MANU/SC/0362/1972

Equivalent/Neutral Citation: AIR1972SC 2284, 1973(2)AnWR1, 1972 INSC 106, (1972)3SC C 717, [1973]1SC R172, 1972(4)UJ885

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 189 of 1971
Decided On: 12.04.1972
G. Narayanaswami Vs. G. Pannerselvam and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.M. Sikri, C.J., A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray, D.G. Palekar and M. Hameedullah Beg, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: V.P. Raman and Vineet Kumar, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: Bhasker Sen and Sobhag Mal Jain, Advs.
Case Note:
Election - qualification - Articles 171, 171 (3) of Constitution of India and
Sections 5 and 6 of Representation of People Act, 1951 - election to graduate
Legislative Council challenged on ground that appellant does not possess
graduation - nothing in article 171 and 173 or in Representation of people Act
which requires that such candidate should possess graduation - in such case
election of returned candidate cannot be set aside on grounds that he does
not possess degree.

JUDGMENT
M. Hameedullah Beg, J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951. The
appellant selection , held on 11-4-1970, to the Madras Legislative Council from the
Madras District Graduates' Constituency was set aside by a learned Judge of the Madras
High Court who decided all the issues except one in favour of the appellant. The only
issue decided against the appellant, which is now before us, was framed as follows :
Whether the first Respondent was not qualified to stand for election to the
Graduates Constituency on all or any of the grounds set out by the petitioner in
paragraph 7 to 9 of the election Petition ?
2 . Paragraphs 7 to 9 of the election petition against the appellant are lengthy, prolix,
and argumentative. The case and the contentions of the Respondent G. Panneerselvam,
the petitioner before the High Court, which were accepted by the High Court, may be
summarised as follows:
3. Firstly, the whole purpose of Article 171 of the Constitution was to confer a right of
"functional representation" upon persons possessing certain educational or other
qualifications so that the Appellant Narayanaswami, who had only passed the High
School Leaving Examination and was not a Graduate, could not be elected at all to the

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Legislative Council from the Graduates' Constituency; secondly, it would be absurd and
destructive of the very concept of representation of especially qualified, persons that an
individual who does not possess the essential or basic qualification of the electors
should be a representative of those who are to be represented because of this special
qualification of theirs; and, thirdly, the Constitution, being an organic instrument for the
governance of the land, must be interpreted in a particularly broad and liberal manner
so as to give effect to the underlying principles and purposes of the system of
representation sought to be set up by it and not in such a way as to defeat them. Hence,
the educational qualification of the electors should be read into the system of
representation set up by the Constitution for Legislative Councils as a necessary
qualification of candidates in such constituencies.
4. Authorities are certainly not wanting which indicate that Courts should interpret in a
broad and generous spirit the document which contains the fundamental law of the land
or the basic principles of its Government. Nevertheless, the rule of "plain meaning" or
"literal" interpretation, described in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes as "the primary
rule", could not be altogether abandoned today in interpreting any document. Indeed,
we find Lord Ever-shed, M.R., saying : "The length and detail of modern legislation, has
undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule". (See:
Maxwell on "Interpretation of Statutes" 12th Edition p. 28). It may be that the great
mass of modern legislation, a large part of which consists of statutory rules, makes
some departure from the literal rule of interpretation more easily justifiable today than
it was in the past, But, the object of interpretation and of "construction" (which may be
broader than "interpretation") is to .discover the intention of the law makers in every
case (See: Crawford on "Statutory Construction" 1940 Ed. para 157, p. 240-242). This
object can, obviously, be best achieved by first looking at the language used in the
relevant provisions. Other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to only if
the language used is contradictory, ambiguous, or leads really to absurd results. This is
an elementary and basic rule of interpretation as well as of construction-processes
which, from the point of view of principles applied, coalesce and converge towards the
common purpose of both which is to get at the real sense and meaning, so far as it may
be reasonably possible to do this, of what is found laid down. The provisions whose
meaning is under consideration have, therefore, to be examined before applying any
method of construction at all.
To these provisions we may now turn.
5 . Article 168 of our Constitution shows that the State Legislatures in nine States in
India, including Madras, were to consist of two Houses : the Legislative Assembly and
the Legislative Council. Article 170 lays down that the Legislative Assembly,-of each
State "shall consist of members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies
in the State, in such a manner as the Parliament may by law determine". After that,
comes Article 171 which may be reproduced in toto here :
171(1) The total number of members in the Legislative Council of a State
having such a Council shall not exceed one third of the total number of
members in the Legislative Assembly of that State:
Provided that the total number of members in the Legislative Council of a State
shall in no case be less than forty.
(2) Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the composition of the
Legislative Council of a State shall be as provided in Clause (3).

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 (3) Of the total number of members of the Legislative Council of a State-
(a) as nearly as may be, one-third shall be elected by electorates
consisting of members of municipalities, district boards and such other
local authorities in the State as Parliament may by law specify;
(b) as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected by electorates
consisting of persons residing in the State who have been for at least
three years graduates of any university in the territory of India or have
been for at least three years in possession of qualifications prescribed
by or under any law made by Parliament as equivalent to that of a
graduate of any such university;
(c) as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected by electorates
consisting of persons who have been for at least three years engaged hi
teaching in such educational institutions within the State, not lower in
standard than that of a secondary school, as may be prescribed by or
under any law made by Parliament;
(d) as nearly as may be, one-third shall be elected by the members of
the Legislative Assembly of the State from amongst persons who are
not members of the Assembly.
(e) the remainder shall be nominated by the Governor in accordance
with the provisions of Clause (5).
(4) The members to be elected under Sub-Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Clause
(3) shall be chosen in such territorial constituencies as may be prescribed by or
under any law made by Parliament, and the elections under the said Sub-
clauses and under Sub-clause (d) of the said clause shall be held in accordance
with the system of proportional representation by means of the single
transferable vote.
(5) The members to be nominated by the Governor under Sub-clause (2) of
Clause (3) shall consist of persons having special knowledge or practical
experience in respect of such matters as the following namely:-
Literature, Science, Article cooperative movement and social service.
6. The term "electorate", used in Article 171(3) (a)(b) and (c) has neither been defined
by the Constitution nor in any enactment by Parliament. Section 2(1)(e) of the
Representation of People Act 43 of 1951, however, says :
'elector,' in relation to a constituency means a person whose name is entered in
the electoral roll of that constituency for the time being in force and who is not
subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 16 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1950.
7 . The plain and ordinary meaning of the term "electorate" is confined to the body of
persons who elect. It does not contain, within its ambit, the extended notion of a body
of persons electing representatives "from amongst themselves". Thus, the use of the
term "electorate", in Article 171(3) of our Constitution, could not, by itself, impose a
limit upon the field of choice of members of the electorate by requiring that the person
to be chosen must also be a member of the electorate. The qualifications of the electors

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constituting the "electorate" and of those who can represent each "electorate",
contemplated by the Constitution and then supplemented by Parliament, are separately
set out for each house. We may glance at the provisions relating to Legislative
Assemblies first.
8 . Section 16 of the Representation of People Act 43 of 1950 lays down the
qualifications of an elector negatively by prescribing who shall be disqualified for
registration in an electoral roll. A disqualified person is one who :
(a) is not a citizen of India; or
(b) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or
(c) is for the time being disqualified from voting under the provisions of any
law relating to corrupt practices and other offences in connection with
elections.
9 . Section 19 lays down the two conditions for registration on the electoral roll of a
constituency. The person to be registered must not be less than 21 years of age on the
qualifying date and must be ordinarily resident in the constituency. The persons so
registered, whose names appear on the electoral roll, constitute the electorate for the
legislative Assembly of each State. Section 5 of the Representation of People Act, 43 of
1951 enacts :
5. Qualifications for membership of a Legislative Assembly:-
A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative
Assembly of a State unless-
(a) in the case of a seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes or for the
Scheduled Tribes of that State, he is a member of any of those castes
or of those tribes, as the case may be, and is an elector for any
Assembly constituency in that State;
(b) in the case of a seat reserved for an autonomous district of Assam,
other than a seat the constituency for which comprises the cantonment
and municipality of Shillong, he is a member of a Scheduled Tribe of
any autonomous district and is an elector for the Assembly constituency
in which such seat or any other seat is reserved for that district; and
(c) in the case of any other seat, he is an elector for any Assembly
constituency in that State;
1 0 . Coming to the Legislative Council, we find that the qualifications for the four
"electorates" are indicated by Article 171(3 )(a)(b)(c) & (d). Arid, the qualifications of
candidates for seats in a Legislative Council are given in Section 6 of the Representation
of People Act 43 of 1951 which lays down :
6. Qualifications for membership of a Legislative Council.-
(1) A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative
Council of a State to be filled by election unless he is an elector for any
Assembly constituency in that State.
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative
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 Council of a State to be filled by nomination by the Governor unless he is
ordinarily resident in the State.
1 1 . A look at Article 171(2), set out above, indicates that the composition of the
Legislative Council of a State was a matter to be also provided for by law made by
Parliament. It is evident that "the Constitution makers had directed their attention
specifically towards the methods of election and composition of the legislature of each
State. They themselves prescribed some qualifications to be possessed by members of
each House of the Legislature. Article 173 lays down :-
1 7 3 . A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to-fill a seat in the
Legislature of a State unless he-
(a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person
authorised in that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or
affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third
Schedule;
(b) is, in the case of a seat in the Legislative Assembly, not less than
twenty-five years of age and, in the case of a seat in the Legislative
Council, not less than thirty years of age; and
(c) possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that
behalf by or under any law made by Parliament.
12. An important and very noticeable difference between qualifications prescribed by
Parliament for the membership of a Legislative Assembly by Section 5 of the
Representation of People Act of 1951 and those for the membership of a Legislative
Council by Section 6 of that Act is that, so far as a member of the Legislative Assembly
is concerned, he or she has to be an Elector in the Constituency from which he or she
stands, but a member of a Legislative Council in a State is not, similarly, required to be
a member of the electorate. All that Parliament says, in Section 6 of the Representation
of People Act, 1951, is that the person to be chosen as a member of the Legislative
Council has to be "an elector for any Assembly constituency" in the State to whose
legislative Council he was to be chosen. He has to be "ordinarily resident" in the State
to qualify "for nomination. No other qualifications, apart from those found in Article 173
of the Constitution and Section 6 of the Representation of People Act of 1951, are to be
found laid down anywhere. But, an additional qualification was found, by the judgment
under appeal before us, to exist by resorting to a presumed legislative intent and then
practically adding it to those expressly laid down.
13. It may be possible to look for legislative intention in materials outside the four-
corners of a statute where its language is really ambiguous or conflicting. But, where no
such difficulty arises, the mere fact that the intentions of the law makers, sought to be
demonstrated by what was said by some of them or by those advising them when the
Constitution was on the anvil, were really different from the result which clearly follows
from the language used in the Legislative provisions under consideration, could not
authorise the use of such an exceptional mode of construction. "It is well accepted",
said Lord Morris (See: Davies Jankins and to. v. Davies) 1967 2 W.L.R. . 1139 @ 1156,
"that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make
the law".
14. The judgment under appeal, after discussing the manner in which Article 171 of the
Constitution was framed and the different views expressed about the nature of the
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Second Chambers , to be set up by it in our States, says : "The system of functional,
which is also called occupational representation, as distinguished from territorial
representation, was borrowed from the Irish Constitution and that is the underlying
principle in Article 171. The opinion of political thinkers and statement on the wisdom
of such representation may not be unanimous. Whatever be the divergent views, the
accomplished fact in the Constitution is that such a representation has been given
recognition and it has to be implemented. In making the Legislative Council as a
representative body, the framers of the Constitution have not made it exclusively one of
elected representatives according to their occupations. It is intended to be a
heterogeneous and more broad based body consisting of persons of different walks of
life, some elected and some nominated, each with the experience in his own field of
activity". The learned Judge concluded; "It is with these objects that Clauses (a), (b),
and (c) of Article 171(3) have been conceived so that persons in those walks of life
could make their contribution to the Legislative functions of the State. Article 171 in
fixing the composition of the Legislative Council as a functional chamber, has also
indirectly laid down certain qualifications and also disqualifications of members to be
elected thereunder".
15. Whatever may have been the opinions of Constitution makers or of their advisers,
whose views are cited in the judgment under appeal, it is not possible to say, on a
perusal of Article 171 of the Constitution, that the Second Chambers set up in nine
States in India were meant to incorporate the principle of what is known as "functional"
or "vocational" representation, which has "been advocated by Guild-Socialist and
Syndicalist Schools of political thought. Some of the observations quoted above, in the
judgment under appeal itself, militate with the conclusions reached there. All that we
can infer from our Constitutional provisions is that additional representation or
weightage was given to persons possessing special type of knowledge and experience
by enabling them to elect their special representatives also for Legislative Councils. The
concept of such representation does not carry with it, as a necessary consequence, the
further notion that the representative must also possess the very qualifications of those
he represents.
16. In the case of the Graduates' constituency, it is provided in Article 171(3)(b) that
the electors must have held their degrees for at least three years before they become
qualified an electors. Thus, in laying down the test of competence of voters of such a
constituency, more possession of degrees by them was not considered sufficient.
Moreover, graduates are not an occupational or vocational group but merely a body of
persons with an educational qualification. It would, therefore, not be correct to describe
the additional representation sought to be given to them as an attempt to introduce the
"functional" or "vocational" principle. On the face of it, Article 171 appears to be
designed only to give a right to choose their representatives to those who have certain
types of presumably valuable knowledge and education. If the presumption of their
better competence to elect a suitable representative in there, as we think that there
must be, it would be to the members of such a constituency themselves to decide
whether a person who stands for election from their constituency possesses the right
type of knowledge, experience, and wisdom which satisfy certain standards. It may well
be that the Constitution makers, acting upon such a presumption, had intentionally left
the educational qualifications of a candidate for election from the graduates
constituency unspecified.
1 7 . A test laid down by Blackburn J. in R. v. Cleworth [1864] 4 B and S 927, to
determine what the correct presumption, arising from an omission in a statute should
be, was whether what was omitted but sought to be brought within the legislative
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intention was "known" to the law makers, and could, therefore, be "supposed to have
been omitted intentionally". "It makes no difference", says Craies in "Statute Law"
(Crians on Statute Law-5th En. 1963 p. 72) "that the omission on the part of the
legislature was a mere oversight, and that without doubt the Act would have been
drawn otherwise had the attention of the legislature been directed to the oversight at
the time the Act was under discussion". In the case before us, it could not possibly be
said that the question to be dealt with was not "known" to the legislators. It could not
even be said that qualifications of the electors as well as of those to be elected were not
matters to which the attention of the law makers, both in the Constituent Assembly and
in Parliament, was not specially directed at all or that the omission must be by mere
oversight The provisions discussed above demonstrate amply how legislative attention
was paid to the qualifications of the electors as well as of the elected in every case.
Hence, the correct presumption, in such a case, would be that the omission was
deliberate.
18. A glance at the legislative history lying behind Article 171 also enables us to reach
the conclusion that the omission by the Constitution makers or by Parliament to
prescribe graduation as must be deliberate. Sections 60 and 61 of the Government of
India Act, 1935, deal with composition of Provincial legislatures and of the two
Chambers of such legislatures. The Upper Chambers in the Provincial Legislatures were
to be composed of members retiring every third year in accordance with provisions of
the Fifth Schedule to the Act. Rule 10 of this Schedule lays down :
In a Province in which any seats are to be! filled by representatives of backward
areas or backward tribes, representatives of commerce, industry, mining and
planting, representatives of landholders, representatives of universities or
representatives of labour, persons to fill those seats...shall be chosen in such
manner as may be prescribed.
19. On 30th April, 1936, the Government of India (Provincial Legislative Assemblies)
Order of 1936 was issued by His Majesty in Council. It prescribed the qualifications of
persons to be chosen from the "special constituencies" set up for representation in the
Legislative Councils. A glance at the provisions relating to these qualifications, including
those for the University seats, indicates that it was invariably expressly provided, where
it was so intended, that a necessary qualification of a candidate for a seat was that he
or she should be "entitled to vote for the choice of a member to fill it". Hence,
legislative history on the subject would also indicate that, whenever any qualification of
the candidate was intended to be imposed this was expressly done and not left to mere
implications.
20. We think that the view contained in the Judgment under appeal, necessarily results
in writing some words into or adding them to the relevant statutory provisions to the
effect that the candidates from graduates' constituencies of Legislative Councils must
also possess the qualification of having graduated. This contravenes the rule of "plam
meaning" or "literal" construction which must ordinarily prevail. A logical corollary of
that rule is that "a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has
clearly and undoubtedly not been made" (See: Craies on Statute Law-6th Edn. p. 70).
An application of the rule necessarily involves that addition to or modification of words
used , in statutory provisions is not generally permissible (see e.g. Sri Ram Narain
Medhi and Ors. v. The State of Bombay MANU/SC/0132/1958 : AIR1959SC459 ,
British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh and Ors.
MANU/SC/0148/1959 : [1960]1SCR168 , R. G. Jacob v. Union of India
MANU/SC/0140/1962 : [1963]3SCR800 . Courts may depart from this rule only to
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avoid a patent absurdity (see e.g. State of Madhya, Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co.
and Anr. MANU/SC/0089/1966 : 1967CriL J285 . In Hira Devi v. District Board,
Shahiahanpur MANU/SC/0021/1952 : [1952]1SCR1122 @ 365, miss Court observed :
No doubt it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions
of an Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court
to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the
provisions of an Act.
2 1 . Cases in which defects in statutory provisions may or may not be supplied by
Courts have been indicated in well known works such as Sutherland's "Statutory
Construction" (3rd Edn.(Vol. 2) (Paragraph 4924 at pages 455-558) and in Crawford's
"Construction of Statutes" (1940 Edn.). Only one passage from the last mentioned work
need be cited here: (p. 269) :
Where the statute's meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated.
In the first place, in such a case, they are not needed. If they should be
interpolated, the statute would more than likely fail to express the legislative
intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed might be altered by the addition
of new words. They should not be interpolated even though the remedy of the
statute would thereby be advanced, or a more desirable or just result would
occur. Even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with
or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source
of the legislative intent is in the language of the statute.
22. We think that the language as well as the legislative history of Articles 171 and 173
of the Constitution and Section 6 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, enable us
to presume a deliberate omission of the qualification that the representative of the
Graduates should also be a graduate. In our opinion, no absurdity results if we presume
such an intention. We cannot infer, as the learned Judge of the Madras High Court had
done, from the mere fact of such an omission and opinions about a supposed scheme of
"functional representation" underlying Article 171 of our Constitution, that the omission
was either unintentional or that it led to. absurd results. We think that, by adding a
deemed to be necessary or implied qualification of a representative of the Graduates
which the Constitution makers, or, in any event, the Parliament, could have easily
imposed, the learned Judge had really invaded the Legislative sphere. The defect, if
any, in the law could be removed only by law made by Parliament.
2 3 . We conclude, after considering all the relevant Constitutional and statutory
provisions relating to the qualifications of a candidate for election from the Graduates'
constituency of the Legislative Council of the Madras State, that the appellant possesses
all the qualifications laid down for such a candidate.
24. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the Judgment and order of the Madras
High Court, and dismiss the Respondent's election petition. The appellant is entitled to
his costs throughout.
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