/SF/Log).
c. Allies.
d. International, National and Non- Consideration should be given to the use of
Governmental Organisations. information services by such agencies as well as
the need for communications to and from them.

What is the minimum security level for each

facility?

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Factor Deduction Output
e. SIGINT and Electronic Warfare. How will SIGINT and electronic warfare impact
on the information services plan?

Are there information services requirements for

co-ordination with J3 Operations Support?
f. Inter-agency.

g. Welfare. Provide advice to J1 on Welfare

information services.
h. Spectrum Management. What are the spectrum management requirements? Define spectrum requirement for
deployment.

Identify available spectrum within the

JOA.

Identify spectrum clearance procedures.

Determine Joint Force spectrum

management plan.
i. Logistics.

(1) Sustainability. Consider the disposition of spares, supply lines and

support elements.
(2) Critical information services. Consider the disposition of mission-critical spares.

j. Movement and requirement for Who, what, where to and when?

asset tracking.
(1) Strategic Movement.

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Factor Deduction Output
(a) Availability of assets. Ensure information services is reflected
on the Desired Order of arrival Staff
Table (DOAST).
(b) Desired Order of Arrival
(DOA).

(c) Import restrictions.

(2) Intra-Theatre Movement. The need to manoeuvre may dictate the

static/transportable/mobile options available in a
commercial solution.
(a) Availability of assets.

(b) Import restrictions.

(c) Extra time for road/air

transport.
k. Force Protection.

9. Information Operations.

a. Security – Protecting UK
Information and Network
Infrastructure.
(1) Electronic protection measures. In addition to considering the enemy threat,
consider issues relating to working alongside
coalition partners and allies.

How will UK information be protected whilst also

protecting coalition information?
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Factor Deduction Output

What aspects of the Information Operations (Info

Ops) plan impact on Joint Force information
services?
(2) Physical security. Wireless LANs introduce additional
challenges.
(3) Crypto protection. What gateways to other nations’ Crypto may be Determine crypto plan, including
required? responsibility for distribution of both
materiel and regular KEYMAT updates
across the JOA.
(4) EMCON.

(5) Information Security. Does the JTF require a Force INFOSEC Team A FIT would normally be deployed if the
(FIT)? JTFHQ were deployed and would work
alongside the deployed Computer Network
Is there a need for a deployed Monitoring and Defence (CND) effort, based in the
Reporting Centre (MRC)? NETCEN for Comd JFCIS.

Is there a need for Computer Incident Response?

(6) Co-ordinating Installation

Design authority (CIDA)
Requirements.

(7) Personnel Security. Will security access for foreign nationals be

required?

b. Deception.

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Factor Deduction Output
10. Time. Identification of fixed or proposed times for the Op timelines must be reflected in
deployment of Force Elements, information services CoA.
establishment of HQs and the development of Op
phases across the JOA, including any subsequent
needs to commercialise.

How should the information services deployment

be phased?
11. Pre-deployment information services What is the impact of pre-deployment information Any requirement for pre-deployment
preparation and training. services preparation and training on CoA? preparation and training must be
reflected in the Assessment of Tasks, the
information services CoA and the
information services CONOPS.

12. C2 of information services. What augmentation of the JTFHQ J6 or JFCIS/Jt Determine C2 arrangements for Joint,
NETCEN staff is required? operational level information services,
including relationship with ISS/GOSCC.
What Level 3 Support provision is required?
a. Command and control
arrangements.

b. Information services staff.

c. Specify freedoms and constraints.

13. Information management. What impact will the Joint Information

Management Plan have on information services
CoA?
a. JTFHQ.
b. Components.

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Factor Deduction Output
c. Coalition Partners & Allies.
d. Host Nation.
e. International Organisations (IOs)/
Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs).
14. Summary of Possible Tasks.

All tasks should be identified as essential or optional. In addition, it may be helpful to prioritise essential tasks.

Task Resources / Comment Task Resources / Comment

Identify Tasks by: Task, Staff
Check, Clarification, RFI.

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CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION SERVICES COURSES OF ACTION

Factor Deduction Output

15. List all CoAs from the operational List all possible information services CoAs Consider advantages and disadvantages of
estimate. to satisfy each CoA. each CoA. Backbrief J3/J5 on any
information services CoA that impacts
adversely on CoA in Operational Estimate.

What tasks, advantages or disadvantage are common to all information services CoAs?

16. Selection of CoA.

This can only be done when the JTFC has made his decision as to the CoA for the JTF.
An outline information services CONOPS, including Main Effort, is produced now.

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STANDARD REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
On most operations many of the questions generated by the information services Estimate are routine. Nevertheless they
must be answered in order to inform the planning process. It may be useful to produce these RFI early in the planning
process and refine them later.

The J6 officer on an Operation Liaison and Reconnaissance (OLRT) or advance party could answer many of them.

Ser RFI Area Considerations

1. What limitations - physical or financial - are there on the JTF’s use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)
Electromagnetic across the JOA?
Environment
Who and where is the local spectrum management authority?
What extant agreements exist for our use of the spectrum?

2. What are the SIGINT capabilities of the adversary?

What are the EW capabilities of the adversary?
Enemy Forces What are the Computer Network Attack (CAN), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and CND capabilities
of the enemy?
Request information services vulnerability report on own forces to match with the threat above.

3. What coalition information services will be used within the Force?

What military information services or support, including EW and SIGINT, can the HN provide?
Allies
What information services or support, including EW and SIGINT, can allies provide?
Confirm understanding/acceptance higher-to-lower principle coalition-wide.

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Ser RFI Area Considerations

4. Other Agencies What information services do OGDs (including British Missions), NGOs and IOs have in the JOA?

5. Is a Force INFOSEC Team (FIT) survey required, and, if so, what capabilities will they need?
Request deployed CND capability commensurate with information services vulnerability report.
Security What are the accreditation requirements for the desired equipment?
Does the JTF require a Theatre Cryptographic Distribution Agency?
Is there suitable crypto available for coalition use?
6. What is the SATCOM footprint for all likely friendly military and civil satellites to be used (SKYNET,
INMARSAT etc)?
What cellular phone coverage is there in the JOA?
How reliable are the cellular networks?
What cellular protocols are used in the JOA (that is, GSM, DAMPS, analogue, WAP, GPRS, 3G) and in what
band?
Host nation Who are the main suppliers of cellular services in the JOA?
information Are cellular handsets readily available, what is the cost to hire and who are the best local suppliers?
services
How is the local telephone network provided and controlled?
What is the HN telephone socket format?
Who is our point of contact for local telephone network service provision?
Who are the main suppliers of PTT services in the JOA?
How reliable is the local telephone network?
What are the local telephone network call response times (International)?

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Ser RFI Area Considerations

What are the local telephone network call charges (international and local)?
What are the local telephone network engineering response times?
Is ISDN available and if so what type of ISDN protocols are used?
How are international trunks accessed, is it direct (IDD) or through an exchange?
What Local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are available and are they reliable?
Host nation
information Which major International ISPs (CompuServe/AOL, etc..) are available?
services (continued) What are the host nation domestic electrical power standards and normal wall socket and plug formats?
What are the host nation frequency clearance procedures?
Do any MOUs or other agreements exist for SATCOM access?
Are there any bandwidth limitations/special baseband requirements?
Are there any local microwave interference issues?

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ANNEX 3B – INFORMATION EXCHANGE

REQUIREMENT

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION
3B1. The information exchange requirement translates the commander’s information
needs (ends) through the development of an appropriate architecture of core services
and applications known as the information services requirement (ways). This provides
the foundation for developing the network design that is articulated in the
communications service requirement (means). This process, supported by the output
from the information services estimate, develops the detail required by information
services staff to provide robust and capable operational capability throughout all
phases of the campaign. To ensure maximum flexibility with limited capability and
within resources, the JTFC and his staff should articulate their information needs
rather than the process or systems they may already be familiar with.

SECTION II – 3-STAGE INFORMATION EXCHANGE

REQUIREMENT PROCESS
Operational
and IS Estimate

J5 Led CPT
(with J6 Advice)

Commander’s • What information?

FLCs

Information Needs • What time frame?

• How is it presented
ISR Analysis to what level of
detail and accuracy?
Iterative Analysis of Scaling • Who does it need
J1-9 Staff Input information
Process Analysis to be shared with?
Needs

ISR
J6 Staff Support (Owned by J5,
and Advice developed by J6)

Gap Analysis
(J6 Lead)

CSR
(J6 Lead)
No

PJHQ J6
Review and Endorse
Yes

IS Solution

Figure 3B.1 – Information Exchange Requirement Process

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3B2. The 3-Stage information exchange requirement process ensures that all staff
branches contribute the necessary information at the appropriate time, as shown in
Figure 3B.1. 1

3B3. Analysis of Information Needs. The analysis of the information needs is the
first and most important stage of the information exchange requirement process and
aims to identify the ways of working required between the organisations supporting an
operation. This requires the identification of: what information the commander needs,
in what timeframe (real-time, near real-time or higher latency); how is it presented, to
what level of depth or detail, how accurate does it need it to be; and who does it need
to be shared with (multinational, host nation, other governmental departments and so
on)? This analysis defines the transfer and sharing of information between staff
branches within the JTFHQ and components, including special forces, headquarters
and other formations both inside and outside the JOA. It should include other
government departments, coalition partners, international organisations and non-
governmental organisations. While many of the commander’s information needs can
be explicitly drawn out of his statement of information needs as well as the operational
and information services estimate, others may be implied or not immediately
identifiable. The analysis provides the foundation for developing the required
architecture and eventual network design, and constitutes the rationale for all
information services requirements. J1-9 staffs must provide the underpinning
information required for the analysis with J6 staff providing support and advice as
required.

3B4. Scaling Analysis. Scaling Analysis is the second stage in the information
exchange requirement process. It details the number of personnel associated with each
formation and how many of them require concurrent access, grouped against generic
information services. Again, staff branches must provide the appropriate information,
with the support of J6/JFCIS staff.

3B5. Components. Component commands conduct their own analysis and ensure
that the resulting information exchange requirement for their information services is
incorporated in a timely manner into the overall campaign information exchange
requirement and is passed through their front line commands into the J5-led
contingency planning team.

3B6. Production of the Information Services Requirement and

Communications Services Requirement. Production of the information services
requirement is the stage at which J6 staff combines the data captured within the
analysis of information needs and the scaling analysis, and apply their technical
expertise and experience to develop the information services architecture. This
process must take into account any resource constraints such as availability of network
1
Further detail may be found in Commander Joint Force CIS Standing Operating Instructions.

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and infrastructure equipment. Any gaps in capability can then be fed back to the
commander to prioritise his information needs or request that additional capability is
provided; often this is will require a urgent operational requirement process.
Representative examples of a completed information services requirement and
communication services requirement are at Appendices 3B1 and 3B2 respectively.

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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

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APPENDIX 3B1 – EXAMPLE INFORMATION SERVICES REQUIREMENT

Core Services Application Services
Ser Area Class Office Loc A Loc B Loc C Loc D Remarks
Voice Email Web Publish Collate VTC HR C2 SA ISR
Extras
JTFH
1 U - 20 20 5 - - - Y N N N UK - - -
QJ1
JTFH Visio, NATO
2 R - 20 20 10 20 - Y N Y N CC UK APOD
QJ1 Project HQ
JTFH
3 SUKEO 5 5 5 5 5 Project 10 N Y Y N CC UK - APOD
QJ1
JTFH NATO
4 MS 20 20 20 20 20 - 10 Y Y Y N CC UK -
QJ1 HQ
JTFH
5 U - - 5 - 5 - -
QJ2
JTFH
6 R - 10 10 - 5 - -
QJ2
Access,
JTFH
7 SUKEO 10 10 10 10 10 Visio, 5
QJ2
Project
Access,
JTFH
8 MS 10 10 10 10 10 Visio, 5
QJ2
Project
JTFH
9 TS 5 5 5 5 5 Access 2
QJ2

Figure 3B1.1 – Example of the Information Services Requirement

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3B1.1. Information Services Requirement Completion. The information needs of all

deploying personnel must be collated and translated into capabilities in order to enable J6 to
deliver an appropriate solution. The naming of specific systems must be avoided to enable
the delivery of a coherent and supportable network to enable information services. To
assist with developing this information, the framework offered in the table shown at Figure
3B1.1 should be used. The table should be amended for each location and each operation.
It is divided into the following components:

a. Area. The group name of the working area, i.e. J1 within the JTFHQ or A1
within the Air Component Headquarters.

b. Classification. The classification that the users predominately require to

work on. The normal choices will be unclassified, restricted, secret UK eyes only,
mission secret 1 and top secret. Other classifications can be added, such as US/UK
Eyes Only, NATO Secret, etc.

c. Core Services. 2 These are the core tools that users will require on a daily
basis that will be delivered on every operation. The number represents how many
users, by each area, require access.

d. Application Services. This area captures the generic application set that the
user will require access to. For example, Human Resources (HR) will result in
delivery of the most appropriate HR application, not necessarily a specific one.
This information enables J6 to deliver the CIS that can meet the operational
requirement, while maintaining the integrity of the system, delivering services with
in-built resilience and reducing pre-deployment training overheads. The cells
should be completed with either yes (Y) or no (N) to identify each area’s access
requirements.

e. Locations. The location boxes will enable J6 to identify who the users need
to communicate with most and how best to enable those services. The locations
should be broken down by order of priority, for example component commands may
be their highest priority, then UK, then NATO headquarters, etc.

3B1.2. J6 staff will advise and support all staff branches during completion of the
information services requirement, to ensure all users’ information needs have been captured
and accurately articulated. Upon completion, the information services requirement will
form the basis of identifying any gaps in capability, which could result in urgent operational
requirement action, and used to develop the communications services requirement which is
covered in detail at Appendix 3B2.
1
Generic term to identify a coalition system specifically designed for the operation.
2
Services those are normally available through the appropriate service catalogue.

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APPENDIX 3B2 – EXAMPLE COMMUNICATIONS

SERVICES REQUIREMENT
JTFHQ Communications Services Requirement
Throughput/
Preferred Intra/Inter
Service Classification Users Traffic Comments
Solution Theatre
Profiles
DATA
RLI tunnelled
Internet Unclass PJHQ.COM 10 Inter
– 128k
Inter and
Log IS Restricted HOUSEKEEPER 30 RLI – 512k
Intra
Inter and
C2 SUKEO DII/FD 50 SLI – 512k
Intra
C2 Mission Secret OVERTASK 150 Blue – 2M Intra
Top Secret Inter and
ISR LABYRINTH 20 RLI – 2M
Strap 1 Intra
Inter and
VTC UKEO xxxxx 40 SLI – 512k
Intra
VOICE
Inter and
UK SUKEO FALCON 150 SLI – 128k
Intra
Inter and
UK Top Secret BRENT 20 RLI – 128k
Intra
Coalition Mission Secret VOIP 150 Blue – 128k Intra
MESSAGING
FAX SUKEO xxxxx 5 SLI – 128k Inter
Top Secret Inter and
FORMAL xxxxx 2 SLI – 128k
Strap 1 Intra
APPLICATIONS
Inter and
HR Restricted JPA 20 -
Intra
HR Mission Secret NATO Admin 20 - Intra
Inter and
SA SUKEO JOP 150 -
Intra
C2 Mission Secret JADOCS 50 - Intra

Figure 3B2.1 – Template of the Communications Services Requirement

3B2.1. Communications Services Requirement Completion. Using the information

services requirement completed in accordance with Appendix 3B1, J6 staff will
identify how the information services will be delivered. Figure 3B2.1 to this
Appendix is used to capture the common requirements and will identify the broad
order bandwidth requirements. Much of this work will use pre-defined information to
assist with the capture.

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3B2.2. Following completion of the communication services requirement it will be

released to DISS and the front line commands to derive the plans for the delivery of
the information services solution. The use of the preferred solution will enable the
delivery team to better understand what system could meet the user’s information
needs; however, it may not be feasible to deliver that particular element for a variety
of reasons.

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ANNEX 3C – COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION

SERVICES DIRECTIVE
Issuing Headquarters:
Place of issue:
Date/Time Group of Signature: XXXXXXZ MMM YY

File Reference:

INFORMATION SERVICES DIRECTIVE

OP [****]

References: [Add references as required, for example a Joint Task Force

Commander’s (JTFC’s) Campaign Directive and other instructions should be
included and referred to in the detail of the document.]

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: XXXX

Other time zones in which elements of the Force are located should also be detailed.

SITUATION

[Taken from the JTFC’s Campaign Directive or equivalent documentation.]

1. Situation. [Detail as required to set the context for CIS staff required to satisfy
the IXR.]

2. Mission. The Joint Task Force (JTF) is to….[a clear, concise statement of the
task of the command and its purpose].

a. Commander’s Intent. My Intent is ... [This should focus on the overall

effect the JTF is to have and the desired situation it will bring about. It should
be a concise and precise statement of what the JTFC intends to do and why, and
should not be a synopsis of the operation. In effect it provides the enduring logic
behind the whole Campaign Plan.]

b. Scheme of Manoeuvre. [This should describe how the JTFC sees the
Campaign Plan unfolding. The JTFC should explain where, when and how the
JTF will achieve its purpose, so that subordinates can understand what their
particular role is in the overall plan and the effects they are to achieve.]

c. Main Effort. [Main Effort is the concentration of forces or effect, in a

particular area, in order to bring about a decision. It is the principal method by

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which a JTFC makes his overall intent clear to his subordinates and will usually
be supported by the allocation of resources in order to give substance to that
which he considers crucial to the success of his mission.]

3. JTF C2. Annex A.

4. JTF Liaison Matrix. Annex B.

5. Task Organisation. Annex C.

a. Attachments. Describe which units will be attached from where, for

what purpose, and to be effective from what date/time.

b. Detachments. Describe which units will be detached to where, for what

purpose, and to be effective from what date/time.

INFORMATION SERVICES

6. Information Exchange Requirement. Annex D. 1

7. Threat to CIS. A clear articulation of the threat to CIS in the JOA is essential
from the outset to ensure that all the security factors are considered, safeguards
established and information appropriately assured. The threat statement includes the
opponent’s ISTAR threat (for example, SIGINT) and Cyber Threat within the JOA
and globally as it applies to the operation.

JFCIS MISSION

8. A succinct statement of Comd JFCIS’ Mission. For example, to provide

Communication and Information Services within the JOA in order to enable the JTF to
set the conditions for…

EXECUTION

END-STATE

9.

1
Described in Annex 3B to this publication.

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INFORMATION SERVICES CONCEPT OF OPS

10. Intent.

11. SoM.

12. Main Effort.

13. Role of Jt NETCEN. The Jt NETCEN is to determine and maintain

configuration control of the operational network and systems required to meet the IXR
under the direction of Comd JFCIS. Jt NETCEN is the nominated engineering and
configuration authority for the deployed network and associated systems.

FREEDOMS AND CONSTRAINTS

14. Comd JFCIS is delegated OPCON of all information services within the JOA,
with the exception of the following (for example SF CIS 2 and SATCOM 3 ), to support
the JTFC’s Intent and Main Effort. To achieve this, Comd JFCIS directs the
disposition and usage of CIS within the JTF, regardless of origin or ownership.

15. Key Principle. Where constraints have not been specified by the Network
Operating Authority or PJHQ, Comd JFCIS allows components the freedom to
configure and operate information services to support local Comds, but this only
applies to capability which is not part of a wider network or Joint Force C2
integration.

16. Specific Constraints.

JOA CIS LAYDOWN

17. Core Information Services Architecture. Annex E.

18. Operational-level Information Services.

19. Tactical Networks.

a. Secure and Insecure Voice.

b. Formal Messaging and Secure Facsimile.

2
The reallocation of SF CIS requires Director SF approval.
3
Strategic satellite communications (SATCOM) capability remains OPCOM with CIO/J6-Ops and CJO retains OPCON.
It cannot be delegated.

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20. Satellite Communications.

21. Radio Networks.

a. Point-to-point service.

b. Radio Automatic Tele-Type (RATT).

c. Air-to-ground.

d. Shore-ship.

e. Ship-ship.

f. Air Traffic control.

22. Tactical Data Links.

23. Coalition Information Services.

24. Host Nation Services.

25. Inter Agency Information Services.

26. Special Information Services.

27. Service Delivery. Annex F.

JOINT (AND MULTINATIONAL) INTEROPERABILITY

28. This section covers both Joint and multinational interoperability of systems and
services at all levels of command (Strategic, Operational and Tactical). A detailed
Interoperability Matrix is included at Annex G.

TASKS

29. Jt NETCEN.

30. JTFHQ.

31. All Component Commands. To remove repetition, tasks that apply equally to
all CCs should be described here.

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32. MCC.

33. LCC.

34. ACC.

35. JFLogCC.

36. Joint Force Support.

37. To include CIS supporting and supported commanders.

CO-ORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

38. Timings.

39. Risks. Annex H.

40. Restoration Priorities. Annex I.

41. Battlespace Spectrum Management Plan.

42. INFOSEC Measures (such as CND) and information services Security.

43. Personal Equipment and HN CIS usage policy.

44. Engineering Recovery Plan. Annex J.

45. Formal Messaging Plan. Annex K.

SUSTAINABILITY PLAN

46. Sustainment Concept.

47. Level 3 Support.

48. Critical Spares.

49. Commercialisation (ISS Plans) and Enabling Works.

50. CSO.

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MISSION ESSENTIAL AND CRITICAL EQUIPMENT

51. Identify equipment (Annex L) that is fundamental to the successful achievement

of a mission (Mission Essential) and equipment that, if lost, would cause the loss of
mission-essential capability (Mission Critical). Detail how such equipment is to be
allocated and controlled.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

52. Appointments and Locations.

53. Alternative Comd/Headquarters.

54. Information Services R2.

55. Information Services Liaison.

56. EMCON.

Ack: Authenticate:

NAME NAME
Rank Rank
JTFC Comd JFCIS

Annexes:

A. JTF C2.
B. JTF Liaison Matrix.
C. Task Organisation.
D. IXR.
E. Core Information Services Architecture.
F. Services Delivery Plan.
G. Interoperability Matrix.
H. JFCIS Risks.
I. Restoration Priorities.
J. Engineering Recovery Plan.
K. Formal Messaging Plan.
L. Jt Mission Essential and Critical Equipment.

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Distribution:

JFMCC AmphibFor
JFLCC 11 Sig Bde
JFACC 90 SU
JFLogCC J3 Ops Sp
Jt NETCEN
JFEngr

Copy to:

CIO/J6-Ops
PJHQ
JTFHQ
FLCs (via PJHQ)
HQ DSF
ISS

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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

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ANNEX 3D – SECURITY AND INFORMATION

GOVERNANCE
3D1. Authoritative Communications and Information Services (CIS) Security Policy
is detailed in Joint Service Publication (JSP) 440, Defence Manual of Security. This
Annex sets out the high-level approach to security and its application to the
governance of CIS capability. It is a guide to the factors considered on operations.
This Annex describes constituent elements of information governance, particularly
those within the scope of Information Assurance (IA) and how they relate to
equipment and services so that appropriate measures may be taken before, during and
after an operation. IA is a contributor to Operations Security (OPSEC) 1 and hence to
force protection.

SECTION I – SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

3D2. Security. Information services are of little use to a commander if they
compromised or delayed. The threat to information services, articulated in Comd
JFCIS CIS Directive, defines the appropriate security requirements.

3D3. Aggregation of Information. Throughout an operation, there is a risk of an

opponent intercepting seemingly unimportant pieces of information which, when
aggregated, lead to the deduction of important intelligence about friendly operations.
Therefore, the timely accreditation 2 of information services and the application of IA
measures are at the forefront of information services planning.

3D4. Protection. Information services are protected to survive physical and

electronic attack or failure according to the value of the information held and its
importance to users. If protection is breached, recovery measures should be available
to restore capacity. Diversity and redundancy are both used to enhance network
protection.

3D5. Risk Management. The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), advised by
Comd JFCIS, balances the implications of reduced IA against the required operational
tempo. The establishment of an IA Officer enables Comd JFCIS to provide
appropriate risk management advice. Effective Security Risk Management (SRM)
ensures that risk owners are aware of the level of risk they are holding and the impact
should an incident occur.

3D6. Vulnerability Analysis. Specialist units, with engineering, information

services security and intelligence communications professionals, undertake an

1
OPSEC is the process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means,
to deny an enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6).
2
A formal statement confirming that the use of a system meets extant security requirements and that its use does not
present any unacceptable risk. (JSP 440, Defence Manual of Security).

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Information Security (INFOSEC) Vulnerability Analysis for the Commander, 3 which

includes:

a. Defensive Monitoring (DM), 4 which may be used to monitor

unencrypted forms of communication (unencrypted radio (voice), static
telephone, service mobile telephone and facsimile transmissions) at fixed and
deployed sites.

b. DISS will deliver TEMPEST inspections and assessments to help

minimise compromising emanations from computer and communications
systems.

c. Technical Security Countermeasures Assessment (TSCMA) to identify

the presence of clandestine eavesdropping devices.

d. Computer Security (COMPUSEC), monitoring and audit tasks to

identify the vulnerabilities of networked and distributed Information
Technology (IT) systems, and to recommend remedial measures.

3D7. Allied and Coalition Communications. When UK and allied forces operate
together, secure communications are usually provided in accordance with Allied
Communications Publications (ACPs). For coalition operations, the lead nation
generally determines appropriate INFOSEC. National CIS remains subject to national
CIS Security Policy.

3D8. Application of Security Policy. Information services security policy applies

to all military and civil information services used in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
To avoid confusion with single-Service procedures, information services Security
Policy is detailed in the CIS Directive.

3D9. Operations Security. OPSEC is a J3 lead, but has close ties to J6:

a. Planning. During planning for an operation, there is an increase in

communications traffic between headquarters and nominated force elements.
Information services used during the planning process requires appropriate
protection. Subsequent force element preparation requires practise in OPSEC
techniques, usually through exercises or mission rehearsals. Consideration
should be given to disguising these events by deception techniques where
practicable. INFOSEC is used to prevent any indication that force elements
preparation is tied to a particular operational plan or geographical area.

3
Depending on the risks identified and the prevalent threat to CIS, Comd JFCIS may request a Force INFOSEC Team
(FIT) to deploy as part of the JTFHQ J6/JFCIS for all or part of an operation.
4
An IA technique formerly known as ‘COMSEC Monitoring’.

3D-2
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b. Force Assembly. Irrespective of whether the operation is mounted from

the UK, or from a forward mounting base, force assembly generates significant
traffic over strategic information services links. Increased communications
traffic to, or from, an assembly area may focus an adversary’s interest, and
result in an increased hostile intercept effort. Political events may indicate UK
interest, but only the interception of communications may provide information
about the timing, location and scope of any future operation. Transmission
security in modern systems significantly improves protection against an
adversary intercepting and analysing friendly communications. INFOSEC
during this phase is enhanced by the use of only approved information
services.

c. Deployment. Communication increases markedly during the

deployment phase, particularly on information services supporting maritime
and air assets. OPSEC is critical during this period, and the imposition of
radio and electronic silence should be considered to deny information to the
adversary. It is vital that OPSEC is maintained during deployment, and under
no circumstances should insecure means be used to pass sensitive deployment
information.

d. Force Entry. Radio silence is often appropriate during force entry and
compliance with the Emission Control (EMCON) plan is essential.

SECTION II – INFORMATION GOVERNANCE

Information Security
3D10. Figure 3D.1 illustrates the links between security disciplines. 5 Within the
framework of information governance and IA, information security describes the
security measures taken to safeguard information in any form. It provides an
important connection between traditional security staffs embedded within the J2/3
community and those directly charged with the protection of information services and
its products. The information services community has a particular INFOSEC
responsibility, given its ownership of the provision and maintenance of CIS
equipment, to ensure that the risks to information are identified and appropriately
managed.

3D11. The INFOSEC measures required are determined by a Vulnerability

Assessment and/or Risk Analysis, and implemented with the appropriate Criticality
Level (CL) of the CIS and/or Protective Marking (PM) of the information being
handled, stored, processed or transmitted. This process ensures that confidentiality,
integrity, availability and accountability concerns are addressed.
5
DGInfo/CBMJ6/CND Policy 1.5 dated 14 May 2007 MOD Policy for Information Assurance in the Deployed
Environment.

3D-3
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Figure 3D.1 – Linkage between Security Disciplines

Computer Security

3D12. COMPUSEC covers all facets of computer security to ensure the

confidentiality, integrity and availability of IT systems, and is applied to both
hardware and software. Deployed information services staffs should be aware of the
significant risks that exist through the lack of accreditation of some legacy systems,
standalone equipment and small systems as advised by each system’s accreditor and
risk owner. Accreditation advice should be taken prior to deployment or after any
subsequent significant system changes, including all proposed changes to connectivity.
Compliance with system security policies and any additional local policies
(particularly in a multinational environment) is a vital element of COMPUSEC.

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Communications Security
3D13. Communications Security (COMSEC) measures are specialised protective
security measures taken to ensure the confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation
and integrity of information in communications channels. On operations, COMSEC
procedures are designed and issued as JTF-level instructions, particularly if they differ
from Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Most COMSEC procedures are detailed
in the CIS Directive, but it may be appropriate to produce a specific instruction on
COMSEC depending on the scale and classification of the operation. Such an
instruction covers the duties and responsibilities for COMSEC, but emphasises:

a. Arrangements for the distribution of cryptographic material.

b. Transportation of cryptographic material.

c. Handling and storage of protectively marked material.

d. Transmission of plain language communications.

3D14. Measures that indicate the levels of information leakage and that help deny an
opponent the opportunity to electronically eavesdrop include:

a. Defensive Monitoring. DM is essential to reinforce OPSEC training

and to act as a deterrent against poor COMSEC, including EMCON. DM
equipment is used to monitor all unencrypted forms of communication.

b. Technical Security Countermeasures Assessment. Eavesdropping

uses clandestine listening devices to overhear and transmit or record
conversations. An electronically-safe working area is critical in deployed
environments where information is processed in unfamiliar locations. This is
particularly important early in an operation or during a reconnaissance phase
where un-trusted facilities may have to be used. The provision of an
electronically safe working area requires an inspection comprising both a
physical check and a TSCMA. Specialist units 6 and staff within deployed
headquarters hold deployable TSCMA equipment.

3D15. COMSEC procedures also provide protection against Electronic Attack,

including any defensive measures against search, interception and direction finding,
jamming and deception. These procedures are produced as a JTF-level instruction -
Protection against Electromagnetic Attack (see Section III).

6
For example, 591 Signals Unit at RAF Digby and ISS DE3A EST at Blandford.

3D-5
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Cryptographic Security
3D16. Specially devised methods or processes, usually called cryptosystems, are used
to protect information in communications channels. Cryptosystems are used to
conceal the content of communications and their effectiveness depends on the strength
of the cryptologist used, the overall protection given to the cryptosystem and the
correct use of operating procedures. Specific guidance on cryptographic security is
published in BMD/0001/0001 the Defence Cryptosecurity Operating Instructions and
JSP 440. UK national instructions are compatible with the corresponding NATO
Cryptographic Security Instructions published in Allied Military Security General
(AMSG) 293 and Allied instructions contained in ACP 122(E) Information Assurance
for Allied Communications and Information Systems.

3D17. Most modern UK and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

cryptosystems are highly resistant to cryptoanalysis, but a determined and capable
adversary could obtain details of the cryptology either by theft or by suborning a
UK/NATO national. Cryptographic material is safeguarded by enforcing a
comprehensive security policy, articulating physical, personnel, and communications
security (including Radiation Security (RADSEC) and TEMPEST). Comd JFCIS
directs which protective measures are applied to information exchanges and
information storage, including online and offline cryptographic systems, secure speech
equipment and authentication and code systems.

Radiation Security
3D18. RADSEC manages the risk associated with radio signals, both intentional and
unintentional. Compromising emanations, when intercepted and analysed, may
disclose protectively marked information. An essential element of RADSEC is
TEMPEST, the investigation and study of unintentional emanations. In addition, it is
important to conceal the radio frequencies to be used by UK forces, normally
conducted in conjunction with the Battlespace Spectrum Management (BSM) Plan.

Computer Network Defence

3D19. Information services relies heavily on computer networks, and the risk from
Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) is
increasing due to a proliferation of increasingly sophisticated opponents and
techniques. Countermeasures are essential to provide IA. Alert, Warning and
Response (AWR) is vital to the Computer Network Defence (CND) effort and JSP
541MOD Alert Warning and Response Policy and Procedures Manual describes the
procedures for implementing CND measures across Defence networks.

3D-6
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3D20. Networks are susceptible to attack from a wide range of opponents: directly
from individuals, terrorists and Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS); and indirectly
from malicious code such as viruses. The risk of attack becomes more acute as
frontline capability becomes increasingly network enabled.

3D21. The most likely method of electronic attack against information services is
through gateways with other systems. Access could be made via the information
systems of third parties, such as allies, industry or other government departments,
which are connected to military systems. Indirect attacks may be made against
services upon which military activities depend. CND is used to counter attacks and is
defined as actions taken within an overall IA framework to deter, protect from, react
to and recover from a CNA or CNE on MOD’s computer networks. Threats to
information hosted on the MOD’s computer networks are categorised in Figure 3D.2:

Figure 3D.2 – MOD CND ‘Threat Stack’

3D22. Although CND can detect and respond to threats from the lower 3 categories in
Figure 3B.2, its operational focus is on the top 2 categories of FIS and elite hackers. A
balanced and cost-effective mix of CND measures is deployed to counter these threats
to provide credible defence against CNA. These measures are:

a. Deter. A well-defended installation with an effective guard force is

likely to deter a physical attack. An information system or network well
protected against CNA is similarly likely to deter an electronic attack.

b. Protect. Protection is provided through a combination of physical and

electronic security measures. The cost of absolute protection is usually
prohibitive; therefore, the residual risk is identified and managed, striking a

3D-7
 JDP 6-00

balance between technical and non-technical information security procedures.

The sensitivity of the information to be protected, resources available and the
likely operational impact of compromise influences the degree of proactive
risk management.

c. Detect. Detection is used to gain evidence of attacks or methods. This

alerts staff to attacks and triggers countermeasures. Detection measures
include malicious code detection, system audit and accounting, network
monitoring, hardware and software configuration management, detection of
unauthorised system configuration changes, detection of unauthorised actions
by personnel and the provision of appropriate training. CND Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) are deployed, in particular at network boundaries,
key nodes and gateways, to maximise the potential of attack detection.

d. React. Reaction consists of:

(1) Preventing further damage by immediate response.

(2) Implementing counter-compromise actions.

(3) Assessing information lost, corrupted or compromised.

(4) Ameliorating the damage already sustained by reconfiguration of

systems or pathways.

(5) Restoring the system service, possibly at a degraded level.

(6) Initial measures to locate the source of the attack by initiating an

investigation including the forensic safeguarding of evidential data.

e. Recover. Recovery includes analysing and applying the lessons from an

attack, and establishing protective measures to generate a more robust IA
posture.

SECTION III – PROTECTION AGAINST ELECTROMAGNETIC

ATTACK
3D23. All electromagnetic emissions are vulnerable to exploitation by an adversary
conducting Electronic Warfare (EW). With the appropriate equipment, signals can be
detected, intercepted, sourced, analysed and disrupted. The ideal result of effective
Electromagnetic Protection (EP) is preventing an opponent from detecting friendly
electromagnetic radiation. Full prevention may be unachievable, so the principal
objectives of EP are to:

3D-8
 JDP 6-00

a. Minimise emissions and thereby reduce an opponent’s intelligence

collection.

b. Minimise all other types of electromagnetic transmissions, such as radar

and infrared lasers, which may compromise friendly operations.

3D24. Effective EP is achieved in 2 ways:

a. Active Electronic Protection. This consists of detectable measures to

ensure effective use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS), such as changing
frequencies and changing modes of operation.

b. Passive Electronic Protection. This consists of undetectable measures,

such as operating procedures and technical features of the equipment, to ensure
the unhindered use of the EMS as well as counter Electronic Surveillance (ES)
and counter Electronic Attack (EA) measures.

3D25. EMCON is complex, given the plethora of CIS involved. A JTF depends
heavily on the EMS for communications, surveillance, target acquisition and weapons
guidance. The benefits of radio silence are balanced against the need for effective
Command and Control (C2).

3D-9
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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

3D-10
 JDP 6-00

ANNEX 3E – BATTLESPACE SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT

3E1. Battlespace Spectrum Management (BSM), a subset of Battlespace
Management (BM), is the planning, co-ordination and management of the
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) through operational, engineering and administrative
procedures; it enables military electronic systems to perform their functions within
intended environments without causing or suffering harmful interference. 1 Efficient
and effective use of the EMS by the Joint Force provides an operational advantage to
the Commander and enables optimal spectrum use through de-confliction, protection,
exploitation and denial of this valuable resource within the Joint Operations Area
(JOA).

3E2. BSM is primarily a J3 function 2 and the process through which the EMS,
within the Electromagnetic Environment (EME), is controlled. BSM is discussed in
JDP 3-70 Joint Battlespace Management 3 and supporting Joint Force Operating
Procedures (JFOPS) for Joint (Jt) BM. The following information relates to BSM
within the context of Joint Force Communications and Information Services (JFCIS)
and Frequency Management.

Battlespace Spectrum Management Function

3E3. BSM is conducted through a BSM Cell within the Joint Task Force
Headquarters (JTFHQ), normally part of J3/5 but it can also be a J6 role. BSM
requires close engagement and liaison with key spectrum stakeholders within a Joint
Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and beyond, including:

a. JFCIS/Joint Network Centre (Jt NETCEN) Frequency Manager

(FMAN) for CIS requirements.

b. J2 (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) for Unmanned

Aerial Systems (UAS) Common Data Link (CDL) downlink, Tracking,
Telemetry and Control (TT&C) uplinks and Restricted Frequency List (RFL).

c. Electronic Warfare Co-ordination Cell (EWCC), to co-ordinate

Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Surveillance (ES) and Electronic Defence
(ED).

d. Force Protection Electronic Countermeasures (ECM(FP)).

e. Tactical Data Links Authority (TDLA), for example Links 11 and 16.

1
Allied Communications Publication (ACP) 190(B) Guide to Spectrum Management in Military Operations.
2
J5 or J6 can also undertake the BSM role depending on the operation in hand.
3
Programmed for promulgation in early 2008.

3E-1
 JDP 6-00

f. Government Communications Officer (GCO) for Signals Intelligence

and Electronic Intelligence (SIGINT/ELINT) requirements.

g. J3 for kinetic/non-kinetic effects on the EMS or its users.

h. Other Government Departments (OGDs) for CIS or other requirements. 4

i. Media Operations and Information Operations (Info Ops) for support to

broadcast requirements.

j. Maritime, Land and Air Components for requirements including

navigation radar, ground-to-air communications, tactical mobile radar, Missile
Approach Warning Systems and EA (including attacks on navigation systems
(Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR)).

3E4. Additionally, there may be a requirement to liaise and co-ordinate with Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), International Organisations (IOs) or Private
Military Security Companies (PMSCs), who characteristically use radio
communications and commercially available ECM(FP) equipment.

3E5. In a multinational operation, the Lead Nation establishes a Combined BSM

Cell (CBSMC). Participating nations deploy a national BSM Liaison Officer (LO) to
work in the CBSMC as well as a national BSM Cell within their own senior national
HQ. For non UK-led multinational operations, a UK BSM LO is deployed in the
CBSMC.

3E6. Initial planning for a Joint Force identifies the information exploitation
requirement. Those elements of the information exchange requirement that require
EMS allocation are co-ordinated and consolidated into the force spectrum bill or EMS
resource requirement. This requirement is passed to the BSM Cell to consolidate all
spectrum requirements and liaise with the host nation (HN) civil spectrum
management authority to gain approval. In a multinational operation, consolidation of
all multinational force spectrum requirements and liaison with host nation is done by
CBSMC on behalf of all participating nations’ military forces.

3E7. In an operation where there is no civil spectrum management authority, or the

political/strategic situation prevents liaison from taking place, anecdotal spectrum
records, together with spectrum situational awareness derived from real-time spectrum
monitoring, provides a best-estimate spectrum resource from which to provide
assignments and allotments.

3E8. Once a host nation issues spectrum assignments or allotments, they are sub-
issued to the appropriate requesting authority. For example, assignments and
4
Such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or Department for International Development may be deployed with a
JTFHQ, separately, or as an Inter-agency Planning Team (IAPT), as part of an integrated approach.

3E-2
 JDP 6-00

allotments to support JFCIS (including components) are issued to the JFCIS/Jt

NETCEN FMAN, who in turn issues them to the relevant system manager or
component FMAN.

3E9. The BSM organisation depends on the size and scale of each operation;
however, Figure 3C.1 offers generic guidance on the BSM organisational structure
within a medium or large scale JTFHQ. BSM is based on interpretation of the
Commander’s Intent, operational priorities and an intelligence assessment of the EME.
BSM, therefore, requires significant coordination with the J2, J3 and J6 staff branches.
In this example, the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), through Jt BM staff and
BSM Spectrum Working Group (SWG), empowers the BSM Cell to manage the EMS
throughout the JOA in order to ensure minimal restrictions are applied to friendly
forces. BSM SWG composition and BSM Command and Control (C2) structure
diagrams are at Figures 3E.2 and 3E.3 respectively.

JTFC Intent D CBM/J6

Defence Spectrum
Centre

Advice to the J3 Battle Direction, Intentions

Commander Management & Direction and Priories

J3 Ops SP
BSM / EWCC / ECM(FP)
(Spectrum Use, Planning
and De-confliction)
Coordination with Coordination with
Non-military users Civil Authorities
J2 - Intelligence Coordinated
Navigation
Collection Plan use of the EME
Warfare
and ISTAR coord by the force
J3 - EWCC
(EA,ES,ED)
J3 - Targeting J6 - CIS
Coordination with Other spectrum Coordination with
Coalition Partners stakeholders TDLA, GCO, Lead Nation
OGD, Media Ops, Info Ops

Figure 3E.1 – JTFHQ BSM Organisational Structure

3E-3
 JDP 6-00

Figure 3E.2 – JTFHQ BSM C2-SWG Composition

Figure 3E.3 – JTFHQ BSM C2 Structure

3E-4
 JDP 6-00

CHAPTER 4 – INFORMATION SERVICES SUPPORT TO

THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
401. During operations, Commander Joint Force CIS’s (Comd JFCIS) staff ensure
that information services deployed within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) satisfies
the Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC) information needs. Information services
should be sufficiently agile to respond to changes to the commander’s plan, as well as
changes in tempo and posture, which may alter the information exchange requirement.
Comd JFCIS should also consider in advance the information services support
required during the roulement of forces, the transition to a follow-on force and
redeployment from the JOA. Following on from the prepare phase articulated within
Chapter 3, this Chapter focuses on deploy, operate and recover.

SECTION I – DEPLOY PHASE

402. Deployment. Upon arrival in theatre, the primary focus of the J6 staff will be
delivering the priority services identified during the prepare phase. This will enable
the deploying force to begin exploiting information services upon arrival in the JOA.
The CIS Directive defines the Initial Operating Capability (IOC), which will deliver
mission-essential C4, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), logistics and
medical information services capability as early as possible. It will also identify and
prioritise the critical services needed for setting-up and commissioning the
headquarters. Once critical services are established the information services delivery
teams will focus on delivering the full information exchange requirement in order to
achieve FOC. The CIS Directive will define the requirements and expected
completion dates of both IOC and Full Operating Capability (FOC) 1 . However, the
operational tempo may force an adjusted timeline which will need to be planned as a
contingency and managed. Once FOC has been declared information services enter
the operate phase.

403. Command and Control. The command states of all information service
assets are detailed in the CIS Directive. Normally Comd JFCIS assumes operational
command of all strategic assets 2 and theatre information services capabilities assigned
to the operation (SF excluded 3 ). Tactical information services assets usually remain
under operational command of their assigned formations. In effect Comd JFCIS acts
as a service provider of strategic and operational level information services to a range
of customers; who may then have their own bespoke tactical systems. The key
1
IOC will be the minimum CIS required for the headquarters to commence work. FOC will be the fully resilient solution
identified within the information exchange requirement to meet the JTFC’s requirements.
2
With the exception of strategic satellite communications (SATCOM) capability remaining OPCOM with CIO/J6-Ops
and CJO retaining OPCON.
3
However, Special Forces (SF) and other government departments requirements will be investigated during the planning
stages to identify if consolidation of IS is feasible. There will be a requirement to deliver SF LO specific VOICE and
DATA capability within the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ).

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principle for discharging this responsibility is that unless Comd JFCIS specifically
issues any constraints, subordinate commanders have the freedom to configure and
operate information services to meet their local needs (provided that the capability is
not part of a wider network or forms part of the joint force information exploitation
effort). It should also be noted that maritime-based operations will be supported in a
different way due to the additional limitations associated with maritime platforms;
however, the principles outlined throughout the deploy, operate and recover phases
should be adhered to.

404. Governance. The Network Authority (NA) is responsible for the coherence,
performance and integrity of all aspects of the Defence network, and the information
flows it enables, to support the operational and business needs of Defence. The
Network Authority comprises the following three sub-authorities:

a. Network Capability Authority. The role of the Network Capability

Authority (NCA) is to manage the coherent development of requirements for
new services, systems, platforms and applications that require support from the
Defence Network; this includes prioritisation of funding. The NCA captures
these requirements in order that the network is designed, built, maintained and
configured accordingly. 4

b. Network Technical Authority. The Network Technical Authority

(NTA) has authority over the entire Defence network and will ensure technical
compliance for the development and integration of changes to, introduction
and disposal of, all services, systems, applications and platforms.

c. Network Operating Authority. The Network Operating Authority

(NOA) has authority for the operation of the whole of the Defence network
through 2 separate delegations: first from the Chief Information Officer (CIO)
on behalf of the Defence Board for routine operation and second, from Chief
of the Defence Staff (CDS), via Chief Defence Materiel (CDM), for those
activities specifically associated with defending the network. The NOA can
reshape the network to meet priorities and, if required, to isolate services or
users. The NOA provides assured end-to-end (E2E) information services to all
users less SF and users on non-assured services. The day to day responsibilities
of the NOA are largely directed and guided through the operation of the Global
Operations Security Control Centre (GOSCC) and Comd JFCIS as specified in
the CIS Directive.

4
The intention is for the NCA to engage with other capability sponsors on a ‘green card’ basis i.e. collaboratively
account for information needs from the outset. The NCA reserves the right to adopt a ‘Red Card’ approach in the event
of wilful non-conformity by which it will articulate risks present in a particular course of action or programme/project
through its relationship with the scrutiny group and Secretariat Equipment Capability.

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405. Building Information Services Capability in Theatre. The first priority is to

commence delivery of the information services capability to a support the IOC
services. 5 This must be achieved quickly as headquarters staff arriving in theatre need
information services immediately. As each service is tested and commissioned and
declared operational it is captured on the network operating picture. Comd JFCIS uses
the network operating picture to judge when IOC and FOC are achieved. In doing so
Comd JFCIS must ensure that the Jt NETCEN and the DISS GOSCC have agreed that
all services are operational, subject to agreed support arrangements, and are being
managed in accordance with extant policy.

406. Business Continuity of Information Services. Mission critical information

flows are identified as part the information exchange requirement process. Business
continuity plans must consider alternative methods for delivering mission critical
information, including the need to establish and test reversionary modes of service
delivery. The resilience of non-mission critical services depends on the prioritisation
of resources.

407. Prioritisation. Information services staff, at each level of command, maintain

priorities for their area of responsibility, 6 reflecting the operational impact of service
loss. These priorities, updated on a regular basis to reflect changes in the JTFC’s plan,
should be clearly understood by all service providers to ensure the timely restoration
of essential capability.

408. Service Management. Service providers should be clear about how to apply
technical direction and escalate issues. Comd JFCIS is responsible for producing
service management and assurance concept of operations (CONOPS) for the operation
in line with standing ISS publications. The CONOPS will be outlined in the CIS
Directive that will assign specific service management and assurance responsibilities
in the JOA for the Jt NETCEN and Component J6 staffs. Service assurance policy and
direction is provided by DISS, via the Network Operating Authority (NOA) issued by
CIO/J6-Ops, and is reflected in DISS Publications. Information service users are
provided with procedures to report faults and service providers should have
instructions on how to manage and report service delivery.

SECTION II – OPERATE PHASE

409. To declare FOC, Comd JFCIS must ensure that information services deployed
within the JOA satisfies the commander’s information needs. Following FOC, the Jt
NETCEN focuses on sustaining current in-theatre information services to meet the
commander’s extant information needs allowing Comd JFCIS to focus on planning for
5
This should be conducted as soon as possible and may involve assets being set up and utilised in a location other than
their planned final location. If this is the case, then JFCIS and Jt NETCEN must mitigate against their potential
movement during the testing and commissioning phase.
6
For example, at the strategic level, the CIO/J6-OPS CIS Restoration List prioritises strategic assets such as SATCOM.

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future requirements. The historical J6 focus purely on the provision of a

communications network is no longer sufficient. J6 staff must have a detailed
understanding of how information is managed and exploited, the C4ISR, logistic and
medical applications and core services, how information flows to enable the services,
and the network design and capabilities over which the information is collected,
transmitted, stored and retrieved. This understanding enables the Jt NETCEN to
prioritise services, diagnose and rectify faults, and manage reversionary modes. Comd
JFCIS’s planning will include new requirements, enhancements, reductions and
technical upgrades of information services, support to the roulement of forces, the
transition to a follow-on force and termination of the operation.

410. To sustain information services an E2E service management and assurance

approach is used that enables quick identification and rectification of any failures.
Each system or capability will have a Through-Life Capability Management (TLCM)
plan detailing the level of support that has been procured. Additional considerations
for Comd JFCIS are:

a. Level 3 Support Organisations. This support sits between that

available at Front Line Command (FLC)/formation level and any in (or out of)
theatre support provided by contractors. Tasking will be directed by the Jt
NETCEN, via the respective Level 3 liaison officer normally located within
the Jt NETCEN. The liaison officer will act as the conduit to any contractor
support, whether in-theatre or via the Level 3 reach-back facilities. The size
and composition of this deployed support will be decided during the
information services estimate.

b. Surge Personnel. Surge personnel may be required to install, restore or

maintain information services in support of the E2E approach. Comd JFCIS
agrees the need for, and allocation of, surge personnel (who may be military,
civil service or contractors) with PJHQ, ISS and the FLCs as required.
Deployment of surge teams, including Contractor Support to Operations, is co-
ordinated by PJHQ.

c. Logistic Support to Information Services. Comd JFCIS should

consider logistic support as part of the information services estimate and keep
the requirement under review as the campaign develops. Prioritisation,
tracking and management of spares helps maintain information services
capability. If applicable, local purchase of spares should be considered to
improve availability. However, this is only feasible for some equipment and
should be detailed prior to deployment. Non-military information services can
attract significant commercial rental or call charges. Local purchase may also
be used for consumable items that form a critical element in information
services capability. Delegation of financial authority to Comd JFCIS and
Component J6 staffs provides local control over operational usage and costs.

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These arrangements are subject to formal delegation of financial authority

agreed with the relevant J8 finance organisation.

d. Environmental Support. Following delivery of the information

exchange requirement an assessment of environmental issues related to
information services should be kept under frequent review. Some commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) products may not be designed for use in extreme
environments and may be prone to degradation or failure due to temperature
extremes, vibration, water and foreign particles ingress. COTS equipment
may, therefore, require environmental protection, additional power, as well as
physical and electronic protection.

411. Reports, Requests and Returns. The requirement for Reports, Requests and
Returns (R3) is articulated in directives and instructions issued by headquarters at
every level of command, with Comd JFCIS’ requirements set out in the CIS
Directive. 7 JFCIS R3 should be fully aligned with the theatre battle rhythm. Comd
JFCIS’ staff should pay particular attention to the information services contributions to
the JTFHQ Assessment Report and JTFHQ Down Report.

412. Situational Awareness. During the campaign, Comd JFCIS seeks to gain and
maintain the situational awareness 8 required to react rapidly to changing situations,
which should include a detailed view of the information services situation and of the
campaign as a whole. Integration into the JTFHQ Campaign Rhythm, as well as the
reports and returns process, augmented by other tools and techniques, serves to
improve Comd JFCIS’ staff’s situational awareness. Additional tools include:

a. Video Teleconference and Conference Telephone Calls. Component

headquarters are often remote from the JTFHQ and Comd JFCIS. VTC and
conference calls are used to ensure close liaison is maintained between Comd
JFCIS and Component J6 staff as well as connection back to PJHQ and UK-
based organisations. Agendas for these exchanges may include:

(1) An update from Chief of Staff (COS) JFCIS on recent

developments.

(2) Back briefs from component J6 staffs.

(3) A review of the Risk and Issues registers.

(4) A summary of key events and tasks over the next 24 hours.

7
ASSESSREPS, DOWNREPS, Logistics Reports, Personnel Reports, Operational Record Reports, Serious Incidents
Reports.
8
Situational Awareness is the understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s (or staff
officer’s) mission (or task). (JDP 0-01.1, UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database, 8th Edition)

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(5) Comd JFCIS’ intent and guidance for the next 96 hours.

b. Joint Operations Picture. Comd JFCIS and component J6 staffs

contribute to the Joint Operations Picture (JOP) 9 by incorporating detail on
information services activity affecting the JOA.

c. Mission Rehearsal and ‘Red Teaming’. 10 Mission rehearsal and red

teaming are used to run through likely operational tasks. The process involves
selected personnel from Comd JFCIS’ and component command headquarters’
staff testing the robustness of plans, identifying risks and developing
contingency plans.

413. Operations Documentation. Comd JFCIS’ staff contributes to all operations

documentation, especially the CIS Annex of the JTFC’s Mission Directive.
Documents with a CIS contribution are:

a. Campaign Directive. The JTFC’s Campaign Directive provides an

overview of the conduct of the campaign and is the keystone document for the
JTF and component commands. Comd JFCIS’ staff provides a short paragraph
outlining how they will support the campaign.

b. Force Instruction Document. The Force Instruction Document

supports the Campaign Directive and provides supplementary instructions and
information from across the JTFHQ. The CIS Directive will normally be
published as an annex to the Force Instruction Document.

c. Operations Plans. As the design of the operation is refined, an

Operations Plan (OPLAN) is written by J5 to outline the envisaged Concept of
Operations (CONOPs) including the JTFC’s intent and could potentially draft
Component mission statements. Comd JFCIS’ staff completes the CIS
contribution to this OPLAN.

d. Warning Orders. Warning Orders (Wng Os) are produced in advance

of a formal task to ensure that the personnel and equipment are ready, and
capable, to deploy and meet the task timelines on order.

e. Operation Orders. The J3/5 cell drafts Operation Orders (OPORDs)

including component mission statements and detailed coordinating
instructions. Comd JFCIS’ staff completes the CIS contribution to this
9
The Joint Operations Picture (JOP) is the total set of shared information on a particular operation, or Joint Operations
Area, available through a secure information environment on CIS networks to support situational awareness and
decision-making by UK commanders, and facilitate information sharing with allies and partners. (JDP 0-01.1,8th
Edition)
10
DCDC Guidance Note, A Guide to Red Teaming, 2010 refers. A red team is an enabled cell, discrete from the main
staff, that serves to develop opponent, neutral, cultural and contextual perspectives in order to challenge the perceived
norms and assumptions of the commander and staff.

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OPORD.Fragmentary Orders. Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) are significant

modifications to previous orders or direction. Comd JFCIS contributes to
JTFHQ’s FRAGOs as appropriate, but may also issue FRAGOs to subordinate
CIS organisations to accomplish specific tasks.

f. Lessons Identified. Throughout all phases of an operation, on

roulement or at major transitions in a campaign there is a requirement to
capture any lessons that will enable improvement. Part of the lessons process
is the creation of a post event report which will be produced by all Force
Elements. However, a single post event report from Comd JFCIS is required
by PJHQ J6, which will be followed up by a post event interview to allow for
expansion and in-depth discussion of any of the points raised within the
formation’s post event report. The post operational interview will be led by
ACOS J6 in line with PJHQ J7 guidelines.

Enduring Campaigns
414. Planning During an Operation. Under the direction of Comd JFCIS his staff
conducts planning throughout a campaign; a planning process that follows the same
stages described in Chapter 3. The commander’s information needs are continually
reviewed. If required Comd JFCIS will direct a review of the information services
estimate to deliver an updated information exchange requirement thereby ensuring that
changes to the JTFC’s scheme of manoeuvre, main effort and force laydown are
supported by an appropriate information services plan. Comd JFCIS and his staff
within the JOA lead the planning in consultation with PJHQ J6, FLCs and DISS,
supported by the service providers and their staff. DISS, as the Network Authority, in
consultation with Comd JFCIS, approves the information services solution’s design,
although PJHQ retains ownership of the requirement and associated risk. DISS, as the
design authority, is then responsible for assuring E2E connectivity and service
delivery. This condensed information services planning environment requires close
coordination and active risk management to underpin operational success.

415. Management of the Information Exchange Requirement. As the operation

develops the information exchange may change to incorporate new user requirements
into the information services design and architecture. Accordingly, the information
exchange requirement evolves under Comd JFCIS’ configuration control.

416. Changes to Force Structure. As the operational theme changes between

major combat operations, stabilisation and peace support activities or a campaign
footing is desired, the force structure and tasks will change and engagement with
multinational and multi-agency actors will increase. These changes in posture,
purpose and operational theme will all alter the JTFC’s information needs and must be
planned for, and resourced, in advance. Any drawdown of forces associated with an
improving security environment may offer the opportunity to commercialise and

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contractorise military information services in order to regenerate a contingent

capability.

417. Commercialisation and Contractorisation. While commercialisation and

contractorisation of CIS capability may offer considerable benefits, including the
potential regeneration of military capability, 11 and a more cost-effective and capable
solution, they can, however, create additional operational risk. Commercial solutions
are unlikely to be suitable in mobile, hostile or austere environments, and
contractorised solutions may impose an additional force protection burden. The
feasibility of a commercial or contractorised solution depends upon operational
circumstances and a detailed assessment of the potential risks and benefits.

418. Multinational Aspects. In multinational operations, command and control

and situational awareness are normally supported by a coalition network
infrastructure. Comd JFCIS should develop a clear understanding of how contributing
nations are supporting the overall information exchange requirement. In complex and
rapidly changing operational situations however, national postures and contributions
may change suddenly and disrupt the cohesion of the multinational information
services contribution. Services provided by individual nations may be withdrawn,
reducing the capability and integrity of the network. Comd JFCIS’ staff must be
prepared to react to these changes by developing and rehearsing contingency plans and
subsequently taking action to deal with unexpected events.

419. Roulement of Forces. The roulement of forces is likely to lead to a change in

the commander’s information needs. If J6 forces are subject to roulement, which may
be initiated by the JTFC, CIO/J6-Ops, PJHQ J6 or Comd JFCIS it may provide the
opportunity to consider contractorisation and commercialisation to release military
assets and provide a more cost effective enduring solution. In either case these
changes to the force require deliberate planning to:

a. Capture new information exchange requirements.

b. Redesign the information services solution.

c. Issue new directives, such as a revised CIS Directive.

d. Manage the changeover of personnel.

Continuity of information services is aided by engaging with the incoming

commander, his staff and specialist information services staff as soon as practicable.
This enables information services planning to both meet any new information needs
and to develop the incoming staff’s appreciation of how current information services
11
Commercialisation replaces military ‘green’ equipment with commercial ‘white’ equipment; this only frees up the
military equipment for redeployment, but does not negate the need for military manpower to operate it and therefore does
not regenerate the full operating capability. However, contractorisation releases both military equipment and manpower.

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contributes to the overall mission. A key challenge will be maintaining the

information services during the change of personnel; Comd JFCIS should investigate
the early deployment of key liaison officers to act as the continuity to bridge any gaps
in staff capability.

SECTION III – RECOVER PHASE

420. The completion of the operation or a significant change in the tasks undertaken
by the components (such as a move from focussed intervention to peace support) may
require major force restructuring including the requirement for formations to depart
from the JOA. This requires the J6 staff to develop appropriate plans to drawdown the
information services. The plans will ensure that: operational information is correctly
annotated and archived to assist with the formal operational record keeping process;
equipment is returned and regenerated (if appropriate); and UOR equipment will be
either taken into core or disposed of. Throughout, drawdown information services
must continue to meet the remaining force element’s information needs until final
departure.

421. Handover of Responsibility. As the campaign develops, the JTFC may need
to transition responsibilities to an indigenous force or multinational follow-on force.
Careful planning and co-ordination with the incoming nation’s information services
staff will ensure capability is sustained during the transition phase. CIO/J6-Ops and
PJHQ J6 should assess whether it is appropriate to leave UK CIS equipment in place
to assist the follow-on force, which may require gifting policy direction from PJHQ
and MOD.

422. Recovery. The recovery of forces from theatre involves significant logistic
effort, changes to information services capability, potential contractorisation or
commercialisation and the drawdown or cessation of services. Comd JFCIS’ staff
require early and close engagement with J4 staff to achieve a full appreciation of the
JTFC’s recovery plan to ensure that capability is maintained at the appropriate level
throughout. Areas that should be considered are:

a. Data Management. Contemporary operations have highlighted that the

amount of data produced during an operation, across various systems and
security domains, requires consolidated effort to: capture the data, transfer it to
a system that enables the records to be accessed; cleanse the data (remove
duplicates); and produce the Historical Record. To mitigate some of these data
challenges, regular deployment of surge information management/information
exploitation teams, particularly if the operation has been enduring, will ensure
that data management is continuously reviewed. The requirement to deploy
surge capability should be captured as early as possible in order to fully
understand and consider the benefits of deploying an information
management/information exploitation surge team.

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b. Urgent Operational Requirement Disposal. Any equipment procured

under the operation’s UOR process will require a review to clarify its future
utility, prior to cessation of its capability. DISS, as the Network Authority,
working with MOD Comd JFCIS, PJHQ and the FLCs will conduct a review
to identify if the capability is to be taken into core, disposed of locally,
transferred to another operational theatre or alternate options considered.

c. Maintaining Information Services until Final Drawdown. As forces

drawdown, the information exchange requirement will change as less users,
from fewer locations, require access to core services and applications.
However a significant surge in logistic information services should be
expected and this may require the deployment of addition capability to meet
the demand . To ensure sufficient information services are maintained
throughout the period, consideration should be given to the order of departure,
surging expeditionary capability to release less mobile or fixed infrastructure,
and transfer of responsibilities to either the host nation or to another troop
contributing nation.

d. Asset Management. Comd JFCIS must be fully involved in the J4

draw-down process during the recover phase. Information services constitute
a significant part of the asset management process and as such will probably be
the last service to be de-commissioned.

e. Recuperation. Following the recovery of the equipment, there will be a

FLC-led requirement to reconstitute (and rehabilitate) the capability.
Consideration of the enduring financial requirement and any follow-up
investigation into significant capability losses can be mitigated by ensuring
that regeneration is an integral part of the recover plan.

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LEXICON OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The primary references for terms and their definitions are indicated in parentheses. 1
Those marked (JDP 6-00) are new and will be incorporated in JDP 0-01.1 ‘UK
Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’ following ratification and
subsequent promulgation of this publication.

Computer Network Defence

Actions taken to protect against disruption, denial, degradation or destruction of
information resident in computers and computer networks or the computers and
networks themselves. (JDP 0-01.1)

Concept of Operations
A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to
accomplish his mission. (AAP-6)

Control
That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate
organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which
encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directions. All or part of
this authority may be transferred or delegated. (AAP-6)

Coordinating Authority
The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for co-
ordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or
commands, or two or more services, or two or more forces of the same service. He
has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their
representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of
disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential
agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he
shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority. (AAP-6)

Host Nation
A nation which, by agreement:
a. Receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or
transiting through its territory;
b. Allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory;
and/or
c. Provides support for these purposes. (AAP-6)

1
JDP 0-01.1 ‘United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’, AAP-6 ‘NATO Glossary of
Terms and Definitions’.

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Host-Nation Support
Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO
and/or other forces and NATO organizations which are located on, operating on/from,
or in transit through the host nation’s territory. (AAP-6)

Information
Information is the meaning that an individual associates with data, presented in
context. Information combined with experience, interpretation and reflection,
generates knowledge and thereby enables effective us of the information, in decision-
making for example. (JDP 6-00)

Information Assurance
The confidence that the information within the Defence Community is maintained
reliably, accurately, securely and is available when required. (JSP 440)

Information Exchange Requirements

Those categories of information that must be exchanged between operational facilities
in order to provide commanders with essential information for decision-making.
(JDP 6-00)

Information Exploitation
The use of information to gain advantage and improve situational awareness to enable
effective planning, decision-making, and coordination of those activities required to
realise effects. (JDP 6-00)

Information Management
Integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on
time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. (JDP 6-00)

Information Superiority
Possessing a greater degree of information about the battlespace, being able to exploit
the information more rapidly and preventing the adversary from obtaining or
exploiting information which could give combat advantage. (JDP 0-01.1)

Integration
In CIS usage, the act of putting together, as a final item, various components of a
system in such a way that the combination of separate systems, capabilities and
functions can operate effectively, singly or in concert, without adversely affecting the
other elements. (JDP 6-00)

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Intelligence
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations,
hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential
operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to
the organization engaged in such activity. (AAP-6)

Interoperability
The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (AAP-6)

Joint Commander
The Joint Commander (Jt Comd), appointed by CDS, exercises the highest level of
operational command (OPCOM) of forces assigned with specific responsibility for
deployment, sustainment and recovery. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Operations Area (UK)

An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated
Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a
specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as
time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission-specific. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Operations Area (NATO)

A temporary area defined by the Supreme allied Commander Europe, in which a
designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational
level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope
of the mission and geographical area, are contingency-or mission-specific and are
normally associated with combined joint task force operations. (AAP-6)

Joint Operations Picture

The total set of shared information on a particular operation, or Joint Operations Area,
available through a secure information environment on CIS networks to support
situational awareness and decision-making by UK commanders, and to facilitate
information sharing with allies and partners. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Task Force Commander

The operational commander of a nominated joint force. (JDP 0-01.1)

Mission
A clear, concise statement of the task of a commander and its purpose. (AAP-6)

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Mission Critical Information

Mission Critical Information (MCI) is that information which is deemed critical to the
business or operational needs of an organisation, requiring guaranteed delivery within
a particular timescale, an audit trail, acknowledgement of receipt and alternate means
of passing the information. MCI must be pushed to the action addressee and an
acknowledgement of receipt must be achieved. The most likely method for
dissemination, is published to the Web plus e-mail link, however, e-mail plus
attachment with acknowledgement of receipt may be required when crossing system
boundaries. (JDP 6-00)

Mission Support Information

Mission Support Information (MSI) is that information which is used to support the
organisation, but does not require to be delivered within a specific timescale or require
an acknowledgement of receipt. MSI should also be published to the Web to provide
shared situation awareness. (JDP 6-00)

Operation
A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or
administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including
movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of
any battle or campaign. (AAP-6)

Operational Command
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate
commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational
and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Note: It does not include
responsibility for administration. (AAP-6)

Operational Control
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the
commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by
function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical
control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of
components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or
logistic control. (AAP-6)

Operations Security
The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using
passive or active means to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities
and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6)

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 JDP 6-00

Situational Awareness
The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s (or
staff officer’s) mission (or task). (JDP 0-01.1)

Standardisation
The development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs
in order to achieve and maintain the compatibility, interchangeability or commonality
which are necessary to attain the required level of interoperability, or to optimise the
use of resources, in the fields of operations. (AAP-6)

Tactical Command
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command
for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (AAP-6)

Tactical Control
The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres
necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (AAP-6)

TEMPEST
The investigation and study of unintentional emanations from classified systems.
(JSP 440)

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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Lexicon-6 3rd Edition

 JDP 6-00

LEXICON OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACP Allied Communications Publication
ACPT Agency Contingency Planning Team
APOD Airport of Disembarkation
ASSESSREP Assessment Report
AWR Alert Warning and Response

BM Battlespace Management
BSM Battlespace Spectrum Management

C2 Command and Control

CA Comprehensive Approach
CBM Command and Battlespace Management
CBSMC Combined Battlespace Management Cell
CC Component Commander
CCII Command, Control, Information and Infrastructure
CCIR Commanders Critical Information Requirement
CCT Current Commitments Team
CDL Common Data Link
CDM Chief Defence Material
CDS Chief of the Defence Staff
CESG Communication Electronic Security Group
CIDA Coordinating Installation Design Authority
CinC(s) Commander in Chief(s)
CIS Communications and Information System (s)
CJFO Chief Joint Force Operations
CJO Chief of Joint Operations
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force (NATO)
CJTFC Combined Joint Task Force Commander
CIMIC Civil Military Co-operation
CLS Contractor Logistic Support
CM(IS) Capability Manager (Information Superiority)
CNA Computer Network Attack
CND Computer Network Defence
CNE Computer Network Exploitation
CoA(s) Course(s) of Action
CoG Centre of Gravity
Comd JFCIS Commander Joint Force CIS
COG Current Operations Group
COMPUSEC Computer Security
COMSEC Communications Security
CONLOG Contractor Logistic

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 JDP 6-00

COS Chief of Staff/Chiefs of Staff (MOD)

COTS Commercial off the Shelf
CPT Contingency Planning Team
CSO Contractor Support to Operations

DA Design Authority
D CBM Director(ate) Command and Battlespace Management
DCDS(C) Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments)
DCDS(EC) Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Equipment Capability)
DCIRT Defence Computer Incident Response Team
DCMC Defence Crisis Management Centre
DCMO Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DCN Defence Communication Network
DCM Defence Crisis Management
DEC Directorate of Equipment Capability
DE&S Defence Equipment & Support
DFID Department for International Development
DG Info Director General Information
DG ISS Director(ate) General Information Systems and Services
DG ISSP DG ISS Publication
DIS Defence Intelligence Staff
DM Defensive Monitoring
DOA Desired Order of Arrival
DOAST Desired Order of Arrival Staff table
DOP Defence and Overseas Policy
D Ops Director Operations
DOWNREP Down Report
DSF Director Special Forces
D Strat Plans Director Strategic Plans

EA Electronic Attack
EBA Effects-Based Approach
ECM Electronic Counter Measure
ECM(FP) Force Protection Electronic Counter Measure
ED Electronic Defence
EEFI Essential Elements Friendly Information
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
EMCON Emission Control
EME Electromagnetic Environment
EMS Electromagnetic Spectrum

EP Electronic Protection
EPM Electronic Protection Measure

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 JDP 6-00

ES Electronic Support
ESM Electronic Support Measure
EU European Union
EW Electronic Warfare
EWCC Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell

FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FE Force Element
FID Force Instruction Document
FIS Foreign Intelligence Services
FIT Force INFOSEC Team
FLC(s) Front Line Command(s)
FMB Forward Mounting Base
FofS Foreman of Signals
FOC Full Operational Capability
FP Force Protection
FRAGO Fragmentary Order
FSG Forward Support Group

GCO Government Communications Officer

GII Global Information Infrastructure
GOSCC Global Operations Security and Control Centre
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications

HF High Frequency
HN Host Nation
HNS Host-nation Support
HQ Headquarters

IA Information Assurance
ICS Information and Communications Services
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IER Information Exchange Requirement
IFA Information Flow Analysis
IM Information Management
INFOSEC Information Security
Info Ops Information Operations
IO International Organisation
IOC Initial Operational Capability
IP Internet Protocol
IPT Integrated Project Team
IS Information Systems

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 JDP 6-00

ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and

Reconnaissance
IX Information Exploitation

JCB Joint Coordination Board

JCP Joint Contingency Plan
JCS Joint Command System
JCISI Joint Communications and Information Systems Instruction
JDP Joint Doctrine Publication
JDLMO Joint Data Link Management Organisation
JFAC Joint Force Air Component
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFCIS Joint Force CIS
JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters
JFLC Joint Force Land Component
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFLogC Joint Force Logistic Component
JFLogCC Joint Force Logistic Component Commander
JFMC Joint Force Maritime Component
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFSFC Joint Force Special Forces Component
JFSFCC Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander
JHQ Joint Headquarters
JOA Joint Operations Area
JOCS Joint Operations Command System
JOP Joint Operations Picture
JOP Joint Operational Standards
JPG Joint Planning Guide
JRRF Joint Rapid Reaction Force
JSyCC Joint Security Coordination Centre
JSP Joint Services Publication
Jt Comdr Joint Commander
JTFC Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ Joint Task Force Headquarters
JTFHQ(A) Joint Task Force Headquarters (Afloat)

KV Key Variable

LO Liaison Officer

MARBAT Maritime Battlestaff

MCI Mission Critical Information
MN Multinational

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 JDP 6-00

MOD Ministry of Defence

MODCERT Ministry of Defence Computer Emergency Response Team
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MRC Monitoring and Reporting Centre
MSE Military Strategic Estimate
MSI Mission Support Information

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NAVWAR Navigational Warfare
NEC Network Enabled Capability
NCC National Contingent Commander
NETCEN Network Centre
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NSE National Support Element
NSID National Security, International Relations and Development
NTM Notice to Move

OGD Other Government Department

OLRT Operation Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
OPCON Operational Control
OPCOM Operational Command
OPLAN Operational Plan
OPORD Operational Order
OPSEC Operations Security
ORBAT Order of Battle
OT Operations Team

PFI Private Finance Initiative

PM Prime Minister
PME Political/Military (Pol/Mil) Estimate
PMSC Private Military Security Companies
POC Point of Contact
PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters
PSA Political Strategic Analysis

R3 Reports Returns and Responses

RADSEC Radiation Security
RATT Radio Automatic Tele-Type
RFI Request for Information
RFL Restricted Frequency List
ROE Rules of Engagement
RSOI Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration

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 JDP 6-00

SA Situational Awareness
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SF Special Forces
SFCC Special Forces Component Commander
Sig Bde Signal Brigade
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIO Senior Information Officer
SOFA Status of Forces Act
SOI Standing Operating Instructions
SoM Scheme of Manoeuvre
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SOR Statement of Requirement
SofS Secretary of State
SPG Strategic Planning Group
SPOD Seaport of Disembarkation
SRM Security Risk Management

TACOM Tactical Command

TACON Tactical Control
TDA Theatre Distribution Authority
TDLA Tactical Data Link Authority
TLMP Through Life Management Plan
TSCMA Technical Security Countermeasures Assessment
TTC Telemetry Tracking and Control

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UKSF United Kingdom Special Forces
UOR Urgent Operational Requirement
USSO Unified System Support Organisation
USUR Urgent Statement of User Requirement

VTC Video Teleconference

WAN Wide Area Network

WARP Warning and Reporting Point

Abbreviations-6 3rd Edition