TRANSITIONAL DEBATE

FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM

The decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism, also known as the ‘transition debate,’ has sparked
intense discussions among scholars.

• This debate focuses on why feudalism fell and how its collapse led to the rise of capitalism, which in
turn shaped the modern world.
• The disagreement is not just between Marxist and non-Marxist scholars, but also within the Marxist
camp itself, as there are different theories about feudalism, capitalism, and the shift from one to the
other.

The debate began with:

⇒ Maurice Dobb’s influential book Studies in the Development of Capitalism after World War II.
⇒ Dobb argued that feudalism’s decline was due to internal contradictions within the feudal system.
⇒ Scholars like Rodney Hilton, Boris Porchnev, and Christopher Hill supported this view, which is
called the ‘inner-contradiction model’ or ‘property-relations perspective.’

On the other hand, Paul Sweezy disagreed with Dobb.

⇒ He believed that feudalism declined because of the growth of trade and the commercial economy, a
theory known as the ‘market’ or ‘commercial’ model.
⇒ Immanuel Wallerstein further developed this idea with his world-systems theory, supported by
Janet Abu-Lughod and Andre Gunder Frank.

Some non-Marxist historians, such as H.J. Habakkuk, M.M. Postan, and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie,
argued that demographic factors, like

⇒ Population growth and decline, were the key reasons for feudalism’s decline.
⇒ This is known as the Malthusian or demographic model.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Robert Brenner revived the debate

⇒ By focusing on the importance of class relations in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, while
still keeping some of Dobb’s ideas.

Each of these theories has its strengths and weaknesses, but the central question remains: why do scholars,
even within the Marxist tradition, have such different views on the transition?

⇒ One reason for these different views is that Karl Marx himself did not provide a clear explanation of
the transition from feudalism to capitalism.
⇒ While Marx and Friedrich Engels studied capitalism in-depth, they didn’t focus much on the
specifics of the transition.
⇒ In their works, such as The German Ideology, The Communist Manifesto, and Pre-Capitalist
Economic Foundations, they briefly mentioned the transition, but their main focus was on historical
materialism, the capitalist system, and class conflict. As a result, they didn’t go into detail about how
the transition happened.

Another reason for the debate is the way scholars define ‘feudalism’ and ‘capitalism.’ Different definitions
lead to different ideas about how feudalism turned into capitalism.
 ⇒ Some scholars argue that true capitalism began with the Industrial Revolution in late eighteenth-
century England, while others believe it started earlier with merchant capitalism in the sixteenth
century.

Marx’s views on the transition evolved over time. In the 1840s, he focused on ‘productive forces’ or
‘technical determinism’ as the main cause of social change. Marx suggested two possible paths to
capitalism.

a) One path involved mercantile activity, growing markets, and expanding cities, which he believed
pushed feudal systems toward capitalism.
b) The second path, explained in Capital, focused on how producers could become merchant capitalists.
Marx considered this the true path to capitalism, where some producers would become capitalists,
and most would become property-less wage laborers, separated from the means of production.

While the growth of mercantile activity might turn products into commodities, it doesn’t explain how labor
itself becomes a commodity. For Marx, turning labor into a commodity was crucial for generating surplus
value, which capitalists rely on. Marx believed that industrial capitalism didn’t fully develop in Western
Europe until the sixteenth century, and its industrial form only emerged in the late eighteenth century.

He argued that industrial capitalism depended on three key factors:

a) Private ownership of the means of production,

These three elements formed the basis for long-term production and profit accumulation. Marx’s explanation
of capitalism focused more on establishing these necessary conditions, rather than explaining the detailed
processes that created them.

MODELS PROPOSED TO EXPLAIN THIS DEBATE

INNER CONTRADICTION MODEL

Maurice Dobb's explanation for the decline of feudalism is based on the "inner-contradiction model," which
is a central idea in classical Marxism. This theory focuses on the conflict between two systems: feudalism,
which relied on serf labor, and capitalism, which depends on hired wage labor. Dobb argues that feudalism
broke down because these two systems were in conflict, leading to a crisis in feudal society and its eventual
collapse.

Dobb believes that to understand the decline of feudalism, we must consider several factors, such as the
uneven development of feudalism across different regions and the introduction of serfdom. The rise of wage
labor, central to capitalism, also played a key role in the breakdown of feudalism. Unlike historians like
Henri Pirenne, who argued that capitalism began with the rise of trade and the merchant class, Dobb places
the beginning of capitalism in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, when capital began to be used in
production on a larger scale, marking a true shift toward capitalism.

Dobb defines feudalism as a self-sufficient economy based on land and its distribution. In this system, land
ownership is tied to economic power, and producers, such as peasants, must give part of their labor or
produce to their lords. This system is closely linked to serfdom, where peasants were forced to meet their
obligations to the lord.

According to Dobb and other scholars like Rodney Hilton, Eric Hobsbawm, and Kohachiro Takahashi,
feudalism’s inefficiency led to its decline. Low productivity, a lack of technology, and the growing need for
revenue—especially for wars and the nobles’ lavish lifestyles—strained the system. Feudalism could not
meet the material demands placed on it, eventually causing its collapse.
The crisis began in the 14th and 15th centuries when feudal incomes fell and lands shrank. Lords started
leasing land to peasants, and marginal lands were used to meet food and revenue needs. This crisis led to
mass migrations and changes in the relationship between lords and laborers. In places like France, lords
reduced serfdom and started paying peasants with money, while in Eastern Europe, lords increased control
over peasants.

Maurice Dobb describes the period from the late 15th century to the Industrial Revolution as a transitional
phase. Eric Hobsbawm, who supports Dobb’s views, stresses that the transition from feudalism to capitalism
was uneven and complex. Capitalist elements within feudalism grew strong enough to break free from the
feudal system, and the full rise of capitalism became clear during key historical events like the Industrial,
American, and French Revolutions.

Rodney Hilton also supports Dobb’s view that feudalism’s growth and decline were caused by internal
contradictions. He explains that the feudal system’s need to extract maximum rent from labor conflicted
with the broader social needs for growth. Competition among the ruling class for land and power fueled the
crisis, and control over feudal rent became a key issue. Kohachiro Takahashi also defends Dobb’s theory,
agreeing that the conditions surrounding labor were crucial in the decline of feudalism and the rise of new
systems of production.

MARKET-CENTRIC EXPLANATION

Paul Sweezy and Immanuel Wallerstein present different perspectives on the role of the market and exchange
economy in the decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. Sweezy's view, known as the ‘market-centric’
or ‘commercial model,’ directly challenges the ‘inner-contradiction explanation’ proposed by Dobb and
others. While Dobb connects feudalism with serfdom and views feudalism as a self-contained economic
system, Sweezy argues that feudalism's inherent inability to foster growth and long-term expansion is what
ultimately led to its transformation into capitalism, with trade playing a critical role.

Sweezy disagrees with Dobb’s identification of feudalism and serfdom as synonymous. Dobb defined
feudalism in terms of serfdom, where peasants were compelled to meet economic demands of overlords under
force. For Dobb, feudalism was a static system, where markets played a secondary role. In contrast, Sweezy
defines capitalism as a system of production for profit through market exchange, one that relies on
international trade and a division of labor. He contends that feudalism, being a system of production for use,
lacked the internal mechanisms to transition into capitalism, but that the rise of market-based exchanges and
the monetization of relationships between feudal lords and peasants weakened feudalism’s stability and led to
its dissolution.

Sweezy critiques Dobb for not addressing the change-resistant nature of feudalism or exploring how trade
impacted feudal society. He emphasizes that serfs couldn't simply escape manorial estates without the
existence of other economic opportunities. He also questions whether urbanization and trade, which became
increasingly significant in medieval Europe, were driven by internal feudal factors, or if they represented an
external force transforming the system. Sweezy asserts that once trade exceeded the primitive ‘peddling’ stage
and localized trade centers emerged, it fundamentally altered the feudal economy by introducing new forms
of production for market exchange.

While Sweezy acknowledges that not all feudal systems transitioned smoothly into capitalism, he insists that
the long-term trend was the replacement of serf labor with tenant farming and wage labor. He believes that
the rise of urban life and the demand for new products led to changes in rural production methods and social
relations, ultimately undermining feudalism.

On Eastern Europe, Sweezy suggests that limited urbanization and underdeveloped market structures hindered
the rise of capitalism, which differed from Western Europe, where the growth of towns and trade played a
pivotal role in economic transformation.
In contrast to Dobb’s view that the period between feudalism and capitalism was transitional, with no clear-
cut defining characteristics, Sweezy views this period as one of ‘pre-capitalist commodity production.’ He
argues that the rise of commodity production, driven by external forces like trade, dismantled feudalism and
paved the way for capitalism.

Dobb, however, defends his position by asserting that feudalism had an internal capacity for change, despite
its stability. He also upholds his definition of feudalism, aligning it with the concept of serfdom, and maintains
that feudalism and serfdom are inherently linked.

The fundamental disagreement between Dobb and Sweezy centers on the role of trade and urban centers in
the feudal system, and whether these existed within or outside the feudal structure. Dobb argues that trade
influenced the internal conflicts of the feudal system, and the growth of towns was part of the feudal process
itself. He disagrees with Sweezy's idea that the decline of feudalism was linked to proximity to trade centers.
For example, in the northwest of England, which was more isolated from trade routes, serfdom (in the form
of labor services) disappeared faster than in the more developed southeast, which was closer to towns and
markets. Dobb also notes that in eastern Europe, the growth of trade in the 15th and 16th centuries actually
led to a strengthening of serfdom. Dobb believes that Sweezy's focus on market relations overlooks the shift
from feudal labor systems to the use of hired, free labor. Critics of Sweezy argue that the monetization of
feudalism (such as rent payments instead of labor services) did not mark the end of feudalism, as capitalism
did not emerge immediately. Some scholars, like John E. Martin, note that money rents coexisted with labor
rents as far back as the 10th century in places like England and Italy, and that the rise of money rents was not
incompatible with feudalism.

Takahashi rejects Sweezy’s thesis, arguing that the real contradiction was not between a ‘system of production
for use’ and a ‘system of production for the market,’ but between feudal landownership (serfdom) and
industrial capitalism (wage labor). Takahashi believes that the key process in the transition from feudalism to
capitalism was the separation of the means of production from the direct producers, which led to the
disintegration of feudalism. He argues that trade and markets did not cause feudalism’s collapse, but rather,
internal changes in the social structure and organization of labor did.

Immanuel Wallerstein adds a new perspective to this debate. Like Sweezy, he emphasizes the importance of
changing market structures, but he differs in his approach. Wallerstein argues that capitalism is not just a
national phenomenon but a global system. Unlike earlier empires, which were held together by political power,
the capitalist world economy is driven by international trade and labor. For Wallerstein, capitalism is a world-
economy, not a world-empire, because it is based on economic relations rather than political or military
control. He divides the world into three zones: the core, the periphery, and the semi-periphery. The core is the
most economically developed region, exploiting resources through global markets and advanced technology.
The periphery consists of less developed regions, producing raw materials and agricultural goods, often
through forced labor like serfdom or slavery. The semi-periphery is an intermediate zone, exploiting the
periphery but also being partly exploited by the core.

Wallerstein argues that capitalism emerged between the 1450s and 1640s, and that Spain and Portugal were
the first capitalist states due to their colonial empires. However, these states soon lost their core status, with
the Netherlands, England, and northern France replacing them. Wallerstein’s critics argue that his theory does
not explain why some states became core regions, as it overlooks internal social and political dynamics.
Additionally, Wallerstein’s view that trade in the core-periphery model was the main driver of capitalism is
questioned by scholars like Paul Bairoch and Patrick K. O’Brien, who point out that trade did not contribute
much to Europe’s economy until the 19th century. Critics also challenge Wallerstein’s claim that European
absolutism was a capitalist phenomenon, arguing that states like Prussia and Austria had stronger forms of
absolutism than those in the core regions, like England and the Netherlands.

DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL

The demographic explanation of the decline of feudalism and rise of capitalism suggests that shifts in
population patterns played a significant role in the disintegration of the feudal economy. Writers like M.M.
Postan and H.J. Habakkuk have emphasized the role of population in long-term economic changes. This
demography-centric approach is often referred to as the ‘Malthusian model,’ named after Thomas Robert
Malthus, an English political economist. The model contrasts with the market-centered interpretations of
thinkers like Sweezy, who viewed trade and markets as primary drivers in the decline of feudalism.

Postan’s view suggests that market forces were not immediately effective in dissolving serfdom. Rather, they
may have intensified it, as seen in the 13th century’s seigneurial reaction to global grain market pressures,
which tightened peasants’ bonds. This suggests that economic factors like the market were not the sole
catalysts of capitalism; population dynamics also played a crucial role.

The Malthusian model assigns an exclusively determinist role to population. It argues that from the 11th to
the 13th century, Europe saw substantial economic and demographic growth, which led to overpopulation.
This imbalance between population and resources resulted in agricultural pressures, declining productivity,
land fragmentation, food shortages, lower wages, and rising rents. This demographic pressure caused an
agrarian crisis because increasing production in a natural economy was not feasible. This crisis, driven by
overpopulation, was followed by famines, disease, and the Black Death, which led to a sharp population
decline, solving the crisis temporarily.

In the 15th century, the reversal of this trend marked the beginning of capitalist development. Habakkuk
applied the Malthusian model over an eight-century period, noting that the demographic crisis of the 14th
century led to a shortage of labor and a fall in landlords' incomes, shifting power from the nobility to peasants.
Some landlords responded by introducing new forms of bondage or converting feudal dues into money rents,
while others embraced capitalist farming, such as sheep farming. Wage labor and the emergence of yeomen
farmers, especially in England, were indicators of capitalist trends.

The demographic model’s cyclical nature, involving growth, crisis, and resolution, is seen as a recurring
process in pre-modern Europe. Abel and Le Roy Ladurie also support the demographic model, with Ladurie
adding climatic factors to the equation. He argues that economic, social, and biological factors, rather than
class struggle, were the primary drivers of historical change.

However, the demographic explanation has faced criticism. Robert Brenner challenges the deterministic
nature of the Malthusian model, arguing that it overlooks the complexities of class relations and income
distribution. He believes that the long-term economic changes cannot be explained solely by demographic
shifts but must consider the role of class power and the distribution of property. Brenner criticizes the model
for its failure to address the persistence of economic stagnation or growth and the uneven outcomes of
demographic changes across different regions of Europe.

Furthermore, Guy Bois acknowledges the role of demography but criticizes the demographic school for
ignoring other factors such as the evolution of feudal and royal revenue, accumulation tendencies, and the
changing institutional and moral dimensions of feudalism’s crisis. Bois believes the feudal system’s decline
was more complex, driven by both demographic factors and broader structural changes, including the rise of
industrial and commercial activities, which disrupted the feudal system and contributed to the emergence of
new economic patterns.While the demographic model offers important insights into the decline of feudalism
and the rise of capitalism, it is critiqued for being overly deterministic and neglecting other key factors such
as class relations, institutional changes, and the impact of external economic forces.

CLASS RELATION MODEL

Robert Brenner has significantly improved Maurice Dobb's explanation of the origins of capitalism,
particularly the idea of property relations. Brenner critiques other transition theories by offering a more critical
synthesis. Like Dobb, he rejects the idea of capitalism emerging from trade-based economies and emphasizes
that merchant capital was not the main driver. He also identifies problems with demographic models,
particularly how they fail to explain two main issues: (1) the persistence of serfdom, and (2) why secure small
peasant properties developed rather than landlord or large tenant-farmer relations. Brenner argues that the
structure of class relations—how different groups interact with land, tools, and each other—determines how
demographic or commercial changes affect economic growth, not the other way around.

According to Brenner, class structure has two main aspects: (1) the relationships between direct producers,
their land, and tools during the production process, known as the "labour process" or "social relations of
production," and (2) the "relations of property," which involve the extraction of surplus from producers by
elites. Brenner believes that the fundamental classes of society are based around these property relations, and
these class structures shape a society's long-term economic development. He stresses that class structures are
not influenced by changes in population or trade but, instead, directly influence economic progress or decline.

On the decline of feudalism, Brenner agrees with Postan that medieval society faced a demographic crisis, but
he argues that this crisis wasn't caused by demographic factors alone. The real issue was that serf-based
agricultural economies couldn't innovate, even when there were market incentives. Lords extracted surplus
from peasants, leaving them with insufficient funds to maintain their farms and prevent long-term productivity
decline. The surplus was wasted on military and luxury goods instead of being reinvested into agriculture.

Brenner also goes beyond Dobb's views by incorporating "political factors," such as state formation, into his
explanation of capitalism's origins. He argues that the political and economic systems were deeply intertwined
in feudal societies. One of his key ideas is "political accumulation," where the state's role was essential in
shaping class relations and economic development. Brenner compares the class structures of England and
France to show how the state influenced the balance of power between landlords and peasants.

In France, the centralized state supported rural communities to maintain peasant property, fixed rents, and
peasant freedom, which helped prevent rural differentiation and agrarian transformation. The French state
protected peasants from landlords, which kept them relatively stable. In contrast, England’s state formation
was closely linked to the power of landlords. By the fifteenth century, many peasants in England were free,
but they didn't secure permanent property rights. The state supported the landlords, allowing them to raise
rents and push out small tenant farmers. The enclosure movement further hurt peasant property, leading to
differentiation among peasants and the rise of agricultural capitalism, with large-scale farming and wage labor.
Brenner argues that England’s economic growth was driven by the productive use of surplus, not rising
population or market demand for grain.

Historians have long debated why serfdom declined in Western Europe but intensified in Eastern Europe. One
explanation is that Eastern Europe had fewer developed towns, so the nobility could overpower the peasants.
Brenner rejects this view, arguing instead that the real reason was the contradiction between peasant
productivity and the extraction of surplus. This tension led to peasant crises in both regions but with different
outcomes. In Western Europe, particularly in places like Western Germany, peasants organized themselves
through local institutions to resist landlord control. These institutions helped protect peasant rights and
contributed to the decline of serfdom. In contrast, Eastern Europe lacked these strong peasant institutions,
making peasants more vulnerable to control and leading to the persistence of serfdom. Brenner believes that
Eastern Europe's economic backwardness was not caused by its trade in primary goods, but by its unequal
class structures and surplus extraction.

Brenner's class-relations explanation of capitalism's rise marks an important development in Marxist thought,
particularly in comparison to earlier theories. His confrontation with scholars who emphasize demographic or
exchange-based models sparked intense debate, known as the "Brenner Debate."

Some scholars who support the demographic model, such as Patricia Croote and David Parker, criticize
Brenner's interpretation of England and France's development. They argue that Brenner overemphasizes the
role of landlords and fails to provide enough evidence for his claims. Heide Wunder also criticizes Brenner’s
work, saying it’s based on secondary sources and contains factual inaccuracies, especially regarding Germany.

Brenner’s first article was very critical of demographic models, and its harsh tone provoked strong reactions.
Scholars like M.M. Postan and John Hatcher argue that Brenner’s class-relations model cannot fully replace
the demographic model. They assert that while demographic trends weren't all-determining, they still played
a significant role in economic fluctuations. They also argue that Brenner misinterprets the Malthusian model
and exaggerates the importance of surplus extraction in shaping class structures, particularly in Germany.

Many critics of Brenner argue that his rejection of the Dobb-Hilton explanation for East-West differences,
along with his own interpretation focusing on the contrasting features of rural class structures and peasant
resistance in the two regions, is exaggerated. Guy Bois generally agrees with Brenner’s criticism of the
Malthusian model and the emphasis he places on class struggles in the long-term development of capitalism.
However, Bois disagrees with Brenner’s methodology.

Bois’ hypothesis differs from Brenner’s in two key ways. First, Bois believes that capitalism emerged as a by-
product of the functioning of the feudal system as a whole, rather than being confined to specific regions as
Brenner suggests. Second, Bois argues that the inequalities within the feudal system itself played a
fundamental role in historical development. These inequalities, in the context of feudal production, are at the
heart of the divergence between regions. Bois describes Brenner’s Marxism as “political Marxism.”

Another criticism against Brenner is his belief that capitalism developed through large-scale production units.
Dobb and Hilton emphasized the complex process that led to rural social differentiation, where even small
peasant-proprietors could eventually become capitalist farmers over time. Patricia Croote and David Parker
argue that the real agricultural revolution was a long-term process involving new techniques and crops. Instead
of being obstacles to economic development, peasants might have actually helped drive it. They focus on the
innovations made by small producers rather than medium-sized landowners. While Brenner pointed to
examples of large-scale production units in many parts of England, he did not fully address Croote and
Parker’s concerns.

Croote and Parker appreciate Brenner’s comparative analysis but argue that it has limitations. They believe
that in making several important observations, Brenner oversimplifies long-term economic trends and misses
crucial stages of development. They also find his comparison of developments in England and France
unsatisfactory and too generalized. For example, Brenner misinterprets the position of the peasantry in France,
exaggerating its independence. In England, Brenner focuses too much on the role of landlords, overlooking
the significance of “customary tenants” and “short-term leaseholders.” Critics argue that Brenner
overemphasizes the role of landlords and neglects the contribution of peasants. Furthermore, Brenner suggests
that capitalism in England emerged primarily from aristocratic initiatives, but critics note that agrarian
capitalism flourished after the English Revolution, with many capitalist farmers coming from the traditional
aristocracy. By associating the rise of capitalism solely with aristocratic actions, Brenner’s explanation
overlooks the broader process.

Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie criticizes Brenner for presenting a too-linear explanation of agricultural and
capitalist development. Ladurie believes there is evidence to show that the transition from feudalism to
capitalism can occur without destroying small farmers. He cites the examples of Holland, Belgium, parts of
France, and Japan, where small farming supported the working population in industrial capitalism. Ladurie
suggests that while large-scale farming in the English model could also lead to capitalism, it is not the only
route.

Perry Anderson’s viewpoint, in contrast, is often called “Marxist eclecticism” because it combines non-
Marxist themes, like the Malthusian idea of cyclical imbalances between population and food supply, with
Marxist approaches that focus on production relations and class structures. Like Dobb and Hilton, Anderson
believes changes in social relations preceded the development of productive forces in the emergence of
capitalism. However, Anderson does not propose a simple, evolutionary theory of change within feudalism
based on class struggle leading to a feudal crisis. Like Brenner, Anderson also sees political factors as
important in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. He acknowledges the role of towns and international
trade, and in his study of the rise of absolutism in Europe, he emphasizes the significance of the “super-
structural” features of Western European absolutist states. For Anderson, the key factor in the rise of capitalist
property rights was the integration of Roman law into the feudal system, which helped centralization and
transformed feudal property relations. The absence of Roman law in Eastern Europe hindered the development
of capitalist property rights. For Anderson, legal traditions played a crucial role in the transition to capitalism,
first in England, then in France, and later in other regions.

Brenner’s main concern has been to explain the origins of capitalism based on different patterns of class
relations in pre-industrial Europe, connecting the rise of capitalism to state formation and the idea of “political
accumulation.” Perry Anderson, in contrast, presents a more eclectic framework, considering factors like the
legal system in the transition to capitalism.

In recent years, the decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism have been explained outside of traditional
models, in line with the world-systems approach. Andre Gunder Frank rejects the idea that there was a major
shift from feudalism to capitalism in the sixteenth century. He dismisses terms like “feudalism” and
“capitalism” as distinct modes of production and argues that capital accumulation has been ongoing since
around 3000 BCE. Janet Abu-Lughod also follows the world-systems approach, suggesting that the rise of a
capitalist world order began as early as AD 1250. She challenges the Eurocentric view, arguing that China,
rather than Europe, was the core region, with Europe being the periphery. Abu-Lughod believes that the West
only began to expand when China’s economic decline and the breakdown of its trade links gave Europe the
opportunity to grow. These perspectives highlight the importance of global trade networks in the development
of capitalism.

Other writers suggest that the rise of capitalism can be credited to the nation-state, like Anderson, but they
also argue that nation-states helped rationalize law, freed land for market activities, removed internal barriers,
standardized taxation, and redistributed income, which facilitated capitalism. However, these views have not
yet become widely accepted, and the debate about the transition from feudalism to capitalism remains
unresolved.