SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

ISP-I-22-08 Office of Inspections March 2022

(U) Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic

Security, Domestic Operations,
Office of Protection

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
IMPORTANT NOTICE: This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the U.S. Agency for
Global Media, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of Inspector General. No secondary
distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the U.S. Agency for Global Media, by them
or by other agencies or organizations, without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the
document will be determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report
may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) March 2022

(U) OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS
(U) DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
(U) Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
Domestic Operations, Office of Protection
ISP-I-22-08 (U) What OIG Found
• (U) The Office of Protection met its multi-faceted
(U) What OIG Inspected protection mandate through the deployment of
(U) OIG inspected the Office of Protection, which is hundreds of special agents on a wide range of
located under Domestic Operations in the Bureau domestic and overseas security details each year.
of Diplomatic Security. • (U) The Deputy Assistant Director’s performance
was consistent with Department of State
(U) What OIG Recommends leadership and management principles.
(U) OIG made three recommendations to the
• (U) Office leadership successfully handled the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
management challenges associated with the
COVID-19 pandemic.
(U) In its comments on the draft report, the
• (SBU) (b) (2)
Bureau of Diplomatic Security concurred with all 3
recommendations. OIG considers all 3
recommendations resolved. The bureau’s
response to each recommendation, and OIG’s
reply, can be found in the Recommendations
• (U) Spotlight on Success: The protection detail for
section of this report. The bureau’s formal written
the Ambassador to the U.S. Mission to the United
response is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix B.
Nations created an in-house orientation training
program to familiarize special agents with
standard operating procedures related to the
detail.
• (U) Spotlight on Success: The Major Events
Coordination Unit collaborated with the Foreign
Service Institute to develop and conduct crisis
management exercises to prepare watch officers
from the Department and other U.S. Government
agencies to respond to a variety of potential
crises.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) CONTENTS
(U) CONTEXT ................................................................................................................................. 1
(U) EXECUTIVE DIRECTION ............................................................................................................ 3
(SBU) (b) (2) .................................................................................. 4
(U) SECTION OVERVIEWS .............................................................................................................. 7
(U) Secretary of State’s Detail ................................................................................................... 7
(U) Dignitary Protection Division ............................................................................................... 7
(U) Protective Liaison Division ................................................................................................... 8
(U) Major Events Coordination Unit .......................................................................................... 9
(U) RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................ 12
(U) APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY ...................................................... 14
(U) APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSE ............................................................................... 16
(U) ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................... 17
(U) OIG INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS ........................................................................................ 18

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) CONTEXT
(U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is the Department of State’s law enforcement and
security arm.1 The Office of Protection (DS/DO/P) reports to the bureau’s Assistant Director of
Domestic Operations.2 According to 1 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 262.4-3, the office is
responsible for:

1) (U) Managing and directing protective security for the Secretary of State (Secretary)
and other official representatives of the United States and foreign governments as
well as managing the Department’s protective liaison programs.3
2) (U) Managing and coordinating the protection of certain foreign missions and
officials in the United States.4
3) (U) Administering reimbursements to Federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies or private security companies for expenses incurred in the protection of
certain foreign government and United Nations missions and officials.
4) (U) Serving as co-chair of the International Security Events Group under the
authorities of National Security Presidential Directive-46.5

(U) In addition to this mandate, DS/DO/P plays a major role in fulfilling the DS Functional
Bureau Strategy6 goal to lead in the protective operations field by collecting lessons learned,
implementing continuous improvements, and demonstrating best practices.

(U) To carry out its responsibilities, DS/DO/P is organized into three divisions: the Secretary’s
Detail, Dignitary Protection, and Protective Liaison. The Secretary’s Detail (SD), the largest

1
(U) DS operates a global security platform ensuring that the U.S. Government can safely and securely conduct
diplomacy. The bureau operates via delegation of authority for the Secretary of State’s security responsibilities
under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 as amended (22 United States Code (U.S.C.)
4802, et seq).
2
(U) Title II of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as amended, authorized the
creation of the Diplomatic Security Service, which is responsible for managing DS' day-to-day security operations.
This authorization resulted in a dual title for the Assistant Director, whose full official title is Deputy Assistant
Secretary and Assistant Director for Domestic Operations.
3
(U) Pursuant to the Foreign Missions Act of 1982 (as codified at 22 U.S.C. 4314) and 18 U.S.C. 3056A(d), the
Department may provide extraordinary protective services for foreign missions, international organizations,
resident foreign missions and officials, and visiting foreign government officials under certain circumstances
throughout the United States. DS/DO/P is responsible for the overall management and coordination of the
extraordinary protection program, including liaison with these organizations.
4
(U) These include foreign missions, international organizations, and visiting foreign government officials.
5
(U) National Security Presidential Directive 46/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 15, known as the "U.S.
Policy and Strategy in the War on Terror" directive, is a directive signed by President George W. Bush in March
2006 that clarifies and coordinates the role of Government agencies in the war on terror. It identifies gaps and
overlaps in agency duties that resulted in competing agency jurisdiction.
6
(U) The DS FY 2018-2022 Functional Bureau Strategy is a strategic document that guides the bureau as it operates
in diverse security environments in support of U.S. diplomacy. The strategy highlights areas where DS must
continue to strengthen its capabilities to effectively position itself for the future.

ISP-I-22-08 1
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

division, provides protection for the Secretary and the Secretary’s immediate family, as well as
security coverage of the Secretary’s residence. Dignitary Protection (DP) coordinates protective
services for visiting foreign dignitaries, resident foreign officials, and certain U.S. Government
officials. It also organizes and manages protective services for special events involving multiple
protectees. Protective Liaison (PL) maintains liaison with U.S. Government agencies, foreign
governments, Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, or private security companies
that assist the Department in providing protective security. PL also coordinates and monitors
state and local police protection for certain foreign missions and administers the
reimbursement of funds to other agencies that provide protective services.

(U) In addition to these three divisions, DS/DO/P has a Major Events Coordination Unit (MECU)7
to coordinate U.S. Government security resources leading up to and during major international
events that have significant U.S. Government participation. It also has a Protection Operations
Section that provides logistics for all DS/DO/P operations, ensuring consistency and operational
continuity among the divisions through direct oversight of support functions.8

(U) DS/DO/P is led by a Deputy Assistant Director for Protection. He reports directly to DS’
Assistant Director of Domestic Operations and, at the time of the inspection, was supported by
a staff of approximately 119 Foreign Service special agents, 11 Civil Service staff, 6 personal
services contractors, and 15 third-party contractors. In addition to its cadre of permanent
special agents, DS/DO/P relies on hundreds of temporary duty (TDY) special agents detailed
from other parts of DS to staff its protection details.

(U) Protective operations are inherently unpredictable and therefore require considerable
flexibility regarding the number of hours and resources used for each detail. In FY 2019 and FY
2020, DP conducted 272 protection details requiring 1,929 detail special agents (both full-time
permanent and TDY) for a total of 220,573 protective security hours. During that same period,
SD special agents also provided security for the Secretary’s travel to 88 countries on 77
different trips. Of the 2,107 agents supporting the Secretary’s travel, almost one third were TDY
special agents.

7
(U) MECU serves in a protective liaison and advisory capacity as the interagency security and law enforcement
lead for major events abroad through leadership on the International Security Event Group under the authorities
of National Security Presidential Directive 46 (see footnote 5).
8
(U) The section provides administrative support including assignment staffing, travel and vehicle support, and
equipment inventory to all units within DS/DO/P except for the Secretary’s Detail, which has a dedicated
administrative operations team.

ISP-I-22-08 2
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) Figure 1: Office of Protection Organizational Chart

Source: (U) OIG generated from information obtained from the Office of Protection.

(U) EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

(U) The Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) is a career Foreign Service special agent with more
than 20 years of domestic and overseas experience. He joined DS/DO/P in August 2020 but
served concurrently as acting DAD of the DS Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence
until December 2020. Because of COVID-19 restrictions on in-person work starting March 16,
2020, and a stay-at-home order issued March 30, the DAD’s contact with colleagues and
subordinates, with rare exceptions shortly after his arrival, had been almost entirely virtual.

(U) OIG assessed the DAD’s performance based on DS/DO/P staff responses to questionnaires,
document reviews, and interviews conducted with staff from DS/DO/P, other Department
bureaus, regional security officers at U.S. embassies that received Secretary of State visits
between March 2020 and March 2021, and other entities that partner with the office. Based on
these sources, OIG concluded that the DAD led DS/DO/P in a manner consistent with
Department leadership principles in 3 FAM 1214b. Employees also credited the DAD with
providing strong leadership in managing operations during a period in which the COVID-19
pandemic and staffing shortages created significant workplace challenges.

(U) Deputy Assistant Director Empowered Staff and Communicated Effectively

(U) Employees told OIG the DAD empowered senior staff to make decisions and listened to
their ideas, consistent with 3 FAM 1214b(8). For example, the DAD invited staff input on
preparing the new Functional Bureau Strategy and considered their views when proposing
revised language. Employees said his leadership reinforced team cohesion among the office’s
Foreign Service, Civil Service, and contractor staff. In addition, the DAD took steps during the
inspection to strengthen internal communication disrupted by the pandemic by establishing a
Front Office newsletter and developing a specific plan to resume in-person staff outreach as

ISP-I-22-08 3
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

soon as conditions permitted. Employees cited the DAD’s field visits early in his tenure, before
the Department again tightened its COVID-19 restrictions in December 2020, as effective in
sharing his vision and listening to employee ideas.

(U) Deputy Assistant Director Addressed Challenges Strategically

(SBU) Staff members told OIG the DAD addressed problems, consistent with requirements in 3
FAM 1214b(2) to plan strategically. For example, he proposed a compromise solution to a
recurring problem of staffing gaps in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations protection detail by
providing for the early arrival of some special agents assigned to the mission. He also worked
with the Bureau of Medical Services to ensure special agents had priority for testing and COVID-
19 safety guidance customized for the protection detail work they performed. (b) (2)

These approaches led to positive results. The number

of entry-level special agents seeking to extend their tours of duty rose from 8 in March 2020 to
14 in March 2021. (b) (2)

(U) Mentoring and Career Development Support for Entry-Level Specialists Met Department
Guidelines

(U) OIG determined through interviews that that the current system of on-the-job training and
ad hoc mentoring for entry-level specialists was consistent with Department guidance in 3 FAM
2253.1c, 3 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-2251.3a, and 3 FAH-1 H-2253.2f and g. For
example, unit supervisors implemented on-the-job training and provided the staff with
increasingly complex protection tasks to promote job mastery. Staff members told OIG that
while they appreciated informal mentoring and career development advice, they preferred a
formal structured program to provide consistent information to all entry-level specialists. In
response to this information, the DAD and his senior staff initiated a formal, structured
program during the inspection.

(SBU) (b) (2)

(SBU) (b) (2)

(SBU) (b) (2)

9 (b) (2)

9
(SBU) (b) (2)

ISP-I-22-08 4
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(b) (2)

10 (b) (2)

11

(b) (2)

10
(SBU) (b) (2)

11
(SBU) (b) (2)

ISP-I-22-08 5
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(SBU) Figure 2: (b) (2)

(b) (2)

(SBU) Notes: (b) (2)

(U) Source: Generated by OIG from data provided by DS.

(SBU) (b) (2)

(SBU) (b) (2)

ISP-I-22-08 6
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Recommendation 1: (SBU) The Bureau of Diplomatic (b) (2)

(Action: DS(b) (2) )

(U) SECTION OVERVIEWS

(U) Secretary of State’s Detail
(U) SD provides 24-hour, 7-days-a-week protection for the Secretary as well as comprehensive
coverage for the Secretary’s residence. SD also provides protection for designated family
members of the Secretary. The detail works closely with offices within the Department and
other Federal, state, local, and foreign security and law enforcement organizations to ensure
the Secretary can carry out U.S. foreign policy safely and securely.

(SBU-LES) OIG found that SD generally followed operational standards for protection as
specified in 1 FAM 262.4-3(C) and 12 FAH-2. OIG based this conclusion on interviews with
regional security officers from eight overseas missions that supported Secretary visits during
2020, interviews with special agents assigned to SD, reviews of SD records, and an observation
of a protective movement from the Secretary’s residence to the Department’s headquarters,
the Harry S. Truman building. (b) (7)(F)

(U) Dignitary Protection Division

(U) DP coordinates protective services for visiting foreign dignitaries, resident foreign officials,
and certain U.S. Government officials, including permanent protection details for the U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations and for the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to
the United States. The division also organizes and manages protective services for special
events involving multiple protectees.

(U) OIG determined through employee interviews and document reviews that DP generally
followed standard operating procedures for all their primary functions, including the annual
United Nations General Assembly and foreign dignitary protection services. In 2019, DP
organized more than 700 law enforcement and support personnel for the 74th General
Assembly, which included 41 protection details and associated operations. DP generally
operated in accordance with Department standards in 1 FAM 262.4-3(A) and 12 FAH-2 H-200
except in the reporting of meals as gifts, as discussed below.

(U) Gift Reporting Did Not Meet Department Standards

(U) DS special agents assigned to protection details did not consistently report gifts received
from foreign dignitaries. According to 12 FAH-2 H-024d, an Agent in Charge is required to

ISP-I-22-08 7
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

submit a gift report at the end of each detail identifying gifts received and the value of those
gifts. Employees told OIG that foreign dignitaries occasionally purchased meals at restaurants
for special agents assigned to their protection detail, which 11 FAM 613.1a identifies as gifts.
OIG reviewed closing reports for protection details from October 2018 through June 2021 and
did not find any reports where special agents identified meals as gifts. The Office Director said
he understood that agents did not have to report meals because they were below the de
minimis threshold for gifts specified in 5 United States Code § 7342(a)(5). However, 12 FAH-2 H-
024e requires reporting all gifts regardless of value in the closing report.

Recommendation 2: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should require employees to

report all meals provided by foreign dignitaries as gifts, in accordance with Department
standards. (Action: DS)

(U) Spotlight on Success: Protection Detail Created Orientation Program to Familiarize Agents
With Needed Skills
(U) The protection detail for the Ambassador to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations
created an in-house orientation training program to familiarize special agents—both those on
temporary duty and those permanently assigned to the detail—with standard operating
procedures specific to the United Nations details. The details relied on temporary duty
special agents from outside the Office of Protection to supplement the permanent protection
staff, and as a result, there were occasional learning gaps in agents’ knowledge. To address
this situation, the details’ permanent special agents, with the help of senior leadership,
developed a 2-day orientation course to help temporary agents with protection rehearsals,
equipment, and skills specific to the United Nations protection details. The special agents
also drafted standard operating procedures to codify this training. The permanent special
agents on the United Nations details also valued this orientation course, stating that it
offered them a refresher of their Basic Regional Security Officer training as well as instruction
on areas not covered in their initial training. As a result of the success of the orientation
course, other protection details within the Dignitary Protection Division started developing
similar courses.

(U) Protective Liaison Division

(U) PL is the primary liaison among DS, multiple Department offices, and more than 176 foreign
embassies on security and law enforcement matters related to protective functions and
criminal investigations. PL also performs liaison and coordination for all DS protection details at
Washington, D.C., area airports, the White House, and Capitol Hill. Additionally, PL provides or
coordinates escorts for all armed foreign security personnel transiting through U.S. airports. PL
supports the protection of the foreign diplomatic community in the United States, with special
agents available 24 hours a day to respond and provide security assistance and liaison to
foreign diplomatic officials. PL also provides enhanced security support to foreign missions
through agreements with Federal, state, and local law enforcement.

ISP-I-22-08 8
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) OIG examined PL’s liaison and coordination function, the status of memoranda of
understanding (MOU) with partner agencies, and compliance with weapons training
requirements for special agents assigned to protection details. OIG reviewed documentation
and conducted interviews with representatives of four Federal and state agencies and offices12
about PL’s liaison and coordination and found those activities generally complied with
Department standards outlined in 1 FAM 262.4-3(B)(1). In addition, although there was no
requirement for MOUs between PL and any other law enforcement entity involved in
protection activities, OIG found that PL had an MOU13 with the U.S. Secret Service Uniformed
Division and, at the time of the inspection, was negotiating an MOU with the Washington, D.C.,
Metropolitan Police. Finally, OIG reviewed documentation of PL’s compliance with DS weapons
qualifications requirements and found that all PL-assigned special agents met requirements
described in 12 FAH-9 H-110.

(U) Major Events Coordination Unit

(U) The MECU coordinates protective security, intelligence, and long-range security planning for
major international events, such as the Olympic games and international summits. MECU
carries out its responsibilities through the International Security Events Group (ISEG), a multi-
U.S. Government agency group.14 MECU has an MOU with the U.S. Olympic Committee (now
known as the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee (USOPC)) regarding security coordination
at their events.15 To ensure the security of U.S. participants and staff at major USOPC events
outside the United States, MECU relies on TDY special agents such as field liaison officers and
watch officers.16

(U) During this inspection, OIG examined three areas: MECU’s coordination with its ISEG
partners; MECU’s training and support provided to its permanent staff and for up to 140 TDY
personnel at international events; and the status of the USOPC MOU. OIG conducted interviews

12
(U) U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Office of Foreign Missions, and the Washington,
D.C., Metropolitan Police Department.
13
(U) DS’ Policy and Planning Division is responsible for coordinating the development of DS-related MOUs and
memoranda of agreement between DS and other entities, such as other Department bureaus, Federal agencies, or
other organizations. See 12 FAM 053.
14
(U) The ISEG coordinates, plans, and provides U.S. Government security, intelligence, and crisis response for
international special security events with significant U.S. involvement. The ISEG is co-chaired by senior DS
personnel and steered by the MECU chief. The ISEG charter, signed on October 15, 2019, codified ISEG operations.
15
(U) On November 17, 2010, DS and the U.S. Olympic Committee entered an MOU for coordination of safety and
security for U.S. athletes, U.S. Olympic Committee staff, and delegations at major international sporting events
held outside the United States. Such events include the Olympics, Paralympics, the Pan American Games, the
Parapan American Games, and other international sporting events under the committee’s direction, as agreed to
by both parties. In June 2019, the U.S. Olympic Committee changed its name to the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic
Committee.
16
(U) Major USOPC events outside the United States include the Olympics, the Youth Olympics, the Beach
Olympics, the Paralympics, the Pan American Games, the Parapan American Games, the Women’s World Cup, and
the Men’s World Cup.

ISP-I-22-08 9
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

with two of MECU’s three primary ISEG partners17 and a USOPC representative and found
MECU provided appropriate support and coordination by chairing the Security and Law
Enforcement Committee of the ISEG and providing executive secretary services,18 as specified in
the ISEG charter. OIG also interviewed all MECU permanent staff, reviewed survey responses
from TDY respondents, and reviewed the new arrival welcome kit and related briefing
documents and found MECU provided training and support to temporarily assigned staff.
Finally, OIG reviewed the MOU between DS and USOPC. Although MECU and USOPC
coordinated their activities in accordance with the MOU, OIG determined that the MOU itself
required updating, as discussed below.

(U) Memorandum of Understanding With U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee Was
Outdated

(U) OIG found that the MOU between DS and USOPC was outdated. Senior DS personnel and a
USOPC security employee told OIG the 2010 MOU did not include important operational
changes that had occurred since it was signed. For example, the MOU did not include new
events such as the Youth Games. In addition, DS/DO/P senior leadership stated the MOU did
not define the DS liaison role adequately, which created inefficiencies and a lack of clarity about
liaison responsibilities. In addition, a MECU Overseas Security Coordinator told OIG that the
2010 MOU did not adequately define respective responsibilities of the Overseas Security
Coordinator and USOPC personnel. Finally, the MOU did not codify USOPC responsibility for
requesting accreditation for personnel and vehicle access placards, which resulted in in
duplication of effort. According to 12 FAM 053.2c, DS program managers, in coordination with
other entities in the proposed agreement, determine the issues to be specified in the MOU.
Without an updated MOU, DS risks having gaps in coverage for Olympic events and
inefficiencies in supporting protective services.

Recommendation 3: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should update its memorandum
of understanding with the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee. (Action: DS)

(U) Spotlight on Success: Crisis Management Exercises for Major Events Prepared Watch
Officers to Respond to Emergencies
(U) DS’ Major Events Coordination Unit recognized the need to develop specialized crisis
response training for watch officers assigned to Joint Operations Centers at major events,
such as the Olympics and the FIFA Men’s World Cup. The unit collaborated with the
Department’s Foreign Service Institute to develop and conduct crisis management exercises
for specific events and event sites. The exercises helped prepare watch officers from DS and
from other U.S. Government agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Homeland Security, to respond to a variety of potential crises by maximizing

17
(U) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Transportation Safety
Administration.
18
(U) Executive Secretary Services as defined in the ISEG charter are preparation of minutes for each ISEG meeting
that includes a summary of discussions, distribution of documents to the general membership, and maintenance of
agendas, meeting minutes, and policies for member review upon request.

ISP-I-22-08 10
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

their respective capabilities. Members of three non-DS agencies, a unit Overseas Security
Coordinator, and a unit Field Liaison Officer told OIG the crisis management exercises were
instrumental in responding to emergencies during past events, such as a cyber threat during
the 2018 Olympics in South Korea, a crime threat at the 2019 Pan American Games in Peru,
and an international aviation threat during the 2019 Women’s World Cup in Paris.

ISP-I-22-08 11
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS
(U) OIG provided a draft of this report to Department stakeholders for their review and
comment on the findings and recommendations. OIG issued the following recommendations to
the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The bureau’s complete response can be found in Appendix
B.1 The bureau also provided technical comments that were incorporated into the report, as
appropriate.

Recommendation 1: (SBU) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security,(b) (2)

(Action: DS(b) (2)

Management Response: (U) In its January 20, 2022, response, the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (SBU) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be
closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(b) (2)

Recommendation 2: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should require employees to report
all meals provided by foreign dignitaries as gifts, in accordance with Department standards.
(Action: DS)

Management Response: (U) In its January 20, 2022, response, the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security concurred with this recommendation. The bureau noted an estimated completion date
of February 2022.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be
closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
requires employees to report all meals provided by foreign dignitaries as gifts, in accordance
with Department standards.

Recommendation 3: (U) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should update its memorandum of
understanding with the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee. (Action: DS)

Management Response: (U) In its January 20, 2022, response, the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security concurred with this recommendation. The bureau noted an estimated completion date
of July 2022.

1
(U) OIG faced delays in completing this work because of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting operational
challenges. These challenges included the inability to conduct most in-person meetings, limitations on our
presence at the workplace, difficulty accessing certain information, prohibitions on travel, and related difficulties
within the agencies we oversee, which also affected their ability to respond to our requests.

ISP-I-22-08 12
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be
closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
updated its memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee.

ISP-I-22-08 13
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

(U) This inspection was conducted from March 15 to September 1, 2021, in accordance with the
Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspections Handbook, as issued by the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the Department and the U.S. Agency for Global Media
(USAGM).

(U) Objectives and Scope

(U) The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chief Executive Officer of
USAGM, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the
Department and USAGM. Consistent with the Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980,
OIG’s objectives for this inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Domestic Operations,
Office of Protection (DS/DO/P) were to determine whether:

• (U) The Director adequately managed and directed the office’s personnel and
operations to meet the office’s responsibilities.
• (U) Office leadership had processes in place to mentor and develop employees.
• (U) DS/DO/P had systems and designated points of contact in place to monitor
resources and programs (e.g., essential equipment, training) and
ensured compliance with internal controls and other Department standards.
• (U) The Secretary’s Detail complied with operational requirements.
• (U) DS/DO/P provided effective management and oversight of dignitary protective
services for the annual United Nations (UN) General Assembly.
• (U) DS/DO/P ensured that special agents complied with weapons qualification
standards.
• (U) The Protective Liaison (PL) unit maintained current agreements with agencies
assisting the Department with protective security.
• (U) PL effectively responded to and assisted foreign missions with security threats.
• (U) The Major Events Coordination Unit (MECU) coordinated effectively with
International Security Events Group partners.
• (U) MECU fulfilled its responsibilities under the existing memorandum of understanding
with the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee and if the memorandum was current
or needed updates or revisions.
• (U) MECU trained and supported both its permanent staff and temporary duty special
agents.

(U) Methodology
(U) OIG used a risk-based approach to prepare for this inspection. Due to the COVID-19
pandemic and taking into consideration relevant guidance, OIG largely conducted this
inspection remotely and relied on audio- and video-conferencing tools in lieu of in-person
interviews with Department and other appropriate personnel. However, because of the unique
operational aspects related to protection details, OIG conducted direct observations of

ISP-I-22-08 14
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

protective operations and resources. OIG also reviewed pertinent records; circulated surveys
and complied the results, as appropriate; and reviewed the substance of the report and its
findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, and organizations affected by the
inspection. OIG used professional judgment, along with physical, documentary, testimonial, and
analytical evidence collected or generated, to develop its findings, conclusions, and actionable
recommendations.

ISP-I-22-08 15
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED January 20, 2022

INFORMATION MEMO TO SANDRA LEWIS, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL

FOR INSPECTIONS – OIG

FROM: DS – Gentry O. Smith

SUBJECT: (U) Bureau of Diplomatic Security response to the Office of Inspector General
(OIG) Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Domestic Operations,
Office of Protection (DS/DO/P) ISP-I-22-08t, December 2021

(U) Below is the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s response to recommendations 1-3 of the
subject report.

(SBU) Recommendation 1: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security,(b) (2)

(Action: DS(b) (2) )

(SBU) DS Response (01/18/2022): DS agrees with this recommendation (b) (2)

(U) Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should require employees to report
all meals provided by foreign dignitaries as gifts, in accordance with Department standards.
(Action: DS)

(U) DS Response (01/18/2022): DS agrees with this recommendation and will take appropriate
steps to ensure that agents are aware of reporting requirements as specified in 12 FAH-2 H-024.
This recommendation will be implemented within one month.

(U) Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should update its memorandum of
understanding with the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee. (Action: DS)

(U) DS Response (01/18/2022): DS agrees with this recommendation and will work with the
U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee to update the existing MOU. This recommendation
will be implemented within six months.

ISP-I-22-08 16
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) ABBREVIATIONS

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DAD Deputy Assistant Director
DP Dignitary Protection
DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security
DS/DO/P Office of Protection
FAM Foreign Affairs Manual
FAH Foreign Affairs Handbook
ISEG International Security Events Group
MECU Major Events Coordination Unit
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
PL Protective Liaison
SD Secretary's Detail
TDY Temporary Duty
U.S.C. United States Code
USOPC U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee

ISP-I-22-08 17
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U) OIG INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS

Gillian Milovanovic, Team Leader
Richard J. Sypher, Team Manager
Pasquale Capriglione
Robert David
Ronald Deutch
Darren Felsburg
Hanane Grini
Paul Hussar
Shawn O'Reilly
Matthew Ragnetti
Joseph Talsma
Erik Winther

(U) Other Contributors

Cindy Cobham
Leslie Gerson
Caroline Mangelsdorf
Patricia Stewart

ISP-I-22-08 18
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

HELP FIGHT
FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE

1-800-409-9926
www.stateoig.gov/HOTLINE

If you fear reprisal, contact the

OIG Whistleblower Coordinator to learn more about your rights.
[email protected]

Office of Inspector General | U.S. Department of State | 1700 North Moore Street | Arlington, Virginia 22209

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE