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Religious Diversity in Europe
 Also Available from Bloomsbury:

French Populism and Discourses on Secularism

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Religious Pluralism and the City

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 Religious Diversity in Europe
Mediating the Past to the Young

Edited by
Riho Altnurme, Elena Arigita and Patrick Pasture
 BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC
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vi
 Contents

List of Illustrations ix
List of Contributors xi
Acknowledgements xv

Introduction Religious diversity in Europe: Meditating the past to the young  1

Patrick Pasture

1 Religious diversity in Europe: The challenges of past and present 15

Patrick Pasture and Christophe Schellekens

2 Views of the young: Reflections on the basis of European pilot studies 33

John Maiden, Stefanie Sinclair, Päivi Salmesvuori, Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse
and John Wolffe

3 Representing European religious diversity in textbooks for history education 51

Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse, Madis Maasing and Laura Galián

4 Society exhibited: Museums, religions and representation 67

Merve Reyhan Kayikci, Tamara Sztyma-Knasiecka, Naum Trajanovski
and Marija Manasievska

5 Religious diversity and generation Z: TV series and YouTube as

instruments to promote religious toleration and peace 91
Mikko Ketola, Ivan Stefanovski, Kaarel Kuurmaa and Riho Altnurme

6 Refugees and the politics of memory: Political discourses of religious

toleration and peace 113
Laura Galián, John Maiden, Stefanie Sinclair and Árpád Welker

7 Commemorating the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the Ohrid

Framework Agreement (2001) 137
Lidija Georgieva, Naum Trajanovski and John Wolffe

8 Religious pluralism in the Islamic tradition in late al-Andalus and in

contemporary Islamic transnationalism: A conceptual approach 159
Nadia Hindi Mediavilla, Antonio Peláez Rovira and
María Dolores Rodríguez Gómez
viii Contents

9 From dialogue to peace: Organizations for interreligious and

interconvictional dialogue in Europe 175
Elina Kuokkanen and Patrick Pasture

10 Religious toleration in the new spirituality subculture: The Estonian case 191
Lea Altnurme

Notes 207
References 213
Index 261
 Illustrations

Figures

4.1 Institut du Monde Arabe  75

4.2 Reconstruction of the roof of the synagogue in Gwoździec at the core
exhibition of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews POLIN  79
4.3 The Museum of the Macedonian Struggle and the Archaeological
Museum in Skopje 86
7.1 A commemorative plaque in Lenište near Prilep  145
7.2 Monument ‘Macedonian Defenders’ in Skopje  147
7.3 ‘Skenderbeg Square’ in Skopje  148
7.4 Clonard Martyrs Memorial Garden  154
7.5 Mural on the Shankill Road  155
8.1 Capitulations of Granada, Archivo de los Duques de Frías (Sección
Nobleza, Archivo Histórico Nacional)  163

Tables

1.1 Agnostics and atheists in Europe per UN region

(percentages, 1900–2020) 24
1.2 Muslims in Europe per UN region (percentages, 1900–2020) 25
1.3 Religious diversity in Europe (index, 2010) 26
x
 Contributors

Lea Altnurme is Associate Professor of Sociology of Religion at the School of Theology

and Religious Studies, University of Tartu (Estonia). She is the principal investigator of
H2020 project Religious Toleration and Peace (RETOPEA) at the University of Tartu.
Her research focuses on changes in spirituality on the individual level, new phenomena
in the religious landscape and the role of religion in Estonian cultural history. She is
the founder and editor-in-chief of the series Mitut usku Eesti (Multireligious Estonia).

Riho Altnurme is Professor of Church History at the School of Theology and Religious
Studies, vice dean for research at the Faculty of Humanities and Arts, University of
Tartu (Estonia) and also visiting professor at the University of Latvia (2019–21). His
research is concentrated on nineteenth- and twentieth-century church history, in
the context of church-state-society relations. He is the editor of History of Estonian
Ecumenism (2009) and Old Religion, New Spirituality: Implications of Secularisation
and Individualisation in Estonia (2021).

Elena Arigita is a permanent Lecturer of Arab and Islamic Studies at the Department
of Semitic Studies, University of Granada (Spain). Earlier, she was a language lecturer
at Cairo University and al-Azhar (Egypt), postdoctoral researcher at the International
Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World-ISIM in Leiden (The Netherlands)
and senior researcher at the International Institute for Arab and Muslim World
Studies-IEAM Casa Arabe (Spain). She is the principal investigator of RETOPEA at
the University of Granada. Her research interests and publications deal with religious
authority and institutionalization of Islam and the politics of inclusion and exclusion
of Islam in Europe.

Laura Galián is assistant professor at the Department of Arab and Islamic Studies
and Oriental Studies, Autonomous University of Madrid (Spain). Earlier, she was a
postdoctoral researcher at Universidad de Granada and a Juan de la Cierva research
fellow. Her research interests and publications deal with history of concepts, history
of ideas and the Middle East. She has recently published the book Colonialism,
Transnationalism and Anarchism in the South of the Mediterranean (2020).

Lidija Georgieva is Professor in Peace and Conflict Studies at the Faculty of

Philosophy, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. She is a UNESCO chair
in Intercultural Studies and Research and principal investigator of RETOPEA for Ss.
Cyril and Methodius University.

María Dolores Rodríguez Gómez is Associate Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies
at the Department of Semitic Studies, University of Granada (Spain). Earlier, she
xii Contributors

was a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Abdelmalek Essaâdi (Tetouan,

Morocco). She is assistant editor-in-chief of the journal Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes
y Hebraicos: Sección Árabe-Islam, and director of the group of research ‘Ciudades
Andaluzas Bajo el Islam’ (HUM-150 PAIDI). Her research focuses on economic and
social history of al-Andalus (thirteenth and fifteenth centuries), and particularly its
relations with the Maghreb.

Merve Reyhan Kayikci is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Department of Semitic

Studies, University of Granada (Spain) and collaborator at the Interculturalism,
Migration and Minorities Research Centre (IMMRC), KU Leuven (Belgium). She
obtained her PhD from the IMMRC, KU Leuven. Her doctoral work investigated the
intersections of volunteering and ethical self-becoming among Belgian Muslim female
volunteers. She is the author of Islamic Ethics and Female Volunteering Committing
to Society, Committing to God (2020) and co-editor of Muslim Volunteering in the
West: Between Islamic Ethos and Citizenship and European Muslims and New Media
(2020).

Mikko Ketola is Adjunct Professor and University Lecturer in Church History at the
Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki (Finland). He is the principal investigator of
RETOPEA at the University of Helsinki. He is also secretary of CIHEC (International
Commission for History and Studies of Christianity) and editor of the Finnish
opinion journal Vartija. His research interests include Finnish and Baltic church
history, religion and popular culture, post-communist Ukrainian church politics, and
contemporary papacy. He has published several articles in Finnish and international
scholarly journals and has edited eight volumes of the Yearbook of the Finnish Society
of Church History.

Elina Kuokkanen holds a BA in Social Work from Jyväskylä University of Applied

Sciences (Finland) and an MA in European Studies: Transnational and Global
Perspectives from KU Leuven. She is project assistant at Beyond the Horizon ISSG,
and is a founding member of Bonding Beyond Borders.

Kaarel Kuurmaa is a doctoral fellow at the School of Theology and Religious Studies,
University of Tartu (Estonia), and film programmer, critic and consultant (artistic
director of the Arvo Pärt Centre film nights, as well as programmer for Tallinn Black
Nights Film Festival, DocPoint – Documentary Film Festival in Helsinki and Tallinn
and film commissioner for the Estonian Film Institute).

Madis Maasing is research fellow at the Institute of History and Archaeology, University
of Tartu (Estonia). His main research interests and publications deal with the history
of sixteenth century in Estonia and Latvia (then known as Livonia), including the
political consequences of the Reformation. This subject also featured prominently in
his doctoral dissertation The Role of the Bishops in the Livonian Political System (in the
First Half of the 16th Century (2016). He is also co-author of a two-volume Estonian
textbook about Medieval times (Keskaeg: ajaloo õpik 7. klassile (Middle Ages: History
Textbook for the 7th Grade), 2016–17).
 Contributors xiii

John Maiden is head of department and senior lecturer in Religious Studies at the
Open University, UK. He is a historian of twentieth-century religion with a particular
interest in transnational evangelical and Pentecostal Christianities. He is co-editor
of Transatlantic Charismatic Renewal, 1950–2000 (2021) and Evangelicalism and the
Church of England in the Twentieth Century: Reform, Resistance and Renewal (2014).

Marija Manasievska is a PhD candidate in Classical Studies and researcher at the Ss.
Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje (North Macedonia).
Nadia Hindi Mediavilla is Assistant Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies at the
Department of Semitic Studies, University of Granada (Spain) and research associate
at the RETOPEA. Her research interests and publications deal with feminism and
gender and its relation to nationalism and sectarianism in Iraq.

Patrick Pasture is Professor of European and Global History and director of the
Centre for European Studies at KU Leuven (Belgium). He is the project leader
of the European H2020 project RETOPEA and principal investigator of the Jean
Monnet Network European Transoceanic Encounters and Exchanges (ETEE).
He has published extensively on European and Global History and in particular
the social, political and cultural history of religion in a global perspective,
including Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international: la difficile recherche
d’une troisième voie (1999), Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD (2015) and
Ontmoetingen in het Oosten: een wereldgeschiedenis (Encounters in the East: A
Global History), 2019).

Antonio Peláez Rovira is Associate Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies at the
Department of Semitic Studies, University of Granada (Spain). Earlier, he was a
postdoctoral researcher at the University of Genoa (Italy) and had other research stays
in Arab countries. He coordinates the master’s programme in Arabic and Hebrew
Cultures: Al-Andalus and the Contemporary Arab World, and he is the principal
investigator of SONADE Project (Nasrid Society in the 15th Century: Application of
the Law and State Administration) at the University of Granada. His research interests
and publications deal with political structures and power in al-Andalus (thirteenth–
fifteenth centuries), Nasrid intellectuals and relationships with other states.

Päivi Salmesvuori is university researcher and lecturer at the Faculty of Theology

and board member of the Doctoral Programme in History and Cultural Heritage,
University of Helsinki, Finland. She has researched issues of gender, power, authority
and religion from the Middle Ages to present times. She has been awarded the
membership of the Teachers’ Academy of University of Helsinki for her achievements
in university pedagogics.

Christophe Schellekens is a historian working at the intersection of teaching, research

and research management. He was researcher for the RETOPEA project at the Leibniz
Institute for European History in Mainz and coordinator of RETOPEA at KU Leuven
until September 2021. Since August 2020, he is a lecturer at the University of Utrecht
(The Netherlands).
xiv Contributors

Stefanie Sinclair is Senior Lecturer in Religious Studies and director of the Centre
for Scholarship and Innovation at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the Open
University (UK). She has a special research interest in religion, identity, politics and
education in Germany and the UK, and is the Teaching and Learning representative on
the executive committee of the British Association for the Study of Religions.

Ivan Stefanovski holds a PhD in law from the Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence
and is currently researcher at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje (North
Macedonia).

Tamara Sztyma-Knasiecka is a postdoctoral fellow at the Faculty of ‘Artes Liberales’,

University of Warsaw and curator at the Museum of the History of Polish Jews (Polin)
in Warsaw (Poland).

Naum Trajanovski is a PhD candidate in sociology at the Institute for Philosophy

and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, and a doctoral research fellow
at the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje (North Macedonia). His major
academic interests include memory politics in North Macedonia and sociological
knowledge-transfer in 1960s Eastern Europe. He is the author of a book in Macedonian
on the Museum of the Macedonian struggle and the Macedonian memory politics
(2020).

Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse is Associate Professor in Historical Education and director

of the Specific History Teacher Training Programme (MA), Faculty of Arts, KU
Leuven (Belgium). He is president of the Flemish Association of History Teachers
and vice president of the International Research Association for History and Social
Sciences Education. He was involved as an expert in the development committee for
new standards for (primary/secondary school) history education in Flanders. He has
published extensively on the history of history education and historical representations
in history education and popular historical culture, and on research about teaching
and learning processes within history education.

Árpád Welker is currently a policy officer at the European Commission. He was

previously affiliated with the University of Helsinki where he researched topics related
to anti-Semitism, history of Jewry and interconfessional relations.

John Wolffe is Professor of Religious History at The Open University (UK), where he
was also associate dean (Research Enterprise and Scholarship) in the Faculty of Arts
and Social Sciences from 2016 to 2021. He is the principal investigator of RETOPEA
at the Open University. He is the author of numerous publications on North Atlantic
Evangelicalism, anti-Catholicism, responses to death and, most recently, Sacred and
Secular Martyrdom in Britain and Ireland since 1914 (2020).
 Acknowledgements

This book is a result of the European H2020 research project RETOPEA to promote
religious toleration and peace, particularly among youth. This project involves scholars
from eight academic institutions all over Europe – the KU Leuven (Belgium), the
University of Tartu (Estonia), the University of Helsinki (Finland), the Leibniz Institute
for European History in Mainz (Germany), Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in
Skopje (UKIM, North Macedonia), the University of Warsaw (Poland), the University
of Granada (Spain) and Open University, Milton Keynes (UK) – as well as three
centres for civic education: the Euro-Arab Foundation (FUNDEA, Granada), Le Foyer
in Brussels and the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC).
The premise of the project is that insight into historical religious peacemaking offers
a prism for interpreting contemporary issues related to religious diversity, including
the use of the public space. From this perspective, we first explored the different ways
in which religious coexistence was thought of and achieved in different historical
environments. Second, we delved into how religious plurality in the past and in the
present is represented in the context of different media today. This volume presents the
conclusions of this part of the research. We have also developed a new tool – making
‘docutubes’ in the way of vlogs – to stimulate religious literacy and active learning
among young people. For more information, please visit our website https://reto​pea.
eu/s/start/page/home.
We would like to thank all the authors and the entire RETOPEA team for their
enthusiastic collaboration. The production of this book – not to speak of the making
of docutubes – was seriously hampered by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021,
but we managed to go forward. We are blessed with a project officer at the European
Commission, Jarkko Siren, who is particularly supportive of this project, for which we
would like to express our particular appreciation. Thanks also to Nigel Walkington and
Chun Gan for their assistance as well as to Lalle Pursglove, Lily McMahon and their
collaborators at Bloomsbury, who have warmly welcomed this book.
xvi
 Introduction

Religious diversity in Europe: Mediating the

past to the young
Patrick Pasture1

God Is Back is the title of a bestselling book about an alleged return to religion in the
world (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2009). But rather than the return of one single
God, what we in fact seem to be witnessing is the appearance of many different gods and
a plurality of competing world views, both religious and secular. It raises discussions,
with deep historical roots, about the place of religion in society and in particular in what
is labelled as ‘the public space’. Also religious violence has returned, in Europe, mainly
from Islamist terrorists. Furthermore, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism led to violence
and oppression. At the same time an awareness that religion can connect people and
may contribute to peace and toleration emerged as well. History in this context is often
invoked as a motivation or legitimation for divergent actions and policies.
Young people in particular are exposed to such narratives and experience their
effects in their daily lives. However, as the authors of Chapter 2 (John Maiden, Stefanie
Sinclair, Päivi Salmesvuori, Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse and John Wolffe) emphasize, on
the basis of a series of pilot studies in different places and contexts in Europe, young
people are usually quite open-minded with regards to religious (or convictional)
diversity, and are willing to discuss their experiences, reflect on them and learn from
them. At the same time, it is also obvious how little historical and religious knowledge
they have and how much their vision of the past is twisted by presentism, that is,
the backward projection of present experiences into the past (Borries 1994; Angvik
and Borries 1997). In fact, they get their information from a wide variety of sources,
from their close, personal circle (family, friends, religious community) to schools and
various mediating contexts, most of which are covered in this book.
This book sets out to offer a critical assessment of contemporary representations of
the history of religion and religious – or broader, ‘convictional’ – pluralism, particularly
with regards to young people. It is part of a wider project that aims to improve the
understanding of religious pluralism and to facilitate peaceful coexistence and
toleration among young people,2 although in this book we will be focusing particularly
on assessing these representations and how they are mediated to the young.
2 Religious Diversity in Europe

Defining Europe
Unlike many studies that refer to Europe’s history and identity, this book adopts a
broad, inclusive view of Europe. We use the term first of all as a geographical concept,
referring to a generally accepted definition which situates the continent between
(including) the British Isles in the west, the Nordic countries in the north and the
northern Mediterranean (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece) in the south. Europe’s eastern
borders are perhaps less easy to agree on: for practical purposes in this volume we
have excluded both Russia and present-day Turkey (but not the ‘European part’ of the
former Ottoman Empire). We are aware that such a meta-geographical concept is far
from being ‘objective’ (see extensively Lewis and Wigen 1997), but it is workable. We
also decided to work within a limited time frame: our historical references do not go
back beyond the European Middle Ages, thereby avoiding possible discussion about
the ‘Europeanness’ of Ancient Roman and Greek civilizations. At the same time, this
time frame encompasses the history of al-Andalus and the Ottoman lands in Eastern
Europe as well as that of European Christendom, to which most studies of European
identity tend to be confined. This is important in many respects, not least because
the experiences and memories of these Muslim lands resonate strongly in the present,
albeit in quite diverse ways, as will become clear in the following chapters.
Such an inclusive view of Europe raises other issues though: to what extent is it
meaningful to group together such diverse countries and (sub)regions? Is there ‘enough’
homogeneity or similarity to isolate them as a separate continent? For outsiders (and for
Europeans living elsewhere) the answer is obvious enough, even if the question of the
exact boundaries remains unsolved. From a religious perspective, we can nevertheless
easily distinguish between an Orthodox Europe, born out of the Byzantine Empire, a
Catholic and a Protestant Europe, divided into Lutheran, Calvinist and Anglican areas
(a careful observer will also recognize patterns in early and late Christianization). For
its part, Islam dominated much of the Iberian Peninsula for centuries, until its final
conquest by Catholics at the end of the fifteenth century and the subsequent expulsion
of Muslims (and Jews). Islam also held sway in Southeast Europe after the conquests of
the Ottoman Turks spanning the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. Since then (until
the twentieth century, that is), the latter region has been a mixed Islamo-Christian
zone, a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional concoction which did not just include
Orthodox Christians and Muslims but also Catholics, Protestants and Jews, to name
just the main religious categories. Secularization patterns, the Cold War, post-war
migrations and the increasing attraction of Asian and Amerindian spiritual cultures
and New Age have also had a profound impact on the religious fabric of Europe, and
are perhaps even more prevalent today (Pasture 2013; see also Chapter 1). The main
issue is whether the contemporary divisions within Europe are less significant than
those distinguishing Europe from the rest of the world. An answer to that question,
however, lies beyond the scope of this book and would require a global comparative
study, including ‘outside-in’ perspectives.
It does seem remarkable, however, that many contemporary narratives about
Europe, even secular(ist) ones, emphasize the Christian dimension, somehow
 Introduction 3

marginalizing or blatantly ignoring the fact that large swathes of Europe were
under Islamic rule for centuries. Antiquity, by contrast, is normally included within
European history. Many claim that Europe is rooted in Christianity and treat Islam
as the ‘external other’ against which Europe has defined itself (Wintle 2016; Delanty
2013). At first sight, these views appear to encompass Jewish history, as they often
refer to a Judeo-Christian heritage, but appearances can be deceptive: the notion of
Judeo-Christianity has ambiguous, if not deeply anti-Semitic, roots, and does not
prevent anti-Judaic or even anti-Semitic stances, for example, with regards to ritual
slaughter (see in particular Nathan and Topolski 2018; Kluveld 2018; Topolski 2018).
The contemporary use of Judeo-Christianity has another obvious downside in that it
effectively excludes Muslims from Europe’s identity construction.
A different set of questions arises regarding the distinction with America, to which
Europe is connected as part of what is called ‘the West’ – a concept with an even more
complex history even though the Atlantic Ocean is clearly vast enough to act as a
boundary (Corm 2005, 2009; Nemo 2010). There are no such links between Europe
and the East, however. The exclusion of Russia from Europe may appear bizarre: as the
heir to the Orthodox legacy and to that of communism (that quintessentially European
ideology), it is in many ways undoubtedly European, and its exclusion is a political
and cultural construction based on complex, largely geopolitical considerations and
reasons (Neumann 1995, 1998a, 1998b; see also Pasture, forthcoming). In this book we
would have liked to buck this trend and to have included Russia in our analysis, but the
huge scale of this task rendered this impractical.
The European perspective is also a way to overcome the trap of methodological
nationalism, although the national straitjacket is difficult to escape from, as media and
mediating contexts are often structured along national lines and are highly dependent
on language (itself an important barrier for effective transnational or pan-European
research). As Laura Galián, Madis Maasing and Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse remark in
Chapter 3, history textbooks, for example, often take a strongly national perspective,
and focus almost exclusively on national history. Significantly, some smaller Northwest
European countries, however (with Germany as an interesting exception as a larger
country), adopt a broader European perspective, which in fact is part of their national
identity. Likewise, in this book most chapters contain a national dimension, although
we have tried to offset this as far as possible by making comparisons between different
countries.
Before continuing our investigation, a few more observations are required – first
about the meaning of religion as defined in this volume. In reality, we leave the definition
rather open-ended. Most contributions deal with the main religious institutions or
communities, although non-institutional forms such as New Spirituality are covered
as well. We also touch on non-religious world views, albeit without discussing all their
possible interpretations, definitions and boundaries. As Lois Lee (2015) demonstrated,
the non-religious encompasses a wide variety of positions, from agnosticism to atheism,
and many variations in between, which include personal searches for meaning and
individualistic bricolage. A similar story could also be told about religious people: they
too display a wide variety of positions and practices. This is the case for all beliefs,
and applies just as well to Muslims, Christians, Jews and Buddhists. As it happens,
4 Religious Diversity in Europe

even the boundaries between religious and non-religious have become porous, and
appear increasingly irrelevant for many. This is what we observed in different settings,
among the young people that took part in the pilot studies (Chapter 2) and in our study
of interconvictional associations (Chapter 9). This, to be sure, is completely at odds
with the polarization that appears to dominate the media, although, in this case too,
appearances can be misleading. In the current populist discourses about a Christian
civilization under threat, for example, religion is rarely the issue, but it is politicized
as an identity-marker (Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016); hence blurring the
boundaries between politics and religion.

Religious diversity in Europe: Different narratives and

interpretations

It is widely accepted that Europe has become a multicultural, multireligious, even

hyper-diverse region, mainly as a result of immigration, although huge differences
exist within Europe: while the main Western European capitals such as London, Paris,
Brussels or Berlin perfectly illustrate this assertion, the situation is much less diverse
in more rural areas, and in Mediterranean countries – within which huge differences
exist – as well as in Eastern Europe, even in capital cities such as Warsaw and Budapest.
Although countries that belonged to the former communist bloc were interconnected
to some extent and welcomed activists from all over the world (Mark, Kalinovsky
and Marung 2020), they did not experience the same waves of immigration as in
Northwestern Europe, which attracted large numbers of workers for their booming
industries as well as refugees and fortune seekers after decolonization and other major
upheavals.
The narrative that Europe has become a hyper-diverse region suggests that this
is a largely recent phenomenon and therefore flies in the face of another discourse
that has always identified Europe with pluralism and diversity, and in which Europe
is represented as the cradle of toleration. The latter is certainly part of the self-
identification of the EU, although this narrative has lost much of its appeal in the
face of current debates about multiculturalism and immigration. To a large extent the
discourse of ‘unity in diversity’ – from this perspective a highly ambiguous motto –
actually refers to national and ethnic pluralism rather than cultural and religious,
although these are obviously strongly connected. Elsewhere I have argued that
although characterized by large internal migrations, for centuries and until recently,
Europe was relatively homogenous compared to some other regions such as South
and Southeast Asia or Africa, and actually developed an ideal of homogeneity that
was rooted in the complex history of Christendom, through monopolistic claims
over the truth as proclaimed by Christianity as well as the close association between
church and state. Pluralism, and toleration as its alter ego, rarely was something
that was valued positively, let alone something to strive for. This ideal has survived
the gradual secularization of Europe (which also needs to be put into perspective)
and particularly inspires modern and contemporary ideologies of nationalism and
populism (see Pasture 2015 and Chapter 1 of this volume).
 Introduction 5

Secularization is certainly a dominant narrative when discussing the meaning

of religion in society today – Paolo Costa considers it a ‘modern foundational myth’
(Costa 2019) – although it has become highly contested. There is, however, no
consensus on the meaning of the term, referring most frequently to the declining
social significance of institutional religion and in particular of Christian churches.
When used with regards to Europe, the term ‘secularization’ could arguably therefore
be replaced by ‘de-Christianization’ (e.g. Christie and Gauvreau 2013). The original
theorists of secularization and their contemporary acolytes, however, clearly refer
to religion in general when they imagine an inconsistency between religion and
modernization, and claim that modernization, understood in widely divergent terms
as social differentiation, rationalization and individualization, and as underlying an
ideal of progress, would inevitably entail, and indeed bring about, a decline in the
social significance of religion.
In this description it is hard not to discern an ideological component, and a
conceptual history reveals the common origins of secularization and secularism in
Christendom itself (Lübbe 2003; Quack 2017; see also Asad 2003 and Weir 2015).
Notwithstanding extensive attention to trying to define the different concepts, the
two are easily conflated. Rather than speaking about ‘the ideological underpinning of
secular society and politics’ (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer and Van Antwerpen 2011: 9),
I prefer to limit the use of the term secularism to the ideology advocating that ‘religion
ought to be separate from all or some aspects of politics or public life (or both)’
and that the state has ‘a raison d’être of its own and should not be subordinated to
religious authority, religious purposes or religious reasons’ (Fox 2015: 2; see also
Modood and Sealy 2019: 6; Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012). While secularism in
the sense of emphasizing the neutrality of the state and a formal separation between
religious institutions and the state is often presented as a tool promoting toleration –
in India it is sometimes even identified with toleration (Keysar 2017: 40) – a more
radical, political interpretation of secularism views it as a means of limiting the
role of religion in the public sphere and subordinating religion to the interests and
values of the state (Asad 2013). Speaking about the French laïcité, Étienne Balibar
in this respect distinguishes between a position that respects ‘the autonomy of civil
society, to which belong the liberties of conscience and of expression’, and a radical
interpretation of laïcité as ‘an essential piece of the “normative” primacy of public
order over private activities and opinions’ (Balibar 2018: 163). In this perspective,
secularism risks becoming ‘identitarian’ and limiting the freedom of conscience and
religion, excluding people who manifest their faith. It then has a lot in common with
the positions of New Atheism, which basically considers religion incompatible with
Western liberties and rationality (Lee 2015: 136; Modood and Sealey 2019). In that
perspective, secularization is not only the inevitable result of social processes but also
the desired outcome of secularism.
To be sure, few, if any, still endorse the normativity and inevitability of secularization
as a process closely tied to modernity: secularization theory has been redefined and
reinvented as a theory of religious change explaining why religions may actually resist
decline and even expand in modern societies (the classic example being Inglehart and
Norris 2004). Neo-secularization theorists also concede that secularization does not
6 Religious Diversity in Europe

imply the eventual disappearance of religion (and thus is ‘relative’), and may follow
different paths: Karel Dobbelaere (2002), for example, distinguishes between macro-,
meso-, and individual levels, while José Casanova (1994) recognizes that social
differentiation led to the emancipation of ‘the secular spheres’ (the state, the economy
and science are the prime examples) as well as to the parallel formation of a separate
religious sphere. However, he argues that the latter is not confined to the private
domain and that a process of de-privatization has taken place since the 1980s through
which religions (re-)emerged as public actors.
Nevertheless, surveys and statistics do reveal the declining relevance of both
institutionalized religious practices and ‘churching’ in Europe, with only minor
variations and exceptions (see Chapter 1). Ronald Inglehart (2021) recently made
a strong case that religion worldwide – not just Christianity – is receding, but his
argument remains contested (see also Stolz 2020 and the reactions in this special issue
of Social Compass for a state-of-the-art discussion).
What such surveys are largely unable to measure is the significance of non-
institutionalized religion and individual spirituality, which are often said to have no
significant societal impact (see e.g. Bruce 2002, esp. 95–9; for a poignant critique see
Aupers and Houtman 2006; Houtman and Aupers 2007). The traditional literature
on secularization interprets spirituality and non-institutionalized religion therefore
as cyphers of secularization – illustrating in this way how much the concept of
religion in secularization theories owes to Christianity (Asad 2003). These new trends
could also be considered as signs of the vivacity of religions that are engaging with
modernity in various ways. They may be viewed as expressions of individual liberty
which lead to and legitimize a wide variety of spiritual alternatives to institutionalized
religions. From this perspective, rather than as a sign of increasing secularization, New
Spirituality should be considered as a form of ‘democratization’ of religion, as well as
blurring the lines between the secular and the sacred (Cooper 2016). In this process,
as Slavoj Žižek (2001) observed, believing and believing in became dissociated. Hence,
adopting a long-term perspective, Ethan Shagan concluded that ‘secularization has not
segregated belief from the world, it has instead opened the world to belief liberating
a central category of Western civilization from the demands that Christianity placed
upon it’ (Shagan 2019: 293).
The secularization of Europe is also put into perspective when migrants are added
to the equation. In this case we are less concerned about whether the religiosity of
migrants will decline in the same way as that of the autochthonous population or
follow different paths, and are more interested in the fact that migrants bring in
different religious traditions and hence increase the diversity of the religious landscape,
thereby creating a need for societies to ‘govern’ this diversity. In a political perspective
pluralism appears as the core of the liberal ideology according to which the state
should ‘not impose on all citizens one single view or way of doing things’ (Bardon et al.
2015). For others, the difference between pluralism and diversity lies in pluralism’s
presumed ‘engagement’ and its evaluative or normative stance. In this respect religious
pluralism refers to an imagined ideal state in which ‘balance, harmony, mutual support
and equality of opportunity between faith communities’ prevails (Eck 2016; Beckford
2003: 101; see Giordan 2012; Bock and Fahy 2019).
 Introduction 7

In any case the ways in which European states have accepted religious diversity
and pluralism vary quite considerably, giving way to different ‘secularisms’ or, to avoid
the latter concept’s ideological load, ‘secularities’, that is, secular state systems which
in diverse ways govern religion and spirituality.3 This refers to ways of guaranteeing
religious freedom and the right to believe and worship as well as to proselytize, and
affects the way religions may organize themselves, the relationships between religious
institutions and secular authorities and with other organized world views, and the
degree of reciprocity and equality shown to minority religions and world views. The
latter is hardly an issue in Europe though, but not because European societies treat
different world views in the same way. In fact quite the opposite is true (Roy 2019).
In most states in Europe, (organized) religions, spiritualities and secular world views
do not have equal status and do not enjoy the same rights and benefits (Fox 2015).
Notwithstanding centuries of conflict and continued separation, historical Christian
churches have privileged relationships with secular authorities, and concertation
with other religious institutions is organized according to the same model applied
with the Christian church(es). However, most religions, including New Spirituality
and non-religious world views, do not have similar centralized church structures.
Only recently, that is, roughly since the 1960s and, particularly, since the 1990s, has
there been a growing tendency to treat different religions equally, although today this
equality increasingly means that they all suffer from the same biases (Ferrari 2013;
see Chapter 1). In this respect the late Alfred Stepan introduced a useful alternative
approach, looking into the ways in which societies guarantee what he calls the ‘twin
tolerations’, according to which democratic political institutions get ‘sufficient space’
from religious institutions to function, while the state allows its citizens to live their
religion in peace. These twin tolerations effectively allow for several regimes of
secularity (Stepan 2000, 2011).
Even if declining religious statistics may suggest otherwise, people, and young people
in particular, are exposed to religious differences in their daily lives and are challenged
in their beliefs – which can be religious but also non-religious and secularist – and in
their search for identity. Sometimes they are faced with manifestations of intolerance
and violence, in their own personal experiences or in their immediate surroundings,
or through what happens elsewhere, both nearby and far away – as modern media
has considerably reduced the significance of physical distance, while at the same
time creating new opportunities for interaction. The gruesome murder of French
secondary-school teacher, Samuel Paty, on 16 October 2020, which happened while
we were working on this book, once again revealed to us all – including the young
people we have in mind in this book – the power of religious fanatism and the reality of
apparently incompatible world views in Europe. Clearly the murder not only affected
the local community of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, but also resonated all over Europe
and beyond.
Apart from the increased significance of diversity and pluralism, perhaps the
most striking feature today is the enhanced public visibility of religions (Casanova
1994; Hjelm 2015; Furseth 2018a), even if the visibility question depends a lot on
one’s particular perspective and location: the position of religion in society looks quite
different if you are analysing it from the perspective of a country like the Netherlands,
8 Religious Diversity in Europe

where only a minority still considers themselves Christian, or Poland, where a

militant Catholic Church is trying to help shape a nation after decades of communist
oppression, or Ireland where the same Church dominated public life but has now
entered a deep crisis after the exposure of major abuse scandals, or the United States,
where the impact of evangelicalism and Christian nationalism has increased greatly
since the Second World War,4 let alone from the standpoint of China or Iran (Hjelm
2015; Beckford 2010, 2012).
The ‘visibility’ of religion in the public sphere is largely mediated through the media.
An extensive literature has developed to assess the multiple ways in which various
media function as intermediaries for processes of change within and between religious
and other social institutions, and what the relationship is between the ‘mediatization of
religion’ (Hjarvard 2008, 2012, 2013) and its changing public representation. A central
issue here is whether religion itself is changed by this process: obviously religious
institutions adapted in different ways, depending on issue and context (Furseth 2018b;
Hellemans and Rouwhorst 2020). There is certainly also evidence that it becomes more
diffuse and even ‘banal’ (as Michael Billig claims has happened with nationalism), in
the sense of being present in everyday action, receiving its meaning not from grand
manifestations but often from the simplest of daily events. Although in this book, we
will not be dealing with these changes an Sich, they do coincide with our findings that
religion is a reality and a practice that young people encounter in their daily lives, and
not (only, not even particularly) in explicitly religious settings. An important finding
of the research on the mediation of religion is that changes may not only be abrupt and
immediate, provoked by specific incidents such as terrorist attacks, but that they also
take place at a deeper, more gradual level. Another conclusion, more directly relevant
for us, is that it is possible to ‘use the media to engage with contentious issues in ways
that may reduce ethnic and religious stereotypes’ and polarization (Lövheim and
Hjarvard 2019: 208; Hjarvard 2008, 2012, 2013). In the Nordic countries, in particular,
the potential use of the media to improve relations between people, and particularly
youngsters, with different world views and faiths has been extensively studied.
Nevertheless, the mainstream media, from newspaper and television headlines
to the unrestrained clamour of social networks, continue to be dominated by often
simplistic, black-and-white narratives. This is not surprising, as the media tend to
focus on the spectacular and on issues that disrupt social order (Hjarvard and Lundby
2018). Nonetheless, a closer look at the representations of religion quickly reveals that
there are more voices than may appear at first sight. A more nuanced picture soon
emerges, showing different views of the meaning of religion, religious liberty and the
separation of church and state as well as about the role of religion in society, the (il)
legitimation of violence, and the past and present of religious diversity in Europe and
elsewhere.
It could be argued that five, not entirely unrelated, issues dominate the public
perception of religion in Europe today, which also suggests that religion has become
a political factor again (Schwörer and Fernández-García 2020): (1) the occurrence
of politically motivated religious violence, particularly by some Islamist movements;
(2) the uses of religion in contemporary populism, often adopting a ‘clash of
civilizations’ identity discourse between a ‘Christian’ Abendland and an Islamic East,
 Introduction 9

fuelled by anti-Islamic images and cartoons that often seek to provoke and insult;
(3) more generally the discussions on the place of religion and religious (mostly
Islamic) symbols and practices in the public and the social sphere (the wearing of
headscarves, the building of mosques and minarets, the ritual slaughter of animals);
(4) to a lesser extent, the political clout of conservative Christian evangelicalism in US
politics, especially since the presidencies of George W. Bush and Donald Trump and
(5) the resurgence of religion in conservative ethics, in the pro-life movement, which is
also gaining ground in Europe. The notion that religion might also be a force for good
seems to have dissipated in European narratives – missionaries tend to be presented
as colonialists or as ‘aid workers’, ignoring their religious motivation (Goddeeris 2021:
96–102). When religions, especially Islam, are referred to, it is often in a distorted,
schematic way, either casting doubts about present-day political Islam or praising a
decontextualized and idealized past of coexistence. In any case religion appears mostly
within a context of tensions, if not conflict, which particularly emphasizes religious
‘minorities’ – including Jews, not only as an ethnic group (and associated with Israel),
but also Judaism as a faith community (e.g. with regards to ritual slaughter).5 The
Covid pandemic has furthermore fuelled anti-Semitism, in various ways.

Mediating contexts

This book assesses the representations of religion and religious interactions in Europe
today. Rather than focusing exclusively on the media, we decided to look at different
mediating contexts where religion is represented. In this case, ‘mediating contexts’
refer to places and instances in the public sphere where religion is (made) ‘visible’,
and thus also mediated towards the public. Mediating contexts can not only be print,
audiovisual and online media, in the widest sense – for example, also including
books – but also places such as museums where religions are literarily ‘on display’
(although this of course depends on the type of museum) as well as symbolic ‘places’
in civil society, including political parties, religious institutions, spiritual groups and
(inter)faith associations.6 The intended public of these representations are primarily,
but not exclusively, young people. After all, young people also encounter images and
representations that are not specifically targeted at them.
Our initial expectation was that this approach would provide a far more diverse
picture of the presence of religion in contemporary society than the traditional
sociological surveys, which inevitably argue that religion is in decline, even though
this conclusion clearly runs contrary to the widely held perception that religion is
increasingly visible in society. We do believe, however, that this increased visibility,
if narrowed down to what is commonly referred to as the public sphere, is also
incomplete. In fact, it pays to abandon the framing of secularization that underpins
this notion, and to take the perception of religion seriously, appreciating that
religion is a multifaceted phenomenon that is present in very different contexts. This
corroborates Inger Furseth’s approach towards religion, which is grounded in a social
science complexity frame of reference and argues against reducing history to ‘single
dimensions’ and basic evolutions in one or other direction: in reality there are (and
10 Religious Diversity in Europe

actually always were) ‘several seemingly contradictory religious trends at different

levels’ (Furseth 2018b: 16). This is also highlighted by this book, even if our aim is
not to engage in this theoretical debate on the place of religion in society here. In
this respect our ambition remains far more modest: assessing (albeit still to a limited
extent) the multiple ways in which religion and religious coexistence are presented to
the public and to the young in particular, and what we can learn from these experiences
to improve our understanding of the issues inherent in living together with people of
different faiths and world views.
Ever since we first imagined this book, we realized that the representation of
religion would vary according to the particular mediating context. Indeed, you hardly
have to be an expert to imagine that the way popular newspapers depict religion would
differ from the representations in, for example, religious schoolbooks (see also Lundby
et al. 2018; Christensen 2018). This may appear a self-evident truism, but it seriously
questions some of the basic assumptions that dominate public debate and current
scholarship. This book also brought together different approaches and perspectives.
The results of our research certainly confirm our initial expectations, but also show
that, once again, reality is more complex than anticipated. In fact, the phrasing of the
example above already suggests as much: by specifically comparing the popular press
and religious schoolbooks (rather than just the press and schoolbooks), we are already
implying that differences exist within each of these quite different mediating contexts
(RETOPEA 2020).
The fact that the press is diverse may not come as a surprise: indeed, the media
landscape includes not only tabloids but also so-called quality press, as well as lifestyle
magazines and explicitly religious journals, published either by secular publishing
companies or by religious institutions and associations. National political and mediating
contexts also play a role in how religions and religious and convictional plurality and
interactions are covered: media coverage of the same subject in Scandinavia, the UK or
Greece can vary considerably as a result of the different political and mediating contexts,
in line with diverging institutional positions of religions and the way media position
themselves within the media market (Christensen 2018). Moreover, religious actors
are often active participants or mediators in the media representation of religion: they
are publishers and intervene in the public debate (Hjarvard 2012, 2013). Contrasting
representations of religion can also occur in situations in which religious actors are not
involved and where one would perhaps expect there to be only minimal differences, as
between religious and history schoolbooks, for example. Religious textbooks tend to
be far more inclusive, discussing a variety of religious traditions from different places,
than history textbooks – which focus on Christianity, conflict and largely lose their
interest in religion after the French Revolution.7
That said, there are also quite a few parallels in the way history textbooks deal with
religious diversity and interactions. Representations of religious diversity in history
textbooks vary, but as Laura Galián, Madis Maasing and Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse
argue in Chapter 3, there are also some important parallels between the almost fifty
textbooks they analysed from four countries – they even suggest some sort of common
‘canon’, notwithstanding important national differences. Not surprisingly these
representations focus on conflicts and take into account a relative variety of actors,
 Introduction 11

even if they also tend to homogenize the different faiths. But this restricted focus on
conflict and the implicitly positive depiction of secularism – which is not critically
assessed – is, as the authors note, highly problematic, particularly because textbooks
clearly constitute an important source of information for young people, as was also
confirmed in the pilot studies; they are arguably the most ‘pedagogical’ tool through
which young people can obtain information.
The same applies when we move on to museums, a large selection of which have been
analysed by Merve Reyhan Kayikci, Tamara Sztyma-Knasiecka, Naum Trajanovski and
Marija Manasievska in Chapter 4. Many national historical museums consider religion
as constituent (if not identical) to civilization. Islam, for example, is presented in this
way. But this also implies that Islam is homogenized and disconnected from both
European history and the present-day world. The dialogue with the local community,
particularly with a Muslim background, then becomes difficult. Some, more general,
museums, while also ‘exoticizing’ religions, appear more successful. The Chester
Beatty Museum in Dublin, one of the world’s leading religious museums, offers a case
in point. It organizes extensive activities aimed at promoting religious understanding
among young people. However, it also illustrates the fact that museums, in contrast to
history textbooks (but similar to religious textbooks), often neglect more contentious
parts of religious history. Some museums are implicitly or even explicitly designed
to encourage mutual understanding, as is the case with the Jewish museums studied
in Chapter 4. Given the long history of persecution of the Jews, culminating in the
Holocaust, Jewish museums in this respect constitute a particular case. Most of them
engage very successfully with the pluralist past to convey a message of connection and
unity. Some museums, however, prefer to remain silent about religion. For its part, the
permanent exhibition at the House of European History in Brussels, an initiative of
the European Parliament and open since 2017, recognizes the legacy of Christendom
and – in passing – Islam and Judaism as parts of European heritage and as ‘defining’
features of Europe but gives them hardly any visible space (Cf. Rosenberg 2018; Settele
2015; Kaiser 2017). A guide explained to me that the museum considers religion as a
divisive force in Europe, which clashes with its ideal of creating a common, unifying
narrative.8 These differences make the narrative of museums complex, and quite
different from that presented in textbooks.
However, both textbooks and museums, although not all to the same extent and
in different ways, share a certain secularist bias, associating religion rather with non-
European cultures and, when talking about Europe, with pre-modern times, as if
religion in Europe somehow ceased to be a significant political and societal factor after
the French Revolution. Religious minorities – perhaps most obviously in the case of
Jews – become ‘ethnicized’ or ‘nationalized’ and are presented (if at all) as national
or ethnic minorities. This version of events has some historical basis: an evolution of
this kind did happen, but to a much lesser degree than suggested, and in fact nation
and religion were often intertwined (see Wood 2016 for a recent discussion). In the
Yugoslav wars in the late twentieth century, religion again functioned as an identity-
marker, and around the same time it re-emerged in the debate on multiculturalism,
in which the word ‘culture’ was used to refer to migrant communities and was mainly
associated with religion.
12 Religious Diversity in Europe

Remarkably, this secularist bias (which has largely been debunked by recent
historical scholarship: see Chapter 1) paradoxically disappears if one moves away
from mediating contexts that bear the mark of academic traditions (such as textbooks
and museums) towards popular culture – an observation that points at the need for
more self-reflexivity among the academia. Popular media (as expressions of popular
culture) illustrate the new visibility of religion in different ways. They describe religion
as quite widespread, even if it still depends a great deal on media and context (Lundby
et al. 2018). Moreover, although very prominent in particular settings (particularly
online and in extremist media, which hardly qualify as popular culture), the
tensions that characterize political and academic discourses in general seem far less
prominent in popular media. In fact, they could be considered ‘post-secular’ in that
religious plurality, in all its different guises, is a reality that in itself is hardly viewed as
problematic; attitudes appear far more relaxed. This may also relate to the prominent
presence of non-institutional religious expressions, in particular (New) Spirituality
(formerly called New Age), which appear in various popular media, including video
games and lifestyle magazines (Lundby et al. 2018). Religious symbols moreover are
often decontextualized and dissociated from their particular origins; they also show
a wide variety of identities ‘in between’ religious and non-religious and atheism (Lee
2015). In fact, as Stef Aupers and Lars de Wildt (2019) recently argued, role playing in
video games (in which religious references are very prominent) can actually contribute
to mutual understanding and empathy towards the (non-)religious other and can
bridge the gap between belief and non-belief.
In Chapter 5 Mikko Ketola, Ivan Stefanovski, Kaarel Kuurmaa and Riho Altnurme
analyse two media that may be illustrative of popular culture: TV series and YouTube
videos. TV series remain extremely popular among people of all ages, even if the ways of
watching have changed since the first (mass) introduction of the medium in the 1950s.
While religion is sometimes depicted in conflictual settings, this is not necessarily the
case, as, for example, in the internationally successful series Citizen Khan, or even
in the series from the Balkans. Although one tends to associate online media with
radicalization and fundamentalism – particularly Islamist but also from other religious
traditions – most online content is actually either neutral or promotes religious peace
and toleration. YouTube offers a case in point, as indicated by the authors, who found
a diverse range of video clips that promote religious literacy and toleration and in so
doing also combat extremism and radicalism. In fact, this chapter nicely illustrates
how TV series and YouTube videos can be used to educate young people.
Politics is the mediating context where one would expect the greatest emphasis
on religious oppositions and an instrumentalization of religion in line with political
agendas of conflict and identity-building, all the more so as political discourses are
mediated to the public through the press, be they in print, audiovisual or online,
which arguably tend to inflate tensions even more. In Chapter 6, taking political
debates about the ‘refugee crisis’ between 2013 and 2017 as a case study, Laura Galián,
John Maiden, Stefanie Sinclair and Árpád Welker compare how notions of national
and transnational memory have been used to discursively frame contemporary
understandings of toleration and peace. Their chapter focuses on political debates in
Germany, Hungary, Spain and the UK as examples of quite different national contexts,
 Introduction 13

with complex histories of religious coexistence, not necessarily peaceful, between

Christians, Muslims and Jews. The results of this comparative study not only confirm
our expectations, but also qualify them to some extent. References to religious history
are indeed instrumentalized, but with different goals. Particularly interesting in this
respect are the very divergent ways in which history is used to legitimize and provide
support for very different political stances. Although not addressed in the chapter (nor
in this book), one may also observe the difference in which the political press addresses
religion through political debate and the way other popular media such as lifestyle
magazines represent it (Cf. esp. Lundby 2018).
In Chapter 7, Lidija Georgieva, Naum Trajanovski and John Wolffe assess the
representation and commemorative practices of two major examples of peace-making
from recent times: the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the Ohrid Framework
Agreement (2001) that put an end to the civil wars in Northern Ireland and North
Macedonia respectively. Although the cases differ in several respects, their analyses
reveal the futile attempts made by academic or ‘elitist’ circles to propagate a supposedly
inclusive narrative, but nevertheless show that cultivating collective memory,
particularly through physical memorials and museums recalling the conflicts, can
contribute at least to a sense of justice, as a first but not unimportant step towards more
enduring peace. This is actually an important finding as it highlights the potential role
heritage can play in promoting peaceful coexistence.
Contemporary debates about religion in society often treat Islam as the European
other. As explicit religious violence in contemporary Europe appears to be largely
carried out by Islamist terrorists, so Muslims in particular have been targeted by
secularists and populists, who describe them as backward and criticize them for being
dissociated from ‘European values’ of democracy, freedom (inter alia of expression)
and (gender) equality and emancipation. There are also, however, counternarratives
that emphasize Islamic traditions of toleration and convivencia. In Chapter 8, Nadia
Hindi Mediavilla, María Dolores Rodríguez Gómez and Antonio Peláez Rovira
discuss how in al-Andalus, especially during the Nasrid era of Granada (1230–1492), a
relatively peaceful convivencia was enacted and legitimized on the basis of the Islamic
legal and ethical tradition, and how concepts such as dhimma (the legal status of non-
Muslims under Islam), mudajjan (the legal status of Muslims under Christianity), dār
al-islām (the ‘house’ of Islam), ʿadl (justice), istisḥsān (the public good) and tasāmuḥ
(mutual tolerance) are being used in contemporary initiatives to reimagine Islam in
the current plural context.
By looking into the discourses in some prominent Islamic initiatives towards
peaceful coexistence and toleration, Chapter 8 already introduces the theme of
interfaith and interconvictional collaboration. Interfaith and interconvictional
organizations offer a fascinating space for encounter and dialogue, often particularly
addressing young people. While most research concentrates on interfaith movements,
Elina Kuokkanen and Patrick Pasture argue in Chapter 9 that they should actually
be viewed in a broader perspective and also include the non-religious. Their findings
show a remarkable level of engagement in dialogue as a means of increasing mutual
understanding and acceptance of difference, of setting up a conversation without – and
that distinguishes them from ecumenical initiatives – arguing for a particular truth.
14 Religious Diversity in Europe

The purpose appears above all to be about reintroducing civility into the debate, which
is reminiscent of a largely forgotten tradition associated with the Radical Reformation
and in particular with arguably the earliest ‘Western’ experiment with religious
pluralism, the ‘holy experiment’ of Roger Williams in Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations (on Williams’s significance for civility and the debate of toleration see esp.
Bejan 2017). A more inclusive narrative can also be found among the New Spirituality
subculture, as is studied by Lea Altnurme with regards to the Estonian case in
Chapter 10. Altnurme, however, also points to continuing tensions between different
understandings of religion, and to institutional and non-institutional spirituality.
In conclusion, and before we go on to discuss the mediating contexts in detail
in the following chapters, we thought it would be useful to provide an additional
perspective to this book. As we often refer to the representations of the past, we wanted
to outline this past according to the latest historical scholarship. In Chapter 1, Patrick
Pasture and Christophe Schellekens offer a wide-reaching essay of how Europeans
dealt with the issue of religious diversity. They do not provide the usual narrative of
Europe as a beacon of toleration though, and question the still-popular narrative about
the alleged progress of secularization and the marginalization of religion, arguing that
the role played by religion in society changes in far more complex ways. Instead, the
authors emphasize a fundamental longing for homogeneity and a deep-rooted fear of
diversity as a continuing legacy of Christendom, and the association between religion
and politics. They present history as one of people who are struggling to find practical
solutions to what they perceive as existential problems. They also include the history
of al-Andalus and the Ottoman Empire in their assessment, noting the parallels,
differences and interactions in dealing with religious differences.
 1

Religious diversity in Europe: The challenges of

past and present
Patrick Pasture and Christophe Schellekens1

This book assesses historical and contemporary representations of religious diversity

in Europe and how the past is mediated to the present and future generations. Indeed,
present-day representations of this issue often invoke and refer to the past. Europe has
a troubled history with religion, as manifested, for example, in the Wars of Religion.
Nevertheless, Europeans have also learned to live together, and perhaps this was more
often the case than we assume. In order to properly understand and grasp the full
significance of contemporary representations of religion, we must also therefore have a
reasonable understanding of the past. This chapter briefly outlines some of the salient
features of Europe’s long and complex history of religious coexistence and toleration,
less as a yardstick to measure the accuracy of historical representations – though this
objective, even if never fully attainable, is not entirely absent – and more as a means of
comprehending and historically contextualizing these contemporary representations.
It not only looks at Europe as the original centre of (or heir to) Christendom, but
also explores the experiences of al-Andalus and the Ottoman Empire. Throughout this
chapter, we will be focusing not only on practices and attitudes but also on the norms,
beliefs and values held by a diverse set of actors and institutions.

A history of (in)tolerance, war and peace-making

‘We have learned that tolerance is the soul of Europe,’ the German Chancellor Angela
Merkel declared at a ceremony to mark the 500th anniversary of the Reformation on
31 October 2017, in Wittenberg (Merkel 2017). The place and timing of the statement
suggest that she was mainly referring to religious toleration, without excluding
tolerance in other walks of life.2
The underlying idea is that tolerance is Europe’s answer to its remarkable diversity,
an idea that is also expressed in the European Union’s (EU’s) motto, ‘Unity in Diversity’,
which it adopted in 2005. It is perhaps worth pausing for a moment to look at these
two assumptions. Is Europe really so diverse? Compared to South and Southeast
Asia with their multitude of languages, ethnicities and religions, one may wonder. In
fact, rather than being particularly diverse, one could argue that Europe, if anything,
16 Religious Diversity in Europe

is obsessed with a drive towards unity and has an innate fear of diversity (Pasture
2015). From that perspective, perhaps the opposite is true: that intolerance lies at the
heart of Europe’s soul. The origins of this intolerance lie in the particular history of
Christendom, in which an intense alliance was forged between church and state and
their interests became closely aligned. It also explains why Europe never completely
endorsed freedom of religion in the way the United States did – after all, tolerance is
not the opposite of intolerance (although calling it its counterfeit, as Thomas Paine did,
may be overstating it as well) (Paine 1791: 78).
The learning process invoked basically refers to the tolerance that allegedly
emerged after the Wars of Religion. According to the standard narrative, these wars
ended with the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ushered in a new, stable European
order based on sovereign states with fixed territorial boundaries, the ‘Westphalian
model’ that is still referred to in most textbooks and analyses of the international
system. It was also responsible, so the story goes, for the rise of religious toleration, for
which the Enlightenment is mainly credited. Both narratives are highly problematic
historically. The alleged Westphalian order, for example, is a nineteenth-century myth
that describes an idealized political model that has no basis in the actual peace treaties
or in political practice. Neither did it bring an end to religious violence, certainly not
if one takes a pan-European perspective (e.g. Nexon 2009: 265–88). And as for its
contribution to the rise of toleration, arguments in favour of religious freedom and
tolerance had been formulated by various thinkers long before the Enlightenment,
including Christian ones.3
The narrative furthermore ignores Europe’s non-Christian and particularly
Islamic pasts, and thus implicitly equates Europe with the history of Christendom,
excluding other religions (Asad 2003). In this chapter, we will be focusing on how
both Christendom and Europe’s Islamic empires dealt with religious diversity, offering
examples of their ‘tolerance’ and intolerance, and discussing their different ways of
living together. While Classical Antiquity is usually associated with a tolerant attitude
towards religious diversity (notwithstanding the persecution of Christians) (Marcos
2018), Christendom is notorious for its intolerance which goes back to the recognition
of Christianity as a state religion in the late Roman Empire (Edict of Thessalonica in
380 AD). This also applies to the Christian kingdoms that were constituted in Western
Europe in the Early Middle Ages, although at that stage religion appears to have been
more of a social commitment than a belief system, and society seems to have been
far more open to foreigners and religious diversity than in later times (Classen 2018;
see also Brown 2013). It was not until the eleventh or twelfth centuries that Europe
turned into a ‘persecuting society’ (Moore 2006). With few exceptions, European states
demanded adherence to Catholicism as a sign of obedience (even though the different
interpretations of religion allowed for considerable variation in practice).
The fear of diversity applied, among others, to ‘heretics’ as well as pagans and
‘infidels’, which explains why non-Christian advisors or experts (doctors, astronomers,
mathematicians, etc.) were rarely to be found at European courts. Likewise, non-
Christian merchants in Medieval and Early Modern Europe hardly travelled inland.
This even extended to the Arabs, great travellers and merchants who in Asia and Africa
ventured far beyond Islamic territories. Jews, however, could be found throughout
 The Challenges of Past and Present 17

Christendom since Roman times. Though often harassed and persecuted, they were
respected as people of the ‘Old Covenant’ and enjoyed the protection of canon law
even if they were also condemned for their rejection of the New Covenant (Sicut
iudaei, c. 1120) (Levy 2016). Sometimes they enjoyed royal protection in exchange for
loyalty and for their services as moneylenders and scholars. Especially when Europe
became more urbanized and moved towards more organized feudal states, however,
Jews became systematically and massively persecuted. In 1290 they were expelled from
England, and later also from France and Spain after the Reconquista (Moore 2000;
[1987] 2006; see also Kaplan 2007: 294–330; Nirenberg 1996, 2014). Romani, although
mostly Christians, faced similar difficulties. Itinerant descendants of military clans
from northern India, they arrived in Europe in the fourteenth century, as wandering
vagrants, tolerated sometimes with fascination, but more often despised, persecuted
and expelled (Taylor 2014).
There were nevertheless times and places in Christendom, such as medieval Sicily,
Hungary (between c. 1200 and c. 1300) and Christian Spain (until c. 1500), in which
Muslims and Christians lived together in (relative) peace, and Catholic monarchs
recognized Muslims as legitimate citizens, granting them a similar status to that afforded
to Christians in Muslim countries (Catlos 2014). Resisting calls from the hierarchy to
impose religious uniformity, the Catholic kings of the Polish-Lithuanian Union in 1368
granted religious freedom to all: Catholics, Orthodox, Jews, Shamanistic and Islamic
Tatars (who settled in Lithuania in the fourteenth century), and increasingly Christian
dissidents or heretics, such as Hussites, Lutherans, Calvinists and Anabaptists. It would
be wrong though to consider the Polish kings as ‘enlightened’ advocates of religious
freedom, as their power was tightly restrained by the powerful nobility (Forst 2018).

Tolerance beyond Christendom

While in Christendom most of the time ‘infidels’ and heretics were persecuted, the
situation in Europe’s Muslim areas appears different. Although the history of the
Islamic view on religious diversity is complex and varied from one place to the next
and at different times in history, in Medieval and Early Modern times Muslim states
adopted Islam as the state religion, while not only tolerating and protecting, but also
discriminating against other religions to varying degrees.
The Umayyads conquered Visigoth Spain in the eighth century. In addition to
instituting the Sharia as the political and judicial fundament of the state, they also laid
the ground for a brilliant Arabic-Islamic culture. Non-Muslims received protection in
return for paying a jizya (religious tax). They were nevertheless held in a subordinate
position and were limited in what they could and could not do. They were also
compelled to wear cultural markers that set them apart from the Muslims. They could
not proselytize because for Muslims apostasy was punishable by death. The degree
of protection and discrimination varied over time such that in the twelfth century
non-Muslims were even banished (although in practice most stayed while enduring
harsher discrimination). Pogroms of Christians and especially Jews did occur,
although they remained rare compared to Christian Europe. In fact Christians and Jews
18 Religious Diversity in Europe

were able to make significant contributions to the blossoming of arts and sciences. The
conquest of al-Andalus by the Catholic monarchs eventually put an end to this relative
toleration. Although initially a system of coexistence developed that was similar to
that applied in al-Andalus, recognizing the right of Muslims to emigrate or to remain
subject to restrictions (see Chapter 8 of this book), intolerance soon prevailed after the
fall of the last independent Muslim state on the Iberian Peninsula, the Nasrid kingdom
(Emirate) of Granada in January 1492. The Jews were expelled almost immediately
in March 1492, and in the following decades Muslims were also forced to convert
or emigrate; the Inquisition ruthlessly persecuted alleged false conversions. In 1609,
converted Muslims (Moriscos) were also expelled. While some Jewish entrepreneurs
set up businesses in major Western European ports such as Bordeaux, Livorno and
Amsterdam, most Jews escaped to North Africa or the Ottoman Empire, where they
were welcomed with open arms. Some found refuge in Poland-Lithuania (Kaplan 2007).
The Ottoman Empire, which from the fourteenth century onwards expanded across
Eastern Europe and reached its maximum extent in 1683 at the gates of Vienna, was in
effect a multireligious state in which diversity was ‘managed’ rather than suppressed;
similar to al-Andalus or the Ancient Roman, the Russian and the Mongol Empires,
the Ottomans believed that toleration contributed to internal peace and stability and
was beneficial to the welfare of the empire. While guaranteeing the supremacy of
Islam as the rock on which the state was built, they largely followed local customs of
organization and granted certain freedoms, including freedom of worship, to the many
religious and cultural minorities, albeit in exchange for the payment of religious taxes
and the observance of certain codes of conduct under which Muslims were treated
differently from those of other creeds. The specific degree of protection, liberty and
discrimination varied widely across the empire, depending on the particular time,
political context and the changes in the interpretation of Ottoman law. Although until
the mid-seventeenth century the Ottomans sometimes captured Christian boys to raise
them as Muslim soldiers in the elite corps of the Janissaries (where they could rise to
the highest position in the empire), for most ‘infidels’ Ottoman rule was to be preferred
over Catholic suzerainty, as in the Habsburg Empire. The Greek-Orthodox Church
even enjoyed a privileged position at the centre of Ottoman power: it was allowed
to levy its own taxes and the patriarch was appointed by the sultan. The Ottomans
welcomed Jews as well as Christian refugees of all sorts, fleeing from the Wars of
Religion. Although not always actively encouraged by the sultans, some non-Muslims
did convert to Islam. Conversion in the opposite direction, however, was effectively
prohibited, as it was everywhere else in the Muslim world. Overall an ‘ecumenism of
everyday life’ existed, although from the late sixteenth century onwards a process of
‘Ottoman confessionalization’ (Tijana Krstić) took place, along similar lines to post-
Reformation Christendom (see Gara 2017 for a brilliant discussion of the literature;
also Barkey 2008: 110–11).
While in Christian Europe, Islam figured prominently in apocalyptic visions and
the Ottoman invasions still haunt the imagination of the old Habsburg lands, the
wars were more a clash of empires than faiths. Ottoman armies, for example, had a
considerable number of Christian soldiers, even in positions of command (Almond
2009: 151–80). In spite of initial papal opposition, the French and the English
 The Challenges of Past and Present 19

concluded lasting alliances with the Ottoman Turks. Religion did not stand in the way
of trade either. In fact, a rich imaginary of Islam as Europe’s ‘other’ existed which was
threatening to be sure, but at times also very much admired (Malcolm 2019).

European Christendom between toleration and genocide

Although most wars in Europe’s turbulent history had other origins, religion only
slowly ceased to be a major issue during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
(Kaplan 2007). Overall the authority of secular powers over the different religions
was reinforced: Protestant Churches became state or ‘national’ churches in Protestant
countries, while the monarch’s authority over the church in Catholic states also
increased. However, secular authorities also supported concerted efforts by the
different confessions (churches) to impose orthodoxy (Ocker 2018; Nexon 2009;
Gorski 2000). These campaigns achieved mixed results however: all authority was
somewhat tainted and people had learned to think for themselves, particularly in
Protestant areas (Marshall 2018).
In practice, therefore, limited multi-confessionalism, or ‘tolerated diversity’,
became the norm in most of Europe. The American historian Wayne P. Te Brake (2017)
distinguishes a plethora of different arrangements to secure peace after religious war.
In reality, however, in most of these, religious homogeneity remained the ideal and
the solution often tried to put this ideal into practice, albeit symbolically, for example,
by imposing segregation, repression or, by contrast, partial integration of dissidents
(involving restrictions on the public expression of religion). Sometimes other solutions
were reached in which one church was favoured over others, or in which two, or more,
different churches were granted equal status, or which included diverse forms of ‘ad
hoc tolerance’ (Te Brake 2017; see also Kaplan 2007; Friedeburg 2011). But they never
encompassed all churches, excluding new and radical religious communities.
Two of the states that became best known for their tolerant attitude towards religion
were the Polish-Lithuanian Union and the Dutch Republic. The Dutch respected
freedom of conscience and everyone was free to believe what they wanted in private,
but the extent to which these beliefs could be practised in public depended on many
factors. Commercial interests came before confessional concerns. Jews in Amsterdam
were allowed to build a huge synagogue, but they could not join the guilds. Catholics
were considered a liability, as were Anabaptists, and could at most practise their faith
in ‘hidden churches’. Elsewhere in Europe religious freedom was more restricted,
although in many places mixed communities found ways of living together, mostly
peacefully. In some, this meant living ‘together apart’, in separate communities. For
Jews, and in very rare instances also Muslims, this implied living in a ghetto, a measure
which also afforded them a degree of protection (Safley 2011; Kaplan 2007).
One should also emphasize that the general trend was not necessary towards
extending toleration and when rulers felt strong enough, they rolled it back, as was the
case of King Louis XIV of France, who in 1685 repealed the Edict of Nantes of 1598
that had granted religious freedom to Protestants. The dialectic between tolerance and
persecution was played out in full in the British Isles, leading to the emergence of ideas
20 Religious Diversity in Europe

about civil and religious liberty and later to the extension of the freedom of worship
to Nonconformists in 1689 (Toleration Act), which paved the way for ‘Protestant
pluralism’ (Coffey 2000; Stevens 2018; Walsham 2008; Worden 2013).
Toleration emerged mainly to guarantee a stable and peaceful political order
and to maximize the contribution of all towards economic and political prosperity.
But it was also advanced on philosophical grounds. The most radical proponents of
religious freedom were members of the Radical Reformation such as Thomas Helweys
and Roger Williams, who claimed that God was an advocate of separate religious and
secular powers and of full religious freedom. Many of their arguments in favour of
religious freedom were based on the ideas of ancient church fathers such as Tertullian
and Lactantius as well as Medieval thinkers. More moderate theologians, such as the
Swiss Reformed theologian Thomas Erastus, advocated that a strong monarch acting
as God’s representative should grant religious freedom in order to guarantee peace and
stability. Increasingly, ‘Enlightened’ philosophers expressed doubts about the validity
of religious claims altogether (Forst 2011; Laursen and Nederman 1998; Wilken 2019;
Sorkin 2008; Zagorin 2003). Together with freedom of thought, they also called for
control over the churches and over the Catholic Church in particular. Some Catholic
thinkers actually welcomed the prospect of ‘modernizing’ the church (Lehner 2016).
Enlightened monarchs followed suit. Emperor Joseph II of Austria, for example, issued
a Toleration Edict in 1781–2 allowing Lutherans, Calvinists, Orthodox and Jews to
hold private religious ceremonies.
The American Revolution, in response to the actual pluralism that had emerged
in the New World and inspired by a mixture of Radical Reformation, Evangelical and
Enlightened ideas, went even further and imposed the separation of church and state
and religious freedom in the newly established United States of America (although a
Christian nationalist current emerged which argued that the United States had been
founded on Christian principles: Green 2010; Haselby 2015)).4 In Europe the French
Revolution adopted the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789), which declared that
all sovereignty originated with the people, and introduced freedom of opinion and
religion. However, while pursuing a policy of active de-Christianization of state and
society, the revolutionaries went so far as to create an alternative secular state religion
(The Cult of Reason). The latter proved premature and soon afterwards Napoleon
reinstated the Catholic Church as the ‘majority church’, although he maintained the
freedom of religion. The Congress of Vienna (1815) restored the Ancien Régime while
modernizing the international order; in the process the power balance between church
and state was tipped a little further in favour of the latter.

Secular Christendom in context

In the nineteenth century, religion apparently faded as political drive, class, ethnicity
and nation came to the fore (see e.g. McLeod 2000; McLeod and Ustorf 2003;
Hempton and McLeod 2017). Nevertheless, religion remained an important social and
political factor in much of Europe and continued to impact upon the state, so giving
rise to ‘secular Christendom’. From the 1860s onwards nation and religion became
 The Challenges of Past and Present 21

increasingly intermingled. In continental Western Europe in the 1870s–90s conflicts

arose between secularists and both the Reformed and (especially) the Catholic Church,
which actively opposed liberal values and ideas of self-determination, democracy and
sovereignty. In France this resulted in the separation between church and state and the
obligation of the state to remain ‘neutral’ (laïcité), while more informal separations
between church and state took hold in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria
(the Habsburg Empire) and, eventually, also Italy. Confessional political parties in
these countries took on the defence of church interests, supporting their claims to
remain active in education, social and health care. Secularists acted as a different
‘confession’ but pursuing an agenda of political secularization (Weir 2014). Different
convictional movements constituted competing life-worlds, sometimes developing
into extensive ‘pillarized’ communities in which ‘believers’ were nourished ‘from the
cradle to the grave’ (Kaiser and Clark 2003; Hellemans 1990, 2020). After the First
World War, the Vatican regained political clout as an international political actor,
establishing concordats with various countries to secure the interests of the church
(Chamedes 2019).
In the 1920s and 1930s, a period of strong political polarization between right and
left, churches across Europe largely came down on the side of authoritarianism, Fascism
and even Nazism. The Vatican actively and successfully promoted authoritarian
Catholic confessional states, as happened in Hungary, Poland, Austria, Portugal
and Spain, among others. This also encouraged anti-Semitism, particularly because
Jews were branded as communists and secularists. At the same time, however, some
Christian movements and individuals developed theologies and practices that upheld
democracy and liberty (Chamedes 2019; Chappel 2018; Conway 2006; Hanebrink
2006, 2018; Weir 2015).
Meanwhile since the eighteenth century, conflicts emerged in the Ottoman Empire
between Muslims and non-Muslims as a result of the latter’s better economic and
commercial connections with the burgeoning European economies. This led to more
closed, ‘bounded’ ethno-religious identities, and each religious community was given
a degree of autonomy to regulate its own affairs (often referred to as the ‘millet-system’,
although it was never as systematic as imagined). Tensions were further fuelled by
Western European economic success and religious-political interventions by Russia
and other European empires in defence of Christian minorities. The Ottomans reacted
by ‘modernizing’ and centralizing their state apparatus (Tanzimat Reforms, 1838–76),
although in the end this only heightened the frictions between the ethno-religious
communities. The introduction of religious equality introduced religious freedom,
including for Christian missionaries, but stripped the minorities as well as the Muslim
majority of their communal privileges, provoking frustration among all. For their part,
the educational reforms fostered a spirit of competition and rivalry between ethnic
and religious communities. Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) in contrast promoted
a modern Pan-Islamist ideology as the common source of identity for the empire, at
the expense of non-Muslims. The Young Turks in the twentieth century reacted by
formulating a secularist-nationalist alternative. This also failed to unite the various
different populations and resulted in the ‘genocide’ of the Armenians. The new nation
states that emerged in the wake of the disintegrating empire similarly tried to establish
22 Religious Diversity in Europe

a common identity based on the fusion of religion and nation. Once again, the most
common result was more suffering and death. The relatively peaceful coexistence
that had existed between ethnic and religious communities in the Ottoman Empire
was erased from memory and replaced by one of discrimination and conflict (Barkey
2008: 277–97; Gara 2017; Mazower 2000; Hajdarpašić 2008; Todorova 1997: 180).
It would be a mistake, however, to limit religious nationalism in Europe to the
Balkans. Increasingly churches associated themselves with nations, while the new
nation states and nation-empires themselves began to exorcise minorities (see e.g.
Wood 2016; Weitz 2008). In spite of this, in most of Central and Western Europe
nationalism in the nineteenth- and twentieth century appears more secular. Most
Protestant countries retained their state churches, albeit merely symbolically, leaving
room for religious dissent. This did not vaccinate them against racism however. The
call for ethnic (and religious) homogenization in Germany and other parts of Central
Europe ultimately culminated in the genocide of Jews and Romani. It is clear that the
underlying anti-Judaism leading to the Holocaust was part of a centuries-old European
tradition. However, anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism received a new impulse in the
nineteenth century through scientific racism, which impregnated secular ideologies
more than religious ones, most of all National Socialism in Germany, but also Marxism-
Leninism in the USSR.
Meanwhile Christian churches, albeit with certain ambiguities, supported European
imperialism and colonialism, and its underlying racist ideology. Nevertheless, respect
for other religions in the colonies began to emerge in the late nineteenth century, first
in Protestant, and later also in Catholic missionary circles. They also gave local people
leadership roles in the local churches, and gradually and to varying degrees distanced
themselves from colonialism. This allowed them to survive and even expand after
decolonization.
The Second World War signalled the end of empire in Europe (although it took
fifteen more years to acknowledge that colonial empires were also doomed), giving
way to more homogenous nation states. The idea that ethnic and religious diversity
constituted a risk for stability and peace remained strong initially, and the new nation
states idealized ethnic and religious homogeneity (Ther 2015). The communists in
Eastern Europe pursued their own purification politics by oppressing religion, which
was considered divisive for both class and state interests. Forced secularization and
ethnic and religious assimilation policies went hand in hand in communist countries,
such as Bulgaria where the communist regime imposed dire measures on Muslims
and Romani. Elsewhere in communist Europe religious freedom was also suppressed,
even in Yugoslavia, which, in spite of this, largely retained its multireligious character
(Mazower 2000: 116–42).

A new start?

After the Second World War, Western Europe tried to distance itself from its
tumultuous past in a different way. Most countries adopted the European Convention
of Human Rights, which protected religious freedom as an individual human right
 The Challenges of Past and Present 23

and provided for the creation of a European Court of Human Rights to enforce its
principles (albeit initially excluding the colonies). The freedom to believe, which
included changing religion, and respect for the autonomy of religious institutions
in matters of internal organization and doctrine became important features of state-
church relations in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the impact of religion on politics
and society remained high, as seen by the fact that the Cold War was presented as a
conflict between secular materialism and Christian humanism (Betts 2020: 125–72).
The Catholic Church continued its anti-communist crusade, backing authoritarian
regimes in Spain and Portugal, while only belatedly accepting democracy elsewhere
(Chamedes 2019: 265–9; Chappel 2018: 144ff.; Müller 2011: 132–43). Although
Western European nation states emphasized their autonomy vis-à-vis the churches,
multiple ties remained and Christian Democracy emerged as the most powerful
political movement in continental Western Europe. The ‘pillars’ – which organized
people into separate sociopolitical ‘mental worlds’ according to their world
view (Hellemans 2020) – blossomed and, in the case of Christian pillars, were
financed by official church taxes or even state subsidies. In Protestant countries with
a state church, however, the monarchs – as formal heads of the state and the church –
abstained from interfering in ecclesiastical affairs, limiting their role to confirming
any decisions with regards to church organization and dogma. In the UK, a pluralistic
model of church-state relations emerged in which diversity is valued as a source of
national identity. One manifestation of this is that public servants are allowed to wear
religious symbols (Ferrari 2013; see also Roy 2017)..
Although religion was at the heart of a lasting conflict between Catholics and
Protestants in Northern Ireland, in general Christian churches set out on a path of
reconciliation and ecumenism, thereby reversing the mutual antagonism that had
previously characterized their relations, as well as the anti-Semitism that had been
part of Christian culture until 1945. Although late compared to Protestant churches,
perhaps the most stunning volte-face was that of the Catholic Church which around
the time of the Second Vatican Council (1962–5) cast off the anti-modernist approach
that it had adopted a century earlier and accepted political and religious freedom,
although in fact the church maintained its claims upon the truth and the obligation of
the state to support it (see esp. Schindler and Healy 2015).
While the political reshaping of Europe after the Second World War and in
particular the breakthrough of the nation state created smaller but culturally more
homogenous political spaces, this homogeneity has since been shattered by at least
three different processes, which are largely unrelated but do interact, and are significant
with regards to religious coexistence: secularization, or rather the de-Christianization
of politics and society; ‘Easternization’ or, more broadly, the impact of New Age and
new spiritualities; and immigration of people with other faiths.
De-Christianization refers above all to the declining impact of Christian churches
on society, especially since the late 1950s, affecting politics and moral and social
life. It was also manifested in declining adherence to churches and participation in
traditional Christian rituals and practices. In communist countries, the state, while
in theory recognizing religious freedom, in practice actively promoted atheism and
discriminated against religions, limiting their ways of expression and barring religious
24 Religious Diversity in Europe

people from promotion at work. In Western Europe this decline happened more
spontaneously, although particularly in France secularism was also actively promoted
(Stanley 2018: 79–101). Although the debate on causes is still open, rising educational
levels and prosperity increased the autonomy and liberty of individuals: it was no
accident that especially young women took on a vanguard role (Brown 2001; McLeod
2010). From the 1980s onwards the ‘pillarized’ systems eroded; in Italy Christian
Democracy collapsed. In Germany, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands the ‘pillars’
largely remained intact, although their ideological sharpness became increasingly
blurred (Hellemans 1990, 2020). French ideas about political secularism – the alleged
‘neutrality’ of the state – widely spread over Western Europe, leading to what Joseph
Weiler (2005) termed ‘Christianophobia’ in the EU, where references to Europe’s
Christian past became viewed as problematic.
Surveys of Western Europe since the 1960s indicate a pronounced decline in
Christianity, although the pace of decline has varied from one country to the next.
Recent surveys that include Eastern Europe show that in most Central and Eastern
countries the share of Christian affiliation has remained more or less stable in
recent decades (Dargent 2017; Pew Research Center 2018a, 2018b; Inglehart 2020).
In some Eastern European countries, and especially Orthodox countries where
the association between nation and church has been re-established after the fall of
communism (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria), both participation and affiliation
numbers in contrast have even been increasing, although the politicization of religion
can also cause a backlash. The surveys moreover show changing patterns in belief in
God that to a certain extent mirror those of religious affiliation and participation.
Furthermore, while differences certainly remain, traditional distinctions between
Protestants and Catholics – such as those regarding the paths to salvation (by faith
alone or also by ‘good deeds’) – have lost much of their power to divide. Most
Catholics and Protestants in Western Europe today believe that the similarities
outweigh the differences (Pew Research Center 2017). These figures suggest that
in Europe today there are various forms of ‘believing without belonging’ (Dargent
2017; Davie 2000).
Secularization and de-Christianization were, however, also expressed in an increase
in atheism and agnosticism as well as adherence to alternative spiritual movements.
The numbers of atheists and agnostics have augmented particularly in Northern
and Western Europe since 1970, despite a decline after the demise of communism in
Eastern Europe (see Table 1.1). New spiritualities – including local esoteric traditions,

Table 1.1 Agnostics and Atheists in Europe per UN Region (Percentages, 1900–2020)

UN Region 1900 1970 2000 2015 2020*

Western Europe 0.19 4.74 10.23 12.59 13.20

Southern Europe 0.13 4.70 5.06 5.63 5.78
Northern Europe 0.70 5.80 9.47 10.15 10.78
Eastern Europe 0.11 18.60 7.76 4.45 4.16
 The Challenges of Past and Present 25

Amero-Indian shamanistic practices and highly secularized Indic religions – in Europe

remain a minority interest. Nevertheless some 15–40 per cent in Western Europe
declare that they believe in a ‘higher power’ or spiritual force, and in some surveys
in Central and Eastern Europe over a third express a belief in reincarnation, an idea
originating in Indic religions (Pew Research Center 2018a: 42–5, 119–38, 2018b: 19–20,
24; see also Campbell 2007; Pasture 2011). Interestingly, this development has led to
a remarkable ‘secularization’ of religious symbols. This process started especially in
popular (youth) culture and New Spirituality, which appropriated religious signs from
different cultures, often enabling people to piece together some form of individual
spirituality (Lee 2015).
The 1950s and 1960s saw an influx of migrants into (North)Western Europe. Intra-
European migration from Eastern and Mediterranean countries to Western Europe
remains hardly visible in the statistics, but did lead to perceptions of cultural difference
even if newcomers shared the same faith as the population of the host country. Most
non-European migrants were either postcolonial refugees or ‘guest workers’ for the
expanding industries. Most of them were usually Christians or, to a lesser extent,
Muslims as well as Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs. Conversion does not appear to have
been a major reason for the spread of non-European religions in Europe, including
Islam. The Muslims belonged to different Islamic currents, and there were also ethnic
divisions between them. The ways in which they integrated into European societies
diverged, ranging from assimilation to radical opposition and many variants in
between (creating many ‘Euro-Islams’, to use a concept that is usually interpreted in a
normative and in our view inadequate way) (Dressing, Jeldtoft and Woodhead 2013;
al-Azmeh and Fokas 2007; esp. Nielsen 2007 and Cesari 2007; al-Sayyad and Castells
2002; Bistolfi and Zabbal 1995) (see Table 1.2).
The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Empire and the subsequent ‘liberation’ of
Eastern Europe reintroduced real religious and political liberty in these countries.
Religious groups, which with the exception of Poland tended to be made up of
quite small, non-institutionalized communities, became massively engaged in the
civic protests. In some countries, most obviously in Poland, this was paralleled by a
restoration of religious life and a revival which lasted for decades. A similar revival,
however, did not take place in the Baltic States or indeed in most other Eastern

Table 1.2 Muslims in Europe per UN Region (Percentages, 1900–2020)

UN Region 1900 1970 2000 2015 2020*

Western Europe 0.05 1.21 5.87 7.29 7.74
Southern Europe 2.75 3.14 6.59 7.61 8.26
Northern Europe 0.00 0.77 2.93 5.50 6.09
Eastern Europe 4.35 4.18 5.74 6.43 6.81
* Estimate
Data source: Johnson and Grim (2020) (accessed 20 July 2020). It should be noted that the classification of UN
regions is rather counter-intuitive. The UK, for example, is classified as part of Northern Europe. See https://
unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/#fn2.
26 Religious Diversity in Europe

Table 1.3 Religious Diversity in Europe (Index, 2010)

Country Index Country Index Country Index

Netherlands 6.4 Slovenia 4.0 Greece 2.5

Bosnia-Herzegovina 6.0 Spain 3.9 Andorra 2.2
France 5.9 Austria 3.8 Lithuania 2.1
Belgium 5.7 Albania 3.7 San Marino 1.8
Latvia 5.7 Switzerland 3.7 Ireland 1.7
North Macedonia 5.6 Bulgaria 3.5 Liechtenstein 1.7
Estonia 5.5 Finland 3.5 Serbia 1.6
Sweden 5.4 Hungary 3.5 Croatia 1.4
Germany 5.3 Denmark 3.3 Portugal 1.4
UK 5.1 Italy 3.3 Poland 1.2
Luxembourg 4.9 Norway 3.1 Iceland 1.1
Russia 4.9 Ukraine 3.1 Malta 0.7
Belarus 4.7 Slovakia 2.9 Moldova 0.6
Czech Republic 4.1 Monaco 2.8 Romania 0.1
Montenegro 4.0 Kosovo 2.6 Vatican City -
Data source: Pew Research Center (2014). Johnson and Grim (2020) contains more recent statistics, but the
figures are calculated very differently and the results are not as convincing (e.g. with Sweden as the religiously
most diverse state in Europe).

European countries. With the break-up of Yugoslavia, a series of nationalist-religious

conflicts erupted, leading to ethnic cleansing and even genocide. Of the countries since
the end of this war, only Bosnia-Herzegovina and North Macedonia retain a somewhat
precarious multi-ethnic and multireligious character. Another result of the fall of
communism was that most former Eastern Bloc countries experienced an exodus of
workers and young people in search of opportunities in Western Europe, increasing
the sense of diversity there (see Table 1.3).

Religion in a multicultural society

Although already in the making since the end of the 1960s and initially mainly
in response to the enlargement of the European Community, the EU embraced
multiculturalism as an ideal in the late 1990s (Prügl and Thiel 2009; Kastoryano 2009;
Lähdesmäki 2012). Around the same time, however, multiculturalism became a target
for extreme right-wing and emerging populist movements, even though until then it
had hardly ever been actively encouraged as a political project (Schinkel 2017: 5–6;
Chin 2017: 80–138). In fact, religious diversity, including the presence of Muslims,
was not perceived as an issue until the end of the 1980s. The relative unimportance of
this question is nicely illustrated by the European Values Study, which until 1989 did
not even ask Europeans about their opinions about migrants and different religions.
Culture, in a broad sense, began to be considered an issue in the 1980s, and only
 The Challenges of Past and Present 27

since the 2000s has this been narrowed down to religion, and especially Islam (Chin
2017: 3–4; Allievi 2005; Yilmaz 2016).
Religious communities had modified their stance towards others some time earlier.
Some churches had been arguing for dialogue and unity for decades; ecumenism came
to the fore with the establishment of the World Council of Churches in 1948 and the
ecumenical shift of the Catholic Church with the Second Vatican Council. After the
9/11 attacks in 2001, interfaith and interconfessional movements emerged in an effort
to combat religious extremism by establishing a dialogue based on mutual respect,
appreciating difference as a positive value in itself (see Chapters 8 and 9).
The new EU member states, however, did not all share the same imaginary based
upon the rejection of a past beset by nationalism and genocide, as symbolized by the
Holocaust, which had emerged in the 1980s as the ultimate symbol of Europe’s depravity
against which the EU and its predecessors had been created. This was particularly true of
the new member states from the East. Former communist European countries preferred
to emphasize their own suffering under the Soviet yoke (Littoz-Monnet 2012; Leggewie
2011; Trimçev et al. 2020). Likewise, the ethically liberal and secular(ist) narrative
of EU values incited increasing opposition. The debate in 2004 on the preamble to a
proposed ‘EU Constitution’ (which was eventually dropped) laid bare tensions between
those who thought it should contain a reference to Christian values and history and
those who emphasized the humanistic-secular values of the Enlightenment and
cherished the ‘secular’ nature of the political. An anti-Islamic dimension increasingly
entered the debate, which crystallized around the possible accession of Turkey to the
EU. Opponents of Turkey’s membership highlighted either the legacy of Christendom
or that of Enlightened secularism, and often both, disregarding the fact that Turkey
was a secular state (in some ways even more so than most EU countries). Within this
debate, the German-Syrian sociologist Bassam Tibi (1998: 154) proposed the idea –
reminiscent of the traditional Islamic way of dealing with diversity – that Europe had a
common Leitkultur (leading culture) which he associated with modernity: ‘democracy,
secularism, the Enlightenment, human rights and civil society’. In this context, religions
(not without cause) were exposed as illiberal, undemocratic and intolerant, especially
towards LGBTQ, and as regards liberal values of self-determination. Others, by contrast,
associated European Leitkultur with (Judeo-)Christian values, or with a combination of
Christian and secular, enlightened thinking. This leads to various and often paradoxical
political stances, especially with regards to gender-related issues, for example, when
wearing certain (allegedly religious) clothing is prohibited. Gender has indeed moved
to the centre of the debate on the place of religion in society, and exposes the complex
and divergent ways both are imagined (Furseth 2018).
Since the 2000s wearing religious clothing and symbols in the public space (a
space that has gradually enlarged) has become contentious throughout Europe.
The argument focuses on the need of the state in a multicultural society to remain
‘neutral’ – including teachers and pupils in public schools – but has increasingly spilled
over to other domains such as the workplace and even ‘public’ free-time zones such as
swimming pools. Especially female religious clothing, in particular the hijab, is viewed
as inherently oppressing and opposite to Western values. In this perspective signs of
worship have become contentious as well. Minarets were prohibited as were the calls to
28 Religious Diversity in Europe

prayer by the muezzin. While Muslims were particularly targeted, other religions also
shared the same fate in similar circumstances, although in general Christian symbols
were spared: Christian church towers or church bells never faced the same criticism;
the (disappearing) wearing of cassocks, habits or nuns’ veils was not targeted either
(it should be noted though that in public positions in France and Belgium all religious
signs are prohibited). European courts have sanctioned discrimination mainly by
interpreting Christian symbols (even the crucifix) as part of European ‘culture’ and
denying their ‘proselytizing’ capacities, thus ‘secularizing’ them, as Elayne Oliphant
(2012) observes (see also Roy 2020, 144–50; Bhuta 2014; Moyn 2014; Martínez-
Torrón 2016; a different philosophical perspective in Forst 2011: 543–71). In the
wake of the murder of a French schoolteacher by Islamist terrorists on 16 October
2020, the French government demanded clear adherence to its ‘republican values’,
criticizing intellectuals and proponents of interfaith dialogue. Freedom of religion
itself has come under fire – in 2013 several local councils in Moldova, for example,
made it illegal to hold Islamic rites in public. Some forms of religious harassment have
increased by about 70 per cent in Europe since 2007, often affecting not just religious
people but society at large (Diamant 2019; Sägesser et al. 2018: 28–34). Religiously
unaffiliated and non-religious people have also come under attack, as in Greece, while
Islamist terrorists targeted particularly the freedom of expression (Villa 2019).
Populist Islamophobia has also resuscitated narratives of a decline of the Christian
Occident. In fact, such narratives had already appeared during the final days of the
communist regime in former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the late 1980s when Muslims
were depicted as a threat to European civilization. Such rhetoric underpinned the
expulsion in 1989 of approximately 350,000 Muslim ‘Turks’ (descendants of people that
had migrated from Central-Asia to the Balkans in the fourteenth–fifteenth century) and
motivated anti-Muslim violence during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. In this respect
the discourses of Serbian leaders such as Slobodan Milošević in 1989 are identical to
those of contemporary populists such as Victor Orbán, the present prime minister of
Hungary, in defence of ‘European Christian civilization’ (Mark et al. 2019: 154–72).
These claims about a Christian European civilization under threat also appeared in
Western Europe, as espoused by German Christian Democrats in Bavaria (Germany),
British Brexiteers and the Italian populists of Matteo Salvini (see Chapter 6).
Even if they vary considerably between different populist parties, these discourses
about a Christian European Leitkultur may suggest a growing politicization of
religion (Caiani and Carvalho 2021). But they should not be confused with signs of
re-Christianization or desecularization. In fact, the references to Europe’s Christian
past among populists are anything but consistent, and rarely mention faith. They
illustrate what Olivier Roy termed, with regards to Muslim fundamentalists, as ‘holy
ignorance’, the individualist, cultural-emotional reaction against secularization and
elitism that underpins radicalization and fundamentalism of different persuasions
(Roy 2010; Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016; De Cesari 2020: 26–46). Moreover,
Christian churches often resist such instrumentalization of Christian symbols,
expressing their solidarity with embattled Muslims and Jews. That is not always the
case though. Some local churches, most notably the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria and
the Catholic Church in Poland and Hungary, strongly oppose Muslim immigration,
 The Challenges of Past and Present 29

which they describe as an ‘invasion’ (Sägesser et al. 2018: 28–34). In doing so, they
actually support populist Islamophobia. One should, however, refrain from dismissing
these resistances too easily: they are actually very much in line with a long tradition
of confessional politics, and point to the continued prevalence of a persistent religious
‘social imaginary’ that is mobilized more effectively by populists than by the Christian
Democratic parties, who often appear too much a part of the elite culture (Van den
Hemel 2019). Other signs of a revival of political Christianity can be seen in the pro-
life and anti-LGBTQ movements. Gender equality and sexual democracy have become
core values of Western secular ethics (in Western Europe often presented as a litmus
test for migrants, especially Muslims, and often also viewed as taking precedence over
religious freedom: Furseth 2018), but they incite increasing opposition, particularly
in Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary) as well as in France and Italy (Bialasiewicz and
Gentile 2020).
This raises the question about the degree of religious toleration in Europe. Surveys
highlight huge differences in acceptance of the other, especially non-Christians,
and reveal a deep East-West divide – with Greece clearly situated in the East.
Notwithstanding the variations between the different surveys, the trends and relative
positions largely correspond. It is interesting to note that people in Western Europe
generally believe that religious discrimination is more widespread in their country
than discrimination on the grounds of gender, age or disability, but less than for race/
skin colour (Romani being perceived as the most discriminated against group), while
Eastern Europeans think there is less religious discrimination. As regards acceptance
of the other, the answers strongly suggest that religious discrimination may be far
more widespread in Eastern than in Western Europe. But no doubt realities are more
complex than these self-assessments suggest (GESIS 2019).
The surveys show that prejudices and negative stereotypes towards Muslims
and, to a lesser extent, Jews, still hold strong support, even if they seem in general
to be on the decline: in Western Europe 20–40 per cent, for example, agree that
Muslims want to impose religious law in their country (Belgians in particular
appear deeply alienated from the Muslim population), while about 11–36 per cent
(median 21 per cent) hold negative stereotypes towards Jews. Those with negative
attitudes towards religious others tend to reject all those of different persuasions,
even if their specific attitudes towards Muslims (most difficult to accept as family
members or neighbours), Jews, Indic religions, other Christians or even atheists
do not entirely coincide. In general Europeans are more tolerant towards atheists
and non-religious people than towards religious people, more tolerant towards
Jews than towards Muslims, and more tolerant in terms of accepting the religious
other as a neighbour than as a family member. Catholics are usually less tolerant
than Protestants, but those who were raised Christian but left the church have
more tolerant attitudes towards Muslims and Jews than those who were raised in a
non-religious environment (Pew Research Center 2018a: 42). Acceptance of other
Christians is quite common, also at a more intimate level. Ignorance about the
others’ religion, however, is widespread everywhere. There is extensive, though very
divergent, support for restrictions on Muslim’s ‘religious’ clothing and especially
face coverings (though in Portugal and Sweden about half of the population say
30 Religious Diversity in Europe

‘Muslim women should be allowed to wear whatever religious clothing they want’)
(Pew Research Center 2017, 2018a).

Conclusions

This overview of different ways of dealing with religious diversity in Europe cannot be
summarized in terms of the usual narrative that increasing tolerance has emerged as a
reaction to the intolerance of religions and their mutual exclusivism. Today secularism
is viewed as the most effective way of dealing with religious and cultural diversity, but
the term refers to quite different realities, and the more radical manifestations actually
may hamper the inclusion of religious minorities (see also the introduction to this
volume). Though not central to the analysis, our review of this issue moreover shows
that arguments for toleration can be found within religious traditions themselves. It
also makes clear that the concepts of tolerance or toleration can mean different things,
and rarely imply that differing world views are considered of equal worth, in the past
or in the present. Christendom, with its close but ambivalent association between the
secular and the sacred, privileges homogeneity, but has always included countervailing
forces.
The ‘secularization’ of politics in Europe has continued the search for homogeneity
in different guises, to the point that, as Zygmunt Bauman (1991: 8, 53–74) argues,
‘intolerance is, therefore, the natural inclination of modern practice’, even if religion
is not currently the driving force behind it. One may, however, also observe that it
is easy to overestimate the significance of religion: it is just one of many sources of
identity and alliance, perhaps not even the main one. And before arguing that religion
surely mattered more in the past than in the present it is worth reminding that it did
not always have the same meaning: for centuries religion referred more to relations
and practices than to belief, and the meaning of belief itself also changed dramatically,
transcending the traditional boundaries of faith (Shagan 2019).
We also looked at ways in which Muslim regimes dealt with religious difference.
Muslims and Christians are often seen as opposites, particularly in contemporary
representations. While evolution is mostly associated with Christendom – narrated
in terms of progress – the worlds of Islam are usually (as will also appear in following
chapters) portrayed as static. They are then viewed as either eternal enemies of
Christendom and ‘the West’, or idealized for their capacity for convivencia, which in
reality allowed for very divergent practices. Our analysis, by contrast, shows that both
worlds changed profoundly over time and were characterized by unequal patterns
of coexistence and inclusion, sometimes relatively peaceful, co-operative even, but
also often violent, sometimes extremely so, while not exactly weaving a story of
continuing progress in either case. Moreover, as one moves away from Medieval and
Early Modern times, more similarities between faiths emerge: while Islamic empires
disappeared from Europe, they were confronted with European, and later American,
imperialism elsewhere. Muslim reactions throughout the globe varied from absolute
rejection and opposition, to accommodation, and modernization – sometimes by not
only reinventing fundamentalist traditions, but also by supporting secularism (as in
 The Challenges of Past and Present 31

Turkey) and democracy: similar processes can be observed in ‘Christian’ and modern
Europe as well. It is also worth noting that today there are more Muslims living in
democracies than in autocratic regimes (the same perhaps cannot be said for atheists
or Christians). Muslim democracies moreover appear more inclusive than European
states, for example, by respecting the traditions and customs of different faiths and
world views, such as recognizing their respective feast days (Stepan 2011, 2014).
Meanwhile, the longing for homogeneity remained a key component of European
politics at least until the early post–Second World War period, although ‘secularized’
and dissociated from its origins. It is particularly visible in the population policies that
became associated with the ideal of the nation state (even if they were first introduced
in modern European empires of the late-nineteenth- and twentieth century). The
current situation in the late twentieth-/early twenty-first century is sometimes labelled
post-secular, but what that exactly means is open for debate (Beckford 2012; Hjelm
2015). One thing that is certain is that the social significance of Christianity in Europe
(and in Canada and Australia, but not elsewhere) has declined considerably, to the
point of it becoming a marginal social and political factor in some countries, although
in recent times Christian references have been re-emerging as political and cultural
signifiers. Secularism has also lost a lot of ground, but has made a forceful comeback in
reaction to mainly Islamist terrorism and an increased public visibility of religions, in
particular Islam. As will become clearer in the following chapters, currents in society
that embrace more pluralist visions of society also certainly exist. Sometimes even the
boundaries between religions and between the religious and the secular evaporate or
are transcended, where religion becomes immanent or non-believers adopt religious
symbols and spiritual practices. The contemporary religious landscape has become
multiple and complex, even inconsistent, escaping any simplistic label.
So, tolerance unfortunately is not the soul of Europe. European history has too
often been characterized by violence and intolerance to warrant such a claim,
even if, in reaction, Europeans – using quite different arguments – have developed
philosophies and practices that enable peaceful coexistence. But especially they have
learned – although they also tend to forget – that dialogue is possible, which may
lead to practical arrangements which may not be ideal, but guarantee peace and ways
of living together nevertheless. Tolerance remains no less a challenge though in the
twenty-first century than it did in the tenth, sixteenth or twentieth.
32
 2

Views of the young: Reflections on the basis of

European pilot studies
John Maiden, Stefanie Sinclair, Päivi Salmesvuori,
Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse and John Wolffe

Introduction

Although recent years have seen growing interest in views and understanding of
religious diversity in European countries, one particular demographic has received
markedly less attention: the young. This chapter examines data from the multinational
RETOPEA project, collected between 2019 and 2020. It was intended as preparatory
cross-European research for involving young people in making short films (docutubes)
which explore religious diversity, tolerance and intolerance. A unique aspect of this
data is that it concerns the perspectives of young people regarding both contemporary
and historical religious diversity. We are therefore able to consider the ways in which
European young people relate past and present in considering religious diversity. In
particular, we examine the sources of information upon which they construct their
understanding and the extent to which a ‘presentist’ epistemology shapes their attitudes.
In what follows we will first survey the literature on young people’s attitudes towards
religious diversity; then, second, we describe the methodology used by RETOPEA for
gathering data on young people’s perspectives; third, we offer analysis of this data; and,
fourth, we discuss its significance both in terms of our understanding of young people’s
thinking and, practically, in relation to pedagogical approaches.

Existing literature of young people’s views

Scholarly research on European young people and religious diversity is linked with a
wider academic agenda to understand changing patterns of religiosity. One dimension
of this is the significance of Christianity. This has been expressed by some, such as in Steve
Bruce’s God Is Dead: Secularization in the West, in terms of inexorable ‘secularization’
(2002). Others have tended to emphasize multiple and complex patterns and dynamics
at play; for example, Grace Davie (2000, 2006) has adopted terms such as ‘believing
without belonging’ and ‘vicarious religion’ while also pointing towards the significance
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Enemy's Left, might not have fully maintained his original position
until dark, and thus have saved his Army from defeat. By the arrival
of Bülow's Corps during the night, he would then have been prepared
to meet his opponent on the following morning with a greatly
preponderating force; whilst, on the other hand, Wellington, having
concentrated a considerable portion of his Army, would have been
placed in an equally advantageous position as regards the already
vanquished Enemy in his own front. When it is considered that along
the whole extent of Blücher's line, the French had not gained any
material advantage upon one single point, and that the Prussians
continued to hold their ground with most exemplary firmness; the
circumstance of his not having delayed the collecting of his Reserves,
for a grand attack upon the Enemy's Left, until actually joined by
either the British or Bülow's troops, can scarcely be explained except
by a reference to the peculiar character of the Prussian Chief, whose
natural fiery temperament led him, in all probability to seize with
avidity the first prospect which opened itself of a favourable
opportunity of aiming a deadly thrust at his hated foe, rather than to
adhere to that comparatively passive kind of warfare which so ill
suited his own individual inclination and disposition.

Napoleon had undoubtedly gained the victory from the moment he

succeeded in penetrating the Prussian Centre; but it was not
distinguished by that brilliant success, or by those immediate and
decisive advantages, which might have been anticipated from the
admirable manner in which the attack had been prepared, and the
care with which it was concealed from the Prussians, at a moment
when they had no Reserve remaining, and when the co-operation of
the British on their Right, or the arrival of Bülow's Corps from Hannut,
had become quite impracticable. This appears the more surprising
when we reflect that he had a considerable Corps of Cavalry under
Grouchy at hand to support this attack, and that the whole of Lobau's
Corps was in the Field, fully prepared for active operations.
The consequences resulting from the absence of energetic measures
on the part of the French Emperor, in following up the defeat of the
Prussians, on the evening of the 16th and morning of the 17th, will
be fully developed in subsequent Chapters.

CHAPTER VII.
THE bivouac on the Field of Quatre Bras, during the night of the
16th, continued undisturbed until about an hour before daylight,
when a Cavalry Patrol having accidentally got between the adverse
Picquets near Piermont, caused an alarm in that quarter that was
quickly communicated to both Armies by a rattling fire of musketry,
which, rapidly augmenting, extended itself along the line of the
Advanced Posts. Among the first who hastened to ascertain the origin
and nature of the engagement was Picton, who, together with other
Staff Officers, as they arrived in succession, on discovering that no
advance had been attempted or intended on either side, soon
succeeded in restoring confidence. Similar exertions were successfully
made on the part of the French Officers, and as day began to break
upon the scene, both parties resumed their previous tranquillity. In
this untoward affair, the Picquets furnished by Kielmansegge's
Hanoverian Brigade, and by the 3rd Brunswick Light Battalion were
sharply engaged, and a Picquet of the Field Battalion Bremen
suffered considerably.
It was not long before Wellington, who had slept at Genappe, arrived
at Quatre Bras, where he found Major General Sir Hussey Vivian,
whose Brigade of Light Cavalry, consisting of the 10th British Hussars
(under Colonel Quentin), of the 18th British Hussars (under Lieutenant
Colonel the Hon. Henry Murray), and of the 1st Hussars of the King's
German Legion (under Lieutenant Colonel von Wissell), was posted on
the left of that point with two strong Picquets thrown out; one, of the
18th Hussars, under Captain Croker, on the Namur road, and the
other, of the 10th Hussars, under Major the Hon. Frederick Howard, in
front—with a Picquet from the latter, under Lieutenant Arnold, on the
right of the Namur road.
Vivian, on being asked what account he could give of the Enemy,
communicated to the Duke the result of his observations, which were
necessarily very limited, as, with the exception of the firing that had
taken place, as before mentioned, along the line of Picquets, the
French had continued perfectly quiet, and had as yet given no
indication of any offensive movement.
The Duke then took a general survey of the Field, and while
sweeping the horizon with his telescope, he discovered a French
Vedette on some rising ground, in the direction of Fleurus, and a little
to the right of the high road leading to Namur, apparently belonging
to some Picquet thrown out from Ney's extreme Right on the previous
night, after the battle had ceased; or to some detached Corps placed
in that quarter for the purpose of observation, and for the
maintenance of the communication between Napoleon and Ney. The
Duke had received no intelligence of Blücher; and, probably, judging
from the advanced position of the Vedette in question that whatever
might have been the result of the Battle of Ligny, the Prussians could
not have made any forward movement likely to endanger Ney's Right,
he came to the conclusion that it was quite possible that, on the
other hand, Napoleon might have crossed the Namur road, and cut off
his communication with Blücher, with the design of manœuvring upon
his Left and Rear, and causing him to be simultaneously attacked by
Ney. His Grace therefore desired Vivian to send a strong Patrol along
the Namur road to gain intelligence respecting the Prussian Army.
A Troop of the 10th Hussars, under Captain Grey, was accordingly
despatched on this duty, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel the Hon.
Sir Alexander Gordon, one of the Duke's Aides de Camp. As the Patrol
advanced along the road, the Vedette before mentioned began to
circle, evidently to give notice of the approach of an Enemy, and then
retired. This induced the Patrol to move forward with great caution,
so as to guard against the possibility of being cut off. Nevertheless it
continued, but with all due precaution, advancing along the road,
until after passing a few scattered cottages, comprising a hamlet
called Petit Marbais, it reached, about a mile and a half further on,
some rising ground, about five miles from Quatre Bras, and beyond
which was another height. A Vedette was observed posted upon the
latter, but who had evidently not yet discovered the approach of
Captain Grey's Troop. Down in the intervening hollow was an isolated
house, at the door of which stood a dismounted Sentry, and some
horses were standing in an adjoining yard.
Captain Grey directed Lieutenant Bacon to patrol towards the house,
while he remained with the remainder of the Troop, concealed from
the Enemy's view, a disposition favoured by the nature of the ground,
and the trees in the hedges, on both sides of the road. When
Lieutenant Bacon's party moved forward, it was discovered by the
Vedette, who began circling, and fired his carabine. The French
Picquet posted in the house instantly rushed out; several of the men
had their jackets and accoutrements off; and the Post could easily
have been captured, had the special duty on which the British Patrol
was engaged admitted of an attack. The French turned out very
quickly and galloped to the rear along the high road, while Bacon's
party was recalled. A few French Cavalry galloped up to the Vedette
on the Heights, but evinced no disposition to advance.
It had now become sufficiently evident that, commencing from this
point, the French were in possession of the Namur road; but the
principal object which Sir Alexander Gordon had in view was yet to be
attained. The Patrol now retired a little until it reached a cross road,
which a peasant pointed out as the Prussian line of retreat. Pursuing
this track, the Patrol, within an hour, reached Tilly; where General
Zieten, who had been placed in temporary command of the Cavalry,
was covering the retreat of the Prussian Army.
After remaining here about a quarter of an hour, during which Sir
Alexander Gordon obtained from General Zieten the most ample
information respecting the movements of the Prussians, the Patrol
commenced its return, at a quick pace, striking into a cross road,
which joined the high road at a point nearer to Quatre Bras than the
one whence it had quitted it. The Patrol reached Quatre Bras at about
half past seven o'clock; and Sir Alexander Gordon immediately
reported to the Duke that the Prussians had retreated towards
Wavre, that the French occupied the ground on which the Battle had
been fought; but that they had not crossed the high road, along
which the Patrol had proceeded almost into the immediate vicinity of
their Advanced Posts.
This latter circumstance was very remarkable, and served to satisfy
Wellington that, either Napoleon's victory had not been followed up
with a vigour and an effect, by which the safety of his own Army
would have been perilled, or, that it had not been of a character
sufficiently decisive to have enabled the French Emperor to avail
himself of such a vantage ground.
Having ascertained that the contingency for which, as has already
been explained, he was fully prepared, had actually taken place; he
instantly decided upon retrograding his troops to a position in front of
the point of junction of the roads leading from Charleroi and Nivelles
upon Brussels, in which he might rely upon the co-operation of a
sufficient portion of Blücher's forces from Wavre with his own, by
which he would be enabled to confront Napoleon and his main Army
with ample means, and thus attain that great aim and end of all
strategy, of "operating with the greatest mass in a combined effort
upon a decisive point."
Hence, a change in the direction of the previously ordered
movements became necessary, and the following instructions were
issued:—

"To General Lord Hill.

"17th June 1815.
"The Second Division of British Infantry to march from Nivelles
on Waterloo, at 10 o'clock.
"The Brigades of the Fourth Division, now at Nivelles, to march
from that place on Waterloo, at 10 o'clock. Those Brigades of the
Fourth Division at Braine le Comte, and on the road from Braine
le Comte to Nivelles, to collect and halt at Braine le Comte this
day.
 "All the baggage on the road from Braine le Comte to Nivelles to
return immediately to Braine le Comte, and to proceed
immediately from thence to Hal and Bruxelles.
"The spare Musket Ammunition to be immediately parked behind
Genappe.
"The Corps under the command of Prince Frederick of Orange will
move from Enghien this evening, and take up a position in front
of Hal, occupying Braine le Château with two Battalions.
"Colonel Estorff will fall back with his Brigade on Hal, and place
himself under the orders of Prince Frederick."

Shortly after the departure of the before mentioned Patrol of the 10th
Hussars, along the Namur road, the Duke received some despatches
from England, to which he gave his attention; and now that he had
satisfied himself as to the real state of things, and issued his Orders
for the movements of his distant troops, as also for the retreat of
those present in the Field, he laid himself down on the ground near
Quatre Bras, covered his head with one of the newspapers he had
been reading, which had accompanied those despatches, and
appeared to fall asleep.
After remaining some time in this state, he again rose, mounted his
horse, and rode a little distance down the Field in front of Quatre
Bras. He then looked about through his telescope, and expressed to
those about him his astonishment at the perfect stillness of the
Enemy, remarking at the same time, "What if they should be also
retiring? It is not at all impossible."
A second Officer, Lieutenant Massow, had been despatched from the
Prussian to the Anglo-Allied Head Quarters; and it was about this
time that he reached the Duke, with a verbal communication
respecting the retreat upon Wavre, and the position intended to be
assumed in that quarter. It was of a nature which, taken altogether,
was so far satisfactory, that Wellington immediately sent a verbal
message by this Officer to Blücher, acquainting him with his intended
retrograde movements, and proposing to accept a battle, on the
following day, in the position in front of Waterloo, provided the Prince
would detach two Corps to his assistance.

The following is the manner in which the retreat of the Anglo-Allied

Infantry, then in full operation, was executed. It was an important
matter to mask the retreat as much as possible, so as to gain time for
the free and unimpeded movement of the Army along the high road
leading to the position in front of Waterloo. For this purpose, the
Light Troops continued to maintain the line of Outposts, until their
respective Supports, which had remained stationary sufficiently long
to conceal the retreat of the troops in their rear, began also to retire.
The First and Fifth British Divisions, and the Second Dutch-Belgian
Division, as also the Brunswick Corps, effected their retreat in
excellent order, notwithstanding the delay that was created by the
narrowness of the bridge and street of Genappe. Their retreat was
covered by Alten's Division, to which were added for this purpose, the
1st Battalion of the 95th British Rifles, the 2nd and 3rd Brunswick
Light Battalions, the Brunswick Advanced Guard Battalion, and the
Light Companies of Byng's Brigade of Guards.
The main body of Alten's Division commenced its retreat about eleven
o'clock. Ompteda's Brigade of the King's German Legion was
withdrawn to Sart à Mavelines, which it immediately occupied, as also
the Wood of Les Censes in its front. Halkett's British Brigade then
retired secretly until it reached some favourable ground, a little
distance in rear of Ompteda's Brigade, upon which it was immediately
drawn up. Kielmansegge's Hanoverian Brigade was withdrawn still
further to the rear, and occupied a third position. Thus posted, the
Division was ordered, in the event of being attacked, to retire by
Brigades alternately.
It was a little before midday when the Light Troops of Alten's Division
began to retire. They occupied the advanced line, commencing from
the southern extremity of the Wood of Bossu on the right, extending
along Gemioncourt and the inclosures of Piermont, and crossing the
Namur road on the left: from which line they gradually and slowly fell
back upon Ompteda's Brigade, in a manner evincing admirable skill,
steadiness, and regularity.
In order more effectually to mask the movements on the Allied side
of the Namur road, the whole of the Cavalry was drawn up in two
lines immediately contiguous to, and in rear of, that road; the Heavy
Cavalry forming the Second Line, and Picquets being thrown out from
the First Line, to relieve those of the retiring Infantry.
The main body of Alten's Division now commenced its further retreat;
but not by alternate Brigades, this mode having been directed only in
the event of an attack; the latter retired successively in the order in
which they stood, preserving their relative distances, so that they
might commence the alternate system of retreat, if attacked. To
facilitate the passage of other portions of the Army through the
narrow defile of the bridge and town of Genappe, this Division retired
by Bezy, and crossed the Genappe, lower down the stream, by the
bridge of Wais le Hutte.

In the early part of the morning, Ney had, like his opponent, been
ignorant of the result of the Battle of Ligny; but he was aware that
the Anglo-Allied Army had been considerably reinforced during the
night, principally by the arrival of its Cavalry.
The Marshal calculated that if Napoleon had gained a victory, and
crossed the Namur road, the longer Wellington remained in the
position of Quatre Bras, the greater the danger he incurred of having
not only his communication with Blücher effectually cut off, but also
his main line of retreat upon Brussels intercepted; and that in such a
case it was wiser not to advance against the British General, as the
latter might then retire, and thus elude the effect of a combined
operation between Napoleon's and his own forces. He also judged that
if, on the other hand, the French Emperor had been defeated, an
attack made on his own part, upon the Anglo-Allied Army, might
subject himself to the risk of having to contend against a combined
operation between Wellington and Blücher; and thus expose both his
own and Napoleon's forces to the probability of being defeated in
detail.
In this uncertainty, Ney sent a message by General Count Flahaut,
who happened to be still with him, and who was returning to rejoin
the Emperor wherever he might be found, expressive of his anxiety
to learn the result of the action of the preceding day. In the mean
time, he kept his troops in a state of perfect quietude; his main body
was posted in reserve on the Heights of Frasne, between which and
the Outposts there were intermediate Columns of Support; but no
movement whatever was attempted.
Ney at length received the information he had solicited, in a despatch
from Soult, wherein the result of the Battle of Ligny was briefly
described. It also stated that Napoleon was proceeding, with the
principal portion of his forces, to the Mill of Bry, close to which the
high road leads from Namur to Quatre Bras, and that therefore it
would not be practicable for the Anglo-Allied Army to act against him
(Ney); but that, should such a case happen, the Emperor would
march directly upon it by that road, while Ney should attack it in
front, and in this manner that Army would at once be destroyed. The
despatch required from Ney a report of the exact position of his
forces, and an account of all that was going on in his front.
Hence it is evident that Ney's opinion, that a victory at Ligny ought to
be followed up by a combined attack upon Wellington, perfectly
coincided with Napoleon's views; but while Ney was thus justified in
remaining inactive during the early part of the day, the fact of the
Emperor's not moving directly upon Genappe with the morning's
dawn, and his excessive delay in breaking up his bivouac at Ligny, are
inexplicable. A glorious opportunity had presented itself for the
attainment of his original design of defeating both Armies in detail,
but which was completely lost by a most extraordinary and fatal want
of energy and vigour in seizing upon the advantages which the
victory of Ligny had placed within his reach.
Ney, having ascertained that Napoleon's forces were in motion, had
commenced the advance of his own troops, when a second despatch
reached him, dated, "in front of Ligny, at noon," intimating that the
Emperor had just posted a Corps of Infantry and the Imperial Guard
in advance of Marbais, that he wished him to attack the Enemy at
Quatre Bras, and force him from his position; and that his operations
would be seconded by the Corps at Marbais, to which point his
Majesty was proceeding in person.
Upon discovering that the Anglo-Allied Infantry had retired, and that
the troops around, and in rear of, Quatre Bras, consisted of Cavalry
covering the retreat, Ney brought forward his own Cavalry in advance,
and appeared to regulate its movements so that its attack might be
directed against the Front of the British simultaneously with that of
the Cavalry which he now perceived advancing along the Namur road
against its Flank.
About this time, the 10th Hussars were moved across the Namur
road, and down the slope in front where they were halted, in echelon
of Squadrons; and while they were thus posted, Wellington and his
Staff came to the front of the Regiment. From this spot the Duke was
attentively watching, through his telescope, the dispositions and
movements of the French, whom he could discover as soon as they
reached the Quatre Bras side of Little Marbais; when all at once at a
distance of about two miles, masses were seen forming on the side
of the Namur road, conspicuously glittering in the sun's rays; by
which the Duke was at first induced to believe that they were
Infantry, whose bayonets were so brilliantly reflected; but it was soon
discovered that they were Cuirassiers.
After a short time, these were observed to advance, preceded by
Lancers, and it was not long before the Picquet of the 18th British
Hussars, posted on that road, began skirmishing, as did also the
Picquet of the 10th British Hussars, more in the front of the position,
and likewise, still further to the right, in front of Quatre Bras, a
Picquet consisting of a Squadron of the 11th British Light Dragoons,
detached from Major General Vandeleur's Brigade, which comprised
the 11th Light Dragoons (under Lieutenant Colonel Sleigh), the 12th
Light Dragoons (under Colonel the Hon. Frederick Ponsonby), and the
16th Light Dragoons (under Lieutenant Colonel Hay). The 10th
Hussars then fell back again into their proper place in the line. Vivian
now took up a new alignment, throwing back his Left so as to
present a front to the Enemy's advance, and to protect the left of the
position. Vandeleur's Brigade was then in Right Rear of Vivian's and
close to Quatre Bras.
The Anglo-Allied Infantry having, some time previously, entirely
crossed the Genappe, with the exception of the Light Companies of
the Second Brigade of Guards on the right, and of the 1st Battalion
95th British Regiment (Rifles), on the left, which troops had been
directed to remain until the last moment, and were now retiring to
Genappe (where they were subsequently drawn up at the entrance of
the town), and the Duke having satisfied himself that a formidable
body of the French Cavalry was endeavouring to fall upon him and to
molest his retreat, it became a question with his Grace, at that
moment, how far it might be advisable to offer any serious resistance
to the advance of the Enemy; but Lieutenant General the Earl of
Uxbridge, the Commander of the Anglo-Allied Cavalry, having
remarked that, considering the defiles in the rear, and the distance to
which the great mass of the Infantry had already retired and from
which it could offer no immediate support, he did not think the
Cavalry was favourably situated for making such an attempt, the
Duke assented to the correctness of this view, and requested his
Lordship at once to carry into effect the retreat of the Cavalry.
Uxbridge immediately made the following dispositions for this purpose.
The First or Household Brigade of Heavy Cavalry commanded by
Major General Lord Edward Somerset, and consisting of the 1st Life
Guards (under Lieutenant Colonel Ferrior), of the 2nd Life Guards
(under Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Edward P. Lygon), of the Royal
Horse Guards, or Blues (under Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Chambre
Hill), and of the 1st (or King's) Dragoon Guards (under Colonel
Fuller), together with the Second Brigade of Heavy Cavalry,
commanded by Major General the Honourable Sir William Ponsonby,
consisting of the 1st, or Royal Dragoons (under Lieutenant Colonel
Clifton), of the 2nd Royal North British Dragoons, or Scots Greys
(under Colonel Hamilton), and of the 6th, or Inniskilling Dragoons
(under Colonel Muter), formed the Centre Column, which was to
retire by the Brussels high road.
Vandeleur's and Vivian's Brigades constituted the Left Column, which
was to effect its retreat by a Bridge over the Genappe at Thuy, still
lower down the stream than that by which Alten's Infantry Division
had crossed.
The Right Column was formed of part of the Third Light Cavalry
Brigade, commanded by Major General Sir William Dörnberg, the 1st
and 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion (under
Lieutenant Colonels Bülow and de Jonquières), while the remaining
Regiment, which was the 23rd British Light Dragoons (under Colonel
the Earl of Portarlington), was employed as a portion of the Rear
Guard of the Centre Column. The 15th British Hussars (under
Lieutenant Colonel Dalrymple), belonging to the Fifth Cavalry Brigade,
under Major General Sir Colquhoun Grant, was also attached to the
Right Column; while of the two remaining Regiments of the Brigade,
the 2nd Hussars of the King's German Legion (under Lieutenant
Colonel Linsingen), and the 7th British Hussars (under Colonel Sir
Edward Kerrison), the former had been left in occupation of a line of
Posts on the French frontier, extending from Courtrai, through Menin,
Ypres, Loo, and Fürnes, to the North Sea, and the latter formed a
part of the Rear Guard of the Centre Column. This Right Column was
to pass the Genappe by a ford higher up the stream than the town of
Genappe.
These skilful dispositions had scarcely been arranged, when the
Picquet of the 18th Hussars, on the left, came in at a good round
trot, followed by two or three Squadrons of French Cavalry, upon
which Vivian's Battery of Horse Artillery, opened a fire whereby their
advance was checked. The Enemy, however, was observed to be very
active in bringing up his Artillery, which soon opened upon the Hussar
Brigade. Vivian, having received the Earl of Uxbridge's instructions to
retire, accompanied with an intimation that he would be supported by
Vandeleur's Brigade, then in his rear, and observing that the French
Cavalry was pressing forward in great numbers, not only in his front,
but also on his flank, he put his Brigade about, and retired in line,
covered by the Skirmishers. The French followed, with loud cries of
"Vive l'Empereur!" and just as the Brigade reached a sort of hollow,
their guns again opened, throwing shells, which mostly flew over the
heads of the 18th Hussars, against which Regiment they appeared to
be principally directed. In the mean time, Vandeleur's Brigade had
been drawn up in support, on rather a commanding position, and
Vivian approached it in the full expectation that it would open out for
the passing through of his own men, and take the Rear Guard in its
turn; but on the Hussars arriving within fifty or sixty yards of the
Fourth Brigade, Vandeleur put it about, and retired—Vivian not being
aware that Vandeleur had previously received Orders to retire and
leave the road clear for the retreat of the Cavalry in his front. Vivian
immediately occupied the ground thus vacated, and, with a view to
check the Enemy's advance more effectually, ordered the 18th
Hussars to charge, as soon as the French approached within
favourable reach.
The weather, during the morning, had become oppressively hot; it
was now a dead calm; not a leaf was stirring; and the atmosphere
was close to an intolerable degree; while a dark, heavy, dense cloud
impended over the combatants. The 18th Hussars were fully
prepared, and awaited but the command to charge, when the
Brigade guns on the right commenced firing, for the purpose of
previously disturbing and breaking the order of the Enemy's advance.
The concussion seemed instantly to rebound through the still
atmosphere, and communicate, as an electric spark, with the heavily
charged mass above. A most awfully loud thunder clap burst forth,
immediately succeeded by a rain which has never, probably, been
exceeded in violence even within the tropics. In a very few minutes
the ground became perfectly saturated; so much so that it was quite
impracticable for any rapid movement of the Cavalry. The Enemy's
Lancers, opposed to the Sixth British Brigade, began to relax in their
advance, and to limit it to skirmishing; but they seemed more intent
upon endeavouring to envelope, and intercept the retreat of, the
Hussars. Vivian now replaced the 18th Hussars by the 1st Hussars of
the King's German Legion, as Rear Guard, with Orders to cover well
the Left Flank and Left Front of the Brigade. He had already sent off
his Battery of Horse Artillery, to cross the Genappe by the Bridge of
Thuy, and despatched an Aide de Camp to Vandeleur, to request he
would move his Brigade as quickly as possible across that Bridge, so
that he might meet with no interruption in his retreat, in the event of
his being hard pressed.
Of the Centre Column, the Heavy Brigades of Lord Edward Somerset
and Sir William Ponsonby had retired along the Charleroi road, and
were taking up a position on some high ground, a little in rear of
Genappe, on either side of that road. The detached Squadron of the
11th Light Dragoons (under Captain Schreiber), was withdrawn and
directed to retire through the above town. The 23rd Light Dragoons
were also withdrawn, and posted upon the ascent between Genappe
and the position occupied by the two Heavy Brigades. The 7th
Hussars continued on the south side of Genappe, as Rear Guard.
Neither the Centre, nor the Right, Column experienced any serious
molestation in its retreat while on the French side of the Genappe:
large bodies of Cavalry were seen in motion, but their Advanced
Guards limited their attacks to skirmishing.
At length the 7th Hussars retired through Genappe, after having
thrown out their Right Squadron, commanded by Major Hodge, as
Rear Guard, to cover the retreat of the Centre Column, regulating its
proceedings in conformity with such Orders as it might receive from
Major General Sir William Dörnberg, who had been desired to
superintend the movements of the Skirmishers. Major Hodge led out
the Right Troop, under Captain Elphinstone, to skirmish, while
Lieutenant Standish O'Grady, who commanded the Left Troop, held the
high road, from which he had occasionally to send assistance to the
former, and frequently to advance, to enable the Skirmishers to hold
their ground, as their movements were difficult, through ploughed
fields so soft that the horses always sank up to their knees, and
sometimes to their girths. In this manner, every inch of ground was
disputed, until within a short distance of Genappe.
Here Dörnberg informed Lieutenant O'Grady that he must leave him;
that it was of the utmost importance to face the Enemy boldly at this
spot, as the Bridge in the town of Genappe was so narrow that the
Squadron would have to pass it in file; that he was to endeavour as
much as possible to obtain time for drawing off the Skirmishers, but
not to compromise his Troop too much. Lieutenant O'Grady then
called in his Skirmishers, and advanced with his own Troop boldly up
the road at a trot. The Cavalry immediately opposed to him, went
about, followed by him for some distance; and he thus continued
alternately advancing and retiring, until he saw all the Right Troop
safe on the road in his rear. He then began to retire at a walk,
occasionally halting and fronting, until he turned the corner of the
town of Genappe: when he filed the men from the left, and passed
through the place at a gallop. Upon the arrival of the Squadron at the
opposite entrance of Genappe, it was posted between this point and
the main body of the 7th Hussars, which had been drawn up on the
road in a column of divisions, prepared to check the advance of the
Enemy on his debouching from the town.
The British Left Cavalry Column continued its retreat, which was
towards the little Bridge of Thuy, by deep narrow lanes, converted by
the tremendous pour of rain into perfect streams. Vivian withdrew the
10th and 18th Hussars from the position he last occupied, but on
their approaching the Genappe an interruption occurred in
consequence of Vandeleur's Brigade not having effected its passage
across the Bridge; and the delay became so great that he was
induced to put about the 18th Hussars, with a view to their affording
a Support to the 1st German Hussars, should they require it. In a
short time after this, Vandeleur's Brigade resumed its progress: the
10th Hussars followed; and, as the 1st Hussars, with which Regiment
Vivian himself was at the moment, continued to maintain a vigorous
and effective skirmish, he ordered the 18th to resume its retrograde
movement; having previously directed that some men of the 10th
Hussars should be dismounted on reaching the opposite bank of the
Genappe, and be prepared with their carbines to defend the passage,
should the retreat of the remainder of the Brigade be severely
pressed. After skirmishing some time, Vivian despatched a Squadron
of the 1st German Hussars to the Bridge, and the moment he began
to do so, the French Cavalry again pushed forward with so much
boldness and rapidity as to interpose between the Left Squadron and
the main body of the Regiment, and to compel that Squadron to pass
the Genappe lower down than the Bridge over which the Brigade
passed the little stream. Having ascertained that all was ready, Vivian
galloped down the road to the Bridge with the remainder of the 1st
German Hussars. The French followed them, loudly cheering, but as
soon as the Hussars cleared the Bridge, and the Enemy's Dragoons
reached it, some of the dismounted men that had been formed along
the top of the opposite bank, in rear of a hedge, overlooking the
Bridge and a hollow way, through which the road led from it up the
ascent, opened a fire upon the foremost of the French Lancers that
had come up to the other end of the Bridge, while the remainder of
the 10th, and the whole of the 18th Hussars, were drawn up along
the rising ground or bank. The good countenance here shown by
Vivian's Brigade, combined with the soft and miry state of the ground
after the thunderstorm had set in, completely checked the pursuit by
the Enemy's Cavalry, which now turned towards the high road.
The Left Cavalry Column, after Vivian's Brigade had remained in its
position for some little time, continued its retreat without further
molestation (the Enemy having contented himself with merely
detaching a Patrol to watch its movements) along a narrow cross
road, running nearly parallel with the Charleroi high road, and leading
through the Villages of Glabbaix, Maransart, Aywiers, Frischermont,
Smohain, and Verd Cocou. Here Vivian's Brigade arrived in the
evening, in the vicinity of the Forest of Soignies, and bivouacked;
while Vandeleur's Brigade passed the night somewhat nearer to the
ground which had been selected for the position to be taken up by
the Anglo-Allied Army.
The Right Cavalry Column, consisting only, as previously stated, of
the 1st and 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion, and of
the 15th British Hussars, effected its retreat in good order, protected
by its Skirmishers, as far as the ford, which it crossed above
Genappe. At this point, the French Cavalry suspended its pursuit, and
proceeded, in like manner as that on the right had done, to join the
main body on the high road; while the British Right Cavalry Column
continued its retreat unmolested towards the position of Waterloo, in
rear of which it bivouacked.
A large body of French Cavalry, consisting of from sixteen to eighteen
Squadrons, was now entering Genappe by the Charleroi road,
followed by the main body of the French Army under Napoleon.
The Earl of Uxbridge, who was desirous of checking the Enemy's
advance, so as to gain sufficient time for the orderly retreat of the
Anglo-Allied Army, and to prevent a compromise of any portion of the
rearmost troops, decided upon embracing the advantage which the
narrow Defile of Genappe seemed to present in aid of his design. The
town consists mainly of houses lining the high road, on the Brussels
side of the Bridge. The road then ascends a ridge, the brow of which
is about six or seven hundred yards distant, and here Lord Uxbridge
had halted the Heavy Brigades of Lord Edward Somerset and of Sir
William Ponsonby, and posted them so as to cover the retirement of
the Light Cavalry. At first, he formed them in line; Somerset's on the
right, and Ponsonby's on the left, of the high road; but observing by
the Enemy's formidable advance, that the Light Cavalry would soon
be compelled to fall back, his Lordship drew up Somerset's Brigade in
a Column of half Squadrons upon, but close to, the right of the road
itself, so as to admit of troops retiring by its left; and formed
Ponsonby's Brigade into a Column of Half Squadrons upon the left of
the high road, and somewhat to the rear. The 7th Hussars were
formed at some little distance in the rear of Genappe, and the 23rd
Light Dragoons were drawn up in support of that Regiment, and
about midway between it and the Heavy Cavalry on the Height. The
Squadron of the 7th Hussars, under Major Hodge, it will be
recollected, was halted between the main body of that Regiment and
the town of Genappe.
Thus posted, the Centre retiring Cavalry Column remained about
twenty minutes, when loud shouts announced that the French had
entered the town. Presently a few horsemen appeared galloping out
of the street, and dashed at speed into Major Hodge's Squadron. They
were found, on being taken, to be quite inebriated. In a few
moments afterwards, the French Column showed its head within the
town; the leading Troop consisted of Lancers, all very young men,
mounted on very small horses, and commanded by a fine looking,
and, as it subsequently appeared, a very brave man. The Column
remained about fifteen minutes within the town, its head halted at
the outlet facing the British Rear Guard, and its flanks protected by
the houses. The street not being straight, and the rear of the Column
not being aware that the front had halted, continued pressing
forward, until the whole mass became so jammed that it was
impossible for the foremost ranks to go about, should such a
movement become necessary.
Their apparent hesitation and indecision induced Lord Uxbridge, who
stood upon some elevated ground adjoining the right of the road, to
order the 7th Hussars to charge. The latter, animated by the
presence of the Commander of the Cavalry, who was also their own
Colonel, rushed forward with the most determined spirit and
intrepidity; while the French, awaiting the onslaught, opposed to
them a close, compact, and impenetrable phalanx of lances; which,
being securely flanked by the houses, and backed by a solid mass of
horsemen, presented a complete chevaux de frise. Hence, it is not
surprising that the charge should have made no impression upon the
Enemy; nevertheless, the contest was maintained for some
considerable time; the Hussars cutting at their opponents, and the
latter parrying and thrusting, neither party giving way a single inch of
ground; both the Commanding Officer of the Lancers, and Major
Hodge, commanding the leading Squadron of the Hussars, were killed,
gallantly fighting to the last.
The French had by this time established a Battery of Horse Artillery
on the left of Genappe and upon the opposite bank of the river, from
which they opened a brisk fire upon the British Cavalry in support,
and several shot struck the main body of the 7th Hussars, upsetting
men and horses, and causing great impediments in their rear. The
French Lancers now advanced, and drove the 7th Hussars upon their
Reserve; but here the 7th rallied, renewed their attack, and forced
back the Lancers upon the town. The latter having been reinforced,
rallied, in their turn, and drove back the Hussars. These, however,
again rallied, and resolutely faced their opponents, with whom they
gallantly continued a fierce encounter for some time longer, when to
terminate a conflict which was most obstinate and sanguinary
without being productive of any favourable result, but in which the
bravery of the 7th Hussars shone most conspicuously, and became
the theme of admiration of all who witnessed it, Lord Uxbridge
decided upon withdrawing that Regiment and charging with the 1st
Life Guards. As soon as the Hussars went about, in pursuance of the
Orders received, the Lancers followed them. In the mêlée which
ensued, the French lost quite as many men as did the Hussars; and
when at length the latter were able to disengage themselves, the
former did not attempt to follow them. The 7th retired through the
23rd Light Dragoons, took the first favourable turn off the road and
reformed in the adjoining field.
During this contest, the French, having become sensible of the evil
that might arise from the closely wedged state of the Cavalry in the
town, began to clear the rear of the most advanced portions of the
Column, so as to admit of more freedom of movement in case of
disaster. A Battery of British Horse Artillery had taken post close to a
house on the Height occupied by the Heavy Cavalry, and on the left
of the road; and it was now replying to the French Battery on the
opposite bank of the river.
So exceedingly elated were the French with having repulsed the 7th
Hussars in this their first serious encounter with the British Cavalry,
that immediately on that Regiment retiring, the whole Column that
was in Genappe raised the war cry, and rent the air with shouts of
"En avant!—En avant!" evincing the greatest impatience to follow up
this momentary advantage, and to attack the Supports; for which,
indeed, the opportunity appeared very favourable, as the ranks of the
latter were suffering considerable annoyance from the well directed
and effective fire of the French guns on the opposite bank of the
river.
They now abandoned the secure cover to which they had been
indebted for their temporary success, and were advancing up the
ascent with all the confidence of a fancied superiority, when the Earl
of Uxbridge, seizing upon the advantage presented for attacking them
while moving up hill, with their Flanks unsupported, and a narrow
Defile in their rear, and being also desirous of affording the 1st Life
Guards an opportunity of charging, brought forward that Regiment
through the 23rd Light Dragoons, who opened out for its passage to
the front. The Life Guards now made their charge, most gallantly
headed by Colonel Sir John Elley, Deputy Adjutant General, who, at
the moment of contact with the Enemy, began by cutting down two
men right and left. It was truly a splendid charge; its rapid rush down
into the Enemy's mass, was as terrific in appearance as it was
destructive in its effect; for although the French met the attack with
firmness, they were utterly unable to hold their ground a single
moment, were overthrown with great slaughter, and literally ridden
down in such a manner that the road was instantaneously covered
with men and horses, scattered in all directions. The Life Guards,
pursuing their victorious course, dashed into Genappe, and drove all
before them as far as the opposite outlet of the town.
This brilliant and eminently successful charge made a deep
impression upon the Enemy, who now conducted his pursuit with
extreme caution. The 23rd Light Dragoons, which had supported the
1st Life Guards in their charge, became again the last Regiment in
the Rear Guard, and continued so during the remainder of the
retreat. Ponsonby's Brigade had deployed to the right of the high road,
and the guns were so disposed as to take advantageous positions,
retiring en échiquier.
The Enemy, after quitting Genappe, tried to get upon the Flanks of
the Centre retiring Column, chiefly upon the Right Flank; but the
Royals, Greys, and Inniskillings, manœuvred beautifully; retiring by
alternate Squadrons, and covered by their own Skirmishers, who
completely beat the French Light Cavalry in that kind of warfare.
Finding that from the deep state of the ground, there was not the
least danger of his being turned by the Enemy, Lord Uxbridge
gradually withdrew Ponsonby's Brigade to the high road. He kept the
Light Cavalry, protected by the Household Brigade, as the Rear
Guard, and slowly retired into the chosen position in front of
Waterloo, the guns and rockets constantly plying the Enemy's
Advance, which, although it pressed forward twice or thrice, and
made preparations to attack, never ventured to come to close
quarters with its opponents; and the Column received from it no
further molestation.
On arriving at the foot of the Anglo-Allied position, the 23rd Light
Dragoons moved off to the (Allied) right of the high road, and into
the hollow in which lies the Orchard of the Farm of La Haye Sainte.
Here they were drawn up, prepared to meet the French Advanced
Guard, should it follow them, or to fall upon its Flank, should it
venture to continue its march along the road. The latter, however,
halted upon the Height which intervenes between La Haye Sainte and
La Belle Alliance, and opened a fire upon the Centre of the Duke of
Wellington's Line, above the former Farm, from two Batteries of Horse
Artillery.
Picton, who was then upon the rising ground in rear of La Haye
Sainte, and who was intently watching the Enemy's advance along
the high road, perceived Columns of Infantry advancing from La Belle
Alliance. He immediately took upon himself to unite the two Batteries
nearest at hand, which were those under Major Lloyd of the British
Artillery, and Major Cleeves of the King's German Legion (although not
belonging to his own Division), and to place them in position on the
high ground close to the Charleroi road. The guns immediately
opened a brisk cannonade upon the French Columns, of which they
had obtained a most accurate range just as their leading Divisions
had entered the inclosed space between the high banks which line
the high road where it is cut through the Height before mentioned as
intervening between La Belle Alliance and La Haye Sainte. This mass
of the Enemy's Infantry suffered severely from the fire, to which it
stood exposed about half an hour: for the head of the Column having
been unable to retrograde, in consequence of the pressure from its
rear, and prevented by the high bank on either side of the road from
filing off to a flank, could not readily extricate itself from so
embarrassing a situation.
During the whole of this fire, the Allied Batteries were replied to,
though very ineffectually, by the two Batteries of French Horse
Artillery posted on the Height in question.
It was now twilight: the approaching darkness was greatly
accelerated by the lowering aspect of the sky. Picquets were hastily
thrown forward by both Armies, and to so great a height had the
mutual spirit of defiance arisen, that the near approach of opposing
parties, advancing to take up their ground for the night, led to little
Cavalry affairs, which, though unproductive of any useful result to
either side, were distinguished, on different points of the Lines, by a
chivalrous bravery which seemed to require a prudent restraint.
In one of these affairs, Captain Heyliger of the 7th Hussars, made a
very brilliant charge with his Troop; and when the Duke of Wellington
sent to check him, his Grace desired to be made acquainted with the
name of an Officer who had displayed so much gallantry. A very
spirited charge was also made by the Right Troop of the 2nd Light
Dragoons of the King's German Legion, under Lieutenant Hugo; who
was allowed by his Commanding Officer to volunteer for that service,
and who, from the vicinity of Hougomont, boldly rushed up the
Height intervening between that point and Mon Plaisir, and gallantly
drove back a portion of the French Advanced Guard of Cavalry;
recapturing at the same time three carriages filled with British sick
and wounded.

The manner in which the Duke of Wellington withdrew his Army from
the position of Quatre Bras to the one of Waterloo, must ever render
that retreat a perfect model of operations of this nature, performed in
the immediate presence of a powerful Enemy. Those dispositions
which have been described as having been made by him for the
purpose of masking the retirement of the main body, of affording
perfect security to the passage of the Defile in his rear, and of
ensuring the orderly and regular assembly of the several Corps on
the ground respectively allotted to them in the new position, evince
altogether a degree of skill which has never been surpassed.
In such operations, the covering of the Army by its Cavalry and Light
Troops necessarily forms an important feature; and a glance at the
manner in which this duty was fulfilled by the Earl of Uxbridge, with
the Cavalry, Horse Artillery, and a few Light Battalions, at his disposal,
is sufficient to show that the exemplification of such feature on this
occasion was exceedingly beautiful. Indeed, so orderly and so perfect
were all the arrangements connected with this retreat, from its
commencement to its close, that the movements partook more of the
appearance of a Field Day upon a large scale, than of an operation
executed in the actual presence of an Enemy; and this was
particularly observable as regarded the protection afforded by the
Cavalry and Horse Artillery, which manœuvred to admiration, and in a
style that, combined with the brilliant charge by the 1st Life Guards
at Genappe, evidently impressed the Enemy with a due sense of the
efficiency of the gallant troops immediately in his front. It may here
also be remarked, that the judicious dispositions made by Lord
Uxbridge in covering this retreat, and the high degree of confidence
with which he inspired the Cavalry, afforded well grounded
anticipations of the success likely to attend his measures when
conducting that Cavalry in the open battle field, on which, it was
foreseen, its prowess would so very soon be tested. The British and
German portion of the Cavalry was in excellent order, and seemed
already to have imbibed, in a high degree, that gallant bearing and
chivalrous spirit, which it beheld and admired in its distinguished
Chief.
In the course of the evening, the Duke received from Prince Blücher a
reply to the request he had made for his support in the position he
was now occupying. It was highly characteristic of the old man, who
had written it, in the following terms, without previously conferring
with, or addressing himself to, any one:—"I shall not come with two
Corps only, but with my whole Army; upon this understanding,
however, that should the French not attack us on the 18th, we shall
attack them on the 19th."

The Duke, who, as has already been explained, had, from the
commencement of the Campaign, considered it very possible that
Napoleon would advance by the Mons road, still entertained
apprehensions of an attempt on the part of his opponent to turn him
by Hal, and seize Brussels by a coup de main. For this, however, he
was fully prepared, having made his dispositions for the security of
that Flank, in the manner pointed out in the following instructions,
which he issued to Major General the Hon. Sir Charles Colville:—

"17th June
1815.
"The Army retired this day from its position at Quatre Bras to its
present position in front of Waterloo.
"The Brigades of the Fourth Division, at Braine le Comte, are to
retire at daylight tomorrow morning upon Hal.
"Major General Colville must be guided by the intelligence he
receives of the Enemy's movements in his march to Hal, whether
he moves by the direct route or by Enghien.
"Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his Corps the
position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as
possible.
"The Army will probably continue in its position in front of
Waterloo tomorrow.
"Lieutenant Colonel Torrens will inform Lieutenant General Sir
Charles Colville of the position and situation of the Armies."

The respective lines of Picquets and Vedettes had scarcely been

taken up along the low ground that skirted the front of the Anglo-
Allied position, and the last gun had just boomed from the Heights,
when "heaven's artillery," accompanied by vivid flashes of lightning,
again peeled forth in solemn and awful grandeur; while the rain,
pouring down in torrents, imparted the utmost gloom and discomfort
to the bivouacs, which the opposing Armies had established for the
night, upon the ground destined to become celebrated in history,
even to the remotest ages.

CHAPTER VIII.
IT was not until the night of the 16th, after Zieten's and Pirch's Corps
d'Armée had retired to Tilly and Gentinnes, that it was decided the
Prussian Army should retreat upon Wavre. This decision was
communicated in the Orders then transmitted from the Prussian Head
Quarters to the First and Second Corps d'Armée (Zieten's and Pirch's)
directing them to bivouac at Bierge and St Anne, in the vicinity of
Wavre; as also in the Orders forwarded, on the next morning, to the
bivouacs of the Third and Fourth Corps (Thielemann's and Bülow's), at
Gembloux and Basse Bodecée, directing them to fall back, and
bivouac at La Bavette and Dion le Mont near Wavre.
Zieten's and Pirch's Corps retired by Mont St Guibert, in rear of which
Defile the latter Corps remained a considerable time as Rear Guard,
while the former marched on to Wavre, where it arrived about
midday, crossed the Dyle, and took up its position at Bierge. Pirch
followed the same route, but took post on the right bank of the Dyle,
between St Anne and Aisemont.
With the first glimmering of daylight the troops, which, under the
command of General Jagow, had continued in full possession of Bry
and its immediate vicinity during the night, began to retire, firstly, in
the direction of Sombref, and thence to Gembloux, which they
reached before the arrival of Thielemann's Corps. After the receipt of
the Order pointing out the direction of the retreat, Jagow conducted
these troops, in the course of the 17th, towards their respective
Brigades.
Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, whose Cavalry Brigade with half a Horse
Battery, formed the Rear Guard of the line of retreat of Zieten's and
Pirch's Corps, received Orders to take up a concealed position
between Tilly and Gentinnes, thence to watch the movements of the
Enemy; and, as soon as he found himself pressed by the latter, to fall
back upon the Defile of Mont St Guibert.
Thielemann, who, it will be recollected, had received a message from
Gneisenau, leaving it optional with him to retire by Tilly or Gembloux,
according to circumstances, decided on falling back upon the latter
point; being well aware that the Enemy was in possession of the
Villages of St Amand and Ligny, and of the Field of Battle to within a
very short distance from Sombref.
He had collected together his widely disseminated Brigades, and
drawn in his Advanced Posts; an operation which, executed in the
darkness of the night, retarded his departure so much that it was two
o'clock in the morning before the Reserve Artillery, which formed the
head of the Column, struck into the road which at Point du Jour, leads
from the Namur chaussée to Gembloux. The Rear Guard of this line
of retreat, which consisted of the Ninth Infantry Brigade, under Major
General Borcke, and the Reserve Cavalry, under General Hobe, and
was drawn up along the Namur road, having in its front the Fleurus
chaussée, leading directly towards the Enemy, did not commence its
march until after four o'clock, when the sun had risen. The main body
of the Corps reached Gembloux at six o'clock in the morning.
On approaching this place, Thielemann learned that Bülow had posted
the Fourth Corps about three miles in rear of Gembloux, upon the old
Roman road; whereupon Major Weyrach, Aide de Camp to Prince
Blücher, who had continued with Thielemann during the night of the
16th, set off to seek out the Field Marshal, and to report to him the
position and attendant circumstances of the Third and Fourth Corps
d'Armée. He soon succeeded in discovering the Prussian Head
Quarters at Mélioreux, and communicated the above important
information to Count Gneisenau.
Thielemann gave his own Corps a halt on the other side of the town, in
order that his troops might obtain rest and refreshment.

The Advance of Bülow's Corps had reached Basse Bodecée, upon the
old Roman road, at nightfall of the 16th of June. Here that General
became acquainted with the loss of the Battle of Ligny: whereupon
he ordered the Brigades of his Corps to be posted at intervals along
this road, with the exception of the Thirteenth (under Lieutenant
General Hake), which was directed to bivouac more to the rear, near
Hottoment, where the same road is intersected by that which
conducts from Namur to Louvain.
Both Corps remained for some hours in a state of uncertainty as to
the direction to be taken for forming a junction with the First and
Second Corps. Thielemann wrote to Bülow that he had received no
Orders from Prince Blücher, but that he presumed the retreat was
upon St Trond. He also stated that he had not been followed by the
Enemy, but that he had heard distant firing on the right, which he
concluded was connected with the Duke of Wellington's Army.
At length, about half past nine o'clock, Prince Blücher's Aide de Camp,
Major Weyrach, arrived at Bülow's Head Quarters, and brought the
Orders for the retreat of the Fourth Corps to Dion le Mont, near
Wavre, by Walhain and Corbaix. The Orders also required that Bülow
should post the main body of his Rear Guard (which consisted of the
Fourteenth Brigade) at Vieux Sart; as also that he should send a
Detachment, consisting of one Regiment of Cavalry, two Battalions of
Infantry, and two guns of Horse Artillery, to the Defile of Mont St
Guibert, to act, in the first instance as a Support to Lieutenant
Colonel Sohr, who was at Tilly, and then, upon the latter falling back,
to act as Rear Guard in this direction. Lieutenant Colonel Ledebur was
accordingly detached upon this duty with the 10th Hussars, the
Fusilier Battalions of the 11th Regiment of Infantry and 1st Regiment
of Pomeranian Landwehr, together with two guns from the Horse
Battery No. 12. The Corps itself moved directly upon Dion le Mont,
and on reaching the Height near that town, on which is situated the
public house of A tous vents, took up a position close to the
intersection of the roads leading to Louvain, Wavre, and Gembloux.

At two o'clock in the afternoon, Thielemann commenced his march

upon Wavre; where the Corps arrived late in the evening, and took
up its position at La Bavette, leaving the Ninth Infantry Brigade
(General Borcke) and the Cavalry Brigade of Colonel Count Lottum, on
the right bank of the Dyle. In this position the Corps was now
rejoined by Colonel Marwitz' Cavalry Brigade, which had retired by
Tilly; as also by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr, and
the two Squadrons of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, which
troops had been left at Dinant. The Squadron of the 7th Uhlans that
had been detached to Onoz, also joined, but having fallen in with a
superior force of the Enemy's Cavalry, had experienced a great loss.
The two Squadrons of the 9th Hussars, belonging to this Corps, had
not yet arrived from Ciney.

The Prussian Head Quarters were established, early on the 17th, at

Wavre. The veteran Field Marshal, who was still suffering
considerably in consequence of his fall, was obliged to seek rest the
moment he arrived there, and did not quit his bed during the
remainder of the day.
In the course of the forenoon, Lieutenant Massow, who had been
despatched with a message to the Duke of Wellington, returned with
the one from his Grace, communicating the intention of the latter to
fall back upon Waterloo and accept a battle there, provided he
received the support of two Prussian Corps. (See page 264.) There
was every disposition to enter into this proposal, but some degree of
uncertainty existed as to whether Bülow's Corps would join the Army
on the 17th, as also a certain misgiving respecting the Park of
Ammunition of both Zieten's and Pirch's Corps, which had been
directed upon Gembloux, a circumstance that excited apprehensions
as to the possibility of furnishing the much needed supply of
ammunition to these Corps which were at hand. In this state of
uncertainty, no other resolution could be adopted than that of holding
the position in front and in rear of the Dyle (with the Advanced Guard
of the Fourth Corps as far forward as Mont St Guibert), until the
required ammunition should be obtained; and Blücher deferred
replying to Wellington's communication, in the hope that his Army
would very soon be relieved from the unpleasant circumstances
above mentioned.

While the Prussians were thus effecting their retreat in good order,
along the cross roads of that part of the country (high road there was
none), no corresponding activity manifested itself on the part of the
French, whom the morning's dawn found still lying in their bivouac.
Their Vedettes stood within half a mile of the Columns of Thielemann's
Rear Guard; the retreat of which, not having commenced until after
sunrise, might have been easily remarked: and had the French
detached but the smallest Patrol, they could not have failed to
discover the direction of that retreat—whether towards Namur or
Gembloux.
It was not until after Thielemann had retired a sufficient distance to
escape further notice that any disposition for movement occurred to
disturb the perfect quietude of their repose. Then, Pajol with a
Division of his Light Cavalry Corps, under Lieutenant General Baron
Soult, consisting of the 1st, 4th, and 5th Hussars, was detached in
pursuit of the Prussians. He struck into the Namur road, and shortly
afterwards Lieutenant General Baron Teste's Infantry Division of
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