T26
T26
Armor 6–15 mm
Primary 45 mm gun Model 1932
armament (20K)
Secondary 1× Degtyarev tank machine
armament gun
Gasoline T-26
Engine
90 hp (68 kW)
Power/weight 9.57 hp/tonne
Suspension Leaf spring
Operational
140 km
range
Speed 31.1 km/h
The T-26 was a light tank used by the Soviet Union from the 1930s until World War II. It
was based on the British Vickers 6-Ton tank and widely considered one of the most
successful designs of the 1930s.[1]
The T-26 made-up the majority of the Red Army's armour force until late 1941, and saw
a long history in the armed forces of various different nations around the world. For
almost a decade the T-26 proved to be one of the best tanks in production, with a total of
around 12,000 units produced.[2] Success and failure in the Spanish Civil War, where it
served as the most widely used tank, ultimately played a major role in influencing the
Soviet doctrine of tank warfare in the late 1930s; later in its service the T-26's
obsolescence contributed to some of the major Soviet defeats during the German invasion
of the Soviet Union in 1941.[citation needed]
Although the T-26's reputation was marred by its abysmal performance during World
War II, it was nevertheless the most important tank of the Spanish Civil War and played
major roles during the Winter War and the Battle of Khalkhin Gol in 1939. Between its
introduction and its retirement, the T-26 saw a great deal of modernization efforts
between 1932 and 1941.
Design
By 1933, the Red Army fielded at least six different types of tanks to fulfill Deputy
Commissar for Defence Mikhail Tukhachevsky's view of mechanization for his theory of
deep operations. These models included the T-26 for armour attachments to infantry
divisions, the BT-5 for mechanized cavalry, the T-35 as a heavy breakthrough tank and
the T-37/T-38 as an amphibious reconnaissance vehicle.[3] By 1940, the T-26 was the
most widely produced of all these tanks.[4]
The T-26 was designed to replace the obsolescent T-18, also called MS-1. It was
designed in 1929, when several Soviet military officials travelled to Western Europe to
choose a new tank model for indigenous production and upgrading.[5] Originally, the
Soviet Experimental Design Department attempted to produce two "pirated" prototypes
of the Vickers Six-Ton—the T-19 and T-20[6]— but neither prototype fulfilled the role
required by the Red Army. Eventually the Soviets opted to simply purchase the
production license.[7] Following acquisition of the production license, production of the
T-26A, a copy of the Vickers Six-Ton model A, began in 1931.[8]
The T-26 Model 1933 carried 122 rounds of hand-loaded 45 mm ammunition, firing
armour-piercing 45 mm rounds with a muzzle velocity of 820 m/s, or lower-velocity
high-explosive munitions.[19] The tank was powered by a GAZ 91 horsepower (68 kW)
gasoline engine which gave it a top speed of almost 30 km/h. The hull had a maximum
steel thickness of 16 mm, which proved enough to stop light machine gun ammunition,
including German 7.92 mm armour-piercing rounds but would later prove to be too light
against newer German anti-tank weapons in 1941. There would be subsequent attempts to
thicken the front plate, but ultimately the T-26 would end production in favour of newer
and superior tank designs, such as the T-34. In 1937 there was an effort to equip many
tanks with anti-aircraft machine guns, as well as the addition of two searchlights, a new
VKU-3 command system and a TPU-3 interphone. The T-26 was also given an improved
carrying capacity, from 122 rounds to 147 for the main gun.[20] In 1938 the cylindrical
turret was replaced with a conical shaped turret, with the same 45 mm model 1934 gun.[21]
When compared to the Vickers Six-Ton tank, the T-26A had superior maximum armour
protection - 15 mm as compared to 13 mm. Although the Vickers Six-Ton B would have
its armour increased to a maximum of 17 mm, this was not much superior to the 16 mm
of the T-26 Model 1933. Furthermore, the T-26 would later see its armour improved.
Concerning respective armaments, the Soviet 45 mm gun which equipped the majority of
the T-26s produced was superior to the low velocity, short-barelled, 47 mm gun which
equipped the Vickers Six-Ton B. However, the Vickers Six-Ton was slightly lighter and
slightly faster than the T-26.[22]
The majority of T-26 produced were T-26Bs carrying the 45 mm main gun. The T-26
saw wide and valuable service during the Spanish Civil War. Even as WW2 began, the T-
26 continued to be the backbone of the Red Army's tank corps. Plans were made to
replace the T-26 and BT tanks with a new generation of tanks such as the T-34 and T-50,
but these plans were just beginning to be executed on the eve of Operation Barbarrossa.
Production of the T-26 was halted; readiness and maintenance standards fell, which put
the Red Army at a disadvantage during the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.
T-26 Model 1933 tank in the Spanish Civil War. Note partially welded hull construction
and anti-aircraft DT machine gun
The first shipment of T-26Bs to Spain was delivered on October 15, 1936, at the Spanish
port city of Cartagena which was occupied by the Popular Front. It was one of the first of
many shipments to Spain during "Operation X" which became the Soviet Union's primary
stream of aid to the Spanish Republic's cause. This first shipment, arriving on the Soviet
ship SS Komsomol, provided 50 new T-26Bs to Spain under the command of General
Semyon Krivoshein. This immediately sparked retaliatory German aid to Franco; the first
shipment of Panzer Is arrived only weeks later. Both tanks would see their first combat
during the Nationalist advance towards Madrid and during the Siege of Madrid proper.
Ultimately, the Soviet Union provided a total of 281 T-26Bs, half of which would fall
into Nationalist hands by the end of the war and form the crux of the Spanish Brunete
armoured division until 1953.[23] Additionally, the Soviets would provide over 50 BT-5
fast tanks.[24]
Krivoshein only had ten days to prepare his armour for the defence of Madrid. On
October 26 he was ordered to deploy at least some of his tanks to defend the Spanish
capital from the nationalist advance. Krivoshein's force only numbered 15 tanks and was
crewed by poorly trained Republican militia.[26] The Republic's new armour was put
under the command of Spanish Captain Paul Arman and it was used immediately in a
counterstroke dedicated against the town of Torrejón de Velasco. Although the offensive
saw initial success against the unprepared Nationalist infantry, poor communications
resulted in Arman's tanks separating from the supporting infantry provided by Colonel
Enrique Lister's infantry brigade, thus allowing Nationalist infantry to knock out at least
one T-26 and force the rest to withdraw under severe pressure with the help of one of the
Nationalist legion's cavalry brigade. Furthermore, while the T-26s exploited the
breakthrough, Lister's infantry were pinned down fighting around the village of Seseña,
making infantry support impossible. Republican armour and infantry suffered from
similar cooperation problems throughout the war, ultimately shaping Stavka's and Stalin's
view of the tank in war.[27]
Stalin was also inadvertently the largest provider of tanks to the Nationalist armoured
forces. Due to the superiority of the Soviet T-26 over the Italian CV-33, the Italian CV-
35, and the German Panzer I, the Nationalist front would put many captured T-26s into
service, using them against their previous masters. During the Republican offensive
towards Torrejon three T-26s were captured, and another four taken a few days later. By
the end of the Siege of Madrid there would be enough captured T-26s to create an ad-hoc
armoured battalion. By the end of 1937 the Nationalist front had created and equipped a
battalion of engineers solely responsible for the capture of Soviet armour, especially the
T-26, and by the end of the war 178 T-26Bs had been captured by Francisco Franco's
Nationalist forces. Of these, 30 were so damaged that they could not be used (although
they would be scavenged for their parts) and another 50 which were captured by different
bodies of the Nationalist armies and not utilized.[28] The T-26 was the most widely used
tank of the Spanish Civil War in both armies and has been referred to "the tank of the
Spanish Civil War" in the title of one of Lucas Molina Franco's articles.[29]
Despite the T-26's success in the Spanish Civil War, the fact that it performed badly
within the context of tank operations meant that its days were numbered. Its perceived
success fatally influence post-Spanish Civil War Soviet military thinking as it proved
ineffectual against advanced anti-tank weapons and better-armed tanks.[32]
Comparing tanks
Of the three major tanks which saw action during the Spanish Civil War the T-26 proved
itself superior to both the Panzer I and the CV-33. The T-26 was the only tank equipped
with an actual cannon, as opposed to a machine gun, and although heavier, was no less
manoeuvrable than its enemies. The T-26 was also deployed in greater numbers than the
Panzer I and CV-33 combined. The Italians ultimately equipped Nationalist Spain with
155 CV-33s in 9 shipments between August 26 1936 and December 1938.[33] The
Germans provided a total of 122 Panzer Is in 5 shipments. On the other hand, Moscow
provided 281 T-26Bs to the Spanish Republic by 1938, although many of these fell into
the Nationalist's hands. Below is a comparison of the different tanks used during the
Spanish Civil War.
Perhaps the single largest advantage the T-26B had over the Panzer I and CV-33/35 was
the 45 mm cannon. Although Panzer Is were able to perforate the T-26B's front armour
plate during the first clashes of the Spanish Civil War using armour piercing 7.92 mm
ammunition, it was only able to do this at under 150 m. Republican and Soviet tank crews
countered this by engaging at ranges of up to 1,000 m.[37] This advantage in engagement
range outweighed the fact that all tanks had similar protection levels at their thickest
point, and the Italian and German tanks had slightly better mobility. It allowed the T-26B
unrestricted dominance during the Spanish Civil War. The relatively high power of the
45 mm gun was one of the reasons Spanish nationalist engineers attempted to upgrade the
gun of the Panzer I, (although, as stated, this would prove ultimately unsuccessful). The
power of the Soviet 45 mm gun was matched by the accuracy of the gun sights, which
allowed for engagement ranges of 3,000 m.[38] Nationalist anti-tank gunners using the Pak
37 could not accurately hit at beyond 900 m, and although the Spanish did use the
German 88 mm anti-aircraft cannon in the anti-tank role,[39] they were not supplied in
large enough numbers to make an impact.[40]
The Nationalist army, under Francisco Franco, never truly found a solution to defeating
the T-26B, given the inferiority of armor supplied by his Italian and German allies.
Consequently, some of the most innovative answers to the T-26 were developed by
Spanish infantry. For example, the molotov cocktail would be invented during the
Spanish Civil War, as well as the satchel charge.[41] Despite the unprecedented superiority
of the T-26B its susceptibility to infantry and to infantry guns made a profound impact on
Soviet military thinkers of the time.[42]
Inter-war years
In 1938 the T-26B saw an additional upgrade to the C version which had its front armour
plate thickened to 25 mm of steel. This still proved to be insufficient against better anti-
tank weapons, and the tank was upgraded one more time. This time it manifested itself as
the T-26S and was completed after the T-26 performed ineffectually against Japanese
light tanks during the undeclared war between Japan and the Soviet Union in Mongolia.
After the Spanish Civil War the T-26 was used in large numbers during the Soviet-
Finnish Winter War in 1939. The poorly coordinated Soviet offensive ended in large
numbers of the tanks utilized being knocked out by Finnish anti-tank weapons and more
than 40 captured. Even more T-26 tanks would be captured during the offensive phase of
the Continuation War. The Finns also rearmed their Vickers 6-Ton tanks with the Soviet
45 mm gun and these would be re-designated as T-26Es and used by the Finnish Army
during the Continuation War. 75 T-26s and 19 rebuilt Vickers tanks continued in service
after the end of the Second World War.[43] The debacle in Finland persuaded the Soviet
Union to reassess the value of armour in an offensive war, but also made public serious
weaknesses in the Red Army's armoured divisions which were not corrected until after
the large-scale losses of 1941 against invading German armour.[44]
Prior to the Second World War the T-26 saw one last successful encounter against
Japanese tanks at Khalkhin Gol, under the command of Soviet General Georgi Zhukov.
Zhukov's offensive included 469 light tanks, most of which were T-26s. Infantry during
the offensive rode on the hulls of armour and armoured cars various times to reduce the
time it took to close with the enemy, which aided in co-operation between armour and
infantry.[45] Although the offensive against Japanese forces infiltrating Mongolia was an
unexpected success following poor-performance by the Red Army in Poland[46] and major
set-backs in Finland,[47] despite the ultimate Soviet victories in both cases, it became
apparent that the T-26 was obsolete against newer tanks, including the Japanese Type 97
Chi-Ha, the older Type 89 Chi-Ro and German tanks which were showcased in Poland,
such as the Panzer III and Panzer IV.[48] One of the largest faults of the tank was the
riveted armour, which was found to be too weak to protect against direct hits. This would
be corrected on the T-26S variant which replaced the riveted front plate with a thicker
welded plate.[49] The T-26S had an increase in armour thickness from 16 mm to a
maximum of 25 mm at 55 degrees on the upper glacis plate. The turret featured an
increase to 20 mm at 45 degrees sloping.[50] Unlike the T-26B in Spain, the T-26S used a
maximum of two machine guns, one of which was mounted in the rear.[51]
Soviet military developments
An anonymous British attaché to the Spanish Republic claimed, "The greatest caution
must be used in deducing general lessons from this war: a little adroitness and it will be
possible to use it to “prove” any preconceived theory."[52] His remarks are drawn into
context when taking into consideration Soviet tank developments during and after the
Spanish Civil War.
The 1937 purges of the Red Army claimed the life of General Tukhachevsky, one of the
most important theorists of armoured warfare of the inter-war period. With no major
proponents of Tukhachevsky's theories in a position to implement them, the advances he
had made in armoured strategy were lost.[citation needed] Based on observations from the
Spanish Civil War it was decided that armour was too unwieldy to successfully interact
and operate with infantry. Tanks moved too quickly for the infantry to accompany, and
there was no clear communications doctrine between tanks and infantry. Furthermore,
some infantry refused to accompany tanks and there was no clear training of Spanish
soldiers to correct these tactical inefficiencies. Republican tanks frequently fell to anti-
tank gunnery, due to the lack of infantry support, as there was no infantry to locate and
knock out enemy anti-tank positions that were hidden from the armour.[53] Republican
tanks rarely operated on the move in Spain since the radios often broke down, and the
majority of tanks simply didn't have radios. Due to these operational difficulties, many
old-school Soviet military leaders believed that tanks were not a worthwhile weapon of
war, and so the role of the tank was played down considerably.
It was only after the quick German success in Poland contrasted with Soviet set-backs in
the same country and the debacle in Finland, that Stavka and Stalin were persuaded to
introduce the T-34 into production to replace the light tanks, and to reform large
mechanized formations.[54] These provisions were both too little and too late, although not
all developments between April 1, 1939, and June 22, 1941, were negative; a commission
under the leadership of Soviet General Grigory Kulik oversaw a new reorganization of
the Soviet armoured force in December 1939.[55] It was found that the large mechanized
corps which had been proposed by Tukhachevsky was too unwieldy and hard to
coordinate due to the sheer bulk of armour[56] and the commission emphasized using tanks
for infantry support, as opposed to using them in stand-alone armoured divisions.
Therefore, Kulik planned for fifteen new motorized divisions to replace the Soviet
mechanized corps. By 1940, four of the fifteen had been created.[57]
Impressed by the German campaign of 1940 against France, the Soviet NKO changed
their original plans however and ordered the creation of nine mechanized corps on July 6,
1940. Between February and March 1941 another twenty would be ordered, and all larger
than those intended by Tukhachevsky. Although, on paper, by 1941 the Red Army's 29
mechanized corps had no less than 29,899 tanks, this proved to be a hopelessly inaccurate
account.[58] There were actually only 17,000 tanks available at the time, meaning several
of the new mechanized corps were under-strength, and the sheer majority of these were
older, less capable designs, including over 10,000 T-26 tanks.[59] By June 22, 1941 there
were only 1,475 T-34s and KV series tanks available to the Red Army, and these were
too dispersed along the front to provide enough mass for even local success.[60] For
example, the 3rd Mechanized Corps in Lithuania was formed up of a total of 460 tanks,
109 of these were newer KV-1s and T-34s. This division proved to be one of the lucky
few with a substantial number of newer tanks. However, the whole 4th Army was
composed of 520 tanks, all of which were the older T-26, compared to its authorized
strength of 1,031 newer medium tanks.[61] This problem was universal throughout the Red
Army's available armour. This fact played a crucial role in the defeats of the Red Army in
1941 at the hands of the German Armed Forces.[62]
During the Soviet-Finnish Winter War, the Soviets initially employed 2,514 tanks, a
number which increased to 6,541 by the end of the war.[63] Apart from the pure tank
brigades and regiments, which mainly consisted of heavy tanks, and lighter tanks like T-
26s and of the BT-type, the Soviet infantry divisions were also equipped with infantry
support tanks, mostly T-26s. Thus, the T-26 would become the most common tank of the
war.[64] The Finns on the other hand lacked modern tanks and had only a limited number
of effective 37 mm AT-guns to defend themselves against such.[65][66]
Heavier Soviet tanks, like the T-28 easily broke through the Finnish defence on the open
fields at Summa on the Karelian Isthmus, as the Finns lacked effective means of stopping
them. However, lighter tanks and supporting infantry were often stopped by determined
defences and therefore the heavy tank units lacked support and were forced to withdraw.
[67]
The Finnish terrain in Karelia proved unsuitable for Soviet tank tactics.[68] Together with
the poor military leadership at the time, the Soviets suffered from horrendous casualties
as a result. Having to stick to available roads, the stretched out columns were vulnerable
to the Finnish motti tactics. The smaller and more mobile Finnish units divided the Soviet
units and defeated them one by one. The Finns simply chose where and when to fight and
therefore concentrated their strengths to gain local tactical superiority, while smaller units
guarded other pockets. The lack of anti-tank guns forced the Finnish defence to improvise
means in order to stop Soviet armour. Often, Soviet tank crews were isolated until the
crews were forced to try escaping by foot through the forests. Other times, the tanks were
immobilized by Molotov cocktails or by knocking-out their tracks by using mines or
simply by blocking the sprocket with a block of wood. This enabled the Finns to capture
large amount of armoured vehicles and weapons almost intact - a welcomed gift for the
under-armed Finnish military.[69]
At the motti battle of Tolvajärvi, the Finns managed to capture 60 T-26s, 3 armoured cars
and a number of Komsomolets armoured tractors in this way.[70] A further 132 tanks and
12 armoured cars were captured at Lemetti. Given that the encircled unit was mostly
motorized the tanks captured were mostly BT-type and turned out to be almost
completely intact.[71]
Finnish soldiers inspecting an abandoned Soviet T-26 at Raate.
At the battles of Suomussalmi and Raate, the Soviet 163rd and 44th infantry divisions
lost all of their armour consisting of 86 tanks.[72] The Finns took more than 69 T-26 tanks
and 10 armoured cars, a number equal to the entire pre-war Finnish armoured force. Far
more important was the large amount of effective 45 mm anti-tank guns captured during
these battles, which enabled the Finns to defend against armoured vehicles more
effectively.[73] At Pelkosenniemi and Ilomantsi the Finns would capture a further 10
tanks.[74]
Altogether, the Finns captured around 288 tanks and thirty-five armoured cars during the
battles; most tanks turned out to be T-26s, BT-5s and BT-7s. 167 captured armoured
vehicles were rebuilt for use with Finnish tank units.[75] Of these, three OT-26s and fifty
T-26s were later repaired and taken into Finnish service. According to new Russian
sources, the Soviet Red Army lost 3,179 tanks during the Winter War - 1,904 tanks as
combat losses and 1,275 tanks as non-combat technical losses [irrecoverable losses from
them were 358 tanks, others were repaired].
In 1939, the Finnish armoured forces consisted of around thirty-two obsolete Renault FT-
17 tanks, some Vickers-Carden-Lloyd Mk. IVs and Model 33s, which were equipped
with machine guns, and 26 Vickers Armstrongs 6-ton tanks. The latter had been re-
equipped with 37 mm Bofors AT-guns after the outbreak of the war. Only 13 of these
tanks managed to get to the front in time to participate in the battles.[76]
At the Battle of Honkaniemi on February 26, 1940, the Finns employed their Vickers
tanks for the first - and only - time against Soviet armour during the Winter War. The
battle ended with Finnish defeat. Of the thirteen available Finnish Vickers 6-ton tanks
only six were in fighting condition and able to participate in the first assault on the Soviet
lines - to make matters worse, one of the tanks was forced to stop, unable to cross a wide
trench. The remaining five continued onwards a few hundred meters but ran into dozens
of Soviet tanks in the village of Honkaniemi. The Finnish tanks managed to knock out
three Soviet tanks but were soon themselves knocked-out.[77] In the skirmishes that
followed, the Finns lost two more Vickers tanks.[78]
The T-26 formed the backbone of the Red Army's tank force during the first months of
the German invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The Red Army
was equipped with 10,268 T-26 tanks of all models on June 1, 1941.[79] This and the lack
of coordination between different units of the Red Army influenced a very poor
performance of the Red Army against the Germans between June and August 1941. Even
in instances where Soviet commanders showed initiative, such as Soviet General
Kirponos counterstroke in the Southwest, Soviet forces were simply not coordinated
enough to stall the German advance, nor were their tanks comparable to the newer
generation of German armour, such as the Panzer III and Panzer IV.[80] By the end of
fighting along the central axis in August 1941, in preparation for the end of German
operations around Kiev and Leningrad, the majority of the Red Army's armour had been
destroyed or captured. Although the Germans themselves fielded various obsolete
designs, such as the Panzer I and Panzer II, their heavier armour was packed together to
provide enough mass to punch through Soviet front lines and exploit any breakthroughs
achieved. In instances where Soviet heavy and medium armour was available the German
offensive was many times stalled, as in the Soviet counterattack in front of Raseiniai,
Lithuania, on June 24, 1941, which was able to overrun an advance reconnaissance
detachment of the German 6th Panzer Division, forcing the divergence of the 1st Panzer
Division and stalling the offensive for a day.[81] By the end of the year most surviving
units of the T-26 had been reverted to other duties, including logistics, and were often
used as chassis for new tank surrogates.[82]
However, despite the fact that the majority of the Red Army's T-26 tanks had been
destroyed in the first months of the war with the Third Reich, T-26 tanks still saw combat
around Leningrad until at least 1944. There would also be T-26 tanks present during
Operation August Storm, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in March 1945. In this
operation the T-26 tank aided in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army.[83]
Many T-26s were captured by the Germans during the offensive. Most of the captured
tanks were captured without serious damage, a testament to existent mechanical problems
within the tank. Under German usage the T-26 was found to have severe clutch problems,
a hot steering apparatus and seized bearings. Several T-26Bs were used by the German
3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" as renamed Mistbiene tanks, or 'droneflies'. The T-
26B, redesignated as the T-26B 738(r.) was used extensively by the German Army. Many
T-26Cs were also used on the Eastern Front during the war by the Germans. Later in the
war, several T-26s of all versions were abandoned by their new German owners due to
the same severe mechanical defects which had caused their original capture. Many light
tanks were used as tractors to carry Pak guns and artillery guns, and there were also
instances where German T-26s were used to support infantry operations as well—these
vehicles were renamed the T-26 C740(r).[84]
There would be several replacement programs for the T-26 throughout the Second World
War. The original replacement light tank would be the T-50, adopted for the Red Army in
February 1941. Despite the fact that mass production was to start in the Leningrad Plant
No. 174 on January 1, 1941 the sophisticated T-50 saw several production problems.
Ultimately 50 T-50 tanks were assembled in Leningrad prior to the plant's removal and
movement to Omsk in August 1941. Efforts to renew production in Moscow failed,
although Plant No. 174 in Omsk managed to produce another 15 tanks before production
was switched to T-34s only.[85] The T-50's production failure at Moscow Plant No. 37 led
to the design of the T-60 light tank, an austere version of the T-50 heavily based on the
T-40 amphibious tank. Between July 1941 and early 1943, 5,839 T-60s were delivered to
the Red Army, of which 5,796 were accepted into active service.[86] Yet another
replacement was manifested as the T-70 tank which saw its beginnings in October 1941
as a project of the GAZ plant design bureau. The T-70 was largely based on the T-60 to
keep the two as similar as possible. Later, the T-70 would see a modernization effort,
known as the T-70M. 8,226 T-70s of all types would be constructed.[87] The final
replacement light tank was known as the T-80 light tank which was a new manifestation
of the T-70 with a thickened armor plate and a three-man crew. Eighty-five T-80s were
produced between late 1942 and early 1943.[88]
During the Continuation War, the Finns captured a further 76 T-26 tanks, besides a large
number of other types. Of these, 35 were fully repaired and sent to the armoured units, 21
were stored for later refurbishment, while 20 were scrapped. The T-26 remained the main
tank of the Finnish Armoured Division throughout the war, although it was started to be
replaced by German StuG IIIs from 1943. As noted above, 94 T-26 tanks remained in
service with the Finnish Army by 1945. Peak numbers in Finnish service occurred during
the summer of 1944, when the Finns kept up to 126 various T-26s, including 22 T-26Es,
2 T-26 m 1931s, 1 OT-26, 63 T-26 m 1933s, 32 T-26 m 1937s and 1939s, and 1 T-26 T.
Some of these tanks were kept as training tanks until 1959, when they were finally
phased out and replaced by newer British and Soviet tanks.[89]
Additionally, Franco's Spain kept captured T-26Bs as the backbone of the new Spanish
armoured division, the Brunete. After the end of the Spanish Civil War, Spain received
additional T-26 tanks from France which had been taken from retreating Popular forces
and interned in French warehouses. In 1942 the Spanish Army had 139 T-26Bs in
service.[90] After the end of the Second World War Spain had at least 116 T-26Bs in
active service, along with 20 Panzer IVs, 93 Panzer Is, 10 StuG IIIs, 60 CV-33s and
another 80 assorted machine gun carriers.[91] The T-26s were organized into two
battalions of 30 tanks each, along with a single Panzer I command tank, six other Panzer I
Ausf. As and a CV-33 for reconnaissance in each battalion. The T-26 were not be
replaced until 1953 when Spain and the United States signed an agreement for open
shipments of new military matériel to Spain. The first twelve M47 Patton tanks,
dedicated to replace the T-26, arrived at Cartagena in February 1954.[92]
60 T-26 light tanks were sold to Turkey in 1953, along with five T-27 tankettes, about 60
BA-6 armoured cars, and two T-28 medium tanks, to form the 1st Tank Regiment of the
2nd Cavalry Division at Luleburgaz.[93] Another 87 or 88 tanks were sold to China. An
unknown number, consisting of at least 2 T-26s of the first model, were sold to
Afghanistan during the same time period.[94][95]
Variants
Operators
Afghanistan: 2 T-26 (first model)
Republic of China: 88 T-26B (model 1933)
Finland: 126 T-26
Germany: as the Panzerkampfwagen T-26 737(r)
Soviet Union
Spain: 116 T-26B
Turkey: 60 T-26