Admin Law cases

I.

*Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service Commission GR NO. 47065,

June 26, 1940

FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner
Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been
engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting
passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and
Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public Service
Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC
granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply
also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration
with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed
a petition/ writ of certiorari.

ISSUES:
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission
-is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation
- constitutes undue delegation of powers

HELD:
The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and
constitutional because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called
subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation because of the growing
complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the
administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of
the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public
interests in a proper and suitable manner. The Certificate of Public
Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights
and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the
good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend,
modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the facts
and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard,
so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings. In addition, the
Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected
by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. When private property is affected with a public interest,
it ceased to be juris privati or private use only.
*US v Ang Tang Ho

Facts:
Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868
"An Act penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay,
rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution
and sale... thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent
of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor,
and making an appropriation for this purpose,"
Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should
be sold.
complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with
the sale of rice at an excessive price
Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one
ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater
than that fixed by
Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines,... he was
tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower
court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and
effect, in finding... the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing
the sentence.
the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919;
that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August,
1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and
that the... proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August,
1919.
The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council
of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not
specify or... define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or
how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force
and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself
has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the... order, but has
left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General to say
what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary
rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency
measure for the carrying out... the purposes of the Act.
Issues:
Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can
it delegate that power to another, and, if... so, was that power legally
delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative
power to the Governor-General?
Ruling:
By the Organic Law,-all legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the
power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be... delegated to
the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the
legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and
within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-
General to make rules and regulations to... carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is
valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define a crime, and
is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or
a... crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act
is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the
power to adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the
facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to... make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, arid the conferring an
authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in
all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature,... so that, in form and
substance
But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those
who were to act under such general provisions 'power to fill up the details' by
the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of
which could be punished... by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by
penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury done.
"That 'Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution.'
"That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to
any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a
fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government established by... the constitution.
"Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of
itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some
certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
"The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a
law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon
which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend."
A legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative officer power to
make a law, but it can, make a law with provisions that it shall go into effect
or be suspended in... its operation upon the ascertainment of a fact or state
of facts by an administrative officer or board.
after the passage of Act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any
price, even at a peso per "ganta,"... in the absence of a proclamation, it was
not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the
defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General... issued
the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to
sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price
was not a crime.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price
that the industrial or merchant may demand."
The law is a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and
different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and
delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here,... then, you would have a, delegation of
legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that
power to provincial treasurers and their deputies,... Act No. 2868 is a general
law and does not authorize the Governor-General to fix one price of rice in
Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him to fix the
price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law, which is... general and
uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice
fixed in the proclamation must be the same all over the Islands.
Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade or quality of the...
rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and
convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 571/2
kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and
says nothing about grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it
was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to
the sole discretion of the
Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for
enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn,"
Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation
should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was
committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the
Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not
say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the
defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that... fixed by Executive
Order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No, 2868, in so far as it
undertakes to authorize the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation
of the proclamation a crime, is... unconstitutional and void.
the question here presented is the constitutionality of a particular portion of
a statute, and... none of such matters is an argument for, or against, its
constitutionality.
As to the question here involved, the authority of the
Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and, corn
may be sold in the manner and under the conditions stated is a delegation of
legislative power in violation of the organic law.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged.

*Compania General v Board of Public Utility

Facts:
This is an appeal from, or a petition for review of, an order of the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands, requiring the petitioner
to file a detailed report of its finances and operations in the form set forth in
the petition.
The petitioner alleges that it is a foreign corporation organized under the
laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a common
carrier of passengers and merchandise by water; that on or about the 7th
day of June, 1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and
caused to be served on petitioner an order to show cause why petitioner
should not be required to present detailed annual reports respecting its
finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in
the form and containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the
petition; that after a hearing the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
dictated an order in the following terms: "The respondent is therefore
ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed
report of finances and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a
common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the
matters indicated in the model of annual report which accompanied the
order to show cause herein." The model referred to is made a part of this
opinion and may be found in an appendix thereto.

On its return to the order to show cause before the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners the petitioner denied the authority of the board to require
the report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied
on by said board as authority for such requirement was, if construed as
conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the
part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. The
petitioner also answered that the requirements of the board with respect to
the proposed report were "cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that
the preparation of the same would entail an immense amount of clerical
work."

The case coming here under the provision of section 37 of said Act No. 2307,
the petitioner raises the same questions that it presented to the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners in its answer to the order to show cause.

The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent to the case at hand,
reads as follows:

"Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in
writing, to require every public utility as herein defined:

* * * * * * *
"(e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such
form and containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by
order prescribe."
As is apparent at a glance the provision conferring authority on the board is
very general. It is also very comprehensive. It calls for a detailed report of
the finances and operations of the petitioning steamship company. That, it
would seem, covers substantially everything; for there is very little to a
steamship company but its finances and operations. It would have been
practically the same if the statute had given the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners power "to require every public utility to furnish annually a
detailed report." Such provision would have been but little broader and little
less general than the present provision. It is clear that a statute which
authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports
from 'public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof,
the general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall
proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of
the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect
to the public utilities to which it refers. Such a provision does not declare, or
set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to
it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or
control, or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and
equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly and
equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized
'the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the
board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in
question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its
powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute and without
laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be
directed, guided or applied.

In the case of Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. (1 Ohio
St., 77), the court, dealing with the question of whether a power is strictly
legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of the law,
said:

"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made."
This principle was applied in the case of Dowling vs. Lancashire Insurance
Co. (92 Wis., 63). In that case the statute provided that the insurance
commissioner shall prepare, approve and adopt a printed form of fire
insurance policy to conform as nearly as might be to that used in the State of
New York. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that to be a delegation of
legislative power saying:

"The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform
policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of
the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act
could not possibly be put in use, as an act in conformity to which all fire
insurance policies were required to be issued."
The court also said:

"The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in
all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details, in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed
fact or event."
In the case of Birdsall vs. Clark (73 N. 3f., 73), the court said:

"If discretion and judgment are to be exercised, either as to time or manner,

the body or officer intrusted with the duty must exercise it, and cannot
delegate it to any other officer or person."
See also King vs. Concordia Fire Insurance Co. (140 Mich., 268); O'Neil vs.
Fire Insurance Co. (166 Pa. St., 72) ; Anderson vs. Manchester Fire Assurance
Co. (59 Minn., 182).

In the case of State ex rel. Adams vs. Burdge (95 Wis., 390), a statute
authorizing1 the state board of health "to make rules and regulations, and to
take such measures as may in its judgment be necessary for the protection
of the people of the state from Asiatic cholera, or other dangerous
contagious diseases" and declaring that the term "dangerous and contagious
diseases," as used in the act, "shall be construed and understood to mean
such diseases as the state board of health shall designate as contagious and
dangerous to the public health," was held to "import and include an absolute
delegation of the legislative power over the entire subject here involved,"
and was therefore declared unconstitutional.

In the case of Merchants Exchange vs. Knott (212 Mo., 616), in declaring
unconstitutional, on the ground of delegation of legislative power, a statute
authorizing the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners to establish
state inspection of grain "at such places or in such territory * * * as in their
opinion may be necessary," the court said:

"It is obvious that the foregoing grant of power is given without statutory
landmark, compass, map, guide-post or corner-stone in one whit controlling
its exercise or prescribing its channel, or indicative of any certain intendment
of the legislative mind, beyond the mere grant. In essence it is the power of
pure and simple despotism."
Commenting on the statute, the court further said:

"True, the act was passed by the General Assembly, approved by the Chief
Executive and stands published as authenticated law, but to all intents and
purposes it is only a barren ideality, having such life as is thereafter
breathed into it from an unconstitutional source. No Missourian may know
whether it applies to him or his concerns, as a rule of civil conduct, or will
ever apply until in the 'opinion' of the commissioners it 'may be' considered
'necessary'.

"The General Assembly may not clip itself of one iota of its lawmaking power
by a voluntary delegation of any element of it by putting its constitutional
prerogatives, its conscience and wisdom, 'into commission'."
In the case of Schaezlein vs. Cabaniss (135 Cal., 466), the question before
the court was the validity of the following provision of the state law of
California;

"If in any factory or workshop any process or work is carried on by which

dust, filaments, or injurious gases are generated or produced that are liable
to be inhaled by the persons employed therein, and it appears to the
commissioner * * * that such inhalation could, to a great extent, be
prevented by the use of some mechanical contrivance, he shall direct that
such contrivance shall be provided, and within a reasonable time it shall be
so provided and used."
Another section of the same act made it a misdemeanor for any person to
violate any of the provisions of the act including those above quoted.
Respecting the validity of the act the court said:

"The manifest objection to this law is, that upon the commission has been
imposed not the duty to enforce a law of the legislature, but the power to
make a law for the individual, and to enforce such rules of conduct as he
may prescribe. It is thus arbitrary, special legislation, and violative of the
constitution."
The decision in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Goodrich
Transit Co. (224 U. S., 194) seems, by implication at least, to bear out the
theory on which we are deciding this case. The question there involved the
validity of an act authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to
prescribe the form of accounts, records and memorandums to be kept by
carriers, and to require such carriers to make annual reports to the
commission with respect to certain information defined in the act. One of the
questions raised by the steamship company was that section 20 constituted
an invalid delegation of legislative power to the commission. The Supreme
Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, but said:

"The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a

commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a
commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application
of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a
view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the
Congress. * * *

"In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has authorized the
commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in detail what
those reports shall contain. * * * In other words, Congress has laid down
general rules for the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the
carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we
think, is not a delegation of legislative authority."
In another part of the same decision the court said with reference to the
form of reports called for by the Interstate Commerce Commission:
"But such report is no broader than the annual report of such carriers, as
prescribed by section 20 of the Act."
See also Field vs. Clark (143 U. S., 649); State vs. Great Northern Ry. Co.
(100 Minn., 445).

The Attorney-General lays great stress on the case of Kansas City So. Ry. Co.
vs. United State (231 U. S., 423). That case, however, so far as it touched the
question of delegation of legislative power, was decided on the principles
governing the case of Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Goodrich Transit
Co., supra. Section 20 of the Act referred to in that and in the Goodrich case
sets out in detail the form which the accounts shall take and the matters
they shall contain, and even goes into considerable detail with regard to the
classification of the carriers' accounts. In that case the court said:

"It amounts, after all, to no more than laying down the general rules of action
under which the Commission shall proceed, and leaving it to the Commission
to apply those rules to particular situations and circumstances by the
establishment and enforcement of administrative regulations."
In the case at bar the provision complained of does not lay "down the
general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed," nor does
it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically
everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act,
how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.

We believe that the Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated

its powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in
violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. We believe that the
Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information
which the State wants but has authorized the board to obtain the information
which the board wants.

The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned to the Board
of Public Utility Commissioners with instructions to dismiss the proceeding.
So ordered.

*Asuncion v Yriarte

Facts:
the chief of the division of archives of the Executive Bureau... the respondent
refused to file the articles of incorporation... upon the ground that the object
of the corporation, as stated in the articles, was not lawful and that, in
pursuance of section 6 of Act No. 1459,... they were not registerable.
The proposed incorporators began an action in the Court of First Instance...
to compel the chief of the division of archives to receive and register said
articles of incorporation and to do any and all acts necessary for the
complete incorporation of the... persons named in the articles.
The court below found in favor of the defendant and refused to order the
registration of the articles mentioned, maintaining and holding that the
defendant, under the Corporation Law, had authority to determine both the
sufficiency of the form of... the articles and the legality of the object of the
proposed corporation.
Issues:
whether or not the chief of the division of archives has authority, under the
Corporation Law... to decide not only as to the sufficiency of the of the
articles, but also as to... the lawfulness of the purposes of the proposed
corporation.
whether or not the chief of the division of archives, who is the representative
thereof and clothed by it with authority to deal with articles of incorporation
offered for registration, is subject to... mandamus in the performance of his
duties.
whether or not the purposes of the corporation as stated in the articles of
incorporation are lawful within the meaning of the Corporation Law.
Ruling:
Section 6 of the Corporation Law reads in part as follows:
"Five or more persons, not exceeding fifteen, a majority of whom are
residents of the Philippine Islands, may form a private corporation for any
lawful purpose by filing with the division of archives, patents, copyrights, and
trademarks of the Executive Bureau articles of... incorporation duly executed
and acknowledged before a notary public,... Simply because the duties of an
official happen to be ministerial, it does not necessarily follow that he may
not, in the administration of his office, determine questions of law.
it is the duty of the when articles of incorporation are presented... for
registration, to determine whether the objects of the corporation expressed
in the articles are lawful.
We do not believe that, simply because articles of incorporation presented
for registration are perfect in form, the division of archives must accept and
register them and... issue the corresponding certificate of incorporation no
matter what the purpose of the corporation may be as expressed in the
articles.
It seems to us to be not only the right but the duty of the division of archives
to determine the lawfulness of the objects and purposes of the corporation
before it issues a certificate of incorporation.
the division of archives, through its officials, has authority to determine not
only the sufficiency as to form of the articles of incorporation offered for
registration, but also the lawfulness of the purposes of the corporation as
stated in... those articles... he may be mandamused if he act in violation of
law or if he refuses, unduly, to comply with the law.
While we have held that defendant has power to pass upon the lawfulness of
the purposes of the proposed corporation and that he may... determine the
question of law whether or not those purposes are lawful... this does not
necessarily mean, as we have already intimated, that his duties are not...
ministerial.
his duties are ministerial and that he has no authority to exercise discretion
in receiving and registering articles of incorporation. He may exercise
judgment that is, the judicial... function in the determination of the question
of law referred to, but he may not use discretion.
If he err in the determination of that question and refuse to... file articles
which should be filed under the law, that decision is subject to review and
correction
Discretion, it may be said generally, is a faculty conferred upon a court or
other official by which he may decide a question either way and still be right.
The power conferred upon the division of archives with respect to the...
registration of articles of incorporation is not of that character. It is of the
same character as the determination of a lawsuit by a court upon the merits.
If, therefore, the defendant erred in determining the question presented
when the articles were offered for registration, then that error will be
corrected by this court in this action and he will be compelled to register the
articles as offered.
The object of the proposed corporation, as appears from the articles offered
for registration, is to make of the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel a corporation
which will become the owner of and have the right to control and administer
any property belonging to the municipality... of Pasig found within the limits
of that barrio. This clearly cannot be permitted. Otherwise municipalities as
now established by law could be deprived of the property which they now
own and administer.
This would disrupt, in a sense, the municipalities of the Islands by dividing
them into a series of smaller municipalities entirely... independent of the
original municipality.
What the law does not permit cannot be obtained by indirection. The object
of the proposed corporation is clearly repugnant to the provisions of the
Municipal Code and the governments of municipalities as they have been
organized thereunder.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed

II. Creation, Abolition and Reorganization of Administrative Agencies

*Crisostomo v Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of
Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of
the Philippines on July 17, 1974. During his incumbency as president of the
PCC, two administrative cases were filed against petitioner, which were filed
with the Office of the President, and were subsequently referred to the Office
of the Solicitor General for investigation. On October 22, 1976, petitioner was
preventively suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge on
November 10, 1976, and then as Acting President on May 13, 1977. On April
1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS. Mateo continued
as the head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting
President and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of six (6)years. On
July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment
acquitting petitioner of the charges against him. Pursuant to the provisions
of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and under which the accused has been suspended
by this Court in an Order dated October 22, 1976, said accused was ordered
reinstated to the position of President of the Philippine College of Commerce,
now known as the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, from which he
has been suspended. By virtue of said reinstatement, he is entitled to
receive the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him. The bail bonds filed by the accused for his provisional
liberty in these cases are hereby cancelled and released. On February 12,
1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for execution of
the judgment, particularly the part ordering his reinstatement to the position
of president of the PUP and the payment of his salaries and other benefits
during the period of suspension. The motion was granted and a partial writ of
execution was issued by the trial court on March 6, 1992. On March 26,
1992, however, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as
acting president of the PUP, following the expiration of the term of office of
Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of
the five nominees considered by the President of the Philippines for the
position. The sheriff stated that he had executed the writ by installing
petitioner as President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not vacate the
office as he wanted to consult with the President of the Philippines first. This
led to a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. Petitioner assumed the office of
president of the PUP. On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the
Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the orders
and the writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also asked for a
temporary restraining order. On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from
acting as president of the PUP pursuant to the reinstatement orders of the
trial court. On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision to set aside the orders and writ of reinstatement issued
by the trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner accruing
after the conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of
salaries and benefits was limited to those accruing from the time of
petitioner’s suspension until the conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The case
was remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amounts due and
payable to petitioner. Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No.
1341, which converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He
contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would
have specified that the PCC was being "abolished" rather than "converted"
and that if the PUP was intended to be a new institution, the law would have
said it was being "created." Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a
continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be reinstated
to his former position as president.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conversion of the PCC into PUP abolished the PCC

RULING:
No. In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be explained,
reinstatement is no longer possible because of the promulgation of P.D. No.
1437 by the President of the Philippines on June 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1341 did
not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce
into what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same
way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the
Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce.
What took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the
expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and
organization. As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to
abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it with
another one, the lawmaking authority says so. But the reinstatement of
petitioner to the position of president of the PUP could not be ordered by the
trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated
fixing the term of office of presidents of state universities and colleges at six
(6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and authorizing the
President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbents who were
not reappointed. RATIO: When the purpose is to abolish a department or an
office or an organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking
authority says so. What took place was a change in academic status of the
educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its
name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its
structure and organization.

*PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO

ANIMALS vs. COA. G.R. No. 169752 September 25, 2007

FACTS:

The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years
ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine
Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of
animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner,
as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to
cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine
Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any
way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.
At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law,
Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the
Corporation Law and the constitution of the SEC.
For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and
enforcing laws for the protection of animals, the petitioner was initially
imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal
welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines
imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related
thereto.
Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to
retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws
were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the cruel treatment of
animals is now an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes,
which the Government is duty bound to enforce;
When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the
reason that they are a private entity and not under the said commission. It
argued that COA covers only government entities. On the other hand the
COA decided that it is a government entity.
ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.

RULING:

YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test” cannot
be applied. Essentially, the “charter test” provides that the test to
determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or
private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of
a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law?
Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its
provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, and are
compulsory members of the GSIS.
And since the “charter test” had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution
and not earlier, it follows that the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which
was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905.
Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. All statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be
resolved against the retrospective effect.
Second, a reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to
control or supervision by any agency of the State, unlike GOCCs. No
government representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner.
Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined
voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and
may exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such
as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal,
and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner
shall be managed or operated by its officers “in accordance with its by-laws
in force.”
Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by
the SSS at the latter’s initiative, and not through the GSIS, which should be
the case if the employees are considered government employees. This is
another indication of petitioner’s nature as a private entity.
Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a “body politic”
because its primary purpose is to secure the protection and welfare of
animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good. This argument, is not
tenable. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public
interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public
corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private although its charter
contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the public
good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public
corporations, which are private corporations that render public service,
supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While
purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required
by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these
corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water
supply corporations and transportation companies. It must be stressed that
a quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but the
qualifying factor is the type of service the former renders to the public: if it
performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.
Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot
be taken as a safe guide, for the fact is that almost all corporations are
nowadays created to promote the interest, good, or convenience of the
public. A bank, for example, is a private corporation; yet, it is created for a
public benefit. Private schools and universities are likewise private
corporations; and yet, they are rendering public service. Private hospitals
and wards are charged with heavy social responsibilities. More so with all
common carriers. On the other hand, there may exist a public corporation
even if it is endowed with gifts or donations from private individuals.
The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or
private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State.
If the corporation is created by the State as the latter’s own agency or
instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then
that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the
above test, provinces, chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify
public corporations. They are created by the State as its own device and
agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works.
Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner
requires the latter to render periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose
functions have been inherited by the President, the petitioner is, therefore, a
government instrumentality.
This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all
corporations owe their very existence and powers to the State, the
reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature,
whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporations—as creatures
of the State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate the
activities of a corporation to determine whether it acted within its powers. In
other words, the reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the
State may see to it that its creature acted according to the powers and
functions conferred upon it.

*Buklod v Zamora
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the
petitioners seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 191 and Executive
Order No. 223 on the ground that they were issued by the Office of the
President with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of their
constitutional right to security of tenure.
FACTS:
The Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) was created as
part of the structural organization of the Ministry of Finance through the
issuance of Executive Order No. 127 by former President Corazon Aquino.
The EIIB was tasked to: evaluate intelligence reports, gather evidence on
illegal activities affecting the national economy and aid in the prosecution of
cases; coordinate with external agencies in monitoring financial and
economic activities of persons or entities which may adversely affect
national financial interest; provide for the guidelines in the conduct of
intelligence and investigation operations; and perform such other
appropriate functions. The EIIB was assigned to primarily conduct anti-
smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 225 issued by former president
Aquino. Subsequently, former President Joseph Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 191 ordering the deactivation of the EIIB and the transfer of its
functions to the Bureau of Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation
on the ground that: the designated functions of the EIIB are also being
performed by the other existing agencies of the government; and that there
is a need to constantly monitor the overlapping of functions among these
agencies. Executive Order No. 196 was issued creating the Presidential Anti-
Smuggling Task Force Aduana. He also issued Executive Order No. 223
whereby all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein were
separated from the service pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting
to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present case invoking the court’s power of
judicial review of Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223. Petitioners contend that
the issuance of the said executive orders is: (a) a violation of their right to
security of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they were not actually
intended to make the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task
Force

Aduana the functions of which are essentially and substantially the same as
that of EIIB; and (c) a usurpation of the power of Congress to decide whether
or not to abolish the EIIB. On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains
that: (a) the President enjoys the totality of the executive power provided
under Sections 1 and 7, Article VII of the Constitution, thus, he has the
authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223; (b) the said executive
orders were issued in the interest of national economy, to avoid duplicity of
work and to streamline the functions of the bureaucracy; and (c) the EIIB was
only deactivated and not abolished.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the President has the authority to carry out reorganization
in any branch or agency of the executive department.
2. Whether or not the reorganization in this case is valid.

RULING:
1. Yes. The President is empowered by the Administrative Code to validly
reorganize his office even without congressional authority in order to achieve
economy and efficiency. The general rule has always been that the power to
abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the
legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A
public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority
of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it
may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The
exception is that, as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him
to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant
him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. In the whereas
clause of Executive Order No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his
authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745, the General
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999. It provides: Sec. 77. Organized
Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of
the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any
department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational
structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act. The
Supreme Court said that the above provision recognizes the authority of the
President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency
under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section
78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are
mandated to conduct actual streamlining and productivity improvement in
agency organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or
Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.

Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987, the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and
in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. The EIIB is a bureau
attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the
President. Hence, it is subject to the President’s continuing authority to
reorganize.

2. Yes. The reorganization is valid. The Solicitor General invoked the

distinction between deactivation and abolition. To deactivate means to
render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning
personnel, while to abolish means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or
destroy completely. Abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office
wholly and permanently. While in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the
same is not true in deactivation where the office continues to exist, albeit
remaining dormant or inoperative. Deactivation and abolition are both
reorganization measures. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department is concerned, the President’s power of control may
justify him to inactivate the function of a particular office or certain law may
grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measure. An
examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of
EIIB and the creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was
not for the purpose of removing the EIIB employees, but to achieve the
ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While Task Force
Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does not entail
expense to the government. Firstly, there is no employment of new
personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196 provides that the technical,
administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of people who
are already in the public service, they being employees of other existing
agencies. Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of
military men under the direct control and supervision of the President as
base of the government’s anti-smuggling campaign. The idea is to encourage
the utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the already existing
departments instead of maintaining an independent office with a whole set
of personnel and facilities. And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget
appropriation of the government that the creation of the Task Force Aduana
was especially intended to lessen EIIB’s expenses. Reorganizations in this
jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that
event, no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. If the abolition, which is nothing else but a separation or
removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of
tenure, otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes and whatever
abolitio is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there
is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.

In the present case, petitioners’ right to security of tenure is not violate

because the abolition of EIIB within the competence of a legitimate body is
done in good faith and suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is
neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Hence, the petition was
denied for lack of merit.

*Bagaoisan v National Tobacco Administration

Facts
The petitioner was terminated from their position in the National Tobacco
Administration as a result of the executive order issued by then president
Estrada which mandates for the stream lining of the national tobacco
administration, a government agency under the department of agriculture.
The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the civil service commission to
recall the Organization Structure And Staffing Pattern (OSSP). Petitioner all
file a petition for certiorari with prohibition an mandamus with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction and a temporary restraining order with the
regional trial court of Batak to prevent the respondent from enforcing the
notice of termination and from ousting the petitioners in their respective
offices. The regional trial court issued an order ordering the National Tobacco
Administration to appoint the petitioner to the OSSP to position similar to the
one that they hold before. The National Tobacco Administration appealed to
the court of appeals who reversed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether or not, the reorganization of the national tobacco administration is
valid true issuance of executive orderby the president.

Held
According to the supreme court, the president has the power to reorganized
an office to achieve simplicity ,economy and efficiency as provided under
executive order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which provides that
activities of executive agencies may be scaled down if it is no longer
essential for the delivery of public service.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and the
Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of
judgment be made in due course. No costs.

*Domingo v Zamora

Facts:
Pres. Estrada issued EO No. 81 transferring the sports development
programs and activities of the DECS to the PSC. DECS Sec.
Gonzales then issued memoranda reassigning remaining BPESS staff to
other offices within the DECS. The petitioners were among the
reassigned staff, and they argued that the EO constitutes undue
legislation and violates their right to security of tenure. However,
while the case was pending, the congress enacted RA No. 9155 which
expressly abolished the
BPESS and provides that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC shall
be retained by the DECS. The SC then dismissed the case for being
moot and academic, but explained that the assailed EO was valid.
Doctrine: EO No. 292 expressly grants the President continuing
authority to reorganize the Office of the President, i.e., power to
reorganize, to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. FACTS: 1. This
is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify EO No.
811 and DECS Memoranda.2 2. Pres. Estrada issued the assailed EO
which transferred the sports development programs and activities of
the DECS3 to the PSC.4 DECS Sec. Gonzales then issued the DECS
Memoranda which reassigned all remaining BPESS5 personnel (people
who were not transferred to the PSC) to other offices within the DECS. 1

Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of

Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and
Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports 2 Memoranda Nos. 01592
to 94 3 Department of Education, Culture and Sports (now called Department
of Education) 4 Philippine Sports Commission 5 Bureau of Physical Education
and School Sports

Petitioners were among the reassigned personnel. They argue that the
EO is unconstitutional for violating the principle of separation of
powers-- as it constitutes undue legislation by Pres. Estrada-- and
their right to security of tenure. During the pendency of the case, RA
No. 9155,6 which expressly abolished the BPESS, was enacted (NOTE:
this made the undue legislation issue moot and academic). It provides
that: a. all functions, programs and activities of the DECS related to
sports competition shall be transferred to the PSC; b. whereas the
Program for school sports and physical fitness shall remain part of the
basic education curriculum. The RA also provides that the personnel of
the BPESS, presently detailed with the
PSC, are hereby transferred to the PSC without loss of rank, including the
plantilla positions they occupy, while all others shall be retained by the
DECS (NOTE: this solves the security of tenure issue).

ISSUE:
1. W/N the EO constitutes undue legislation by the President.

Ruling:
NO
RATIO: 1. The SC dismissed the petition for
being moot and academic because of the enactment of RA No. 9155,
but they nonetheless explained that the EO was valid. 2. EO No. 2927
expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the
Office of the President8 to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
3. Under EO 292, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the
Executive Branch; but even if the DECS is not part of the Office of
the President, Sec. 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer Governance of
Basic Education Act of 2001 Administrative Code of 1987 8 Sec. 31 of EO No.
292 provides that the President may take any of the following actions: 1.
Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; 2.
Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; 3. and Transfer any agency
under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well
as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or
Agencies any function
or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President. On the other hand,
the charter of PSC provides that it’s attached to the Office of the
President. Hence, the President has the authority to transfer the
functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports
development to the PSC, thus making EO No. 81 a valid presidential
issuance. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the
President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and
policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the
President.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: 1. The President’s power to reorganize the Office

of the President under Sec. 31 (2) and (3) of EO No. 292 should be
distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of
the President Proper under Sec. 31 (1) of the same issuance. 2. Under
Sec. 31 (1), the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring
functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Sec. 31 (2) and
(3), the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the Office of
the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is
limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of
the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa. 3. This
distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees.
The abolition of an office in good faith necessarily results in the
employees cessation in office, but in such event there is no dismissal
or separation because the office itself ceases to exist. On the other
hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the
employees cessation in office because his office continues to exist
although in another department, agency or office.
*Liban v Gordon

FACTS:

Respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration on a Supreme Court

decision which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and that the charter
creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and
the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.

The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a
private corporation. Respondent takes exception to the second part of the
ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC
as a private corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality
was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the
constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.

ISSUE: Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of
the PNRC statute?

HELD: In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised
in the issue of standing. As such, the Court should not have declared certain
provisions of such as unconstitutional. On the substantive issue, the PNRC is
sui generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the Constitution wants to
prevent Congress from creating. First, the PNRC is not organized for profit. It
is an organization dedicated to assist victims of war and administer relief to
those who have been devastated by calamities, among others. It is entirely
devoted to public service. It is not covered by the prohibition since the
Constitution aims to eliminate abuse by the Congress, which tend to favor
personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created in order to participate in the
mitigation of the effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva Convention. The
creation of the PNRC is compliance with international treaty obligations.
Lastly, the PNRC is a National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is
not like government instrumentalities and GOCC.

The PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed

to local law regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it was improper
for the Court to have declared certain portions of the PNRC statute as
unconstitutional. However, it is the stand of Justice Carpio that there is no
mandate for the Government to create a National Society to this effect. He
also raises the fact that the PNRC is not sui generis in being a private
corporation organized for public needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that the
PNRC is neither private or governmental, hence it was within the power of
Congress to create.
It has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Court should exercise
judicial restraint when it comes to issues of constitutionality where it is not
the lis mota of the case.

Separation of Powers In re: Manzano [A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5,

1988]

IN DEFERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, JUDICIAL

OFFICERS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO BE APPOINTED TO POSITIONS PERFORMING
NON-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. - Under the Constitution, the members of the
Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section
12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in
the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges
administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in
his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably
sets forth: "While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not
to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial
in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain
departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to
decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass
on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to
the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the
maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less."
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City
Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the
structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication
of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they
are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City
Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but
only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
their judicial duties.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs Court of Appeals and Davao Pilots Association
GR No. 116356, 29 June 1998, J. Panganiban

FACTS: Private respondent Davao Pilots Association filed a complaint against

petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. for sum of money, alleging that
petitioner has unpaid fees for pilotage services rendered by respondent.
Petitioner disputed the claims of respondent by assailing the constitutionality
of Executive Order 1088, from which respondent based its claims. It
maintains that rates of pilotage fees should be based on circulars issued by
the Philippine Ports Authority since it has been given the power to set the
rates by virtue of PD 857.The lower court ruled in favor of respondent and
this decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether EO 1088 is unconstitutional. RULING:
EO 1088 is valid. The Court adopts its pronouncement in Philippine
Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals: “…
E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without
withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease
rates, charges or fees. The reason is because EO 1088 is not meant simply to
fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of
pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted
rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports. xxx xxx xxx We
conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound
to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not
decrease them below those mandated by EO 1088…” Because the PPA
circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective.
"Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." An
administrative agency, like PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the
law or not. Its duty is to enforce it. Thus, if there is any conflict between the
PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is denied
and the decision of the CA is affirmed

Philam v Arnaldo G.R. No. 76452 July 26, 1994

Facts: One Ramon Paterno complained about the unfair practices committed
by the company against its agents, employees and consumers. The
Commissioner called for a hearing where Paterno was required to specify
which acts were illegal. Paterno then specified that the fees and charges
stated in the Contract of Agency between Philam and its agents be declared
void. Philam, on the other hand, averred that there Paterno must submit a
verified formal complaint and that his letter didn’t contain information Philam
was seeking from him. Philam then questioned the Insurance Commission’s
jurisdiction over the matter and submitted a motion to quash. The
commissioner denied this. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the
resolution of the legality of the Contract of Agency falls within the jurisdiction
of the Insurance Commissioner. Held: No. Petition granted. Ratio: According
to the Insurance code, the Insurance Commissioner was authorized to
suspend, directors, officers, and agents of insurance companies. In general,
he was tasked to regulate the insurance business, which includes: (2) The
term "doing an insurance business" or "transacting an insurance business,"
within the meaning of this Code, shall include (a) making or proposing to
make, as insurer, any insurance contract; (b) making, or proposing to make,
as surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely
incidental to any other legitimate business or activity of the surety; (c) doing
any kind of business, including a reinsurance business, specifically
recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within the
meaning of this Code; (d) doing or proposing to do any business in substance
equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the
provisions of this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2[2]) The contract of agency
between Philamlife and its agents wasn’t included with the Commissoner’s
power to regulate the business. Hence, the Insurance commissioner wasn’t
vested with jurisidiction under the rule “expresio unius est exclusion
alterius”. The respondent contended that the commissioner had the quasi-
judicial power to adjudicate under Section 416 of the Code. It stated:

The Commissioner shall have the power to adjudicate claims and complaints
involving any loss, damage or liability for which an insurer may be
answerable under any kind of policy or contract of insurance, or for which
such insurer may be liable under a contract of suretyship, or for which a
reinsurer may be used under any contract or reinsurance it may have
entered into, or for which a mutual benefit association may be held liable
under the membership certificates it has issued to its members, where the
amount of any such loss, damage or liability, excluding interest, costs and
attorney's fees, being claimed or sued upon any kind of insurance, bond,
reinsurance contract, or membership certificate does not exceed in any
single claim one hundred thousand pesos. This was, however, regarding
complaints filed by the insured against the Insurance company. Also, the
insurance code only discusses the licensing requirements for agents and
brokers. The Insurance Code does not have provisions governing the
relations between insurance companies and their agents. Investment
Planning Corporation of the Philippines v. Social Security Commission- “that
an insurance company may have two classes of agents who sell its insurance
policies: (1) salaried employees who keep definite hours and work under the
control and supervision of the company; and (2) registered representatives,
who work on commission basis.” The agents under the 2nd sentence are
governed by the Civil Code laws on agency. This means that the regular
courts have jurisdiction over this category.

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989

FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year
exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to
request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to
them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return
to the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.

RULING: Yes According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The
phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power
although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the
President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16),
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17),
power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making
power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section
22), informing power (Section 23). The Constitution may have grant powers
to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

Pelaez vs. Auditor General Digest G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

Facts: From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds
thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive
orders.

Issue: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this
power has been vested in the legislative department.

Held: Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains: “The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power
than what was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio
and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or
any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

Tatad vs Secretary of Energy G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997 Petitioner:

Francis Tatad Respondents: The Secretary of the Department of Energy and
the Secretary of the Department of Finance

Facts: In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through

the enactment of R.A. No. 7638) to control energy-related government
activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180 (Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in pursuance to the deregulation of
the power and energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any
person or entity was allowed to import and market crude oil and petroleum
products, and to lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream
oil facilities. Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since the imposition of tarrif violates the equal
protection clause and bars the entry of others in the oil industry business.
Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the
constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be
expressed in its title. In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel
Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights
Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition and Sanlakas argued that R.A.
No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is unconstitutional because it: (1) gives
undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of
Energy by not providing a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392, an order declaring
the implementation of the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, is
arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged
depletion of the Oil Price Stabilization Plan- a condition not found in R.A. No.
8180; and (3) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the
formation of a de facto cartel among Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of
constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of
trade and unfair competition. Respondents, on the other hand, declares the
petitions not justiciable (cannot be settled by the court) and that the
petitioners have no locus standi since they did not sustain direct injury as a
result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

Issues: 1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional. 2. Whether or not

E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable. 3. Whether or not Section 5 of
R.A. no. 8180 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. 4. Whether
or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power.
Held: 1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19, Article
XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of
trade and unfair competition. The deregulation act only benefits Petron, Shell
and Caltex, the three major league players in the oil industry. 2. Yes,
Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore
considered void. The depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors enumerated
in R.A. No. 8180 to be considered in declaring full deregulation of the oil
industry. Therefore, the executive department, in its declaration of E.O. No.
392, failed to follow faithfully the standards set in R.A. No. 8180, making it
void. 3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1), Article
VI of the Constitution. A law having a single general subject indicated in the
title may contain any number of provisions as long as they are not
inconsistent with the foreign subject. Section 5 providing for tariff differential
is germane to the subject of the deregulation of the downstream industry
which is R.A. No 8180, therefore it does not violate the one title-one subject
rule. 4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of legislative power. The tests to determine the validity of
delegation of legislative power are the completeness test and the sufficiency
test. The completeness test demands that the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions such that when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is
enforce it. The sufficiency test demand an adequate guideline or limitation in
the law to delineate the delegate’s authority. Section 15 provides for the
time to start the full deregulation, which answers the completeness test. It
also laid down standard guide for the judgement of the President- he is to
time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency test. Decision: The
petitions were granted. R.A. No. 8180 was declared unconstitutional and E.O.
No. 372 void.

Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372)

Facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional

Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its
"Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to
take the licensure examinations in accountancy: No examinee shall attend
any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall
receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination
day including examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall
be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and
Regulations of the Commission. On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all
reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own
behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ
of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from
enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21,
1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to
enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the
lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No.
105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent
PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
petition was granted.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held: CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal
branches. They relied heavily on the case of National Electrification
Administration vs. Mendoza where the Court held that a Court of First
Instance cannot interfere with the orders of SEC, the two being a co-equal
branch.

SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that
the reason why the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not
interfere with the orders of SEC was that this was provided for by the law.
Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling
was specifically limited to the SEC. The respondent court erred when it place
he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for the next
course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the
PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office of
the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our
jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be
reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has
jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its
resolution. As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution
has a commendable purpose which is to preserve the integrity and purity of
the licensure examinations, the resolution is unreasonable in that an
examinee cannot even attend and review class, briefing, conference or the
like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college
or university, or any review center. The unreasonableness is more obvious in
that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without ill
motives will be barred from taking future examinations. Resolution No. 105 is
not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees’ right
to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on
the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful. Another evident
objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of
the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that
review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass
the examination. Unless the means and methods of instruction are clearly
found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools
and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. The
enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged
leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least
minimized. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the
source of such leakages and stop it right there. The decision of the CA was
REVERSE and SET ASIDE.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals [G.R. No. L-52306.
October 12, 1981]

Facts: During the period pertinent to this case, petitioner corporation was
engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired
from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the
Philippines for which petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of
30%of one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax
Code, the Commissioner issued General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto,
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR
30% of ½ of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in
trade or business in the Philippines. The last year that the company withheld
taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431
amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to
35% and revising the tax basis from “such amount” referring to rents, etc. to
“gross income.” In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment
and demand for deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968.
The company requested for reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not
act upon.

Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General

Circular V-334, may be retroactively applied.

Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no

retroactive application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to
taxpayers. Herein, the prejudice the company of the retroactive application
of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971,
or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes
under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner
to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after
1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no longer
in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had
already remitted all film rentals and had no longer control over them when
the new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are
concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.