Political Science Draft
Political Science Draft
Trimester 2
Year 1
SAMPADA PRAHALLAD
1ST YEAR BA. LLB. (HONS)
B24124
NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA UNIVERSITY
SUBMITTED ON: 4th JANUARY 2024.
Introduction
A majority of the Indian population believes dharma to be a societal concept. Their understanding of
dharma comes from famous epics like Mahabharata. The concept of dharma is believed to have many
different aspects and meanings in Hinduism (cite Doniger 59). Indian political theorists like Manu or
Kautilya might infer it to be a way of living, whereas some may look at it as a code of law. Manish
Kumar refers to it as “a principle which unifies the Godly and the human world through its code of
conduct” (Manish 27) Such a code defines the socio-political laws, duties and rights concerning the
rulers and citizens. (Manish 27)The nature of governance and its optimisation has been a field of vast
study and has given rise to many questions. The question of how humans govern themselves and
construct a moral order for themselves has been tackled by both Western and native theorists in
distinctive ways. But, what does it take to balance authority and freedom in human civil society? And
can the ancient dharmic rules find a place in the modern political domain?
In this essay, I argue that dharma and dharmic ideologies fail to fit into the notion of politics and
government as we see it now. In the first part, I will examine the Hobbesian and Lockian views of
human nature and governance and then analyse how the concept of dharma mirrors and conflicts with
certain aspects of these notions. Second, the essay examines rajadharma and the position of morality
in dharma and Western theories. Third, I discuss the concept of adaptability of dharma and its
decentralized nature which conflicts with the idea of a centralized authority as propagated by Hobbes
and Locke.
All countries as we know them now did not come with a naturally formed government. They are the
product of various circumstances like war, rebellion, colonisation and others. Before humans were
governed by a central power, they were slaves of their passions and wits.
Hobbes believes all men to be born equal. (Hobbes 82) He describes the life of a man in nature who is
in constant search of something greater than himself which has the power to awe everyone else.
(Hobbes 83) This is a world where men quarrel and are motivated by three things – competition,
diffidence and glory. (Hobbes 83) In short, Hobbes views the state of nature as a ‘man eat man’
society which necessitates an absolute figure of authority to enforce and maintain order. Without this,
he deems it a ruleless world without any security surrounded by a constant state of war. Locke
contradicts Hobbes in his view of the state of nature. To him, it is a state of ‘perfect freedom’ where
men are free to do whatever they like and however they deem fit. (Locke 18) Unlike Hobbes’ anarchic
view of natural men, Locke believes that all power in such a situation is reciprocal and reason governs
the actions of men. He too, prescribes for an overlooking power which will keep men in control but
only when they come into quarrel about property. (Locke 20) His conception of authority also seems
to imply a sense of self-regulation or power stemming from within.
Locke’s conception aligns with dharmic ideas. As Suda points out, Dharma emphasizes self and arises
out of one’s nature. (Suda 361) The word Dharma at its core stems from the word ‘dhr’ which means
to hold or maintain. (Suda 359) Both the classical authors propagate a model with powers which
maintain law and order in society staying consistent with the meaning of dharma. Kumar describes
dharma as intricate principles which signify social and political order (Kumar 27) It was considered to
be the real sovereign creating laws for the people and the rulers. (Kumar 27) These laws served the
same purpose that the established government system in Hobbes’ and Locke’s theory.
Nevertheless, we can see that it differs from the proposal of a ‘central’ figure. Dharma prescribes a
more decentralized form of governance which I will discuss further in this essay.. Dharma is
something that applies to everyone in the form of a moral or ethical law but, as seen in Doniger’s
piece, can also tend to be ambiguous. (Doniger 59,60) If we look at the present world right now, the
more accepted version of government would be either that of Hobbes or Locke. Ambiguous dharmic
laws which provide subjective analysis and a much more personalised approach would lead this fast-
paced society to a state of chaos.
Rajadharma translates to ‘the dharma of the king’ and is noted to be one of the most important aspects
of dharma in political statecraft. (Manish 28) The fluidity of interpretation allowed in dharmic
principles is a sharp contrast to the rigid government system that both Hobbes and Locke argue for.
Doniger illustrates this by quoting an excerpt from the Mahabharata wherein Duryodhana says that
regardless of whether it is adharma or dharma, the king should always think of his own Artha because
the path of kings differs from that of the rest of the world. Here the morality of the king comes into
question. Does rajadharma accommodate the moral obligation of kings? To Suda, rajadharma is
specifically the moral obligation of rulers to uphold justice and ensure the welfare and betterment of
their subjects. One of these moral obligations, as pointed out by Manish Kumar, is to punish the
wicked and protect the weak. (Manish 28) The king, in my opinion, has two reasons to do so, namely,
to be the divine bearer of dharmic principle and to protect himself from anarchy.
Ancient India believed the king to be superior to the commoners. Manu and Kautilya, two of the most
widely accepted political authors of ancient India identify the king as a divine figure – simply put he
becomes “a great deity in the form of a man”. (Doniger 66) Rulers, with their exercise of rajadharma,
guided people towards following their svadharma – one’s own personal dharma. This reflects on the
intrinsic nature of dharma which acts as an internalized moral code, where the law is not merely a set
of rules but a replication of cosmic order and individual duty. (Suda 362) Manu talks about the
concept of an adharmic king who plunders the weak and does not do his duty of helping his subjects
achieve their moral ends. (Manish 29) Such a king he says will go to hell but, on closer inspection, we
see that he fails to present actual punishment for adharmic kings. (Doniger 71)
This also relates in a way to Locke, who believes that the central authority must be brought to power
with the consensus of all the people. He argues that the political authority has the power to punish
offenders of society restoring order (Locke 23) just like a dharmic king would punish those who do
not obey dharma. Where rajadharma, the moral force that bears dharma and protects it, (Manish28) is
established by the Lord(Doniger 66), Locke’s social contract, rooted in the preservation of life, liberty
and property, is established by the people themselves. (Locke 25) We observe an application of both
these theories in the present-day governments. The Lockian idea of choosing a ruler is employed in
the form of democracy and the dharmic concept of punishment to those who speak against the ruler
(government, in this case) finds form in the modern idea of sedition.
Manu and Kautilya both address the predicament of anarchy and supply a method of dealing with
anarchic forces in society. Kautilya draws upon the law of fish – “big fish eating little fish” – to
establish that there is a constant threat to the king in the form of anarchy. (Doniger 67) This fear is in
turn used to justify the violence of the king. (Doniger 66) They portray the relationship between the
king and his subjects as a give-and-take. The subjects pay the king a certain amount in taxes and this
acts as payment for his protection. (Doniger 68) Hobbes’ idea of the state of nature, as mentioned
earlier, is almost a perfect resemblance to this idea. He too advances the idea of maintaining the state
of peace using fear, according to which a man is only willing to submit to another figure when he
outshines him.
Though it aligns in the aspect of anarchy, Hobbes’ rigid Leviathan, which effectuates uniformity
differs from dharma’s variability where the king can use his power to manipulate those citizens who
do not want to be under his control. (Doniger)Kautilya openly discusses means like spying, spreading
of rumours, fear and dissent among people to make sure they do not resort to anarchy. (Doniger 67)
Hobbes’ government has a set of laws which do not change from person to person, unlike dharma
which varies across the strongly established varnashrama dharma. This brings us to the point of the
adaptability of dharma.
The varnashrama dharma was a key component of ancient Indian society. This varnashrama dharma
regulated not only the subjects but also the kings. (Manish 28) This social aspect of dharma divides
the society into four classes. According to Manu and Kautilya, men and women are sorted into
Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras owing to their functions namely, intelligence, ruling,
commerce and menial tasks respectively. (Manish 28) Doniger’s piece highlights the rigidity of these
social hierarchies and how there were many means in place to subdue and control the weaker sections.
She mentions the differences between classes in punishment and fines on the same crime committed.
(Doniger 65) Kautilya too, though more leniently than Manu, discriminates across the classes.
(Doniger 65)To illustrate, let us take the punishment for slander. If someone of a lower class cusses
someone of a higher class the fine is doubled or increased, but is decreased if it was someone higher
than the other. Doniger’s analysis shows that in reality, the flexibility of dharma can result in such
entrenched hierarchies and inconsistencies. For instance, the egalitarian principles advocated by
Locke and even Hobbes’ pragmatic authoritarianism are frequently undermined by caste-based
responsibilities, which are a fundamental component of traditional dharma.
Social hierarchies also led to a form of decentralization of power. Looking at the levels of division, we
see that the kings are ranked lower than Brahmins. It makes us question whether the king did have the
singular power that Hobbes and Locke talk about in their version of authority. The king employed the
well-learned Brahmans as counsellors on matters of politics and more. In a certain way, this confers
the power to the Brahmin too who had a crucial role in the decision making. This is a breakdown of
power into many hands. Another version of this decentralization comes from the subjectivity of
dharma allowing one to lead his life according to his own rules and law – svadharma. What absolute
authority and enforceability does the king really have if the citizens claim to be following their own
dharma? The king cannot deny them that right because, as mentioned above, his individual duty is to
help them follow their dharma. We cannot imagine that situation in a modern government. It would
lead to major instability and revert back to Hobbes’ ‘ruleless world’. The relevance and applicability
of dharma in contemporary settings is called into question by such structural inequalities.
Conclusion
The concept of dharma, while rich in philosophical depth and historical significance, struggles to
alogn with the demands of contemporary political systems characterized by centralization and
egalitarianism. Its decentralized and morally flexible nature conflicts with the uniformity and stability
required in modern governance. While parallels can be drawn between dharma and the theories of
Hobbes and Locke, dharma’s adaptability and caste-based biases undermine its applicability in
fostering equality and good governance. The ambiguities inherent in dharmic principle, as highlighted
by Doniger, make them ill-suited to the fast paced world of today where authority and individual
freedom require a slight yet consistent balance.